

# American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

Vol. LVI

March, 1962

No. 1

Deviation Control .....	Zbigniew Brzezinski .....	5
<i>Politics and Strategy</i>		
The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain .....	Laurence W. Martin .....	23
Congressional Innovation and Intervention .....	Raymond H. Dawson .....	42
Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives .....	William H. Riker and Donald Niemi .....	58
Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960 ...	Andrew R. Baggeley .....	66
<i>Two Views of the Supreme Court</i>		
Deeds Without Doctrines: Civil Rights in the 1960 Term of the Supreme Court .....	Robert G. McCloskey .....	71
The 1960 Term: A Psychological Analysis .....	Glendon Schubert .....	90
Two Theorems on <i>Ceteris Paribus</i> .....	Franklin M. Fisher and Albert Ando .....	108
Positive Liberty, 1880-1914 .....	David Nicholls .....	114
<i>Editorial Notes</i>		
Toward a Definition of Editorial Policy for the Review ..	Harvey C. Mansfield .....	129
Toward a Definition of Book Review Policy .....	Avery Leiserson .....	139
Communications to the Editor .....		141
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography .....	Thomas H. Eliot (ed.) ...	143
News and Notes .....	Ralph A. Straetz (ed.) ...	233

(For list of book reviews, see page 143)

Published quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

IV

## MAJOR GOVERNMENTS OF MODERN EUROPE

Herman Finer, University of Chicago. "... an admirable text for courses in Comparative Government. It is surely the most readable and the most up-to-date of textbooks in this area ... it is always refreshing to see so able a writer and scholar as Herman Finer making completely clear what his judgments are instead of hiding them under a bushel in the name of 'objectivity'." Frederick L. Schuman, Williams College, 1960; Second Printing, 1962. 736 pp. \$8.25

## AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Vassar College. "... a sound and lucidly written text which can be strongly recommended ... full of excellent and important up-to-date empirical material ... Crabb is generally clear and organizes his material well, and the reader has something to get his teeth into."—H. S. Wolfsohn, *The Austrian Journal of Politics and History*, May, 1961. 1960. 544 pp. \$6.90.

---

### *Other books of interest*

#### HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE

Paul P. Van Riper, Cornell University. The standard reference work; belongs in every professional library. 588 pp. \$7.50

#### LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A Sociological Interpretation

Philip Selznick, University of California, Berkeley. Valuable as a corollary text for public administration and business administration courses. 162 pp. \$4.00

#### HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL POLITICS

Paul P. Van Riper, Cornell University. For courses in political parties, American government, political behavior, or local and state government. 356 pp. Paper, \$4.00

---

Row-Peterson also published the text materials for Continental Classroom:

\*AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Structure, Problems, and Policies. By Peter H. Odegard, Hans H. Baerwald, et al. \$4.00

\*AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Readings and Documents. Peter H. Odegard and Victor G. Rosenblum, editors. \$2.50

\*AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Second Semester Study Guide. By Peter H. Odegard. \$1.00

Examination copies available upon request to teachers of the appropriate courses.

### ROW, PETERSON AND COMPANY

Publishers of Good Books in Evanston, Illinois, and Elmsford, New York

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



## THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO and Related Documents

40

**Dan N. Jacobs, Miami University, Editor.** In the Second Edition, Professor Jacobs has added the Program of CPSU, first published in draft form on July 30, 1961, and here included in final form as ratified by the Party Congress XXII on October 31, 1961.

The documents in the original edition, all of which are still included, are: The New Communist Manifesto of 1960, Khrushchev's "secret" address to the Party Congress XX, Lenin's Testament with the codicil, the original Communist Manifesto, The 1957 Declaration of the Communist and workers' parties delegates, Mao's "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom" speech, and extracts from Edvard Kardelj's "Socialism and War." *Second Edition, 256 pp. Paper, \$1.90*

---

## POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT

**Loren P. Beth, University of Massachusetts.** An introduction to the study of constitutional law, this book emphasizes the things that political science students should know about our judiciary: the role it plays in our political system, the reasons why it has been given such a role, and how it performs. Primarily useful as a supplement to the usual case or text materials used in the constitutional law course, and may also be used as supplementary reading in other courses. *About 192 pp. Probably \$2.00. Ready in March, 1962.*

---

## THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE

**Benjamin Munn Ziegler, Amherst College.** A collection of thirty-seven land-mark decisions of the Supreme Court, touching all phases of the relationships between government and business. Concisely excised opinions, clearly introduced. *About 288 pp. Probably \$2.40.*

---

Examination copies available upon request to teachers of the appropriate courses.  
Write for a copy of Row-Peterson's current College Catalog.

---

**ROW, PETERSON AND COMPANY**  
Publishers of Good Books in Evanston, Illinois, and Elmsford, New York

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

*Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association*

## EDITORIAL BOARD

- HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Managing Editor, Ohio State University*  
WALLACE S. SAYRE, *Associate Editor, Columbia University (on leave)* DWIGHT WALDO, *University of California Berkeley (at Bologna, Italy)*  
SAMUEL H. BEER, *Associate Editor, Harvard University* HAROLD STEIN, *University of Michigan*  
ALEXANDER HEARD, *University of North Carolina*  
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University* JOHN D. LEWIS, *Oberlin College*

## EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

- THOMAS H. ELIOT, *Book Review Editor, Washington University (St. Louis)* WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, *Catholic University*  
CECELIA M. KENYON, *Smith College*  
RALPH A. STRAETZ, *News and Notes Editor, New York University* JULIAN FELDMAN, *University of California (Berkeley)*  
FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, *University of Maryland*  
HIRAM M. STOUT, *Washington, D.C.*

## EDITORIAL OFFICE

*Managing Editor, APSR*  
100 University Hall, Ohio State University, 216 N. Oval Dr., Columbus 10, Ohio

## EXECUTIVE OFFICE

*Executive Director, APSA*  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington 6, D.C.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, July, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are \$15.00 a year (\$6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. Equivalent of \$1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

*Current issues* are priced at \$3.75 per copy. Prices of other issues are furnished on request.

*Applications for membership*, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington 6, D.C. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by 5th day of the month of publication.

*Address correspondence about contributions* to the REVIEW to Harvey C. Mansfield, 100 University Hall, 216 N. Oval Dr., Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio; *books intended for review* to Thomas H. Eliot, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.; *News and Notes items*, to Ralph Straetz, Department of Political Science, New York University, University Heights, New York N.Y.; *advertising correspondence*, to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The *International Index to Periodicals* indexes current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

*Office of publication*: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

*Foreign Agent*: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1962, by The American Political Science Association.

*A new guide to useful field work at the local level*

### **LOCAL POLITICAL SURVEYS**

E. E. Schattschneider, *Wesleyan Univ.*; Victor Jones, *Univ. of California, Berkeley*

This unique book shows the student how to acquire the practical experience that will enable him to test—in the field—hypotheses advanced in classrooms and texts. The procedures of data-gathering and analysis are described in detail along with information on the sources of necessary data.

**CONTENTS:** Introduction; Organization and Functions of Local Government; Local Politics; Election Statistics; Political Significance of Demographic, Social, and Economic Data; Areas and Boundaries; Use of Census Data in the Study of Congressional and Legislative Districts in Metropolitan Areas; Population of the Local Community; Political Economy of the Local Community. *March 1962, 256 pp., \$4.50 paper, tentative*

*What, if any, are the rational justifications for Democracy?*

### **THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY**

Thomas Landon Thorson, *Univ. of Wisconsin*

In this new, exciting essay the technique of modern logical analysis is applied to finding out why "democratic principles are to be preferred over authoritarian ones." The more traditional justifications of democracy are examined and found wanting. The ideologies that form the core of political democracy are explored and clarified in a direct, succinct, and stimulating style. You will be especially pleased with this book for use in any course in political theory, modern political thought, or political philosophy. *Jan. 1962, 176 pp., \$2.25 paper*

*Why do metropolitan reorganization battles usually end in failure?*

### **METROPOLITAN REFORM IN ST. LOUIS: A CASE STUDY**

Henry J. Schmandt, *Univ. of Wisconsin (Milwaukee)*; Paul G. Steinbicker and George D. Wendel, *both of St. Louis Univ.*

This unique and systematic case study of an urban action program provides some of the answers to this important problem. *1961, 84 pp., \$1.00 paper*

**HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, INC.**

383 Madison Ave., N.Y. 17

## *New Books of Exceptional Interest*

### **GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST** *in the Twentieth Century*

by H. B. SHARABI, Associate Professor of History and Government, Georgetown University. This important new text clearly describes the structure, functioning, and politics of contemporary Middle Eastern governments. One pre-publication reviewer comments: "This is an excellent piece of work and would make a first-rate textbook . . . the volume is better designed for political science courses on the Middle East than any book on the market at the present time. . . . Sharabi handles the English language with deftness and precision. His style is clear, economical, and eminently readable. . . ." March 1962.

### **THE IMPERIALISM READER**

#### *Documents and Readings on Modern Expansionism*

by LOUIS L. SNYDER, Professor of History, The City College of New York. The many-faceted problems relating to imperialism are explored in this comprehensive collection of 178 readings and documents. In an extensive introductory essay Professor Snyder authoritatively discusses each phase of modern expansionism. Brief introductory notes before each selection place the wide variety of official documents, eye-witness reports, essay and arguments in proper perspective. Of special interest is the timely and balanced section on Communist imperialism. March 1962.

**D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.**


120 Alexander St.

Princeton, N.J.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

240077

7



# The American Political Science Review

VOL. LVI

MARCH, 1962

NO. 1

## DEVIATION CONTROL: A STUDY IN THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINAL CONFLICT

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
*Columbia University*

This essay is a comparative study in the dynamics of doctrinal conflicts. It deals with organized international movements overtly committed to spreading and carrying out a doctrinal program of action, theological or political, on the basis of both the individual commitment of their respective members and their collective goals as organized bodies. Its purpose is to generalize from the experience of these organizations in handling deviations involving a unit of the movement differing or clashing either with the acknowledged center, with another unit of the movement—in both cases over theological or ideological issues, but within the common doctrine, and accompanied by mutual doctrinal recriminations. A brief and selective analysis of the historical experience of one such movement, Catholicism, might contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of some recent developments within a contemporary international movement, Communism.

More specifically, this study will seek some implications from the doctrinal clashes between Rome and the Jansenists and from the Jesuit missionaries' disputes with their Franciscan and Dominican critics in the 17th century for the problems of unity and diversity which international communism has recently encountered.<sup>1</sup>

Among the growing literature on the Sino-Soviet relationship the following books may be suggested: A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York, 1960), especially ch. 12; F. Hudson, R. Lowenthal and R. MacFarlane, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (London, 1961); London, *Unity and Contradiction* (New York, 1962); D. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton, 1962). On eastern European affairs see P. Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York,

Since the issue of Jansenism involved the relations between the French kingdom, with its strong emphasis on the Gallicanism of the French Church, and Rome, the first case has elements of a conflict between a nationally based doctrinal deviation and the center. The second instance pertains to doctrinal-strategic conflicts between component units of the international movement.

### I

In both cases we are dealing with theological or ideological movements which are action-oriented; thus a theological or ideological dispute among their respective units is more than just a discussion of philosophical abstractions. Factors of political power and control inevitably become involved. Also, since in any doctrinal bargaining there is no firm, "objective" way of determining the correctness of conflicting positions, a doctrinal dispute has a dynamic quality to it. Once it breaks out, a doctrinal compromise is extremely difficult to arrange. Splitting the difference as in financial transactions, selecting a river or a mountain range as in border disputes, accepting the line held when firing ceased as in armistices: all

1957); J. H. Hallowell, ed., *Soviet Satellite Nations* (Gainesville, 1958); R. Bass and E. Marbury, eds., *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958* (New York, 1959); F. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961). On the general problem of Communist bloc relations, see Z. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (rev. ed., New York, 1961).

<sup>2</sup> For the purpose of brevity henceforth the word "doctrinal" will be used to cover both theological and ideological disputes, even though there are obvious differences between doctrine, theology and ideology.

these devices are simply not applicable. Barring an outright split, the usual solutions tend to be more extreme: the agreement of one protagonist to become doctrinally silent, although not necessarily retracting his original views; or the doctrinal subordination of one to the other. A third solution, a mutual agreement to become silent, is not stable if one of the parties involved is the center, since a doctrinally oriented movement cannot remain doctrinally silent in the face of continually changing reality.

The same consideration makes the commitment to silence on the part of a deviation-inclined unit also difficult to sustain. In time the unit involved must make doctrinal judgments, for the same reason that the movement as a whole cannot become silent, since doctrine rationalizes and justifies its program. When that happens, the unit is faced with the choice of either saying that which it was earlier unwilling to say—in effect, thereby capitulating—or reopening the dispute. By way of example, Gomulka's 1956 implicit agreement to remain doctrinally silent was gradually translated into doctrinal capitulation. Tito and Khrushchev, after attempting in 1955–1956 to effect something amounting to an agreement of mutual silence, both soon discovered that they were compelled to speak up, and so they clashed again. The Jansenists during the 17th century faced the same dilemma, since they also were attempting to wage a doctrinal conflict within the framework of a common doctrine and a common international organization.

Power is heavily involved in these disputes. A concession on a doctrinal issue automatically magnifies the power and strengthens the prestige and even authority of one protagonist at the expense of the other. Furthermore a doctrinal dispute very frequently generates related conflicts. These may stir up, for instance, jurisdictional or organizational or personal issues, which then also intensify the doctrinal conflict. Indeed, in doctrinally oriented organizations the latter-type conflicts in themselves usually stimulate doctrinal differences, since there is a strong temptation among doctrinally sensitive organizations to use the charge of doctrinal laxity (or some other imperfection) as a means of scoring a point in any disagreement. The term doctrinal deviation or conflict is used here whenever such doctrinal recriminations are exchanged, irrespective of their cause, within the common doctrinal and organizational context.

In spite of this inherent dynamism of doctrinal conflict, there are also certain elements of stability to it. Usually until quite some time

after a deviation has become a defection or defiance, the conflict tends to be limited by mutual acceptance of a common value-system inherent in the doctrine, which tends to contain that conflict within the organization and excludes alliances outside of it. For instance, sharing of mutual animosity towards the "believers" is a persisting characteristic of doctrinal conflict. Furthermore, the common doctrine facilitates communication between protagonists, communication both of the explicit and implicit kinds. Certain moves are not only understandable but easily deciphered, hence the ambiguity inherent in conflicts between doctrinally antithetic protagonists (e.g., "the enigma" of Communism in the eyes of the West) is limited.<sup>3</sup> Doctrinal conflict thus involves agreement and disagreement at the same time.

## II

With the foregoing setting the general framework, it may now be appropriate to outline those aspects of the Church's history of the 16th and 17th centuries<sup>4</sup> and of today's Communism which provide the point of contact for this comparative treatment of deviation control. The analogies that will be suggested are not meant to establish a rigid identity in behaviour but rather to unfold certain parallel trends given the structural-functional similarities of the two movements. Perhaps it need not be added that the pace of events in our age is so rapid that changes involving mere decades must be equated with processes which in the past took several centuries to mature.

No general equivalence between Catholicism and Communism can be implied by this study. Indeed, a most vital and distinctive aspect of the activity of the Catholic Church, the spiritual, which defines the unique character of the Church as both a spiritual and a temporal institution, is altogether excluded from consideration. However, certain aspects of the social-political functions of the two movements are both sufficiently similar and unique to them to justify a joint analysis. Both movements see themselves as the exclusive standard bearers of an absolutely correct and normatively all-embracing vision of reality; both have been frequently tested in the defense of it.

<sup>3</sup> It could be argued that the failure of the West to appraise Communism in terms other than the traditional to the West helped Communism in the phase of its weakness. Cf. George Kennan, *Russia and the West* (New York, 1961).

<sup>4</sup> I have largely relied on L. Pastor, *History of the Popes* (32 vols., London, 1928–40).

purity of their doctrine; and, since almost nothing that occurs on this earth is seen as irrelevant to the doctrines of these organizations (although Catholicism recognizes the realm of the morally neutral), both have been faced by the difficult task of developing their doctrinal store house to take into account changing social conditions. Both are inherently committed to proselytization and are expansion-oriented: a static or defensive outlook is contrary to their internal nature, while their value-systems make the success of any one unit of the movement the source of satisfaction to the entire membership. This membership is exclusive, and both movements have jealously protected themselves against the free influx of groups claiming alleged identity of views.<sup>5</sup> Both are international, yet both have been frequently faced by the challenge of having to reconcile their claim to universality with the often intense impact of nationalism on their various memberships. Finally, both movements have a highly developed hierarchical power structure, they stress internal discipline, and possess a sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus which in itself generates an organizational compulsion towards application of the doctrine in practice. At the same time, it would be incorrect to think of them simply as homogeneous, single units. Precisely because of their universal scale, their internal organization has to reflect the complexity of the human condition, and they must take into account various national and functional needs. Hence these movements possess only relatively homogeneous international organizations,<sup>6</sup> composed of usually more homogeneous units.

Deviation involving the relations among some of these units, and not deviation within any one of them, is the object of this study. In the case of Catholicism in the 16th and 17th centuries (the choice of this period is justified below), the principal units were, first of all, the center of the organization, the Papacy, with its highly developed bureaucratic apparatus and

far-flung Papal Nuncios; the various Catholic kingdoms which in general accepted the principle of universal Catholic unity but with varying degrees of actual Papal intervention in their church matters;<sup>7</sup> the established Catholic universities, such as Louvain or the Sorbonne, which were very active in doctrinal discussions and which operated as corporate entities; the dioceses, particularly those ruled by strong-willed bishops anxious to assert the principle of internal episcopal independence from Rome; the various orders of the Church, such as the Jesuits, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, etc. A systematic classification of the component units of international Communism would presumably include the various Communist-governed nation-states, and also the national Communist parties, as well as the center of the movement, the CPSU.<sup>8</sup> These states differ in national power and are in various stages of doctrine-fulfillment (*i.e.*, some are still building "socialism" while others are more or less ahead); some are truncated states, hence the expansion-orientation of their Communist elites is more intense; some are indigenous Communist regimes while some are entirely dependent on Soviet support.<sup>9</sup> Within the various ruling parties different shades of ideological orientation have developed in recent years, the extremes of which are generally described under the terms revisionist and dogmatist. There are also strictly international functional Communist undertakings, such as the WFTU, etc. Thus both international movements are composed of various political entities of asymmetrical strength, interacting and sometimes clashing within a common organizational-doctrinal framework.

<sup>7</sup> For instance, the French king and the French church always stressed the traditions of Gallicanism as a justified restraint on Papal power. See the lengthy treatment in L. Pastor, *op. cit.*, esp. vol. 32, pp. 246-325.

<sup>8</sup> For different definitions of its special position of primacy see the November 1957 Twelve-Party Declaration and the December 1960 Eighty-One Party Declaration.

<sup>9</sup> A fuller classification of Communist states might have the following categories: stages of doctrine-fulfillment; stages of social-economic development; unified or truncated states; indigenous or imposed Communist regimes; stable popular regimes; stable, unpopular regimes; unstable, unpopular regimes. It would be interesting to see whether there is any relationship between the above and the doctrinal attitudes of the ruling elites. However, that is a subject matter for a separate study.

<sup>5</sup> For this reason, both organizations have established exclusive standards for membership. Cf. Lenin's "Twenty-one Conditions" and, for example, the difficulties faced by the Chaldean monks in the 17th century.

<sup>6</sup> Relatively, as compared to some others, less doctrinal, less disciplined, etc. Another way of looking at them would be to see them as international systems, but this tends to underestimate the internally binding factor of ideological commitment. See G. Modelski, *The International Communist System*, mimeo., Princeton, 1960, for a definition of "international system."

Perhaps it is not entirely accidental that these organizational-functional analogies are also matched by certain parallels in historical experience. By the late 16th and early 17th centuries the Church, and particularly the Papacy, was seeking new formulae for doctrinal and organizational unity. Badly shaken by the Reformation which had split Christian unity, the Church was exposed to various cross-currents of reform, some seeking salvation in new forms of organization and behavior, others turning to a fundamentalist, literalist reaffirmation of the doctrine. The emergence of absolutism, furthermore, meant that the Catholic world was increasingly becoming a composite of units each claiming domestic sovereignty. The universal Church in effect had become an international one, i.e., composed of national units. The direct physical scope of Papal power became much more limited, and the problem of defining its limits and of somehow translating it into authority was a source not only of concern but also of tension within the Catholic world.

Communism has faced similar problems in the course of the last decade. Communism in one country expanded to twelve countries, thus becoming international. But the split with Tito, then Stalin's death, the crisis of 1956 and the self-assertion of China have limited the direct scope of Soviet power,<sup>10</sup> despite nuclear weapons. The problem of defining the role of the CPSU within the changing bloc, and of coping with the revisionist and the dogmatist remedies for some of its ills, has been preoccupying Communist leaders over the last few years. In both cases, perhaps the two most important antecedent developments, which subsequently shaped the histories of the respective movements in the above periods were (1) the emergence of highly centralized power within each, and (2) the crisis of unity, prompted in part by the internal deformations generated by the arbitrary and increasingly corrupt practices employed in the exercise of that power.

Papal power, including its use of physical coercion, grew rapidly in the late Middle Ages. Many factors contributed to its growth. The doctrine itself generated pressures, with the Petrine Texts of the Gospel of St. Matthew, chapter 23, providing the authoritative source for Papal supremacy over the other bishops.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc, op. cit.*, and "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc." *Foreign Affairs*, April 1961.

<sup>11</sup> Opposition to the Papacy was based on the argument that the earlier organization of the

The Crusades, with their mobilization of doctrinal zeal, reinforced the special position of the Papacy, while the diplomatic initiatives of the Popes in gaining the support of European monarchs and in raising the necessary financial backing through indulgences and other means enhanced their special status. The appearance of military orders, independent of local parishes and dioceses, acknowledging only the sovereignty of the Pope, likewise contributed to Papal power. These were followed, on a larger and more enduring scale, by various mendicant orders, whose ordained members, circulating over Europe, gradually undermined the autonomy of the local bishops. Two great Catholic universities, Bologna and Paris, helped to develop the intellectual underpinnings of the Papal system.<sup>12</sup> Under Pope Gregory IX, the principles of Papal supremacy were fully developed while in the Roman Curia the nucleus of an efficient and centralized bureaucracy was established. More generally perhaps, these developments can be viewed as a centralizing drive inherent in any action-oriented organization committed to an absolutist value-system.

Doubtless, the Inquisition also contributed to the consolidation and expansion of Papal power. The use of physical violence, frequently wielded by members of one of the mendicant orders, delegated by Rome directly, was vigorously applied against those accused of doctrinal error, defined in practice as devia-

Church involved equality of all bishops: "Without prejudice to its agreement with the Church Universal in all essential points, every church manages its own affairs with perfect freedom and independence, and maintains its own traditional usages and discipline, all questions not concerning the whole Church, or of primary importance, being settled on the spot . . . Laws and Articles of faith, of universal obligation, are issued only by the full church, concentrated and represented at an Oecumenical Council." Janus, *The Pope and the Council* (London, 1869), pp. 85-86. (Janus, a 19th century writer, was bitterly opposed to the doctrine of Papal infallibility. A less one-sided source is the *Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge 1957), Vols. IV, V; see also P. Sigmund, Jr., *Hierarchy and Consent: The Political Theory of Nicholas of Cusa*, Harvard Ph.D. thesis, 1959. I am much indebted to Dr. Sigmund for his critical but constructive comments.

<sup>12</sup> Although both institutions also contributed to the development of the intellectual underpinnings of Averroism and Gallicanism, respectively. See Janus, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-181; also Pastor and Sigmund, *op. cit.*, for fuller and less hostile accounts.



tion from the principles of faith laid down by the center.<sup>13</sup> Much of the Inquisition was directed at the members of the movement itself. In spite of the opposition of some bishops, who warned that its practices would harm the Church,<sup>14</sup> in time the Inquisition, especially the Spanish, mounted in intensity, employing tortures, requiring confessions, rendering judgment by administrative trials without defense for the accused, and applying sanctions against families of the accused.

In the Communist case, too, an inherent tendency towards centralization was operating, given the doctrines and the early organizational inclinations of the ruling groups.<sup>15</sup> The launching of the internal revolution in 1928-1929, much like the Crusades, intensified internal zeal, while the gradual absorption of the Comintern, and the purges of foreign Communists made the universally oriented movement a Soviet-centralized one. In both cases, the centralization and the application of physical violence led to corruption and internal decay.

Indeed, there are striking parallels between the processes and the effects of the Inquisition and of the Soviet purges of the '30s. Some Communist leaders, like Kirov, warned against the use of physical violence within the movement, but were overruled. The purges which followed swept the Communist party, using techniques similar to those cited above.<sup>16</sup> And just as the Inquisitors made ample use of the charge of witchcraft to mobilize popular ignorance and suspicion, and particularly to take advantage of the susceptibility of the masses to prejudice, so too the Soviet secret police charged many purge victims with *vredivelstvo* or wrecking.<sup>17</sup> While it would be

interesting to speculate at what stage a doctrinal movement undergoes such internal convulsions (might it be when exhausted patience and growing skepticism prompt in some members a renewed quest for utopian fulfillment?), the effect of the purges was a further concentration of power at the center. The fear of opposition intensified the violence, and the violence in turn intensified the fear.

In the case of the Church, the internal decay led to a challenge to centralized power and subsequently to the fracturing of the unity of the organization. In the case of Communism the two events were telescoped closer together, with the unity fractured while centralized power still existed, but with that centralized power challenged shortly after disunity appeared. The Council of Constance (1414-1418), already reflecting strong national differences, was a major effort to upset the power of the Curia, although its actual purpose was to elect one Pope in place of the three claimants. Its consequence was the doctrine of conciliar supremacy, which shortly afterwards was tested at the Council of Basle (1431). Although Papal power had been badly shaken, in that contest the Pope still prevailed. The split in Christian unity, effected a century later by the Reformation, thus came at a time when the movement was still basically centralized, although underneath the surface secular absolutism was setting the stage for the transformation of the Church from a single homogeneous unit into an international one. The Stalin-Tito break was in that sense remarkably similar, for it took place when Communism outwardly was united but in reality it, too, was becoming international, having absorbed a number of nation-states and having set up nationally-based Communist regimes in them.

Neither organization handled its first major crisis of unity well, but each was to derive valuable lessons from it. At first both apparently thought that past methods would suffice to repel the challenge posed respectively by Luther in 1518 and Tito in 1948. The Pope seems to have expected that branding Luther's views heretical and ordering him to appear in Rome (Papal citation of August 1518) would dispose of the German cleric; Stalin, with the purges presumably still fresh in his memory,

Bolsheviks were derailing Soviet trains with the same seriousness with which their 13th and 14th century counterparts accepted the accounts of "nocturnal meetings, where the devil appeared in the form of a toad, a pale spectre, and a black tomcat, [with] wicked abominations . . . practiced." Janus, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-253.

<sup>13</sup> For example, "Savonarola's crime was disobedience to the Pope—and that Pope was Alexander VI. He was not a rebel against the apostolic See; but he was torn between the claims of obedience to God and submission to the orders of an unworthy Pope." W. Nigg, *Warriors of God* (New York, 1959), p. 278.

<sup>14</sup> Bishop Wazo of Liege, Bishop Hildebert of Le Mans, Rupert of Deutz, and Saint Bernard (see Janus, *op. cit.*, p. 238).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. L. Schapiro, *The Origins of the Communist Autocracy* (New York, 1956).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge—Politics of Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956).

<sup>17</sup> Many credulous and semi-literate Soviet citizens, baffled by the dislocations caused by the first impact of the social revolution, probably swallowed the charge that some distinguished old

assumed that a mere condemnation of Tito's regime would topple the recalcitrant Yugoslav revolutionary. It is particularly striking that in both cases, the prospective deviants did not wish to deviate, and at first went to considerable pains to reassure the center of their continued loyalty. However, the center's insistence on continuing the dialogue with the deviating member<sup>18</sup> resulted in the further crystallization of the deviant position as well as in increasing the personal stake of the would-be deviant in not becoming physically subject to the center's power.

The open defiance and the split came rather quickly in both cases. An attempted compromise, engineered by von Miltitz, the Papal nuncio, and based in part on Luther's promise to observe silence if his opponent did also, failed in late 1518 for the reasons outlined earlier in this essay. Luther continued his defiance and in June, 1520, a Bull of Condemnation was issued and it was followed six months later by personal excommunication. Allowing for problems of communication, the split was about as rapid as in the 1948 Stalin-Tito case.

Both Luther and Tito found haven for their doctrinal defiance in national power, and in both cases the center, not accurately interpreting the changes that had taken place in their respective international movements, had not foreseen this contingency. Instead of either arranging for a quiet liquidation, then followed by an open condemnation of the improper views, or merely ignoring the alleged deviant, the centers in both cases moved precipitously, personalized the conflicts, thereby making conciliation more difficult, and then found themselves unable to cope with the alerted and properly entrenched defiers. It is likely that greater patience on the part of the centers, and particularly a refusal to engage in open dialogue, might have been more productive, especially since both Luther and Tito viewed themselves as merely attempting to invigorate their respective movements, were in some ways doctrinally more orthodox and more radical than their centers, and would have been unlikely to effect a split on their own. With time, and particularly with their deaths, the centripetal pressures inherent in the combination of

absolutist doctrine and action might have sealed whatever breaches Luther's or Tito's excessive zeal could have effected.

The splits, accompanied by the more profound transformation of the two organizations, resulted in a quest for a new balance of unity and diversity and for new bases of central power. With Stalin's death, Communism experienced also a crisis of leadership and it has since been seeking some enduring definition of the center's doctrinal authority. Like the Kremlin until 1956, the Papacy had not needed an explicit and formal affirmation of its infallibility as long as it was enjoying some temporal power. With the decline of its physical power, pressures developed from within the Church, particularly from some of the orders (*e.g.*, the Jesuits), in favor of an explicit doctrinal assertion of Papal authority so as to protect the movement's organizational unity which further doctrinal divergences, like the one with Luther, could rupture. Furthermore, the tactical lessons of the Luther experience were not lost on the Church: in the handling of subsequent deviations it displayed far more sensitivity to the dangers inherent in doctrinal conflict and far greater skill in deviation control.

### III

The Church's "deviation consciousness," acquired at the price of deviation transformed into open defiance, became apparent when Jansenism came to threaten Catholic unity and to defy the Pope's leadership throughout most of the 17th century.<sup>19</sup> Jansenism can be seen as a fundamentalist reaction both to the internal decay which had caused the doctrinal split (the Reformation) and to some of the reform movements within the organization, particularly the Jesuit movement, that became active after the split. Thus it bears strong resemblance to the dogmatists active in international Communism after the difficulties prompted by de-

<sup>18</sup> In the case of Luther, see the report of the official Roman *Censor Librorum* "In praesumptuosas M. Lutheri Conclusiones Dialogus," and Luther's "Responsio ad Silv. Prierietatis Dialogum," in which he, however, still accepted Papal authority; in Tito's case, see the Stalin-Tito correspondence, in Bass and Marbury, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> My principal sources have been Pastor, *op. cit.*, volumes 29-32; M. Tollemache, *French Jansenists* (London, 1893); N. Abercrombie, *The Origins of Jansenism* (Oxford, 1936). Specialists in Church history will perhaps forgive me for this very sketchy treatment. In my analysis I will not attempt a detailed historical summary nor deal with the theological content of Jansenism but only focus on those aspects which are relevant to the purposes of this study. Basically, the Jansenists, not unlike Calvinism, took a rather dim view of man's capacity to resist sin; they urged such intense and demanding standards before partaking of holy communion that many of them abstained from the sacrament for years at a time.

Stalinization, reacting furiously against the remedies suggested by the revisionists,<sup>20</sup> and using their attacks on the revisionists, as a form of criticism of the center.

When Jansenism first appeared in the Lowlands, with the posthumous publication in 1640 of Cornelis Jansen's (Jansenius) major opus "Augustinus, Seu Doctrina . . .,"<sup>21</sup> stirring a lively discussion in the circles associated with the University of Louvain (as well as a prompt Jesuit rejoinder), the official attitude of the center was to discourage any doctrinal debates on the complex subject of Grace and Communion.<sup>22</sup> Thus both the Jansenist publications and the Jesuit attacks on them were criticized by Papal decree without, however, an explicit condemnation or affirmation of either.<sup>23</sup> The center's position was clearly one of avoiding a new doctrinal debate. However, the Jansenists were quick to exploit this restraint—much as the revisionists and the dogmatists did prior to the unity conference of 1957—as proof of the orthodoxy of their position. Citing copiously from Saint Augustine, they argued that their views represented the true principles of Christianity, as contrasted with the alleged doctrinal elasticity of the Jesuits.

Although the Louvain debates were vexing to

the Church, Jansenism became a serious problem only when its principles were shortly afterwards adopted by a gifted French theologian, Antoine Arnauld, and popularized by him within the French church and influential French court circles. Sympathetic members of the clergy, including several bishops and at least one convent, in turn found support in the government, always ready to protect the Gallican Church (with its French way to heaven) against the encroachments of the center.<sup>24</sup> Arnauld, in his voluminous writings (he was a brilliant pamphleteer), and his adherents avoided attacking Rome, but concentrated their ire especially on the Jesuits<sup>25</sup> who were said to be gradually undermining the true doctrinal foundations of the movement. Formally proclaiming their obedience to the Pope,<sup>26</sup> the Jansenists thus made use of what we might call the "indirect-dialogue technique" and "the enemy-by-analogy" device to challenge the doctrinal interpretations of the center—again much like some of the recent Chinese and Albanian polemics against Moscow by way of the Yugoslav revisionists. Similarly some of the French bishops, in the course of assuring Rome of their loyalty, and of Arnauld's, hinted that "certain persons" within the movement "instead of applying the true remedies to the decay of manners, had recourse to attenuations and palliations."<sup>27</sup>

As Jansenism spread in France, the doctrinal debate over Grace inevitably led to a challenge to the authority and doctrinal infallibility of the center. Both sides were still anxious to limit their rift. Thus anti-Jansenist critics avoided making explicit charges of heresy. Instead, they pointed to the operational harm of Jansenist views; for instance, Jansenist priests, because of their severity, were accused of having become divorced from the masses.<sup>28</sup> This charge is strikingly similar to that often made

<sup>20</sup> It is interesting to note that much of the reform criticism came from the peripheries both in the case of Catholicism and Communism. Jansenism originated, as noted, in the Lowlands. Compare with the criticisms of Communism by the Yugoslav Djilas, or the Hungarian Nagy, etc.

<sup>21</sup> The full title was "Augustinus, seu doctrina Sancti Augustini de Humanae Naturae Sanitate, Aegritudine, Medicina, Adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses" (Louvain, 1640), 3 vols.

<sup>22</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 29, p. 109. The Jansenist principles were: "(1) some of God's commandments are impossible to just men who wish and strive to keep them considering the powers they actually have; the grace by which these precepts may become possible is also wanting; (2) in the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace; (3) to merit, or to demerit in the state of fallen nature we must be free from all external constraint, but not from interior necessity; (4) the Semipelagians admitted the necessity of interior preventing grace for all acts, even for the beginning of faith; but they fell into heresy in pretending this grace is such that man may either follow it or reject it; (5) to say that Christ died or shed his blood for all men is Semipelagianism." *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 8 (New York, 1913), p. 288.

<sup>23</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 29, p. 114 ff.

<sup>24</sup> After Arnauld published in 1643 his *De La Frequent Communion*, the French government was prepared to apply sanctions against him but he was protected by the leading Paris circles and by some of the French bishops. Gallicanism resembles domesticism more than national communism; for the distinction see Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53. See Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 32, ch. iv.

<sup>25</sup> The Jesuits were among the most active proponents of frequent communion. See Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 29, p. 136.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* p. 150.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

against the contemporary dogmatists.<sup>29</sup> Beyond that point, the center was loathe to go. Thus, when in 1654 Pope Alexander VII was urged by some of his advisors to publish a new Bull against Jansenism, he delayed, explaining that as long as the Jansenists did not explicitly defend the errors of Jansenius he "was unwilling . . . to drive them to fresh subterfuges and to a denial of Papal infallibility."<sup>30</sup> The center was not anxious to create a new heresy, which could conceivably prompt rash reactions from the most influential Catholic monarchy in Europe.

Papal restraint gave the Jansenists some margin for maneuver. Enjoying at least the passive support of the French government, which viewed favorably those developments that might limit the Papacy's influence over French life, the Jansenists had no intention of detaching themselves from the Church.<sup>31</sup> A defection on their own initiative would have posed a difficult dilemma for many French Catholics otherwise favorably inclined to them. Jansenism was thus more influential when still part of the organized movement. Its fundamentalist attitude had won over numerous sympathizers who pleaded their cause with the center. Many concerned believers viewed them as dedicated reformers, anxious to restore a zealous church.<sup>32</sup> (Doubtless, the same arguments among others have operated recently in criticizing precipitous Soviet action against their Albanian or Chinese critics). The Jansenists, furthermore, in spite of their doctrinal zeal, did not hesitate to point to the spectre of the Inquisition whenever Papal sanctions threatened, just as the contemporary dogmatists, whenever pressed, are quick to insist that true internationalism must prevail in the internal affairs of the Communist bloc. But above all, their major stress was on denying any novelty to their views; indeed, they frequently used the Dominican Order to prove the orthodoxy of their interpretations,<sup>33</sup> and Arnauld kept reiterating that he was merely expounding the views of Saint Augustine, not of Jansenius.

<sup>29</sup> "Dogmatism and sectarianism . . . lead to the isolation of Communists from the masses. . . ." N. Khrushchev, speech of January 6, 1961.

<sup>30</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 31, p. 198.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 29, p. 146.

<sup>32</sup> ". . . the severity of the Jansenist principles, excessive though it was, operated in favor of the party." *Ibid.* vol. 31, p. 261.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 225-227. In this, too, there are contemporary parallels. For instance, the Albanians like to cite the Chinese on the subject of revisionism.

(The dogmatists rarely cite Stalin; they rely primarily on Lenin.) Even when Arnauld took the imprudent step of openly questioning Papal infallibility,<sup>34</sup> and the center's sense of concern for organizational unity led the Pope (in August 1656) to condemn explicitly Arnauld's writings, an outright rupture did not occur. A new spokesman for the Jansenists, Blaise Pascal, eloquently pleaded that there was no real disagreement with the center because the allegedly heretical principles were in fact never uttered by either Jansenius or Arnauld, and that the whole affair was a Jesuit plot. The Jansenists thus simply refused either to submit or to leave the organization.

At this point, the issue, already grown from the purely doctrinal realm to that of discipline, became complicated with the intrusion of the factor of national sensitivity. "Gallicanism became Jansenism's strongest ally,"<sup>35</sup> just as Chinese or Albanian nationalism doubtless buttresses the dogmatists' stand against Moscow. Thus "the Papal decisions were received with docility insofar as they concerned the sphere of faith, but as soon as the Pope attempted to intervene in any other way, Gallican susceptibilities were at once aroused in most alarming fashion."<sup>36</sup> The center's efforts to place before its tribunal four French bishops who had espoused Jansenism were effectively sidetracked by the French insistence that instead they be tried by 12 French bishops, who could be expected to reflect a polycentric organizational orientation.<sup>37</sup> The matter thus dragged for years, until the death of Alexander VII. Bitterness built up on both sides and each hinted that the other had in effect betrayed the true faith.

The change in central leadership (which in Catholicism usually is handled more efficiently than in Communism) created a new situation. The successor, Clement IX, elevated in 1667 with French support, was quickly approached by the deviant churchmen who, while formally apologizing, promptly blamed the rift on the Pope's predecessor. In effect, they seized the opportunity to try to reduce the quarrel to a

<sup>34</sup> But even here he equivocated somewhat. He thus made a distinction between infallibility of dogma and fact. *Ibid.*, vol. 31, pp. 174-175.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

<sup>37</sup> Compare to the Soviet effort to restrict the discussion of Chinese dogmatism only to the bloc, and the Chinese insistence on the participation of 81 parties. See my *The Soviet Bloc*, the Epilogue, *op. cit.*

merely posthumous personal issue.<sup>38</sup> Since both Rome and Paris were predisposed to compromise (and the Jansenists, as deviants, could only welcome it since it would keep them within the organization), an arrangement, involving the *pro forma* submission of the recalcitrant bishops to Rome was hammered out in 1668–1669. However, Rome was advised by its delegate not to publish anything which would make it appear as a total capitulation and to ignore evidence which suggested that the bishops' submission was insincere and very limited.<sup>39</sup> "In the end, Rome had to be content with the subscription of the four and to take its sincerity for granted. 'The Pope only judges of external actions,' Cardinal Rospigliosi observed . . ."<sup>40</sup> Khrushchev might have said the same after obtaining Liu Shao-chi's signature to the December 1960 declaration. The strategy of conciliation thus involved a deliberately staged reciprocal ritual.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>38</sup> This is what Khrushchev did in 1955–56 when he blamed Stalin for the quarrel with Tito; and this the Chinese might do after Khrushchev's death, or the Soviets after Mao's.

<sup>39</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 31, pp. 385–392. This arrangement bears great resemblance to the Tito-Khrushchev compromise whereby the Yugoslavs acted as if the Soviets had repudiated all the Cominform declarations, while the Soviets knew that this was not the case but remained silent. Similarly, when Rome placed on the Index a prayer book written by one of the pro-Jansenist French bishops, the Papal nuncio did not publish the decree in France. *Ibid.*, vol. 31, p. 359.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 385.

<sup>41</sup> The above decision did not come easily. A vigorous debate took place within the top councils of the organization's center, and sharply conflicting points of view were presented. Some cardinals advised acceptance of the compromise since "the sincerity of the subscription was vouched for by a public document, whereas the opposite rested solely on rumors and unreliable writings", *Ibid.*, vol. 31, p. 395. The opposite point of view warned against accepting the alleged submission when it was well known that it was not genuine. Cardinal Albizzi who handled much of this matter pleaded: "I cannot suffer that an attempt should be made to persuade the world that this heresy had been destroyed, seeing that in spite of its seeming destruction it appears more vigorous than ever" (*ibid.*, p. 396). It may be assumed that Moscow has also faced similar dilemmas. There is evidence that on the Yugoslav issue Molotov pleaded with Khrushchev not to create the impression that Yugoslavia is again

The short-range effect of the "Clementine peace" was to legitimize continued Jansenist activity in France and even to facilitate its growth.<sup>42</sup> The center, however, persevered in its policy of moderation,<sup>43</sup> maintaining silence while still fully encouraging various other units of the organization (in this case, the Spanish and Hungarian clergy) to condemn the French deviation.<sup>44</sup> Skirmishes and occasionally bitter clashes continued, but the Jansenists were fighting a losing battle. With Arnauld's death in 1694 the doctrinal mantle passed to Pasquier Quesnel but even pro-Jansenist writers concede that Jansenism was in its decline.<sup>45</sup> With the doctrinal vigor of the deviation weakened by the death of its most vigorous spokesman and with its influence on the French monarchy waning, more energetic measures of suppression could be applied. Early in the 18th century two Papal bulls condemned Jansenism and the French royal authorities no longer opposed their enforcement. The issue was simply no longer a crucial one and the fundamentalist zeal had expended itself. Isolated pockets of Jansenism persisted but on a socially insignificant scale.

It could be argued perhaps that the center's policy of restraint and covert manipulation had weakened the doctrinal cohesion of the movement's organization, but the alternative which had been avoided was that of a split. It had been skirted because the highly doctrinaire deviant had an inherent inclination not to cast himself out of the common fold, while the center, aware that France might be lost if the deviation became defiance, played the game in such a manner as not to destroy all the binding elements. This meant, of course, that the deviant enjoyed a measure of impunity but at the same time his oft-proclaimed loyalty to the center was bound to become politically operative when the divisive issues ultimately lost their conflict-fed sense of urgency.

Before turning to the general implications of the foregoing, a briefer survey of another aspect of the Church's history in that period is revealing. Catholicism in the 16th–17th centuries, much as Communism today, seemed to have reached its zenith in Europe, and increasingly it saw its fulfillment in what today would be called the underdeveloped lands. Missionary

orthodox since it would undermine international Communism. (*The Soviet Bloc*, pp. 175–177.)

<sup>42</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 31, p. 485 for data.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 32, pp. 424, 656 ff. for efforts to kill with kindness.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 310–312.

<sup>45</sup> Tollemache, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

work, particularly in the Orient, seemed full of promise. The Chinese Empire offered a particularly appealing target and late in the 16th century the first Jesuit missionaries succeeded in penetrating its hitherto sealed frontiers.<sup>46</sup>

Conscious of the intense Chinese self-esteem and xenophobia, the Jesuits proceeded with utmost caution and discretion. Since foreigners were generally not allowed to settle within the Empire, and since foreign proselytizers were certain to be kept out, the Jesuit fathers carefully avoided any specific identification with Christianity and in their petition to the Chinese authorities, seeking the right to settle in China, they (in the words of Father Ricci) "explained that they were members of a religious order, who had left their native land over distant seas, attracted by the fame of the Chinese Empire . . . that they intended to remain here for the rest of their lives, and that all they wanted was a small plot of ground to build a house, and also a church in honor of the King of Heaven. . . . Neither in this request nor in any other way was any mention made of Christianity. . . ."<sup>47</sup>

The Jesuits were quick to adapt themselves to Chinese customs, applying their founder's injunction that "we may *ad bonum* approve or agree with someone in regard to some one thing that is good, passing over other bad points, and thus by winning his confidence we further our good object; by going in with him we come out with ourselves."<sup>48</sup> They tolerated Chinese ancestor-worship on the grounds that it merely involved filial veneration, and they praised Confucius as a wise philosopher.<sup>49</sup> After a quick appraisal of the Chinese social-political structure, the Jesuits adopted the dress, the customs and the status of the *literati* and cultivated the upper classes. In their appeal to them, the Jesuits at first avoided outright proselytization, but instead attempted to impress the Chinese with European science and gadgets. For example, they gained the right to establish residence in the province of Canton by presenting a mechanical clock (a device unknown in

China) to the governor.<sup>50</sup> Later, having gained entry into Peking through the presentation of similar gifts to the king, "the esteem which the Jesuits enjoyed at the Imperial Court grew still further when, in 1610, they foretold the date of an eclipse of the moon with greater accuracy than the native astronomers." Father Ricci himself at various stages of his remarkable mission overcame Chinese suspicions by making for them detailed maps and globes of the world (and carefully putting China in the middle so as not to hurt Chinese self-esteem); by presenting their dignitaries with clocks and watches; by installing a large clock on the outside of his mission so that the people could admire it; by teaching advanced astrology and mathematics to the Chinese scholars. In his memoirs, in a chapter entitled "Mathematics and Converts," he states that "whoever may think that ethics, physics and mathematics are not important in the work of the Church, is unacquainted with the tastes of the Chinese, who are slow to take a salutary spiritual potion, unless it be seasoned with intellectual flavoring."<sup>52</sup>

It is evident from the foregoing that the "soft sell" technique of the Soviet technical missions is neither original nor novel. Contemporary Soviet policy towards the underdeveloped lands is clearly premised on a similar sophisticated appreciation of the depth of national sensitivities. The Soviets, by and large have toned down direct ideological propaganda, and they calculate that Communist doctrinal advances will be a function of demonstrated Soviet technical skill. They have been de-emphasizing the revolutionary ethic, and have been concentrating on winning over the "national bourgeoisie," i.e., the intellectual political elite. Not revolutionary peasant armies but rather Soviet-trained intellectuals mesmerized by Soviet technical achievements will lead these nations into socialism. The similarity in the relationship of Father Ricci's clocks and astrology to Catholicism and of the sputniks and cosmonauts to Communism is striking.

<sup>46</sup> For a fascinating account of Jesuit efforts in China, see *China in the Sixteenth Century: the Journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583-1610* (New York, 1953). An interesting statement of the tactical problems faced by the Jesuits is in P. Duignan, "Early Jesuit Missionaries: A Suggestion for Further Study," *The American Anthropologist*, August 1958. This account was prompted by Mr. Duignan's analysis.

<sup>47</sup> Ricci, *op. cit.*, pp. 142, 147.

<sup>48</sup> Quoted by Nigg, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

<sup>49</sup> Ricci, *op. cit.*, pp. 93, 96. See also Duignan, *op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> Ricci, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-139.

<sup>51</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, p. 355.

<sup>52</sup> Ricci, *op. cit.*, p. 325. Elsewhere he says "The Fathers have made an effort to merit a reputation for learning, not as a matter of vain glory but with a view to the end for which they came here, namely to further the cause of Christianity, which on all occasions they purposely weave into the conversations," p. 201. Similar techniques were employed by the Jesuits, under Roberto de Nobili, in their approach to Indian Brahmins, Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, pp. 359-361.

The parallel goes further, since these moves provoked severe charges of doctrinal laxity within both international movements. Just as the Chinese Communists have given evidence of their displeasure with the Soviet approach towards the neutralist and underdeveloped lands,<sup>53</sup> so the Franciscan and Dominican missionary orders looked askance at the Jesuit methods in China and India, and, traditionally emphasizing other aspects of the common doctrine, they saw in these methods dangerous signals of heresy. Their suspicions were especially easily aroused since the orders had earlier differed (as the Soviets and Chinese recently have) on matters pertaining to internal reforms within the movement's organization. Thus, for example, the Dominican Alfonso de Avendano had spent 17 years (1577-1594) preaching that the Jesuits were "secret heretics, hypocrites, and pharisees."<sup>54</sup> Some Dominicans, furthermore, had been sympathetic to the Jansenists. The feeling was widespread among many Catholics that the Jesuits "adapted their teachings too freely to the spirit of the world. . . ."<sup>55</sup> Moving into the Orient, the Franciscans, therefore, proceeded to apply their own more direct strategy: "Crucifix in hand they preached in the open streets and public places, condemned to the deepest hell Confucius . . . and proclaimed that every kind of veneration of ancestors was unlawful; the Jesuits' caution with regard to Confucius and the veneration of ancestors they condemned as connivance at idolatry."<sup>56</sup> It may be assumed that the pre-

dominance of the Spanish Conquistador tradition among the Franciscans and Dominicans had something to do with their attacks on the predominantly Portuguese and Italian Jesuit missionaries. National differences thus probably intensified the tension.

Although the Franciscan methods quickly backfired by provoking Chinese violence (one is tempted to think of possibly varying Soviet and Chinese communist guidelines to the Iraqi Communists and of the ill-fated Kirkuk uprising)<sup>57</sup> the debate persisted. In effect, the center was faced with the now familiar question of determining the proper balance between the universal and the particular. Wisely, however, no quick decisions were reached. The matter was deliberated; missions travelled to and fro the Orient (consuming years in the process); commissions were appointed. The formal solutions finally adopted by Rome tended towards compromise: in 1645 the Jesuits suffered a setback; in 1651 they recouped some of their losses.<sup>58</sup> However, just as the Jesuits effectively argued after 1645 that the center had not been appraised of all the relevant facts, so after 1651 the other orders similarly felt that the concessions now granted to the Jesuits were based on improper information, and they simply would not take advantage of such doctrinal shortcuts. But with time, they gradually relented as practice showed the advantages of Jesuit efforts.

Several factors helped to contain the dispute, even though some outraged spokesmen at times had already charged heresy. (It is to be remembered that the issues involved were of very great doctrinal import even though superficially they may have seemed only matters of tactics.) The acceptance by the parties involved of the center's judgment as doctrinally authoritative established a certain common frame of reference even if the respective parties tried subsequently to evade surreptitiously the center's decisions. Recognition of Papal authority automatically meant the acceptance of arbitration as the method for resolving doctrinal issues. Secondly, the *esprit de corps* of the organization and the dedication of its member units to a common value system in which the specific success of one unit reflected glory on the movement as a whole meant that doctrinal

<sup>53</sup> Compare "Present-day leftism in the Communist movement is also manifested in both concealed and overt resistance to the Communist parties' policy of establishing collaboration with working people in the ranks of the social-democratic, Catholic and various other bourgeois-radical parties and organizations." (*Sovietskaya Rossiya*, June, 10 1960); and the warning contained in *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1960, against those who exaggerate revolutionary feelings and "call for direct revolutionary overthrow," with the following Chinese statements: "History teaches us that people's revolutions in all countries stem from the needs of the people and are the result of the development of class struggle" (*Red Flag*, No. 20-21, 1960), and "The modern revisionists and certain representatives of the bourgeoisie try to make the people believe that it is possible to achieve socialism without a revolutionary party. . . . This is sheer nonsense and deception" (*Red Flag*, No. 8, 1960). See Hudson et al, *op. cit.*, for detailed treatment.

<sup>54</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, p. 150.

<sup>55</sup> Nigg, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

<sup>56</sup> Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 29, p. 250.

<sup>57</sup> The Communist Kirkuk rising took place in July 1959. *The World Marxist Review*, April 1960, contains a self-criticism by the Iraqi C. P. which reveals that an allegedly dissident group of Communists was responsible for this highly premature action.

<sup>58</sup> See Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 31, pp. 165-169 concerning the disputed practices.



issues which could be tested in action (as contrasted to purely abstract ones) were not easily translatable into overt doctrinal ruptures. Thirdly, the center's handling of the problem (in part due to the slowness of communications and bureaucratization) was deliberate, which created a safety-valve and made compromises possible. Lastly, the passage of time demonstrated quietly the superiority of one method over another, thereby also helping to control potential deviationism.

A 17th century outside observer might have expected a different outcome. An imaginary analyst, employed either by an interested non-Catholic power in, for instance, A-CIA (The Anti-Catholic Information Association) or, let us say, by the Constantinople CAND (Catholic Analysis and Development Center) might have quickly dismissed the common doctrine as an irrelevant factor to his analysis, especially since, being external to it, he would find it difficult to grasp the doctrine's special universalizing function of self-identification. The analyst, furthermore, would have been very conscious of the relatively recent split in Catholicism, and might hence have tended to interpret every limited scrap of evidence, culled from Jansenist pamphlets or from discreet Jesuit or Franciscan "leaks," as signalling the likelihood of a new rupture. Internal doctrinal deviation coupled with evidences of internal strategic differences, based in part on nationalism, would have seemed to augur a dark future for the international movement's organizational unity.

#### IV

Perhaps certain lessons relevant to analysis of developments within contemporary Communism are to be learned from this very brief survey, and they may even serve as a modest point of departure towards a "doctrinal conflict and deviation-control manual." International Communism, a doctrinally oriented movement of various nationally based Communist parties, is inevitably involved in perpetual internal bargaining designed to establish common doctrines, common strategies, and to resolve conflicting interests or views. Since the CPSU is still by far the most powerful and authoritative party,<sup>59</sup> it follows that its basic preoccupa-

tion is with minimizing doctrinal divisions and with preventing any one unit from assuming the stance of outraged doctrinal self-righteousness. Harmonious unity avoids situations which could lead to a challenge to that primacy. On the other hand, the various other units, and particularly those which have some claim to speak authoritatively, especially the CCP, by adopting doctrinally deviant positions and arguing about them with the center, indicate clearly that their purpose is to persuade the center to change its position even while preserving internal organizational unity. The very fact of argument indicates absence of a desire to defect but also signals the possibility of a challenge to unity. However, the dynamic of argument can subsequently generate sufficient heat to cause defiance, or defection or condemnation, *i.e.* the process of escalation.

The weaker but skillful deviant, therefore, especially in the beginning, acts as if there were no distinction between his and the center's doctrinal position, even if he should suspect that the center has strayed from the "truth." On the contrary, he studiously and monotonously reiterates his allegiance to the movement, while appealing to some earlier and mutually respected source of its doctrine. This forces the center either to tolerate the deviation, allowing it perhaps to spread, or to take the first step in joining the issue, in effect launching a process of argument which it naturally would prefer to avoid. The skillful deviant makes the choice difficult by his strategy of ambiguity—always implying the possibility of his returning to the position of doctrinal subordination while gradually consolidating his position and probing the international movement for other sources of support. This prevents the center from issuing public threats since the issuance in itself implies conflict and, with the center presumably wishing not to precipitate conflict, forces the center into silence. Informal threats, on the other hand, can be deflected by the deviant through equivocation, requests for further explanation, etc.

The deviant, furthermore, may protect himself against the center by using his assets of weakness or of fanaticism or both. "The asset of weakness" involves pleading sympathy with the center's doctrinal position but inability to enforce it. Thus the center is faced with a situation in which the alleged deviant pleads doctrinal orthodoxy in principle but deviates doctrinally in practice. The choice then is

<sup>59</sup> There is an inclination in some quarters to exaggerate the present power of the CCP. It is to be remembered that China's general backwardness, overpopulation, economic difficulties, etc. all place it in a position *vis-a-vis* the USSR analogous in many respects to that of India *vis-a-vis* the United States in the non-Communist world. It is curious that when India is discussed its over-

population is normally mentioned as a factor of weakness. When talk shifts to China, then the same factor is normally mentioned as proof of China's power.



whether to punish the deviant for a situation which he, indeed, perhaps truly may not be able to control. For instance, the University of Louvain pleaded lack of competence to enforce a Papal Bull against the Jansenists while not questioning the validity of the Bull.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, Gomulka accepted in principle socialism in agriculture but pleaded that he could not enforce collectivization.<sup>61</sup>

"The asset of fanaticism," *i.e.*, being more doctrinally extreme than the center, restrains the center by implying to it that the deviant "has his heart in the right place but is a little extreme." The effect is similar to that achieved by the advantage of ignorance in a mixed-motive game "if it is recognized and taken into account by an opponent."<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, within a doctrinally oriented movement the fanatic usually can protect himself by "literalism," *i.e.*, by citing texts, thereby forcing the center into the more difficult position of having to prove that its own novel interpretations, often necessitated by changing social conditions, are still in "the proper spirit" of the doctrine.<sup>63</sup> The fanaticism, furthermore, carries with it a degree of commitment which may inhibit the center's reaction out of fear of

prompting an irrational defiance by the deviant.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, under certain circumstances, it may even be advantageous for one of the protagonists, usually the weaker, to acquire some uncertainty about himself in order to minimize predictability: *e.g.*, the alleged Jesuit reputation for "duplicity" or the inscrutability and vagueness of the Chinese Communists. (Apparently the Soviets have complained that the Chinese use of aphorisms is complicating "comradely" discussions.)

Lastly, the deviant in order to support his position can mobilize non-doctrinal commitments which then are cloaked in the doctrinal mantle. It is noteworthy that Luther, Arnauld, Tito, Mao and Hoxha, all of whom would consider themselves as strict exponents of the doctrine, used nationalism as a source of power to buttress their doctrinally deviant positions.

In responding skillfully, the center must be careful to take advantage of those factors in the posture of the deviant which inhibit the potentially dynamic escalation of deviation into defiance or defection.<sup>65</sup> As long as the deviant

<sup>60</sup> This tactic was used by the University of Louvain when confronted by instructions from Rome. See Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 31, p. 263.

<sup>61</sup> The center can also use this dodge to protect itself against claims. For instance, the public Soviet emphasis on achieving a higher standard of living can be seen as a form of commitment to a third party (*i.e.*, its own people) which makes it difficult for the Soviet Union to respond fully to the demands of its allies for economic aid. *E.g.*, when China demands greater aid, the Soviet leadership can point to its public commitment as an excuse for not giving it.

<sup>62</sup> T. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 161.

<sup>63</sup> Khrushchev had to face this difficulty in 1960 when criticized by the Chinese. He responded that "If we act like children who, studying the alphabet, compile words from letters, we shall not go very far. Marx, Engels and Lenin created their immortal works which will not fade away in centuries. . . . On the basis of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism we must think ourselves, profoundly study life, analyze the present situation and draw the conclusions which benefit the common cause of communism." (Speech of June 21, 1960). The more "revisionist" the position, the more difficult it is to resist "literalist" criticisms. The Chinese warned that "as pupils of Lenin and as Leninists, we must utterly smash all attempts of the modern revisionists to distort and carve up the teachings of Lenin." (*Red Flag*, No. 8, 1960.)

<sup>64</sup> This gives the physically weaker but more extreme deviant a bargaining advantage. If, for instance, in the Sino-Soviet dispute the Soviet and Chinese preferences were as follows:

#### *Soviet*

- (1) Only Moscow speaks for the movement on doctrinal issues.
- (2) Neither speaks; *i.e.*, agreement to silence.
- (3) Both speak, *i.e.*, open dispute.
- (4) Only Peking speaks, *i.e.*, capitulation.

#### *Chinese*

- (1) Only Peking speaks. . . .
- (2) Both speak, *i.e.*, open dispute.
- (3) Neither speaks.
- (4) Only Moscow speaks, *i.e.*, capitulation.

then, using game theory, the advantage would rest with the Chinese. See R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York, 1958), pp. 146-149 for alternative mathematical calculations, on the basis of a payoff matrix, of relative scales of advantage. (The above example is adapted from their use of two individuals resolving a problem of conflicting choices.)

<sup>65</sup> The center must watch out against the danger that a precipitous condemnation of the deviant can actually force distantly potential deviants into deviation. For instance, the Dominicans feared that condemnation of Jansenism would reflect on them (Pastor, *op. cit.*, vol. 29, p. 118). Might not some Communist parties object to an explicit condemnation of the dogmatists for fear that this would reflect on them as well?

acknowledges the principle of organizational unity, the organization enjoys a long-range advantage. Deviants die, the organizations go on.<sup>66</sup> But if the center abandons self-restraint, and cuts off the heretical limb before waiting for it to wither, the limb may sprout its own roots and grow into a tree. That was Stalin's mistake with Tito which Khrushchev has so far avoided with Mao. An open condemnation, furthermore, involves an irrevocable doctrinal commitment, creating a gulf which subsequently may be very difficult to bridge without the outright capitulation of one of the parties. Khrushchev discovered this when seeking a reconciliation with Tito.

Restraint, furthermore, is more advisable in the case of fanatical, fundamentalist deviants than in the case of those who wish to moderate and dilute the doctrine. The former, in the final analysis, can still be counted as adherents to the common doctrine in terms of still being *against* (and even more so) the common enemy. In the latter case, the shift is toward the camp of the enemy. But even in the latter case, the deviant is normally very careful to avoid any identification with the enemy and, as long as this is the case, the internally unifying doctrinal self-identification still exercises pressures for unity.<sup>67</sup>

An open condemnation of doctrinal heresy should either accompany or follow the physical liquidation of the deviant. Issuing it in the expectation that it will cause his liquidation or submission is not likely to be effective if the deviant enjoys local, nationally based organizational backing and is given no choice but to mobilize it for the defense of his position and

life.<sup>67a</sup> Rather, since early in the game the deviant normally wishes to avoid a schism<sup>68</sup> but is also concerned with proving to his own local organization that it must swim or sink with him, and since furthermore there are normally groups within his organization which would like to displace him and can take advantage of the friction with the center to attempt to do so, it is to the center's advantage to pose as the moderate party seeking reconciliation. Doctrinal arguments, even if covert, lead to the doctrinal crystallization of the deviant's position, which tends to be quite rigid once it has taken shape. Restraint gives opposition elements within the deviating local unit an opportunity to argue that their deviant leadership is recklessly and unnecessarily rupturing the international organization's unity. A useful device here might be to invite the deviating leader for conversations with the center: this puts the option up to him—to refuse to go is to take the initiative in splitting; to go is to take a certain personal risk.<sup>69</sup> The desirable quality of ambivalence in this invitation would be increased if the past record could not provide the deviant with much certainty of either a safe return home or an untimely demise.<sup>70</sup>

As long as the deviant still sees himself as part of a doctrinally bound family, fear of isolation is a powerful restraining factor available to the center. Just as Rome took advantage of the loyalty of the peripheries to subtly restrain the French, so Moscow in 1960 attempted to isolate the Chinese and the Albanians. Here the fanatics are more vulnerable than the moderates since they have nowhere else to go. For this reason an outright condemnation should be delayed, while the fear of it, to which even a deviant is susceptible since he still sees himself as sharing in the common undertaking, should not be diluted by threats. Besides, partial direct reactions (*e.g.*,

<sup>66</sup> For this reason, posthumous personalization of deviation has some merit since it allows room for hope that unity ultimately will be restored. However, premature personalization runs the risk that emotion may obscure reason. We might thus distinguish between spontaneous, personal conflict—one involving the role of personal antipathy or of personality which tends to become emotional, direct, and all-out; and protracted, institutional conflict, which leaves greater room for skilled management and more tacit bargaining (*cf.* Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 21).

<sup>67</sup> See Modelski, *op. cit.*, p. 67, for in-system conflict resolution. It is revealing to observe that after the Suez crisis, the British Conservative and Labour Parties were also much more lenient with their respective "fundamentalist" deviants than with their "moderates." See L. D. Epstein, "British M.P.s and their Local Parties: the Suez Cases," this REVIEW, June, 1960, esp. pp. 381-385.

<sup>67a</sup> Alternatively, it might be issued when the opponent is already in the process of being defeated. Presumably this was why Abraham Lincoln, who had insisted earlier that preservation of the Union, not slavery, was the issue in the Civil War, delayed the Emancipation Proclamation until after he had significant victory on the battle field to give it weight. (I am indebted to Professor Mansfield for this observation.)

<sup>68</sup> Luther, Arnault, Tito, Hoxha, all apparently started off with no desire to split.

<sup>69</sup> Arnault, Luther, Tito refused; Gomulka went in 1956; Hoxha apparently hesitated. Many of Gomulka's friends urged him not to go.

<sup>70</sup> This might be called the center's asset of inconsistently uncivilized behavior.

counter-arguments) on the center's part have the double disadvantage of suggesting weakness and of stimulating further disagreement; thus, the suspended and undiluted fear of condemnation is a better deterrent in a situation which has no easy way out. This may be true even if the deviant, aware of his importance (e.g., China), doubts that the center would take such an extreme step: he may doubt it but he cannot be certain.<sup>71</sup> Dilution increases his security and hence impunity.

Indirect and ostensibly irrelevant reactions are another weapon of doctrinal conflict, in addition to the techniques of "indirect-type dialogue" and "enemy-by-analogy" already mentioned. Avoiding any *direct* relevance to the issues at stake and formally maintaining the position that no disagreement is involved, such reactions can convey the center's displeasure without permitting the deviant to assume the pose of the aggrieved party and to mobilize local support which becomes convinced that it has no choice but to resist the center. Slowing down economic aid, granting fewer honors (but still granting *some*), addressing anniversary greetings to the unit but failing to mention its leaders, downgrading the deviant's doctrinal standing—these are insufficient to provoke a rupture but can weaken the internal position of the deviant and provoke factional struggle within his realm.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, if the issue is sufficiently acute, it may be advisable to select some insignificant section of the international movement for forceful condemnation and destruction as a lesson to others. Failure to liquidate rapidly and physically the moderate Gomulka in 1956 (which presumably could have been done, although at unpredictable risks) gave the fanatical Hoxha a certain amount of security in 1961.<sup>73</sup> And Hoxha's condemnation in 1961 or 1962, while creating a new split, would at least have the effect of increasing credibility for Soviet seriousness while putting before the Chinese the

difficult option of responding, or not, to an accomplished fact which ostensibly does not concern them.<sup>73a</sup>

But even if the center decides to take such an indirect, but extreme, step as condemning Hoxha to influence the behaviour of the more important Mao, it is still desirable to find means of giving Mao some advance warning, sufficiently ambiguous to prevent a counter-warning but clear enough so that the step itself cannot be subsequently interpreted as an effort to take Mao by surprise. Irrevocable, surprise moves, such as a sudden condemnation, intensify the conflict by eliminating the stabilizing factor of mutual anticipation. They are only desirable in a post-defiance or defection situation, *i.e.*, in a case of outright conflict.<sup>74</sup>

The foregoing "praxeology"<sup>75</sup> of deviation control is derived from the mixed-motives character of doctrinal conflict. Significantly, in such conflict the opponents have generally tried to keep their disagreements confidential; and sometimes even after a doctrinal rupture they have cooperated in protecting the internal secrets of the movement from "outsiders."<sup>76</sup> Secrecy not only gives them a certain flexibility and allows them room for maneuver; its cause is more deep seated than that. It is rooted in their mutually shared sense of distinctiveness as compared to the rest of the world and in the self-restraint imposed on them also by the very existence of that world. Both China and the USSR think of the United States every time they exchange mutual accusations, and the United States cannot help but restrain deviationist tendencies within Communism. Furthermore, if the movement as a whole is experiencing the self-invigorating sense of fulfillment in its mission of world expansion,<sup>77</sup> the divisive

<sup>71</sup> See Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 115, for a discussion of the role of "inherently unknowable factors."

<sup>72</sup> Thus, for example, the general theme that no country can build socialism alone (with its implied threat of isolation of China) was certainly more credible when quietly accompanied by illustrative steps—gradual shutting off of her supplies, etc.

<sup>73</sup> This has resulted in a paradoxical situation whereby Tito, who is outside the Communist orbit, is closer to Khrushchev than Hoxha, who is within it. See the excellent discussion in W. E. Griffith, "Peiping, Tirana and Moscow," *East Europe*, July 1961.

<sup>73a</sup> This paper was submitted for publication prior to the open Soviet attack on Albania in October 1961, and not revised in the light of subsequent events.

<sup>74</sup> The sudden Soviet move against the Chinese in Bucharest in the summer of 1960 did much to intensify the bitterness.

<sup>75</sup> The fullest and most systematic treatment of the nature of praxeology (principles of correct, rational decisions) is in T. Kotarbinski, *Traktat o dobrej robocie* (Warsaw, 1955).

<sup>76</sup> The Yugoslavs are a good example.

<sup>77</sup> See Modelski, *op. cit.*, p. 23 for a discussion of system-orientation towards expansion. The analogy here is between the attitude of a given Communist state, even a deviant one, toward a general Communist expansion, and the attitude of a Christian state toward the crusades.

tendencies within tend to be submerged by the political momentum of its forward thrust and by the emotional satisfaction of personal triumph on the part of the individual members.

The stabilizing effects inherent in the common doctrine, which provides a mutually understood framework for communication,<sup>78</sup> and of the conflict-limiting factor of distinctiveness, which makes alliances outside the doctrine very difficult, are at their greatest if the international organization possesses an acknowledged doctrinal arbiter. An organization built around an absolute dogma requires this arbiter to avoid splits. The church as an organization sought him by rooting Papal authority in the dogma of infallibility. Indeed Catholicism probably preserved itself as a major unified force by taking that step. Otherwise, it might have become a loose federation of various national units, with very differing doctrinal commitments. Stalin's infallibility derived only from an authority which rested primarily on power, and the remaining vestiges of both were destroyed by Khrushchev in 1956. One may justifiably speculate (leaving Soviet domestic considerations apart) whether Khrushchev's position with *international* Communism would not have been stronger today if he had not destroyed the element of legitimacy inherent in his own past Stalinism and in his successorship to Stalin.

As it is, the recent divisions between the Chinese and the Soviets, while still restrained by the factors mentioned above, necessarily become contests for doctrinal primacy. The relationship is thus different from the Franciscan-Jesuit conflict which could ultimately be resolved through their mutual recognition of Papal authority, just as the 1957 tensions of the East Germans and the Czechs with the Poles could be arbitrated by Moscow, especially after the November 1957 reaffirmation of Soviet leadership. The ability of the Chinese to act in spite of Soviet guidance, and the eventual proclamation in December 1960 of the CPSU's *non-leadership*<sup>79</sup> mean that doctrinal divisions can no longer be effectively arbitrated, but only negotiated, within the organization. This is a politically grave liability, inhibiting expeditious deviation control.

This liability, however, is balanced by two factors. First, the Communist doctrine is so

<sup>78</sup> This was well illustrated by the difficulties encountered by Westerners in deciphering the various moves by Tito in 1955-1957 and by the Chinese more recently.

<sup>79</sup> Brzezinski, "The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc," *op. cit.*, for a discussion.

action-oriented that pure, abstract issues (such as those raised by the Jansenists) do not become the fulcrum of disputes. True, to western pragmatists even the discussion of the nature of imperialism or of the transition to Communism, or of the nature of our era, may already appear to involve relatively abstract, unreal issues, and the tendency to discuss them as matters of general principle seems entirely alien to a western observer. Nevertheless, these issues are far more closely related to material reality than some of the issues raised by the Jansenists, and they furthermore do serve as points of departure for action.<sup>80</sup> Thus while the absence of a recognized arbiter doubtless stimulates acute tensions,<sup>81</sup> at the same time the rapid pace of events in our age permits a much more rapid testing in action of the alternative doctrinal approaches, thereby establishing a somewhat more objective standard of judgment. This seems already to have happened in the Sino-Soviet dispute.<sup>82</sup>

Second, the absence of an arbiter is at least partially offset by the CPSU's constant efforts to establish itself, again through practice, as the unit of the international movement closest to the stage of doctrine-fulfillment. Its emphasis on "objective" material demonstration of this proximity is designed to ward off possible challenges based on such "subjective" factors as mass zeal and revolutionary will. At the same time, space achievements help to underline the Soviet Union's primacy by underscoring its technical leadership in an age of technology and science. Both of the foregoing factors tend to compensate for the absence of a formally recognized doctrinal arbiter, and give the USSR a privileged position.

Another difficulty which both international movements have experienced involves the ten-

<sup>80</sup> R. S. Tarn, "Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy," *International Journal*, Autumn, 1950; Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York, 1962), ch. 4. See also the symposium on ideology in A. Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York, 1960).

<sup>81</sup> A good discussion is in R. Lowenthal's contribution to his volume with Hudson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> See A. Halpern, "The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism," RAND Mimeograph Study 2026, July 1960; D. Zagoria, "Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas," *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1961; T. Thornton, "Peking, Moscow and the Underdeveloped Areas," *World Politics*, July 1961; A. Whiting, "Moscow and Peking: Suspended Dialogue?", *Current Scene*, June 21, 1961.

dency already noted in this paper, for doctrinal deviations to support themselves on a national base. Since nationalism is still intense, and since international Communism is composed of nation-states and nationally based parties, Communism is particularly exposed to its challenge. Stalin's solution, to put it most simply, was to suppress it. The violent and divisive reaction which this prompted has resulted in a far more sophisticated approach, which aims at providing such close underlying economic and social ties that eventually national interdependence will make national-based deviation much more difficult to sustain. At the same time, all the elites make a great effort to educate their future successors in the common doctrine and strive to develop in them a sense of common identification.

Looking into the future it may be worth remembering that deviation is the rule in doctrinally oriented international movements. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which such an international movement, action-oriented and composed of a variety of homogeneous units, each with a special interest, national perspective and power, could avoid internal doctrinal conflicts, with some units deviating one way or another. The ebb and flow of this persisting condition can be described as a dynamic state of *divergent unity*. This condition arises because the movement cannot avoid the process of differentiation, which is a function both of scale and of its having become an international organization. A triumphantly expanding doctrinal movement, with an allegedly universally valid program, can be said to go successively through a stage of universalization, with its principles accepted or imposed almost *in toto* on other societies; and then, when these societies develop their own doctrinal elites, a stage of particularization. The clash of the two, with its occasionally painful adjustments, may result in the retention of the universal doctrine and of unity, but with a far greater degree of diversity permitted within the international movement. Otherwise, the alternative is an open split. The common but originally absolutist doctrine thus gradually becomes relativized.

This relativization slowly dissipates doctrinal vitality. It vitiates the dichotomic sense of distinctiveness from non-members, and weakens the concomitant fanaticism. More than this, it can in turn cause within some units of the international organization a process of erosion of the doctrine to the point where the doctrine gradually becomes an empty, formal vessel, even if currency is still given to some time-honored slogans. At the same time, in

others, by a process of reaction, it may then prompt outraged doctrinal revivalisms and, depending on the nature of the general world context, cause more or less intense clashes.

Focusing more specifically on international Communism, it is hence most unlikely that the international scene will soon see a realignment of forces which pits, as some seem to expect, a Soviet-American coalition against the Chinese Communists. For this to happen a major domestic transformation of the Soviet system would be necessary, with its Communist elite losing all hope of Communist victory, in effect moving over into the doctrinal position of its erstwhile enemies, and consequently giving up its doctrinal claim to domestic power. This transformation could only occur in conditions of prolonged international stability. A lengthy international stalemate, with its dangerous implications of doctrinal boredom, is the condition most likely to lead to major internal stresses in international Communism, with potentially excessive reactions on the part of the more impatient units. However, such an impasse is very unlikely since it would have to include not only the so-called western world but also the underdeveloped areas which at the moment seem to offer the best revolutionary prospects.

In the more likely condition of dynamic international change, either involving developments increasing the sense of Communist momentum or events which seem to them to imply a turning of the tide against Communism, the pressures for unity may be fed by optimistic feelings of doctrine-fulfillment or by the quest for mutual security. Admittedly, the forward thrust of expansion can produce its own divisive reactions: for instance, the more radical members may begin to urge even more energetic steps to accelerate the process. But it appears highly unlikely that the division would be deep enough to make one of the units take the ultimate initiative of splitting or eventually even siding with the "historically doomed" enemies. More acute difficulties could occur in the event of sustained defeats, with mutual accusations of ineptness, lack of commitment, etc. generated by them. However, it is likely that the very conflict with the outside enemy which led to such defeats would have intensified the hostility of the members of the movement for their enemies, thus helping to contain the divisive pressures.

Of course, unforeseen factors can intervene in any of these hypothetical projections. Clumsy responses by either side can promote splits since they contribute to the escalation of conflict. The succession problem is also an unpredictable factor.

240077

A sudden change in Moscow or in Peking could intensify the conflict by getting it involved in the succession-struggle. On the other hand, to the extent that the existing deviation may be a function of personal animosity among the leaders, the divergence could actually narrow. To predict this one would have to know much more about the personal relations prevailing among the Communist leaders.<sup>83</sup> On the whole, however, it may be said that the inherent and normal deviations are (1) least likely to generate acute conflicts when the movement is engaged offensively and is successful; (2) more so when the movement is on the defensive; (3) most likely in conditions of frustrating stalemate. Furthermore, till now, the relatively rare cases of major defection or

expulsion have not only occurred in conditions of relative stalemate, but they probably could have been avoided if the parties involved especially the center, had been less inept and more flexible. Finally, both parties have usually regretted the split, especially since an expansion-oriented doctrinal movement cherishes its dynamic sense of statistical or territorial growth. A break inescapably involves a doctrinally embarrassing retrogression, and experience has shown that it is very hard to repair.

Provided the leaders exercise a minimum of skill in deviation-control, along the lines sketched above, splits can be avoided. At the same time, the very appearance of divergent unity, with its reliance on deviation control to prevent splits, is a reflection of the very gradual underlying process of differentiation relativization and erosion. Each successful case of deviation control involves perhaps only a small measure of further doctrinal relativization, but it still always involves some. Through this relativization the doctrinal movement as a whole eventually may lose some of its overt militancy. Hence it appears that deviations contained but not crushed, are the handmaidens of history, stimulating the inevitable internal evolution of doctrinal movements.

<sup>83</sup> An obvious rule-of-thumb runs as follows: the death of friendly leaders always makes relations worse; the death of unfriendly leaders can improve them if the conflict has not become institutionalized by organizational clashes. For some recent discussions of the problem of succession, see: R. Conquest, *Power and Policy—USSR* (New York, 1960); H. Hinton, "The Succession Problem in Communist China," *Current Scene*, July 19, 1961; M. Rush, *The Khrushchev Succession Problem*, RAND Mimeograph Study 2283, 1961.

## THE MARKET FOR STRATEGIC IDEAS IN BRITAIN: THE "SANDYS ERA"

LAURENCE W. MARTIN  
*School for Advanced International Studies,  
The Johns Hopkins University*

Britain and the United States have long taken an intense mutual interest in the methods by which they arrive at a defense policy and the two countries have frequently borrowed from each other's experience. In the last few years the British scene has been worthy of special attention because Britain has faced, in a peculiarly acute form, the universal military problem of limited resources and extensive commitments. Recently Conservative governments have tried to resolve this dilemma by plunging heavily for certain strategies and weapons: as a Minister of Defence told the Commons, "We have to pick the winners out of the stable."<sup>1</sup>

To set a crude financial ceiling and leave the selection of strategy and design of forces wholly to bargaining among the services is frequently regarded as an invitation to aimlessness. An obvious and tempting remedy is to compel the services to conform to a single, coherent and supposedly economical strategic doctrine. This solution carries its own risks of neglecting important aspects of the total problem and of discouraging flexible response to experience. Such a risk is especially serious in a field, such

as military policy in peacetime, where there can rarely be conclusive practical tests of policy. Thus the more one searches for comprehensive strategic answers, the more important it is to enquire whether strategic ideas are debated in a market wide and open enough to offer every possible assurance of conceiving and evaluating alternatives. The recent course of British policy is of interest in this respect.

### I. DEFENSE BY BARGAINING: THE PATTERN BEFORE SUEZ

The history of British defense organization at the top since establishment of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1902-4 has largely been one of proliferating committees deriving authority from a central fount of power in the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and always claiming to preserve the principle that planning must lie with those responsible for execution. Putting the wartime expedient of a Minister of Defence on a permanent footing in 1945 followed precedent, for the new official<sup>2</sup> was essentially a deputy to the Prime Minister for coordinating the Services. His Ministry was a small secretariat chiefly engaged in assisting the network of committees which now supported the new Defence Committee of the Cabinet. This Committee was itself served by a reduced military section of the Cabinet Office.<sup>3</sup> The most important of the subcommittees, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) retained its primary responsibility to the Cabinet rather than to the new Minister. Among the other committees were and are a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) under a Foreign Office chairman, a Defence Research Policy Committee under the Chief Scientist to the Ministry, and the Joint Planning Committee, composed of the Service Directors of Plans, under which worked the Joint Staff. This Staff reported to the CSC but preserved the

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this paper the term "official" is used to refer to those connected with Government, not in the special British sense of a civil servant as distinguished from a politician.

<sup>3</sup> Many members of the Ministry of Defence are seconded temporarily from the Service Ministries; the Cabinet Office in turn draws on the Service Ministries and on the Ministry of Defence.

<sup>1</sup> *H. C. Debs.*, Feb. 29, 1960, col. 861.

The sources are never adequate in dealing with a period so recent and a system so addicted to secrecy. While most of the facts that follow can be found in the public record, I have had to rely on many conversations with well informed participants for guidance as to which parts of the record are reliable. I cannot cite most of the individuals because they still hold official posts. They included a diverse collection of experts, such as ministers, leaders of Opposition, back-benchers, official scientists, staff officers, senior civil servants, defense correspondents and others. I can express my thanks to the Hon. Alastair Buchan and the staff of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Bt., Mr. Richard Crossman, M.P., Admiral Sir Richard Denny, Mr. John Grant, Mr. Michael Howard, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor. The original work on this subject was made possible by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. None who helped me is at all responsible for any particular statement of mine.

service identity of its members and, with the exception of a minute secretariat, worked in the respective service ministries.<sup>4</sup>

It is a feature of the British system, sometimes envied by others, to conceal both its methods and its achievements. But results cannot be hidden forever and the performance of the postwar machinery was disappointing. As a result a number of modifications were in the making even before the Suez crisis of 1956 precipitated some far-reaching changes.

The chief failing of the system appears to have been the typical tendency of committees to decide by compromise rather than reason. Though the postwar years saw an understandable shift of resources to the air arm, the allocation of money year by year seems to have proceeded more on the basis of "fair shares" than a coherent overall strategic plan. The CSC was, in fact, unable to agree on such a plan. During Field Marshal Montgomery's tenure as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), apparently almost the only subject on which the CSC reached agreement easily was their common distaste for the Minister of Defence. Even then they quarrelled over an effort to oust him.

Making allowances for the author's contentious nature, Montgomery's *Memoirs* present a convincing picture of indecision and service jealousy. An acute shortage of funds aggravated competition by each service to maintain its appropriation, minimize the importance of other service contributions, and seize—and then frequently neglect—weapon systems which fell between the defined roles of services. A constant disagreement existed between the Army, which was anxious to secure adequate airlift, and the R.A.F. which preferred to spend its money on fighting aircraft. The Navy made repeated efforts, especially in 1954, to take over Coastal Command. Both Army and R.A.F. were sceptical of the Navy's expenditure on carriers, and a bitterly fought battle was waged between the R.A.F. and the Army as to control of certain classes of ground-to-air missiles.

Such competition for funds particularly discouraged innovation or production of "hardware", for the contest naturally took place at the margins and consequently turned in concrete fact on the survival of the least deeply rooted programs, the more so as a result of the

very high "house-keeping" expenses imposed by universal military service.<sup>5</sup> Shortage of money was also a temptation to defer development for fear of precluding later possibilities. Thus the vice of preparing for the last war was joined by that of getting ready for the next but one. There was in fact very little weapon development other than that of the atomic bomb during the 'forties, and this is particularly true for the Army.<sup>6</sup>

During his years as CIGS, from 1946 to 1948, Montgomery made a number of efforts to persuade the CSC to reach agreement on a coherent strategic plan. In particular he wanted the CSC to lay down guidelines, give more positive instructions to the joint planners and abandon their tendency merely to rule on the planners' proposals. His decisive failure led him to recommend a further centralization of planning very similar to that later adopted. "We need a unified defence policy," he wrote in 1948. "We have not got one and we have no hope of getting one with our present system."<sup>7</sup>

If the CSC was rarely successful in arriving at a comprehensive view of national security policy in the early postwar years, its political masters did little to extract a decision from the Committee or impose one on it. Most members of the Labour Governments were not greatly interested and the Prime Minister, while personally much attracted by military affairs, was heavily engaged by economic and diplomatic crises. When Churchill returned to be his own Minister of Defence once more, he found it difficult to adjust to the peacetime necessities of management. After him, Conservative ministers of defense suffered rapid obsolescence, so that there were eight in as many years.<sup>8</sup>

For many postwar years governments were apparently content to set an overall financial ceiling on defense, to lay down policy on certain matters of great domestic political significance such as National Service, to rule on possible applications of force, as at Abadan and Buraimi, but to leave the allocation of the

<sup>4</sup> The most recent and by far the most comprehensive history of the formal system is Franklyn A. Johnson, *Defence by Committee, The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959*, London, 1960. This excellent informative history does not deal in any detail with developments after 1956.

<sup>5</sup> Some critics also believe the system of handling research and development through a separate Ministry of Supply (MOS) also hindered provision of equipment, by encouraging overspecification by the services and inflation of research and development costs by the MOS, which had no interest in output.

<sup>6</sup> On this see the account of Christopher Soames, *H. C. Debs.*, March 1, 1960, cols. 1050 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *The Memoirs of F.M. The Viscount Montgomery* (London, 1958), p. 495.

<sup>8</sup> Churchill, Alexander, Macmillan, Selwyn Lloyd, Monckton, Head, Sandys, Watkinson.



available funds to the bargaining of the CSC. The overall ceiling itself was reached by annual negotiation between the services, the Minister of Defence and the Treasury, but one gathers the result was very largely predetermined by the economic plan of the Government. When large cuts in service demands were required, this was apparently done by the Ministry of Defence in a relatively crude, across-the-board fashion.<sup>9</sup> Each service strove with inadequate resources to fulfill its image of a Second World War force and the disputes in the CSC offered the government a series of unconnected disputes over allocation rather than a choice of strategies.

The opening of the 1950s brought several challenges to this system. A practical test came with the Korean War, on the outset of which, according to the admission of the Minister of Defence at the time, a 400,000-man Army had grave difficulty in putting together one combat brigade, even though the logistical "tail" was provided by America.<sup>10</sup> The program of rearmament which the Labour Government undertook at American urging brought home the costs of defense in an exacerbated form, entailing sacrifices of men and money that soon came to be regarded as politically unbearable and economically dangerous. At the same juncture the accession of a new Party to office facilitated consideration of change. Moreover a fortuitous collection of mutually tolerable personalities on the CSC, including Sir John Slessor as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), a vigorous individual with a taste for broad strategic speculation, encouraged a departure from recent practice in devising recommendations to the government. The CSC set themselves aside for a few weeks and drew up an overall review of defense resulting in a policy centered on

nuclear deterrence;<sup>11</sup> a proposal stimulated by the burden of the goals envisaged in NATO's program of conventional rearmament, and by the long-awaited fruition of Britain's nuclear effort. These decisions were accepted by the Cabinet and reflected later in the White Papers of 1953 and 1954.<sup>12</sup>

This departure was also accompanied by some improvement in liaison with the Foreign Office, whose representative on the CSC at the time was a personal friend of Slessor's. Also, contrary to practice, the review of defense had apparently received formal Foreign Office approval before reaching the Cabinet. Although working relations on day-to-day concerns are uniformly agreed to be excellent between the Foreign Office and the services, with intelligence handled by the JIC under Foreign Office leadership, it was widely felt that forward planning left something to be desired. An improvement was made here when, in 1950, a committee to coordinate British policy within NATO was set up under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Cabinet, with representatives from the Foreign Office, the CSC, the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence.<sup>13</sup>

This achievement made Slessor as firm a champion of the CSC system as Montgomery was a critic.<sup>14</sup> But, leaving to one side the merits of the policy of deterrence adopted, its design owed much to fortuitous circumstances. Nor were the decisions as thoroughgoing as might appear, for, because the task of building the bombs and bombers had only begun, the bills were not yet coming in and their size was unsuspected. Thus while the positive decisions had perhaps been made, the more difficult task of pruning elsewhere had not yet begun in earnest. The role of the Army and Navy was not yet under full assault and they were left undefined scope in the notion of "broken-backed" warfare which emerged in the same White Papers.

<sup>9</sup> See Emanuel Shinwell's account of the 1951 budgetary process in *H. C. Debs.*, July 28, 1958, col. 1002. The Permanent Secretary and his staff, and particularly the Chief Scientist, were frequently the actual decision makers at the margin. Even those who claim a united recommendation by the CSC to be virtually irresistible—and such recommendations were not too common—make an exception for cases where the military view calls for overall increases in defense expenditure and where Treasury restraint is powerfully backed in the Cabinet by a natural reluctance of all other departments to see a larger slice of revenue for the military accommodated by a cut in their own budgets. Aneurin Bevan's resignation during the Korean War is an exception to prove this rule.

<sup>10</sup> *H. C. Debs.*, Feb. 28, 1961, col. 1458.

<sup>11</sup> This is the paper which, as advocated by Slessor in the U.S. is said to have been rejected by the Truman Chiefs, but resuscitated under Eisenhower as the germ of the "New Look." See *inter alia*, B. H. Liddell Hart, *Defence or Deterrence* (London, 1960), pp. 18–20, and Alastair Buchan, "Their Bomb and Ours," *Encounter*, October, 1958.

<sup>12</sup> Cmd. 8768, 9075.

<sup>13</sup> Max Beloff, *New Dimensions in Foreign Policy* (New York, 1961), p. 54. This book is an excellent source of information on many aspects of British administration.

<sup>14</sup> See his memoirs, *The Central Blue* (New York, 1957), pp. 450–63.

It therefore should not have been surprising that the allocation of resources still presented an increasingly severe problem when Sir Anthony Eden became Prime Minister in 1955. In July, after Eden took over, Selwyn Lloyd, then Minister of Defence, projected the expense of armed forces of 700,000 men—100,000 less than existing numbers—for five years as a basis for long range planning. The resulting estimate of a 30 per cent rise in costs indicated the need for major changes and in 1956 Eden inaugurated an elaborate review of defense policy by a small Cabinet sub-committee.<sup>15</sup> While motivated by the need for economy, Eden hoped the review would help to put planning on a basis more satisfactory than the "annual exchanges between the Treasury and the fighting Services," which clearly were in his opinion the primary determinant of the national military posture. Eden also appreciated the weakness which ministers of defense had shown in the determination of policy and attempted to remedy this by announcing, in October, 1955, an expanded interpretation of the minister's role, to include ensuring that the "composition and balance" of each service conformed to the government's policy. At the same time he created the office of chairman of the CSC. This officer (the first incumbent was the senior chief, Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir William Dickson) was to report the views of the CSC to the Minister, but the chief public justification for his creation was the expanding demands upon the CSC for representation on international bodies.<sup>16</sup> As an immediate start on revising the substance of military policy the Government announced reduction of the forces from 800,000 to 700,000 men. Privately, the review of 1956 led Eden to plan for reduction to about 450,000 by 1960 or 1961, accompanied by the abolition of conscription. This was to be

made possible by more wholehearted commitment to nuclear deterrence.<sup>17</sup>

The motive of Eden's activity was immediately economic, but it had occasioned a much more than usually intense interference with the characteristics rather than just the overall cost of the services. Thus the indecision of the military seemed to be inviting initiative from above. Already in the early 'fifties, senior civil servants in the Ministry of Defence had been playing a more positive role as the arbitrator of interservice disputes. The Chief Scientist proved particularly useful for settling issues ostensibly on technical grounds but frequently merely to secure a decision. The DRPC became an agency where, in an effort to economize in technical manpower and research facilities, decisions were being taken that in effect governed the balance of forces.<sup>18</sup>

The measures Eden set on foot in response to these problems had had no chance to take effect when the Suez crisis erupted. Justifiable or not, the performance of the services in that operation was widely regarded as conclusive evidence of the dangers of "trying to get something of everything and succeeding in getting enough of nothing."<sup>19</sup> This disillusionment coupled with a new economic crisis and another new Prime Minister having an urgent need to refurbish his party's reputation, made understandable that a new look should be sought in defense policy.

## II. DEFENSE BY DOCTRINE: THE FORMULATION OF THE SANDYS' POLICY

Even after the tentative movement toward a policy of nuclear deterrence in White Paper since 1953, the *Outline of Future Policy* issued in April 1957 by Duncan Sandys, Minister of Defence in Harold Macmillan's new Cabinet, created the impression of being a new departure. In this respect it was accorded

<sup>15</sup> Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (Boston, 1960), pp. 415 ff.

<sup>16</sup> It should not go unremarked that the CSC was scarcely consulted about this innovation, which a number of officers suspected to be based more on a political desire to appear active with regard to defense than any well thought out theory of organization. The announcement was made to the Conservative Party conference. Sir John Slessor's critical view can be seen in *The Central Blue*, pp. 450 ff. Slessor believes a solemn commission should have been set up to review the whole system—such as preceded inauguration of the CSC in 1923—before tampering with existing methods.

<sup>17</sup> See in particular Eden's letter to Eisenhower, July 18, 1956, *Full Circle*, p. 417. Eden had been particularly impressed by the nuclear-mindedness of Khrushchev and Bulganin during their visit to London in 1955.

<sup>18</sup> An *ad hoc* Air Defence Committee under Sir Frederick Brundrett, then Deputy Chief Scientist, settled the ground-to-air missile controversy mentioned above.

<sup>19</sup> The phrase is John Strachey's from the 1955 defense debate. A senior British official describes the operation in a paraphrase of the R.A.F. motto, as "*per ardua ad hoc*."

<sup>20</sup> Cmnd. 124, accompanied by *Defence Statistics*, Cmnd. 130.

a general welcome, for the Suez affair had induced wide agreement among military commentators at least upon the need for a close scrutiny of existing programs.

The contents of Sandys' paper have become well known. Doctrinally it was characterized chiefly by frank recognition that active and passive protection of Britain against nuclear attack was impossible and that defense must therefore be by deterrence, with active defense limited to safeguarding retaliatory forces. Manned aircraft, both bombers and fighters, were to be replaced after existing generations by missiles. The "strike" part of this program rested heavily on hopes for the coming British intermediate range ballistic missile Blue Streak. This liquid-fueled rocket was to be entrenched in underground emplacements and to perform the "equalizing" function on Britain's behalf anticipated of thermonuclear weapons by Winston Churchill several years earlier. Ground forces were to be small, but this, it was alleged, would be offset by greater mobility and by nuclear weapons. An Army Strategic Reserve would be set up in Britain. National Service was to go and the armed forces were to be reduced to 375,000 men by 1962. The plan was presented as one for five years, which, it was claimed, perhaps paradoxically, would provide stability for planning and also flexibility for meeting changing circumstances.

All of this has attracted a great deal of notice. Less adequately recognized have been the distinctive manner in which Sandys created his policy and the changes which this and the subsequent process of implementation wrought in the defense machinery. Before examining how the Government came to select its course of action, however, it may be well to consider what alternatives were available to it.

It should already be clear that the new policy was no complete break with previous trends; commitment to a nuclear force was long established and the Eden Government had earlier decided in principle upon a reduction of forces to 450,000 and the ending of National Service. (The last two intentions, of course, had not been announced so that the public saw a dramatic cut from 700,000 to 375,000.) Nonetheless the policy was truly a bold one, for the fresh cuts carried some force levels below the very minimum which the professional military advisers would recommend, even with nuclear weapons, and thus finally accepted consequences which previous trends had only foreshadowed. Given the need for economy of national resources, the Government could presumably have selected two different courses.

It could have expanded military expenditures and cut consumption.<sup>21</sup> This would, however, have carried grave political risks for an already unstable regime and would not in itself have done anything to impose greater rationality on military planning. Nor would it have released certain scarce material and human resources needed for the export effort. Defense competed with exports as well as with domestic consumption and the Treasury's anxiety as to the health of the economy had been reflected in the Suez crisis, first as eagerness to regain control of the Canal and then, with the pound under pressure, as importunity to cease the operation. It was therefore not irrelevant that the former Chancellor was now Prime Minister.

Alternatively the Government could have abandoned the strategic nuclear effort and concentrated upon its conventional contribution to the Western alliance. But the nuclear force was firmly believed by ministers—and, indeed, by the CSC—to enhance national prestige and preserve an independence of action regarded as particularly desirable in view of what many regarded as America's treacherous abandonment of her allies during the Suez affair. Nuclear forces were also thought to increase positive British influence over the United States by undertaking a share in the task of deterrence and demonstrating technological skill. Moreover the strategic nuclear option was a policy for which both the weapons and a doctrine existed. The Chief Scientist, to whom recourse was had as the representative of professionalism untainted by service prejudice, greatly favored this doctrine which was, incidentally, the kind of "macro-strategy" appealing to and easily grasped by political leaders who are not specialists in military affairs. None of the Services was ready with an immediate alternative proposal of equal clarity or sweeping promise, while the technical obstacles to the policy were shrouded in the future.<sup>22</sup>

Yet another discouragement to emphasis on conventional force was the pressing anxiety to end conscription—felt both by the Government for political reasons, and by the Army in

<sup>21</sup> For the reality of this alternative, see A. C. L. Day, "The Economics of Defence," *Political Quarterly*, Jan.-March, 1960, pp. 57 ff. With a rising national product, of course, the decision to hold defense expenditure steady was to reduce the proportion spent on military affairs.

<sup>22</sup> This was the period in which Admiral Radford pressed the nuclear view in the U.S. and Franz Joseph Strauss cut back the proposed Bundeswehr.

order to end the constant wastage of training and personnel movements. The influence of this incentive would be hard to exaggerate. While the extra men denied to the Army in 1957 could statistically have been bled from a deemphasized R.A.F. or Navy, it was unlikely that in real life this could be done by voluntary recruitment.

If these were some of the considerations which appear to have weighed with the Government, the process by which the decision was taken displays an interesting interaction of personal, political and organizational influences.

Although the White Paper was discussed in a series of highly acrimonious meetings between the Minister and the Chiefs of Staff, it was very much the personal achievement of the Minister, who, on good account, paid scant regard to protests and on occasion refused even to consider dissenting papers. Such advice as the Minister did employ in his remarkable *tour de force*, which entailed some dozen drafts, came largely from senior civil officials of his Ministry, particularly the Chief Scientist, and—allegedly—from one Colonel Post, a personal confidant. Inspiration for the line taken came also from the Prime Minister, who had himself served a brief and unprofitable period as Minister of Defence and who had endowed his deputy with the more generously defined authority he would himself have liked. In an announcement to the House of Commons on January 24, 1957, the Prime Minister authorized the Minister of Defence to decide matters of general defense policy affecting the "size, shape, organization and disposal of the armed forces and their equipment and supply including defence research and development," and to interfere in matters of particular importance within each Service, all with a view to "a substantial reduction in expenditure and manpower." At the same time the Chairman of the CSC was given the parallel office of Chief of Staff to the Minister.

Each of the Service chiefs was unhappy with Sandys' policy. None questioned the principle of a British deterrent, but each, including the Chief of Air Staff, in whose hands the deterrent was primarily placed, deplored the effect of economy on his own Service. R.A.F. sentiment was by no means enamored of missiles, which spelt the end of pilots and aircraft, and the CAS, Sir Dermot Boyle, represented that "cavalry school" of air officer most attached to the traditional appearance of an air force. The Royal Navy came in for its share of cuts, but was less dissatisfied than might have been expected, for it retained big ships and a strate-

gic capability in its carriers, together with an anti-submarine mission. If the White Paper left the Navy's role somewhat obscure, this may not have been unwelcome to a Service which was not at the time provided with a strategic concept on which to build its future or with a better weapon than the carrier.<sup>23</sup> In contrast to the Navy, the Army was unreservedly distressed by the severe cuts proposed especially those in manpower, which would reduce numbers well below what it regarded as a minimum. As a result the CIGS was the unhappiest chief of all, engaged in sharp disputes with the Minister and reportedly only dissuaded from resignation by the reflection that his fellow chiefs would not join him and that an isolated demonstration would not prevail against the determination of ministers and the general enthusiasm for economy.

The disposition of the Army's case serves to illustrate the extent to which economic and political guidelines took precedence over military opinion in 1957. The new, all-regular, "streamlined" Army was to be 165,000 strong.<sup>24</sup> Under Antony Head, who became Minister of Defence in October, 1956, and had previously been Secretary of State for War, various studies and ministerial urgings had reconciled the Army to a strength of 200,000, the ultimate figure embodied in Eden's plans. This acceptance was based on use of Gurkhas in Asia, reductions of garrisons, severe weakness east of Suez and, in general, upon a number of optimistic assumptions as to capabilities and commitments. It also rested on promises of the very best equipment, tactical nuclear weapons and provision for air mobility. Even so, when actuaries of the Central Statistical Office were called upon to estimate the highest possible voluntary recruitment for the Army, their answer of 165,000 left a gap which, if small enough to make all-regular forces enticing, was large enough to be of critical military consequence. As a result, after Suez made economy urgent, a sharp dispute developed between Head and the Chancellor of the Exchequer

<sup>23</sup> The Polaris was not seriously taken up at this time. For this two American influences were partly responsible: that of the USAF in providing both the R.A.F. and the Ministry of Defence with skeptical assessments, and that of Admiral Rickover and associates in advising the British missile chiefs to avoid the Polaris until more development problems—then expected to be greater than was the case—had been solved.

<sup>24</sup> The exact figures for individual services were not in Cmnd. 127. See George Wigg's analysis of the arithmetic, *H. C. Debs.*, Feb. 29, 1960, col. 909

Harold Macmillan. Neither a Cabinet meeting nor a conference between the two Ministers could resolve the difference, and, before further debate was possible, Macmillan became Prime Minister.

Head's refusal to retain office under Macmillan thus represented his unwillingness to be the Prime Minister's agent in reducing the Army against military advice. The new force level, based on the estimate of recruitment, was naturally declared to be militarily adequate by the Government. Of course the CSC strongly disagreed but no appeals were successful in face of the determination of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The CSC had also been persuaded, unwisely as some thought, to prepare a plan for the deployment of a hypothetical army of 165,000 and presentation of this as a workable professional proposal, it has been said, enabled the Minister to conceal the full extent of service anxiety even from some members of the Cabinet.<sup>25</sup>

It seems reasonable to say that this represented a distinct departure from precedent in method as well as doctrine. There was a marked change in the tone of policy making and in the character of political direction. Fears voiced in the press that the economy would come across-the-board, in the old percentage style, proved wrong. On the contrary, the Minister came down heavily for a particular doctrine and imposed a number of very far reaching consequent changes upon the military posture of the nation. The question remained, however, as to whether this decisiveness had been wisely exercised. It is not surprising that these formative months proved to be but the beginning of a prolonged public and private debate.

### III. THE REORGANIZATION OF 1958

The dispute between the Services and Mr.

<sup>25</sup> This must rest in part on private information, but Head's later speech of July 28, 1958, *H. C. Debs.*, col. 988 ff. goes a long way. Suspicion that 165,000 was actuarial rather than military is born out by the Government's raising the figure to 180,000 when recruiting went well, on the ground of providing a cushion for fluctuation in recruitment (presumably as desirable in 1957 as later) and by the Minister of Defence's frank admission in 1960 that a cut to 165,000 again, made necessary on financial grounds, was felt undesirable by the Army, *Times*, Nov. 7, 1960. The leadership of the Labour Party was equally committed to ending conscription for electoral reasons and tried to discourage those Labour Members who advocated a bigger Army.

Sandys as to both the content of his policy and his method of making decisions continued during the months when the bare bones of his outline were being fleshed in detail. In this running dispute the two elements of content and method were inextricably entwined. Anxiety about Sandys' plans for reshaping the formal machinery of making defense policy was given point by dislike for the use he could be expected to make of it. Protests against the detailed applications of his policy and the manner in which these were made, implicitly criticized the way the machinery was working.<sup>26</sup>

The nature of British defense machinery being what it is, particulars of the heated, high-level controversy which continued after publication of Sandys' White Paper are hard to acquire. This observation, indeed, touches directly on a main service grievance. For the CSC were now made painfully aware that the traditional reticence which preserved them from close public scrutiny of their achievements could cut two ways. They now felt that the pattern of closed debate and service reticence was being exploited to impose unsound policies while concealing from the public and Parliament and even from the full view of the Cabinet, risks which were being taken and the extent to which professional military opinion was united in misgiving if in little else. The Minister, they felt, was refusing his military advisers the justice of a fair hearing and was reaching firm agreement with the Prime Minister before going through the semblance of debate in the Defence Committee. It was also suggested that Sandys encouraged service rivalries so as to prevent formation of a solid front against him. Admittedly it would be difficult to distinguish precisely between making use of divisions amongst advisers to railroad home a plan condemned by all, and being compelled to devise and insist upon a scheme because the advisers could not themselves hit upon an agreed policy. Yet many apparently felt they could distinguish the difference, which in itself indicated a grave absence of mutual trust in military affairs. Perhaps the *Economist* best expressed what was felt to be at stake when it declared that there must be authority, and that the authority must be the Minister's, but that authority should be used to extract agree-

<sup>26</sup> The difficulties raised by economies already envisaged in the White Paper were sharpened for some months by the anxiety of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to secure still further reduction of expenditure. This ultimately terminated in the resignation of the Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, in January, 1958.

ment from the military leaders, not merely to squash them and ride roughshod over their views.<sup>27</sup> The danger of authoritarianism was also well put during a later parliamentary debate by Sandys' immediate predecessor: "My right honorable Friend has great qualities of strength of character and determination. He is known for it inside and outside the House. They are fine qualities in a Minister provided he is right. If, however, he introduces a policy which may lead the country into danger, such qualities can be calamitous."<sup>28</sup> Thus while there was no question of the Government's right to lay down the law, considerable uneasiness arose from the feeling that this was being done without a full and free flow of ideas within the official machine. A further question also existed as to whether a wider public had no right to learn the broad lines upon which professional debate was proceeding on a matter of such moment.

As to formal organization of defense policy, the amplified powers of the Minister of Defence, defined by Macmillan in January, 1957, were confirmed in a major restatement of *Central Organisation for Defence* in a White Paper of July, 1958.<sup>29</sup> This paper apparently represented a compromise between the Minister's inclination to carry the centralization of authority further and the desire of the services and the service ministers to maintain their autonomy. The arrangement was worked out in a hotly contested debate of many months some rumors of which reached the press.<sup>30</sup> Once more the overall authority of the Minister was asserted, though with the omission of his right to interfere with matters internal to the services which he considered important.<sup>31</sup> He secured a right of review over senior appointments and the power to transfer functions to his own Ministry. Moreover the Minister was made the fount of operational orders, for which purpose he was given a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to replace the jointly held offices of Chairman of the CSC and the Chief of Staff to the Minister. This perpetuated the *ad hoc* arrangement whereby the Suez operation had been directly controlled by Eden by way of the Chairman of the CSC. Appointment of the CDS was also intended to provide a head for

the CSC equipped to give independent advice to the Minister. For this purpose the new Chief was authorized to call on the Joint Staff for assistance.<sup>32</sup> The collective responsibility of the CSC to the Government for professional advice and the individual right of each Chief to have access to the Minister and Prime Minister, were however, reaffirmed.

The second major change made in the White Paper was the announcement that the membership of the Defence Committee would be regarded as a floating one, with attendance at particular meetings being decided *ad hoc* by the Prime Minister.<sup>33</sup> At the same time a lower level Defence Board was created to contain, under the Minister of Defence, both the service ministers and the CSC, together with the Permanent Secretary and Chief Scientists of the Ministry. This Board was to deal with all purely military affairs while the Defence Committee would normally confine itself to problems related to financial, foreign, colonial and commonwealth affairs.<sup>34</sup> According to well informed sources, Sandys' original plan had been to confine the service ministers to the Board, excluding them from the cabinet committee. This the Cabinet overruled, leaving their attendance subject to discretion, and it was made clear that minutes of the Defence Committee would always be circulated to all the nominal members.<sup>35</sup> The service ministers also retained their right to "make submissions to the Cabinet." The actual effect of this reorganization on the relationship between Minister of Defence and the services thus remained to be seen. In general the increase in power received by the Minister in 1957 seemed to be confirmed, and the service ministers further reduced in status. The exact effect of the changes in staff organization was also uncertain. Would the CDS be the ally or the rival of the Minister?

<sup>27</sup> For explanation of all this see Sandys' contribution to the debate on the White Paper, July 28, 1958, *H. C. Debs.*, col. 954 ff.

<sup>28</sup> The Chiefs of Staff would apparently attend as of right. See Para. 4 of Cmnd. 476.

<sup>29</sup> In this respect it partly replaced an informal Service Ministers Committee in which the Minister of Defence had periodically met the service heads.

<sup>30</sup> *I.e.*, Prime Minister, Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor, Commonwealth Secretary, Minister of Defence, Minister of Labour, the Service Ministers, and the Minister of Supply. The Minister of Supply survived this reorganization but disappeared the following year, to be replaced by a Ministry of Aviation, for development of aircraft and missiles, and by distribution of other supply functions to the Services.

<sup>27</sup> Dec. 7, 1957.

<sup>28</sup> July 28, 1958, *H. C. Debs.*, col. 994.

<sup>29</sup> Cmnd. 476.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 28, April 25, July 10, 1958; *Times*, June 26, 1958; *Observer*, June 29, July 6, 1958.

<sup>31</sup> In April, 1957, Sandys had announced a Defence Administration Committee to consider service unification but little more was heard of it.

Some believed the whole reform to be an unsatisfactory hybrid, as a result of the deadlock between the ambitions of the Minister and the services, and that such features as increasing the responsibility of the CSC to the Minister while at the same time affirming the right of the services to appeal over his head, might confuse rather than clarify matters.

#### IV. THE SERVICE APPEAL AGAINST SANDYS

While the services thus continued to put their case through formal channels they did not confine themselves to these when they felt the results to be unsatisfactory. In Britain, the ultimate objective of an attempt to revise a matter of broad policy must be to change the mind of the cabinet. This has increasingly come to mean the mind of the Prime Minister and his closest advisers, who may be senior civil servants as well as ministers. For this the obvious recourse of the services is to the formal processes of the governmental machinery. But they are not without further resources if these processes fail to serve their ends. There are devious methods to change the government's mind: by efforts to bypass unreceptive superiors to ensure that they have not left ministerial colleagues in ignorance of the service case, for example, or by representations to influential unofficial circles within the ruling party. Failing success in this way there is the possible expedient of attempting to change the climate of opinion within which the inevitable adjustments of policy will be made, by appeals to the attentive public.

For all the legendary service abhorrence of such unorthodox methods in Britain there are numerous well known historical instances of such campaigns.<sup>36</sup> And, in fact during the Sandys' era, when the services felt they were not receiving a fair hearing, there was a

<sup>36</sup> The "Fisher era" before World War I, and that war itself, are renowned cases. Liddell Hart's writings abound in examples from the interwar years. In his valuable article on "Civil-Military Relations in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1958," *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1960, p. 40, Michael Howard undoubtedly expresses the *tendency* of the British system as compared to the American when he writes that "defeated or disgruntled parties are prevented from reopening a *chose jugée* and throwing everything once more into confusion." But it is not absolutely so and the later 1950s would seem to have been a period of strenuous efforts to reopen issues publicly. It is perhaps worth recalling that as a Territorial Army officer before the war, Duncan Sandys caused a furor by denouncing deficiencies in anti-aircraft preparations.

marked increase in behavior so frequently thought of as peculiar to Americans.

There is a wide impression among British politicians particularly concerned with defense that during the Sandys' era there was an appreciable increase in the number of "leaks" of information both as to planned developments and as to interservice disputes.<sup>37</sup> Not all of this came from the military; indeed some suggest that civil servants were an especially prolific source.<sup>38</sup> Nor can all leaks be regarded as intended to obstruct the Minister's policy. Some are doubtless accidental, some made for personal reasons, and others may be intentional trial balloons and maneuvers by the Government. Nor, of course, were leaks intended to influence interservice disputes unprecedented. Nevertheless, with all these reservations, there appears to have been a marked increase in the willingness of serving officers to talk in confidence with the press, with backbenchers and even with individual leaders of the Opposition.<sup>39</sup>

It is not necessary, however, to confine oneself to this elusive phenomenon, for there was also a remarkable number of more overt and dramatic "demonstrations" in the years fol-

<sup>37</sup> For one public reference to this see George Brown's—Labour's chief spokesman on defense—observation, "We . . . have had almost every member of the Services' team . . . making quite sure that their particular angle on what was happening was well known and well publicized." *H. C. Debs.*, July 28, 1958, col. 971.

<sup>38</sup> A onetime minister has suggested to me that leaks are particularly prevalent in areas where private contractors have an interest in boosting or detracting from a particular weapon, *e.g.*, in the missile and aircraft field, as compared to programs handled by national arsenals, etc. SHAPE, ever since the incumbency of F. M. Montgomery, has afforded a somewhat privileged sanctuary for a greater outspokenness than is common at home: *cf. The Economist*, November 14, 1959, discussion of the case of Sir John Eccles.

<sup>39</sup> Again note George Brown's allegation: "The Service Chiefs spoke in public, against all traditions, taking that risk in order to get round the Ministers whom they could not persuade in private. There was virtually nobody in the Service Departments at that time who was not taking the trouble to tell anybody about it who would listen. I have minuted notes of receptions and of conversations in which leading Service men made only the reservation, 'Do not quote me' . . . other Service advisers had articles written in leading journals with only the thinnest of pseudonyms hiding the authority behind them . . ." *H. C. Debs.*, April 27, 1960, col. 221.



lowing 1957. Each of the services was associated with one or other of these. The most noted and sensational were Conference and Exercise Prospect, mounted by the R.A.F. in the spring of 1958 and organized by the Director of Plans. This was a three-day briefing session for a selected group of R.A.F. officers and Air Ministry civil servants, later followed by a one-day performance held in the Royal Empire Society Hall on May 6, 1958 for selected correspondents and others.<sup>40</sup> At these affairs the emphasis upon deterrence, wielded by the R.A.F., was upheld as the only practicable policy. The press directed its attention, however, chiefly to the degree to which the R.A.F. of the future was depicted in a fashion which differed in several prominent respects from that implied in the White Papers, especially in the matter of manned aircraft. A second generation of strategic bombers, of tactical bombers and of fighters were all held essential. A call was also issued for an airborne missile,<sup>41</sup> reflecting reluctance to depend entirely on fixed bases. "Prospect" aroused a public sensation, though the results were apparently mixed. The discussions then going on as to procurement of a new medium-range nuclear strike aircraft, the TSR2,<sup>42</sup> and a fighter, the Lightning, were shortly settled in favor of the R.A.F. But the press sharply criticized such demonstrations and it is said that the incident strengthened the Minister of Defence in the strenuous Cabinet discussions then proceeding on his plans for reorganisation.<sup>43</sup>

Naval efforts were more discreet, as by repute they have always been. Throughout these years senior naval officers continued to maintain particularly close liaison with certain newspapers, such as the *Observer*. Early efforts to enhance the Navy's role under the Sandys regime were directed toward anti-submarine warfare.<sup>44</sup> To the extent naval opinion contemplated a part in deterrence, it was in terms of

the carrier, for which were being developed ship-to-air missiles and a low-level strike aircraft, which was regarded as a rival to the R.A.F.'s TSR2. The carrier was under heavy criticism on grounds of vulnerability, but the Navy was slow to develop an alternative interest in the Polaris. A number of considerations reportedly still underlay this caution: doubt as to the availability of nuclear propulsion, a "cavalry" traditionalism in which submarines were not a suitable backbone for a fleet; and, perhaps most of all, fear of being compelled to undertake development within existing limits of the naval budget. Nevertheless, during 1958, especially after amendment of the MacMahon Act, interest in a naval deterrent grew and senior naval officers provided information for certain newspaper articles extolling the merits of seaborne deterrence and casting doubt upon the efficacy of the R.A.F.'s striking force.<sup>45</sup>

The most dramatic instance of the Army speaking up was the lecture that Lieutenant General Sir John Cowley delivered to the Royal United Service Institution on November 4, 1959. In this highly publicised pronouncement the General, while admitting the danger of service parochialism, criticised reliance on deterrence on both moral and practical grounds, and outspokenly deplored neglect of the conventional forces, drawing a critical comparison between the proportion of expenditure devoted to the deterrent and that to the Army. Cowley wrote a little verse on this theme:

"I also have a plan to spend a thousand million pounds  
To buy some guided missiles and to hide them in the ground,  
And then to clearly paint on each 'these things must not be used,'  
No wonder that our citizens are getting so confused."

This was one man, but a man who spoke as Controller of Munitions in the Ministry of Supply, who drew attention to the fact that he was on active service, and whose remarks had been cleared by the Secretary of State for War. Press comment and correspondence in the *Journal* of the RUSI were noticeably more favorable than in the Prospect case; perhaps a reflection of the headway made by Sandys critics. The Prime Minister himself was re-

<sup>40</sup> See *Air Power*, Summer 1958, pp. 283 ff.

<sup>41</sup> As far as I can discover, this was not, as is now sometimes said, an anticipation of the Skybolt airborne ballistic missile later made the mainstay of British policy, but a cruise missile for low-level radar penetration.

<sup>42</sup> For the history of this aircraft, see the *Observer*, Jan. 4, 1959.

<sup>43</sup> *The Economist* once more provided the most incisive comment, "Whose Hand on the Tiller?", May 10, 1958.

<sup>44</sup> See Admiral Sir John Eccles' outburst, "repudiating" the White Paper and reverting to the concept of "broken-backed" war. *Economist*, Oct. 5, 1957.

<sup>45</sup> A telling broadside under the *nom de plum* of Nucleus, in the *Observer*, was said, by those in a position to know, to be the direct contribution of a just retired, very senior naval staff officer see *Observer*, Dec. 7, 28, 1958.



portedly much annoyed by this incident and it was announced that henceforth such utterances would require clearance not merely by the services but also by the Minister of Defence.<sup>46</sup>

Public complaints of this kind might be expected to attract more attention in a period of doctrinal change but such a number of incidents in so short a period tends to confirm the belief that unaccustomed constraints on the interplay of views within the official machine encouraged dissent to seek other channels. Certainly the demonstrations were successful in communicating professional misgivings to a wider circle of attentive opinion, and thereby placed the Government under the necessity of justifying its policy before a critical audience.

#### V. THE WIDER MARKET FOR STRATEGIC IDEAS

Service leaders were, of course, only one of many sources of attempts to manipulate the wider market and through it, the Government. This market ranges in a complex fashion from the narrower influential circles, a twilight zone between direct influence and the creation of generally favorable opinion, to the broadest forms of public advocacy. In Parliament the various kinds of influence are inextricably entwined, and the service leaders are the targets as well as sources of attempts at influence.

The nature of the market for strategic ideas in Britain and its relation to official processes is ill understood, but the higher temperature of military affairs under Sandys made it somewhat easier than usual to discern the cruder patterns.<sup>47</sup> By their very character the points

at issue were conducive to public debate. The basic question of nuclear deterrence, and the shortage of manpower, had a deceptive simplicity which encouraged lay discussion; and the simplicity of doctrine which permitted Sandys to seize the reins also gave scope to his critics. Quite apart from service grievances, the White Papers of 1957 and 1958 and particularly the latter's willingness to contemplate the initial use of strategic nuclear weapons, aroused considerable public misgiving. Some public fears paralleled those of the services—fears of overspending on deterrence, duplication of American efforts, failure to provide tactical nuclear weapons, neglect of conventional forces in size, equipment and airlift—while others, such as those of the effect of policy on prospects for disarmament or the ill-defined state of doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, were less frequently heard on service lips. There was also considerable criticism of a tendency to hold on to widely scattered bases, the role of which was not clear in the light of the reliance on mobile reserves and of diminishing imperial responsibilities. Thus *The Economist* spoke sarcastically of "the dogged construction of NAAFI clubs and married families quarters at distant staging posts that are summarily discarded . . ."<sup>48</sup> But this was not particularly felt to be characteristic of Sandys' influence, perhaps the contrary.

Service demonstrations of dissent reinforced unofficial anxiety by providing evidence of specific grievances and, perhaps even more, simply by revealing the existence of general professional unrest, of which these partial glimpses may even have given an exaggerated notion. The *Times* commented eloquently on the dangers of this at the time of General Cowley's outburst. Admitting the undesirability of every senior officer repeatedly holding forth in public, the *Times* continued:

It would be equally dangerous on the other hand, if none of them was ever allowed to express an honest criticism publicly. But we have come perilously close to this in recent years. There has been no way for the public to know whether or not crucial defense decisions were being taken against the advice of the Government's professional military advisers. Strategy has had to be accepted in a vacuum. Public opinion has been denied its

tensity of feeling may have distorted as well as intensified the normal pattern.

<sup>48</sup> March 7, 1959. On the subject of bases there is an exhaustive Princeton doctoral dissertation by Lt. Col. C. Dewitt Armstrong, U.S.A., "British Policy Toward Strategic Bases," 1959.

<sup>46</sup> A text of the Cowley lecture is in the *RUSI Journal*, February, 1960. An exchange in the House of Commons, in which the new rules on clearance were stated, is in *H.C. Debs.*, Nov. 11, 1959, cols. 378 ff. While the Cowley lecture was the most sensational single Army effort, the most solid presentation of the Army case was the Army League report, *The British Army in the Nuclear Age* (London, 1959), edited by Richard Goold Adams. Another Army officer's complaint was that of Brigadier Fernyhough, Director of Ammunition Stores, who made a report referring to the absence of a practical war plan and to the alleged fact that "in relation to its small size and large commitments, the British Army must be one of the worst equipped in the world. Yet the Treasury continues to urge us, with loud cries, to avoid overinsurance." See *H. C. Debs.*, Feb. 29, 1960, cols. 915-17.

<sup>47</sup> It should be observed that the unusual in-

proper part because there has been no access to the views of the senior officers of the three services.<sup>49</sup>

Press comment on defense matters in general was frequent and lively, though spasmodic during these years. The so-called quality press<sup>50</sup> paid particular attention to defense. Certain individuals, the defense correspondent of the *Times*, Alastair Buchan<sup>51</sup> of the *Observer* and the defense writers of the *Guardian* and *Economist*, became especially prominent in maintaining a drumfire of sceptical comments on official doctrine and in drawing attention to military unrest. Certain of the more popular papers were perhaps the most fertile in publication of the various leaks. Press comment was not, of course, uniformly opposed to the Government. The *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Times* fairly staunchly defended official policy, the *Times* chiefly criticised overemphasis on deterrence, while the *Observer* and *Guardian* went much further and appeared ready to abandon the deterrent should that be the only way to refurbish conventional forces. By late 1958 the press comment was overwhelmingly critical in one way or another. The prestige papers, above all the *Times*, were also the vehicles for correspondence on military affairs, which a number of well qualified students of British affairs believe to have perhaps even greater influence in sowing doubt in official minds than editorial comment.<sup>52</sup>

The press embodies a considerable number of that small group of professional and semi-professional students of defense who are perhaps best described as commentators. There has in point of fact been a small discussion group called the Commentator's Circle, with Liddell Hart as head, which is credited with no little influence in developing informed opinion and coloring the tone of the mass media. The notion of commentator embraces the leading defense correspondents, such eminent military historians as Liddell Hart, and articulate re-

tired officers such as Sir John Slessor and Sir Anthony Buzzard, together with such politicians as Richard Crossman, George Wigg and John Strachey who write and engage in journalistic debate. These would also rank high among the contributors to such specialized journals as that of *RUSI*, *International Affairs* and *Air Power*, or to general periodicals like *Encounter*, in which an extended series on the theme of "Their Bomb and Ours" attracted much attention in 1958.

In some respects a broader extension of the concept of a commentator's circle is the Institute for Strategic Studies set up in 1958, and intended both to further study of military affairs and to bring together people concerned with military affairs from varying points of view. The Council of the I.S.S. contains several of the most influential commentators. The I.S.S. has apparently won greater countenance from those officially engaged in military and foreign affairs than is common for private bodies in England; it includes a number of senior officials among its members and enjoys the favor of the present Chief of the Defence Staff. From time to time the I.S.S. is used for briefing sessions in which official information is confidentially conveyed. This is thought to serve the dual purpose of broadening support for policies which are based on information not suitable for general dissemination—the "scrambling" performance of the V-bomber force being an example. In return the audience receives more substance for its unofficial assessments and may presumably hope that its own views may not be without influence on the officials.

This kind of activity is a particularly clear illustration of the way in which the roles of publicist and confidential adviser may blend. Even the press may have its direct influence on the important officials as well as its general effect on the tone of public opinion. Thus there may be combined in a single person or organisation types of influence ranging all the way from the undoubted achievement of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in raising the level of public attention to military questions by the most overt possible activities to the contribution that confidential representations by the Society of British Aircraft Constructors are said to make to resisting the elimination of aircraft.<sup>53</sup> Parliament itself, the single most im-

<sup>49</sup> *Times*, November 12, 1959. On the effect of secrecy on trust in the Government, see the exchange between Sandys and Brown, *H.C. Debs.*, Feb. 11, 1957, cols. 1155 ff.

<sup>50</sup> Which might be said to comprise the *Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Guardian*, *Financial Times*, *Observer* and *Sunday Times*, together with the weekly *Economist*, *New Statesman*, *Spectator*, *Time and Tide*, *Tribune*, and the *New Scientist*.

<sup>51</sup> Since 1958 Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies.

<sup>52</sup> Captain Liddell Hart, for example, firmly maintains that a well written critical letter to the *Times* does more to influence leading civil servants than a wealth of books or articles.

<sup>53</sup> The general mode of operation of such interest groups in Britain has been much clarified in recent years by the works of Ivor Jennings, S. E. Finer, Sam Beer, and J. D. Stewart. The effect of the arms industry is still an obscure issue much beclouded by old emotions. Equally hard to evaluate is the coincidence between strategic views

portant sounding board for opinion on military affairs, is at the same time the scene of much confidential interchange.

Because the formal legislative and financial powers of Parliament are under the effective control of the government these days, Parliament's influence on defense policy depends chiefly on the quality of the arguments it can generate and the attention it can secure for them. The difference between Parliament and Congress in this respect is perhaps not as large as one might think, for we have recently become aware of how rarely Congress directly enforces a change in American military policy.<sup>54</sup> It is rather in Parliament's lack of Congressional resources for securing information that its chief disadvantage lies. George Brown, then defense spokesman for the Labour Party, has gone so far as to declare that "in this area, we are given so little information in the House, less I rather think, than anywhere in any democratic country in the world . . ."<sup>55</sup> This difficulty has repeatedly drawn comment and has led to proposals for a specialized committee on the American pattern, or at least for examination of the service Estimates before a select committee.<sup>56</sup> Such a device would not only provide information but also enable Members to

make use of what they know without fear of damaging the national security.<sup>57</sup>

The expedient of secret briefings for leaders of the opposition, tried under the Labour Government, was soon abandoned by Churchill on the ground that it unduly hampered criticism, and an offer of similar consultations made during the reorganizations of 1958 was immediately rejected by Gaitskell for the same reason. The prejudice on all sides against private communication of official information seems reinforced by distaste for characteristics of the American system associated with Congressional independence, as well as by the desire of all parties to enjoy the fruits of executive privacy in power.<sup>58</sup> Such information as is received other than openly from government pronouncements therefore comes from the public media and from the leaks and private channels mentioned earlier. Occasionally Ministers informally give a courtesy briefing to their opposite numbers in the shadow cabinet, but this, by all accounts, is usually advance notice of an imminent public announcement and never in the nature of prior consultation. The White Papers on defense, particularly the routine annual issues, are frequently envied in the United States<sup>59</sup> but though they do offer the advantage

advocated by certain leading, articulate, retired officers, and the kinds of equipment manufactured by firms of which they are directors. The fact that many of the retired officers most respected as commentators are connected with armaments firms is sometimes said to be due to their advantage in keeping up with technical developments, but it seems at least equally probable that it is their articulateness or reputation as publicists which secures them the favor of manufacturers. Most of these pundits, one notices, are drawn from the R.A.F. or the Navy, the "weapons services." For a reference to this at the highest level see Sir Frederick Brundrett's speech to the R.U.S.I., March 16, 1961. Sir Frederick was Chief Scientist to the Ministry of Defence until December, 1959 and closely associated with the Blue Streak. Quite apart from vested interests there are of course powerful arguments for the preservation of an aircraft industry on grounds of employment and the export trade.

<sup>54</sup> See for instance Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," this REVIEW, Sept., 1958, and, since completion of this paper, S. P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York, 1961).

<sup>55</sup> *H.C. Debs.*, Dec. 13, 1960, col. 226.

<sup>56</sup> See F. J. Bellenger's suggestion, *H.C. Debs.*, Feb. 26, 1958, col. 427, that of W. Wyatt on April 27, 1960, *H.C. Debs.*, col. 288, and Gaitskell's

complaint, *H.C. Debs.*, March 1, 1960, col. 1140. Wyatt was concerned that "We are handicapped at present in this country because we have no adequate machinery for going into these highly important but complex and technical matters in any satisfactory way."

<sup>57</sup> When, in their intermittent checks, the committees on Estimates and Public Accounts have examined military affairs, they have several times recently revealed inefficiencies in the handling of research and development and in the organization of administration.

<sup>58</sup> In contrast to which the CID had a certain amount of bipartisan representation in early days.

<sup>59</sup> E.g., "all the relevant details in ten pages or less." Laurence Levine, Appendix, p. 144, in T. Stanley, *American Defense and National Security* (Washington, 1956).

It is interesting to notice that during the period of fullest commitment to the Sandys policy, the White Papers of 1957, and particularly 1958, contained long theoretical expositions of the relation between force and foreign policy. As promotion of the pure form of the doctrine has weakened, so the Papers have reverted to factual descriptions of the defense measures taken. On the other hand, as a dubious tribute to increased public attention to defense, the 1961 White Paper contains a large number of pictorial graphs to emphasize the logic of the Government's policy.

of a single focus for debate, informed British observers believe they are as much a vehicle for deception as for enlightenment, and at best a partisan brief. Scepticism has gone to the length of a proposal for issuing White Papers only quinquennially or at important departures, for some critics feel that the need to produce an annual report encourages over-dramatization and a search for illusory achievements.<sup>60</sup>

The unofficial contacts of politicians outside the government with officers and civil servants are reportedly more numerous and intimate with Conservatives than Labour, and, consequently, a Conservative opposition may be better informed than a Labour one. The chief alternative sources of the opposition are the press, certain recently retired officials, authors, private commentators and a small number of Members especially interested in and informed about Defence. George Wigg, a veritable mine of information, is a preeminent Labour example of the last. A considerable number of references in debate to expert writings are to American commentators, reflecting the paucity of English equivalents,<sup>61</sup> while the flow of information about United States policy provides facts about matters of allied concern and technological information which can be applied to British circumstances.

Lack of information is undoubtedly a handicap to the opposition, though it probably does not undermine their arguments to the extent that governments not unnaturally suggest. Some would say that a more serious limitation on the effectiveness of Parliament as a forum is the surprisingly small number of Members who show much really sustained interest in military affairs.<sup>62</sup> Despite the common idea that the House of Lords is a superior senate of experience, very few indeed of the myriad ex-service peers use their right to debate, to an extent which has drawn direct reproachful comment in the Lords itself.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, parliamentary attention to defense is heavily concentrated in the first half of the year under

influence of the schedule for the White Paper and budget, and many feel that Government frequently escapes sustained attack as a result of this, of adjournments, and of the pressure of other issues on parliamentary time. It is revealing to note that when forming his governments, Sir Anthony Eden regarded the parliamentary duties of the Minister of Defence as exceptionally light.<sup>64</sup>

In the workings of the present Labour Opposition the formal committees of the Parliamentary Party, though much used to register differences, are apparently not the forums for a great deal of debate, still less for the formulation of the leader's policy or sifting of information. There is a committee of members of the Shadow Cabinet holding the ghostly defense and foreign affairs portfolios, and at Transport House a defense adviser, serves the whole Party. But far and away the most influential body would seem to be a confidential committee gathered by the shadow defense minister, comprising two or three congenial Members of Parliament, with a small entourage of commentators and informants, supplemented from time to time by special working parties. This device is useful not only to inform and advise the leaders but also to avoid the pressures of internal party differences.

This recalls that there are centers of dissenting opinion in Parliament other than the Opposition front bench. In the Labour party the nuclear disarmers have been an obvious influence on the climate of debate. George Wigg and Richard Crossman have formed the nucleus of another line of criticism both of Government and official Opposition policy, standing out for greater emphasis on conventional forces and maintaining the impracticability of both the strategic and tactical nuclear elements of existing policies.<sup>65</sup> Critics of this kind are inclined to say that the official Labour leaders have tried to maintain a monolithic allegiance to front bench views akin to that sought by Sandys himself. Certainly Gaitskell made several efforts to suppress Wigg's criticism of official Opposition policy, especially as enunciated by John Strachey, and Crossman was ousted from the Shadow Cabinet, partly for his failure to support an Opposition amendment in the defense debate of 1960. The damage such dissidence may do to the effectiveness

<sup>60</sup> The Paper of 1959 was dubbed by *The Economist* "Blank White Paper"; cf. *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 7, 1958, and *H. C. Debs.*, Feb. 26, 1958, cols. 561-4; Feb. 29, 1960, col. 903.

<sup>61</sup> The debate in the Lords on March 5, 1958, is full of examples of this, *H. L. Debs.*, cols. 1095 ff.

<sup>62</sup> The Bow Group, a collection of young Conservative thinkers, is said to have found it difficult to recruit a working party to prepare a study on defense to match their publications on other topics.

<sup>63</sup> *H. L. Debs.*, March 5, 1958, col. 1248.

<sup>64</sup> *Full Circle*, p. 354. The intensification of interest in defense matters in the last few years, however, might lead him to modify that assessment.

<sup>65</sup> See especially their joint articles in the *New Statesman*, May 14, June 11, 1960.

of an opposition is hard to assess, but there seems little doubt that the present Conservative Government has been greatly relieved of need to reexamine and justify its policy by the conflict of views among its critics, which prevents the emergence of an image of a clear-cut alternative policy.<sup>66</sup>

As it happened, the leaders of the Labour Party did not seem to want to advance a policy much different from the Conservatives. While they joined in criticism that the Government placed excessive faith in deterrence and opposed the prospect of initiating the use of nuclear weapons, the Labour front bench was unwilling to accept the onus of continued conscription or higher expenditure.

The degree of agreement which existed between the two front benches was paralleled by a similarly cross-bench alliance of critics who particularly deplored the neglect of conventional forces. This alliance produced harmonious mutual support in debate between such otherwise dissimilar individuals as George Wigg and Antony Head, Sandys' predecessor. Indeed, disgruntled Conservative back-benchers have as good a claim as the Opposition to have resisted the Government in recent years. Supposedly, dissent within the governing party often does more to give a British government pause than the attacks of the official opposition, for such criticism comes from relatively trusted sources and raises a threat to the effectiveness and enthusiasm of the party. When such dissent becomes public, it weakens the impression of confident official policy based on inside information that is so discouraging to the opposition. A number of Conservative back-benchers have enjoyed a special reputation for wisdom on defense matters during the Sandys era, among them Fitzroy Maclean, Viscount Lambton, Nigel Birch and Antony Head. These offered a natural focus for criticism among those, probably more numerous among Conservatives than Labour, who normally took an interest in military affairs and maintained an association with one or other of the services.<sup>67</sup> Head's disagreement with official

policy was well known as a result of his resignation, but, in the Tory tradition, he behaved with great discretion and for some time limited himself to private remonstrances and to remarks in party committees. In 1958, however, something of an open Conservative revolt began against the trend of official policy and, in the debate on reorganization, Head partially unfolded the story of his resignation. While the facts had long been suspected, this explicit and undeniably well informed account came with all the more telling effect against the normal fog of secrecy penetrated only by hearsay. By 1961 unrest had gone far enough for a Young Conservative convention deliberately to avoid giving a vote of confidence in Government policy.<sup>68</sup>

#### VI. THE RETREAT FROM SANDYS

By the beginning of 1959, when the critics were in full cry, a number of practical challenges to British policy had arisen to encourage second thoughts. The expedition to Jordan the previous summer had emphasized deficiencies in the conventional forces needed for such operations. Technologically, developments made the Government reconsider both its emphasis on deterrence and the means for implementing it. Estimates for the Blue Streak proved grossly inadequate, the cost of putting it underground alone having almost doubled, while demonstrations of Soviet accuracy with missiles cast doubt on the whole idea of fixed bases. Amendment of the MacMahon Act in 1958 also provided information about the alarming array of expensive devices being developed as countermeasures and aids to penetration. More encouraging news of Polaris now become available, along with progress on the projected Skybolt airborne missile. The personal stake of the officials intimately associated with Blue Streak, the money already invested, the space research possibilities of the missile and the residual lack of naval enthusiasm for Polaris all precluded a rapid change of policy. Nor was the technical situation absolutely clear. But at the beginning of 1959 a reassess-

<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately for the Labour Party, of course, its constitution and its ideological bent tend to compel it to try to draw up a coherent policy despite frequent pleas that an opposition is only obliged to criticize.

<sup>67</sup> Retired officers, particularly from the Army, are numerous in the Commons and were especially alarmed by reductions in manpower. On the subject of retired officers, mention should be made of such service-related interest groups as the Navy and Army Leagues. With the exception of

such special efforts as the Army League's occasional study reports—and the unique but elusive influence of the service clubs—these organizations would not seem to be sufficiently up to date in their thinking to contribute much to the supply of ideas, though they may have some restraining influence on the desire to eliminate established formations. See Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-2.

<sup>68</sup> *Sunday Times*, February 26, 1961; and see Viscount Lambton's privately printed pamphlet, *Inadequacy*, 1961.

ment commenced, the Blue Streak was cut back to ten emplacements, and a committee under Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, undertook a review of the deterrent program.

The tendency of British military planners and civil servants is to deny that public criticism has much effect on their recommendations. By the time events have stimulated such comment, it is said, the same stimulus has set on foot official studies which are more prompt and better informed. But even the proudest claimants for professional imperviousness agree that public sources and debate influence their political chiefs. Certainly it seems beyond question that press and Parliamentary criticism reinforced the case for reassessment at this time. The course of debate in Parliament supports this judgment by the frequency of references to well known commentators and the energy devoted to arguing as to whose side of the question particular pundits supported. One can often trace a notion from a commentator in one year, to the lips of a Parliamentary critic in the next, and to the White Paper or ministerial speech in the third. One of the clearest, though perhaps unintentional, tributes to the role of public debate was paid by Watkinson when, in defending the time taken to decide on abandonment of Blue Streak, he explained that, "Of course the decision was a narrowly balanced one. All big decisions are. Among the surrounding experts, the advisers, the newspaper correspondents, and so on, there are conflicting views."<sup>69</sup>

The abandonment of Blue Streak for military purposes, announced on April 13, 1960, had been foreshadowed by the annual White Paper earlier in the year.<sup>70</sup> The Government still clung to the principle of a national deterrent and both the prospective American airborne ballistic missile Skybolt and, for a later stage, the Polaris, were spoken of as the means to preserve British nuclear power after the Mk. II V-bomber armed with the free-falling missile, Blue Steel, had had its day. But official language adopted the phrase "independent contribution to the Western deterrent" and some observers believed the Government was resigned to the ultimate abandonment of a national deterrent, a policy already formally adopted by the Labour leadership. Certainly the trend was in the direction advocated by the Government's long-time critics, and official spokesmen now spoke more warmly of conventional forces as an essential component in the

deterrent role played by the armed forces as a whole.<sup>71</sup>

This did not serve to scotch criticism, however, that now turned increasingly from the delusiveness of the deterrent to the inadequacies of conventional forces both in numbers and arms. The Government met these charges in part by some fairly blatant juggling of the figures, but once more a number of practical tests arose to lend credence to the criticisms. Unrest in Central Africa in 1960, the Kuwait expedition, and, above all, the Berlin crisis of August 1961, all drew attention to shortages of men and munitions. The Berlin crisis revealed that to prepare for the possible need for substantially reinforcing the Rhine Army, already reduced to a nominal 55,000, and actually well below strength, the Government had to seek legislation to retain the remaining conscripts and prepare to recall those recently discharged. Moreover, the Government admitted that the 165,000-man Army, when achieved, would not be "balanced", thus confirming charges that the CSC had not succeeded in creating an order of battle below the figures for which they had originally fought with Sandys. This a Conservative Member described as "the collapse of the Government's five year defence plan, six months before it was due to end."<sup>72</sup>

Despite the triumphal cries of the advocates of conscription, the Government resisted this solution and, while showing some interest in selective service, pinned its faith initially on a renewed drive for recruits—linked to a scheme for technical education—and on an attempt to raise a small, well-paid reserve of some 30,000, that was to make possible "expanding and contracting the Army in conformity with changing demands upon it."<sup>73</sup> A special study had already been set up under the CDS during the summer, to review military commitments and this was now supplemented by a group under the retiring CIGS, instructed to take a fresh look at prospects for further integration of the services.<sup>74</sup>

Along with these modifications of the substance of policy, beginning in 1959, there has also been a distinct effort to meet the com-

<sup>71</sup> See the defense debate, Feb. 29, March 1, 1960, *H. C. Debs.*, cols., 846-1168.

<sup>72</sup> Fitzroy Maclean, *H. C. Debs.*, Nov. 1, 1961, col. 218.

<sup>73</sup> *H. C. Debs.*, Nov. 1, 1961, col. 203 ff.

<sup>74</sup> The 1961 White Paper, Cmnd. 1288, had made a gesture toward integration by abandoning the classifications of land, sea and air, and adopting those of "the nuclear force" and "the conventional force."

<sup>69</sup> *H. C. Debs.*, April 27, 1960, col. 237.

<sup>70</sup> Cmnd. 952.

plaints of undue authoritarianism and to improve the tone of official dealings. Duncan Sandys' forceful personality was always an important element in events during his tenure and his translation to the new Ministry of Aviation after the election of 1959 (where he was to knock together the heads of the aircraft industry rather than the CSC) did much to change the atmosphere. His successor, Harold Watkinson, seemed anxious for more amicable relationships and opened the 1960 defense debate with a general tribute to the CSC. Not much less important was the entry as CDS of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Mountbatten who, by no means dedicated to the R.A.F. and certainly not to Duncan Sandys, apparently began a rapid and adept campaign to soothe ruffled feelings all around.

At about the same time as Sandys' departure there occurred another important but very little noticed development: the appointment in September 1959 of an officer of equal rank to the Service Directors of Plans as Director of Plans to the CDS and as Chairman of the Joint Planning Committee.<sup>75</sup> This continued the process of fully equipping the CDS to take an independent initiative in planning and, by creating the machinery for giving the joint planning teams coherent terms of reference based on an interservice viewpoint, went far toward the method advocated years earlier by Montgomery.<sup>76</sup>

With the new Director as independent chairman, the DPC thus formed a microcosm of the new form of the CSC. There was some question as to whether this development would strengthen or weaken the Minister of Defence in relation to the professional military, and the answer would depend on how the undoubtedly reinforced CDS employed his new instrument. Within the service ministries there were also some misgivings as to whether the new office would not be used to prejudice the work of the joint planning teams in directions favored by the CDS. In practice, however, Mountbatten has apparently taken great pains to see that all sources of ideas are tapped and are known to be tapped. Before meetings of the Plans Committee to consider the drafts which planning teams have produced in consultation with the services and the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth

Relations Offices, the independent Chairman secures other neutral views from the military, scientific and civil staffs in the Ministry of Defence. Similarly, before meetings of the CSC, the CDS receives not only the recommendations of the JPS but also his Director's own view and his preview of the services' positions. In addition, the CDS is briefed by his personal staff, which contains representatives of each service,<sup>77</sup> and by the Permanent Secretary and Chief Scientist or their representatives. Moreover the CDS has the habit of very freely bringing interested parties, particularly from the civil service, into the CSC to avoid any appearance of a closed military shop. The presence of the Director of Plans to CDS in the Ministry is said to have improved relations between the civil and military components of the defense establishment, whilst his attendance at all meetings of the CSC has ensured a more direct and healthier relationship between the CSC and the JPS.<sup>78</sup>

As a result of all this, those involved in joint planning now feel that there is a freer flow of ideas, a more trustful atmosphere and a better blend of a variety of views and interests than at any time since 1945. It is also said that since the appointment of an independent chairman no "split" papers have been sent forward by the joint planning committee.<sup>79</sup> This is not to say, however, that the problems of planning have been solved. For one thing, now that the failure of the Blue Streak project has cast a blight on the first flush of enthusiasm for deterrence as a panacea, and no service is yet confident that it has its hands on a substitute, the issues of defense policy are momentarily not such as to stimulate a wholehearted contest. Thus the improved lot of the Army can be regarded as symptomatic of more balanced, coherent strategic thought, but it may also be in part a return to the old "fair shares" arrangement—which might well be expected at a period of doctrinal poverty and under the conciliatory successor to a doctrinaire Minister. Should this be the case the next era of innovation or

<sup>77</sup> This is a very small staff indeed. Service representatives double as the CDS's personal briefer on a geographical area.

<sup>78</sup> The service members of the JPC may also be invited to attend certain meetings of the CSC.

<sup>79</sup> Liaison with the Foreign Office on the mutual implications of military and diplomatic policy is said to have improved since the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, which handles liaison with the CSC and Ministry of Defence, has established, in 1959, a stronger section for long-term planning.

<sup>75</sup> The first officer appointed, Air Commodore F. E. Rosier, had been Director of Plans in the Air Ministry.

<sup>76</sup> The JPC still reports to the CSC. But the CDS can initiate studies, informing the CSC, and the cover note to plans originated by the CDS makes reference to this initiative.



economy may reveal that the new planning system is as subject to disputes and ill feeling as the old. The performance of the new system under such a strain will, indeed, be the only adequate basis on which to judge it.

For the moment, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Sandys' era definitely strengthened the tendency toward centralization in British defense policy and left Watkinson, even without his predecessor's vigorous personality, in firmer control of policy than Antony Head had been. At the same time, however, deliberate and apparently successful efforts are being made to reconcile this centralization with a flow of ideas and a freedom of debate much greater than under Sandys.

#### VII. THE "SANDYS ERA" AND STRATEGIC DEBATE

Whether Fitzroy Maclean was right when he said that Sandys' policy had collapsed will probably always remain open to argument. By 1962 the strategic nuclear force still existed, expenditure was being held down, universal military service had gone and the Army was much reduced. On the other hand, hardly anyone now relied on the nuclear force to perform the prodigies Sandys had forecast, and the small Army now sought after was to derive its efficiency as much from highly mobile conventional strength as from the nuclear capacity envisaged in 1957. Yet it could be argued that it took the shock of Sandys to stimulate the acceptance of the newer concept. As to whether the dogmatism of Sandys' approach made for undue rigidity in reacting to later information and ideas, it could be said that three or four years is not long to prove a policy. Yet undoubtedly the era did give rise to an unpleasant amount of figure-juggling and evasion, creating the unhealthy impression that defense was being made secondary to politics, in the narrower sense of party, and that changes of policy by speech were only occasionally accompanied by action. On balance it seems in retrospect that a less wholehearted plunge into strategic nuclear weapons would have been more consonant with the probable future development of British defense policy.<sup>80</sup>

It would be foolish to venture a prediction of the 1962 White Paper before it is published. Major changes in British defense policy have come about during the last five years when some aspect already under debate has en-

countered at least a partial practical test or obstacle, as with Suez or the rising costs of the Blue Streak. The Berlin crisis was such an occasion and already has accelerated modification of the Sandys' policy. The indications at the end of 1961 were for further development of the proposals for reserve forces, yet another increase in emphasis on airlift and mobility for conventional forces, and an initial measure of integration in research and development, especially perhaps if new generations of aircraft are to be approved. Two apparently divergent interests, that of the Foreign Office in pursuing further integration of NATO—related to the decision to apply to the Common Market—and a simultaneous ambition to develop Britain's pretension to be a center for military and strategic training for the newer nations—a conference on defense administration at Oxford in 1961 being perhaps the forerunner of a permanent program—might also be reflected in the paper, and it might not be beyond ingenuity to blend the two, integration in Europe releasing energy for the global task.

Within the official British defense establishment it seems probable that there will be further centralization of planning if not of execution, a continuation of the trend represented by "military statesmen" of the Mountbatten type and increased participation of civilian experts such as the Permanent Secretary, the Chief Scientist, and their staffs in matters once regarded as purely the concern of military officers. Following development of the Joint Staff, greater attention to long-range planning may lead to a department for fundamental military research of the kind Liddell Hart has long advocated. In general, recent reforms seem to have been aimed at harnessing the driving force of the political leaders without losing the benefits of professional staff work.

One noteworthy contrast with the United States is the absence in Great Britain of the semi-official research groups, such as the RAND Corporation or the Institute for Defense Analyses, to broaden the range of talent and variety of viewpoints on which the services and government can draw, and to serve as a link between the "insiders" and the wider market for strategic ideas. There is also a relative lack of academic interest in national security policy. One symptom of this is the heavy reliance of British politicians upon American authors for their arguments. Indeed one might wonder whether such Labour leaders as Denis Healey have not overdone this and acquired opinions—favorable observers would

<sup>80</sup> It should not go unsaid that, as a secondary Power, Britain was handicapped by the need to conform in part to American policy at a time when it was not very clear what this was.



say sophistication—which partly accounts for their losing touch with the sentiments of many of their followers.

There is undoubtedly a good deal of prejudice in Britain against anything which seems to be a breach in the principle of keeping affairs within the official family. The disadvantages of such openness as is practiced in the United States for security and discipline are obvious enough. Less frequently acknowledged are the liabilities of a closed system which obscures the proper basis of debate, encourages rumor and constrains the exchange of ideas between the professionals and intelligent observers. In practice it is clear that contacts between official and unofficial interested parties do take place, if haphazardly, and journalists do find grist for their mill. A more open acknowledgment of the relationship between the inner and outer sections of the market therefore, might not only make the creative resources of a wider range of talent available to those in charge of policy, but also relieve them of some of the difficulties which arise from criticism which is ill-founded and from the rumor which ostentatious reticence nourishes.

It thus seems possible that, paradoxically, one of the more promising areas in which to look for improving the British defense machinery may lie outside the machine itself, in the encouragement of closer attention to questions of national security both by officially countenanced, specialised consultants, and by a wider attentive public.<sup>81</sup> Education of the wider

public in questions of fundamental strategy seems particularly desirable, not only on grounds of democratic theory during an age when technology increasingly demands delegation of fateful decisions, but also because so many of the government's problems revolve around the question of what the public can be induced to support. Even in Great Britain, despite the towering authority of the Prime Minister and his dominance over the legislature, the government needs a high degree of consensus among both services and public if the execution of its policies is to be wholehearted and sustained. The government may be formally unassailable, yet it needs the ultimate approbation of an attentive audience from which it can seldom permanently hide its performance, and from whose stock of ideas it cannot insulate itself. Nor should it try. For here may lie germs of dissent and innovation from which will spring the doctrine of tomorrow. Though there must be decision, it should be decision tempered by the freest possible flow of thought in the widest market compatible with national security: a limit likely to be generous on the more fundamental questions of strategy. Thus if, however unjustifiably, the Blue Streak is coming to be regarded as a monument to the dangers of dogmatism in the conduct of defense policy, the myth may yet prove a salutary one.

the pretentious apparatus with which some American military experts surround themselves may not be justified. But none of the unofficial British commentators I have talked to doubt the need for this kind of activity in principle.

<sup>81</sup> This is not to say that the scepticism of many British military officers and commentators as to

## CONGRESSIONAL INNOVATION AND INTERVENTION IN DEFENSE POLICY: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS\*

RAYMOND H. DAWSON

*The University of North Carolina*

Students of congressional-executive relations have long recognized the weakness of legislative oversight of the Executive, and in few areas of public policy has this weakness been more pronounced than in national defense. A recent and significant change in this relationship was made when the 86th Congress in 1959 imposed upon a reluctant executive and military establishment a major innovation in the established processes of making defense policy. The innovation was deliberately intended to alter the balance in executive-congressional controls over some strategic decisions, and was in the form of a new requirement for legislative authorization of the principal weapons programs of the military services. Designated the Russell amendment, it was incorporated into the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal 1960 as Section 412(b) and directed that No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such date.<sup>1</sup>

This terse stipulation served to break the monopoly long held by the annual Department of Defense Appropriations Act as the single regular confrontation of Congress, as a decision-making participant through its appropriations committees, with the complex of strategic issues and choices contained in defense policy. In adopting the practice that has—notwithstanding objections—governed its foreign aid policy determination since the war, Congress reversed the long-standing custom of generalized authorization on a continuing basis for major procurement by the armed forces. It made a substantial and critical proportion of the defense budget subject to review by the legislative committees, by means of the requirement of a prior legislative authorization intended to op-

erate on an annual basis.<sup>2</sup> Section 412, in effect, represents an attempt by key legislative spokesmen in the defense area to reorder the formal process of policy-making in a manner which, by broadening the span of control and jurisdiction of the Committees on the Armed Services, will enhance the power of Congress.

Students of military affairs have paid relatively little attention to the role of Congress and the legislative functions in defense policy-making.<sup>3</sup> There is a general assumption that Congress must be involved at some level in certain kinds of military decisions, but rarely as a constructive or significant participant. Its negativism, its preoccupation with detail and with marginal concerns, are duly noted,<sup>4</sup> and attention then turns to the executive and the military. Certainly the tendencies toward negativism, and the fixation with incidentals rather than with the major questions of policy choices, are real enough. However, such studies as those of Hilsman and Huntington<sup>5</sup> have pointed the way to a more explicit recognition of the legislative functions in the political processes of defense, and to the fact that the role of Congress, although subordinate, adds an important and distinctive element. An analysis of the origins and initial experience

<sup>2</sup> For fiscal 1962, when it requested \$43,794,345,000 in new obligational authority in the Defense Appropriation Bill, the administration was required under Section 412 to seek new legislative authorization for \$11,974,800,000 for major weapons procurement.

<sup>3</sup> See the discussion of Richard C. Snyder and James A. Robinson in *National and International Decision-Making: A Report to the Committee on Research for Peace* (New York: Institute for International Order, 1961), pp. 84-85, 145-148.

<sup>4</sup> Not unusual in this respect is the treatment of Congress *vis à vis* the military by Morris Janowitz in *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, 1960), pp. 354-360, which he entitles "Congressional Negativism."

<sup>5</sup> Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (September, 1958), pp. 725ff.; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38 (January, 1960), pp. 285ff.

\* This is a part of a research project begun as a postdoctoral fellow of the Merzhon National Security Program at Ohio State University. The project has also had assistance from The University Research Council, University of North Carolina.

<sup>1</sup> Public Law 86-149. 73 Stat. 322. Italics added.

under Section 412 provides some additional insights into this role, and into the conditions of an active and effective legislative intervention in strategic decisions.<sup>5a</sup>

I. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN STRATEGIC DECISIONS: HYPOTHESES SUGGESTED BY THE AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT

A significant aspect of this episode was that, contrary to the more usual practice of expanding delegations of authority to the armed forces in a time of military danger and an atmosphere of "preparedness," Section 412 had the effect of rescinding or delimiting their authority simultaneously with a growing anxiety over such a danger. It could be argued from the timing of the move—coming from a Democratic Congress in the late stages of the second term of a Republican President whose judgment in military matters seemed invincibly popular—that Section 412 was the result of a temporary excess of partisanship. But the determined implementation of the device by a Democratic Congress in 1961, in the face of a world crisis and expanding military programs, is evidence of more than a cyclical zeal.

Also, the factor of inter-committee rivalry—the resentment by some Armed Forces Committee members of the preeminence of Appropriations—could be adduced as an important factor behind the adoption of Section 412. But though this element was certainly present, the fact remains that the leadership of what we may call the "412 movement" came from a group of senators who served on both committees in that chamber.

Partisanship and committee competition thus cannot adequately account for this departure from well established methods and procedures. This study will attempt to show that Section 412 is the product, basically, of a sense of restiveness among congressional leaders in the area of defense policy, particularly in the Senate. This restiveness has grown out of their

dissatisfaction with the course of events in the military establishment, the evident inability or disinclination of the administration to order matters more to their liking, and their own sense of helplessness in the legislative branch to influence military policy decisions, except by negative restraints that are of little significance in a period of international tension. Dissatisfaction, gradually accumulating over a period of years, created among these leaders a frame of mind receptive to a search for new techniques and devices which could redress in some measure the disparity in executive-congressional powers over military affairs, provide Congress with a more effective means of evaluating executive policy, and supply methods by which correctives sought by Congress might be applied.

Besides this general hypothesis of mood, the series of events leading to the imposition of the weapons authorization requirement also suggests that the likelihood of Congressional intervention in strategic policy questions in any specific instance is maximized under these circumstances:

(1) When technology and doctrine are in flux so that there is no standard orthodoxy, and, as a result, many important decisions must be reached on the basis of political as well as technical criteria;

(2) When the military services advance opposing doctrines, and thereby divulge derogatory information about rival programs, or, in the interests of mutually protective harmony, pursue such evidently duplicating programs that members of Congress are enabled to raise embarrassing questions and gain a foothold for action;

(3) When forceful committee chairmen in Congress, and senior members of these bodies, can match the administration's political executives at the Pentagon in span of experience, familiarity with specific details of policy and program development, and political standing.

These conditions all point to the obvious fact that evidence of executive indecision is an invitation to congressional intervention. In this connection, the origins of Section 412 demonstrate that hard-pressed executive officials will sometimes deliberately create an environment for legislative intervention. Pressed by rival programs or doctrines within their own agencies, and unwilling to assume the penalties of choice themselves, they may allow a "crisis" to bring an issue to a head knowing that Congress will compel some resolution of the conflict, transferring to itself the onus of ensuing deprivations. But Section 412 also demonstrates that the nature of such invited

<sup>5a</sup> Since the completion of this paper, Bernard K. Gordon has published a study of Section 412: "The Military Budget: Congressional Phase," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 23 (November, 1961), pp. 689ff. He ascribes much greater weight to committee rivalries, particularly in the House, as a factor in the origins of Section 412, and is more dubious of its benefits. He observes that Section 412 may have a "salutary effect," but he concludes that the goal of "effective congressional—and civilian—control of the military establishment" is more likely to be achieved through "a single locus of the appropriations power..." (p. 710).

congressional arbitration is neither controllable nor predictable.

## II. OTHER TYPES OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL

To put the Russell amendment—Section 412—in perspective, it will be useful to recall that, over the last decade, Congress has resorted to a variety of techniques to exert control over military policy. It has tried to interpose in the deployment and use of forces; it has engaged in direct attacks upon the military leadership; it has worked to structure the defense establishment and component agencies to facilitate its lines of access into the military departments; and it has conducted investigations and inquiries about various phases of military programs. All of this has availed it little, however, in the sense of tangible and direct influence upon policy.

Primarily, Congress has focused its efforts to reshape or modify policy through its control over appropriations. This too has been a disappointing instrumentality. Year after year, the defense budget represents the only consistent, regular, and systematic point of contact between Congress and the substantive policy issues of defense. The task confronting Congress in acting upon this budget is overwhelming. Its members have, and can have, no adequate facilities for formulating alternative programs in any systematic fashion; for this they must rely on military dissent. They must accept in the main what is submitted, grappling with thousands of items and reams of documentary exhibits. They will try to ferret out some evidence of waste and mismanagement, and usually succeed, but this bogs them down in a morass of detail and diverts their attention frequently from underlying strategic issues. In a time of military danger, with the attendant "preparedness" climate, they are naturally inhibited from making any major attack upon the budget proposals or from forcing significant reductions. And they have also been thwarted in attempts to alter policy by providing additional funds over the amounts requested by the President's agents. A legislative majority could not compel President Truman to increase aircraft procurement in 1948, nor could it compel President Eisenhower to accelerate the Nike-Zeus program, by the expedient of voting additional funds. When the President refuses to use the money, when he—in Charles Wilson's phrase—"puts it in the bank," Congress has no practicable recourse. In short, the totals involved in the defense budget have become so great, the lump-sums and carry-overs so large, the discretion to shift funds from one category to another so extensive, that budgetary controls

have actually provided Congress with little leverage over policy.

The important positive decisions about defense and strategy have therefore not been made by Congress, though anticipations of congressional opposition have no doubt operated as inhibitions against some policy choices. In a degree not paralleled in any other field of public policy, the position of the executive in this sphere has been definitely ascendant, and Congress has not been able to reverse that fact. It has maintained its lines of access into the defense establishment, and it has rejected such proposals as UMT, which seemed to draft manpower unnecessarily and provoked strong dissent from many influential groups in American society. In the main, however, a degree of "inviolability"—as Samuel P. Huntington has phrased it—has attended the strategic policy proposals embodied in executive requests, an inviolability which stands in sharp contrast to the record of congressional action on presidential programs in domestic policy, or even in foreign policy.<sup>6</sup>

Section 412—the new authorizing requirement—does not mean that this executive primacy has been, or can be, overthrown. As a result of the very nature of defense policy, its substantive problems and issues, and of the qualities inherent in the nature of the legislative and executive branches as political institutions, this primacy will continue. But Congress has now put itself in a position to introduce its voice and its will through another channel of regular and systematic contact with basic strategic programs. Through resurrecting the device of substantive authorizing legislation, adapting it to previous experience and to some salient characteristics of contemporary defense planning, it has provided itself with one more means of leverage.

## III. AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Though the primary instrumentality of congressional action on defense policy has been through appropriations, certainly the involvement of Congress in the affairs of the armed forces is much more extensive than the voting of money. Year after year a vast amount of detailed legislation must be acted upon to insure the proper functioning of the military establishment. This legislation encompasses, *e.g.*, reserve affairs, military pay, retirement and other career incentives, contract negotiation, and a wide range of other problems. Legislative activities here are vital to the

<sup>6</sup> Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-88.

management and operation of the armed forces and essential to their effective functioning. For the most part, however, such matters as these are not the determinants of basic defense policy. They are, in the main, incidental to or in support of it.

This points up the extent to which defense affairs have not been closely related to substantive legislation that defines the operating framework of policy and the supporting programs. The authorization legislation for the military departments has characteristically only established ceilings—and these very high ones, so that the same authorizing statutes could support a defense budget of \$15 billion, or \$40 billion. Hence the unusual degree to which defense policy has been insulated from substantive, authorizing legislation and limited chiefly by budgetary action. The exceptions to this have been military pay, military assistance programs, and military public works. In these three categories the appropriations are determined in a framework of detailed substantive statutes, and the latter two are subject to annual legislative action. Military pay, however, falls into the category of legislation previously referred to, while military assistance is a part of the mutual security program and is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations—not the Armed Services Committees. Of public works more will be said in a moment.<sup>7</sup>

The distinction made by Congress between authorization and appropriation, and their separation in the legislative process, is certainly not one to be overemphasized. The requirement that authorization precede appropriation gives rise to "friction" and is applied with "irregularity."<sup>8</sup> Yet it is a distinction to which

Congress usually gives due consideration, and the broadly drawn character of the military authorizing statutes, as contrasted with those affecting most domestic policy undertakings, and the sheer size of the military budget as contrasted with those of most other government agencies, have placed the military in an unusually favorable legislative position. No one, and Congress least of all, seems to know how to go about the task of a long-range, comprehensive revision of permanent force levels in the present fluid environment of international conflict. Confronted with massive military procurement programs each year, however, some members of Congress—and especially several members of the Senate Armed Services Committee—have become increasingly impressed over the last few years with the extent to which basic questions about strategy and policy have tended to form around a nexus of specific programs of the three services for the development and procurement of weapons. This led to a re-examination of the legal warrant held by the services to pursue the programs, a re-examination prompted by policy disputes in the field of missiles development, particularly with reference to continental air defense.

#### IV. ARMY-AIR FORCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1950

The basic substantive legislation pertaining to the Army and the Air Force in these categories was the Army and Air Force Authorization and Composition Act of 1950. For the Air Force, it authorized "24,000 serviceable aircraft or 225,000 airframe tons aggregate of serviceable aircraft, whichever amount the Secretary of the Air Force may determine is more appropriate to fulfill the requirements of the Air Force. . . ." The Secretary was also empowered to procure "guided missiles" without any specified limitation, and the statute stated that these were not to be included in "the number of aircraft or airframe tons authorized"; and to procure "spares, spare parts, equipment and facilities necessary for the maintenance and operation of the Air Force." The Secretary of the Army, in turn, was authorized to "procure

pressed, furthermore, and in many situations there is a wide range for the judgment of presiding officers in applying the rules when points of order are made."

With specific reference to this parallel structure in military affairs, see Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress through Appropriations, 1933-1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 40-46.

<sup>7</sup> See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 407-409.

<sup>8</sup> For a detailed analysis, see Arthur W. Macmahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse—I," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 57 (June, 1943), p. 174. Macmahon comments: "The risk of friction is inherent in the existence of two partly parallel sets of committees. Much irregularity attends the fact that the whole distinction rests on provisions in the rules of the chamber, enforced by points of order. Through inattention or comity, points of order that would be sustained are often not made. Sometimes a special rule is adopted at the request of the Committee on Appropriations which gives blanket protection against points of order. Much authorization is implied rather than ex-

materials and facilities, including guided missiles, necessary for the maintenance and support of the Army . . . and its divisions and other military organizations, and their installations and supporting and auxiliary elements. . . ." For the Army, Air Force and the Navy, the act also provided that money appropriated for these purposes, and for research and development programs, was to "remain available until expended, unless otherwise provided in the appropriations act concerned."<sup>9</sup>

The mood and the intent of Congress in making these liberal provisions were underscored in a parenthetical observation of the Senate Armed Services Committee when it first reported out the bill in 1949. Remarking on their belief that the House version of the bill permitted an excessive number of commissioned officers for the Regular Army, the senators reasoned:

In the hearings on this bill, and by later investigation, it was found that the Army will not reach its present authorized strength [of 30,600 commissioned officers] for approximately 9 years. The committee feels that the size of the regular Military Establishment is far in excess of that which will be required in the event world conditions are stabilized, and it anticipates that such will be the case before 9 years have passed.<sup>10</sup>

Simultaneously with the final passage of this act, the nation became involved in the Korean war. As a result all personnel ceilings imposed in

<sup>9</sup> 64 Stat. 321. For an analysis of the legislation, and the expressed intent of Congress in the authority voted, see Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Authorizing the Composition of the Army . . . and the Air Force of the United States*, S. Rept. 933, 81st Cong. (August 18, 1949); and House Committee on Armed Services, *Personnel and Composition of the Army and Air Force*, H. Rept. 64, 81st Cong. (February 10, 1949).

<sup>10</sup> *Authorizing the Composition of the Army . . . and the Air Force . . .*, S. Rept. 933, p. 2. The Act authorized a troop strength of 837,000 for the Army, plus 110,000 inducted trainees in service at any given time; and the Air Force was authorized 502,000 regulars plus 15,000 trainees. Appropriations then being sought by the National Military Establishment were considerably under these levels. "Obviously," said General Omar Bradley in his testimony, "Congress cannot—and indeed will not—appropriate from year to year sufficient funds for the maintenance of this authorized force." House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on H. R. 1437 . . .* (81st Cong., 1st sess., Committee Paper No. 12), pp. 105–106.

the act, and in the 1946 Navy personnel act, were suspended for four years, and Congress has continued periodically to renew the suspension.<sup>11</sup> Generous provision was meanwhile made for the Navy's air power, in legislation authorizing an active force of up to 15,000 aircraft, with the added admonition that if, "in the judgment of the Secretary of the Navy the number of airplanes authorized is insufficient to meet the needs of the national defense, the Secretary may, with the approval of the President, make such plans for procurement as the situation demands."<sup>12</sup>

The fleet, of course, had been provided for much earlier, in legislation dating back to the 1930s. Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee in 1959 summarized the status of the Navy in this respect in these words:

In the field of ship procurement, the situation is so broad today that the Armed Services Committees consider only a small fraction of the total shipbuilding program each year.

. . . It [the Vinson-Trammell Act], with its subsequent amendments, provided enough tonnage for the Navy to build ships for an untold number of years without any further authorization. All the Navy has needed, and all it needs today is appropriations.<sup>13</sup>

This same statement could also have been made about the missile programs of all the services, and the aircraft procurement of both the Air Force and the Navy. Necessarily, then, legislative participation in policy decisions was localized around the appropriations function.

#### V. REAL ESTATE, PUBLIC WORKS, AND CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE

A major exception to the exemption of the armed services from the practice of detailed substantive legislation in authorizing their principal programs, as noted already, embraced the area of real estate acquisition and public works construction. Developments in

<sup>11</sup> *Congressional Record*, Vol. 96 (81st Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 10998–11006, and 11083–85. The most recent suspension of the personnel limitations was voted in March, 1959. *Ibid.*, Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1663–90, 3402–8.

<sup>12</sup> 10 U.S.C. §7341.

<sup>13</sup> *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959), p. 13477. A useful history of the Vinson-Trammell Act, and subsequent Navy legislation, related in the context of executive-legislative relations, is in Lawrence H. Chamberlin, *The President, Congress and Legislation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 235 ff.

weapons, and especially in missiles, have recently had the effect of imparting a new strategic significance to these public works.

Congress has always had a very pronounced interest in the real estate transactions and public works projects of the military departments, and kept them under close surveillance, although for reasons that historically have had far more to do with constituency politics than with strategy. Emergency legislation suspended the process of annual authorization for military public works after 1940,<sup>14</sup> but this traditional practice, on a detailed line-item basis, was resumed in 1947.<sup>15</sup> Even during the Second World War, however, a watchful eye was maintained over many real estate matters, especially by Chairman Vinson's House Committee on Naval Affairs. When cold war rearmament again led to vast military public works projects throughout the nation, the Congressmen were disposed to expand their supervision of real estate transactions, and in so doing they collided with the Budget Bureau and the President.

A climax was reached in 1951 when a bill was enacted which required the military departments to "come into agreement" with the Armed Services Committees on the great majority of all real estate transactions to which they were a party, as a condition precedent to the necessary legislative approval of such transactions. To the disgust of Chairman Vinson, the author of the bill, President Truman vetoed it, but the resourceful and influential Georgian thereafter attached the identical proviso to the Military Construction Bill that was before his committee. Retained by the Senate, despite administration protests, and made applicable to virtually all real estate transactions in excess of \$25,000, the bill passed with the "coming into agreement" proviso securely ensconced in a construction authorization bill that was too pressing to be delayed by another exercise of the veto.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> The first suspension was in an act of July 2, 1940, and it was subsequently extended for the "duration plus six months" under the First War Powers Act. 54 Stat. 712 and 56 Stat. 312.

<sup>15</sup> House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on H.R. 4122, Authorizing Military Construction* (80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947).

<sup>16</sup> President Eisenhower asked repeal of the proviso in his budget message in 1959, and in the fiscal 1961 budget message he stated that "the Attorney General has advised me that this section violates fundamental constitutional principles. Accordingly, if it is not repealed by the Congress at its present session, I shall have no

*Real Estate Controls and Air Defense Weapons.* This "coming into agreement" clause, which was operative throughout the 1950s, and the long-established practice of annually passing legislation authorizing military public works, had the unintended result of involving the Armed Services Committees very deeply in the development of Army and Air Force programs for continental air defense and, more recently, in a variety of other missile site construction projects. Indeed, the involvement was more intensive than in any other strategic policy area, because of the close relationship of substantive legislation to policy development. Air defense was, moreover, throughout the 1950s, characterized by vigorously contested interservice disputes over doctrine and roles and missions, and marked by intense competition for funds in support of particular weapons programs. The experience made a deep and lasting impression upon the Armed Services Committees, particularly in the Senate.

This experience grew out of the fact that the air defense programs of both the Army and the Air Force entailed annual action by the Armed Services Committees on legislation authorizing the hundreds of construction projects required, and their approval of hundreds of separate real estate transactions to provide the sites for the projects. Radar networks had to be authorized, combat control centers approved for construction, and defensive weapons deployed. Some statistics on one Army program alone will illustrate the range of committee action that was entailed. Beginning in the summer of 1953 the Army began deploying its Nike-Ajax surface-to-air missile. The range of the missile was approximately twenty-five miles, and the Army had elaborate plans to site it around urban complexes and defense installations throughout the United States. Obviously the missile sites had to be located in immediate proximity to the point defended. Each Nike battery required, first, an area of about eight acres for radars and computers, a launching area consisting of some forty-three acres, and ten additional acres for equipment and as a safety zone. In each of the launcher areas it was

alternative thereafter but to direct the Secretary of Defense to disregard the section unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise."

As a result of this demand, the proviso was removed and a clause inserted in the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1960, which requires instead that real property transactions be "reported" to the Committees, in most instances thirty days prior to the completion of the transaction. 74 Stat. 186.

necessary to construct three underground magazines with four launchers in each, and the site had also to include a missile assembly and test building, a missile fueling facility, troop housing, mess hall, and troop support facilities.<sup>17</sup> From the start, the committee was necessarily and regularly involved in a detailed analysis and review of the program, approving the real estate acquisition and authorizing the construction of facilities on a line-item basis.

The Nike network was only a minor part of the total continental air defense programs. Including the radar warning systems, the SAGE control centers, the aircraft and bases of the NORAD fighter-interceptor units, the various Army and Air Force missile systems that were deployed, the Secretary of Defense stated in 1958 that the total capital investment made in continental air defense in a period of four and a half years had exceeded \$13 billion, and that operating costs were \$2 billion annually.<sup>18</sup> A House Appropriations Committee report in 1959 stated that over a ten-year period the nation had spent \$29 billion on these programs—warning, control, and weapons—that had been designed to meet the threat of manned-bombers and air-breathing missiles.<sup>19</sup>

The details of the various conflicts over doctrine, roles and missions, or weapons, which have arisen between the services in connection with air defense do not need to be noted here, except to say that they have been subjects of serious dispute. Both the Army and Air Force have questioned the other's proper function and mission, and cast doubts on the effectiveness of the other's weapons. Nor have such disputes been peculiar to the problem of air defense. They have been the common currency of Pentagon politics. What is important here is that members of Congress through the Armed Services Committees have consistently had a different kind of relationship to the developments in air defense than they had in any other strategic program throughout the 1950s, and that these Committees found that by participating at a stage closer to operations than appropriations they were able to state criticisms

on the basis of a greater knowledge of problems and issues, knowledge gained from annual and detailed review of legislative programs. As a result, they were able to exert a more effective leverage on policy decisions. The necessity for legislation prior to or complementary with the annual appropriations bills placed Congress in a more advantageous position, when it had a complaint or recommendation to enter.

*The Nike-Talos Dispute.* This was first brought out in 1956 when the Armed Services Committees were confronted with a request to authorize the Air Force to establish installations for a land-based version of the Talos surface-to-air missile. The Air Force wanted to begin deploying the missile to protect four bases of the Strategic Air Command. The Senate military construction subcommittee had been somewhat skeptical about the Nike program, and it was also concerned with the skyrocketing costs of air defense. It wanted to know why both the Nike and Talos were needed. If the Talos were the better weapon, why was it not used to defend cities? Otherwise, why would the Nike not suffice as the defender of SAC bases as well as cities? In any event, the Senators could see no purpose in having rival missile systems on site for the defense of overlapping areas.<sup>20</sup>

This expression of doubt and concern by the Senators naturally led the two services to fear action adverse to their interests. Each hurriedly came forward to defend its program. Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor bluntly told the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee that the Air Force decision to install the Talos was "an invasion of the Army anti-aircraft role."<sup>21</sup> Other Army spokesmen asserted that the Air Force proposal was premature, since the Talos was not yet operational and would not be for some time. As for the Nike, the Army never retreated from its "un-

<sup>17</sup> Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, *Hearings on S. 1765, Military Public Works Construction* (84th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 273ff.

<sup>18</sup> A detailed analysis of air defense costs was in Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1959*, S. Rept. 1982, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (July 28, 1958).

<sup>19</sup> House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1960*, H. Rept. 408, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (May 28, 1959), pp. 15-16.

<sup>20</sup> Senator Stennis referred to committee concern about the "effectiveness" of Nike and "its range or lack of range," and to the great expense incurred on air defense. He concluded: "... I certainly have always steered away from the idea that this subcommittee was a policy making committee on missiles for defense installations except we do approve this when we keep recommending these sites and this money. . . ." Senator Jackson maintained that for Congress to agree to finance both Nike and Talos was simply to compromise service rivalries. *Hearings on S. 3122, Military Public Works Construction* (84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 395-96.

<sup>21</sup> *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for 1957* (84th Cong., 2d sess.), p. 87.



qualified assurance" that "Nike can be relied on" as a weapon "capable of operating against any known aircraft or any aircraft projected into the future of the next five years or so."<sup>22</sup> The Air Force profoundly disagreed. An air staff analysis was leaked to the press at this juncture, dismissing the Nike as an ineffective weapon incapable of meeting the threat posed by high altitude jet bombers.<sup>23</sup>

The Senate subcommittee, after making some inquiries of its own, reacted to this by striking out the Talos in the military construction authorization bill. It said this was being done until "the relative merits of both systems have been positively tested and roles and missions clarified." While Congress ought not "to be placed in the position of defining roles and missions," or of passing on the merits of weapons, it continued, "unless concise responsibilities are assigned, duplication of weapons systems costing in the multi-billion range might result. . . ."<sup>24</sup> The House Armed Services Committee was reluctant to veto a military program, fearing that this was trespassing in the domain of professional decision. It was therefore agreed in conference that the Talos authorization would be conditionally restored, on the understanding that it would not be utilized until the Secretary of Defense had "come into agreement" with both Armed Services Committees on the subject, following an impartial study of the relative capabilities of both the Nike and Talos.<sup>25</sup> On this ground, and also because of an objectionable provision in the bill relating to military housing construction, the President returned it with a veto. He declared: "If the committees should fail or decline to agree with the plans prepared by the Secretary of Defense, the practical effect of this provision would be to lodge in the committees the authority to nullify congressional authorization."<sup>26</sup> With this, the Senate committee insisted upon striking out again all authoriza-

tion for Talos installation construction, and both houses then agreed.<sup>27</sup>

Later that year the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum clarifying roles and missions, in which he assigned to the Army the development and deployment of surface-to-air missiles up to the 100-mile range, removing the previous limit of fifty miles. This automatically put the development of the land-based version of the Talos into the Army's hands. During 1958 the Army announced discontinuance of the Talos program. Chairman John C. Stennis of the Senate military construction subcommittee commented in the upper house that, although enthusiastic claims had been made before this group about the need for the Talos and the important contributions it would make to air defense, since the 1956 action nothing further was ever heard about it until word was received that the Army had cancelled the program. The Senator was personally convinced, and his colleagues agreed, that if the 1956 request had been given legislative approval additional Talos sites would have been installed to cover areas already under the guard of Nike, and that by this action Congress had forestalled a needless and costly duplication that the Defense Department was either unable or unwilling to prevent.<sup>28</sup>

It seems important to note, with reference to the Nike-Talos imbroglio, that the issue was identified and brought to a decision by the deliberations and actions of the Armed Services Committee in the Senate—specifically, by the military construction subcommittee. The Nike program had been before the Appropriations Committees for several years, and annual presentations about its deployment and performance had been made by the Army. Yet, not until the probings of the military construction subcommittee had obviously struck at some vulnerable and sensitive nerve ends in the Pentagon did the appropriations committees join the fray. The strong presumption must be that, immersed as they were in the complexities of the total defense budget, the span of attention of the appropriations committee members was too diffuse to permit the isolation of concrete issues, despite widespread dissatisfaction with missile programs generally.

Little more than a year after the Talos incident, the military construction subcommittee found what it believed to be another and more costly duplication in the air defense programs submitted through the Defense Department.

<sup>22</sup> Lt. Gen. S. R. Mickelsen, in House Appropriations Subcommittee, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956* (84th Cong., 2d sess.), pt. 1, p. 396.

<sup>23</sup> On the air staff analysis "leak," see Anthony Leviero, *New York Times*, May 21, 1956, p. 1. This was but one of a deluge of leaks from the military departments during that spring and summer.

<sup>24</sup> *Authorizing Construction for Military Departments*, S. Rept. 2364, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (June 26, 1956), pp. 10-11.

<sup>25</sup> *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 102 (84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 12167-77.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12959.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14634, 14884.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 104 (85th Cong., 2d sess.), p. 15543.

The Air Force in 1958 began seeking authorization for installations for its Bomarc A missile, an "area-defense" weapon as distinguished from the Army's point-defense missiles. Neither service had any hesitation in voicing its unbounded confidence in the superiority of its own defensive system, while looking with great skepticism upon that of its rival. Again the subcommittee made a detailed and critical review of what it considered to be duplicating programs, in this instance the Bomarc and the Nike-Hercules, and in the authorization bill made a twenty percent reduction in the total funding sought for the two systems.

In taking this action [explained Senator Stennis], the committee does not attempt to set itself up as military experts. These are decisions that must be made by the Secretary of Defense supported by qualified technicians. The committee took this action as a matter of focusing attention on the problem and in underlining its beliefs that Congress should not be called upon to determine the merits of competing weapons systems.

The reduction, he stated, would still permit the Secretary to proceed with construction of essential missile sites, but it would bring pressure to bear to compel a needed decision upon a well ordered surface-to-air missile program that would eliminate unnecessary overlapping between the two services.<sup>29</sup>

Although legislative intervention of this nature in missile programs was primarily confined to the air defense area, these Senate actions on Talos, Hercules and Bomarc coincided with more general expressions of anxiety and dissatisfaction about all aspects of missile developments. The situation in air defense, congressional sources complained, was not unique but was, in fact, symptomatic of basic defects in the decision-making processes in the Department of Defense that were having an adverse effect in all areas of weapons development. Congressmen found confirmation of their views in the resignation, early in 1956, of Trevor Gardner and his public protest against what he called an "administrative nightmare" and "intolerable rivalry" between the services which were obstructing progress in missile development.<sup>30</sup> The congressional viewpoint

was succinctly put in the statement of the House Appropriations Committee on May 21, 1957, pointing to "an apparent lack of timely, effective, and decisive action on the part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in achieving a well-rounded, coordinated guided missile program at a minimum cost commensurate with an adequate system." Echoing Gardner's allegations, the congressmen criticised "an increasing degree of rivalry among the services for roles and missions," which had reached such proportions as "to jeopardize and delay the rate of build-up of our military power." Each service was "striving to acquire an arsenal of weapons complete in itself to carry out any and all possible missions."<sup>31</sup> Clearly the mood of Congress was one leaning toward further intervention, if it could isolate additional concrete controversies such as the Nike vs. Talos.

#### VI. REORGANIZATION AND THE GENESIS OF A LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION

At this juncture, the Soviet Union put Sputnik I into orbit, in October of 1957. This event immediately provided a focus for a theretofore unstructured political debate over missiles and U.S. defense posture. It produced a flurry of investigations in Congress and provided a powerful talking point for the legislative critics of administration policy. In this context—with Congress increasingly disposed to intervene in defense policy matters—the President advanced a series of proposals calling for a reorganization of the Department of Defense. In the spring of 1958 his proposals were embodied in specific legislative requests, and the immediate origins of the 1959 authorizing amendment are to be found in the resulting debate on defense organization.

As these debates progressed, Democratic spokesmen especially came to voice the notion that the administration was attaching to defects in organization the major shortcomings in defense policy, and that the onus of these defects was being placed upon the congressional doorstep. Chairman Russell of the Senate Armed Services Committee observed that many statements made in support of the President's proposals carried the implication that "the Secretary of Defense is powerless—that he is a mere figurehead—and that the Congress has made no provision for the unified

<sup>29</sup> Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1959*, S. Rept. 1982, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (July 28, 1958). See also the military construction subcommittee *Hearings on S. 3756, S. 3863, and H.R. 13015, Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1959*.

<sup>30</sup> See his article, "Our Guided Missile Crisis,"

*Look*, Vol. 20 (May 15, 1956), pp. 46-52. Gardner had been special assistant for research and development to the Secretary of the Air Force.

<sup>31</sup> *Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1958*, H. Rept. 471, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 19-20.

strategic direction of the military services." This, he asserted, was "an impression that is without factual foundation."<sup>32</sup> Thus, there was a contest between the two branches of government to fix responsibility for policy failings, each holding the other accountable for serious organizational defects as a source of the trouble. Armed Services Committee members in both houses repeatedly insisted that many weaknesses in the decision-making structure could specifically be attributed to a failure of officials to use powers already provided, more than to any failure of Congress to endow the executive with needed authority. As evidence they cited the Talos dispute, and the Nike-Bomarc dispute, and the Thor-Jupiter dispute, all of which the Secretary had authority to settle.

In this setting, Senator Ralph Flanders, Vermont Republican and then a member of Armed Services, interrupted his questioning of Secretary McElroy in the reorganization hearings to voice his opinion that the Committee was "not informed," and its judgment was "not asked . . . on overall defense plans. . . ." At the time he became a member of the Committee, he continued, he was "surprised" to discover that most military authorization was of a "perpetual" nature, that "we had no contact with it," despite the fact that the "authorization process exists almost completely, I think, through all the rest of the area of Government operations." The Senator then observed:

My only means of getting any concept of what an overall program is, is due to the fact that you [Chairman Russell] have kindly assigned me as an ex officio member of the Appropriations Committee.

Can they take little bits and pieces of the appropriations, glue them together with some imagination, and arrive at an overall defense program?

. . . I think it [an overall program] ought to be presented to us for our authorization and so that is the main suggestion with regard to this [reorganization] undertaking which I have to make.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. This point came up repeatedly, not only in the reorganization hearings but also in the special investigations launched after Sputnik. See Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, *Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs* (85th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1957-58); and House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Investigations of National Defense Missiles . . .* (85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958).

<sup>33</sup> *Hearings, DOD Reorganization Act of 1958*, pp. 31-32.

Senator Russell took this criticism under careful consideration, once the reorganization bill was disposed of, and directed the committee staff to make a study of the problem.

The staff recognized, of course, the total impracticability of any complete, periodic authorization of the military budget. It was immediately impressed, however, by the convergence of basic policy and strategy and certain major weapons programs. Recalling also the air defense experience to that date, it concluded that the focus should be upon weapons, and as initially drafted and approved by the Committee early in 1959 the amendment stipulated that annual authorization be required for the "design, development, and procurement" of aircraft and missiles. In this form the proviso was attached to the Military Construction Authorization Bill—for reasons both logical and expedient—when it was reported by the Committee on May 19. The report commented but briefly upon this proposed change, soon designated as the "Russell amendment," and seemed to be at pains, in fact, to say as little about it as possible. It did note that the fiscal 1960 budget contained over \$9 billion in proposed appropriations for aircraft and missiles, that in addition to the large expenditures for procurement *per se* these generated "requirements for expenditures in other major budget categories, such as personnel, construction, and operations and maintenance"; and that the authorizations on which these appropriations were based were noteworthy for a "lack of specificity." Therefore:

The committee has concluded that in the discharge of its legislative responsibilities an annual review of the aircraft and missile procurement programs is needed. A thorough examination of this area of activity may serve to reduce the enormous cost of defense and should assist the Committee on Appropriations in their consideration of the mammoth defense budget.<sup>34</sup>

Immediately the Department of Defense voiced its strong disapproval of such a change. At this juncture, however, the debate on the authorizing amendment became intertwined with another but related action of the Committee, one which precipitated another explosion in the long-standing dispute over air defense involving the Army, the Air Force, the Defense Department, and the Armed Services Committee. The military construction subcommittee deleted over 75 per cent of the Army

<sup>34</sup> *Military Construction Authorization . . . , Fiscal Year 1960*, S. Rept. 296, 86th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 15-16.

requests for Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile installations, and repealed previous authorizations of fifty Nike batteries in the continental United States and eight in Hawaii. The subcommittee asserted that the Nike system was "virtually obsolete," that further expenditure was unwarranted, that the Army was investing too great a proportion of its resources in purely defensive systems, and that greater emphasis should be placed upon "area" defensive systems.<sup>35</sup> It demanded that the Secretary of Defense come forward with a "master plan" for air defense, which would eliminate unnecessary duplications in weapons and facilities, before the adjournment of Congress.

The immediate circumstance prompting the Armed Services Committee to take this extreme action, virtually a veto of a weapons program and an ultimatum to the Defense Department, was in remarks made by the Secretary of Defense. Perhaps inadvertently, the Secretary in effect invited drastic Senate action. Appearing before the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee on May 4, he remarked that air defense had been a problem "which has been, I suppose, more difficult than any I have touched—to resolve in a way that is at all satisfying." This led to an unusual colloquy:

Senator STENNIS. . . . I am beginning to think that the Department of Defense would welcome a congressional decision on this matter and then you could move on into a more positive program.

Secretary McELROY. You have certainly touched us in a place that I would call vulnerable.

Senator STENNIS. I do not want to embarrass you.

Secretary McELROY. You are not embarrassing us. This is one area where we have not done very well in making a decision.

As far as I am concerned, it would not bother me if you held our feet to the fire and forced us in connection with this budget.

Senator STENNIS. I appreciate your attitude tremendously, because I frankly think that is what has to be done, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McELROY. I think it is time.<sup>36</sup>

The Defense Department was distressed by these remarks, while the Army was staggered by the resulting blow inflicted by the Committee

on its Nike-Hercules program. Each began attempting to undo the damage. The Army resorted to issuing a memorandum to every member of Congress, which defended the Nike against the allegations made in the report and asked that the requested funds be restored and the Committee be overruled.<sup>37</sup> Before the week was out the confusion was compounded by steps taken in the House of Representatives. In reporting out the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, the Appropriations Committee severely cut back funds for procurement of the Air Force surface-to-air missile system, the Bomarc. Mr. Mahon, chairman of the defense subcommittee, took note of the prolonged dispute over what most congressmen considered competing, not complementary weapons systems, and explained: "We proposed to help bring this controversy to a showdown through the utilization of the power of the purse."<sup>38</sup>

The Defense Department had no choice but to begin preparing at once a revised plan that reprogrammed both the Nike and Bomarc systems, insisting that both were needed.<sup>39</sup> Concurrently it urged the deletion of the authorizing amendment, Section 412, focusing its efforts on the House Armed Services Committee and its chairman. Mr. Vinson was variously reported as opposed, or, at best, lukewarm toward the Senate amendment. Three explanations were advanced: It was said that he feared such an action would violate the principle that "military men should make military decisions," a violation he allegedly believed already made in the Senate action on the Nike-Hercules.<sup>40</sup> Other observers felt that he might have inadvertently committed himself to the Pentagon in advance on the issue; still others believed that he was concerned that the additional work the amendment would demand might cause his then forty-three committee members to become bogged down in a morass of detail. Some significance might also be attached to the fact that the authorizing clause, at that point, did not include ships.

Pentagon chiefs were particularly worried

<sup>37</sup> The memorandum was reported in detail by Mark S. Watson, *Baltimore Sun*, May 23, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup> *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 8642.

<sup>39</sup> A revised bill, drawn on the basis of the "master plan," was reported to the Senate by the Stennis subcommittee on June 25 (S. Rept. 434, 86th Cong.).

<sup>40</sup> *Army Navy Air Force Journal*, May 23, 1959, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. The Nike was defined as a "point" defense weapon.

<sup>36</sup> *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations*, 1960, p. 33.

about two issues raised by the Senate authorizing amendment. They feared that serious delay might result if an authorization process had to be gone through annually. Major complications might ensue from disagreements on programs within each of the Armed Services Committees, between these committees, and between Armed Services and Appropriations in one or both houses. In the Senate, where there was an overlapping membership, this was less likely,<sup>41</sup> but it was a cause of considerable concern with respect to the lower chamber. Not only delay, but something approaching chaos, could be the outcome. Evidently the Nike-Bomarc experience also led some Defense officials to fear that there could easily be repetitions of this kind of encounter. One service organ, echoing these apprehensions, argued that Congress should exercise "close surveillance" over defense matters and that there should be the "closest possible liaison" between Congress and the Pentagon. But it warned that "this surveillance must not be broadened to an extent where Congress can dictate the weapons of defense."<sup>42</sup> The military commentator of the *New York Times* agreed that this was the clear implication in recent actions of the Senate. "Military decisions," he wrote, "properly can be made only by the Pentagon and the President." Otherwise, there was real "danger" that Congress would "choose a weapon or a system on the basis of political and economic factors rather than on objective military and technical ones."<sup>43</sup>

Against these objections the Senate Armed Services Committee stood firm. It felt that it had ample basis for its belief that something other than "objective" military factors were already involved in many weapons decisions, pointing as an example to a series of newspaper advertisements sponsored by defense contractors in support of rival Army and Air Force missiles (the Hercules and Bomarc), and released just as Congress was deliberating on the subject. It further pointed to numerous contradictions, expressed and implied, in statements released by the two military departments, and questioned whether only technical considerations were weighed in Pentagon

deliberations. The Defense Department offered to submit procurement programs to the committees on an annual basis, with detailed explanations and support material; but to this Senators Russell, Stennis, and others countered that such an "information" procedure would place the burden of proof on Congress. If modifications were sought, if it were desired to effect any sort of change, legislation would have to be passed at the congressional initiative and it would be subject to a veto.

After prolonged conference consideration, the Senate and House came into agreement. Whatever his original view, Vinson now gave firm support to the revised amendment. Two reductions in scope, and one expansion, had been accepted by the Senate managers. First, it was agreed that specific mention of annual authorization would be deleted, so that more flexibility could be allowed if circumstances warranted it. The intent of annual action, however, was not dislodged. Second, the authorization of "design and development" was stricken out, and the requirement restricted to include only procurement of operational items. The Committee saw no feasible means of overseeing research. Finally, the amendment was altered to include "naval vessels" as well as aircraft and missiles—a move that no doubt quickened Vinson's interest. The provision was not to take effect until December 31, 1960. A trial run was to be made during 1960, with complete information to be submitted to the Committees on all ship, missile and aircraft procurement programs by January 31, 1960, including "cost," and the "number of each type and kind" to be procured, but this was for the Committees' study only and would not, in the first year, necessitate legislation.<sup>44</sup>

#### VII. THE 1961 PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION: PROCEDURES AND POLITICS

The full coming into effect of Section 412 thus coincided with the arrival of the Kennedy administration. The mechanics of procedure were worked out in the 1960 trial run, and the first legislation authorizing the procurement of ships, aircraft and missiles was submitted to the 87th Congress. It was a one-year authorization. No action was taken pending anticipated program revisions from the new President, and these were submitted in a special message late in March. On April 4 hearings began before the

<sup>41</sup> In the 87th Congress, five members of Armed Services are also members of the defense subcommittee of Appropriations, and three members serve *ex officio* on the Appropriations subcommittee.

<sup>42</sup> *Army Navy Air Force Journal*, May 30, 1959, p. 12.

<sup>43</sup> Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times*, May 28, 1959, p. 13.

<sup>44</sup> 73 Stat. 322. In addition to the Senate reports already cited, see Vinson's defense and explanation of the amendment to the House, *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 13476-77.

Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 1852, authorizing a procurement program of \$11,974,800,000, as already noted, for fiscal 1962. The new obligational authority being sought in the revised Defense Appropriation Bill was \$43,794,345,000.<sup>45</sup>

The circumstances surrounding this novel legislative proceeding were themselves unusual. A presidential transition had meant delay in final program determinations, so legislative action did not begin until relatively late in the session. More important, however, was the atmosphere of crisis which pervaded the deliberations—Laos, Cuba, the Geneva stalemate, and then Berlin. Indeed, little more than a month after the passage of S. 1852, the President made additional military requests on July 26 because of the Berlin threat, and a second weapons procurement authorization of \$958,570,000 was immediately passed.<sup>46</sup>

In both a procedural and a political sense, the authorization process bore an impressive resemblance to the established pattern of military appropriations. Procedurally, this is first demonstrated in the framework of the legislation itself, and secondly, in the type of "compact" entered into by the Armed Services Committees and the Pentagon. As agreed during 1960, the Department's bill contained only eight categories: Army aircraft, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, and Air Force aircraft; Army missiles, Navy missiles, Marine Corps missiles, and Air Force missiles; and Navy vessels. For each of these eight, a lump-sum authorization was provided. The military departments then supplied detailed back-up material as justification, and itemized, detailed information concerning numbers to be procured, operational characteristics, costs and schedules for each individual weapons system within all of the categories. The statute itself was confined to a listing of the broad eight categories and the total amounts under each, as has been the practice in the defense appropriations acts for many years. And, as in the case of appropriations, changes in the numbers and costs of a given weapon, or in the "mix" of

various weapons in a category or in two or more categories, may be made by "reprogramming." That is, the committees are consulted, but no additional legislation is necessary for the changes to be made. Specifically, the Defense Department agreed to submit regular quarterly reprogramming reports to Armed Services along with such special interim reports as changes warranted.<sup>47</sup> Some in the House professed a desire to use a line-item procedure, and the House Committee report took pains to point out that the lump-sum method was instituted only on a "trial basis for one year."<sup>48</sup> One has difficulty, however, envisaging a line-item approach to this area.

The lump sums, it should be pointed out further, are not confined to the "hardware"—i.e., to the missiles, etc., *per se*. "Below the line" items essential to the weapon itself are included. In the case of aircraft, for example, not only the aircraft and all airborne equip-

<sup>47</sup> See especially the testimony of Major General R. F. Friedman, Director of the Budget and Comptroller, USAF, in Senate, *Procurement Hearings*, pp. 457ff.; and the discussion between Congressman Kilday and Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert:

"Mr. KILDAY. . . . Now under 412, we will have in our backup here, but not in the law, the individual planes, missiles and ships which are authorized.

"As I understand it, the Comptroller General has held that this is binding on the Department [in appropriations procedure], even though it is not in the law, but that with the concurrence of the committee you could transfer the funds to another purpose.

"So here you have so much money authorized for airplanes, but we have a detailed justification. Then you are going to put in a detailed justification for Appropriations, but you are going to get your money in a lump-sum. You are going to be required by law to abide by the commitments made to the committees. But by concurrence of the committees, you can transfer it to different types of airplanes, missiles and ships, or change the priorities to which you have committed yourself. . . .

"Secretary ZUCKERT. That is an excellent statement of my understanding."

See House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on H.R. 6151, Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for the Armed Forces* (87th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Paper No. 10), p. 1533.

<sup>48</sup> *Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels*. H. Rept. 380 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 10.

<sup>45</sup> Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Procurement Authorization Fiscal Year 1962* (87th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 26-27. The original Eisenhower request under 412 had been for \$10,572,181,000.

<sup>46</sup> The supplemental procurement bill—S. 2311—passed the Senate on July 28 and the House on August 2, in both instances without dissent and after perfunctory debate. *Cong. Rec.* Vol. 107 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), daily ed., pp. 12905-12919, and 13312-13322.

ment, but the spare engines, initial spares, peculiar ground support equipment and training items are all included. Inclusion only of the "hardware" would have reduced the authorization almost in half, and would have created also major accounting and budgeting problems.<sup>49</sup>

Even more notable, however, was the extent to which the political quality of the authorization process adhered to the appropriations pattern. Although crisis restraints were increasingly operative (and fully so on the supplemental authorization bill), and a spirit of cooperativeness incidental to the launching of a new administration was evident, the hearings demonstrated, first, a search for dissent within the military as a basis of criticism, evaluation and revision. After the style of Secretaries of Defense in the appropriations hearings over recent years, Mr. McNamara commented in his comprehensive statement to the committees that the requests did "not provide everything that everyone would like to have."<sup>50</sup> Accordingly, a considerable part of the hearing revolved around congressional inquiries as to the nature of the items the military departments would have "liked," but which were denied by the office of the Secretary of Defense. The Navy was disappointed that its Eagle Missileer project had not been provided for.<sup>51</sup> The Army was displeased that it had again—after a strenuous campaign—failed to obtain authorization for funds to put into production certain components of its Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile. Senator Thurmond attempted to persuade the committee to add \$169 million authorization in the Army missiles category for this purpose, but the committee accepted the Defense Department's ruling and defeated the amendment by a "decisive" vote.<sup>52</sup> Representative Gubser sought a \$697.5 million addition to the bill to provide authorization for six more Polaris submarines. When the House committee, again accepting Defense Department recommendations, defeated this proposal by a

vote of 3-25, Mr. Gubser carried it to the floor with the endorsement of the Republican Policy Committee. There the amendment was defeated 58-105.<sup>53</sup>

In one important respect only did the committees, and the two houses, reach a consensus at variance with the administration's program of major weapons procurement. The defense establishment did not include a request for authorization of further procurement of the B-52 or the B-58 bombers. The Secretary of Defense indicated that under existing plans B-52 production would end in August, 1962, and B-58 production in October, 1962. Pending further study of the role of the manned bomber, therefore, he saw no need for procurement authority during fiscal 1962. Further, in connection with the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, the administration reduced the development funds for the B-70 by \$138 million.<sup>54</sup>

The committees took strong issue with this evident downgrading of the manned bomber. During the hearings, according to the House committee report, a "perceptible hesitancy in placing sole reliance and dependence on the ICBM for now or the near future" appeared. It noted that the bomber concept was still under study and emphasized the untried nature of the ballistic missile:

...Also—and this is a thought which to the knowledge of the committee has not been stressed in the past—who knows whether an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead will actually work? Each of the constituent elements has been tested, it is true. Each of them, however, has not been tested under circumstances which would be attendant upon the firing of the missile in anger.

By this the committee means an intercontinental ballistic missile will carry its nuclear warhead to great heights, subjecting it to intense cold. It then will arch down and upon reentering the earth's atmosphere subject the nuclear warhead to intense heat. Who knows what will happen to the delicate mechanisms involved in the nuclear warhead as it is subjected to these two extremes of temperature?

The scientists may say that all of these things are determinable by extrapolation. Perhaps this is so. To the committee, however, it seems that our only knowledge of the actual workability of an ICBM fired in anger is in textbooks and in laboratories. The committee is unwilling to place the

<sup>49</sup> Senate, *Procurement Hearings*, p. 462.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> See *Ibid.*, pp. 290-291.

<sup>52</sup> *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 107 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), daily ed., p. 7412. The Army's drive for Nike-Zeus production was "kicked off" by the February issue of *Army* magazine, published by the Association for the United States Army. Speeches were made on the floor on behalf of the Zeus by Congressmen Daniel Flood, George P. Miller, and John McCormack; and by Senators Thurmond and Mundt. See *ibid.*, pp. 1580, 1727, 2022, 2439, 3560, 4425.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8321.

<sup>54</sup> House Committee on Armed Services, *Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels*, pp. 4, 6.



safety of this country in a purely academic attitude, and for this reason has added to the bill authorization for bombers.<sup>55</sup>

The committees not only sounded the trumpet against the academicians but also observed that (1) the bomber possesses a "utility and flexibility in application" not obtainable in missiles; (2) if a stable strategic deterrence were achieved the manned bomber would be able to respond to "other forms of warfare"; and (3) the availability of the Hound Dog air-to-ground missile and the development of the Skybolt enhanced the effectiveness of the manned bomber as a strategic weapon.<sup>56</sup>

The upshot of all this was, in the Senate, an amendment authorizing \$525 million for B-52 procurement, and evidence of serious misgivings about the cuts made in the B-70 development. The House reduced and altered this, adding \$393 million authorization for B-52 and B-58 procurement. The conferees agreed to restore the Senate figure—\$525 million—and specified only that it was for "procurement of long-range manned aircraft for the Strategic Air Command."<sup>57</sup> The Appropriations Committee concurred in this judgment on the need for manned bombers, noting the aerial demonstrations during the year in Moscow. The appropriations bill accepted by the conferees in August thus added \$515 million for purchase of B-52s or B-58s, and also added \$400 million over the administration requests for the B-70 program.<sup>58</sup>

Obviously, however, Congress can no more compel Defense Department utilization of what it has authorized than it can compel expenditure of funds which it has appropriated. Does the authorization process merely result in a situation identical with that of the appropriations process? Has Section 412 altered the realities of the decision-making process, or merely added a new procedural layer?

#### VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In three respects, Section 412 opens the way for an expansion of the role of Congressional

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>56</sup> Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels*, S. Rept. 253, 87th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4.

<sup>57</sup> *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 107 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), daily ed., pp. 9314-9315. The Senate agreed to a House amendment for additional funds for new engines for the C-135 and a compromise was reached on the procurement of guided missile frigates by the Navy.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14262-14265.

leaders in defense policy-making. First, it strengthens the access of Congress to the processes of policy formulation. Strategy is an area of executive initiative and, in this basic sense, Congress' role must be usually and essentially a negative one—the role of critic, questioner, skeptic—though occasionally it can be a prodder. With major strategic doctrines underlying policy inherently focused in the procurement of major weapons systems, the procedure of annually authorizing these systems (and the intent to make this an annual process seems very firm) involves more Congressmen more immediately in the intellectual, technical and political processes from which policy and strategy emerge.

The authorization procedure lends itself to this function better because it possesses, in turn, the *utility of focus*. Defense appropriations must roam across an immense terrain of policy decisions, from the trivial to the momentous. The range of choices is too complex for busy legislators to be able to extract and analyze systematically the pertinent and the fundamental from the irrelevant and transitory. Moreover, important decisions not of a strategic nature become interlocked in the vast reaches of defense appropriations. A great deal of time was given in the debates on the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal 1960, for example, to the issue of federal subsidies to local educational resources in areas where large defense installations are located.<sup>59</sup> This is not an insignificant problem, and it falls into a category of constituency interests that demand legislative attention. But it is time-consuming and diverting from the central issues involved in national defense. Issues of this sort are always involved in the appropriations acts.

Such diversions are less likely to emerge in legislation wholly concerned with authorizing procurement of ships, aircraft and missiles. Strategic issues are not exhausted in the problems of weapons procurement, but S. 1852 clearly raised such questions as (1) the relative allocation of resources to preparations for limited and general war, (2) the relative utility of varying types of strategies of deterrence, (3) the mix of strategic weapons, and (4) the roles and missions of the services relative to these various policy objectives. Procurement hearings and debates may be sidetracked, but aside from the inevitable discussions about the mechanics of the novel procedure the 1961 record demonstrated an impressive degree of focus on the policy choices implicit in the legislation. Events dictated also a considerable

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13624-13633.



concern in the hearings with intelligence programs and with the release of information on military programs, but these were questions deserving of legislative scrutiny and interest.

Finally, access and focus lead into one other important alteration in this executive-legislative dialogue. The authorization procedure creates an *expanded base of knowledge* in Congress for the critical analysis of defense issues. With decision-making in defense centralized around the budgetary process, the Committees on Appropriations—or, more specifically, the defense subcommittees—were in a peculiarly powerful position in setting the terms of debate and deliberation. Under Section 412, the subject-matter committees assume new importance. Chairman Vinson stated in the debates:

... I am afraid ... that members of the Appropriations Committees were the only ones in Congress who actually had very much knowledge of the tremendous programs and expenditures which the Congress was called upon to pass on each year.

It is my hope that section 412 has called a halt to this situation. If it did nothing else, it brought 37 members of the House [*i.e.*, those on Armed Services] into the heretofore exclusive area of knowledge of these very large programs.<sup>60</sup>

The Appropriations Committees have understandably refrained from expressing enthusiastic support for Section 412 and its implications. Privately some of the members agreed with the Defense Department in 1959 that it was an unwise and unnecessary procedure. But 412 certainly does not displace Appropriations from an important position in debate.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8218.

<sup>61</sup> On the preeminence of the appropriations committees, an interesting comment will be found in Douglas Cater, "The Lonely Men on Capital

It does add, however, to that reservoir of information and knowledge available in Congress which is the prerequisite of effective and intelligent debate. While this may represent Congressional "negativism," the role of serious debate is fundamental.<sup>62</sup>

The authorization requirement poses some hazards to a rational political process. It may create delay and more troublesome complications if disputes arise between the two houses and the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. It invites additional pressure tactics from weapons contractors. It imposes added burdens on overworked civilian and military officers by requiring that they spend more time on the Hill giving duplicating testimony before different committees. If these become the real legacy of Section 412 in fact, and if the "preparedness" atmosphere continues, a strong President and Secretary of Defense can probably even dislodge the requirement, ultimately.

Nevertheless, the innovation embodied in Section 412 opens the door to the fulfillment of a vital need in the processes of defense policy-making in the United States: effective searching debate of strategic issues and choices. Confinement of legislative review of policy to the appropriations process has not met this need. The enactment of 412 is thus not only suggestive of the circumstances in which Congress is prone to intervene in strategic decisions. Properly utilized, it provides an improved basis upon which such intervention can be informed and effective.

Hill," *The Reporter*, Vol. 21 (October 15, 1959), pp. 23-26.

<sup>62</sup> See the remarks of Henry Kissinger in *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1961), p. 3.

## THE STABILITY OF COALITIONS ON ROLL CALLS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\*

WILLIAM H. RIKER AND DONALD NIEMI

Lawrence College

University of Chicago

In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified.<sup>1</sup> This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static.

The technique by which we tried to pick out the marginal or shifting members was the calculation of an "empirical power index" for each Representative in the first session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress, using as an index a refined version of one suggested by Shapley and Shubik as the empirical analogue of their *a priori* power index.<sup>2</sup> Entirely aside from the

question of whether or not "power index" is an appropriate name for this measure—indeed it almost certainly is not, for roll calls do not reveal all, or perhaps even much, of the power relationships in Congress<sup>3</sup>—still the index does measure something which, conceivably, may be important. Precisely, it is a computation (over a series of roll calls, where the roll calls are weighted according to their significance) of the average chance that each Representative had to be the pivotal or marginal voter on the winning side. Somewhat more crudely explained, it orders Representatives according to the number of times they were on the winning side, with some adjustment for the relative importance of the kinds of winning.

The potential value of such an index is that, if a member is consistently rated high, this fact indicates he is usually voting with the winners. In a legislature like the House of Commons where one bloc always wins, this reveals nothing we do not already know. But in a legislature like Congress, where everybody wins once in a while, a high index separates out members who are marginal with respect to basically opposed blocs. Had we been able to use the index in this way, we would not only have additionally verified the model, but also have created a tool of practical value for, e.g., lobbyists who could use it to select those members most susceptible to conversion. We discovered, however, that high indices were not consistent over time, which indicates the need for some revision of the model. It suggests, furthermore, that the index might be used to detect, in practical circumstances, when major shifts of allegiance are occurring.

### I. THE INDEX USED

Shapley and Shubik's *a priori* power index rests on the assumption that, for a member of a voting body, the most advantageous position is that of the marginal or last-added member of a minimal winning coalition, defined as a coalition which would be losing or

for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 787-792.

<sup>3</sup> Wilder Crane, "A Caveat on Roll Call Studies of Party Voting," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 237-249.

\* Much of the material in this essay was originally reported in the junior author's honors paper, "An Attempt to Predict Power in the House of Representatives" (Lawrence College Library, 1960, typewritten). We are indebted, for grants to defray the cost of computation, to The Social Science Research Council; the Lawrence College Fund for Research on Public Affairs (a gift of the Ford Foundation); and the Numerical Analysis Laboratory of the University of Wisconsin, where the computation was done. The senior author thanks the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, where this essay was written.

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party: A Case Study* (New York, 1959).

<sup>2</sup> L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method

blocking if one member were subtracted. This seems intuitively persuasive and explains our attempt to use an empirical index based to some degree on the same assumption.<sup>4</sup>

In order to estimate a member's chance to occupy the pivotal position, Shapley and Shubik constructed the following model. For a body of  $n$  members, in which there exists a group large enough and willing to pass a motion, let the members vote randomly and declare the motion passed when the  $m$ th member has voted for it, where  $m$  "yes" votes are required for passage. Define as the *pivot* the member in the  $m$ th position and note that there are  $n!$  (read " $n$  factorial," that is  $1 \cdot 2 \cdot \dots \cdot n$ ) such random orderings of  $n$  voters (that is, the permutations of  $a, b, \dots, n$ ). Then define the power,  $p$ , of a member,  $i$ , thus:  $p_i = t_i/n!$ , where  $t_i$  is the number of times  $i$  is pivot. It is difficult to say just what ought to be regarded as the empirical analogue of this ratio because one almost never knows who is in the pivotal position on a real vote. But Shapley and Shubik have suggested the following as one possibility: When there are  $d$  members on the winning side  $p_i = 1/d$ , if  $i$  is on the winning side, and  $p_i = 0$ , if  $i$  is not. This measure can, by appropriate processes of summation, be extended to cover a series of roll calls. Furthermore, it readily admits of interpretation as the chance that a particular member was pivotal. But, as its originators pointed out, it has the disadvantage of failing to distinguish among roll calls of varying significance. In order to adjust for this feature, we corrected the empirical index with a coefficient of significance of roll calls in voting bodies. This coefficient,  $s$ , where  $0 \leq s \leq 1$ , is based on the assumption that the most significant outcome possible on a vote occurs when (a) all members vote and (b) the margin between winners and losers is at minimum; and that the least significant outcome is one in which (a) a bare quorum votes and (b) the outcome is unanimous. The coefficient,  $s$ , is constructed by appropriately

combining these standards into a measure that gives a unique value for each possible outcome of voting, and then normalizing these values into the interval between zero and one.<sup>5</sup> Using  $s$ , the empirical power index is corrected to the following:

$$P_i = \sum_{\lambda \in M} \left[ \frac{1}{d_\lambda} \cdot \frac{s_\lambda}{\sum_{\mu=1}^v (s_\mu)} \right]$$

where " $v$ " denotes a series of roll calls, " $P_i$ " denotes the power index for  $i$  over the series of  $v$  roll calls, " $\lambda$ " and " $\mu$ " denote particular roll calls, and " $M$ " denotes the set of all roll calls in which  $i$  is on the winning side. Then,

$$\sum_{i=1}^n (P_i) = 1.$$

We should note in passing that the correction with  $s$  considerably complicates the calculations, in some cases perhaps needlessly so. It is our subjective and unverified impression that, if  $v$  is a large number, say 100, the corrections tend to cancel out. If, however,  $v$  is a small number, say 5, the corrected index may be quite different from an uncorrected one.

## II. PROCEDURE

This study used all the roll calls in the House of Representatives during the first session of the Eighty-sixth Congress, a session chosen entirely on the practical grounds that we were reasonably familiar with the issues and political tone of the Congress. For each of the 87 roll calls, it was recorded that a member (a) voted on the winning side, (b) voted on the losing side, (c) did not vote, although eligible to do so, or (d) did not vote because ineligible. Members who had specific pairs were recorded as voting; members who had general pairs were not.

The 87 roll calls were divided into various kinds of subsets:

(1) Twelve subsets were based on a classification of subject matter. Although every one of the 87 roll calls was assigned to at least one of these twelve subsets, the subsets were not disjoint. For example, all the roll calls classified under "foreign military aid" were also classified under "foreign aid." Again, some of the roll calls classified under "prestige of Mr.

<sup>4</sup> It is difficult to make a precise empirical observation that will strengthen one's confidence in the appropriateness of this assumption. See William H. Riker, "A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 120-131, where it is shown that it is not clear whether or not the "power" of the index corresponds to the participants' notion of what "power" is. For a related investigation of a related definition see Duncan MacRae, Jr., and Hugh D. Price, "Scale Positions and 'Power' in the Senate," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 212-18.

<sup>5</sup> The technique of calculation of  $s$  and some *a priori* arguments justifying its use as a measure are set forth in William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies" in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 377-383.

Ezra Benson" were also classified under "agriculture." The substantive content of these subsets is fairly clearly indicated by their titles as given in Table I, except perhaps for "development projects," by which we mean such subjects as grants for airports, sewage disposal, etc.

(2) Five subsets were based on a classification according to procedural or political considerations which, prior to the calculation, we thought might turn out to be important. Again, these were not disjoint sets. Furthermore, not all roll calls were assigned to them. One was a set of those roll calls classified by the *Congressional Quarterly* as expressive of a Republican-Southern Democratic coalition.<sup>8</sup> Others were roll calls with high party cohesion in both parties (using Lowell's standard of 90 per cent of the party on one side, rather than Rice's index), roll calls requiring a two-thirds majority for passage, roll calls on overriding Presidential vetoes, and roll calls on amendments and motions to recommit.

(3) Finally, the eighteenth subset was the identity subset of all 87 roll calls, that is, the subset which is the set itself.

One major consideration in the construction of these sets was that each should contain at least three and preferably eight or ten roll calls. With small numbers of roll calls, most of the members are likely to have one of four or five indices so that there is very little differentiation. Naturally, this requirement biased the result, as did also our *a priori* selection of classifications. If this calculation were to be replicated, we believe that a considerably larger number of subsets would be desirable. In particular, it occurs to us that calculations involving subsets of scalable roll calls would be especially interesting.<sup>7</sup>

Each of the 18 subsets was then divided in half chronologically and  $P_i$  was calculated for the 36 resulting subsets as well as for the original 18, making 54 sets of power indices

altogether.<sup>8</sup> Finally, for each of the 18 subsets, coefficients of correlation,  $r$ , were calculated between the  $P_i$  of the first and the second chronological halves of the roll calls in the subset.

### III. RESULTS

While the *a priori* power index is about .002288 for each member of the House, the empirical index on all 87 roll calls (subset 18) varied from zero to .003283.<sup>9</sup> The medians for groups often thought to be relevant to coalition-making in the House were:<sup>10</sup>

All Democrats	.002582
All Republicans	.001810
Southern Democrats	.002554
Northern Democrats	.002553
Border Democrats	.002746

<sup>8</sup> This calculation was done on an IBM 650 at the Numerical Analysis Laboratory of the University of Wisconsin. The work was programmed by Mr. Stephen Robinson under the direction of Mr. George Struble. We are indebted to both of them for a clever program and the sharpening of the interpretation of the index. In addition to the power index, two closely related indices were calculated. One was an *eligibility index*, that is, the  $P_i$  for each member for that part of each set of roll calls in which the member was eligible to vote. The other was a *voting index*, that is, the  $P_i$  for each member for that part of each set of roll calls on which the member actually voted. These latter indices varied only slightly from the empirical power index for most members. They did help to distinguish, however, between members whose power index was low because they genuinely occupied a disadvantageous position and those whose index was low because of adventitious circumstances. In general, only the empirical power index is used in the subsequent interpretation.

<sup>9</sup> An index of zero was only obtained by those who never voted, such as Speaker Rayburn. (Part of the difficulty with the name of the index is underscored by this curious result: that the man often considered the most powerful had an "empirical power index" of zero.) The lowest index for a member who participated fully and who also had the lowest voting index was .001022.

<sup>10</sup> Throughout this essay "Southern Democrat" (or "SD") means Democrats from the 11 states of the old confederacy; "Border Democrat" (or "BD") means Democrats from Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma; while "Northern Democrat" (or "ND") means Democrats from all the remaining states.

<sup>6</sup> *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. 17 (#49, 4 December 1959), p. 1519 ff.

<sup>7</sup> See Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958). Since we were attempting to predict rather than interpret, we constructed no Guttman-type scales, which are more useful for post-hoc interpretation than for day-to-day prediction. An effort to use our index for interpretation, however, might be especially informative if scalability and consistency of indices over time were found to be associated.

TABLE I. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN EMPIRICAL POWER INDICES OF MEMBERS ON ROLL CALLS, BY SUBSETS DIVIDED CHRONOLOGICALLY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS.

Subset	Description	No. of Roll Calls		Coefficient of Correlation
		First Half	Second Half	
1	Interest rate and monetary policy	3	3	.537
2	Defense	6	6	.240
3	Foreign military aid	3	2	.829
4	Foreign aid	4	4	.826
5	Agriculture	6	6	.572
6	Prestige of Mr. Ezra Benson	2	2	-.534
7	Development projects	12	12	.815
8	Public Works projects	4	4	.084
9	Public housing	3	3	.627
10	Public housing and labor reform	5	5	.078
11	Labor reform and civil liberties	4	4	.452
12	States rights	3	2	.004
13	Republican-Southern Democratic coalition	6	5	.843
14	High party cohesion in both parties	2	2	-.754
15	Roll Calls needing 2/3 Majority	6	5	.411
16	Overriding vetoes	2	1	.761
17	Amendments and motions to recommit	14	13	.361
18	All roll calls	44	43	.484

The main results are set forth in Table I. In two instances the value for  $r$  is negative, when, with only four roll calls involved, one set of blocs won on the first two and the other set on the second two. Since the generally low values of  $r$  might be the result of the variations among members with medium or low indices, we also tried to predict members with "high" indices in both the halves on several selected sets (where "high" means all those indices that stood above an obvious break in the scale). But

in most subsets the number of members with "high" indices is too large to be useful. Some of these results are set forth in Table II. It will be observed that, except in the case of subset 11 (Labor Reform and Civil Liberties) this second attempt at prediction adds almost no information to what Table I shows.

## IV. INTERPRETATION

For the set of all roll calls the coefficient of correlation between the  $P_i$  of the first chrono-

TABLE II. FREQUENCY OF HIGH EMPIRICAL POWER INDICES ON SELECTED ROLL CALL SUBSETS, DIVIDED CHRONOLOGICALLY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS.

Subset	Description	No. with High Indices			$c \div a$
		First Half (a)	Second Half (b)	Both Halves (c)	
1	Interest rate and monetary policy	175	172	110	.63
3	Foreign military aid	216	210	165	.76
8	Public works projects	18	18	3	.17
11	Labor reform and civil liberties	264	264	216	.82
13	Republican-Southern Democratic coalition*	168	159	114	.68
13	Republican-Southern Democratic coalition*	18	145	9	.50
18	All roll calls	44	44	13	.30

\* For subset 13, two standards of "high" have been used.

logical half and the  $P_i$  of the second chronological half is  $r = +.484$  which suggests that one might expect to be right on a prediction about once in four times. While this is considerably higher than pure chance, it is not high enough to warrant staking a heavy wager on it. While other correlations in Table I are considerably closer, there is a technical explanation for some of these high values for  $r$  and this explanation somewhat vitiates the usefulness of the empirical index. Thus the set for which  $r$  is highest is set 13, involving roll calls expressive of the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition as selected by the editors of *Congressional Quarterly*. Since these roll calls were selected precisely because they betokened a visible and enduring and cohesive coalition, naturally the power indices in the first and second halves are roughly identical. In short, these roll calls are known beforehand to satisfy the conditions under which in the introduction of this essay we inferred that prediction would be possible. The discovery that it is possible in these cases is, therefore, not surprising. Indeed, the only odd feature of this rather high value for  $r$  is that it is not somewhat higher. Even in what skilled journalist observers regarded as a very tight pair of coalitions there is apparently considerable fluidity if one can predict only about 70 per cent of the indices accurately. Two other high values for  $r$  are also explained by the same technical fact that the subsets were defined in terms of known and cohesive blocs (*i.e.*, subset 14, involving roll calls with high party cohesion, and subset 16, involving roll calls on overriding Presidential vetoes).

Nevertheless, apart from these special cases, there remain two subsets constructed around substantive issues (subset 4 on foreign aid and subset 7 on development projects) for which the values of  $r$  are fairly high. (We ignore the high value for set 3, since all the roll calls in this set are also in set 4.) For these two subjects in this session of Congress, we have in effect discovered that the model of consistently opposed blocs with unattached members supplying the margin of victory is reasonably accurate. In the Congress that MacRae studied, votes on foreign aid issues were reasonably scalable on a uni-dimensional scale and we assume that these are also. The interesting additional information is about development projects, which were at the heart of the disagreement between parties in this session. Regardless of whether or not a uni-dimensional scale exists on this subject, it is apparent that some sort of consistent structure of blocs exists. In these two areas, at least, it may be said that

the attempt at prediction was somewhat successful. Unfortunately, however, these issues involved only 16 of the 43 roll calls on which we tried to predict. So in the larger sense the attempt at prediction was unsuccessful.

The interesting question is, therefore, why the values for  $r$  were so generally low for subsets 1-2, 5-6, and 8-12. We offer two mutually reinforcing explanations.

The first is that the character of the issues, and indeed the whole tone of Congress, changed during the session. For all the subsets on substantive issues (numbers 1-12) the roll calls are drawn almost equally from the two halves of set 18 and indeed from the first and second temporal halves of the session. This is to say that, for each substantive issue, roll calls were scattered about equally through the time of the session. But for set 13 (Republican-Southern Democratic coalition) only 3 out of 11 roll calls are drawn from the first half of set 18 and one of these three is the 44th, the last roll call in the first half of the set. This fact fairly clearly indicates that the so-called coalition played a much greater role in the second half of the session than in the first. Systematic evidence to this effect is set forth in Table III. As the table indicates, slightly over half of the highest 44 indices in the first half of the session belonged to Northern Democrats; while in the second half of the session exactly half the high indices belonged to Southern Democrats. Apparently, in the first half of the session, Northern Democrats were more likely to have pivoted, and in the second half, Southerners. Clearly, the balance of power shifted as the session proceeded. We have no inside information to explain why this occurred (and would probably mistrust it if we did). Perhaps, as some (Republican-oriented) journals of opinion suggested, it was owing to the ingenuity of the

TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS WITH  
POWER INDICES AMONG THE HIGHEST  
10 PER CENT, BY BLOCS

	ND	BD	SD	R
First half (roll calls 1-44)	23	9	12	0
Second half (roll calls 45-87)	8	8	22	6
All roll calls	11	10	23	0
Idealized Distribution*				
1. Assuming only Democrats may have high indices	24	5	15	0
2. Assuming all members may have high indices	15	4	10	15

\* Assuming each bloc is represented in the highest 10 per cent in proportion to its strength in the House.

minority leader, Mr. Halleck. Just as reasonably, it may be attributed to the reluctance of the majority leader, Mr. McCormack, to bring up issues he knew would split his party before the issues on which they were better agreed were disposed of. Regardless of the causal explanation, the fact of a shift in tone during the session is undeniable. And this fact can in turn explain much of our failure in prediction. If the kind of winning coalitions changed somewhat, if the best chance of pivoting was transferred from Northern to Southern Democrats—if, in short, the persons in the marginal positions changed—then, of

named them, we then suppose that their members *always* behave as if they were bloc members. To a very considerable extent, indeed, they do; but sometimes they do not and it is this fact that so often distorts our discussion of events in Congress.

For example, the assertion that Southern Democrats combine with Republicans to defeat Northern Democrats is of course often true—except when it is not. In this session it was mostly true of 11 out of 87 roll calls. But it cannot always be true, else we would not have the astonishing result that the median empirical power index for Northern and




FIGURE 1. Distribution by faction of power indices for all 87 roll calls.

course, the index of marginality for the first half would not accurately predict marginality in the second half.<sup>11</sup>

A second explanation for the low values of  $r$  on 9 of the 12 subsets is that the blocs themselves are considerably less cohesive than popular opinion would have them be. We often fallaciously reify blocs and, having

<sup>11</sup> This reason for our failure to predict turns out to suggest an interesting and possibly valuable use of the empirical power index. Since it is temporally oriented and since (unlike other techniques of studying roll calls such as scalograms or bloc analysis) it is computed wholly by a machine once the roll calls are recorded and does not therefore require the judgment of a skilled observer in computation, it could be used to detect in week-by-week analysis just such changes in tone and coalitions as they occur.

Southern Democrats was for the whole session almost exactly the same. Instead, in terms of medians, it was the Border Democrats who showed up as 'strongest—a result which, on reflection, seems wholly acceptable intuitively. In Figure 1, the distribution of power indices among several factions is set forth. The distribution for Southern Democrats is actually trimodal, which suggests that there is not one Southern Democracy but three (or more), each of which has a different relationship with the rest of the party. Similarly, Border Democrats display a bimodal distribution which suggests that they too are far from homogeneous. If a simple modal distribution, such as appears for Republicans and Northern Democrats suggests a basic uni-dimensional continuum of attitudes, certainly the bimodal and trimodal distributions within commonly recognized factions hints at the existence of a multidimen-




FIGURE 2. Diagram of coalitions of (a) leaders and (b) followers.

sional set of attitudes, which, of course, complicates prophecy.

We believe that the fallacy of reification occurs because journalists and scholars alike observe chiefly the behavior of leaders of blocs without also closely observing the behavior of all members. Of course, all techniques for dealing with roll-call results force the scholar to consider the rank and file; but this pressure is especially strong when one is faced, as we are, with expectations drawn from observation of leaders that turn out to be false when applied to followers. We find that the behavior of leaders of the three blocs, Northern Democratic, Southern Democratic, and Republican, was quite coherent and indeed almost scalable on a unidimensional scale. This is not true of rank-and-file members. In Figure 2 is shown the number of occasions—regardless of their relative significance—on which (a) leaders of blocs voted together and (b) rank-and-file members voted together. For this Figure we selected Messrs. McCormack and Halleck because they were the authoritatively selected leaders of their parties. Southern Democrats have no authoritatively selected leader, so we arbitrarily gave them one in the person of Wilbur Mills of Arkansas, the Southern Democrat with the second highest power index (.003280, as compared with .003283 for another Southerner, Lindley Beckworth of Texas) and one who was often believed to act for Speaker Rayburn. Messrs. Rooney (Dem. of Brooklyn, N.Y.), Thomas (Dem. of Houston, Texas) and

Latta (Rep. of Bowling Green, Ohio) were selected because they had the median empirical power indices of their respective factions. In these diagrams the brackets indicate acting together on a vote and the numbers above each bracket record the number of occasions when each kind of coalition formed. The broken bracket and figures beneath the names indicate the number of occasions when members at both ends sided together against the one in the middle.

It is apparent from Figure 2 that, when all three did not agree, McCormack and Halleck hardly ever combined against Mills. Hence a rather neat continuum is shown, with Mills in the middle—and indeed he undoubtedly achieved his high index by the fact that whichever one he sided with won. When we turn from leaders to rank-and-file members, however, the picture is less clear. Although Thomas voted with Rooney much more frequently than he did with Latta and thus behaved somewhat like Mills, nevertheless, Rooney and Latta combined against Thomas much more frequently than McCormack and Halleck combined against Mills. All three rank-and-file members exhibit some deviation from the behavior of leaders. Both Rooney and Thomas showed considerably greater preference for alliance with Republicans than did their leaders. And conversely Latta found it easier to vote with both Southern and Northern Democrats than Halleck did. Clearly, the relationship in Figure 2 (b) is not scalable on a uni-dimensional scale and rank-and-file members do not follow their leaders as much as we might expect.

This fact accounts for much of our failure to predict. If all members of all blocs perceived all issues in the same (uni-dimensional) way, prediction would be easy. But in fact issues are not so perceived nor, as MacRae has demonstrated, and as Figure 2 also demonstrates, are they uni-dimensional. Hence attempts at prediction by essentially uni-dimensional devices, such as the empirical power index and all other measures known to us, are bound to fail.

These two explanations of the low values for  $r$  reinforce each other. To say that dominant coalitions change over time is to say that the perception of issues changes over time. Hence these two explanations are probably two aspects of one more complex explanation, which is that Congress is a dynamic system that can only with difficulty be analyzed by essentially static statistical techniques. Yet all evidence for the existence of relatively stable blocs is largely static in conception. Bloc analysis, for example, is carried through by



counting pairs of ballots on a vote as if all the votes occurred simultaneously, when in fact they are cast over a period of many months. The same comment applies (with less force) to scalogram analysis wherein, necessarily, attitudes are scaled as if there were no time dimension. (When scalable issues are discovered, however, the scalogram proves that the attitudes persisted over time; no such proof is inferable from the results of bloc analysis.) Even the simple selection of roll calls that reveal a coalition (such as the *Congressional Quarterly* makes) is only crudely related to time. Out of all these static analyses we obtain some evidence of the existence of continuing factions, evidence which tends to confirm the hypotheses of the model. If we considered only the third line of Table III our calculations also would tend to confirm them, for Southern Democrats appear to be marginal far more frequently than their numbers warrant. But if we take into account the first and second lines, it quickly appears that this high degree of marginality occurred mostly in the second half of the session. Without the time dimension, therefore, our study would constitute merely some more not-very-conclusive evidence in support of the model. The time dimension, however, tends to cast some doubt on its validity.

#### V. CONCLUSION

The findings of this attempt to predict power indices may be summarized as follows:

1. A rather imprecisely defined set of blocs did exist in the first session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress.
2. On two kinds of issues (and for 32 out of 87 roll calls) a fairly high degree of consistency of power indices persisted through the session. For these issues the model was to some degree validated. These 32 roll calls involved (a) the main political issue of the session (*i.e.*, development projects) and (b) the main political issue of the decade (*i.e.*, foreign aid). Precisely what inference should be drawn from this fact we are not certain.
3. On the other sorts of issues, the model was not validated for it turned out to be impossible to predict members' voting behavior with accuracy. This failure does

not mean that on these issues no underlying blocs existed. Rather it means that, if they did exist, their outlines were fuzzy.

4. The exact membership and relative strength and position of blocs changes over time. The crucial features of the change seem to be the content of issues and perhaps the skill and strategy of leaders.

The significance of these findings may be interpreted by a paradox (suggested to us by Professor Glendon Schubert): the wholly literary interpretations of Congressional behavior (in which class one might place Bailey's and Young's<sup>12</sup>) leave one with the impression of anarchy in Congress. No generalizations whatsoever, so one infers, can be made, for every decision is the product of some unforeseeable combination of strategy and counter-strategy. On the other hand, the interpretations based on statistical manipulation of a massive amount of data on voting (in which class one might place the aforementioned studies by Truman and MacRae) suggest that fairly coherent and cohesive blocs exist, so that generalization is possible. In resolution of the paradox, our evidence suggests that the truth of the matter lies somewhere in between the literary and statistical extremes.

In particular, our evidence suggests why this paradox of interpretation has occurred. Literary analyses are historical in orientation and hence fully cognizant of temporal changes. Statistical analyses, on the other hand, usually treat material gathered from different times as simultaneous. Undue concentration on temporal change of course results in an undue emphasis on the unique, while static analysis tends to ignore those unique events of which the results tend to cancel out in summary presentation. These considerations lead us to conclude that a really adequate model of Congress—or of any legislature—must be susceptible to verification by both static and dynamic techniques, and so must allow for both persistent tendencies and episodic variations.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950) and Roland Young, *This is Congress*, (New York, 2d ed., 1946).

## RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON WISCONSIN VOTING, 1928-1960

ANDREW R. BAGGALEY  
*Temple University*

The extent of religious influence on the closely contested presidential election of 1960 has been much debated. Many have claimed that the Wisconsin primary revealed a religious split which then became one of the main issues of the campaign. This paper reports the results of an analysis of religious influence on voting in that state for several elections since the campaign of 1928, when Alfred E. Smith was the first major-party presidential candidate of the Roman Catholic faith. The thesis which will be defended is that religious influences on voting in Wisconsin, although much reduced from 1928, were still considerable enough to have been critical in an election as close as that of 1960. Several independent types of evidence from voting returns will be presented to bolster this argument.

A relatively straightforward method of analysis is to correlate the percent of the two-party vote in various electoral units with available demographic statistics for the same units. A good example of this technique is Ogburn and Talbot's study of 173 counties in eight states in the 1928 presidential election.<sup>1</sup> Their analysis suggested that, of the six variables they investigated, the prohibition issue was most important, followed by the religious factor and then the factor of foreign birth. Contrary to the speculations of many commentators during 1960, they found the urban-rural split to be of quite minor importance.

Robinson has made a cogent criticism of this method of analysis.<sup>2</sup> He calls correlations calculated from percents of groups of people "ecological correlations," and correlations calculated directly from the characteristics of single persons in the groups "individual correlations." He shows that the fact that people with similar characteristics tend to cluster into groups brings about situations where ecological correlations exceed individual correlations. Thus he claims that ecological correlations based on geographically defined units give an exaggerated picture of the relations existing between demographic variables for the indi-

viduals within these units. He further shows that this inflating influence increases when the size of the groups increases.

Robinson's article stimulated Goodman to suggest an alternative way of dealing with ecological percents.<sup>3</sup> In Goodman's technique a regression line is developed such that (using the type of example which will be dealt with below), for each area, from the percent of Roman Catholics a prediction can be made of the percent in the area who will vote for Kennedy. This technique was adopted at the beginning of the present investigation. However, when the points were plotted comparing the percentage of Roman Catholic members in the total population of the 71 Wisconsin counties<sup>4</sup> with the returns for several relevant recent elections, it was apparent that a better fit to the data could be obtained by drawing parabolas instead of straight lines. Figures 1 and 2 show the scatter plots, respectively, for the presidential elections of 1928 and 1960. It will be noted that, although the percents for Smith and for Kennedy increase with an increase in Roman Catholic percent, the voting increase is not proportional, so that the regression lines bend slightly downward as they move to the right in both diagrams.

The relation of religious preference to voting was also studied for three other elections of this era: the School Bus Referendum of 1946, involving the question whether public school buses should carry parochial school pupils; the presidential election of 1956; and the presidential primary election of 1960. By a method described by Lewis<sup>5</sup> the defining statistical constants were calculated for the "best-fitting" parabola for each of the five elections. With  $X$  representing the percent Roman Catholic in each case, and  $Y$  representing, in turn, the percent (1) for Smith in 1928, (2) for the school bus referendum in 1946, (3) for Stevenson in 1956, (4) for Kennedy in the 1960 primary, and (5) for Kennedy in the 1960 final

<sup>3</sup> Leo A. Goodman, "Ecological Regressions and Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18 (1953), pp. 663-664.

<sup>4</sup> *Churches and Church Membership in the United States*, Series C, Numbers 18 & 19, Bureau of Research and Survey, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (1957).

<sup>5</sup> Don Lewis, *Quantitative Methods in Psychology* (New York, 1960), pp. 100-102.

<sup>1</sup> William F. Ogburn and Nell Talbot, "A Measurement of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928," *Social Forces*, Vol. 8 (1929), pp. 175-183.

<sup>2</sup> W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15 (1950), pp. 351-357.




FIG. 1. Voting for Smith in Wisconsin counties in 1928 as a function of Roman Catholic concentration in the population.

election, the equations for the parabolas are:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_1 &= 22.2 + .788X - .00187X^2, \\ Y_2 &= 15.7 + 1.128X - .00482X^2, \\ Y_3 &= 38.0 - .185X + .00254X^2, \\ Y_4 &= 15.4 + .876X - .00376X^2, \text{ and} \\ Y_5 &= 35.9 + .361X - .00103X^2. \end{aligned}$$

This type of analysis gives a satisfactory descriptive picture of the religious influence in each election, but it is of further interest to attempt a ranking of the five elections in this respect by developing a single index. The solution adopted was to compare the predicted vote in each election for hypothetical counties which were 0 percent Roman Catholic with those which were 100 percent Roman Catholic. In the 1928 election, for example, substitution

of 0 for  $X$  in the first equation above gives a  $Y$  value of 22.2 percent. Similarly, substitution of 100 for  $X$  gives a  $Y$  value of 82.3 percent (*i.e.*,  $22.2 + 78.8 - 18.7$ ). Subtracting 22.2 percent from 82.3 percent yields a difference attributable to religious influences of 60.1 percent in the 1928 presidential election. Use of this index produces the following rank ordering for religious influence: first, the 1946 school bus referendum with 64.6 percent; second, the 1928 presidential election with 60.1 percent; third, the 1960 presidential primary with 50.0 percent; fourth, the 1960 presidential election with 25.8 percent; and fifth and last, the 1956 presidential election with 6.9 percent.

The picture which these figures suggest is that the 1928 and 1946 elections showed con-




FIG. 2. Voting for Kennedy in Wisconsin counties in the 1960 final election as a function of Roman Catholic concentration in the population.

siderable religious influence on Wisconsin voting, the 1960 primary somewhat less, the 1960 final election much less, and the 1956 election practically none at all. However, it should be noted that in the 1960 primary there were two Democratic candidates, Kennedy and Humphrey, but only one Republican candidate, Nixon. This circumstance *may* have produced a greater turnout of Roman Catholic Democrats than of Roman Catholic Republicans in the primary. If so, the figure of 50.0 percent given above probably represents an exaggerated picture of the extent of religious influence in the 1960 primary. On the other hand, many Roman Catholic Republicans *may* have voted for Kennedy in that primary with little intention of voting for him in the final election, either because they wished to give a coreligionist a chance to be a presidential nominee or

because they regarded Kennedy as "less radical" than Humphrey. Many observers have noted the Wisconsin voters' long tradition of "crossover voting" during the present century. In view of these competing interpretations about voting in the primary, it is perhaps safer to conclude that both 1960 elections showed a religious influence which was significantly less than that in 1928 and 1946 but still quite a bit greater than that in 1956.

The virtual lack of religious influence in the 1956 presidential election is corroborated by the survey evidence of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes.<sup>6</sup> After comparing the candidate preference of Roman Catholic voters

<sup>6</sup> Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), p. 306.

TABLE I. VOTING IN THE WISCONSIN AREAS EXTREME IN THE 1946 SCHOOL BUS REFERENDUM

	1946 School Bus Referendum %	1928 Smith %	1956 Stevenson %	1960 Kennedy	
				Primary %	Final %
State of Wisconsin	45	45	38	40	48
High School-Bus					
Towns	88	87	45	71	69
Villages	89	88	34	76	69
Low School-Bus					
Towns	7	20	46	10	40
Villages and Cities	7	19	29	15	29

with that of a "control group matched for a variety of conditions of life situation," they concluded that Roman Catholics were only 2.9 percent more Democratic in this election than the rest of the American voting population. However, the survey evidence from this and other studies suggests that Eisenhower was the *only* Republican presidential candidate in recent decades who could induce Roman Catholics of higher socio-economic status to "vote their pocketbook instead of their religion."

Although Goodman's method of analysis of ecological data seems to obviate many of Robinson's criticisms, it is likely that more valid relationships can be discovered when the ecological unit used is as small as possible, for the exaggeration of ecological correlations is most pronounced with large groups. Unfortunately, statistics on religious preference are not available for political units smaller than counties. Nevertheless, the analysis reported above suggests that the 1946 school bus referendum can be used as a rather valid indicator of the percent of Roman Catholics in the smaller political units. The returns filed in the Office of the Secretary of State in Madison, Wisconsin were searched, and the precincts at the two extremes with respect to vote for the school bus referendum were recorded. Eighteen villages<sup>7</sup> and 47 towns<sup>8</sup> voted more than 80

percent for the school bus issue, and below they are referred to by the phrase "high school-bus." Six small cities, 40 villages, and 79 towns voted less than 10 percent for the school bus issue, and below they are called "low school-bus."

Collectively, the high school-bus villages voted 89 percent for the issue, and the high school-bus towns, 88 percent; whereas the low school-bus cities and villages voted 7 percent for the issue, and the low school-bus towns the same. Henceforth, the voters of the small cities and villages will be called "villagers," and the voters of the towns will be called "farmers."

Table I shows the percent vote for the Democratic candidates in the other four elections under consideration. It can be seen at once that Smith did virtually as well in the high school-bus areas as the school-bus issue itself. However, he did not do quite as *poorly* in the low school-bus areas as the school-bus issue, a circumstance which may have resulted from the depressed economic condition of rural Wisconsin in 1928. All 61 of the high school-bus areas which existed as political units in 1928, without exception, voted for Smith. All but 4 of the 120 existing low school-bus areas voted for Hoover in 1928. Considering the fact that 18 years separated the two elections and the fact that one election concerned candidates for office and the other an issue, it is difficult to perceive any factor which might account for the remarkable correspondence of voting in these two elections other than the factor of religious preference. Therefore in the discussion below, the assumption will be made that the high school-bus areas are Roman Catholic areas and that the low school-bus areas are Protestant areas.

On the basis of this assumption, the results for the other three elections with respect to religious influence correspond perfectly with

<sup>7</sup> Two other villages, Frederic in Polk County and Stockholm in Pepin County, were recorded as more than 80 percent in favor of the school bus issue. However, their vote in other recent elections was so consistently in contradiction to this vote that the author suspected these figures had been inadvertently reversed in reporting. In personal correspondence with the author, the Polk County Clerk suggested that the election inspectors may have committed such an error. These two villages accordingly were excluded both from the "high school-bus" group and the "low school-bus" group.

<sup>8</sup> In Wisconsin "towns" are highly rural areas which correspond to the townships of most other states.

the results reported above based on county units; *i.e.*, the order remains: 1928, then 1960 primary, then 1960 final, and 1956 in last place. Furthermore it can be seen that the farmer *vs.* villager split was more important in 1956 than the religious split. Both Protestant and Roman Catholic farmers favored the Democratic ticket<sup>9</sup> more than their villager counterparts. This farmer-villager split persisted in the 1960 final election for the Protestant voters; however Kennedy seems to have appealed to the Roman Catholic villagers as much as he did to the Roman Catholic farmers.

In 1956 all 18 of the Roman Catholic villages voted for Eisenhower; in 1960 all 18, without exception, voted for Kennedy. The abruptness of the change can be seen by noting the vote in the most populous of these villages, Little Chute, which is in a heavily Dutch Catholic area. In 1956 Eisenhower beat Stevenson, 1167 to 521; in 1960 Kennedy beat Nixon, 1467 to 573. This represents a change of 41 percentage points, whereas in the state of Wisconsin as a whole there was a change of only 10 percentage points.

As already noted, interpretation of the 1960 primary is less straightforward because of the presence of three candidates in the race. However, it is significant that Humphrey, the other Democratic candidate, did quite well in the Protestant areas. He gained 66 percent of the vote of the Protestant farmers, 41 percent of the Protestant villagers, 16 percent of the Roman Catholic farmers, and 8 percent of the Roman Catholic villagers.

The conclusion which emerges from these figures and other sources of evidence is that the candidacy of Kennedy in 1960 caused the old fires of religious controversy to flare anew in midwestern rural America. In the case of the Roman Catholic farmers and villagers, the issue of foreign policy has served to lessen the hold of the Democratic Party, as Lubell has so well documented.<sup>10</sup>

The town of Marshfield in Fond du Lac County provides an excellent case history of voting in a heavily German Catholic area. In the majority of elections before 1916, Marshfield gave the Democratic presidential candidate more than 90 percent of its vote. However, the influence of World War I is shown by the

dip of Wilson's vote in 1916 to 45 percent and by Cox's showing of only 4 percent in 1920. LaFollette, the Progressive candidate who had opposed the entry of the United States into World War I, gained 86 percent of Marshfield's vote in 1924. Then there was a temporary return to the Democratic fold; Smith obtained 98 percent in 1928, and Roosevelt won 97 percent in 1932. Roosevelt won again in 1936, but Lemke, who opposed the international involvement which Roosevelt eventually led this country into, won 20 percent of the three-candidate vote. Then in 1940 the Democratic Presidential vote slid down to 22 percent, and it stayed below 25 percent through 1956, except in 1948 when Truman won 34 percent of Marshfield's vote. In 1960 the two powerful forces, the religious appeal of the Democratic standard bearer and the association of the Democratic Party with war, produced an almost exact equilibrium; Nixon won 379 votes in Marshfield, and Kennedy 369. (On the other hand, the Republican candidate for Lieutenant-Governor won, 432 to 254.) Only three other of the 47 high school-bus towns voted for Nixon.

On the other side of the fence, the Scandinavian Lutheran areas of western Wisconsin, heavily Republican in the 19th century, have become considerably more Democratic since 1928. The presumed reason is the position of the Democratic Party on farm issues. Yet the old religious pull has not departed completely. It can be seen from Table I that Kennedy in 1960 did no better in the low school-bus villages and cities than Stevenson in 1956 and that he ran 6 percent *worse* than Stevenson in the low school-bus towns.

The final evidence of religious influence on Wisconsin voting to be cited here concerns voting in Milwaukee County in the 1960 presidential primary. The areas where Kennedy won more than 75 percent of the three-candidate vote were drawn on a county map. In all these areas, the U. S. Census statistics indicated that a high proportion of the inhabitants were of Polish descent and therefore, presumably, of the Roman Catholic faith. The areas where Humphrey gained more than 75 percent of the vote were all in the Negro district, and he seems to have won the vast majority of his Wisconsin vote from Negroes and Protestant farmers and villagers.

Considered collectively, the various lines of evidence discussed above lend rather strong support to the conclusion that religious preference still exerted a considerable influence on Wisconsin voting in 1960.

<sup>9</sup> Newspaper reports during the campaign lead one to believe that Vice-Presidential candidate Kefauver attracted the Wisconsin farmers more than Presidential candidate Stevenson did.

<sup>10</sup> Samuel Lubell, *Revolt of the Moderates* (New York, 1956), pp. 64-74.

## DEEDS WITHOUT DOCTRINES: CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE 1960 TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT<sup>1</sup>

ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY

Harvard University

In 1898, Mr. Justice Brewer measurably strengthened his claim to immortality by publicly inviting criticism of the Supreme Court. His words are well-worn now, for generations of professors have gratefully

quoted them in journal and classroom;<sup>2</sup> and during the 20th century the challenge he issued has evoked a response that may give his shade occasional second thoughts. The Supreme Court has had many problems in the years since he spoke, but a shortage of critics has not been one of them. Journalists, academicians, and politicians have, in their several ways, poured out a steady stream of reproach which from time to time has swelled into a torrent.

<sup>1</sup> For a full review of the work of the term, including civil rights decisions, see "The Supreme Court: 1960 Term," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 75, pp. 40-244 (Nov., 1961); and Philip B. Kurland, ed., *1961 The Supreme Court Review* (Chicago, 1962).

Among the books on the Court published during this period were: P. C. Acheson, *The Supreme Court* (New York, 1961); C. J. Antieau, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States* (Buffalo, New York, 1960); W. O. Douglas, *A Living Bill of Rights* (New York, 1961); O. K. Fraenkel, *The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties: How the Court Has Protected the Bill of Rights* (New York, 1960); P. A. Freund, *The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Business, Purposes and Performance* (Cleveland, 1961); W. L. King, *Lincoln's Manager: David Davis* (Cambridge, 1960); M. R. Konvitz, *Bill of Rights Reader*, 2 ed. rev. and enl. (Ithaca, New York, 1960); P. B. Kurland, ed., *The Supreme Court Review* (Chicago, 1960); Alexander Meiklejohn, *Political Freedom: the Constitutional Powers of the People* (New York, 1960); Wallace Mendelson, *Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court* (Chicago, 1961); W. F. Murphy and C. H. Pritchett, *Courts, Judges, and Politics* (New York, 1961); A. M. Paul, *Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and Bench* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1960); J. W. Peltason, *Fifty-eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation* (New York, 1961); E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., *Death and the Supreme Court* (New York, 1961); C. H. Pritchett, *Congress versus the Supreme Court 1957-1960* (Minneapolis, 1961); J. P. Roche, *Courts and Rights: the American Judiciary in Action* (New York, 1961); L. J. Salomon, ed., *The Supreme Court* (New York, 1961); G. A. Schubert, *Constitutional Politics* (New York, 1960); A. G. Taylor, *Labor and the Supreme Court*, 2 ed. (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1961); Herbert Wechsler, *Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961); A. F. Westin, ed., *The Supreme Court: Views from Inside* (New York, 1961); T. Wilcox, *States Rights vs. the Supreme Court* (Boston, 1960).

### I

The most recent of these outbreaks was set going by the desegregation decisions of 1954 and 1955 and a spate of mildly libertarian pronouncements involving the "subversion issue," in 1956 and 1957. The protest movement and its results have been ably recounted and evaluated elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> For present purposes it is enough to note that a vengeful and foolish anti-court law almost passed Congress in the summer of 1958, that the Court in subsequent years has stood absolutely firm on the desegregation question, but that the controversial doctrines in the subversion field have been held to extremely narrow implications. In this latter area there is room for argument as to whether the Court has significantly backtracked; at any rate the broadly libertarian promises that might have been inferred from some of the language in such decisions as *Watkins*,<sup>4</sup> *Sweezy*,<sup>5</sup> *Slochower*<sup>6</sup> and *Konigsberg*<sup>7</sup> were surely not fulfilled. If the judges were tempted three years ago to launch an all-out onslaught against subversive activities laws, a majority of them have now rather convincingly mastered the impulse.

<sup>2</sup> The most recent seems to be Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Pritchett, *op. cit.*; Anthony Lewis, "The Supreme Court and its Critics," *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 45, pp. 305-332 (Jan., 1961); Freund, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-191.

<sup>4</sup> *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U. S. 178 (1957).

<sup>5</sup> *Sweezy v. New Hampshire*, 354 U. S. 234 (1957).

<sup>6</sup> *Slochower v. Board of Education*, 350 U. S. 551 (1956).

<sup>7</sup> *Konigsberg v. State Bar*, 353 U. S. 252 (1957).

This self-restraint, whatever else may be said about it, has helped to temper the critical climate. The segregationist critics are still fairly robust, but their northern support among the Smith and McCarran Acts crowd has attenuated a good deal, and they miss it. On the extreme Right the anti-Court cacophony goes on; David Lawrence has not quite given up. But the Congressional temperature chart has returned to normal, and the danger of punitive action has subsided.

One man's meat is notoriously another man's poison, however, and it is not strange that the Court's recent gestures of self-denial have displeased some while placating others. Liberals, or some of them, feel that the current majority is derelict when it refuses to shackle the power of legislative investigation, or strike down our national sedition laws. Most of the critics from this new quarter have been, to their credit, more level-headed than the Jenners and Butlers of yesteryear. Indeed some of the most extreme protests have been voiced by two members of the Court itself, Justices Black and Douglas; liberal commentary has in general been milder than they.<sup>8</sup> But there is enough disquiet in this camp to merit notice. The Court, which was yesterday being criticized for defending liberty too much, is today being chided for defending it too little.

So much, for the moment, about what have been called the "result-oriented"<sup>9</sup> critiques of the Court's performance. Meanwhile still another plaint has been heard, largely from the groves of academe. It is that the judges, results aside, have been fudging their obligations as craftsmen. The point seems to be that in one way or another the Court has failed to produce doctrines that rest on the "exercise of reason":<sup>10</sup> the rhetorical flourish or the *ipse dixit* is found where we ought to find explicit principles rationally justified and applied.<sup>11</sup> These stric-

tures are not backed, as the vendetta of 1958 was, by the threat of political retribution. Nevertheless they claim the respect of the Court and those who study it, because their authors are defenders of judicial review who speak more in sorrow than in anger.

The aim of this paper is to review, in terms of these two criticisms, the 1960-61 record of the Supreme Court in the field of civil rights. What is the actual pattern of results here? Did the Court of the 1960 term do less than it ought to have done to buttress the liberties of the individual? And did it at the same time maintain the standards of legal craftsmanship that ought to be maintained by the supreme tribunal of a constitutional democracy? In short, to what extent are either the "result-oriented" or the "reason-oriented" critiques warranted? It happens that the 1960 term was unusually rich in significant pronouncements involving civil rights, and it should provide, therefore, a fairly adequate test of both indictments.

## II

The decisions that excited the gravest misgivings among libertarians were those having to do with alleged subversion. One of them, so Mr. Justice Douglas said, signalized "a sharp break with traditional concepts of First Amendment rights."<sup>12</sup> Others caused Mr. Justice Black to fear that the Court had adopted a deliberate policy of sacrificing individual freedom to governmental control,<sup>13</sup> that the boundaries of the Bill of Rights have been "all but obliterated,"<sup>14</sup> that the liberties of America "must be fast disappearing"<sup>15</sup> and that, "if the present trend continues . . . [g]overnment by consent will disappear to be replaced by government by intimidation."<sup>16</sup> If these forebodings are plausible, the 1960 term does indeed mark "a fateful moment in the history of a free country."<sup>17</sup>

*Wilkinson* and *Braden* involved the old, in-

73, pp. 84-125 (Nov., 1959); A. M. Bickel and H. H. Wellington, "Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case," *id.*, Vol. 71, pp. 1-39 (Nov., 1957); E. N. Griswold, "Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes—Professor Hart and Judge Arnold," *id.*, Vol. 74, pp. 81-94 (Nov., 1960).

<sup>12</sup> *Scales v. United States*, 367 U. S. 203 (1961).

<sup>13</sup> *Braden v. United States*, 365 U. S. 431 (1961).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Wilkinson v. United States*, 365 U. S. 399 (1961).

<sup>17</sup> *Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board*, 367 U. S. 1 (1961).

<sup>8</sup> See: "Retreat from Freedom," *Christian Century*, Vol. 78, pp. 163-4 (Feb. 8, 1961); "Free Speech and Movies," *Commonweal*, Vol. 73, pp. 495-6 (Feb. 10, 1961); "The Court and the Committee," *ibid.*, pp. 624-5 (March 17, 1961); "Security and Civil Rights," *id.*, Vol. 74, pp. 316-17 (June 23, 1961); "Neither Clear Nor Present," *Nation*, Vol. 192, pp. 509-10 (June 17, 1961); "Censorship of Movies," *New Republic*, Vol. 144, p. 8 (Feb. 27, 1961); "Un-American Activities," *ibid.*, pp. 5-6 (March 13, 1961); "No Decision," *Reporter*, Vol. 25, p. 12 (July 6, 1961).

<sup>9</sup> Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

<sup>10</sup> Wechsler, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> H. M. Hart, Jr., "Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol.



tractable problem of legislative investigations, specifically some recent antics of the House Un-American Activities Committee. A subcommittee of that egregious agency had invaded Atlanta armed with a Committee resolution authorizing investigation of Communist infiltration into southern industry, Communist propaganda activity, and "any other matter within the jurisdiction of the Committee." Both Wilkinson and Braden had publicly criticized this proposed inquiry, and had then been brought before the subcommittee, queried about Party membership and duly indicted when they refused to answer. They justified their refusal mainly by a challenge to the pertinency of the questions, and by an appeal to the First Amendment and to the doctrine of "valid legislative purpose."

Now with the best will in the world it was hard to argue that the questions had not been pertinent to the subject under inquiry, or that the witness had not been informed of the subject matter so that he could judge its pertinence. Since *Watkins* the Committee has framed its resolutions carefully and instructed its victims thoroughly, and as Mr. Justice Stewart says, it would be hard to imagine a preliminary question more pertinent to the topics under investigation. Moreover, *Barenblatt v. United States*<sup>18</sup> in 1959 had apparently decided that such inquiries are within the range of valid legislative purpose and do not infringe the First Amendment. But, it was said, the situation in the present cases is different; for Wilkinson and Braden have been called and questioned, not for the sake of gaining public information, but with the aim of punishing them because they assailed the Committee. A legislative purpose that might otherwise be valid is corrupted by this punitive motive.

This was the only significant contention not quite covered by *Barenblatt* or other precedents. Mr. Justice Stewart, upholding the convictions, replied that the Committee's behavior did not inescapably imply an intent to punish the witnesses and that even if it did, the inquiry would be valid. For, quoting *Watkins*, "motives alone would not vitiate an investigation . . . by a House of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served." And in these instances the subcommittee had "probable cause" to believe that the witnesses had information that would serve that purpose.

This implied requirement of "probable cause" may be a slender ray of libertarian promise in an otherwise somber landscape, but it appears slender indeed. For, as Mr. Justice

Black remarked in dissent, each witness had been identified as a Communist, so far as the record shows, only by a single paid informer's flat statement, and if that is enough to satisfy the requirement, its value as a curb on Committee excesses is negligible. As for the pertinency requirement, the legislators can obviously meet it by modest care in drafting resolutions and instructing witnesses. And the claim that the interest in individual freedom may outbalance the state's interest in procuring information is apparently answered by the *Barenblatt* assumption that the state interest is nothing less than the preservation of the nation, admittedly a rather awesome interest to contend with. Justice Black, and others, would insist that the destruction of America is not materially forestalled by the harassment of men like Braden and Wilkinson, and that the majority, while pretending to apply the "balancing test" in cases of this kind, has weighted the government's side so heavily (and artificially) as to preordain the result.

There is some justice in the charge, which becomes even stronger in *Wilkinson* where, as Justice Black says, the Court even "disclaims any power to determine whether the Committee is in fact interested in the information at all." To be sure, the balancing formula cannot be expected to produce certain and precise results. But we can fairly ask that the users of the test weigh realities against realities insofar as imperfect man can discern them.

As an exercise in reason, then, the majority opinions here are marred by an evasion: the supposed key issue—the balancing of private rights and public need—is handled by referring us back to an earlier opinion in which the heart of the matter is likewise evaded. And the net result of these pronouncements is that congressional committees remain unfettered by significant constitutional restraints. Add the latest chapter in the saga of Willard Uphaus<sup>19</sup> in which the Court adhered to a similarly expansive view of state investigatory power, and it becomes clear that the judiciary offers chilly comfort these days to the shorn lambs who face governmental inquisition.

Yet it cannot be said that the dissenters suggest alternative criteria that would meet the difficulties inherent in the problem. Justice Black's opinion in *Wilkinson* makes a powerful assault on the majority position, but can it be seriously proposed that the judiciary should look behind every ostensible legislative purpose and evaluate the latent motives it finds there? Is there any way to insure that such an evalua-

<sup>18</sup> 360 U. S. 109.

<sup>19</sup> Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U. S. 388 (1960).

tion would represent anything but the subjective bias of the judges who made it? How does one assess the weight of the public need for particular information when, in the nature of the investigatory process, the information is not yet known? Some tightening up of the probable cause standard might serve a symbolic purpose, but an investigator cannot be asked to prove in advance what he is supposedly trying to find out. And surely the standards that guide us in this field should not be determined by the performance of the HUAC. They must be applicable to other committees, past and future, whose quest might indeed be relevant to the Republic's welfare. Such standards may be devisable, but they do not emerge from the minority opinions here. And the result of *Wilkinson* and *Braden* should be judged with that fact in mind.

*Wilkinson* and *Braden* were decided in February; the judges thoughtfully waited until June to deliver the next one-two punch in the subversion field. Again by votes of five to four, the Court held that the Communist Party must register under the McCarran Act<sup>20</sup> and that the membership clause of the Smith Act had been validly applied to Junius Scales.<sup>21</sup>

The registration case presented a problem well calculated to tax the ingenuity of a judge who prefers not to invalidate a federal statute. The McCarran Act requires the registration of "Communist action" organizations with the Attorney General, and the registration statement must contain a variety of information including the names of officers and members. Once registered, or validly ordered to do so, the organization and its members become subject to certain obligations and disabilities. After hearings and appeals extending back to 1950, the American Communist Party now faced such an order to register, and the Supreme Court faced the question of that order's validity.

The statutory and constitutional challenges to the order were several, but perhaps the most weighty were those based on the First and Fifth Amendments. The Court has held that registration requirements may sometimes unconstitutionally constrict freedom of expression and association. Does not the McCarran Act applied to the Party have this effect? The Court has also held that the government cannot compel divulgence of Communist Party membership. Do not the Act's disclosure requirements force the officers to incriminate themselves?

The first of these objections could not be ex-

pected to prevail in the light of such holdings as *Dennis v. United States*<sup>22</sup> and such undoubtedly valid statutes as the Corrupt Practices Act and the Lobbying Act. Justice Frankfurter for the majority found that the registration order did not violate the First Amendment. The "balancing" formula was duly stated—impediments on freedom against public need—but the public-need side of the scale was heavily and decisively weighted by the idea that Congress has the primary responsibility for our security against foreign danger and that its choice of means for dealing with such threats must be respected unless the choice is rooted in "unfounded or irrational imaginings." In short, it would seem that no federal law aimed at a foreign-directed menace can fail to pass the balancing test: in this area the principle of legislative deference predetermines the result.

The Fifth Amendment is another matter. But its protections cannot be invoked by the Party on behalf of its officers; they must invoke it themselves, and they had not yet, as individuals, done so. It will be time enough to consider their privilege when they do refuse to register, citing the Fifth Amendment as their justification. Until then the challenge is premature. The Party is now required to register. Whether a given officer can escape the burden of the requirement is a matter for the future, as is the question of the validity of the disabilities imposed on those who are required to register under the Act. The Court thus managed adroitly to postpone the really ticklish Fifth Amendment issue, deciding only the narrow and relatively easy question of whether the Party was altogether immune from the obligation to identify itself. Only Justice Black was prepared to say it was. The Chief Justice wanted to postpone the whole decision by sending the case back once again to the Subversive Activities Control Board to tidy up some procedural loose ends. But, if constitutional issues were to be met, he agreed with Justice Brennan that the Act did violate the Fifth Amendment.

Justice Brennan's argument on this point was formidable. The Court had admitted *arguendo* that the Act would be invalid if it imposed on officials the obligation of answering in such a form as effectively to nullify the privilege against self-incrimination. But, said the Court, the question of whether the statute does contain this vice can wait until the Party or its officers are prosecuted for failure to register. Meanwhile the order to register stands. The Brennan point was that this put

<sup>20</sup> Above, note 17.

<sup>21</sup> Above, note 12.

<sup>22</sup> 341 U. S. 494 (1951).

the official in a cleft stick: he may register and thus surrender his possible privilege or refrain from registering and expose himself to the possibility of the grave criminal penalties provided for non-compliance. He is thus coerced to give up his privilege, and this amounts to an erosion of the Amendment's guaranties. These contentions were not fully answered by Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion. Plainly he was animated by a previously expressed conviction that the privilege against self-incrimination should be rigidly enforced within its traditional limits, but not extended an iota beyond them.<sup>23</sup> In this instance, however, even the traditional limits seemed to be narrowed, for the official was being pressured to waive his rights in much the way that a defendant is pressured if the prosecutor comments on his failure to take the stand.<sup>24</sup>

In the *Scales* decision the majority again revealed its great reluctance to challenge the power of Congress in the subversion field. *Scales* had been convicted of being a member of the Communist Party with knowledge of its illegal purposes and with a specific intent to overthrow the government. The most serious contentions urged in his defense were three: that "guilt by association" violates the Fifth Amendment which prescribes that guilt must be personal; that the First Amendment immunizes such activities and associations; and that the McCarran Act of 1950 repealed the membership clause of the Smith Act.

The Court, by Justice Harlan, conceded that the Fifth Amendment argument had weight. Due process does require that guilt be personal, and membership alone, even in an illegal organization, may indeed be constitutionally protected. But the statute here was interpreted as punishing membership only if the petitioner was an "active" member who knew the Party was engaged in illegal activity and who had himself a specific intent to bring about the illegal result. The standard objection to the concept of guilt by association is that it may lead to punishment of the innocent or confused,<sup>25</sup> but the Court argued that these restrictive interpretations fend off that danger.

As for the First Amendment question, that too was pretty well disposed of simply by citing *Dennis*. Justice Harlan's only problem

was the argument that the law discourages freedom of association by frightening the potential member whose aims are wholly innocent and legal. This objection is met, he said, by the requirement of *knowing* membership.

This may be, so far as it goes, a sufficient answer to the particular point, but the use of *Dennis* as a kind of *vade mecum* is beginning to be disturbing. The idea of that decision—and of such predecessors as *Schenck*<sup>26</sup>—was that the "clear and present [or probable] danger" determination depended on the circumstances "in every case." Whether the Court employs the clear and present danger rubric or its contemporary surrogate, the "balancing test," may not matter very much. In either event, the test, if it is one, must be applied to new contexts as new cases arise;<sup>27</sup> *i.e.*, *Dennis* did not settle "that the advocacy with which we are here concerned" is unprotected speech. It may be answered that the Court is unequal to the task of deciding in a field related to national defense whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger";<sup>28</sup> and that the majority was tacitly conceding this. If so, would it not be better to acknowledge the fact by explicitly giving the Congressional judgment conclusive weight, as Justice Frankfurter did in the registration case? There is little to be said for retaining the appearance of a reasoned, independent judgment without the reality. If both the clear and present danger and the balancing tests are defunct for all practical purposes in cases of this kind, then in the name of reason it would be well to say so.

There remained for the Court a nice problem of statutory construction which had to be met before *Scales* could be locked away. The McCarran Act of 1950 provides that "neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization . . . shall constitute *per se* a violation . . . of this section or of any other criminal statute." Does not this wipe out the membership clause of the Smith Act, passed ten years earlier? No, said Justice Harlan; this simply requires us to construe the Smith Act so as to apply only to active, knowing membership. The quoted phrase declares that *mere* membership is not criminal, but Congress did not intend to immunize membership of a

<sup>23</sup> *Ullman v. United States*, 350 U. S. 422 (1956).

<sup>24</sup> See *In re Opinion of the Justices*, 300 Mass. 620 (1938); *State v. Wolfe*, 64 S.D. 178 (1936).

<sup>25</sup> Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), pp. 470-483.

<sup>26</sup> *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).

<sup>27</sup> The relevant period in *Dennis* was 1945 to 1948; in *Scales*, 1946 to 1954.

<sup>28</sup> *Dennis v. United States*, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950).

purposeful sort. This interpretation was supported, as he saw it, by the context of the clause and by legislative history. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, argued in dissent that the law immunizes against prosecution for any kind of membership. The language is: "membership . . . shall [not] constitute *per se*" a crime, rather than "membership *per se* shall not constitute a crime." The position of "*per se*" makes a crucial difference; and without better knowledge of congressional intent than we have, we should assume that the law means what it says—that membership alone of whatever kind is not forbidden.

These were the main decisions of the term involving federal power and the Red Menace. Certainly their result is to make it clear that the substantive authority of Congress in this field will not be challenged by the Court. But this has been tolerably obvious at least since 1951, and in fact no federal sedition law has ever been held unconstitutional. Like it or not, the policy of judicial acquiescence on this point can hardly be called surprising. What is rather dismaying is the Court's failure to make more use of certain judicial options which have enabled it in the past to take a hand in matters of this kind without running head-on into Congress' basic power to govern. The registration issue might have been evaded altogether by returning the case to the Board, as the Chief Justice suggested. The membership clause might have been bucked back to Congress by construing it in the way Justice Brennan proposed, for the construction was surely not unreasonable. By these expedients, as one acute observer has remarked,<sup>29</sup> the Court could have at least deferred an outright holding that two dubious, repressive statutes are sanctioned by the Constitution. And it seems particularly unfortunate to uphold both statutes, for they look in different directions, and even a modest Court is warranted in telling Congress that it cannot have it both ways, that it must choose between the ventilation of the McCarran Act or the prohibition of the Smith Act. The Court would be on particularly strong ground in enforcing this choice, for the judges would rest squarely on the procedural right against self-incrimination, and procedure is a well-recognized judicial domain. By such techniques—the judicious use of the power to remand, the power to interpret statutes, and the power to enforce procedural regularity—the Court has performed usefully in this field in the past, and it

would be a pity if it now chose to abandon even this carefully self-restrained function.

Fortunately there is evidence even in these cases that such a course of inaction has not been irrevocably set. For one thing, the Court did make it clear in *Scales* that the government is bound to prove active, knowing, purposeful membership in each prosecution, and this requirement should not only mitigate individual injustice, but also hold the number of such prosecutions to a minimum. For another thing, Justice Harlan reiterated the *Yates*<sup>30</sup> doctrine that the government must show advocacy of illegal action, not merely "abstract doctrine," and further explained that very strict standards of proof are required. These pronouncements caused a conservative magazine, loath to approve the Supreme Court's behavior even when anti-subversive laws were upheld, to suggest that the proof requirement would make the cause virtually unenforceable.<sup>31</sup> This is probably too optimistic—or pessimistic as the reader prefers. But in *Noto v. United States*<sup>32</sup> the Court did void a membership clause conviction because the evidence of illegal advocacy by the Party was inadequate by these strict standards. Add *Communist Party v. Catherwood*<sup>33</sup> which held, as against a state determination, that the Party need not be deprived of the benefits of unemployment compensation; and *Deutch v. United States*<sup>34</sup> which freed a recalcitrant HUAC witness under the pertinency rule; and the faint glimmer of a silver lining may be descried. The Court is probably going to behave unobtrusively in this field, but it has not yet wholly abdicated.

Apart from the after-echoes of the Uphaus problem, the only significant state cases involving the "Communist question" were *In re Anastaplo*<sup>35</sup> and *Konigsberg v. State Bar*.<sup>36</sup> Both involved state refusals to admit to the bar candidates who would not answer questions about Communist Party membership. In Illinois and California, where the cases arose, the bar examiners must be satisfied that aspirants are of good moral character, and California specifically denies bar admission to those who advocate violent overthrow of government. The committees argued that Anastaplo and Konigsberg had, by their refusals to answer,

<sup>30</sup> *Yates v. United States*, 354 U. S. 298 (1957).

<sup>31</sup> "Let the Intellectuals Take it From Here," *National Review*, Vol. 10, p. 371 (June 17, 1961).

<sup>32</sup> 367 U. S. 290 (1961).

<sup>33</sup> 367 U. S. 389 (1961).

<sup>34</sup> 367 U. S. 456 (1961).

<sup>35</sup> 366 U. S. 82 (1961).

<sup>36</sup> 366 U. S. 36 (1961).

<sup>29</sup> A. M. Bickel, "The Communist Cases," *New Republic*, Vol. 144, pp. 15-16 (June 19, 1961).

obstructed full investigation of their qualifications, and it was this obstruction of a relevant inquiry that justified their rejection as members of the bar.

The Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Harlan, upheld the committees over sharp dissenting opinions by Justices Black and Brennan. Mr. Justice Black insisted, *inter alia*, that compelling answers to such questions was an unconstitutional impingement on speech and association; and both he and Justice Brennan contended that the states were imposing upon applicants the burden of proving that they did not advocate violent overthrow, a shifting of the burden that had been condemned three years ago in *Speiser v. Randall*.<sup>37</sup> The Court answered the first objection by invoking the "balancing test"—"the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including . . . its procedures for orderly change" is "sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented." As for *Speiser*, Justice Harlan was able to distinguish it. Unlike *Speiser*, the present cases involve the denial of positions of responsibility to "a limited class of persons" regarded as dangerous "because the position might be used to the detriment of the public." Moreover, there is no evidence that the state here shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner; rather, it seems that the state assumed the burden itself and was prevented from discharging that burden by the refusals to answer.

No cloud of words can conceal the fact that a lawyer may now be required to answer questions about Communist Party membership as a precondition to practicing his profession; and it seems equally clear from the Court's language that a state may deny bar admission if advocacy of violent overthrow can be demonstrated. No doubt it is unwise to levy such gratuitous pains and penalties on those who believe, like Shelley, in their right to silence, or even on those who still adhere to the miserable remnant that is now the American Communist Party. But wisdom and constitutionality are different matters, and—as in the investigation cases—the question is where a viable line might be drawn here. Can it be held that the State is *unreasonable* in believing that advocacy of illegal means to change the form of government is an important consideration in determining the fitness of lawyers "in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this country's legal and political institutions?" And if this is

<sup>37</sup> 357 U. S. 513 (1958).

a reasonable belief, can the applicant be allowed to thwart the inquiry designed to implement it? Justice Brennan would apparently concede, *arguendum*, that the belief is reasonable, but would require that the state assume the burden of proving a *prima facie* case against the applicant before denying him admission. This suggestion may have promise; these decisions do not altogether close the door on it. Yet such a rule would apparently be at odds with standing procedures in most states, and the Court seems justified in at least postponing so drastic a departure from custom.

Meanwhile, it must be said of the bar examination cases, like the cases just discussed involving federal power, that they contain few surprises. Some years ago the Court began to hint that it might take a hand when the urge to persecute unorthodox opinion impinged on freedom of occupation. The hints were very tentative, the limitations on state power were cautiously drawn, and the development had to be understood in the light of a line of cases that upheld such impingement when the occupation was that of a specially placed group such as public employees.<sup>38</sup> The bar examination cases surely make no libertarian advance in this field; but neither do they depart significantly from lines long since established.

### III

As has been suggested, one of the justest criticisms of the Communist registration case and *Scales* is that they gave positive sanction to repressive acts, even though the issues might have been avoided. A rather similar point can be made about *Times Film Corporation v. Chicago*.<sup>39</sup>

The issue was movie censorship, and a few words of background are in order. In 1952, the Court repudiated the old doctrine<sup>40</sup> that movie censorship is immune from challenge under the free expression clauses of the Constitution.<sup>41</sup> However, although conceding that movies raise First Amendment questions, Mr. Justice Clark for the majority was careful not to condemn all regulation of this medium of expression, nor was he even prepared to rule that all "prior restraint" was forbidden. In subsequent

<sup>38</sup> *Adler v. Board of Education*, 342 U. S. 485 (1952); *Garner v. Los Angeles Board*, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); *Barenblatt v. United States*, 360 U. S. 109 (1959).

<sup>39</sup> 365 U. S. 43 (1961).

<sup>40</sup> *Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm.*, 236 U. S. 230 (1915).

<sup>41</sup> *Burstyn v. Wilson*, 343 U. S. 495 (1952).

cases,<sup>42</sup> Justices Black and Douglas began to urge that the Court take at least this minimum step of outlawing prior restraint, which has been traditionally regarded as peculiarly objectionable in the free speech field; but the majority steadily refrained from doing so. The case-by-case approach that was adopted had this to be said for it: the whole subject was novel as a constitutional issue; the argument against censorship may depend in part on such variables as the means of communication and the form of the restriction; and judges, like lesser mortals, sometimes need the aid of time to ripen their understanding. Not even the "priorness" of the repression settles the matter. Even before *Burstyn*, Paul A. Freund had persuasively argued that there are kinds and kinds of prior restraint,<sup>43</sup> and the Court, charting new seas, must go slowly while such insights are evaluated and digested.

But in the 1960 term, the majority seemed to lose patience with this tortoise-like pursuit of wisdom. Chicago requires that movies must be submitted, before showing, to the police commissioner who may grant or withhold a permit, subject only to review by the mayor. The Times Film Corporation had refused altogether to submit a film, arguing that—quite apart from the standards the commissioner might employ—this system of administrative prior restraint was void on its face. The Court, by Mr. Justice Clark, saw this as presenting the question of whether an exhibitor has "complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture." The answer, said the Court, is no. Very well. Given this formulation of the issue, the answer is not astonishing. But the result is to uphold the principle of administrative censorship, which is as the Chief Justice said, prior restraint in its "purest and most far-reaching form." From refusing to condemn prior restraint of all kinds, the Court seems to have taken the long stride to a policy of approving a particularly vicious kind. Of course review will still be granted as to the legitimacy of the standards police chiefs may employ. But the concept of administrative licensing itself has apparently been constitutionally ratified.

The mischief of such a concept was exposed by the Chief Justice in his strong but somewhat diffuse dissent. The administrative censor

operates in comparative privacy, free from the procedural safeguards that would prevail in a court of law. Though his decisions may be theoretically subject to judicial review, this is likely to be a hollow consolation in practice because of the delays of the adjudicative process—the present case had been pending for three years. Meantime the would-be exhibitor is trapped because he cannot show the film until the license issues. He is likely therefore to knuckle under to the censor's whim, even though it is based on plainly arbitrary standards.

Mr. Justice Clark's opinion proceeds as if the only alternative to this arrangement would be utter freedom to show any film—however obscene—at least once. But this is a false view of the options available. The Court in 1957 had upheld a system of book regulation which permitted New York City to seek in court a "limited injunctive remedy" under close procedural safeguards, including the right of the book-seller to immediate trial.<sup>44</sup> This procedure mitigates to a considerable degree the objections to administrative censorship mentioned in the last paragraph, and is a far cry from the Chicago arrangements. Perhaps the Court is not ready to prescribe the New York method as a universal rule; perhaps movies present problems of control different from those imposed by books. But the *Kingsley Books* case does at least suggest that there is a middle ground between the evils of administrative censorship and complete abandonment of the principle that condemns prior restraint.

The trouble is that Justice Clark's tendency to think in polarized terms on one side of such issues is matched by a similar tendency on the Black-Douglas side of the courtroom. Justice Douglas had denounced the New York ordinance as "censorship at its worst," which it patently was not. The Chicago arrangement was in fact a good deal worse, and it is this kind of refusal to acknowledge differences in degree that impedes the development of a workable jurisprudence in the civil rights field.

There is some possibility that the implications of *Times Film* are less deplorable than they seem. A later court might hold that the case merely rejected the claim of an absolute right against all prior restraint. That may be what Justice Clark meant when he said "It is that question alone that we decide." The question of the procedural sufficiency of any particular system could then still be raised. But if this was what was meant, nothing would

<sup>42</sup> *Kingsley Pictures v. Regents*, 360 U. S. 684 (1959); *Superior Films v. Ohio*, 346 U. S. 587 (1954).

<sup>43</sup> "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 533-554 (April, 1951).

<sup>44</sup> *Kingsley Books v. Brown*, 354 U. S. 436 (1957).

have been easier than to say so, and the cloudiness of the majority reasoning leaves room for the lamentable inference that administrative censorship is constitutionally approved. That inference may serve as the basis for a substantial revival of censorship before the Court in its deliberate majesty gets around to facing the issue again.

#### IV

So far the tale of the 1960 term is a rather dreary one. In the cases involving the subversion issue, the Court has added another layer or two to the long-standing but growing impression that it will deal only with the extreme periphery of the problem. In *Times Film*, it has marred a ten-year record of cautious but effective discouragement to the spirit of Mrs. Grundy. Despite the cross-threads and reservations that have been duly noted, an observer might understandably doubt that this is a Court whose members are all "equally zealous to enforce the constitutional protection of the free play of the human spirit."<sup>45</sup> But a term, like a book or a life, must be judged in the round, and there are further deeds to be recorded.

The decisions of the term that probably caused the most general excitement were those in the Sunday law cases.<sup>46</sup> No doubt this unwonted public concern for a constitutional issue came about partly because of the widespread impact of Sunday closing laws: there is hardly an American who has not been mildly inconvenienced by such statutes, while most have never so much as seen a communist except in television dramas. But partly the interest must be explained as an aspect of that curious and anachronistic fascination our people have for disputes with a religious undertone. No matter how secular we may become in spirit and practice, the mention of religion can still make dogmatists out of citizens and mountains out of molehills.

The issues posed in these cases were whether Sunday closing laws violated the equal protection and religious freedom guarantees, and the prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The short answer is that they do not. But brevity was hardly the

watchword for the judges in this litigation. The opinions on both sides consumed, by rough count, 58,000 words, 47,000 more than it took Marshall to decide *McCulloch v. Maryland*.

The four cases varied both in the circumstances of the persons involved and in the nature of the statutes challenged, but certain constitutional issues were common to all. For one thing, it was argued that the laws' purpose and effect was to aid religion and that this violated the "no establishment" principle. On the contrary, said the Chief Justice, who spoke for the Court in all four, the *present* purpose of the legislation is to set aside "a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquillity." The original purpose may have been religious, but in the course of time this basis has been replaced by a secular objective which is, constitutionally speaking, unexceptionable. In each case the Chief Justice conducted an examination of the laws in question, and warned that Sunday laws would be struck down if they did betray a religious motive. But surely it would be a modest feat of legislative draftsmanship to avoid such pitfalls, and we may assume that the basic power to establish a "day of tranquillity" is now safe from constitutional assault. Only Justice Douglas seems to disagree.

The second major objection to the laws was that they violated the equal protection clause because of the eccentricity and arbitrariness of the exceptions they granted—Maryland forbids oyster-gathering but permits the playing of pin-ball machines; Massachusetts allows the sale of ice cream at retail and of dressed poultry at wholesale, but prohibits (presumably) the wholesaling of the former and the retailing of the latter. And so on. The pattern in Massachusetts had been called by the District Court an "unbelievable hodgepodge." But the possibility of overthrowing the laws on this ground was thin to the vanishing point once it was conceded that they aimed at a legitimate secular objective. For years the Court has steadily held that a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.<sup>47</sup> These laws may have stretched a little the judicial capacity to conceive, but not more than some others have. A religious (or racial) basis for the classification would, of course, damn it. But absent that factor, the Court found no difficulty in imagining reasonable grounds for the distinctions.

<sup>45</sup> Frankfurter, J., *Murdoch v. Pennsylvania*, 319 U. S. 105, 129 (1943) (diss.).

<sup>46</sup> *Braunfeld v. Brown*, 366 U. S. 599 (1961); *Gallagher v. Crown Kasher Super Market of Mass., Inc.*, 366 U. S. 617 (1961); *McGowan v. Maryland*, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); *Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley*, 366 U. S. 582 (1961).

<sup>47</sup> *Railway Express Inc. v. New York*, 336 U. S. 106 (1949); *Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl*, 328 U. S. 80 (1946).



The final question was not so easy. The Sunday laws may be secular in their motivation, but suppose they have the incidental effect of imposing a discriminatory burden on certain religions—Orthodox Jews, for example, whose faith forbids them to work on Saturday. Is this not a restriction or penalty on religious freedom? The Chief Justice admitted that it is. The Orthodox may be forced to a choice between abandoning Sabbatarianism or suffering the economic disadvantage of a five-day week for their shops, as against a six-day week for their competitors. But, said the Chief Justice, the state is sometimes permitted to restrict or burden religious practices in the course of seeking a legitimate secular objective. This law does not forbid Saturday observance; it merely makes it inconvenient. Such a law is valid “unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.”

However, for Justice Brennan, who dissented on this issue, the quoted phrase was precisely the sticking point. Why not require the state to allow an exception for anyone whose *bona fide* religious beliefs require him to rest on Saturday? Many states do grant this exception which eliminates the burden on religious freedom, yet keeps the “day of tranquillity” substantially intact. This might indeed be the wiser solution, said the Court, but we are not prepared to impose it as a constitutional requirement. Such exceptions could create enforcement problems, since the state might have more difficulty in keeping track of violations. The Sunday observers might arguably claim that *they* were disadvantaged. And finally such a system would plunge the state into the vexing business of distinguishing between sincere and spurious claims of religious scruple. The state may choose to enter such a hornet’s nest if it likes, but the Constitution does not require it.

It should be emphasized that this question of allowing exceptions for Sabbatarians was the only one that was close enough to attract as many as three dissenters. Even if such a rule had been imposed, it would have been a minor qualification of the general holding that Sunday laws are valid, for only the Sabbatarians themselves would have standing to raise the issue, and their number is not great. Perhaps the fact alone argues for the rule. As Justice Brennan said, Sundays might be a little noisier and the task of enforcement a little more difficult, but this price is worth paying in order to avoid discriminating against religion. Yet the objections raised by the Chief Justice (and Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion) were more substantial than Justice Brennan con-

ceded. In fact, the arguments on both sides in these cases have a thoughtful, cogent quality, so that the reader is held delicately poised between agreement and disagreement. The Sunday Law decisions provide us with one of those all-too-rare instances in which reason seems to have played a significant part in the result.

Why is this so? Perhaps because the Sunday laws cut across the categories into which the Court’s thinking has tended to crystallize in recent times. Such a problem as this is not answerable in terms of simplistic pro-individual or pro-government concepts, and the judges are therefore led to look beyond their prepossessions for guidance. How would the results of these cases be assessed in any *pro* and *con* enumeration? How do we weigh the individual right of A to enjoy a tranquil Sunday against the individual right of B to pursue his trade free from discrimination on account of his religion—and incidentally to mar A’s tranquillity? Certainly it is hard to classify as anti-libertarian holdings so equivocal as these, particularly when they are supported by Justices Warren, Black, and (except for the special question of Sabbatarians) Brennan. The vitality of the Court’s concern for religious freedom is evinced not only by the warnings embodied in the language of the Sunday law decisions but by *Torcaso v. Watkins*<sup>48</sup> which unanimously overthrew a requirement of the Maryland constitution that public officers declare their belief in God.

## V

The doctrinal history of the modern Supreme Court in the area of criminal procedure has been extremely complex, partly because procedural and substantive questions are often intertwined and partly because even the cases involving “pure” criminal procedure issues are very numerous. Since the early 1930’s when the judges began to display a new sensitivity for the rights of the accused, such cases have bulked large on the Court’s docket, and the pattern of decision-making is labyrinthian. Nevertheless, allowing for cross-threads and convolutions, it can be said that there has been a broad tendency to go forward (*i.e.*, to extend the constitutional rights of accused persons), moderated by a disposition to hold the line in certain areas, such as the right to counsel in state courts<sup>49</sup> and the right against eavesdropping.<sup>50</sup> Except for the brief period of “the Vinson Court,” when such holdings as

<sup>48</sup> 367 U. S. 488 (1961).

<sup>49</sup> *Betts v. Brady*, 316 U. S. 455 (1942).

<sup>50</sup> *Goldman v. United States*, 316 U. S. 129 (1942).



*Trupiano v. United States*<sup>51</sup> were spawned, relatively few important backward steps have been taken. Perhaps no other field, except racial discrimination, so clearly illustrates the general concord of the judges on a basic ideal of fairness to the individual. The disagreement has usually been between those who would go slow in extending this ideal and those who would go somewhat faster. Between these mild extremes the majority has forged gradually ahead.

The 1960 term was marked by a distinct spurt forward in this field, not indeed the kind of headlong advance that Justice Douglas would favor, but a brisk one nonetheless. Leaving aside decisions already treated like *Wilkinson* and the Communist registration case in which procedural questions were linked to major substantive issues, the Court upheld the government in only a handful of cases. Chief among these were a pair involving the claim of double jeopardy<sup>52</sup> and another pair involving the question whether federal courts should enjoin the use of illegally obtained evidence in state courts.<sup>53</sup> The first three simply represent a refusal to go forward; certainly they could not be regarded as retreats from settled libertarian positions. *Wilson v. Schnettler* may be a little cloudier, for in *Rea v. United States*<sup>54</sup> the Court had held that a federal court injunction could issue to prevent federal agents from presenting in state court evidence illegally seized, and *Wilson* was invoking that holding. But there were factual differences between the two situations, and the Court in *Wilson*, though rejecting the petitioner's claim, did not depart from *Rea*'s basic holding that illegal search can warrant federal court intervention. And at all events, *Mapp v. Ohio*,<sup>55</sup> discussed below, seems to obviate the whole question by holding that *all* unconstitutionally seized evidence is excludable in state courts, so that hereafter a defendant like *Wilson* could simply invoke that rule, and an injunctive remedy would be unnecessary. In short the spirit of these decisions seems at most static rather than retrogressive.

And in any case they are greatly overbalanced on the libertarian side by other criminal procedure decisions of the term. Not only is it true that a heavy proportion of the cases were decided in favor of the accused. More

important, two of these decisions must be regarded as landmarks in the history of modern constitutional doctrine.

The lesser of them was nevertheless highly significant, not because it carved out new doctrine but because it adhered so scrupulously to the limits of the old. Since *Goldman v. United States* permitted admission of "detectaphone" evidence, there has seemed reason to fear that there was no constitutional protection against the ingenious electronic eavesdropping made possible by modern science. Such fears were not entirely stilled by *Silverman v. United States*,<sup>56</sup> but they were confined within borders. In this, the "spike-mike" case, the Court held inadmissible evidence obtained by driving a spike attached to an amplifier into the wall of a house until it hit a heating duct. The entire heating system thereby became a giant microphone. The detectaphone in the *Goldman* case had not penetrated the house wall, and this, said the Court, made a crucial difference. Eavesdropping accomplished by an "unauthorized physical penetration" of this private house invaded the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. The petitioner had asked for reconsideration of *Goldman*, but Justice Stewart found this unnecessary in the light of the difference in the facts. However, the language of his majority opinion reveals alertness to the threat of "frightening paraphernalia" to the right to privacy, and the determination not to go beyond *Goldman* "by even a fraction of an inch." There may in fact be reason to doubt that *Goldman* itself could now survive direct constitutional attack, especially when it is remembered that Justice Frankfurter was among the dissenters in that case.

The second and even more striking decision was *Mapp v. Ohio*, which held that evidence obtained by unconstitutional search was inadmissible in state prosecutions, thus overruling one of the most controversial procedural cases of the modern era, *Wolf v. Colorado*.<sup>57</sup> This development is so spectacularly libertarian, especially when viewed against the background of *Wolf*, that it must play a major part in any evaluation of the term's results. Yet not even a staunch advocate of forward movement in this field could allow himself more than two cheers, unless he were so result-oriented as to be entirely indifferent to the need for reasoned decision.

*Mapp* must surely rank as one of the untidest decisions in which the modern Court has announced a salient constitutional doctrine, which is saying a good deal. The case had

<sup>51</sup> 334 U. S. 699 (1948).

<sup>52</sup> *Gori v. United States*, 367 U. S. 364 (1961); *Callanan v. United States*, 364 U. S. 587 (1961).

<sup>53</sup> *Wilson v. Schnettler*, 365 U. S. 381 (1961); *Pugach v. Dollinger*, 365 U. S. 458 (1961).

<sup>54</sup> 350 U. S. 214 (1956).

<sup>55</sup> 367 U. S. 643 (1961).

<sup>56</sup> 365 U. S. 505 (1961).

<sup>57</sup> 338 U. S. 25 (1949).

arisen from a state prosecution for the possession of "lewd and lascivious" books and pictures, and the main issue briefed and argued concerned the validity of the Ohio law which punishes mere knowing possession of such material. The evidence had admittedly been seized illegally, but the *Wolf* doctrine of course controlled this question, and the suggestion to overrule *Wolf* came in the course of an *amicus curiae* brief and was hardly argued at all. As Justice Harlan remarked, dissenting, an important change in constitutional law should be preceded by full-dress argument, insuring the most sober kind of judicial consideration, especially when the prevailing rule has been laid down comparatively recently and when the issue is one of some intricacy. Even more, it seems unfortunate to decide a constitutional question of such moment when the case might have been disposed of by reference to another clearer question that had been fully briefed. Cases involving illegally obtained evidence are common enough, and if the Court was resolved to overthrow *Wolf* it would not have had to wait long for a more felicitous opportunity.

Unhappily, the faults of Justice Clark's majority opinion did not stop here. His arguments for overthrowing *Wolf* revealed the need for what Justice Harlan called the "aid which adequate briefing and argument lends to the determination of an important issue." The Court's basic point was that *Wolf* recognized that the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy applies to the states and that it is therefore anomalous not to apply the constitutionally derived *Weeks* rule,<sup>58</sup> which excludes illegally obtained evidence from federal trials, to the states as well. But this begs at least three important questions: is the *Weeks* rule of constitutional origin or rather a rule of evidence imposed by the Supreme Court in pursuance of its power to supervise the federal judicial system? Was it the Fourth Amendment that was applied to the states in *Wolf* or the "principle of privacy" which might have a different meaning in the Fourteenth than it has in the Fourth? Is it always anomalous that state courts are allowed more room for variation than federal courts, or does the concept of federalism warrant just such leeway?

Each of these questions needed to be carefully considered even if they were all to be answered as the Court did. And the failure to consider them weakened the Court's other arguments. One of these was that the passage of time since *Wolf* had undermined the case against exclusion, partly because "more than

half" of the states passing on the question since then had adopted the exclusionary principle. As Justice Harlan said, half of all states still do admit such evidence, and in any case state autonomy is not to be overridden simply because a slight tendency has developed to regard one rule as more desirable than another. Another of Justice Clark's points was that we exclude involuntary confessions in state courts and that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is analogous. But Justice Harlan gravely impaired this argument by pointing to a crucial difference. Forced confessions are excluded because they may infect the fairness of the trial itself, not because of something the police did before the trial. To admit such evidence would make the trial a farce; the strongest evidence of innocence might be overborne by a confession that was coerced and thus quite possibly false. On the other hand, illegally obtained evidence is excluded, when it is, not because the trial has been rendered unfair (the evidence may be perfectly convincing, though illegally procured) but to deter police from unconstitutional conduct. The Supreme Court has the authority thus to supervise the conduct of federal police, but under the federal system it has no such power to discipline the police of the states.

The point is not whether the majority's assumptions can be defended or whether Justice Harlan's strictures are unanswerable. Nothing the latter says quite disposes of Justice Murphy's contention in *Wolf* that only the exclusionary rule can make the right to privacy real. And even in connection with the argument canvassed above, one might well ask whether the Court is in fact limited to concerns bearing on the trial itself. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of due process of law, and it might be contended that this touches the whole process by which criminals are brought in and punished. But the point is that the majority opinion did not effectively state the case for overruling *Wolf*; it did not meet the burden of justifying a departure from *stare decisis*. The dissenting opinion was in fact far more effective than the prevailing one. *Wolf* may have deserved to be buried, but it merited a more persuasive funeral oration.

But whatever the infirmities of the reasoning, *Wolf* is decisively overthrown, and the "*Mapp* doctrine" takes an important place among the rules that insure uniform fair play to the individual, as does the "spike-mike" doctrine of *Silverman*. Other decisions of the term, while less spectacular, add to the impression of judicial resolution in this field. For example the Court reconfirmed and strengthened

<sup>58</sup> *Weeks v. United States*, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).

the doctrine of *Griffin v. Illinois*<sup>59</sup> that financial hurdles must not bar an indigent's right to review of his conviction;<sup>60</sup> a state trial prejudiced by newspaper publicity with the prosecutor's connivance was held violative of due process;<sup>61</sup> and an indigent convicted of felony was held entitled to a hearing to determine whether the state denial of counsel offended due process.<sup>62</sup> The interesting thing about this last case was not its result, but Justice Douglas' concurring plea for reconsideration of *Betts v. Brady*, which allowed the state to dispense with counsel in some felony cases. "I cannot believe," he said, "that a majority of the present Court would agree to *Betts v. Brady* were it here *de novo*. . . ." If his guess about the temper of the present Court is correct, there may be further startling events to come in the near future. Has the present majority resolved the old misgivings about the wisdom of imposing procedural rules on the states? Has Justice Frankfurter's concern for flexible federalism lost out to those who contend for a more uniform standard of due process? The answer, as Justice Story would say, is "locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence" (and in the bosoms of five members of the Court); the chances are that it will emerge gradually, if at all. But *Mapp* is a very considerable straw in the breeze; and there can on the whole be little doubt about the direction of the wind currents during the 1960 term at least.

## VI

Since 1954, as every schoolboy knows, the Supreme Court—and even more the lower federal courts which it supervises<sup>63</sup>—has been heavily preoccupied with the problem of public school integration. After the seven-league stride of the *Brown*<sup>64</sup> decision, the Court has moved steadily but not hastily forward against other forms of racial discrimination. The implications of the *Brown* doctrine were applied in *per curiam* holdings against segregation in such facilities as public recreation grounds<sup>65</sup> and intrastate buses;<sup>66</sup> the states that sought to take retributive action against the NAACP were stymied;<sup>67</sup> the concept of "state action"

was extended so as to make it a little harder to maintain a discriminatory policy.<sup>68</sup> With the possible exception of this last case, these developments might be said to be logically inherent in the broad disapproval of racial discrimination that was exemplified by the *Brown* doctrine.

In the 1960 term there began to be signs that the Court was approaching, though not yet reaching, the limits of that logic. For one thing, we get in some of the cases the first real break in the unanimous front that the Court has recently maintained on such questions. In *Shelton v. Tucker*<sup>69</sup> the majority held invalid an Arkansas law requiring schoolteachers to list all organizations they have belonged to for five years. What troubled the dissenters here was the problem of reconciling this holding with such precedents as *Adler* in which a state's right to inquire into its employees' associations had been upheld. Mr. Justice Stewart's point, for the majority, was that the state could have no legitimate interest in all associational ties, and it must therefore draw such statutes more narrowly if it hopes to meet judicial inspection. This doctrine may be a good one, but it is also somewhat novel, and its implications may require careful examination, if the Court is to keep its lines of logic straight.

Again, in *Boynnton v. Virginia*<sup>70</sup> the Interstate Commerce Act was held to bar a trespass action against a Negro who refused to leave a bus terminal restaurant. The Act forbids "unjust discrimination" in facilities "operated or controlled" by a motor carrier, and the whole Court agreed that this would prohibit racial discrimination in a bus company's own restaurant. But this restaurant was owned by a local Virginia corporation and leased to a private operator. Nevertheless, said Justice Black for the Court, it is subject to the Act, without regard to niceties of title, if the bus company has volunteered to provide terminal facilities and "the terminal and restaurant have acquiesced in and cooperated in this undertaking." This feat of constructive alchemy was too much for Justices Whittaker and Clark, who dissented.

In another line, *Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority*<sup>71</sup> raised similar misgivings, this time about the elasticity of the "state action" concept of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that a restaurant privately

<sup>59</sup> 351 U. S. 12 (1956).

<sup>60</sup> *Smith v. Bennett*, 365 U. S. 708 (1961).

<sup>61</sup> *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U. S. 717 (1961).

<sup>62</sup> *McNeal v. Culver*, 365 U. S. 109 (1961).

<sup>63</sup> See Peltason, *op. cit.*

<sup>64</sup> *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

<sup>65</sup> *Baltimore v. Dawson*, 350 U. S. 877 (1955).

<sup>66</sup> *Gayle v. Browder*, 352 U. S. 903 (1956).

<sup>67</sup> *N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama*, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).

<sup>68</sup> *Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors*, 353 U. S. 230 (1957).

<sup>69</sup> 364 U. S. 479 (1960).

<sup>70</sup> 364 U. S. 454 (1960).

<sup>71</sup> 365 U. S. 715 (1961).

operated but leased from the city was engaged in state action and thus subject to the equal protection clause. But the grounds for so deciding were far from clear in Justice Clark's majority opinion which threw together, as Justice Harlan said, "various factual bits and pieces" and then undermined "the resulting structure by an equally vague disclaimer." Since there was some basis for believing that the state law might specifically authorize the racial discrimination in question, which would flatly contravene the Fourteenth Amendment, three members of the Court wanted to seek an authoritative interpretation from the state court before deciding the case. They preferred to avoid the tortuous question of state action until it was forced upon them. Sooner or later that question will have to be faced, but its resolution would strain the powers of Daniel himself, and meantime there is little to be said for such *ad hoc* formulations as this majority opinion offers, however congenial the immediate results may be.

The minority qualms expressed in these cases reflect an awareness that the problems have not been entirely thought through and that pragmatic decisions in defense of the shared value of racial equality may close portals in other areas where an open-door policy has so far prevailed. These reflections are relevant to *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*,<sup>72</sup> which was probably the most surprising racial rights decision of the term and may have the most significant implications. It concerned Tuskegee, Alabama, which had allegedly been gerrymandered so as to exclude from voting in city elections all but four or five of its 400 former Negro voters. The state hoped, relying on *Hunter v. Pittsburg*<sup>73</sup> and *Colegrove v. Green*,<sup>74</sup> that this strategem would be beyond the reach of the federal courts and that the disadvantaged Negroes would thus be unable to raise the claim of constitutional rights.

But the Supreme Court thought otherwise. If the allegations could be proved, the act would be an invalid racial discrimination affecting the right to vote as protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. *Hunter* and related cases did not hold that the state has plenary power to manipulate municipal borders at will, but only that the particular constitutional clauses there invoked could not avail to limit the power in those particular contexts. As for *Colegrove*, the Court there held that the dilution of appellants' voting strength because of

the legislature's failure to reapportion presented a "political question." The present case was different, because the legislature here had affirmatively acted to deny the vote on racial grounds, which is specifically forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment.

This opinion was carefully and neatly wrought so as to permit the Court to checkmate racially discriminatory gerrymanders without opening up the whole vast question of apportionment. Justice Whittaker, concurring, would rely on the equal protection clause, but he too felt that *Colegrove* was distinguishable.

The case is important enough if its emanations go no further than this: that electoral apportionment is subject to challenge on the ground of racial discrimination. But it may prove difficult to confine it to those limits, and the case nicely illustrates the problem of logical consistency that is posed by some of these decisions in the racial field. The Court is obviously determined to nullify "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination"<sup>75</sup> and must therefore be alert against indirect action with a segregationist motive. But that kind of action may take forms that would apparently immunize it from attack under previously announced constitutional doctrine—most readers of *Adler v. Board of Education* would think that it authorized Little Rock to query schoolteachers about organizational ties; most readers of *Colegrove* would think that Tuskegee's gerrymander presented a non-justiciable question. In correcting these misunderstandings, as it did in *Shelton* and *Gomillion*, the Court has two choices: to declare in effect that there are special rules for situations that involve the hint of racial discrimination; or to fashion a new general rule that will cover the situation. If it takes the former course, it will be holding that the right against racial discrimination enjoys a super-"preferred position" in our system of constitutional restraints. That seems to be the idea of Justice Frankfurter in *Gomillion* (though he would of course ardently reject the phrase): electoral inequality is forbidden if based on racial grounds, but other kinds of inequality do not offend the Constitution. This double standard may have some warrant, as he implies, in the precise language of the Fifteenth Amendment. But the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth speaks in more general terms, and the question is whether the concept of equality, so strictly conceived to protect the Negro, can go on being interpreted permissively when the rights of men in general are at issue. There is

<sup>72</sup> 364 U. S. 339 (1960).

<sup>73</sup> 207 U. S. 161 (1907).

<sup>74</sup> 328 U. S. 549 (1946).

<sup>75</sup> *Lane v. Wilson*, 307 U. S. 268, 275 (1939).

some reason to suspect that *Gomillion* may become an entering wedge for reconsideration of the whole apportionment problem.<sup>76</sup> Whatever may be the truth about this, the fact remains that hard judicial soul-searching impends in this field. If a double standard is to prevail, it requires careful exposition and justification. If on the other hand general constitutional doctrines are to be reinterpreted so as to accommodate decisions like these, the task of synthesis will be a formidable one. So far, it seems fair to say, neither job has been done.

### VII

Only brief attention can be paid here to a scattering of other civil rights decisions, though some of them might well have attracted more notice in a term less crowded with momentous developments in this field.

The nasty question of arbitrary security dismissals was raised by the case of one Rachel Brawner who was a short-order cook in a privately operated cafeteria in a naval weapons plant.<sup>77</sup> This installation was under military command, and Mrs. Brawner lost her job when the commanding officer withdrew, without specific charges or a hearing, her identification badge on the ground that she failed to meet security requirements. The Supreme Court might have held that such action was unauthorized by statute,<sup>78</sup> or that it violated procedural due process; Mr. Justice Stewart, for the majority, chose to do neither. Though he admitted that dismissed government employees may have constitutional rights in some circumstances, there was no right to notice and hearing here, where the reasons for her exclusion were not "patently arbitrary or discriminatory." This reasoning by-passed the sticky issue, which was that the "security risk" badge of infamy was involved. To recognize a constitutional right to a hearing for all dismissed government employees would plunge both the law and public personnel administration into endless difficulties. But the "security risk" tag is so damaging to the individual that its use should, at the very least, be accompanied by some procedural protections. One can only hope that a later Court will be able to confine this precedent very narrowly to its specific facts, and minimize the damage it potentially does to the tradition of procedural fairness.

<sup>76</sup> *Baker v. Carr*, 364 U. S. 898 (1960), prob. juris. noted.

<sup>77</sup> *Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy*, 376 U. S. 886 (1961).

<sup>78</sup> *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U. S. 474 (1959).

Two potentially very interesting and important constitutional issues were evaded by the Court in the 1960 term. One was the issue of whether a man coerced by law to join and pay dues to an association can object if his money is used to further political purposes uncongenial to him. In a federal case, the Railway Labor Act as amended was interpreted to forbid a union so to spend a member's money;<sup>79</sup> in a state case involving a bar association, a plurality of four believed that the record did not present the facts "as leanly and as sharply" as they should be in order to justify decision of the constitutional question.<sup>80</sup>

The other issue was birth control.<sup>81</sup> The Connecticut statute in question forbids the use (not the sale) of contraceptives and makes possible the punishment of those who counsel such use (e.g., physicians). Plaintiffs had assailed the law under a state declaratory judgment act. But the fact seemed to be that the law was not currently being enforced, and until it is, said the Court, the constitutional issues are not ripe for our consideration. The plaintiffs' supposed fear of prosecution was deemed chimerical in light of the non-enforcement record.

There were dubious elements in the opinions supporting these evasive results: the federal statute had to be tortured cruelly to produce *Street*; five justices thought the constitutional issue was properly before them in *Lathrop*, so the curious result is that the evasion was supported by only a minority of the Court; the grounds for dismissal in the birth control case were somewhat novel and very debatable, as Justice Harlan's dissent shows. But it is not surprising if the judges began to feel by this time (they were End of Term decisions) that enough was enough. There may be such a thing as domestic economy, even within a Supreme Court, and the 1960 term had already produced enough significant civil liberty decisions to overfill any reasonable quota. The questions of dues and politics and birth control will no doubt be back again, and in short order. Meanwhile, they remain open, and these decisions could not be recorded either *pro* or *con* in a charting of the Court's record in the field of constitutional rights.

Finally, in two significant cases with constitutional undertones the Court construed federal law so as to protect individual rights.

<sup>79</sup> *International Association of Machinists v. Street*, 367 U. S. 740 (1961).

<sup>80</sup> *Lathrop v. Donohue*, 367 U. S. 820 (1961).

<sup>81</sup> *Poe v. Ullman*, 376 U. S. 497 (1961).

*Monroe v. Pape*<sup>82</sup> held that the 1875 Civil Rights Act provides a civil remedy for those deprived of federal rights by state officers, even though the officers have violated state law. The solid majority reconfirmed the *Classic*<sup>83</sup> and *Screws*<sup>84</sup> doctrine that "misuse of power . . . made possible because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law" in the meaning of the statute. In short, state police who violate Fourteenth Amendment rights can now be sued in federal court by the injured party, who need not, by the way, carry the heavy burden of proving a willful deprivation of constitutional rights. In the other case the Court held that railroad publicity programs designed to influence legislation could not be made a basis for suit under the Sherman Act, even though the legislation sought was economically advantageous to the railroads and injurious to their trucker competitors, and even though "reprehensible" and "deceptive" publicity techniques were employed.<sup>85</sup> A contrary construction would "raise important constitutional questions" involving the right of petition.

### VIII

This then was the 1960-61 civil rights record of the Supreme Court—or enough of it to permit evaluation. A few words of summary may sharpen the picture. In the cases involving the "communist menace"—real or imaginary—the Court, with minor exceptions, held against the individual and in favor of governmental power. This spirit of judicial permissiveness was most striking in the field of legislative investigations: it seems obvious that such inquisitions into this subject are now immune from any very meaningful substantive restraints. And pretty much the same statement can be made about government-imposed qualifications for professional practice at least as applied to "a limited class of persons" in positions of public responsibility. With respect to punishment for Party membership and the registration requirements of the McCarran Act, the Court's attitude was a little more ambiguous. Old, mildly restrictive interpretations of the Smith Act were adhered to, and the government was put to a rigorous standard of proof in enforcing the membership clause; the Fifth Amendment

may still be available as an individual defense against the order to register, even though its value may be somewhat attenuated by the time the issue is finally faced. But there is no doubt that a determined government can make things warm for Communists and suspected Communists if it has the time and energy to spare, and that the plea of "security risk" carries great weight in the judicial mind.

Apart from these political offender cases, the most noteworthy anti-libertarian development of the term was the apparent ratification of administrative movie censorship in *Times Film*. But then the impression of the term begins to change. The Sunday law decisions defy classification, but surely little evidence can be wrung from them that the Court has flagged in its concern for religious freedom. The decisions involving dues and politics and birth control were indecisive. On the other hand, the signs of forward movement in the field of criminal procedure and Negro rights seem unmistakable. In the former area the *Mapp* decision stands out like a beacon, perhaps even portending a general erosion of the scruples about federalism that have heretofore retarded movement of this kind. But the pattern of other less spectacular cases reveals a similarly "progressive" trend. And the Negro rights cases also suggest a tendency to mark out new frontiers, not so dramatic as those of 1954, but salient nonetheless.

What kind of a term was it? Was it a "libertarian term," or did its results justify the dark misgivings of Justices Black and Douglas, quoted above? The answer will depend, broadly, on how one weighs the pro-government spirit of the political offender cases and *Times Film* against the pro-individual record in the criminal procedure and racial equality decisions. But even conceding such subjective variations in outlook, it is hard to see how it could be contended that this was, in balance, a retrogressive term. It must be remembered that a few short years ago such matters as legislative investigations, public employment standards, and movie censorship seemed arguably immune from all constitutional restraints. The doctrines correcting these misapprehensions are still in relative infancy. One may wish that the Court would push them toward adulthood a little faster, but this is a quite different thing from charging that they are old and seasoned constitutional traditions, now dead by the Court's hand. In fact, they are neither old nor dead. And a similar point can be made about *Scales*. The present Court is far more scrupulous about requiring personal knowledge and intent than its predecessor was

<sup>82</sup> 365 U. S. 167 (1961).

<sup>83</sup> *United States v. Classic*, 313 U. S. 299 (1941).

<sup>84</sup> *Screws v. United States*, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).

<sup>85</sup> *Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight*, 365 U. S. 127 (1961).

in *Whitney v. California*.<sup>86</sup> True, it has refused to throw out guilt by association altogether, but it never said that it would. True, it has refused to invalidate the Smith Act, but neither, as has already been remarked, has any previous Court overthrown a national sedition law; and at least this Court has construed the law so as to retain some measure of sense and justice.

The truth is that most of these cases represent refusals to advance, not retreats. They may be no less regrettable for that, but it is well to know what we are talking about. In recent years Justices Black and Douglas seem to have themselves developed a libertarian position that is more uncompromising than some of their earlier opinions would suggest.<sup>87</sup> This may create an illusion, even in their own minds, that the majority has retrogressed, but an illusion it is. It is they who have moved "forward," not the Court that has moved "back."

By and large the Court's propensity in the last decade—as exemplified by the 1960 term—has been to extend the concept of civil rights fairly steadily in certain selected but vital fields, to stand relatively still in certain others (notably those involving the security issue) and to retreat, if that is the word, only in the sense that such implied half-promises as those in *Watkins* are unredeemed. By common sense reckoning, this pattern of large pluses and small minuses would seem to yield a substantial gain for civil liberties.

Is this, to pose the result-oriented question, "enough" for the Court to do? Or is it failing the nation in the hour of need? The question is slippery and incurably non-objective, but it is the kind that is hard to avoid in discussing political institutions. And surely even the beginning of any answer must center around some preliminary assumptions about the range of judicial capacity. No one would contend that the Court can correct all the errors, big and small, that a great, dynamic democracy commits. The stock of prestige that supports

judicial review is substantial but not inexhaustible. That stock has been drawn on heavily in recent years, as the 1958 counter-attack attested. Probably it is going to be further taxed as the judges continue to press forward ideals like racial equality and fair treatment of the accused, to name only two. There is no known perpetual inventory system that infallibly warns us when the limit has been approached. All that can be offered here is one observer's judgment that (to drop the metaphor) the Court of the 1960 term did or seemed in the process of doing about as much on behalf of civil rights as we can reasonably expect nine men to do.

## IX

When we turn from the "result-oriented" to the "reason-oriented" line of evaluation, the spectacle is a little different. To be sure, the matter must again be viewed relatively. We cannot demand that a living institution, dealing with living problems, achieve perfect logical symmetry, for logic overdone can stultify all it touches. Nor is it clear that Courts of the past have followed the ideal of reasoned decision more than has the present one. What of the opinions of the 1920's and early 1930's for example, those that T. R. Powell used to dissect so mercilessly? What of such masterpieces of inner contradiction as *Munn v. Illinois*<sup>88</sup> or *Hurtado v. California*?<sup>89</sup>

Yet admitting all this, and admitting further that the modern Court faces riddles of unexampled complexity, it still seems fair to wish that more progress could be made in ordering and solving them. And it must be ruefully said that very little such progress marked the 1960 term. The balancing test begins to seem more and more a "fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers,"<sup>90</sup> at least in subversion cases. The opinions in *Times Film* and *Burton* leave the reader in grave doubt as to what was decided, and why. The conclusion of *Mapp v. Ohio* is fairly plain, but the route to that conclusion is murky.

However, as has already been intimated, the main complaint on this score is a more general one—that the Court is not confronting the task of intellectual architecture that is posed by its modern jurisdictional claims in the field of civil rights. In 1951, Mr. Justice Jackson remarked that the Court's prior decisions

<sup>86</sup> 274 U. S. 357 (1927).

<sup>87</sup> Both of them seem to have taken leave of the clear and present danger doctrine at one end, while the majority was taking leave of it at another. Both had invoked it in earlier cases [*Bridges v. California*, 314 U. S. 252 (1941); *Craig v. Harney*, 331 U. S. 367 (1947)], though Justice Black had declared in the former case that it was only a "minimum compulsion," which left the way open for him to begin applying a more absolutist standard with *Breard v. Alexandria*, 341 U. S. 622 (1951).

<sup>88</sup> 94 U. S. 113 (1877).

<sup>89</sup> 110 U. S. 516 (1884).

<sup>90</sup> *Tyson Bros. v. Banton*, 273 U. S. 418, 446 (1927).



"will be searched in vain for clear standards"<sup>91</sup> governing civil liberties questions. The remonstrance seems just about equally valid ten years later, though it covers an even wider ground, for since then the Court has in important respects extended its power to supervise. The state action problem, the problem of censorship, occupational freedom, legislative inquisitions, the general right of the government to inform itself and ventilate facts, the right against self-incrimination, the problem of scientific eavesdropping and of other unreasonable searches, the limits of statutory flexibility, racial discrimination in the determination of voting units—all these and many more were within the judicial ambit in the 1960 term. Future terms may see new departures bearing on such matters as legislative apportionment and the right to counsel in state courts. These problems are not discrete; the resolution of one touches most of the others. To quote Justice Frankfurter (speaking ten years ago), "there are now so many of these decisions, arrived at by the *ad hoc* process of adjudication, that it is desirable to make a cruise of the timber."<sup>92</sup>

Why has the Court as a whole never taken that cruise? Why has it done so little to develop a reasoned, connected set of doctrines in the field of civil rights? Partly no doubt because this is easier said than done—it is one thing to call for reasoned principles and quite another thing to devise them. But though this might account for some inadequacy in doctrinal structure, it does not fully explain the failure to develop any such structure at all.

That failure seems to be caused by a certain fragmenting and hardening of attitudes that characterize the modern Court, making it impossible to achieve a consensus of reason even when an agreement on result does exist. Even with respect to results the Court has been of course far from unanimous, but the steady expansion of civil rights jurisdiction attests that a majority united by this common concern can frequently be assembled. But the dissensus as to the reasons for the holdings is far more stubborn. As the pattern of concurrences and dissents shows, there is a tendency for such pairs as Warren-Brennan, Frankfurter-Harlan and Clark-Whittaker to produce separate reasons for the positions they take. But the dissensus goes farther than that.

Doctrinal idiosyncracies often require individual statement. Justice Black's special ideas about the absolutism of the First Amendment, and his equally special ideas about search and seizure, produce personal reasoning in such cases as *Noto* and *Mapp*. Justice Clark seems to worry more about procedural regularity in state courts than in federal, while Justice Frankfurter feels quite the other way. Justice Douglas felt called on to speak separately in cases like *Lathrop* and *Scales*.

What has happened is that certain members have frozen into attitudes unacceptable to most of their brethren and they are hence unable to join in a reasoned statement of doctrine. They can perhaps agree *a fortiori* with results, as Justice Douglas does in *Gomillion* or Justice Frankfurter does in *Irvin*, but their reasoning fails to persuade a majority and sometimes persuades only themselves. The justice who seems most nearly free from this quality of dogmatic separatism is Stewart, the swing man in these cases. Justices Black and Douglas have taken a view toward many of these issues that appears irreconcilable with the view of any possible majority. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan can sometimes attract four others to their reasoning, but solid doctrine is hard to build on 5-4 decisions. Justices Warren and Brennan show some tendency to seek a middle ground; they seem more flexible than Black and Douglas at any rate. But they too can seldom carry a solid majority for their opinions in disputed cases.

This multiple stalemate has an incidental effect that is worth noting: it diminishes the contribution to constitutional law of those best qualified by experience and ability to make such a contribution. In the cases discussed above, Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in only three, two of them easy decisions exciting no serious question. Justice Douglas wrote only one. Justice Frankfurter wrote his share—five—but it cannot be said that any of them, except perhaps *Gomillion*, stated new and viable doctrine. How much more impressive and convincing *Mapp* and *Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy* could have been, for example, if these men had not been precluded, for one reason or another, from framing the Court opinions.

But the main point is that these conflicting dogmatisms have, for a long time, impeded the growth of doctrine in general. Worse, there are signs that the divisions have further crystallized with age. There seems small chance that they will soften enough, given existing personnel, to permit the development of a system of reasoned criteria in the civil rights field.

<sup>91</sup> Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 299 (1951).

<sup>92</sup> Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 276 (1951).



This circumstance is profoundly relevant to the question of future appointments to the supreme bench. There may have been times in history when a loyal henchman or a good journeyman would be appropriate enough, but that time is not now. The Court's present need is for a man (or men) with the master crafts-

man's intellectual capacity to weave the disparate strands of civil rights doctrine into a coherent tapestry, and a spirit of moderation that can marshal assent among those who are open to persuasion. It is an exacting set of requirements. But the plea for reasoned doctrine is not likely to be answered until it is filled.

## APPENDIX

## TABLE OF CASES

Case	Result	Opinion for court	Concurrence	Dissent
Boynton v. Va.	+	Bl		Wh, C
Braden v. U. S.	-	S		Bl, Wa, D; D, Wa, Bl, Br
Braunfeld v. Brown	-	Wa, C, Bl, Wh	F, H	D; S <sup>1</sup> ; Br <sup>1</sup>
Burton v. Wilmington	+	C	S	H, Wh; F
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy	-	S		Br, Wa, Bl, D
Callanan v. U. S.	-	F		S, Wa, Bl, D
Communist Party v. Catherwood	+	H	Bl	
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board	-	F		Wa; Bl; D; Br, Wa
Deutch v. U. S.	+	S		H, F; Wh, C
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight	+	Bl		
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market	-	Wa, Bl, C, Wh	F, H	D; Br, S
Gomillion v. Lightfoot	+	F	Wh; D	
Gori v. U. S.	-	F		D, Wa, Bl, Br
In Re Anastaplo	-	H		Bl, Wa, D, Br; Br, Wa
Int'l. Assoc. of Machinists v. Street	+	Br	D; Wh	Bl; F, H; Wh <sup>1</sup>
Irvin v. Dowd	+	C	F	
Konigsberg v. State Bar	-	H		Bl, Wa, D; Br, Wa
Lathrop v. Donohue	-	Br, Wa, C, S	H, F; Wh	Bl; D
McGowan v. Md.	-	Wa	F, H	D
McNeal v. Culver	+	Wh	D, Br	
Mapp v. Ohio	+	C	Bl; D; S	H, F, Wh
Monroe v. Pape	+	D	H, S	F <sup>1</sup>
Noto v. U. S.	+	H	Br, Wa; Bl	
Poe v. Ullman	-	F, Wa, C, Wh	Br	Bl; D, S; S; H, S
Pugach v. Dollinger	-	per curiam	Br	D, Wa
Scales v. U. S.	-	H		Bl; D; Br, Wa, D
Shelton v. Tucker	+	S		F, C, H, Wh; H, F, C, Wh
Silverman v. U. S.	+	S	D; C, Wh	
Smith v. Bennett	+	C		
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago	-	C		Wa, Bl, D, Br; D, Wa, Bl
Torcaso v. Watkins	+	Bl	F, H	
Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley	-	Wa	F, H	D
Uphaus v. Wyman	-	per curiam	Br	D, Wa, Bl; Bl, Wa, D
Wilkinson v. U. S.	-	S		Bl, Wa, D; D, Wa, Bl; Br, D
Wilson v. Schnettler	-	Wh	S	D, Wa, Br

KEY: I have arbitrarily assigned a + when the individual, for whatever reason, won his plea against governmental restriction. Bl, Wa, D=Black wrote opinion in which Warren and Douglas joined. H, Wh; F=Harlan wrote opinion joined by Whittaker; Frankfurter dissented separately.

<sup>1</sup> Concurring in part and dissenting in part.

## THE 1960 TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS\*

GLENDON SCHUBERT  
*Michigan State University*

Much recent research in the decision-making of the United States Supreme Court has been characterized by a pronounced emphasis upon the invocation of socio-psychological theory<sup>1</sup> and statistical methods of data processing<sup>2</sup> in lieu of exclusive reliance upon the legal-historical theory and methods typical of most research in this field of study. Symbolic of this development is the increasing tendency of political scientists to consider constitutional law as an aspect of political behavior as well as a branch of law, and correspondingly, to study the subject matter as judicial behavior. Naturally, this recent work has evinced a preoccupation with unidimensional analysis, since it is less complicated to work with one variable than with many, and the experience so gained no doubt is a prerequisite to multivariate study. Nevertheless, students who remain committed to the more traditional workways in constitutional law are quite right in insisting, as they

do, that most Supreme Court cases raise what at least appear *prima facie* to be many issues for decision, and that their more subjective and impressionistic mode of analysis retains the great virtue of not oversimplifying the rich complexity of many Supreme Court cases to the extent that inescapably seems to be required by the newer theories and methods. Clearly, further advances in the behavioral study of Supreme Court decision-making depend upon the development of multidimensional models of Court action, which will make possible the observation and measurement of interrelationships among the significant major variables that in combination provide the basis for an adequate explanation of the manifest differences in the voting and opinion behavior of the justices.

The purpose of this article is to describe one such multidimensional model of the Court, and to explain its theory and application to the empirical data of the most recent session of the United States Supreme Court, which terminated only a month prior to the time when this was written. Substantively, the purpose is to demonstrate that the psychological approach to be proposed leads to more significant, more comprehensible, and more valid insights into the political behavior of the Supreme Court than seem to be provided by the case-by-case approach—an approach that attempts to realize the same ends by the quite different means of a series of *précis* upon what are inevitably (since there must be some space limitations in professional journals) a fraction of the hundred-odd cases that the Court decides non-unanimously on the merits each term. The specific hypothesis to be tested is that most of the *variance* in the voting behavior of the justices can be accounted for by the differences in their individual attitudes toward a small number of fundamental issues of public policy. These public policy issues constitute the variables of this study.

### I. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL

Since both a general statement of the theory<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Schubert, "Psychometric Research in Judicial Behavior," *Modern Uses of Logic in Law*, Vol. 2 (March, 1962), and "A Psychometric Model of the Supreme Court," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 5 (November, 1961), pp. 14-18.

\* This article was prepared with the very substantial aid and assistance of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. In particular, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to John Gilbert, Staff Statistician, and to my colleague of the fellowship year 1960-61, Professor Clyde Coombs of the Department of Psychology of the University of Michigan.

<sup>1</sup> Harold J. Spaeth, "An Approach to the Study of Attitudinal Differences as an Aspect of Judicial Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (May, 1961), pp. 165-180; S. Sidney Ulmer, "Scaling Judicial Cases: A Methodological Note," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 4 (April, 1961), pp. 31-34, and also his "Homeostatic Tendencies in the United States Supreme Court," in Ulmer (ed.), *Introductory Readings in Political Behavior* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), pp. 167-188.

<sup>2</sup> Franklin M. Fisher, "On the Existence and Linearity of Perfect Predictors in 'Content Analysis'," *Modern Uses of Logic in Law*, Vol. 1 (March, 1960), pp. 1-9; Fred Kort, "The Quantitative Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 3 (March, 1960), pp. 11-14; Stuart Nagel, "Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions," *id.*, Vol. 4 (December, 1960), pp. 24-28; Joseph Tanenhaus, "Supreme Court Attitudes toward Federal Administrative Agencies," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (August, 1960), pp. 502-524.

and a technical description of the method<sup>4</sup> have been published elsewhere, only the essentials needed for comprehension of the substantive findings will be presented here. In accordance with modern psychometric theory,<sup>5</sup> which generalizes the basic stimulus-response point relationship, Supreme Court cases are treated as raw psychological data which embody the choices of the individual justices among a variety of stimuli. Each case before the Court for decision is conceptualized as being represented by a stimulus (*j*) point, which is located somewhere in a psychological space of the relevant dimensions, depending upon the number and intensity of issues that it raises. The combination of the attitudes of each justice toward these same issues also may be represented by an ideal (*i*) point, located in the same psychological space. In each decision of the Court, what is observed is the relationship between the *i*-point of each justice and the *j*-point for the case. The relationship that is measured is one of dominance; that is, whether the position of the *i*-point in the dimensions that define the space equals or exceeds, or is less than, the position of the *j*-point in these dimensions. Technically, an individual-compensatory composition model<sup>6</sup> is assumed: for an *i*-point to dominate a *j*-point, it is not essential that the individual equal or exceed the stimulus on *all* of the relevant dimensions, since an individual may (in appropriate instances) be able to compensate for his deficiency on one (or more) dimensions by an excess on other dimensions. To take a specific example, let us assume a simple two-dimensional space, where the relevant dimensions are judicial attitudes toward "civilian control over the military" and "*stare decisis*." A justice like Clark, whose attitude toward the civilian control variable was relatively negative or unsympathetic, might nevertheless be induced to vote in support of this value in a particular decision, because his relatively posi-

tive attitude toward *stare decisis* might lead him to follow a recent precedent, even though he had disagreed with the decision establishing it. Thus, his deficiency (in relationship to the degree of support for civil liberties demanded by the later case) might be compensated for by his strongly pro-*stare decisis* views. Conversely, a justice like Frankfurter, whose attitude toward civilian control was more positive than Clark's, might nevertheless vote against this value because of his slight regard for the value of *stare decisis*.<sup>7</sup>

Next let us consider the conjoint relationship between the *i*-points of all nine justices, assuming full participation in the decision, and a particular *j*-point. Obviously, how the case will be decided will depend upon whether a majority or a minority of the *i*-points dominate the *j*-point. If a majority of *i*-points dominate, then the value or values raised by the case will be upheld or supported by the decision "of the Court"; and if, to the contrary, the *j*-point dominates a majority of the *i*-points, then the value or values raised by the case will be rejected—"the Court" will refuse to support them. To take a concrete example, let us assume the general value "civil liberty," and the specific question whether "the Fourteenth Amendment requires" the Supreme Court to reverse a state court conviction of a criminal defendant, based in part upon evidence procured as the result of an unreasonable search or seizure. According to the theory proposed, it would be assumed that the *i*-points of no more than three justices dominated the *j*-point representing this issue at the time of the decision in *Wolf v. Colorado*,<sup>8</sup> and that no more than four did so throughout the following decade. As a consequence of Stewart's appointment and of Black's explicitly avowed shift in attitude toward this issue, a majority of *i*-points did dominate when the issue arose once again for disposition in a decision announced on the closing decision day of the 1960 Term; and consequently, *Wolf v. Colorado* was overruled.<sup>9</sup> Actually, the voting division

<sup>4</sup> Schubert, "A Solution to the Indeterminate Factorial Resolution of Thurstone and Degan's Study of the Supreme Court," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 7 (Forthcoming, 1962).

<sup>5</sup> Clyde H. Coombs and Richard C. Kao, "On a Connection between Factor Analysis and Multidimensional Unfolding," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 25 (September, 1960), pp. 219-231; J. P. Guilford, "Factorial Angles to Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 68 (January, 1961), pp. 1-20; and especially Coombs, *A Theory of Data* (forthcoming), chs. 1, 11, and 12.

<sup>6</sup> Warren S. Torgerson, *Theory and Methods of Scaling* (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 352-359; Coombs, *op cit.*, ch. 12.

<sup>7</sup> See *Kinsella v. Singleton*, 361 U. S. 234; *Grisham v. Hagan*, 361 U. S. 278; *McElroy v. Guagliardo*, and *Wilson v. Bohlender*, 361 U. S. 281; all decided January 18, 1960. Cf. Schubert, "Attitudes towards Civilian Control and *Stare Decisis* in the Warren Court," in Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making*, Vol. IV in the series of International Yearbooks in Political Behavior Research (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Forthcoming, 1962).

<sup>8</sup> 338 U. S. 25 (1949).

<sup>9</sup> *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U. S. 643 (June 19, 1961).

in *Mapp v. Ohio* was 6-3, with Clark both supplying the extra favorable vote and writing the opinion of the Court; Clark's position should have occasioned no surprise, however, because it was in precise accord with the intention that he had announced seven years earlier.<sup>10</sup> Clark considered himself bound by the *Wolf* precedent unless and until a majority could be formed that would agree to overrule that decision—an event that was forestalled for several more years, apparently, by Black's idiosyncratic blind-spot for the Fourth Amendment.

We can now consider an operational definition of the Court's decision-making. In one dimension, the voting division of the Court is precisely determined by the intersection of the *j*-point with a line along which are arrayed the *i*-points of the justices. (This definition, it should be noted, is the one which applies for cumulative [or Guttman] scaling of Supreme Court cases.) In two dimensions, a decision is determined by the line orthogonal to the *j*-point vector; all justices whose *i*-points fall on the orthogonal line, or beyond it (in the positive direction of the variable) will vote in support of the value, and the remaining justices whose *i*-points lie on the negative side of the line will vote to reject it; while unanimous decisions occur, of course, when all *i*-points lie on, or on the positive side of, the orthogonal line, or else all *i*-points lie on the negative side of this line. In three dimensions, the decision is determined by the plane which intersects the space orthogonally to the *j*-point vector; and more generally, in *r*-dimensions by a hyperplane of *r*-1 dimensionality which intersects the *r*-dimensional space in a similar manner.

Thus, we conceive of both *i*-points representing the composite attitudes of individual justices, and *j*-points, representing the composite issues raised by individual cases, as sets of vectors terminating in points, each with a unique position in the same psychological space. Hereinafter we shall assume that this space is three-dimensional, since we shall work in three-space in the empirical application which follows. Cases in a set which raises questions of differing degrees of valuation about the same variable (*e.g.*, sympathy for the constitutional claims of the right to counsel in state criminal trials) are located at various points in the space, but in an approximately linear relationship to each other; thus, each such point may be conceived of as lying upon or near a scale axis, representing the sub-variable, which transects the space. Through the centroid of a

set of scale axes, representing a set of civil liberties sub-variables, would pass an axis representing a broadly defined heterogeneous major variable (such as "all civil liberties" issues for a given term); and this scale axis would follow the trace of the mean of the projections from all of the relevant *j*-points. But the *i*-points also project upon any scale axis; and therefore, a one-dimensional solution for the Court's decision-making function may be achieved by measuring the relationship between the projections from *j*-points and from *i*-points upon a scale axis representing any variable that is of interest. This, in effect, is precisely what is happening, in theory, when an analyst constructs a cumulative scale of a set of decisions that are postulated as pertaining to a single dominant variable, and positions the scale as an axis in the space. It is apparent that if the model is adapted for analysis invoking this particular definition of the decision-making function, as we shall do in the discussion which follows, the Court's decision-making is still being measured in unidimensional terms. But the model itself is multidimensional and, as we shall demonstrate, makes possible measurement of the interrelationship among several variables within a common frame of reference; and moreover, there is every reason to suppose that further research, and subsequent work with the model, will lead to the development of mathematical refinements corresponding to the multidimensional conceptions of the decision-making function given in the operational definition above.

In order to utilize the model that has been described, what we require are procedures to locate both *i*-points and *j*-points in three-dimensional space, and to measure the dominance relationship for any dyad, with each dyad consisting of a *j*-point and an *i*-point. Factor analysis affords a readily available technique for locating the set of *i*-points for a given set of decisions, such as a term of the Court, in a fixed spatial configuration. But the raw data come in a form that preclude the use of factor analysis, at least in the same manner, in order to locate the *j*-points. The reason for this is that, in a typical recent term, the Court divides in about a hundred decisions on the merits. Consequently it is possible to make a relatively large number of observations—about 100—of the location of a relatively small number of *i*-points—never more than 9. But more than 9 observations of the location of any specific *j*-point are never possible, because there are never more than 9 votes recorded in a single case. One hundred observations are ample to locate the *i*-points, by factor analytic tech-

<sup>10</sup> Concurring opinion in *Irvine v. California*, 347 U. S. 128, 138-139 (1954).

niques, with considerable precision; but nine observations are far too few to permit the same thing to be done for *j*-points. As we shall exemplify presently, factor analysis is essentially a statistical method for breaking down a correlation matrix into its principal component elements; and it can never be more reliable than the matrix upon which it feeds. No single Supreme Court decision contains enough votes to allow the computation of reliable correlation coefficients. If we had a hundred justices participating in the decision of each of, say, a dozen cases in the typical term, factor analysis could serve very well to locate a configuration of *j*-points, but it would then be incapable of locating the *i*-points. If there were a hundred justices participating in the decision of a hundred or more cases in each term, factor analysis could be used to locate both types of points with what ought to be good precision. This implies that the model here described may very well find application for study of the attitudes of United States Senators or for state legislators, as well as for other smaller decision-making groups like the Supreme Court.

Although it is not possible to locate *j*-points in the space as precisely as *i*-points, at least by factor analysis, it is possible to locate sets of *j*-points in the same space with the *i*-points. This is done by cumulative scaling of sets of cases. Each cumulative scale measures the one-dimensional alignment of the attitudes of the justices towards a single variable. If most of the Court's decisions can be associated with a set of cumulative scales, and if the set of scales can be passed through the space as axes in such a way that the projections from the *i*-points on the scale axes are consistent with the alignments of the justices on the cumulative scales, then it will be assumed that the scale axes are indeed the counterparts of their analogue cumulative scales; and that the variance in the voting behavior of the justices is adequately accounted for by the manifest differences in the attitudes of the justices towards the cumulative scale variables. The procedure for fitting scales in the factor space will be explained in greater detail in connection with specific empirical data, in a later section of this article.

## II. THE UNIVERSE OF RAW DATA

The sample of decisions to be analyzed consists of all cases in which the Supreme Court divided on the merits during the period of the 1960 Term, which extended from October 10, 1960 through June 19, 1961. Both formal and *per curiam* decisions accordingly are included, but unanimous and jurisdictional decisions were excluded. As Table I indicates, almost

TABLE I. SUMMARY OF DECISIONS ON THE MERITS, 1960 TERM

Decision	Formal	Per curiam	Totals
Split	87	12	99
Unanimous	34	41	75
Totals	121	53	174

three-fourths of the Court's formal decisions were reached over the disagreement of one or more justices, while this was true of less than one-fourth of the *per curiam* decisions. These results were in line with previous experience. It has not been unusual either, in recent years, for the justices to disagree in a majority of their decisions on the merits, as they did during the 1960 Term. The average annual number of split decisions over the past fifteen terms was 97, and the average number of unanimous decisions on the merits was 79; in this respect, the 1960 Term was quite typical.

For purposes of this study, each case, to which the Court had assigned a unique docket number and for which the Court had made a disposition on the merits, was a unit for voting analysis. As a unit of content, the docketed case offers the advantages of being specifically and uniquely identifiable, and of providing what with very rare exceptions is an unambiguous basis for voting attribution which can readily be replicated by other analysts. (Those familiar with earlier studies of judicial voting behavior will recognize that some scholars have worked with less explicit units of measurement, such as the "opinion of the Court" or the "decision" of the Court.) There are also disadvantages to the use of the case as a unit, but none relevant to the empirical data with which we presently are concerned.

For each case, one set of nine votes was counted. In each of eleven cases, one justice did not participate in the decision on the merits; and in one other, two justices did not. There were also two Federal Employers' Liability Act evidentiary cases and one Jones Act case in which Frankfurter, according to his custom,<sup>11</sup> persisted in jurisdictional dissent at the time when his colleagues voted on the merits; these three jurisdictional dissents were classified as non-participations, for purposes of the present analysis. Eight votes could not be specified, in one case in which the Court di-

<sup>11</sup> See Schubert, "Policy without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 14 [(March, 1962), pp. 284-327].

vided equally, without opinion. After these non-participations and unspecifiable votes were deducted, a total of 867 votes remained; they constituted the basis for the factor analysis and the cumulative scaling.

### III. THE FACTOR ANALYSIS

*Computation of the Correlation Matrix.* The initial task in any factor analysis is the construction of a correlation matrix. In the present study, the correlation matrix was based upon a set of four-fold tables which, in turn, were constructed directly from the 867 votes just described. These votes were tabulated to show the totals of agreement and disagreement with the majority, in the decision of each case, for every pair of justices. For any such pair, each case holds five possibilities: (1) both may agree in the majority; (2) both may agree in dissent; (3) the first member of the pair may vote with the majority, while the second dissents; (4) the second member of the pair may vote with the majority, while the first dissents; or (5) either or both members may fail to participate, in which event there is no score for the pair for that case. In the tabulation of votes for the factor analysis, no attention is paid to the substantive variables to which the decisions relate; the sole criterion for the attribution of votes in each case is agreement or disagreement with the majority.

It is most convenient to arrange the summary tabulation of agreement-disagreement, for each judicial dyad, in the form of a four-fold table such as Table II. The table shows that Black and Douglas dissented together 29 times; this dis/dis (-/-) cell is the one that contains the kind of information utilized in some

earlier studies<sup>12</sup> of "dissenting blocs" of the Court. Similarly, Black and Douglas agreed in 70 of these 98 sets of votes; this is the sum of the major or positive diagonal (*i.e.*, the +/+ and the -/- cells), and this is the kind of information that was the basis for the "inter-agreement" bloc analysis of the studies just cited. The weakness of these earlier approaches was that, by concentrating upon the *agreement* between pairs of justices, the analysts ignored what is at least an equally important aspect of judicial voting behavior, *i.e.*, the *ways in which justices disagree*. Table II, for instance, shows that not only did Douglas and Black disagree in over a fourth of these decisions, they tended to disagree in a particular way. In over 80 per cent of these instances of disagreement, it was Douglas who dissented while Black adhered to the majority. This finding certainly suggests that Douglas was more extreme in his dissenting behavior than Black (or, as we shall observe presently in Table III, than any other member of the Court during this term). Moreover, the correlation coefficients, which are computed from the four-fold tables, are very sensitive to how votes are partitioned between the two cells of a diagonal, as well as to differences between the diagonals.

In order to measure precisely the relationship among the four cells of a four-fold table, phi correlation coefficients are computed.<sup>13</sup> In

<sup>12</sup> C. Herman Pritchett, *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947* (New York, 1948); Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959).

<sup>13</sup> The phi coefficient is an approximation of the Pearsonian *r* correlation coefficient, and is appropriate to use when, as here, the two distributions to be correlated reflect a genuine dichotomy. The phi coefficient is relatively simple to compute: it is the ratio of the difference of the cross-products of the diagonals of a four-fold table, to the square root of the product of the marginals. For the data of Table II,

$$\begin{aligned} r_{\phi} &= \frac{(41 \cdot 29) - (23 \cdot 5)}{[(46) \cdot (52) \cdot (64) \cdot (34)]^{1/2}} \\ (1) \quad &= \frac{1189 - 115}{(5204992)^{1/2}} \\ &= + \frac{1074}{2281.445} = +.471. \end{aligned}$$

Evidently, the sign of the coefficient depends upon which diagonal cross-product is the larger; or, in other words, upon whether or not a pair of justices agree more often than they disagree, and *also* upon whether they agree both in assent and in dissent, *i.e.*, whether their disagreement is divided

TABLE II. FOUR-FOLD TABLE OF AGREEMENT-DISAGREEMENT, DOUGLAS-BLACK, 1960 TERM\*

	Black		Totals
	+	-	
Douglas	+ 41	5	46
	- 23	29	52
Totals	64	34	98

\* The total of joint votes counted for this dyad is 98 rather than 99, although both Black and Douglas participated in all split decisions on the merits during this term, because of the lack of any objective basis for identifying the partition of the votes in the one case, already noted, in which the Court divided equally.

he correlation matrix shown in Table III, phi ranges from +.745 (for Harlan and Frankfurter) to -.602 (for Douglas and Harlan). Harlan, therefore, was the most extreme justice in the range of his agreement and disagreement; and he voted most frequently the same as Frankfurter, and least often in agreement with Douglas.

Since there are nine justices on the Court, there are four-fold tables and correlation coefficients for each of thirty-six dyads.<sup>14</sup> For purposes of this study, all data were placed on punch cards, and both the computation of phi coefficients and the factor analysis were programmed for computer analysis.<sup>15</sup> Since both matrices are symmetrical, and in order to conserve space, Table III presents the four-fold tables above the major diagonal, and the correlation coefficients below.

Before turning to the results of the factor

analysis, equally or disproportionately between the cells of the diagonals. The maximum range of the phi coefficient is from +1 to -1; but these limits rarely are attained empirically, since the maximum size of phi is a function of the distribution of the marginals, and can be  $\pm 1$  only when all four marginal frequencies are equal. See Edward E. Cureton, "Note on  $\phi/\phi_{\max}$ ," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 24 (March, 1959), pp. 89-91.

<sup>14</sup> When factor analysis is performed by hand use of a calculator instead of utilizing a computer program, it is necessary to arrange the correlation coefficients in the form of a square symmetrical matrix, with the major diagonal filled with the estimates of the highest communality for each justice. For the techniques of factor analysis the interested reader is referred to any of the several standard works on this subject, e.g., Benjamin Fruchter, *Introduction to Factor Analysis* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1954); Raymond B. Cattell, *Factor Analysis: An Introduction and Manual for the Psychologist and Social Scientist* (New York: Harper, 1952); Louis L. Thurstone, *Multiple-Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947).

<sup>15</sup> I am indebted to John P. Gilbert for developing a program for the computation of the phi coefficients, and also one for the computation of the factorial distances discussed in the final section of this paper. The computer program for the IBM 650 utilized was *Centroid Factor Analysis*, Ident. No. SU-4524, written by Jonathan E. Robbins (April, 1957), developed and tested by the Watson Scientific Computing Laboratory, Columbia University, and modified by Mr. Gilbert, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford (multilithed).

analysis of the correlation matrix, some interesting findings may be observed from a mere inspection of Table III. The most obvious is the sharp demarcation of the justices into what appear to be two opposing blocs. Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan all correlate positively with each other, and negatively with the five remaining justices. With the exception of Stewart's marginally negative correlation with Clark, these remaining five justices—Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Clark, and Stewart—all correlate positively with each other, and negatively with the first group. Stewart clearly was the most independent member of the Court in his voting behavior: his highest correlation with any other justice, in either direction, was less than .35; and his voting was almost perfectly independent, statistically, from what are otherwise the most marginal members of each group, since his correlation was approximately -.03 with both Brennan and Clark. As the four-fold tables indicate, Black and Warren often dissented together, as did Frankfurter and Harlan also; but neither Black nor Warren ever joined either Frankfurter or Harlan in dissent. It is obvious that these two pairs of justices, and the respective groups with which each tended to associate, were in pretty sharp and basic disagreement over something; and unless we are prepared to accept the somewhat fatuous notion that they couldn't get together over the meaning or application of the principle of *stare decisis*, as some students of the Court seem to believe,<sup>16</sup> then it may not be implausible to entertain the hypothesis that these groups may have been in disagreement about the social, economic, and political values that the Court upholds in its decisions.

*The Factor Loadings.* The initial product of a factor analysis is a set of derived correlations (or "loadings," as they customarily are called) which purport to measure the extent to which each element, of whatever has been associated in the correlation matrix, is related to the components or dimensions into which the basic correlation matrix has been broken down. In the present study, the elements are the justices, and the factor loadings purport to express the correlation of each justice with the basic underlying dimensions of the phi matrix. Although it is technically possible to extract as many factors as there are elements intercorrelated in the phi matrix—nine, in the instant case—only six factors actually were computed, and of these, only three will be used for purposes of testing

<sup>16</sup> E.g., Fred Kort in this *REVIEW*, Vol. 54 (December, 1960), p. 1000.

TABLE III. FOUR-FOLD TABLES AND PHI CORRELATION MATRIX, 1960 TERM

	D	Bl		Wa		Br		S		C		Wh		F		H	
		+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
D		+ 41	5	42	4	44	2	31	14	23	22	20	26	16	23	20	25
		- 23	29	31	21	33	19	43	6	51	1	45	7	47	3	50	1
Bl	.471			+ 61	3	58	6	41	19	40	23	32	32	31	26	37	26
				- 12	22	19	15	33	1	34	0	33	1	32	0	33	0
Wa	.363		.655			+ 69	4	51	18	50	22	41	32	39	26	45	26
						- 8	17	23	2	24	1	24	1	24	0	25	0
Br	.392		.403		.664			+ 57	16	55	21	45	32	44	25	49	26
								- 17	4	19	2	20	1	19	1	21	0
S	-.230		-.337		-.195		-.029			+ 56	18	52	22	51	15	56	17
										- 15	4	11	9	10	9	11	8
C	-.551		-.410		-.273		-.175		-.031			+ 56	18	55	14	59	14
												- 9	14	8	11	11	12
Wh	-.455		-.474		-.367		-.319		.133		.331			+ 51	12	53	11
														- 12	14	17	15
F	-.578		-.481		-.390		-.287		.228		.343		.348			+ 58	5
																- 4	20
H	-.602		-.441		-.362		-.322		.171		.317		.315		.745		

the principal hypothesis. The reason for so limiting the number of factors is two-fold: (1) the residual matrix, representing the amount of variance unaccounted for by the first three factors, was very small, and less, indeed, than the estimated error variance; and (2) most readers of this REVIEW are accustomed to thinking in terms of three-dimensional space, and three factors can be given an Euclidean graphical representation which accords with the spatial intuitions, and therefore the comprehension, of most readers.

The usual procedure in factor analysis is to rotate the orthogonal factor axes, which are the direct product of a complete centroid routine, to oblique positions that are presumed to correspond to some criterion related to empirical reality, and thus to make possible a more mean-

ingful psychological interpretation than would usually be possible if the orthogonal axes were retained.<sup>17</sup> The orthogonal axes have not been

<sup>17</sup> Perhaps it should be noted, for the benefit of readers not familiar with the method, that orthogonal axes are statistically independent while oblique axes are correlated with each other therefore, making a factor interpretation based directly upon a system of orthogonal axes implies an assumption that there is no relationship among the factors, which must be conceived to be independent of each other. Applied to the present data, this would involve the assumption that there was no relationship, at least in the minds of the justices, among the major issues of public policy toward which they responded in their voting.



rotated in the present study, but for the reason that, contrary to the usual procedure, no reliance is placed upon the association of substantive meaning with the factors. Substantive meaning is associated, instead, with the scale axes which are passed through the space defined by the orthogonal factor axes; and thus the scale axes—which are oblique—perform the same function, for purposes of interpretation, that is usually accomplished by rotation of the orthogonal axes. The orthogonal axes are used, therefore, only as a set of reference axes to define the three-dimensional space in which the *i*-points of the justices and the *j*-points of the cases are located. And the factor loadings, shown in Table IV, function as Cartesian coordinates which locate the *i*-points of the justices in the factor space.

Factor loadings can vary, in principle, from +1 to -1; in practice, their variance is bounded by the extremity of the correlation coefficients upon which they are based. It will be observed that, on the average, the highest loadings (both positive and negative) are on the first factor, and that the mean magnitude of the third factor loadings is smallest. This is inherent in the centroid routine, which assumes that the first factor, to which the largest portion of the variance is attributed, is the most important factor, and so on. The loadings on the first factor range from a high of approximately +.77, for Black, to a low of -.74, for Frankfurter. Evidently, the justices are partitioned on the first factor into the same two groups that were manifest in the phi matrix; but evidently also the groupings on the second and third factors are quite different. Mere inspection of the factor matrix of Table IV suggests that the multidimensional relationships among the justices are going to be somewhat different, and certainly more complex, than the simple bifurcation of a single dimension which

will account for much, but not enough, of the variance in the voting behavior of the justices. For a fuller understanding than a single dimension—even when it is overwhelmingly the most important one—can afford, we must turn to an examination of relationships made possible by work with the three-dimensional factor space.

#### IV. THE CUMULATIVE SCALES

Cumulative scaling is a research operation completely independent of the factor analysis, and so may be undertaken before, at the same time, or after the factor analysis is completed. In cumulative (or Guttman) scaling, the same universe of raw data is used as for the factor analysis. But instead of tabulating votes by dyads and in terms of agreement with the majority, for scaling purposes votes are tabulated by cases, and are classified as being either in support of, or in opposition to, certain defined scale variables. The variables employed here were identified on the basis of experimental work in previous terms of the Warren Court. The basic procedures for cumulative scaling have been discussed elsewhere,<sup>18</sup> although the format of Figures 1-3, below, differs somewhat in the presentation of results.

Consistent votes in support of the scale variable are denoted by the symbol  $x$ , and inconsistent positive votes by  $\underline{x}$ . A blank space indicates a consistent negative vote, and the symbol  $-$  is used to signify an inconsistent negative vote. An asterisk signifies non-participation. Scale scores are simple functions of scale positions, and a justice's scale position is defined as being fixed by his last consistent positive vote. Where one or more non-participations separate a justice's consistent positive and negative votes, his scale position is assumed to be at the midpoint of the non-participation or non-participations, since it cannot be determined how he might have voted. A justice's scale score is computed by the formula:

$$(2) \quad s = \frac{2p}{n} - 1,$$

where  $s$  is his scale score,  $p$  his scale position, and  $n$  equals the number of cases in the scale. Scale scores, like correlation coefficients and factor loadings, can range in value from +1 to -1, with the significant difference in practice that scale scores frequently attain these extreme values, reflecting the extremity of attitude of several of the justices in each of the scales shown in Figures 1-3.

*The C Scale.* Figure 1 is a cumulative scale of

<sup>18</sup> Schubert, *op. cit.* note 12 *supra*, pp. 270-290.

TABLE IV. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR JUDICIAL IDEAL-POINTS, 1960 TERM

Justices	Factors:		
	I	II	III
D	.754	.283	.170
Bl	.769	-.259	-.130
Wa	.699	-.456	.089
Br	.578	-.298	.291
S	-.289	.126	.363
Wh	-.571	.065	-.108
H	-.714	-.373	.226
F	-.736	-.338	.270
C	-.519	-.245	-.309

1960 TERM									
C Scale.									
Cases	Justices								Totals
	D	Bl	Wa	Br	S	Wh	F	H	C
5/762	x								1-8
6/308	x								1-8
6/420	x								1-8
6/582	x								1-8
4/778:200	x	x							2-7
5/265	x	x					*		2-6
4/507	-	x	x						2-7
4/611	-	x	x						2-7
5/458	x	-	x						2-7
4/388	x	x	x						3-6
3370:685	x	x	x						3-6
4839:122	x	x	x						3-6
5/381	x	-	x	x					3-6
4/372	x	x	x	x					4-5
4/426	x	x	x	x					4-5
5/43	x	x	x	x					4-5
5/301:70	x	x	x	x					4-5
5/301:179	x	x	x	x					4-5
5/399	x	x	x	x					4-5
5/431	x	x	x	x					4-5
6/36	x	x	x	x					4-5
6/82	x	x	x	x					4-5
6/117	x	x	x	x					4-5
4581:1	x	x	x	x					4-5
4623:12	x	x	x	x					4-5
4719:486	x	x	x	x					4-5
6/617	x	-	-	x	x				3-6
6/599	x	-	-	x	x				4-5
4/587	x	x	x	-	x		x		4-5
4/479:14	x	x	x	x	x				5-4
4/479:83	x	x	x	x	x				5-4
5/85	x	x	x	x	x				5-4
5/551	x	x	x	x	x				5-4
6/1	x	x	x	x	x				5-4
4694:233	x	x	x	x	x				5-4
4842:161	x	x	x	x	x		x		6-3
5/715	x	x	x	x	x				6-3
4798:236	x	x	x	x	x			x	6-3
4/631	x	x	x	x	x	x			6-3
5/312	x	x	x	x	x	x			6-3
6/213	x	x	x	x	x	x			6-3
6/418	x	x	x	x	*	x			5-3
4703:238	x	x	x	x	-	x			5-4
4754:4	x	x	x	x	x	x			7-2
4577:669	x	x	x	x	-	x		x	6-3
4/350	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	6-3
5/534	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	7-2
4/454	x	x	x	x	-	-	x	x	7-2
4687:181	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x	7-2
5/610	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		8-1
5/167	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8-1
Totals	49-2	43-8	43-8	38-13	20-30	10-41	7-44	6-44	221-236
Scale positions	51	47	45	39	26	13	6	1	457
Scale scores	1.00	.84	.76	.53	-.02	-.49	-.76	-.96	
$R = 1 - \frac{22}{403} = .945$ $S = 1 - \frac{23}{79} = .709$									

FIGURE 1. Judicial Attitudes towards Civil Liberties, 1960 Term\*

\* In Figures 1-3, cases are cited in either of two ways. Those decided prior to June, 1961, are cited to the official *United States Reports*: the digit preceding the slash bar is the third digit of the volume number, and should be read as though preceded, in each case, by the digits 36; the number following the slash bar is the page cite; and if more than one case begins on the same page, a docket number follows the page cite, separated from it

the 51 civil liberties cases that the Court decided by divided votes on the merits during the 1960 Term. In content, the *C* variable was defined broadly to include all cases in which the primary issue involved a conflict between personal rights and claims to liberty, and governmental authority. The number of cases included in the scale—over half of the total—was somewhat larger than in other recent terms; but the ranking of justices on the scale was very similar to that of the 1959 Term, and precisely the same as in 1958, which was Stewart's first term on the Court.

The scale accords with common knowledge that Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan are more sympathetic to civil liberties claims than the other members of the present Court. But there are definite gradations among the attitudes of these four "libertarian" justices toward the civil liberties claims of this term, and the scale distance separating Douglas and Brennan is just as great as the scale distance separating Whittaker and Clark. The mean rate of support for civil liberties claims of the four justices with high positive scale scores (the liberals on this issue) is 85%; the mean rate of opposition for the four justices with high negative scale scores (the conservatives on this issue) is 86%. This differentiation of the Warren Court into a set of liberal justices and a much more conservative group agrees with Pritchett's

by a colon. Official citations are not available, at the time this is written, for cases decided during the final three weeks of the term; such cases are cited to Volume 29 of *United States Law Week, Supreme Court Section*, with a four-digit page number followed by the docket number.

Two coefficients appear at the bottom of each scale; they purport to measure the degree of consistency in the set of votes being scaled. *R* is Guttman's coefficient of reproducibility; .900 or better is conventionally accepted as evidence to support the hypothesis that a single dominant variable has motivated the voting behavior of the justices in the set of cases comprising the sample. *S* is Menzel's coefficient of scalability; it provides a more rigid standard than *R*, because *S* (unlike *R*) does not capitalize upon the spurious contribution to consistency that arises from the inclusion in the scale of either cases or justices with extreme marginal distributions. Menzel has suggested that the appropriate level of acceptance for *S* is "somewhere between .60 and .65"; the scales presented in Figures 1-3 are well above the suggested, minimal levels of acceptability for both *R* and *S*. See Herbert Menzel, "A New Coefficient for Scalogram Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (1953), pp. 268-280.

findings for the Vinson Court,<sup>19</sup> except that Frankfurter now appears as a conservative rather than as an exponent of "libertarian restraint."

It is certainly noteworthy that Douglas, over a wide range of specific issues, supported civil liberties claims in all except two out of fifty-one cases. His two inconsistent (and C-) votes both came in cases that raised technical questions of procedure relating to the statutory rights of federal criminal defendants, in cases where another variable (J-: Supreme Court deference to lower courts) also was present. Douglas was the only justice to dissent alone against C- decisions of the Court; and his four solitary C+ dissents identify him as the justice most sympathetic to civil liberties claims. At the opposite extreme was Clark, who found only five civil liberties claims, out of the total of fifty-one, sufficiently persuasive to gain his vote. Moreover, four of Clark's five C+ votes were inconsistencies, suggesting that in these cases he may have been motivated by his attitudes toward other variables than C; there is, of course, little empirical basis for assuming that all justices perceive all issues raised by cases in the same way, or that any justice's voting behavior will be perfectly consistent. The Guttman model assumes that if in a particular scale most respondents are highly consistent most of the time, it is reasonable to infer that they are predominately motivated by their differential attachments to a common value. And it is in precise accord with the assumptions of the "individual-compensatory composition model," mentioned earlier, that a justice may, in some decisions, compensate for his lack of sympathy for, say, civil liberties by his strong attachment to other appropriate values that he may perceive to be present in the decisions. This theory seems to provide a plausible explanation for Clark's inconsistencies. His most inconsistent votes, for instance, came in two cases, *Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority*, 365 U.S. 715 (April 17, 1961), and *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643 (June 19, 1961), where he joined C+ majorities against the dissents of Harlan, Frankfurter and Whitaker. The first case involved racial discrimination in a restaurant in a publicly owned building; and the second was the decision, already mentioned, which overruled *Wolf v. Colorado*. In both cases, Clark's strong attachment to *stare decisis* appeared to overcome his basically C- attitude sufficiently to cause him to support the majority, although such a consideration obviously did not forestall the more activ-

ist conservatives from voting as their convictions about libertarian claims dictated.

The key decision-maker in C cases during the 1960 Term, however, was Stewart, whose propensity to function as the swing man in an otherwise well-balanced Court was sufficiently obvious to attract journalistic comment.<sup>20</sup> Although Stewart tied with Clark for inconsistency with four such votes, he nevertheless voted consistently over 90 per cent of the time, and his scale score of -.02 indicates the close balance of his voting on civil liberties issues. Stewart was in the majority far more often than any of his colleagues, dissenting in only seven of the fifty cases in which he participated; and in nineteen 5-4 decisions, Stewart's vote was determinative. Slightly less than half (43 per cent) of the cases on the scale were decided C+, but the failure of the cases to break evenly cannot be attributed to Stewart. The division between C plus and minus decisions would have corresponded precisely to Stewart's scale position, except for the inconsistent negative votes of Black, Warren and Brennan, in the bottom three C- cases near the middle of the scale. Brennan's inconsistency is of no particular interest; it occurred in a routine case of statutory interpretation involving the imposition of multiple sentences upon a federal criminal defendant. But the Black and Warren inconsistencies appeared in two of the "Sunday Closing Law Cases," *Gallagher v. Crown Koshier Super Market*, 366 U.S. 617, and *Braunfeld v. Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, both decided in May 29, 1961. Many dispassionate observers will agree that the Black and Warren votes in these cases to uphold the constitutionality of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania "blue laws," which upheld the principle of majority transgression of both the religious and the economic claims of the defendants, were clearly illiberal; and the fact that such votes appear as inconsistencies in the C scale should enhance confidence in the proposition that the C scale provides an adequate general measure of the civil libertarian sympathies of the justices.

*The E Scale.* One finding, which has resulted from applying the research approach of this paper to a much longer period—fifteen terms—has been that political scientists have been living with a somewhat distorted image of the Court during the past two decades. The pronounced emphasis upon the Court's civil liberties decisions,<sup>21</sup> reflecting, perhaps, the no-

<sup>20</sup> *Time*, Vol. 77 (June 16, 1961), p. 18.

<sup>21</sup> This emphasis is reflected, for example in Pritchett, *ibid.*, p. viii; and in Robert McCloskey, "Deeds Without Doctrines: Civil Rights in the 1960 Term," in this issue of this REVIEW, above,

<sup>19</sup> *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 227.

doubt laudable bias with which students of the Court approached their subject, has tended to obscure the significance of the Court's decisions relating to *economic* liberalism. The usual impression that one receives from reading the literature is that the traumatic events of 1937 resolved the problems of economic liberalism for our generation; and that since that time, the economic liberalism of the New Deal has motivated at least a clear majority of successively later Courts in supplanting the economically conservative precedents established by a majority of the "Nine Old Men" and their predecessors of the Taft Court. The real issues of public policy on the Court, it has seemed, have related to civil rights and liberties. But a careful and systematic examination of all of the Court's decisions on the merits contradicts the impression that the Court is preoccupied with questions of constitutional interpretation, and that statutory interpretation—which the economic cases characteristically involve—is a policy making function of lesser importance to the court.

Taking the decade of the 1950's as the most relevant recent sample, there were more cases on the E scale than on the C scale in half of the terms. Specifically, there were more E than C cases in both the 1958 and 1959 Terms, so the clear preponderance of C cases in the 1960 Term is atypical. Counting, of course, is no substitute for thinking; and a quantitative measure of the relative importance of the Court's decision-making on the issues of civil liberty and economic liberalism does not foreclose a qualitative judgment on this question. But the mere assumption that constitutional questions are qualitatively more important than statutory questions is no proof; and absent acceptable criteria in terms of which it can be demonstrated that the Court's civil liberties questions generally—not just the School Segregation Cases—have had a greater impact upon American society during the past two decades than have the Court's decisions involving economic issues, it does not seem too unreasonable to accept at least tentatively findings based upon quantitative criteria.

In content, the E scale is just as broadly and heterogeneously defined as the C scale. The

pp. 71-89. In his series of annual survey articles on constitutional law, published in this REVIEW during the decade 1952-61, David Fellman allocates three-fourths of the approximate 370 pages, in which he discussed civil liberties, economic, and taxation issues, to what are here denominated C scale cases, and the remaining one-fourth to E and F scale cases.

1960 TERM											
E Scale											
Cases	Justices									Totals	
	D	Bl	Wa	Br	C	H	S	F	Wh		
6/169	x									1	8
5/320	x	x								2	7
4/441	x	x						*		2	6
4614:284	x	x								2	7
4618:306	x	x								2	7
4618:307	x	x								2	7
4713:392	x	x								2	7
4743:97	x	x	x	x						4	5
5/705	x	x	x	x				*		4	4
4/325	x	x	x	x	x			*		5	3
4/520	x	x	x	x	x			x		6	3
5/1:45	x	x	x	x	x				x	6	3
5/1:46	x	x	x	x	x				x	6	3
5/336	x	x	x	x	x				x	6	3
6/316	x	x	x	x	*	*				4	3
6/276	-	x	x	x	x	x				5	4
5/731	x	x	x	x	x	x				6	3
4/642	-	x	x	x	x	x	*			5	3
5/160	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	*		6	2
5/667:64	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	6	2
5/667:85	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	6	2
5/695	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	6	2
5/705	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	6	2
5/651	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	7	1
6/28	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	*	*	6	3
										113	100
Totals	23-2	24-1	18-7	17-8	11-13	9-15	6-18	2-14	3-22	213	
Scale positions	25	24	18	18	16	10½	7½	4	0		
Scale scores	1.00	.92	.44	.44	.28	-.16	-.40	-.68	-1.00		
$R = 1 - \frac{13}{196} = .934 \quad S = 1 - \frac{13}{49} = .735$											

FIGURE 2. Judicial Attitudes towards Economic Liberalism, 1960 Term

basic value that permeates the issues of economic liberalism is that of favoring claims of underprivileged economic interests as against those of affluence and monopoly power. Thus, E+ is pro-labor in union-management conflicts, pro-small business as against big business, pro-competition and anti-oligopoly, pro-governmental economic regulation "in the public interest" of special, "private" economic interests, and, most characteristically, economic liberalism means to favor the claims of injured railroad workers and seamen against their corporate employers and insurers.

As Figure 2 shows, the four justices who are civil libertarians are also the ones who score highest on the E scale. But the remaining five members of the Court vote quite differently upon the two kinds of issues. Clark, who was least sympathetic to civil liberties, appears in the role of an economic liberal, scoring only slightly lower than Warren and Brennan, and definitely emerging as the fulcrum of the Court on E issues. Nor is this a matter of recent conversion; Clark also ranked fifth (and again,

after Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan) on the E scales for both the 1958 and 1959 Terms. Neither fact should be surprising; Clark's judicial voting record is quite consistent with the political position of the Texas "Fair Dealer" who served as Truman's Attorney General at the time of his appointment to the Court.

Stewart scores much lower on the E scale than on C; and Whittaker, who was the most moderate of the four C— conservatives, is identified as the anchor man of the Court in terms of his economic conservatism. Of particular interest is the fact that Frankfurter, who was tied with Harlan at the next to the bottom rank on C, also is in the second lowest rank on E. If we consider, as may seem intuitively justifiable, that the C and E scales taken together provide a good test of liberalism as a generalized range of attitudes, then it seems quite clear that Frankfurter was the most illiberal justice in the 1960 Term: he voted only nine out of 67 times in support of the liberal position. The necessary inference that one would draw, on the basis of cumulative scaling theory, from Frankfurter's low scale of scores of  $-.76$  on C and of  $-.68$  on E is that he voted conservatively because of his conservative attitudes. Any inference must be evaluated, however, in the light of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's own explanations, frequently proffered, which contradict the assumption that, for him at least, these two scales each involve a single dominant variable. According to Frankfurter, who often has admitted his passionate personal sympathy for the down-trodden and oppressed among the Court's litigants, many of his illiberal votes in these cases must be attributed to his deference to federalism or to judicial restraint, or to the wise judges who sit on lower courts of the present or the Supreme Court of the past.

*The F Scale.* The third most important variable, in recent terms, has been the F scale, which deals with monetary conflicts of interest between private individuals and government. Thus, F+ means to uphold the position of the government (national, state, or local) in tax and eminent domain cases, and in other matters where fiscal claims are at issue. In a sense, therefore, F is a closer analogue to C than is E, since C also is concerned with conflicts of interest between private individuals and governmental authority. But an examination of the voting and opinion behavior of the justices makes it apparent that for most of them, the issues of the F scale are more closely related to issues of economic liberalism than of civil liberties. This is hardly surprising, since F is

1960 TERM									
F Scale									
Cases	Justices								Totals
	Bl	Wa	C	Br	F	H	S	Wh	
4/443	x								1-8
5/624	x	x						x	3-6
4811:288	x	x	x	x	x				5-4
4/361	x	x	x	x	x	x			6-3
5/467	x	x	x	x	x	x	*		6-2
4/310	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		7-2
4469:533	x	x	x	x	x	x	*	x	7-1
4/289	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8-1
4/446	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8-1
5/753	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8-1
3381:629	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8-1
3381:843	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8-1
4/410	x	x	-	-	x	x	x	x	6-3
6/199	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x	8-1
									89-35
Totals	14-0	13-1	11-3	11-3	12-2	10-4	8-4	9-5	124
Scale positions	14	13	12	12	12	11	9½	8	1
Scale scores	1.00	.86	.71	.71	.57	.36	.14	-.89	

$$R = 1 - \frac{1}{53} = .943 \quad S = 1 - \frac{4}{23} = .826$$

FIGURE 3. Judicial Attitudes towards Governmental Fiscal Claims, 1960 Term

differentiable from E primarily in terms of the parties whose interests are in conflict. Yet this difference in the identity of the parties may make a considerable difference to particular justices, depending upon how far they regard the government as a fiscal trustee acting in the "public interest" of the commonwealth, or as the largest single combination of monopolistic economic power.

The F variable was discovered in the process of empirically examining the voting patterns in several preceding terms. Several justices, and in particular Douglas, voted differently in some cases to which the government was a party from their behavior in most other cases involving economic issues. As Figure 3 shows, Douglas and Black, who ranked first and second on both of the liberalism scales, are at opposite ends of the F scale. In all fourteen cases which comprise the scale for this term, Black voted to uphold the position of the government, while Douglas voted in the opposite way in all except one case—which would have been decided unanimously, and thus would not have appeared upon the scale, if it had not been for Harlan's inconsistent vote. On the other hand, Frankfurter, who ranked near the bottom of the Court on the C and E scales, is tied with Brennan and Clark for the fourth rank on the F scale. Clearly, the ranking

of the justices on F is different from their rankings on either C or E. Moreover, the government won twelve of these fourteen cases, and Douglas was the only member of the Court who did not vote to support the position of the government in at least a majority of the cases.

In terms of content, six of these cases raised questions of national taxation; four were state or local tax cases; and the remaining four were concerned with fiscal claims against the national government: one in eminent domain, one in tort, and two others. It is convenient to postpone, until the next section of this paper where it can be discussed in the context of Figure 4, the question *why* Douglas voted more often in the company of Whittaker and Stewart, than with Black and Warren, on the issues comprising the F scale.

This scale does not meet one of the recommended minimal standards for a Guttman scale, in that fewer than ten of the cases include two or more dissenting votes.<sup>22</sup> But this requirement of Guttman scaling was established in order to avoid the spurious inflation of the coefficient R; and as previously noted, the coefficient S is computed in a way that precludes that possibility. Since the value of S is quite high (.83, or about .20 above the acceptability level), and the ranking of the justices is similar to those of the immediately preceding terms, it seems justifiable to consider F to be scalable for this term, and to accept the scale.

*The Minor Scale Variables.* In addition to the three major variables so far discussed, three other minor variables have been tentatively identified on the basis of similar research in other recent terms of the Court. These include A (judicial activism in reviewing the decisions of the Congress, the President, and administrative agencies); N (federalism, and conflict between the national and state governments); and J (the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court over the decision-making of lower courts). Too few cases have been associated with any of these variables in recent years, to permit scaling them. In the 1960 Term there were four cases on A, two on N, two on J, besides the one 4-4 decision in which the votes were not identified. Therefore, 91 of the 99 split decisions of the 1960 Term are included on the scales of the three major variables; and together, the C, E and F scales account for the variance in the voting behavior of the justices in 91 per cent of the decisions of the Term.

#### V. SCALE AXES IN THE FACTOR SPACE

The next step is to position the scale axes,

which are considered to be the psychological analogues of the cumulative scales, in the space defined by the factorial reference axes. It will be recalled that the configuration of *i*-points for the justices is uniquely determined by the set of factor loadings given in Table IV. The problem now is to determine whether it is possible to pass a set of axes through the factor space in such a manner that the rankings of the projections, from the *i*-points onto the axes, are equivalent, in a statistically acceptable sense, to the rankings of the justices on the scale axes. What is required mathematically in order to accomplish this are sets of weights which will determine the position of the axes in the space, and the points on each axis where the projections from the *i*-points fall. Given such data, it will then be possible to compare the rankings of the justices, on the cumulative scales, with the rankings of the projections from their *i*-points on the counter part scale axes.

It is helpful to prepare a set of two-dimensional plots of the *i*-points against the reference axes, similar to Figure 4 but without the scale axes. Initial estimates of weights can be made from an examination of such two-dimensional plots. More precise determination of a set of acceptable weights requires mathematical analysis of the factor matrix of Table IV, and the use of a calculating machine. The distance from the origin of the factor space to the point which is closest to a given *i*-point, on any scale axis, is computed by the formula,<sup>23</sup>

$$(3) \quad d = \frac{\alpha x + \beta y + \gamma z}{(\alpha^2 + \beta^2 + \gamma^2)^{1/2}},$$

where *d* is the distance from the origin to the point on the scale axis where it is orthogonal to the projection from the *i*-point; *x*, *y*, and *z* are coordinates of the factorial reference axes for the *i*-point; and  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , and  $\gamma$  are the coefficients which determine the position of the scale axis in the three-dimensional factor space. The same set of coefficients also provides the reference axis coordinates for the positive terminus of the scale axis.

The positions in which the scale axes have been placed in Figure 4 do not necessarily constitute a uniquely "best" fit to the configuration of *i*-points; but it is assumed that as defined in Table V and shown in Figure 4 they furnish an appropriate and approximately correct solution. One way to visualize this solution is to think of a cone intercepting a relatively quite small circular area on the surface of a unit sphere; any axis lying within the cone will array the projections from *i*-points so

<sup>22</sup> Torgerson, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

<sup>23</sup> The use of this formula was kindly suggested by John P. Gilbert.



FIG. 4a: Reference Axes I and II<sup>24</sup>

FIG. 4b: Reference Axes I and III




FIG. 4c: Reference Axes II and III

FIGURE 4. Scale Axes and the Judicial Point Configuration in the Orthogonal Factor Space

<sup>24</sup> The direction of orthogonal factor axes extracted by the complete centroid method is

TABLE V. REFERENCE AXIS COORDINATES, COEFFICIENTS, AND COSINES FOR SCALE AXES

Scale axes	C	E	F
	1	2	3
Coordinates/ coefficients:			
I/ $\alpha$	1.00	1.00	.08
II/ $\beta$	.15	-.86	-1.00
III/ $\gamma$	.43	-.47	-.25
Cosines			
Figure 4a	+08½°	-40½°	-85½°
Figure 4b	+23½°	-25°	-72°
Figure 4c	+71°	-151½°	-166°

as to produce the same set of rankings of the justices as will be produced by any other axis within the cone.

The three plots of Figure 4 may be thought of as three views of a cube: Figure 4a is a top view, Figure 4b is a side view and Figure 4c is an end view. With relationship to reference axis I, the C scale axis enters from the lower right octant of the cube, passes through the origin, and emerges at the end through the upper left octant. The E scale axis passes downward and to the right of I. Reference axis I, it should be noted, is approximately the centroid, or arithmetic mean, of the C and E scale axes. The C axis clearly passes closest to Douglas, who also appears to have the most extreme projection on the positive segment of the axis. (Such a projection would correspond to Douglas' position with the highest score on the C cumulative scale.) Black, Warren, and Brennan project upon the positive segment of the C axis too, but we cannot be certain from an examination of Figure 4 precisely what the sequence of their rankings will be. Stewart clearly will project upon the C axis somewhere near the origin, which means that his "loading" on the axis will be close to zero. And the remaining four justices all will project upon the negative segment of the C axis, corresponding to their negative scores on the C cumulative scale.

Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan all will project positively upon the E axis, although it looks as though Douglas will rank

arbitrary; the asterisks following the identifying numbers for the first and second axes (i.e., I\* and II\*) signify that the polarity of these two axes was reversed to facilitate uniformity in inter-term comparisons in the larger study to which this article relates.

lower on the axis than he does on the cumulative scale. Clark, who ranked fifth on the E cumulative scale, also will project to the fifth position on the E axis; and the remaining justices will project negatively, corresponding to their negative scale scores for this variable.

Douglas is somewhat separated from the other three so-called libertarians, and the reason for this becomes apparent when we consider the F scale axis, which cuts across the center of the space to emerge through the front face, with only slight deviation toward the end (at I+) and downward. Particularly in Figure 4a, which includes the two most important dimensions, it can be seen that the relationship of the F axis to the C and E axes is such that the justices who project upon the negative segment of F are Stewart and Whittaker, who have the most negative projections on E, and Douglas, who has the most positive loading on C, in these two dimensions. This suggests that F presents issues that pull together the justices who project at opposite extremes on the two liberalism scales. Douglas, in other words, might vote in opposition to governmental fiscal claims because of a strong and generalized antagonism to governmental regulation and control; this could help to explain the extremity of his support for civil liberties claims, which are also claims of private persons in opposition to governmental regulation and control. Whittaker and Stewart, on the other hand, might vote F— because of their strong economic conservatism, and their corresponding sympathy for “free enterprise” and antipathy for public fiscal controls. The converse argument would explain why the remaining justices all would project positively on the F axis. Economic liberalism, as understood by Black, Warren, and Brennan, frequently involves support of governmental regulation and control “in the public interest”; and both liberals and conservatives agree that taxation is necessary to support positive programs of governmental regulation of the economy. Douglas’ action appears to have been reciprocated by Frankfurter, Harlan, and Clark, whose support of the government against claims of personal right seems to carry over to the support of the government against claims of private fiscal right. In any event, the position of the F axis in Figure 4 is such that, from a statistical and geometric point of view, F appears to be essentially orthogonal to—that is independent of—the C axis, and moderately correlated positively with the E scale. The suggested psychological explanation is at least not inconsistent with the mathematical relationships that are evident in the data.

#### VI. A TEST OF THE BASIC HYPOTHESIS

The principal hypothesis underlying this study is that differences in the attitudes of the justices toward the basic issues raised by the cases that the Court decides account for the differences in their voting. In short, Supreme Court justices vote as they do because of their attitudes toward the public policy issues that come before them. We are now in a position to make a statistical test of this hypothesis.

The *i*-points of the justices are separated in the factor space because of variance in the extent of majority participation of individual justices; but the factor analysis routine knows absolutely nothing about the subject matter of the values to which the decisions relate. The relative degrees of support by the justices of the key substantive issues can be determined by cumulative scaling; but cumulative scaling is a unidimensional measurement device, and each such scale is based upon a different universe of content, and is quite independent *methodologically* (as distinguished from psychologically) from every other scale. Moreover, the cumulative scale data are inadequate to permit the recovery of the configuration of the *i*-points in multidimensional space.<sup>25</sup> We shall assume, therefore, that if the cumulative scales can be reconstituted as a set of scale axes whose position is consistent with the configuration of *i*-points in the factor space, then the attitudinal differences of the justices on the cumulative scales account for the variance in the voting behavior of the justices, which is represented by the spatial separation of their ideal-points in the multidimensional factor space. If the correspondence between the set of cumulative scales and their scale axis analogues can be established in accordance with accepted procedures of statistical proof, then we shall have proved, in a mathematical sense, that the justices of the Supreme Court vary in their voting behavior according to the differences in their attitudes towards the scale variables.

Table VI presents a comparison of the cumulative scale scores, and the distances along the counterpart scale axes at which the *i*-points project (as determined by formula 3), together with the corresponding sets of rankings, for all justices on each of the three major variables. Although both scale scores and axis loadings range in value, in principle, from +1 to -1, so that some meaning can be attached to direct comparisons of pairs of corresponding scores and loadings, it will be recalled that, for mathematical reasons relating to the marginal dis-

<sup>25</sup> Coombs, *op. cit.*, ch. 12; and cf. Coombs and Kao, *op. cit.*, p. 230.



TABLE VI. CORRELATION OF JUDICIAL RANKS ON SCALES AND SCALE AXES

C					E					F				
Axis	Ranks		Scale		Axis	Ranks		Scale		Axis	Ranks		Scale	
.791	1	D	1	1.00	.308	4* D	1	1.00		.341	2* Bl	1	1.00	
.614	2	Bl	2	.84	.752	1 Bl	2	.92		.474	1* Wa	2	.86	
.609	3	Wa	3	.76	.749	2 Wa	3½	.44		.272	3 C	4	.71	
.599	4	Br	4	.53	.498	3 Br	3½	.44		.263	4 Br	4	.71	
-.104	5	S	5	-.02	-.116	5 C	5	.28		.205	6* F	4	.71	
-.553	6	Wh	6	-.49	-.357	6 H	6	-.16		.251	5* H	6	.57	
-.610	7	F	7½	-.76	-.406	7 S	7	-.40		-.232	8* S	7	.36	
-.612	8	H	7½	-.76	-.409	8 F	8	-.68		-.081	7* Wh	8	.14	
-.627	9	C	9	-.96	-.411	9 Wh	9	-1.00		-.256	9 D	9	-.89	
Rank correlation coefficient (tau)														
Significance level, 1-tailed (p)														

\* Inconsistent rankings.

tributions of the four-fold tables, the intervals on the two types of continua are not genuinely commensurable. Moreover, it has been determined experimentally that the error variance in the factor analysis routine is usually around 10 per cent; while the error variance in the cumulative scales is only slightly less; and there are other sources of error variance implicit in the general method. Therefore, it seems reasonable to employ the non-parametric rank correlation test for the purpose of making the comparison. In spite of the seeming precision of coefficients carried to the third decimal place, it would be fatuous to pretend that the measurement employed in this study can hope to be more than a rough approximation of empirical reality.

As Table VI indicates, there are no inconsistencies in the two sets of rankings for C. The correlation coefficient is less than +1.00 because of the tie in the scale scores of Frankfurter and Harlan, which increased very slightly the probability of perfect agreement with another set of rankings.<sup>26</sup> The correspondence between the two sets of rankings for E also is perfect, except for Douglas, whose loading on the scale axis is much too low to correspond well with his maximal scale score. We can readily observe, from Figure 3, that with the point configuration given by the factor analy-

<sup>26</sup> However, it will be observed that the probability of such perfect agreement between the two sets of rankings having occurred by chance alone is less than one chance in 40,000.

sis, it would be impossible to position the E axis in such a way as to accommodate both Douglas' position, and those of the remaining justices. It has, therefore, seemed preferable to position the E axis in the way that best reflects the attitudinal alignment of the other eight justices, and to consider Douglas' *i*-point to be located inconsistently with his manifest attitude towards E. There are several possible explanations for Douglas' apparent inconsistency. The problem might be one of error variance, since the factor routine knows nothing of Guttman scale inconsistencies, and Douglas' two E- inconsistencies would tend to pull him below Black, at least, in projection on E, in the attribution of variance by the centroid factor routine; to this we could add the imponderable effect of the error variance inherent in the factor analysis itself. But an alternative psychological explanation might be that the *i*-point configuration is correct, and that it is inconsistent for a justice, who is as hostile to governmental fiscal control as Douglas, at the same time to be the Court's strongest supporter of claims of economic liberalism.

The two sets of rankings for F are generally in close accord, since a tau of .87 is considered to be very high. There are three reversed pairs in the axis rankings: Black and Warren, Frankfurter and Harlan, and Stewart and Whittaker. Reference to Figure 3 shows that the reversal, for each of these pairs, was occasioned by the difference of a single vote; and the value of tau was lowered by the triple

tie in the scale ranks. It seems quite likely that the F scale, which is marginally acceptable in any event, is based upon too few (and too extreme) cases to constitute an adequate sampling of the attitudes of the justices towards this value; and that a scale based upon twice as many cases might result in a much closer correspondence between the cumulative scale and the point configuration. In other words, it seems most likely that in the case of F, the inconsistency between the two sets of rankings should be attributed to the inadequacies of the scale, rather than to errors in the point configuration. This question could be resolved only by an examination of the justices' voting behavior in a term in which they chose to accept for decision a considerably larger number of cases dealing with the issue of governmental fiscal powers than they have dealt with in recent years; or, as might well be done, by pooling the data for several terms of the Court.

Nevertheless, the correlation between all three sets of rankings is very high, with or without the above explanations. From a statistical point of view, it should be noted that the probabilities shown in Table VI relate to the probability of producing, by chance alone, the indicated congruence between any one scale and the point configuration. The prospect of chance replication of as good a fit for all three scales simultaneously, with the same fixed point configuration, is of course very much more remote; indeed, the joint probability, which is the product of the three discrete probabilities, is a truly astronomical number:  $<.0^{1129}$ , or approximately one chance in a trillion. It seems warranted, under these circumstances, to accept the hypothesis that the variance in the voting behavior of the justices during the 1960 Term can be adequately accounted for by the differences in their attitudes towards the fundamental issues of civil liberty, economic liberalism, and governmental fiscal authority.

#### VII. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE SEPARATING THE JUSTICES

Taking the judicial ideal-points in the factor space as reasonably adequate symbolizations of the respective attitude syndromes of the individual justices, we can use them to examine one final question. Discussion about the justices frequently revolves around such questions as which ones tend to share the "same point of view," and which ones are "furthest apart" in their thinking. The factor space provides a convenient basis for objective measurement

of the psychological distance which separates each justice from each of the others.

Since the measurement of these psychological distances is purely mathematical, we shall carry it out in five-dimensional space. This will afford a slightly more accurate basis for measurement than the three-dimensional space depicted in Figure 4, since the fourth and fifth factors will permit us to consider, presumably, the effect of the minor variables (such as A, N and J) which, although not scalable in the Guttman sense, nevertheless must be considered to be a part of the attitude syndrome of each justice. The psychological distance will be measured on the same scale as that employed for the three-dimensional factor space: along orthogonal reference axes, each of which extends from  $-1$  to  $+1$ . The standard formula for computing the distance between any two points in orthogonal five-space is:

$$(4) \quad d_{(i_1-i_2)} = [(v_1 - v_2)^2 + (w_1 - w_2)^2 + (x_1 - x_2)^2 + (y_1 - y_2)^2 + (z_1 - z_2)^2]^{1/2},$$

where  $d$  is the distance,  $i_1$  and  $i_2$  are the ideal-points of a pair of justices, and  $v, w, x, y$  and  $z$  are the coordinates (or "loadings") of the justices on factors I-V.

The result of computations according to this formula are shown in Table VII. Harlan and Frankfurter are by far the closest two justices, in terms of their attitudes toward the policy issues that the Court decided in the 1960 Term; they are separated by a distance of only .14 in the five-dimensional factor space. Contrary to what even many close observers of the work of the Court seem to believe, however, it is Warren and Brennan—not Douglas and Black—who are next most similar in attitude, at a distance of .42. In fact, there are five other pairs (Wh-C, .52; Bl-Wa, .53; Wh-S, .57; Wh-F, .67; and Wh-H, .70) with "ideational identity" closer than that of Douglas and Black,<sup>27</sup> who are separated by a distance of .75. On the other hand, the greatest difference in attitude is that between Douglas and Black, on the one hand, and Frankfurter and Harlan, on the other; the average distance separating these two pairs of justices is 1.60. Moreover, Douglas, Black, Warren and Brennan all agree that Frankfurter and Harlan are the justices whose point of view is most different from their own; and, conversely, Harlan, Frankfurter,

<sup>27</sup> In an article devoted to the attitudinal similarities and differences of these two justices, Spaeth has concluded that his data, also, "show significant ideational difference between Black and Douglas." *Op cit.*, p. 176.

TABLE VII. ATTITUDINAL DISTANCES AMONG JUDICIAL IDEAL-POINTS, 1960 TERM

	D	Bl	Wa	Br	S	C	Wh	F	H
D		.75	.93	.83	1.21	1.53	1.44	1.63	1.63
Bl	.75		.53	.80	1.30	1.47	1.44	1.58	1.54
Wa	.93	.53		.42	1.18	1.38	1.39	1.52	1.50
Br	.83	.80	.42		1.02	1.27	1.29	1.42	1.44
S	1.21	1.30	1.18	1.02		.93	.57	.78	.82
C	1.53	1.47	1.38	1.27	.93		.52	.80	.85
Wh	1.44	1.44	1.39	1.29	.57	.52		.67	.70
F	1.63	1.58	1.52	1.42	.78	.80	.67		.14
H	1.63	1.54	1.50	1.44	.82	.85	.70	.14	

Whittaker, Clark, and Stewart all agree that Douglas and Black are the justices most distant psychologically from themselves.

If we seek an "average" justice whose point of view best typifies that of the Court as a whole, he is clearly Stewart at an average distance of .98. The variation of Stewart's separation from his colleagues also is confined to the smallest range. Such a finding is perfectly consistent, of course, with the findings of scale analysis, and with the configuration shown in the three-dimensional space of Figure 4. In similar accord with expectations is the finding that the most atypical justice was Douglas who, separated by an average distance of 1.24 from his colleagues, entertained the most generally extreme views of any of the justices.

Although Stewart and Clark are adjacent to each other in the two-dimensional matrix of Table VII, since the pattern shown is the most generally consistent one, these two justices are not very close to each other in five-space (as a glance at three-dimensional Figure 4 suggests). Stewart and Clark both are closer to Whittaker, Frankfurter, and Harlan than they are to each other. Finally, it is noteworthy that Whittaker—not Frankfurter—is the most typical of the group who, at least in relationship to the C and E variables, are the conservative justices; Whittaker's average distance from the other four justices at the "right wing" of Table VII was only .62. And it is Warren—not Black—who is the most typical of the four liberal justices, with an average distance of .63 separating him from the other three.

#### VIII. SUMMARY

The objective of this paper has been to demonstrate the utility, for a more accurate

insight into the basic factors that underlie disagreement among Supreme Court justices, of a more rigorous psychological approach than has been characteristic of most discussion of their attitudes. The attention of scholars always has focussed upon the values articulated in the opinions of the justices, and particularly in majority opinions; but much less attention has been given to the possibility that an examination of the voting behavior of the justices might provide a better and more reliable approach to the understanding of their attitudes than the study of opinions. Research during the last two decades has turned increasingly to the analysis of judicial voting records, in addition to opinion language; and reliance understandably has been placed, during what might well be termed the pioneering stages of the development of a science of judicial behavior, upon unidimensional models. These necessarily are limited in their capacity to represent adequately the complex interplay of attitudes in the mind of any human being. The time has now come when it may be appropriate for students of judicial behavior to consider the advantages to be gained by utilization of multidimensional models of the behavior of Supreme Court justices.

One such model, exemplified here, is suggested by recent (and on-going) research in psychometrics. It proceeds on the premise that a justice reacts in his voting behavior to the stimuli presented by cases before the Court, in accordance with his attitudes toward the issues raised for decision. This article has presented what is believed to be persuasive evidence that this is precisely what the justices were doing when they voted in the decisions of the 1960 Term.

## TWO THEOREMS ON *CETERIS PARIBUS* IN THE ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC SYSTEMS

FRANKLIN M. FISHER AND ALBERT ANDO

*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Analysis of the dynamic properties of two or more interrelated systems is a recurrent problem in social science theory. A particular problem frequently arises (although it often goes unrecognized) in assessing the validity of an analysis of a system, some variables of which are causally related to other variables, which latter, in turn, are either not explicitly taken into account or are assumed constant. Examples are easy to find: economists may study the behavior of a single country's economy with only secondary regard for the rest of the world; studies of group behavior may pay only secondary attention to the other roles played by the group members in other contexts; two more examples are worked out below and others may be found in the works about to be cited. Indeed, in a larger sense, the division of social science itself (or of natural science, for that matter) into separate disciplines is an example, for the variables taken as given by one discipline are the very subject matter of another and *vice versa*. In all these examples, the very real problem is present that if variables taken as given are causally affected by the variables of the system being analyzed, or if variables assumed not to affect that system actually do affect it, the results of the analysis may have little relevance for the study of real problems.

The principal purpose of this paper is to call the attention of social scientists outside the field of mathematical economics to two related theorems in this area that have recently been proved.<sup>1</sup> We shall not attempt a technical dis-

cussion of the theorems here but instead give a general description of them in the next section. We then present two illustrative, albeit somewhat simplified, examples of the sort of results that these theorems can be used to obtain in political science.

### I

Suppose a number of variables such that at any time,  $t$ , the value of each of them is a function of the values of some or all of the same set of variables at some past time  $t-1$ .<sup>2</sup> Suppose further that it is possible to collect the variables into subsets such that the variables within each subset are functions only of the past values of variables in the *same* subset, but not of the past values of any variables in any *different* subset.<sup>3</sup> Then the system is said to be *completely decomposable* and it is obvious that it really consists of several independent systems each one of which can be analyzed separately without reference to any of the others. In the examples mentioned above, this would be the case if every country's economy were really closed so that there were no inter-country effects and if every member of a group had no other roles to play outside the

interrelated systems is covered in F. M. Fisher, "On the Cost of Approximate Specification in Simultaneous Equation Estimation," *Econometrica*, Vol. 29 (April 1961), pp. 139-170.

<sup>2</sup> If values in the further past are relevant, a formal redefinition can always be made to eliminate time before  $t-1$ , without changing anything. Simultaneous dependencies can also be treated, though, for reasons of clarity and intuitive appeal, we restrict ourselves to cases where there is some time lag somewhere in the system. Further, we could consider time as continuous without essential changes. Strictly speaking, however, the theorems under discussion are only known to hold for cases in which the relations involved are linear. Since this was written, the principal results of the theorems have been shown to hold for at least one important class of nonlinear systems in F. M. Fisher, "Decomposability, and Balanced Growth Under Constant Returns to Scale" (forthcoming).

<sup>3</sup> Hereafter, to simplify terminology, by the term "set" instead of "subset," we mean a subset within the set of all variables in the system under consideration.

<sup>1</sup> H. A. Simon and A. Ando, "Aggregation of Variables in Dynamic Systems," *Econometrica*, Vol. 29 (April, 1961), pp. 111-138 and A. Ando and F. M. Fisher, "Near-Decomposability, Partition and Aggregation, and the Relevance of Stability Discussions," in detail (forthcoming) present and prove the theorems. The relation of the sort of system involved to ordinary notions of causation is discussed in H. A. Simon, "Causal Ordering and Identifiability," ch. 3 in *Studies in Econometric Method* (W. C. Hood and T. C. Koopmans, eds., New York, 1953; Cowles Commission Monograph No. 14), reprinted as ch. 1 in H. A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York, 1957); while the bearing of this sort of problem on the estimation of parameters in one of a set of

group or if those other roles had no effect whatsoever on actions within the group.

While the assumption of complete decomposability (or *ceteris paribus*) is often convenient to make, it is seldom likely to be fully satisfied in practice. Thus there are some exports and imports affecting every country; there are outside roles for group members, and so forth. The question thus naturally arises: What remains of the results of an analysis carried out under an assumption of complete decomposability if the system being studied is in fact embedded in a larger system which is not truly completely decomposable, so that variables assumed to be causally irrelevant do in fact matter? Of course, if the assumption of irrelevance—of complete decomposability—is a very bad one, it is unreasonable to expect much to be left of results obtained under it; but what if variables assumed irrelevant do not in fact matter very much? Is there any sense in which complete decomposability and the great simplification which it permits can be used as a good approximation, so that results obtained under it can be expected to be approximately valid when it is relaxed? This is where the first of our two theorems comes in.

Suppose that our system, instead of being completely decomposable, is in fact only *nearly* completely decomposable. In other words, suppose that the variables within each set do depend on the past values of variables outside that set but that this dependence is small relative to within-set dependencies. In such a case, the Simon-Ando theorem<sup>4</sup> asserts the following: carry out the analysis of the system on the assumption that it is really completely decomposable (i.e., ignore inter-set dependencies altogether). Provided that inter-set dependencies are sufficiently weak relative to intra-set ones, *in the short run* that analysis will remain approximately valid in all respects—that is, the system will behave almost as if it were completely decomposable.<sup>5</sup>

Now, if this were all, it would be useful but

<sup>4</sup> Simon and Ando, *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Here and later what is meant by "sufficiently weak" depends on what standard of approximation one wishes to impose on the results. The more closely one insists that the behavior of the system must approximate that of the corresponding completely decomposable one, the weaker must "sufficiently weak" be. What the theorem guarantees is that *whatever* standard of approximation is required (so long as it is an approximate and not an exact standard) a non-zero degree of weakness always exists which is sufficient to produce results satisfying that standard.

not very remarkable, for it would merely mean that if neglected influences are sufficiently weak they take a long time to matter much; however, the theorem does not stop here but asserts a far stronger result.

Consider the long-run behavior that the system would exhibit if it were truly completely decomposable. In particular, consider the *relative* behavior of the variables within each set (i.e., consider the long-run behavior of their ratios). Provided again that inter-set dependencies are sufficiently weak relative to intra-set ones, that same relative behavior will show up approximately in the long-run behavior of the true only *nearly* completely decomposable system. It is important to fully grasp this result. It asserts that even when influences which have been neglected have had time to make themselves fully felt, the *relative* behavior of the variables within any set will be approximately the same as would have been the case had those influences never existed, and this despite the fact that the *absolute* behavior of the variables—their levels and rates of change—may be very different indeed. To recapitulate: if a nearly completely decomposable system is analyzed as though it were really completely decomposable, the results obtained will remain approximately valid even in the long run as regards the *relative* behavior of the variables within any one set.<sup>6</sup>

The detailed examples of the next section will make all this clearer; however, let us pause briefly over the examples already cited. In one variant of the international trade case, the Simon-Ando theorem asserts that if a country trades very little with the rest of the world, its short-run production of every commodity will be approximately the same as if it did not trade at all. Further, in the long run, the *ratio* in which it produces any two commodities will also be approximately the same, although the *levels* and *rates of growth* of production may be very different in the two cases. Similarly, in the group behavior case, the Simon-Ando theorem asserts that, if outside roles for group members are relatively unimportant, the short-run

<sup>6</sup> Even before the full system settles down to its ultimate behavior, variables within any one set will move proportionally, so that inter-set influences can be analyzed as influences among indices, each index representing all variables in a particular subset of the system, rather than as among the individual variables themselves. This point, while a little aside from the main drift of our discussion in the text, is useful and important and will show up in our examples below. It is true of both theorems.

behavior of the group will be approximately the same as if those roles did not exist, while in the long run, the *relative* behavior of the group members *vis-à-vis* each other will also be approximately the same, even though the behavior of the group *as a whole*<sup>7</sup> *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world may be quite different.

Unfortunately, however, useful as completely decomposable or nearly completely decomposable systems are, the assumptions inherent in near complete decomposability are grossly unrealistic for many systems which are of great interest to social scientists. We often study systems which we do not believe, even as an approximation, to be causally uninfluenced by outside forces. In many cases, we deal with systems whose variables are believed to be influenced by outside forces but not to influence these outside variables, so that the latter may be taken as givens of the problem. This is the case of causal influences running only one way among sets of variables (although there may be "whorls" of causation within each set). Thus the economist frequently takes tastes or technology as causally influencing the variables he studies but as being causally uninfluenced by them. So too, a sociologist may take the existing means of production as given independently of the variables he studies but as influencing the latter in a significant way.

More formally, this kind of assumption is equivalent to saying that our variables can be collected into sets *numbered* (from 1 to *N*, say) so that the variables in any given set are functions of their own past values *and* of the past values of the variables in any lower-numbered set but not of the past values of the variables in any higher-numbered one. This sort of system is called *decomposable*. (The reader should go back to the definition of *complete* decomposability to be sure he understands the difference.) Clearly, the dynamic behavior of any set of variables in a decomposable system can be studied, taking the behavior of variables in lower-numbered sets as given and without any regard for higher-numbered sets. (Note, however, that the influence of lower-numbered sets *must* be explicitly recognized.)

Again as in the case of complete decomposability, however, the assumption of decomposability is frequently justified only as a working approximation. Thus tastes and technology are

<sup>7</sup> This phrase is not used accidentally. The influence of the outside roles will eventually be on group behavior as a whole rather than on individual behavior within the group (remember that such influences are small relative to within-group forces). See the preceding footnote.

not *really* independent of the workings of the economic system; the means of production are not *really* given independently of sociological factors.<sup>8</sup> The question then arises as before of the validity of results obtained under such assumptions. Indeed, this question is perhaps even more important here than in the completely decomposable case, for we have already pointed out (and the examples just cited illustrate) that the very separation of social science into the social sciences is a use of the assumption of decomposability.

Fortunately, the same things are essentially true here as in the nearly completely decomposable case. For nearly decomposable systems which are not nearly completely decomposable—in other words, for systems in which *one-way* inter-set influences are too large to ignore—the Ando-Fisher theorem<sup>9</sup> yields substantially the same results as the Simon-Ando theorem does for the nearly completely decomposable case. Thus the economist who takes tastes and technology as influencing but uninfluenced by economic variables will find—provided that such an assumption is *nearly* correct—that his results will be approximately valid in all respects in the short run and that even in the long run, when the full effects of feedbacks in the causal structure are felt, the *internal, relative* behavior of the variables he studies will be approximately the same. The importance of this result for the usefulness of intra-disciplinary studies in an interrelated world needs no emphasis.<sup>10</sup>

## II

We come now to the application of these theorems to two examples in political science which we shall work out in moderate detail, although without any attempt to argue that these examples are more than illustrations.

First, let us consider an over-simple model of armament races. Suppose that at any time, the stocks of armaments of any country (as measured by the number of units of each type of weapon in its arsenal) are a function of the stocks of armaments of all countries (including itself) at some past date.<sup>11</sup> The influences of

<sup>8</sup> Indeed, it would be odd (although not impossible) for both statements to hold exactly.

<sup>9</sup> Ando and Fisher, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> This is not to deny, of course, the usefulness of inter-disciplinary work. The point is that the results of intra-disciplinary studies need not be vitiated because the real world is not so neatly divided as the academic one.

<sup>11</sup> Again, the use of past time is not a restriction; the past date can be last year or yesterday

such past stocks may be of different kinds. Thus armaments may be higher the higher a prospective enemy's armament stocks; lower the higher the stocks of prospective allies; effects on different weapons may be different; stocks of one type of weapon may influence stocks of others positively or negatively; and so forth.

Now suppose that the world is divided into several arms races in such a way that the armaments of a country in any one arms race depend principally on those of the other countries in the same arms race and relatively little on those of countries in other arms races. (This may not be a bad approximation; one might think of the Arabs and Israelis on the one hand and the East-West arms race on the other.) The system is then nearly completely decomposable and the Simon-Ando theorem predicts the following.

From the initiation of the various arms races (since they are at least slightly interdependent they will all begin at least nominally at the same time) until some time thereafter, each arms race will proceed approximately as it would in the absence of the other races. Indeed, this will continue until after the transient effects of different starting stocks of armaments have effectively disappeared. Once this has happened, there will come a time after which the stocks of various weapons for all the countries in each arms race will grow (or shrink or fluctuate) approximately proportionally, so that the influence of any one arms race on any other may be considered as that of an aggregate "country" with one aggregate stock of weapons on another, despite the fact that the influences among the countries and weapons making up the aggregates may be quite varied. Finally, in the long run, the size and rate of growth of every country's armament stocks at any period will be determined by the rate of growth of that arms race which would grow fastest in the absence of the other arms races, but the *relative* sizes of the weapon stocks within any one arms

race will remain approximately the same as if no other arms races existed.

Now consider a somewhat different situation in which the world is again divided into arms races and the arms races are numbered such that armament stocks in any given country are functions of past stocks of other countries in the same arms race and of countries in lower-numbered arms races but only slightly of stocks of countries in higher-numbered arms races.<sup>12</sup> (This, too, may be somewhat realistic. On the one hand, the level of Pakistani armaments is affected by United States military aid; on the other hand, the level of United States armaments is hardly affected by Pakistani arms levels.) Then the system is nearly decomposable and the Ando-Fisher theorem yields results similar to those just presented in the nearly completely decomposable case. Perhaps it is worth remarking here that the theorem thus shows that a very rapid long-run rate of arms accumulation in a high-numbered arms race (say India-Pakistan or North and South Vietnam) can force the long-run rate of arms accumulation in a lower-numbered race (say U. S.-U.S.S.R.) to the same level but cannot more than negligibly affect the *relative* positions in the latter race.

For our second example, we turn to the voting strength of political parties. Suppose that there are several political parties and that the number of votes for any one party at a given time is a function of the number of votes for each party at some past time. For convenience, we shall assume a constant total population and that every individual votes for one and only one party. We shall further assume that the effect of past votes on present party strength can be represented for each party by a sum of terms, each term representing the probability of an individual who votes initially for a particular party changing his vote to the party in question, times the number of people voting for the initial party. Of course, individuals who stay in the same party are counted as going from that party to itself. It follows then that if we add the coefficients which give the probabilities of going from a particular party to all parties in existence, the

or an hour ago. Similarly, influences in the further past can be formally subsumed under this model by redefinition. Finally, the formulation includes the case in which it is the *rate of change* rather than the *level* of the armament stocks which are dependent on past armaments. This sort of treatment of arms races originates with L. F. Richardson. See his *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1960). Of course the stocks of armaments depend on other things such as economic resources; we are trying to keep the example as simple as possible. The functions in question are supposed to represent the strategic choices made by governments.

<sup>12</sup> They need not be functions of armament stocks in *all* lower-numbered races; one will do. Similarly, not every country in the given arms race need have such links; all that is required is that at least one does, so that the system, while nearly decomposable, is not nearly *completely* decomposable. It is also possible to analyze a case in which a part of a nearly decomposable system happens to be nearly completely decomposable.

sum must be unity, as every individual must end up somewhere.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, in equation form, let  $X_{1t}$  be the number of votes for the first party at time,  $t$ ,  $X_{2t}$  be the number of votes for the second party at the same time, and so forth. We have (where there are  $n$  parties):

$$\begin{aligned} X_{1t} &= A_{11}X_{1t-1} + A_{12}X_{2t-1} + \cdots + A_{1n}X_{nt-1} \\ (1) \quad X_{2t} &= A_{21}X_{1t-1} + A_{22}X_{2t-1} + \cdots + A_{2n}X_{nt-1} \\ &\vdots \\ X_{nt} &= A_{n1}X_{1t-1} + A_{n2}X_{2t-1} + \cdots + A_{nn}X_{nt-1} \end{aligned}$$

Here,  $A_{11}$  is the probability of an individual voting for party 1 continuing to do so;  $A_{12}$  is the probability of an individual voting for party 2 changing to party 1;  $A_{21}$  is the probability of an individual voting for party 1 changing to party 2; and so forth. Clearly, all the  $A$ 's must lie between zero and one, and the sum of the  $A$ 's in any column must be unity.

Now consider any set of parties (a single party can count as a set). Ignore the fact that such a set may gain votes from outside itself and consider only its own internal workings. There will be in the long run a single probability that a randomly chosen individual voting for some party in the set will continue to vote for some party in the set at the next time period (he may move between parties in the set). Equivalently, without ignoring the fact that the set may gain votes from outside, we may consider the long-run probability that one of the people *originally* voting for some party in the set who has remained so voting through some particular time will continue so to vote for yet one more period; this comes to the same thing. (In either definition, we assume that every party in the set begins with a very large number of votes so that a zero vote

does not become a problem save for parties which lose all their votes every time period.) We call that long-run probability the *cohesiveness* of the set. Clearly, it must lie between zero and one; the cohesiveness of any single party is the  $A$  coefficient in its own row and column (thus, for example,  $A_{11}$  is the cohesiveness of the first party taken alone); and the cohesiveness of all parties taken together is unity (since nobody can leave the system as a whole). In general, the cohesiveness of a set lies between the smallest and the largest probability of an individual voting for any given party in the set staying put or changing to another party in the same set (this latter probability is given by the sum of the  $A$ 's in the column corresponding to the party in question and in the rows corresponding to all parties in the set including the initial one).<sup>14</sup>

Now suppose that the parties can be divided into sets such that the probability of an individual moving between sets is small relative to the probability of his remaining in the same set. Clearly, each set then has cohesiveness close to unity. The system is then nearly completely decomposable and the Simon-Ando theorem yields the following results:

Begin with any distribution of voting chosen at random. In the short run, the voting strength of each party will behave approximately as it would if there were no movements between sets of parties whatsoever. Moreover, there will come a time after which the ratio of the votes for any party to the votes for any other party in the same set will remain approximately constant. Thereafter, each set of parties can be treated as a single party for purposes of analyzing inter-set movements, with the cohesiveness of the set acting as the probability of remaining therein. Finally, even in the long run, the equilibrium distribution of relative voting strength *within* each set of parties will be approximately the same as if there were no inter-set movements, although the absolute number of votes involved may be quite different.

In this example, however, the more interest-

<sup>13</sup> A discussion of this general sort of model which aggregates from the individual level is given in T. W. Anderson, "Probability Models for Analyzing Time Changes in Attitudes," Chapter 1 in *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences*, P. F. Lazarsfeld, ed. (Glencoe, 1954). It would be possible to abandon the probability interpretation and to let higher strength in one party lead to lower strength in another, but this would lead to an example without some of the nice features of the present one. It would also be possible to build in other influences on party voting strength. Again, we are striving for an illuminating example rather than for a full-blown "realistic" theory. The assumption that every individual votes for some party is innocuous, since we can count all those not voting for any formal party as voting for a party of their own, the "Non-such" Party.

<sup>14</sup> *Technical footnote.* Precisely, cohesiveness is given by the largest characteristic root of the submatrix of  $A$ 's corresponding to the parties in the set. See F. M. Fisher, "An Alternate Proof and Extension of Solow's Theorem on Nonnegative Square Matrices," *Econometrica*, Vol. 30 (July, 1962) forthcoming. The fact that the root lies between the largest and smallest column sums is well known—see R. M. Solow, "On the Structure of Linear Models," *Econometrica*, Vol. 21 (January, 1952), pp. 29-46.



ing case is that of near decomposability. Let us first consider what a truly decomposable system would be. This would occur if the parties could be divided into sets where the sets are numbered (from 1 to  $N$ , say) in such a way that nobody voting for a party in any set ever changes to a party in a lower-numbered set but such that there are non-negligible movements into higher numbered sets. Thus anybody in set  $N$  stays there; anybody in set  $N-1$  either stays there or moves to set  $N$ ; anybody in set  $N-2$  either stays there, moves to set  $N-1$ , or moves to set  $N$ ; and so forth. (Note that set  $N$  has cohesiveness 1; no other single set has cohesiveness 1, but set  $N$  and set  $N-1$  together, set  $N$ , set  $N-1$ , and set  $N-2$  together, and so forth all have cohesiveness 1). The sets are thus "nested," in the sense that all inter-set movements go toward the center which consists of set  $N$ .

Now suppose that all sets begin with a very large number of votes (so that the fact that the lower-numbered sets will eventually lose all their votes is not a difficulty). Consider any set. A time will come such that thereafter the *relative* strength of the parties in that set is determined primarily by their tendency to attract voters from parties in the set with the highest cohesiveness among those sets that are not higher numbered than the set in question. (In the case of set  $N$  or of set 1, this is the set in question itself; in any other case, it need not be.) This is a reasonable result, because as time goes on the parties in the sets with the greatest cohesiveness will acquire more and more votes, so that, given the probabilities of any *single* voter moving among the sets, what happens to these sets becomes of increasing importance to all those sets of parties that acquire voters from them.

We now alter the assumptions and suppose that although the dominant inter-set movements are to higher-numbered sets, there are small movements to lower-numbered ones. (This may not be too unrealistic. We might think of set  $N$  as the major parties; there may be a far higher tendency to move into or stay in them than there is to move out.) The system is now only nearly decomposable and the Ando-Fisher theorem yields the following results:

Begin with any distribution of voting chosen at random. In the short run, the actual number of votes for each party will behave approximately as it would if the only inter-set movements were to higher-numbered sets. Moreover, there will come a time after which the *relative* distribution of voting among the parties within any set will remain approximately the same as would have been the case in the truly decomposable case earlier described. After this time, inter-set movements can be analyzed without regard for the voting distribution within the various sets. Finally these *relative* intra-set distributions will be approximately maintained even in the long run, although the absolute number of votes eventually cast for the parties in each set will depend almost wholly on the tendency of that set as a whole to gain voters from set  $N$  (which by this time is far larger than any other set).

Note that this result implies that an analysis of the *relative* strength of "minor" parties can proceed without explicit account of the tendency of such parties to gain voters from or even to lose voters to major ones, despite the fact that the latter tendency is large. So far as *relative* voting strength is concerned, all that matters are the various tendencies of the minor parties to lose voters to and gain voters from each other (and even some of these may be negligible). Even wide differences in tendencies to lose voters to (or gain them from) major parties need not be explicitly taken into account, provided only that the former tendencies are very strong relative to the latter, a rather surprising result.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> We are perhaps making this result sound a bit more paradoxical than it is. Different tendencies to lose voters to major parties do in fact matter and get taken into account in an implicit fashion. Since every party's voters end up *somewhere* (the sum of the  $A$ 's in any column is one), a minor party with a high propensity to lose voters to major ones will have—*other things being equal*—a lower propensity to retain voters than a minor party with a lower propensity to lose voters to major ones. This will show up in considering their relative strength in isolation; however, it can be nullified by other tendencies if other things are *not* equal.

## POSITIVE LIBERTY, 1880-1914

DAVID NICHOLLS

*The Theological College, Chichester, Sussex*

It would not, I think, be entirely misleading to suggest that doctrines of *laissez faire* and attacks upon reasoned state intervention in political and social life have tended to emanate from two extremes in social philosophy—ultra individualism and an extreme organicism. In the first case, and we may take Locke as an example, society is made up of a heap of individuals who came together to form the state for the limited purpose of the protection of property.<sup>1</sup> Man is not seen as a part of a larger whole, influenced by the structure of that whole, but as an isolated individual; thus any state interference beyond the protection of property is viewed as a restriction of individual liberty. On the other hand are thinkers who regard society as such a complicated and delicate organism that they can only—and governments should only—sit back and gasp at the complexity of it all. Any attempt to improve one aspect will affect the balance of the whole in ways impossible to predict. It is difficult to point to a pure instance of this opinion, but this is the impression left with the reader after perusing such works as Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*,<sup>2</sup> Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*,<sup>3</sup> Bradley's *Ethical Studies* and the works of some more modern conservatives.<sup>4</sup> All that

<sup>1</sup> " 'tis not without reason that he [man] seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, property." *Second Treatise on Civil Government* (1690), para. 123.

<sup>2</sup> Burke, of course, asserted the need for a means of change, but it is not clear how this is to function, and he does not appear to conceive of rationally determined action by the state.

<sup>3</sup> Hegel was not reactionary, as is sometimes asserted, but was gently conservative. If the philosopher were successful enough to achieve an understanding of society, his reflections would be of little use to the practical politician who must proceed in a somewhat hand-to-mouth fashion. Hegel was really a sceptic in politics.

<sup>4</sup> I am thinking, for example, of Professor Oakeshott, for whom political ideals can never guide the politician, and attempts by him to follow anything but intimations are sure to end in catastrophe; the only healer of social complaints worth considering is time. Cf. articles on rationalism in politics in *Cambridge Journal*, 1947. T. E.

governments can be expected to do is to prevent the worst collisions and any attempt to pursue a positive policy is doomed to failure.<sup>5</sup>

The group of thinkers with whom we are here principally concerned held neither view, and although they differed widely in their metaphysic of society, they avoided the extremes.<sup>6</sup>

I wish to distinguish the notions of freedom or liberty<sup>7</sup> with which we shall be concerned in this essay from other conceptions and misconceptions. It is, I think, possible broadly to differentiate two conceptions of freedom,<sup>8</sup> what

Utey also shows a similar scepticism based on complexity; cf. *Essays in Conservatism* (1947).

<sup>5</sup> Herbert Spencer, as we shall see, falls into both camps; he was an extreme individualist, and believed as well that "the social organism cannot be dealt with in any one part, without all other parts being influenced in ways that cannot be foreseen." "Over-Legislation" in *Essays Scientific, Political and Speculative* (1868 ed.), ii, p. 63.

<sup>6</sup> The possible exception is Bosanquet, whom we shall discuss at a later stage, but in many ways was hardly a liberal at all.

<sup>7</sup> I understand the two words "liberty" and "freedom" as synonymous and they will be used indiscriminately; efforts to distinguish between them appear to me not to have met with much success. In the following essay the terminology I shall use will, even when discussing the views of others who use different terminology, be my own as defined in the text, except when the contrary is explicitly stated.

<sup>8</sup> G. de Ruggiero in his *History of European Liberalism* (1927), pp. 350f, divides conceptions of freedom in roughly the same way as this, but names them differently, as does Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (1958). Both these thinkers fail to distinguish the notion of positive liberty which is the purpose of this essay to examine. The former tends to confound it with what he calls positive freedom—and what I call the realist conception of liberty, from which, as we shall see, it can fairly clearly be distinguished. The latter confuses it with what he calls negative freedom—what I call empiricist freedom in general, of which it is merely one variety. Professor Berlin seems to assume that only a fool could hold to what I call negative freedom without seeing that this implies positive freedom; it is certainly possible if one conception of society be held, and the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic barriers be ignored, to slide

I shall call the *empiricist* and the *realist* notions, the former being subdivided into *positive* and *negative* (which can itself be broken down into *dogmatic* and *sceptical*), and the latter into *rationalist* and *idealist*. This is illustrated in the following diagram:

tyranny of his passions.<sup>10</sup> Rousseau believed that a rational man would willingly submit to the general will which is his will;<sup>11</sup> if he does not voluntarily submit, he can be compelled to do so, and thus "he will be forced to be free."<sup>12</sup> Idealist thinkers like Kant, Hegel, Green and




FIGURE 1. Diagram of conceptions of liberty

### I

We shall first of all deal with the realist conception of freedom. In this way of thinking the term freedom is used to signify an objective situation which has little or no relation to the actual will or desire of the person who is said to be free. A free man is one who is doing either the right thing, or the reasonable thing, or the thing which is most in line with his nature. Two types of thinkers have adopted this conception of liberty. The first were the rationalists, like Descartes, Spinoza and, though in a somewhat different way, Rousseau. For Spinoza, a man is free when he is behaving rationally,<sup>9</sup> and when he is removed from the

from one to the other. Nevertheless, Professor Berlin ignores the fact that many eminent thinkers from Hobbes to Spencer have been negative liberals without believing that this implies a positive element. Ruggiero, on the other hand ignores our positive liberals, and seems to assume that all forms of empiricist liberty imply realist liberty, though not in its most rigorous form. Berlin sees that negative and positive liberty have something in common and shows sympathy with the more positive elements in the empiricist notion of freedom (*op. cit.*, p. 8), yet he goes on to quote with evident approval Bentham's dictum that "every law is an infraction of liberty" (*ibid.*, p. 35). If what Berlin says on p. 8 is correct, then some laws increase the total liberty in a society (though not, of course, to the person coerced) and Bentham's statement is misleading. Thus Berlin's terminology leads to confusions, and to the idea that all laws decrease human freedom—implying a *laissez faire* attitude.

<sup>9</sup> "A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear but who

Bosanquet had a similar notion of freedom, and owed much of their political theory to Rousseau.<sup>13</sup> Yet, for Hegel, self-consciousness is essential for a true freedom, and man must will the general will freely.<sup>14</sup> Hegel and his followers introduced into the realist notion of freedom a subjective element for which they have not always been credited; nevertheless it is true to say that for them the ethical life is primarily an objective situation into which the individual

directly desires that which is good." *Ethics*, 4 Prop. 67. For Spinoza a man is free when led solely by reason (4 Prop. 68) and when self-determined (I. Def. 7.)

<sup>10</sup> Passions, however, cease to be passions when reason is applied to them and when we get a clear idea of them (5 Prop. 3).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. esp. *du Contrat Social*, 4:2.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, 1:7.

<sup>13</sup> For his influence on Kant and Hegel, cf. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State* (1951 ed.), ch. 9 and also for his influence on the author. For Green's debt to Rousseau cf. *Principles of Political Obligation*, paras. 64f.

<sup>14</sup> Hegel attacked the Platonic state in which people were pushed around, into jobs which they had no particular desire to do, and had no say in the matter, *Philosophy of Right*, Add. to para. 262; subjective freedom, which takes into account the desires and the aptitudes of individuals is essential to the ethical life, and it was, in his opinion, Christianity which first introduced this subjective element (Add. to para. 185). He attacked the view which tries to ignore passions in man and declared that all great actions have demanded an element of private interest and of self-seeking desires, *Philosophy of History* (E. T. 1894), pp. 24f.

freely fits himself. When we come on to discuss the positive liberals we shall see that many of them were idealists, and held a combination of the realist and the positive empiricist conceptions of liberty. Thinkers like Lord Acton and de Ruggiero, whom we shall not include in our discussion of positive liberty, appear to have rejected the extreme realist position as well as the empiricist position. For them a free man is not one who is actually doing what he ought to do—what is right or reasonable—but one who is in a position to do so.<sup>15</sup>

The empiricist conception of liberty is roughly that a person is free when he can do as he wishes. Nevertheless, complications arise here. If an individualistic conception of society be held, then it is thought that individuals can exist in a society without being greatly affected by that society, except insofar as the government imposes certain restrictions and obligations upon them; and the person who holds this view we shall denominate a negative liberal. The object is to leave men alone as much as possible; all state intervention is regarded as bad, and must be limited to the protection of life, or of life and property. We may take Hobbes as an example. For him a man is free when he can do as he wishes, when there is no external impediment placed in his way.<sup>16</sup> In the

<sup>15</sup> Liberty is "not . . . the power of doing what we like, but the right of *being able to do* what we ought," wrote Acton, *The Rambler* (1860), p. 146 (my italics). Cf. also; "By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what *he believes* his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion." *The History of Freedom*, p. 3 (my italics). This latter definition is somewhat more subjective than the former. De Ruggiero declared that by "recognizing as the only form of freedom the freedom to do right" we should destroy this freedom itself (*op. cit.*, p. 356). T. H. Green appears to have held a somewhat similar position; cf. pp. 120., *infra*.

<sup>16</sup> "A free agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and . . . liberty is the absence of external impediments." *Of Liberty and Necessity*, *English Works* (1840), iv, pp. 275-6. The concept of liberty applies in Hobbes's thought to inanimate as well as to animate bodies, and an object which is tied down is to that extent unfree; *Leviathan*, ch. 21. The constraint, however, must be external. If a man is sick, Hobbes does not say that he is unfree to get up; water is not unfree when it cannot go uphill; *Liberty and Necessity*, *E.W.*, iv, p. 174. There is no opposition between freedom and necessity, the will is determined in its decisions as all things are, and a man is free

state there should be as much liberty as possible,<sup>17</sup> which for Hobbes meant as little law as possible.<sup>18</sup> He was a negative liberal because he does not appear to have conceived the possibility of laws increasing human freedom, and he did not hold, with the positive liberals, that a man is more free in a situation where he can fulfill many choices than in one where he can fulfill a few or only one, as long as the impediments are not external.<sup>19</sup> A man is unfree only insofar as he cannot do what he wishes; the fact that he cannot, through ignorance, wish otherwise than he does, is irrelevant.

Another negative liberal whom we shall discuss at a later stage is Herbert Spencer, and I only mention him now for the purpose of drawing a distinction between two sorts of negative liberals. While all positive liberals were or are dogmatic, not all negative liberals were or are. For Hobbes in the *Leviathan* liberty is only an optional extra which the sovereign will find it convenient to grant; there can be no moral right to any liberty on the part of the subjects; politics is not concerned with liberty and the subject must be content with as much as the sovereign "shall think most convenient."<sup>20</sup>

when he can carry out these decisions; *Leviathan*, ch. 21. He is clear that if a body lacks the power to do something it is not to be called unfree, but if this power—perhaps financial means—could have been supplied by the state and was not, would Hobbes say that a poor man was constrained in this matter? Probably not.

<sup>17</sup> It is bad, he thought, "that there should be more laws than necessarily serve for the good of the magistrate and his subjects." *De cive*, in *E.W.*, ii, p. 178.

<sup>18</sup> "The liberty of a subject lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath prætermitted." *Leviathan*, ch. 21.

<sup>19</sup> "Extrinsic causes that take away endeavour, are not to be called impediments." *Liberty, Necessity and Chance*, *E.W.*, v, p. 352. Thus, for Hobbes, ignorance is not an impediment, and education not a means of increasing liberty.

<sup>20</sup> *Leviathan*, ch. 21. Efforts to prove that Hobbes was a liberal are not particularly successful. It is true that Hobbes's sovereign might decide to be liberal, and Hobbes hoped that he will, but there can be no moral obligation upon him to do so. Hume is another sceptical liberal, who saw liberty as something which might as well be allowed, because there are some things which governments just cannot enforce; it is not for him a positive value in politics. The world is too young declares the sceptic, to discover truth or right, and

Liberty is the residue which may or may not remain after the sovereign has finished; it is desirable that there should be liberty but there is no moral necessity to give as much of it as possible in each situation. Liberty is not for Hobbes one of the ends of politics. Spencer on the other hand held that the purpose of politics is the development of character and that the best way for character to develop is by leaving people as far as possible free to do as they wish.<sup>21</sup> Liberty for him is a positive value which it is the purpose of the state to maintain, as far as maybe, within a system of order and peace.

By positive liberal I mean a person who holds an empiricist conception of liberty, but together with this accepts a view of society which is somewhat different from that of the negative liberal. He believes that liberty is an end—or the end—in politics, and holds that liberty means the ability to do what one chooses; but also he holds that as a man cannot wholly escape the influence of other individuals, of groups and of society at large, there may be cases in which the state can intervene with coercive measures which, while reducing the freedom of the person coerced (at the time he is coerced, at least<sup>22</sup>), increase the freedom of others who were perhaps in the power of the

politics must be conducted as a matter of pure convenience; cf. "Of Civil Liberty," in *Essays*, 1:12. Liberty is "attended with so few inconveniences" that it might as well be granted as not; cf. "Of the Liberty of the Press; in *ibid.*, 1:2. This distinction between dogmatic and sceptical liberalism is a vital one and is too often ignored.

<sup>21</sup> *Principles of Ethics*, para 380 (1900 ed., ii, p. 251).

<sup>22</sup> The question of time has sometimes been ignored in this context. The empiricists were right in saying that a man cannot be forced to be free; freedom is an ability to choose, and if you coerce a person you cannot *at the same time* increase his freedom: I think, though, that it is possible to coerce a person at time *t* and by doing so increase his freedom at time *t'*. An illustration might help. You can coerce a man by preventing him from going to a hypnotist, or from taking drugs, which in itself is an infringement of his liberty; yet this action might increase his freedom at a later date, because if he had been hypnotised or taken the drugs, he would not be in the position to make any choices at all. This is not, however, to say that restrictive action will always (a) increase the total freedom, and (b) work. This argument is distinct from the realist argument, which allows that a man would be following his real will in not going to the hypnotist, and thus would be forced to be free *at the same time* as he was being coerced.

person legislated against. There is, thinks the positive liberal, a coercion by society which can be quite as restrictive of individual freedom as coercion by the state. In addition to this he holds a slightly different view of liberty from that of the negative liberal. Not only does he believe, in Hobbist terminology, that external impediments (such as poverty) can be removed, and the range of fulfillable choices thus extended—which many of the negative liberals would have rejected—but also that some internal impediments can be removed. A person who is so ignorant that he does not know of the existence of certain alternatives and is thus not in a position to will them, is not, for the negative liberal, for this reason unfree. The negative liberal does not consider it possible or even relevant that the whole range of possible choices can be enlarged by government action. Thus there is a fairly clear distinction between our negative and positive liberals, in that the latter believe (a) that a person's freedom is limited in society anyway, and that the total freedom can be increased by coercing some people,<sup>23</sup> and (b) that the whole range of choices open to people can be enlarged by the removal of both external and internal impediments through government action. There were probably only a few pure instances of positive liberalism in our period; I shall, however, take L. T. Hobhouse as the paradigm case, most of the others we shall discuss being to a greater or lesser extent under the influence of idealist philosophy.

## II

Having distinguished our concepts, we must now proceed to an examination of the clash between negative and positive liberals in the period 1880-1914. First we shall look at the negative liberals, who became vocal and in some cases aggressive in this period owing to the great increase of governmental activity, which partly also inspired (and was partly inspired by) the proponents of positive liberty.

In 1854 an essay of Wilhelm von Humboldt (originally written in 1791) was translated into English and had a considerable influence.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> A. D. Lindsay pointed out that an increasingly interdependent society would manifest the need for more state intervention, even under the old conception of the state as the protector of negative liberty. "The State in Recent Political Theory," *The Political Quarterly*, February 1914, p. 143.

<sup>24</sup> The title was *The Sphere and Duties of Government*. Herbert Spencer claimed not to have read this book; "Specialized Administration," in

Humboldt preached a gospel of governmental limitation, arguing that

the State is to abstain from all solicitude for the positive welfare of the citizens and not to proceed a step farther than is necessary for their mutual security and protection against foreign enemies; for with no other object should it impose restrictions on freedom.<sup>25</sup>

J. S. Mill was duly impressed by Humboldt's book and used a passage from it as the text for his great manifesto of Victorian liberalism. Mill, who in his essay *On Liberty* stressed the negative side of governmental duties, moved slightly in the direction of collectivism and was loudly proclaimed by the Fabians to have become almost one of them.<sup>26</sup> Of Herbert Spencer, on the other hand, it has never been said that he moved towards socialism; indeed he was accused of retreating from his previously sympathetic attitude towards the laboring classes.<sup>27</sup> Spencer was certainly one of the most influential writers on politics and philosophy among English-speaking people<sup>28</sup> in the second half of the nineteenth century, and he has received less than justice at the hands of philosophers and historians.<sup>29</sup> Spencer held an organic view of the nature of society,<sup>30</sup> but was,

at the same time, an individualist who passionately believed in a limited state. The state is a mechanical creation existing for the purpose of maintaining law and order and a situation of equal freedom for the members of society. Like Mill<sup>31</sup> he denied that the state should ever intervene to protect a man from himself.<sup>32</sup> Freedom, for Spencer as for Hobbes, meant merely the non-existence of external impediments to the fulfilment of a man's wishes; unlike Hobbes, however, Spencer held that to be barriers to freedom these impediments must have been caused by human beings.<sup>33</sup> As society evolves from the militant type, where people are regimented into doing things, to an industrial society, where their position is determined by a contract into which they have freely entered, state activity will gradually diminish and voluntary activity will take the place of compulsion. Instead of being subordinated to the state, as in militant society, the personality of the citizens is respected,<sup>34</sup> and industrial society, he thought, would be characterized by an increasing heterogeneity, and by more scope for individual choice.<sup>35</sup> He objected to the state intervening, not only because it is harmful for individual liberty, but also because he regarded the state as incompetent and inefficient.<sup>36</sup>

Spencer recruited the theories of evolution and the survival of the fittest to support his belief in non-interference. Progress is achieved, he thought, by a process of the weak being sorted out and the strong being allowed to survive.<sup>37</sup> It is wrong to intervene in the course of nature, which is gradually improving the race,<sup>38</sup> and any organized attempt to do so (he did not include limited private benevolence)

*Essays Scientific Political and Speculative* (1874), iii, p. 166.

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>26</sup> "Every edition of Mill's book [*Principles of Political Economy*] became more and more Socialist. After his death the world learned the personal history, penned by his own hand, of his development from a mere political democrat to a convinced Socialist." *Fabian Essays* (1889), p. 58; cf. also p. 56, and Sidney Webb, *Towards Social Democracy?* (1919), p. 38. It is true that Mill declared that the ideas of himself and of Mrs. Taylor "would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists." *Autobiography* (World Classics ed.), p. 196. A glance at the much vaunted fourth part of the *Principles*, however, confirms the suspicion that in many ways he was only a socialist in the sense that all late Victorians were said to be.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. his reply to the charge in *The Man versus the State* (1940 ed.), pp. 52-3.

<sup>28</sup> He had a great influence in the United States, of course; cf. R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (1955 ed.), pp. 31f.

<sup>29</sup> None of his works, for example, appear in the syllabus of the "Theories of the Modern State" paper in the Cambridge history tripos.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. "Over-Legislation," in *Essays*, ii, p. 71; also *Principles of Sociology*, paras. 213f (1877 ed., i, pp. 466f) and "The Social Organism," in *Essays*, i, pp. 386f.

<sup>31</sup> "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." *On Liberty*, ch. I.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. "Over-Legislation," in *Essays*, ii, p. 55.

<sup>33</sup> Man can be under either a human or a natural master. "When he is under the impersonal coercion of Nature, we say that he is free; and when he is under the personal coercion of someone above him, we call him, according to the degree of his dependence, a slave, a serf, or a vassal." "From Freedom to Bondage," in T. Mackay, ed., *A Plea for Liberty* (1891), p. 6.

<sup>34</sup> *Principles of Sociology*, para. 564, ii, p. 697.

<sup>35</sup> "Progress: its Law and Cause," in *Essays*, i, p. 50.

<sup>36</sup> "Over-Legislation," in *Essays*, ii, pp. 67f.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Principles of Sociology*, para. 438, ii, pp. 240f.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *The Man versus the State*, p. 78.

will lead to a likely degeneration of the race.<sup>39</sup> Thus the state, which for some reason he regarded as unnatural, must not intervene more than is necessary for the protection of life and property; any further intervention is both immoral and inexpedient.<sup>40</sup> The less the state interferes, the more freedom there is for individuals, and this is the important thing. He does, however, appear to have believed that the liberty it is possible to grant to a people is limited in each generation.<sup>41</sup>

Spencer was not alone in his negative liberalism. In 1881 several men, including Wordsworth Donisthorpe and Auberon Herbert banded together to form a Non-Interference Union which was, however, still-born. In the following year their union was more fruitful and was blessed with increase in the form of The Liberty and Property Defence League, which gloried in the motto "Self-help versus State help." A growing amount of governmental intervention in a variety of spheres—in postal services, factory legislation, shipping regulation, sewage, housing and in other fields—had effected this union of such motley types as old-fashioned individualist radicals, aristocratic conservatives and barristers. The Earl of Pembroke, a stalwart of the League, believed that state intervention would inevitably fail, and that in the ensuing misery more demands would be made on state action until the situation got worse and worse.<sup>42</sup> The ideas of Donisthorpe and Herbert (who, in the words

of D. G. Ritchie, "if one may be allowed the expression out-Herberts Mr Herbert Spencer in his advocacy of *laissez faire*"<sup>43</sup>) are interesting in their own right and not merely as echoes of the voice of Spencer. Donisthorpe was probably the most acute of the Spencerians; he once suggested the idea of voluntary taxation—described by its opponents as passing the hat round—but dropped the idea as soon as it was adopted by Herbert and others.<sup>44</sup> Although there can, according to Donisthorpe, be no legal limitation upon the state (he was a lawyer) there can and should be a political limitation imposed from within;<sup>45</sup> he rejected the idea that there is any single principle to determine the limits of state intervention, pointing out, as others had before him,<sup>46</sup> that Mill's attempt falls to the ground owing to the fact that almost all acts are partly other-regarding.<sup>47</sup> There is, he believed, no general principle in the matter, and we must rely on "those middle principles which originate in experience and are verified by experience."<sup>48</sup> Herbert, on the other hand was more optimistic in this

<sup>39</sup> *Principles of State Interference* (1902 ed.), p. 57n.

<sup>40</sup> Donisthorpe, however, in the first place, only suggested the voluntary system for non-essentials, while there would be a system of compulsory taxation for such things as defense. Herbert embraced the idea with his usual radical enthusiasm, advocating the abolition of all but voluntary taxes; cf. his *The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State (For Liberty)* (1885), pp. 43f. Donisthorpe explained his own position in *Law in a Free State* (1885), p. 13.

<sup>41</sup> "The Limits of Liberty," in T. Mackay ed., *op. cit.*, p. 64. Another negative liberal wrote in the same vein, "It cannot be too carefully remembered that almost every clause of an act of parliament, if it have any force or effect at all, takes away a liberty from somebody, because it must of necessity speak of something which shall or shall not be done where before it was optional." Bruce Smith, *Liberty and Liberalism* (1887), p. 252. He went on to say that the situation in Britain was as good as could be expected, and that the policy of liberalism should be "to preserve that state of things." *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>42</sup> The Earl of Pembroke, *Liberty and Socialism*, pp. 82f, and J. F. Stephen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (1874 ed.), Preface to 2d. ed., p.x.

<sup>43</sup> "The Limits of Liberty," *op. cit.*, pp. 70f. Mill, of course, realized this; his distinction was rather between those things which affect others directly and those which only affect them indirectly.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>39</sup> "Society in its corporate capacity, cannot without immediate or remoter disaster interfere with the play of these opposed principles under which every species has reached such fitness for its mode of life as it possesses, and under which it maintains that fitness." *Ibid.*, p. 80. For another example of the conservative influence of evolutionary theory reference can be made to Sir Henry Maine, who praises "the strenuous and never-ending struggle for existence, the beneficent private war which makes one man strive to climb on the shoulders of another and remain there through the law of the survival of the fittest." *Popular Government* (1890 ed.), p. 50.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. "Prison Ethics," in *Essays*, ii, pp. 212-3.

<sup>41</sup> "There seems," he wrote, "good reason to think that the degree of liberty a people is capable of in any given age, is a fixed quantity; and that any artificial extension of it in one direction, simply brings about an equivalent limitation in some other direction." "Parliamentary Reform: the Dangers and the Safeguards," in *Essays*, ii, p. 378.

<sup>42</sup> Address to the members of the Liberty and Property Defense League in *Political Letters and Speeches* (1896), p. 183.

matter; "I would therefore beg you," he wrote,

to reject with scorn that idle and unmeaning creed which is so much in fashion to-day, of refusing to seek for general principles, and hoping to extract from the circumstances of the moment the right way of dealing with them.<sup>49</sup>

The limited duty of the state should not include the provision of services such as drainage, gas lighting or the enactment of such things as compulsory vaccination or factory legislation; the state should merely provide adequate and readily available legal machinery whereby citizens can claim damages when they catch disease from their neighbor's sewage, when their baker sells them adulterated bread, and when their husbands are devoured by the unfenced machinery of employers.

These thinkers, however, were not only opposed to state intervention but also to the existence of powerful groups in society. Donisthorpe thought that too much attention was being paid by individualists to the tyranny of the state; the laws of the church or of the jockey club could be quite as "socialistic" as those of the state.<sup>50</sup> "I affirm," he declared,

that a people might utterly abolish and even extirpate the State, and yet remain steeped to the lips in socialism of the most revolting type.<sup>51</sup>

Spencer looked with no great favor upon trade unions,<sup>52</sup> though neither he nor his followers would have wished to legislate against any of these combinations; it was, in their opinion, up to the members of these associations to act.<sup>53</sup> The concept of evolution was used by these men, just as it was by their master, to refute the advocates of state intervention, and any interference with "the course of nature" was conceived as barring the way to progress.<sup>54</sup>

Many of the negative liberals maintained that liberty is diametrically opposed to law.

J. R. Seeley, for example, thought that liberty is not merely the opposite of over-legislation, but of law and government itself. "There cannot," he said,

be in a state perfect liberty, for perfect liberty is equivalent to total absence of government, and where government is absent there can be no state.<sup>55</sup>

Nevertheless, there was, for Seeley, an inferior sort of liberty to be found in the state, and it exists in inverse proportion to the number of laws; we do not ask what the laws are like, good or bad, but how many there are.<sup>56</sup> Auberon Herbert accepted much of this.<sup>57</sup> Donisthorpe, on the other hand, said some things which indicate an interstice in the negativist armor which was to be exploited by the positive liberals. "All law," he wrote,

is a restriction on liberty. It is a peculiarity of good law that it gives more liberty with one hand than it takes away with the other. The reverse is true of a bad law.<sup>58</sup>

The door was open to a new view.

### III

It is now time to discuss how this last admission by one of the school of negative liberals was exploited by believers in a positive notion of liberty, and how these new liberals (or as Spencer called them, New Tories) attacked the idea that evolutionary theory leads to a belief in "let be." If we say that T. H. Green was the great prophet of positive liberalism, this must not be taken to mean that he was a pure instance of the logical type; he was strongly influenced by what I have called the realist conception of freedom, although he would not be denominated an extreme realist in this matter.

In 1881 Green gave a lecture entitled "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," which was to be the manifesto of the positive liberals who followed him. He had laid

<sup>49</sup> Herbert, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>50</sup> "The Limits of Liberty," p. 91; cf. also "I have recently examined the rules of some of the principal London clubs, and I find that they are, many of them, [presumably he means the rules and not the clubs!] largely socialistic." *Ibid.*, pp. 91-2.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>52</sup> "From Freedom to Bondage," in T. Mackay, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 20f.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. G. Howells, "Liberty for Labour," in T. Mackay, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 110.

<sup>54</sup> E. S. Robertson, "The Impracticability of Socialism," in *ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>55</sup> *Introduction to Political Science* (1902 ed.), p. 119.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *For Liberty*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>58</sup> *Law in a Free State*, p. 17; cf. also "But liberty and lawlessness should not be confounded, one with the other; they are separate and distinct, legally and morally. Individual liberty is consistent with law and order, and the ideal of a State is reached in proportion to the individual liberty attained, and the order which is maintained, in the commonwealth of a free people." George Howell, "Liberty for Labour," in T. Mackay, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 109.



the theoretical basis of his liberalism in his Oxford lectures on political obligation. Society is not, he had declared, merely a collection of self-sufficient individuals come together to protect property, with natural rights which they bring into society and have against society; rights must be recognized or they are mere "powers"<sup>59</sup>—like the natural right in Hobbes's state of nature. The state exists for maintaining the conditions of the good life which can only be lived in common, and this common pursuit of the good must be recognized by society and by its members. "There are," he wrote,

no rights antecedent to society, none that men brought with them into a society which they contracted to form.<sup>60</sup>

If the common interest requires it, no right can be alleged against it.<sup>61</sup>

The freedom which we aim at is not merely a lack of restraint, but "a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying."<sup>62</sup> It should be noted that the freedom spoken of is not the power to do as one wishes, but the power to do something worthwhile. To increase "true freedom," the state must not provide the means for a man to do as he desires, but the means for him to make the best of himself.<sup>63</sup> If this takes one step backwards from the concept of freedom as doing as we like, which Spencer and the empiricists had endeavored to establish, it takes two forward in the direction of positive freedom by the idea that society can often do much to provide the power or the means for someone to do something, and thus increase individual freedom. In one of the most significant statements of the decade Green declared that if indeed freedom be taken in a positive sense then

we are right in refusing to ascribe the glory of freedom to a state in which the apparent elevation of the few is founded on the degradation of the many.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>59</sup> *Principles of Political Obligation*, para 31.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 99. "There is no right 'but thinking makes it so'," para. 136.

<sup>62</sup> "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," in *Works* (1885), iii, p. 371.

<sup>63</sup> "... the mere removal of compulsion, the mere enabling a man to do as he likes, is in itself no contribution to true freedom ... the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves." *Ibid.*, pp. 371-2.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

It was left to later thinkers to develop the concept of positive liberty in its application to political life. We shall, for the purpose of convenience divide these into three groups, first the idealist positive liberals, secondly a group of practical politicians, and finally we shall look at the purest instance of positive liberty in our period.

In the whole of this movement the influence of Oxford University will be apparent. Green was at Balliol; Edward Caird was a fellow of Merton from 1864 to 1866 and after a long period in Scotland returned to Oxford in 1893 as Master of Balliol; D. G. Ritchie was a fellow of Jesus College and later professor at St. Andrews in Scotland; Sir Henry Jones had a connection with Oxford through his teacher Edward Caird<sup>65</sup>—he was at Bangor for some time and later returned to Glasgow; others such as Arnold Toynbee should also be mentioned in this context. After imbibing their social philosophy from such men as Green and Caird, the younger men went out into the provincial universities not merely to teach, but also to follow Green's example and play a full part in civic life; they helped to found trade unions,<sup>66</sup> joined city councils and lectured to business men on the moral obligations of citizenship.<sup>67</sup>

Almost all this first group of positive liberals held a conception of liberty which was greatly influenced by what we have called the realist notion of liberty. "It is," stated Sir Henry Jones,

only the pseudo freedom of irrational caprice which has been limited. Nor has the state invaded any rights in such action; for the liberty to do wrong is not a right, but the perversion of a right and its negation.<sup>68</sup>

F. C. Montague, another Oxford thinker in this group, declared that what is important is not liberty to do as we like—this is not real freedom; rightly conceived, freedom is the release from instinct and thoughtless desire.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>65</sup> "I was born," he wrote, "in Llangernyw in 1852, and born again in 1876 in Edward Caird's classroom." H. J. W. Hetherington, *Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones* (1924), p. 20n.

<sup>66</sup> Henry Jones and J. H. Muirhead, *The Life of Edward Caird*, p. 20.

<sup>67</sup> Henry Jones, *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, pp. 262f.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10. This can also be seen in an earlier essay, "The Social Organism," in A. Seth and R. B. Haldane, eds., *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, p. 201.

<sup>69</sup> *The Limits of Individual Liberty* (1885), p. 122.

Ritchie was a follower of Hegel and attempted to recruit him for the cause of state intervention,<sup>70</sup> pointing out a possible implication of Mill's man on a rotten bridge,<sup>71</sup> which Bosanquet was later to use.<sup>72</sup>

The positive liberals thought that a much wider conception of liberty than that held by the old liberals was necessary; education, they argued, extends the freedom of citizens.<sup>73</sup> Insofar as liberty is to be regarded as an end in politics it is not opposed to law, but on the contrary relies upon law for its maintenance.<sup>74</sup> "The civilized state does more for its citizens than the barbarous state," Jones observed, "and at the same time enables them to do more for themselves."<sup>75</sup> Cliffe Leslie had made the same point in 1861—that the individual is not free to do something if he has not the means and the power to do it.<sup>76</sup> This conception of liberty as including the power to do things was explicitly or implicitly rejected by the old negative liberals,<sup>77</sup> and even if they held it their

individualistic conception of society would have led them to minimize the number of hindrances which could be hindered by state action.

The positive liberals in this period held a conception of society, not simply as a heap of atoms, but as a community of mutually interacting beings; these beings are continually influencing each other and there is always the possibility of the state intervening to prevent coercion and so increase liberty. The old liberalism had taught—and quite rightly according to the new liberals—that many old restrictions had become unnecessary and ought to be removed; their aim was increased liberty and their means were the removal of antiquated restraints and prohibitions. Their work had been well done, but something more was needed; the positive liberals were dissatisfied with the system of "despotism tempered by partial anarchy,"<sup>78</sup> which was the logical result of the individualist philosophy of many of the negative liberals. Ritchie pointed out how liberalism had come to be associated with a negative state policy.<sup>79</sup> Yet there is, he argued, no inconsistency in the same party struggling for the removal of bad restrictions and also for the imposition of good ones, both for the purpose of increasing freedom.<sup>80</sup> State and civic enterprises had greatly multiplied and yet so far from diminishing the realm of individual freedom they had enlarged it.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>70</sup> "Put together Hegel's resuscitation of the Hellenic conception of the State with his declaration in the *Philosophy of History*, that the end of the modern State is to realize the positive freedom of all, and it becomes obvious enough that, though the advocate of *laissez faire* will not relish Hegel's politics, he will have more reason to blame him for (unconsciously it may be) begetting socialism than for supporting the old régime." *Mind*, Vol. 13 (1888), p. 434.

<sup>71</sup> *Principles of State Interference*, pp. 86f., though he does not accuse Mill of holding a theory of the real will without knowing it.

<sup>72</sup> *Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. 64f.

<sup>73</sup> D. G. Ritchie, *Natural Rights* (1895), pp. 139-40.

<sup>74</sup> D. G. Ritchie, *The Moral Function of the State* (1887), p. 9; cf. also "Evolution and Democracy," in Stanton Coit, ed., *Ethical Democracy* (1900), p. 27.

<sup>75</sup> *The Working Faith*, pp. 143-4.

<sup>76</sup> "Practical Freedom involves much more than the absence of legal and social restraint; every limitation of power is an abridgement of positive liberty. A man is not free to go from Shropshire to London . . . if the journey is too long and expensive for him; nor is he actually free to develop a powerful intellect if education lies beyond his reach." "The Individual and the Crowd," in *Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy* (1879), pp. 19-20.

<sup>77</sup> One of them rejected the idea in explicit Hobbist terminology: "No one now-a-days would seriously contend that one citizen should possess better opportunities than another. It is admitted, on all hands . . . that every citizen should

be free to attempt anything which his fellow-citizens are allowed to do. . . . There is a great difference between giving a man the liberty to do anything, and supplying him with the means with which to do it. This distinction has been clearly stated by Hobbes. . . . True Liberalism would give to every man the liberty to do anything which his fellow-citizens are allowed to do; but Socialism is not content with liberty only: it wants the state to confer the power also, that is to say the means." Bruce Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 434. The distinction between opportunity—in any substantial sense of the term—and means or power is prodigiously deep.

<sup>78</sup> *Studies in Political and Social Ethics* (1902), p. 58; cf. "Arbitrary freedom (of the individual) and arbitrary despotism (of Caesar or the State) are not mutually exclusive. They are only a dual phenomenon of the same situation. They may struggle with each other more or less, but by nature they are allies." F. Tönnies, *Community and Association* (E. T. 1955), p. 235.

<sup>79</sup> *Principles of State Interference*, pp. 137-8.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>81</sup> "Is it," demanded Sir Henry Jones of the new idea of the positive state, "a mammoth State,

The state might, argued the positive liberals, take over more things and at the same time leave a wider range of choices open to individuals. Those who worked in the mines with no effective choice, being compelled by economic necessity, were not really free; Jones wrote of them:

They really are as little free as an instrument is free from the manipulation of the man who plays on it.<sup>82</sup>

It is possible, as James Seth pointed out, that by intervening in the economic sphere, the state can secure greater power and freedom to its members.<sup>83</sup> Property, thought Jones, is essential for individual freedom, and the fact that it is sometimes the means of selfishness and greed is no reason to abolish it; property is also the condition of many virtues such as generosity.<sup>84</sup>

This school of positive liberals rejected the idea that the state exists merely to maintain the *status quo* in matters of property, and to keep the citizens from each other's throats. Ritchie ridiculed the Spencerian conception of society with no state intervention except to provide means for criminal and civil redress; the amount of litigation would be too great for a tolerable society, and most men would not have the time to engage in it.<sup>85</sup>

Another important plank in the Spencerian platform was attacked most effectively by Ritchie and others. This was the use of evolutionary theory to bolster up theories of *laissez faire*. Progress is not the same as evolution,<sup>86</sup> they pointed out; progress is achieved by the diminution of waste, while

a Leviathan, gradually absorbing its citizens into itself, annihilating their private wills and all the good and evil which springs therefrom . . . ? Or is it a country whose people are more free, whose private wealth is greater, whose individual enterprises are more far-reaching . . . ? It is possible that the State as a single organism grows in power, even as its citizens acquire freedom." *The Working Faith*, pp. 103-4.

<sup>82</sup> *Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones*, p. 232.

<sup>83</sup> *A Study of Ethical Principles* (1908 ed.), p. 291; cf. also Jones, *The Working Faith*, p. 105.

<sup>84</sup> *The Working Faith*, p. 96.

<sup>85</sup> *Principles of State Interference*, pp. 60-1.

<sup>86</sup> "Every careful biologist (the qualification is unfortunately necessary) recognizes that evolution is not identical with what we mean by progress. Even in the biological sphere, success in the struggle may be attained by degeneration as well as by advance." Ritchie, *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 5 (1894-5), p. 110.

The mere struggle for existence between individuals means waste unchecked. The State, by its action, can in many cases consciously and deliberately diminish this fearful loss; in many cases by freeing the individual from the necessity of a perpetual struggle for the mere conditions of life, it can set free individuality and so make culture possible.<sup>87</sup>

Rational selection must come to take the place of natural selection, which is a cruel and wasteful process.<sup>88</sup> Nature is non-moral, and must be governed by moral forces.<sup>89</sup> In an address to the Oxford branch of the Guild of St. Matthew, Ritchie remarked upon the curious way in which those who were most suspicious of the state with a big "S" were willing to throw themselves into the hands of nature with a very large "N."<sup>90</sup> John Caird similarly remarked that civilization is the result of a struggle with the irrational aspects of nature, rather than of a meek submission to natural processes.<sup>91</sup> T. H. Huxley lent the weight of his prestige to this assault against Spencerian biopolitics. The natural process must be checked by rational and ethical forces, he maintained in his Romanes Lecture of 1893; it is the ethically fittest who should survive.<sup>92</sup> Ethical beliefs, the scientist observed, may be a part of the evolutionary process, but this is no reason why they should not govern it;<sup>93</sup> neglect of this fact leads to what he called "the fanatical in-

<sup>87</sup> *Principles of State Interference*, p. 50. This is not to say that a study of evolution is unnecessary. By studying what has been we are able to see the possibilities for the future, and are able to make use of them; cf. *The Moral Function of the State*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>88</sup> *Darwinism and Politics* (1889 ed.), p. 82; cf. also *Natural Rights*, p. 64.

<sup>89</sup> *Philosophical Studies* (1905), p. 334.

<sup>90</sup> *The Moral Function of the State*, p. 7. Spencer seems to have recognized the distinction between the fittest and the best. "Very often," he wrote, "that which humanly speaking is inferiority, causes the survival." "Mr. Martineau on Evolution," in *Essays*, iii, p. 242. Yet he continued in his political writings to argue as though they were the same.

<sup>91</sup> "It is because man is a spirit and not an animal that history is the record of a progress to which the biologist expert has no key. Civilization is not the result of the forces of nature, but the issue of a struggle with them." *University Addresses* (1898), p. 259.

<sup>92</sup> "Evolution and Ethics," in *Collected Essays* (1895), ix, p. 81.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

dividualism of our time."<sup>94</sup> Darwin himself was always cautious in expressing his views on these matters, but he seems to have held the opinion that while the development of the moral sense itself can largely be attributed to natural selection, its content is due much more to education, habit and religion.<sup>95</sup>

Simply because ethical ideas have evolved by natural processes we are not, thought Ritchie, justified in believing that they are therefore invalid; the origin of an idea must be distinguished from its validity. The logical principle of contradiction and the ethical idea of duty come to man in the process of evolution, but they are not therefore inapplicable.<sup>96</sup> We might be able to explain how a few individuals came to own a large proportion of the country, but this is no justification or condemnation of their doing so at the present time; this, he argued, must be sought in social utility.<sup>97</sup>

The second group of people to be dealt with are the politicians, in particular H. H. Asquith, R. B. Haldane, Edward Grey and Herbert Samuel. These men followed closely the ideas of the philosophers already discussed. For them liberty was a positive concept and they believed that the old negative idea must be superseded. Asquith went up to Balliol in 1870 and became an ardent admirer of T. H. Green, though more, perhaps, with regard to his social and political ideas than to his philosophy which was always something of a mystery to the politician.<sup>98</sup> A mere freedom from compulsion and restraint does not make men free; "To be really free," he wrote, "they must be able to make the best use of faculty, opportunity, energy, life."<sup>99</sup> He based his election

address of 1892 upon this positive notion of freedom; it was this, he thought, which justified the Liberal Party's insistence on more state intervention. "I am one of those," he declared,

who believe that the collective action of the community may and ought to be employed positively as well as negatively; to raise as well as to level; to equalize opportunities no less than to curtail privileges; to make the freedom of the individual a reality and not a pretence.<sup>100</sup>

He maintained these views on liberty to the end of his life.<sup>101</sup> It is this concept of positive liberty which led to the progressive attitude of liberals on such questions as education, housing, and factory legislation; however, elements of the realist conception of freedom remained in the Liberal Party's attitude to the drink question, although by a tortuous process it is possible to justify temperance legislation under the canons of the empiricist notion of positive liberty.<sup>102</sup>

Others in the group of new liberal politicians were Edward Grey, who was at Balliol from 1880 (although he was sent down for a short period); Herbert Samuel, who was there from 1889 to 1893, and Arthur Acland, who was bursar of the college for some years. In his book on *Liberalism*, which embodied many of the positive liberal ideas of Green and the philosophers at the same time as attempting to work out their practical implications in politics, Herbert Samuel argued that although self-reliance and self-help are important in the development of character, this does not rule out the need for state intervention. The extension

Andrews, whose Professor of Philosophy was Sir Henry Jones. The professor wrote of the politician, "I like the statesman in him and believe in his cause." *Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones*, p. 55.

<sup>100</sup> *Memories and Reflections of the Earl of Oxford and Asquith*, i, p. 113.

<sup>101</sup> *Speeches of the Earl of Oxford and Asquith* (1927), p. 308.

<sup>102</sup> I.e., by saying that a man who is drunk, like a man who is hypnotized, is not in a position to take decisions; thus it is possible to restrict his freedom at time *t* in order to increase it at time *t'*. In this matter, however, it should be borne in mind that present freedom is worth more than future freedom, and on the question of liquor laws the position of Archbishop Magee is perhaps more attractive to the liberal than that of the restrictionists; "I would," he declared, "distinctly prefer freedom to sobriety." House of Lords Debates, May 2, 1872, quoted in *Speeches and Addresses*, p. 120.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82. Huxley was by no means a socialist; cf. "Government: Anarchy or Regimentation," in *Collected Essays*, i, p. 402.

<sup>95</sup> *The Descent of Man* (1871), ii, p. 404.

<sup>96</sup> *Mind*, Vol. 10 (1885), p. 136. "Whether our ideals of goodness are due to natural selection (of individuals and societies and usages) or partly to natural selection and partly to use-inheritance may be an interesting historical problem; but it has no direct bearing on the problem of what meaning there is in calling anything 'good' at all." "Heredity and Ethics," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, iii: I, p. 147.

<sup>97</sup> *Darwin and Hegel* (1893), p. 29, and *Natural Rights*, p. 104.

<sup>98</sup> J. A. Spender and H. Asquith, *Life of the Earl of Oxford and Asquith*, i, p. 36.

<sup>99</sup> Introduction to H. Samuel, *Liberalism* (1902), pp. ix-x. Asquith was for a time Member of Parliament for the Fifeshire Burghs, in which constituency was situated the University of St.

of law need not reduce the realm of freedom, but can enlarge it:

to support a policy of State regulation in industry is quite consistent with a belief in liberty, and not merely consistent with it but rather to be regarded as its necessary consequence.<sup>103</sup>

The liberal government of 1892-5 was considerably influenced by the ideas of political and social liberty advocated by these new liberals, and Samuel discusses in his *Memories* the development of thought about liberty among politicians in this period.<sup>104</sup> The influence of such men as Ritchie and T. H. Huxley was beginning to tell.<sup>105</sup> Later a group of Liberals including Haldane and Charles Trevelyan went over to the Labour Party, though they claimed to retain a belief in liberty as the end in politics. They regarded the Labour Party policy as a natural extension of the ideas of positive liberty which they had held as liberals.<sup>106</sup>

Mention should also be made of the attitude of the Fabians to the question of liberty. They regarded the positive conception of liberty as one of the ends of political activity; in 1891 Sydney Webb had remarked on the individualists' inability to understand the phenomenon of "the expansion of the sphere of government in the interests of liberty itself."<sup>107</sup> This effective liberty could, he thought, be realized only by substituting what he called "democratic self-government" in industry for control by a few individuals.<sup>108</sup> The prospectus of the Fabian Society proclaimed that its socialist programme would result in much less interference with personal freedom than was the case with the contemporary system.<sup>109</sup> They do not appear to have thought that liberty was the sole end in political activity and believed that it might have to be sacrificed on occasions to the demands of equality.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>103</sup> *Liberalism*, p. 28.

<sup>104</sup> *Memories* (1945), p. 25.

<sup>105</sup> Samuel records going to hear Huxley's Romanes Lecture, *ibid.*, p. II.

<sup>106</sup> "I never felt *laissez faire* inherent in Liberalism, or I could never have remained as long as I did in the Liberal Party." Charles Trevelyan, Preface to H. Langshaw, *Socialism and the Historic Function of Liberalism* (1925), p. vi.

<sup>107</sup> "The Difficulties of Individualism," reprinted in *Socialism and Individualism* (1908), p. 22.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. Sidney Webb, *Socialism in England* (1890), p. 13.

<sup>110</sup> *Fabian Essays*, p. 59.

It is not always quite clear whether L. T. Hobhouse wished to make liberty the sole end of politics or merely one among several. Certainly he thought that development of individual character is the ultimate end; insistence on personality is the creed of democracy just as the dominance of power and efficiency is that of bureaucracy.<sup>111</sup> It is upon this notion of the development of character that true liberalism is based. The essential thing about liberalism is not that it is unconcerned with people's characters, but that it believes that the best way for character to develop is not by pushing people around, but by leaving open to them as many effective choices as possible. "If we refrain from coercing a man for his own good," he wrote,

it is not because his good is indifferent to us, but because it cannot be furthered by coercion.<sup>112</sup>

The chief means of encouraging the development of character is the increase of freedom, not merely negative freedom, but the positive ability to fulfill choices. He emphasized, as Ritchie had done, that as liberty involves the power of doing things, it is not opposed to the principle of state intervention; the modern state has more power than the ancient one, yet there is more freedom left to the individual.<sup>113</sup> The criterion of state intervention must always be whether it will increase the total amount of individual freedom.<sup>114</sup> J. A. Hobson, another of the positive liberals, and a friend of Hobhouse, said much the same.<sup>115</sup> Bosanquet too had pointed out that there is no antagonism between law and liberty—even "in the plainest and simplest sense of the word."<sup>116</sup> "The range of possible actions presented to the individual for his choice," he wrote,

becomes, as society develops, more and more com-

<sup>111</sup> *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (1918), p. 134.

<sup>112</sup> *Liberalism*, p. 143. "Liberalism is the belief that society can safely be founded on this self-directing power of personality." *Ibid.*, p. 123. "The central principle of Liberalism is self-government." *Democracy and Reaction* (1904), p. 47.

<sup>113</sup> *Democracy and Reaction*, p. 127.

<sup>114</sup> *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (1911), p. 203; cf. also, "Hence in the main the extension of control does not impair liberty, but on the contrary is the means of extending liberty and may and should be conceived with that very object in view." *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>115</sup> *The Crisis of Liberalism* (1909), pp. 92-3.

<sup>116</sup> *The Civilization of Christendom* (1893), p. 379.

prehensive. His liberty, therefore, in the common straight-forward sense of doing what he pleases becomes greater and greater.<sup>117</sup>

But Bosanquet was never content with the simple sense!

Hobhouse was one of the pure instances of our category of positive liberals. Unlike the earlier representatives whom we have discussed, he was basically an empiricist and regarded freedom as the ability to do what one wants to do, whether good or evil; he purged the concept of positive liberty of the elements of idealism which up to this time had adhered to it. Although there is, for Hobhouse, no antithesis between law and liberty when talking of the whole society, there is in regard to one individual. All law is restraint, and all restraint is a limit on freedom. "Law," he observed,

of course restrains the individual; it is therefore opposed to his liberty at a given moment and in a given direction.<sup>118</sup>

Criticizing the idealist conception of freedom, he pointed out that Hegel

saw that freedom involved restraint on something but did not see that it was restraint on something else, that which is free being in the respect in which it is free necessarily unconstrained.<sup>119</sup>

Hobhouse was a fervent critic of idealist metaphysics, and occasionally burst forth into torrents of righteous anger against the influence of this philosophy on social and intellectual life. "The Rhine has flowed into the Thames," he declared in a famous passage, "at any rate into those upper reaches of the Thames, known locally as the Isis."<sup>120</sup> The effect of idealist philosophy was to weaken the brain, to undermine morality by blurring the distinction between right and wrong, and "to throw a gloss over stupidity, and prejudice, and caste, and tradition."<sup>121</sup>

Like Ritchie and Huxley before him, Hobhouse attacked the idea that evolutionary theories necessarily lead to a policy of non-intervention by the state; people who have hastily applied ideas of the survival of the

fittest to society in an effort to prevent state action have understood neither Darwin nor society.<sup>122</sup> The fittest to survive in an all-out struggle are not always the best. The evolutionist, however, is right in one sense; the fittest ought to survive. But who are the fittest for life in society? Are they the unscrupulous men of force who are likely to survive in the anarchical struggle for existence? No; rather they are the men most fitted for co-operating with others.<sup>123</sup> It is moral and social progress to eliminate and restrict the immoral and the unsocial man; but there is all the difference in the world between progress and evolution.<sup>124</sup> Progress is not inevitable,<sup>125</sup> and so far as there has been any it has been social rather than racial;<sup>126</sup> there is no law of racial progress to which we must meekly submit.<sup>127</sup> The study and practice of eugenics might prove useful, but its application is more a matter of ethics than of biology; before we start improving the stock by rational means we must have some conception of what man exists for.<sup>128</sup>

The state can, then, intervene in the social process quite legitimately, and in so doing will not necessarily diminish the total of human freedom. How did the concept of positive freedom apply in practice for Hobhouse? First of all, he believed that it implies a considerable degree of equality;<sup>129</sup> a reorganization of society is needed if we are to achieve a maximum of human freedom. The so-called freedom of contract under which the laborer is said freely to work for a particular employer, is a myth; in many slave systems a man is forced into

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84-5.

<sup>118</sup> *The Labour Movement* (1893), p. 91.

<sup>119</sup> "The Ethical Basis of Collectivism," in *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 8 (1898), pp. 145, 147.

<sup>120</sup> "I was never one of those who think that the general fact of progress may be readily assumed, or that mankind constantly advances to higher things by an automatic law which can be left to itself." *Development and Purpose* (1913), p. xxi.

<sup>121</sup> *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 80.

<sup>122</sup> *Development and Purpose*, p. 207, cf. also *Democracy and Reaction*, pp. 99-100 and 115-6.

<sup>123</sup> *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 43.

<sup>124</sup> *Liberalism*, pp. 24, 29. "Is a man free," demanded J. A. Hobson, "who has not equal opportunity with his fellows of such access to all material and moral means of personal development and work as shall contribute to his own welfare and that of his society?" *The Crisis of Liberalism*, p. 93.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>118</sup> *Liberalism*, p. 23.

<sup>119</sup> *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 36. G. D. H. Cole similarly attacked the idealists, *Labour in the Commonwealth* (1918), p. 194, although only a year previous he appears to have held much the same notion of freedom himself, *Self-Government in Industry* (1917), p. 227.

<sup>120</sup> *Democracy and Reaction*, p. 77.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

slavery by economic necessity.<sup>130</sup> Trade unions do not primarily restrict the liberty of the individual but increase his power (and thus his positive liberty). "True consent is free consent," he declared, "and full freedom of consent implies equality on the part of both parties to the bargain."<sup>131</sup>

A considerable growth of government and municipal trading might be found not only consistent with, but positively to promote, individual freedom; direct government management, however, is only one of the methods of public control which can be exercised in the interests of freedom.<sup>132</sup> A great extension of public education would be justified in the interests of positive freedom; it is necessary, remarked Hobson, "both to the achievement and the utilization of every other element of personal liberty."<sup>133</sup> Freedom to choose a job, to be really effective, implies equality of opportunity with others, and this in turn justifies liberals in demanding a state system of free education.

There is an important difference in the way in which such men as Hobhouse and Hobson interpreted positive liberty, and the way in which Bosanquet and his school did. For the former, some considerable changes in the structure of society were thought to be essential for the securing of real freedom, while Bosanquet was willing to see the state intervene only to help individual "cases" back on to their feet; any social reorganization was to him anathema, and an increase in wealth by the lower orders might undermine their characters. With all his talk of society as an organism, Bosanquet, like Spencer before him, had a basically individualistic approach to the practical problems of society such as poverty. The Charity Organisation Society had a fanatical belief in self-reliance, in providence, and in thrift—"the duty of carrying at least one's own burden"<sup>134</sup>—which sounds passing strange from a professed opponent of individualism. Promiscuous gifts to the poor were held to undermine their characters,<sup>135</sup> although the inheritance of large

sums of money by the rich carries responsibility with it and enables the possessor to develop his character by donations to deserving causes.<sup>136</sup>

There was much in common between the ideas of Hobson, Hobhouse and others of this school, and those which inspired the formation of the Labour Party, but the liberals remained critical of certain aspects of socialist policy. As early as 1902 Hobhouse hoped for a union between the new liberals and the rising labourites,<sup>137</sup> and later classified political thinkers as follows: Communist and Theoretic Socialist; Ordinary Labour and Good Liberal; Bad Liberal and Ordinary Tory; Diehard. He went on to observe that the distinction between the ordinary labor man and the positive liberal was obsolete.<sup>138</sup> Yet both he and Hobson were suspicious of doctrinaire socialism, which was thought to lay insufficient emphasis on individual liberty and too much on state power.<sup>139</sup>

#### IV

A study of the rise of the concept of positive liberty is interesting from several points of view, and illustrates the power of this word—or rather concept of—liberty. Instead of renouncing liberty as the great end in politics, the positive liberals found it convenient to enlarge and adapt the notion of liberty.

On the practical level, though much cannot be said about this here, the movement has an interest. The Labour Party in Britain is abandoning some of its old dogmas and is moving towards a more flexible position. In spite of its old puritan spirit, it is making its peace with a situation of relative prosperity which it was instrumental in creating. Yet the concept of flexibility is only meaningful when applied to an object which has some purpose or aim; to have flexible ideas is not to have no ideas at all—and there is always the danger of thinking that it is. Empirical politics, as Professor Oakeshott has reminded us,<sup>140</sup> is strictly

these chance interferences." "The Principles and Chief Dangers of the Administration of Charity," in *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 3 (1892-3), p. 324.

<sup>136</sup> The smug way in which these organizers of charity used to speak of helping people to help themselves (Bosanquet, *The Social Criterion* [1907], p. 29) would be amusing if it were not that this attitude held up efforts towards real social reform for many years.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Hobson and Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>139</sup> Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism*, p. 93.

<sup>140</sup> *Political Education* (1951), pp. 9f.

<sup>130</sup> *Democracy and Reaction*, pp. 37-8.

<sup>131</sup> *Liberalism*, p. 91.

<sup>132</sup> "The Problem," in J. A. Hobson and M. Ginsberg, *L. T. Hobhouse*, p. 273.

<sup>133</sup> *The Crisis of Liberalism*, p. 94.; cf. also Hobson, *The Social Problem* (1901), pp. 10, 96.

<sup>134</sup> *The Civilization of Christendom*, p. 338. In the Preface to this book the reader is told that the C.O.S. conception of thrift is very different from the individualist idea; as to exactly how, he is left in the dark.

<sup>135</sup> "Nothing undermines character so much as

speaking impossible, but a belief in its possibility is possible, and mischievous at that; how many people do we hear talking of expediency as if it were a policy, when what they really mean is self-interest? The Labour Party might do worse than to examine once more the ideas of the positive liberals which have been discussed in this article—the idea first of all of liberty as the great end in politics. There is surely a lesson to be learned from Hobhouse who was dogmatic on fundamentals and flexible on details, refusing to erect such things as state ownership into dogmas. The Labour Party has tended to transform this mere means into one of the chief ends of politics; this the positive liberals never did.

The implications of this movement for the historian are also intriguing. It is illuminating to trace the way in which, in mid-Victorian England it was found desirable, for a variety of generally very practical reasons, for the state to play an increasingly important role in the life of society. It was gradually discovered that on many questions the state cannot be neutral; and, having the power to intervene, a

refusal to do so is tantamount to a positive acceptance of existing conditions. In response to these changes, a social philosophy grew up, which attempted to justify state intervention under the old and generally accepted canons of liberty; thus was evolved the notion of positive liberty. The idea was taught in the universities, and its fuller implications were worked out both by the more practically minded of the academics, and by a group of young liberal politicians; these men proceeded to apply them in a more systematic manner. We thus have an idea growing up in response to changing social needs, and then itself affecting the structure of society in a subsequent period, illustrating the assertion of J. N. Figgis that

If ideas in politics more than elsewhere are the children of practical needs, none the less is it true, that the actual world is the result of men's thoughts. The existing arrangement of political forces is dependent at least as much upon ideas, as it is upon men's perception of their interests.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>141</sup> *Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius* (1916 ed.), p. 1.



## TOWARD A DEFINITION OF EDITORIAL POLICY FOR THE *REVIEW*\*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Managing Editor*  
*The Ohio State University*

Editorial policy reflects in part an ideal, in part a code of operating practice. It is the editor's business to maintain some gap, but not too large a gap, between the two—to keep the ideal always some distance ahead of the practice, and to keep the practice from lagging too far behind. And it is inherent in the notion of policy that both ideal and practice embody a degree of rational consistency in statement and application that rules out mere personal caprice.

The distinctive characteristics of the *REVIEW* are marked out for it in the main by its functions as a scholarly journal and as an institutional medium, the official journal of the Association. It is not in any significant degree, therefore—as a journal of opinion may be—a vehicle for the predilections of the editor; his duty is to formulate and apply standards appropriate to the purposes of the Association that supports the *REVIEW* and furnishes its principal audience. Because the Association is a national professional society, rather than either an organ of a particular educational institution or the outlet of a group committed to a particular school of thought, the *REVIEW* must be correspondingly catholic in its outlook. Because the domain of political science—however its boundaries are defined—is so broad, the doors must be open to a diversity of subject matters, including occasional essays in neighboring disciplines. Because the *REVIEW* audience—even if narrowly conceived as the dues-paying membership of the Association—extends well beyond the ranks of teachers of political science, to take in many people in public life here and abroad, whether officials or not, materials addressed to questions of public policy have a place along with those confined to more strictly scientific concerns. And because a significant part of the *REVIEW*'s ultimate audience is still unborn, or at least has not yet emerged from school, while verity is supposed to be timeless, the range of appropriate material is not, like a newspaper's, significantly limited by considerations of time-

liness to topics of current interest.<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, one criterion of quality is posed by the question, how well will an item read five years or more hence? Finally, because the *REVIEW* is made up mainly from contributed materials, the distribution of emphasis must reflect primarily the interests of those who are moved to write, rather than any *a priori* desires of the editor's.

In one sense, editorial issues may be thought to arise, like budgetary decisions, from the necessity of choice: space is scarce, more material is available for printing than the customarily available space in the *REVIEW* will contain, and so an ordered scheme of preferences and allocations is needed. Five or six times as many manuscript pages of articles are offered as are printed; a great many books are listed as "received" without being reviewed; the authors of book reviews and especially of book notes are allowed severely limited numbers of words; news and notes items are cut down or rejected, and so on. The amount of space can be increased somewhat by using a double-column page with narrower margins and smaller type, by increasing the number of pages, or by increasing the frequency of issues. But there are financial and other practical limits on all these palliatives, and the overall pressure for space is unremitting.

Nevertheless, the lively and recurrent policy questions regularly emerge in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. Only occasionally, at the margin, does the process of choice work like a zero-sum game where, if A is excluded, B can be admitted. For one reason, since the change in format last year, and because the Association is solvent, there is no longer a fixed number of pages setting an absolute and

<sup>1</sup> References and citations in current literature to issues of the *REVIEW* that antedate the end of World War II are quite uncommon. This may be set down as one of the marks of the gap between the ideal and the practice, either on the part of the *REVIEW* or of the current literature. More likely it only means that articles, more than books, make their contributions to the ongoing stream of professional thought within a few years and then usually lose their distinctive identities as sources needing individual citation. It also reflects the shifts in present professional concerns and in conceptions of the discipline.

\* Presented originally at a special panel at the annual meetings of the Association, St. Louis, September 8, 1961, this paper has been circulated to the members of the Editorial Board and carries their general concurrence. I am grateful for their suggestions and improvements.

mechanical limit to the size of each issue. A few more pages, within reason, can always be bought. For another, the several departments of the REVIEW—articles, book reviews, bibliographical sections, news and notes, and advertising—are autonomously edited and only put together at press time, and their space requirements vary from issue to issue; so that specific allocations of page limits set in advance for each section would usually be unduly arbitrary or unfeasible. In the upshot, then, the criteria of selection and rejection must in the main be formulated and applied qualitatively to each candidate for inclusion on its merits with sufficient rigor to forestall the necessity of a harsher and less discriminating method of choice, word against word. This conclusion is reinforced by the reflection that the primary purposes of the REVIEW as a scholarly journal are qualitative, the advancement of the profession and of the understanding of its disciplinary subject matter: better a small journal, if need be, of top quality, than a guaranteed output of a scheduled number of pages.

One consequence of present policy in this respect is that there is virtually no backlog of accepted articles waiting their turns to appear in print. At any given moment there may be a substantial inventory of manuscripts at the successive stages of reading and editorial consideration, but once a favorable decision has been reached the standards of selection are such that an article can ordinarily go into the next issue or at any rate the issue following. This is a wholesome if not always comfortable condition, in contrast with the situation of some journals whose space, I am informed, is committed for a year or more in advance.

Bearing these general considerations in mind, I shall try in what follows to clarify the principal issues and to some extent codify the practice of REVIEW policy. Since no other journal has quite the same audience or purpose, I shall refrain from gratuitous advice on how other journals ought to be conducted.

The main issues, in my experience, can be conveniently discussed under a baker's half-dozen heads, which I shall take up in the following order: (1) the sources of supply; (2) the rule against reprinting; (3) the balance between service and research functions; (4) the place of opinion and public policy arguments; (5) the room for specialists; (6) the priority for analysis over description; and (7) style, or the sanctity of an author's words.

#### I. SOURCES OF SUPPLY

Market principles of supply, demand and incentive have a bearing on the output of ma-

terials the REVIEW needs, and so policy must take into account some elementary differentials in the operation of these principles. At one end of the line, the Managing Editor has not yet discovered any qualified person who is willing as a labor of love to contribute over 100 hours of her time and disrupt her Christmas vacation in order to furnish the indispensable annual index to the REVIEW, in the form and on the schedule the printer requires, for the sheer satisfaction of seeing her name on the cover page. So the index must be procured and paid for; and so too must the annual listing of dissertations. In a different category stand the stalwart compilers of the bibliographic sections, sorting out the current periodical literature for the convenience of the inquisitive. The REVIEW furnishes its readers with much more of this reference material than most comparable journals. In undertaking to prepare their copy regularly the several compilers respond to a call to duty, in a species of selective service, and like good soldiers are compensated (at a page rate) rather for out-of-pocket expenses than for the economic value of their time; but they must be called.

In a third category are the book reviewers. They are far more numerous, and if they respond at all to invitations, they need no more tangible reward than the retention of the books they review. But they are free agents, not conscripts. They may and often do refuse to serve when called upon. Moreover, they can seldom know in advance what new books are forthcoming, which need reviewing or which are already provided for; and if they volunteer for specific books, their motives may sometimes be suspect. So the Book Review Editor will welcome suggestions from any quarter but must generally take the burden of selection and solicitation book by book. I need not go into the criteria he applies,<sup>2</sup> for I believe these are widely understood and not often in controversy. He has a formidable managerial task, challenging his imagination, his range of acquaintance and his resources for locating appropriate reviewers beyond his acquaintance. Quarrels with his performance are apt to be rather *ad hoc* or *ad hominem* than based on policy or principle, and critics need to bear in mind, what they cannot ordinarily know in a particular case, that the reviewer may have been his first or his fourth choice. On editorial questions other than the allocation of space he

<sup>2</sup> See the admirable discussion by Avery Leiserson, "Toward a Definition of Book Review Policy," that follows this paper, below, pp. 139-141.

can afford to allow reviewers the more latitude of expression because the Communications section provides a medium for complaint, reply or rebuttal.

I am told that the honors for the best book reviewing job among political science journals belong to the *Revue Française de Science Politique* which employs three categories: (a) bibliographical articles consisting of concise characterizations of recent books on a subject, followed by detailed book lists; (b) bibliographical notes corresponding to our regular reviews, of individual books; and (c) bibliographical information consisting of some five to fifteen lines apiece of content analysis and brief characterization of new books in at least five major languages; some of these bear a notation indicating that a full review will come later. This last category strives for maximum coverage as well as for qualitative assessment, and affords the advantage that the selection of books for full review need not be made until after specialists in the several fields have familiarized themselves generally with their contents. Such extensive coverage of books in the REVIEW would leave no room for bibliographies of current periodical articles unless the whole space were considerably expanded. A more formidable obstacle is that the preparation of so many pages of concise abstracts is hardly conceivable except in the framework of a centralized organization such as the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, which maintains a staff of specialists under the same roof—or such, perhaps, as the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. A system practicable for the REVIEW must be compatible with the decentralized deployment of academic resources in this country.

The News and Notes materials stand on quite a different footing. Editorial policy calls for quarterly notices to department chairmen inviting the submission of materials; obituaries are occasionally invited; and official committees of the Association are informed of deadlines for notices they may wish to see printed. But the REVIEW maintains no staff of reporters or correspondents and makes no other systematic provision for securing news items for this section. The section editor gives a semblance of order to the materials that are volunteered, uses his blue pencil on items that seem unduly verbose or self-serving, tries to reward brevity in response by inclusion where possible, and excludes classes of items that have the least claims on general attention. Readers sometimes complain that space is given to trivia, but volunteers also complain when items that concern them are rejected. Perhaps no other sec-

tion of the REVIEW poses so sharply the conflicting demands for saving space and for accommodating personal inclinations; none so perplexingly defies the editor's attempts to formulate criteria that will be uniformly applicable and satisfactory. And all suggestions to date that look toward improving on the vagaries of the present reliance on volunteered items by introducing a more regularized system of positive procurement of news material have foundered on either or both of two rocks: they make impossible demands for staff unless substantial sums of money are to be paid; and they promise even more disappointments for those who want to see their activities noticed unless substantially more space is allocated for the purpose. Proposals for a separate newsletter seem to involve more rather than less expense.

Still different considerations apply to the supply of article manuscripts. Here, in contrast with some of the service features, with commercial magazines and (so I am informed) with the practice of some scholarly journals abroad, no question of payment arises. The satisfaction of seeing an article in the REVIEW, and of getting a modest number of reprints free, is a sufficient reward for most academic contributors, though perhaps not enough for some senior scholars. Nor, in contrast with the book reviews, are invitations to contribute needed to secure an adequate supply of manuscripts that are acceptable or can be made so. There is no consistent surplusage, particularly of the highest quality, but in recent years at least there has been a sufficiency. REVIEW policy accordingly has been to depend, for the supply of articles, mainly upon a selection from amongst the manuscripts offered.<sup>3</sup> I shall come presently to the criteria of selection. At this point it is relevant to ask whether more of the present offerings should be rejected in order to make room for the fruits of a different policy, that by active solicitation might procure articles of a sort not now, or seldom offered.

Two possibilities may be suggested as alter-

<sup>3</sup> Customarily, only two of the 40-odd articles published each year—the President's address and the annual review of developments in constitutional law—have been regularly solicited. I have not hesitated to follow up occasional tips from trustworthy sources telling me of significant work in progress that might be had for the asking; and on other occasions I have invited a comment on a manuscript already in hand, to be published along with it. But these are infrequent and *ad hoc* exceptions to the usual policy of reliance on offerings.

natives. One would seek more control over the subject matter by a systematic editorial selection of topics in need of treatment, followed by invitations to scholars qualified to treat them. In this fashion symposia might be constructed, and presumably the Editorial Board would find a larger scope for collective deliberation on the choice of subjects and authors than is feasible now in the appraisal of two or three hundred unsolicited offerings annually.

The other would seek to alter the sources of supply by securing a larger proportion of the articles printed from authors who are senior statesmen in the profession and recognised masters in their special fields. The overwhelming majority of manuscripts now submitted comes from younger scholars with reputations still to be made or in the making. Taking three recent consecutive issues as a handy sample, the ages of the authors at the time of publication of the 33 articles these issues contained were distributed as follows: eleven under 35; sixteen between 35 and 45; and six over 45, of whom only one was over 60. Perhaps writing for the REVIEW is another New Frontier; evidently, at any rate, publication in the REVIEW is less often a sufficient incentive to induce established authors to submit their thoughts in writing, unasked. Presumably, direct invitations to contribute might be productive.<sup>4</sup>

A first objection to either alternative is self-serving: it would mean more work for the Managing Editor, and indeed would hardly be practicable without a full-time editor, or unless the responsibility were parcelled out, as with the Program Committee for the annual meetings, so that a series of associate editors took charge of particular areas or undertook to fill successive issues in turn. But putting the editorship "in commission" would surely dilute the responsibility for the finished product.

Taking higher ground, I would also doubt the wisdom of the concentration of power, and its anti-democratic implications, inherent in an

arrangement for the management of the official journal of the Association that was premised on the assumption that one editor—or even a small group—knew, better than those who are engaged in their own research and writing, what topics are most in need of attention, or which scholars deserve, in advance of their production, a preferred and protected claim on the REVIEW audience for their output. I believe it possible to find and to replace editors with the critical faculties needed for the appraisal of manuscripts they have not themselves inspired, and who are skilled in helping an author to put his best foot forward in matters of style, logic, organization and the like. I think the Association might soon grow restive with an editor, however conscientious, who was charged with programming the scholarly output that the Association will publish. The Program Committee, which arranges what the Association will hear at the annual meetings, changes each year; but frequent rotation in the office is not a practicable restraint on the potential tyranny of an editor. Finally, considering the difficulties in rejecting articles that have been invited sight unseen, I am not persuaded that the products of a policy of planned contents for the REVIEW would in fact be superior to those now obtained. I favor the continuance of the present policy, therefore, without prejudice to opportunistic exceptions of the sort already noted—whenever opportunity knocks.

## II. THE RULE AGAINST REPRINTING

The REVIEW has a one-way policy of long standing that expresses a preference for the advancement, as against the diffusion, of knowledge: except in its advertising pages and masthead it does not knowingly publish materials of substantially the same content that have already appeared elsewhere in print, even in another country, even in another language. On the other hand, if the author consents, permission to reprint from the REVIEW is ordinarily given as a matter of course.<sup>5</sup> So an article which will presently become a chapter in a book may be accepted and published with a notice to that effect—book publishers seem to welcome

<sup>4</sup> In a conversation I had some years ago on this point with the editor of an esteemed British journal he expressed astonishment on learning of REVIEW policy: "With us, no one who is anyone would dream of sending off an article to our journal without first receiving a nod of invitation from the editor." We concluded that his journal fills its requirements in the way that American departments prefer to make their appointments, by consulting knowledgeable friends informally; while the REVIEW works in the way the British make appointments, by a public advertisement inviting all who think themselves qualified to come forward and submit their credentials.

<sup>5</sup> Over the signature of the Executive Director of the Association, not the Managing Editor, since the Association holds the copyright, and with or without a royalty charge depending on circumstances. A charge is made, e.g., for the inclusion of a REVIEW article in a book of readings commercially published. Policy to govern charges is currently under review in the Executive Committee of the Association.

that form of advertising—and so may an article that has had a mimeographed circulation. But an article drawn from a book, even if very recently published, or from an address published as a separate pamphlet or in official proceedings, or a translation from a foreign journal—buried in obscurity though these may be for practical purposes—will ordinarily be rejected.

A good reason but not the real reason for the rule is the risk of infringing copyrights when materials are reprinted. A better reason is the need to conserve space in order to afford an outlet for original work, the encouragement of which is a prime purpose of the Association and of the REVIEW. A final reason is that without it—and stopping points would be hard to define—the REVIEW might be transformed into an anthology, if not into a reader's digest of "great" articles. There is much to be said for such a publication, since no doubt, across the spans of space and time, more distinguished pieces have been written, and have perhaps escaped the notice of the contemporary American audience, than any particular issue of the REVIEW is apt to contain. Nevertheless, articles meriting reprinting may find their way into the books of readings and other outlets that commercial publishers will support. An insistence on originality, in the form of a rule against self-plagiarism, is one buttress to a larger policy of promoting the highest quality standards attainable.

Like any mechanical rule in human affairs, this one presents evident difficulties and occasional inequalities in application. This is why the reservation of *scienter* was included in stating it. The REVIEW has sometimes been taken unawares in violation of the rule, since the Managing Editor and his advisers have not read everything in print and authors do not always call attention to their prior or pending publications. In close cases where the timing is crucial, adjustments in publication schedules might lead to unintended violations; and here, if a commitment to publish has been given, the REVIEW does not retract it. It is easy to sympathize also with an author who, when he has once committed his thoughts to paper, would like to see them appear in as many places as possible; or who, impatient with the time it takes for one journal to reach a decision, submits them to several and finds it hard to withdraw if more than one accepts what he has written. But an author who hopes to publish in the REVIEW a second time would be short-sighted if he deliberately took advantage of editorial ignorance in a knowing violation of the rule.

It may be that an occasional exception is warranted in the case of an article substantially similar to one the author has published abroad in a foreign language, if it has a widespread interest and would otherwise be largely inaccessible; but the exceptions should be rare or the REVIEW could easily be swamped. It appears prudent also to weight the scales somewhat against an article drawn from a book already scheduled for publication though not yet out.

### III. SERVICE VS. RESEARCH FUNCTIONS

Considerably more than half the printed matter in any issue of the REVIEW comes under the general rubric of the diffusion rather than the advancement of knowledge—a proportion that is in line with the definition of a conservative as one who realizes that most of men's time and energy must be devoted to preventing things from getting any worse than they already are. The sections given over to advertising, index, news and notes, bibliographies and book notes—which because of space limits are seldom more than expository—are all of this nature, and all have a tendency to grow. The conscientious bibliographer, for instance, as well as the indiscriminate one, leans toward inclusion rather than exclusion; and as the volume of materials he canvasses increases, so does the number of entries. The indexer inserts cross-references to be more helpful; the dissertation list is expanded to include Canadian titles; the northern and southern California schools form separate associations with separate programs and lists of officers to record; and so on. All this is useful and desirable, and moreover, some part of the diffusion, not specifiable *a priori*, leads indirectly to further advances in knowledge later on. Even if this were not so, a profession that earns most of its bread and butter by teaching has needs that constitute an independent justification for the provision of reference materials of a specialized nature not readily accessible elsewhere. What, then, is an appropriate balance to maintain between these service functions and the provision of an outlet for original research, in the REVIEW?

One answer is to stick with the *status quo*. Whenever suggestions have been made in recent years to drop or reduce drastically one or another of the existing service sections, defenders of the target have arisen to protest, and approximately the present balance has been preserved. No satisfactory measure of their numbers or relative need has been devised. On the other hand, no strong pressure for a sharp reduction has developed, because the volume of article manuscripts of acceptable

quality has remained in rough correspondence with the space remaining after some modest economizing measures.

So long as these conditions continue, I am at a loss to suggest a more elevated principle for justifying or altering the present balance, other than the one implicitly given above, that the service materials carried be not readily accessible in other sources; and a corollary, that the burden of proof should lie with those who argue for their expansion. That burden I believe has been sustained for the services I have mentioned at about their present levels.

A further criterion of allocation—though hardly a lofty principle—might be a rule that service materials should not be accepted as articles or occupy space allotted to articles. In conformity with that thought the “bibliographical essays” that appear from time to time are located in the book review department, and occasional “teaching notes” have been relegated to rear positions.

But to state such a rule in this way risks prejudging the most perplexing and controversial case posing this general issue that has arisen in my tenure: namely, the future of the annual article on constitutional law, an issue precipitated last winter when its eminent author for the last dozen years asked to be relieved of continuing it. It has been a regular feature of the REVIEW for upwards of 35 years at least, surviving the demise of annual reviews of the sessions of Congress, of developments in state constitutional law, and perhaps other subjects. It has been located and counted among the articles. It is intentionally a service to the diffusion rather than the advancement of knowledge, and many value it as such. It is capably and carefully done, and widely and on the whole favorably known. It is long, as articles go, but it has not precluded the publication of other articles on constitutional law topics in the REVIEW. Even if that were not so, authors in that field probably have, in the plethora of law journals, more opportunities to find outlets for their writings than scholars in most other branches of our discipline. Should the annual article be continued?

In my search for counsel on this question I encountered two characteristic and opposing views. Specialists in the field, with a few exceptions, see no need for it that is not better supplied in more specialized services familiar and available to them—in the more exhaustive annual surveys of the *Harvard Law Review*, in the volumes from the Chicago Law School, and in a variety of official and commercial undertakings. They would prefer to see the space freed for the fruits of original analysis and

research. Defenders of the article—not all of them readers of it, nor any longer teachers in introductory courses—urge not so much their own needs as those of harried teachers in smaller places who are not specialists in the field and have heavy loads and limited library facilities that do not include much in the way of legal materials; and of those in other fields altogether who want an annual refresher. For such as these, it is said, nothing else is so handily available or gives so much in comparable space. Some correlation between age and attitude is also observable: the seniors I have consulted in the profession are more apt to favor continuing the tradition; the juniors are readier to discard it.

My own view is that the annual article has lost much of its former utility, not through its own fault. In part, it cannot any longer be a unique and pioneering effort as it once may have been; teachers and students in constitutional law are far better supplied than before the war with a variety of materials and resources that reduce their dependence on an annual survey. In part also, approaches to the teaching of American government have shifted away from the systematic exposition of constitutional doctrines, so that teachers who are not constitutional lawyers have less occasion to brush up on recent cases. But if the article has thereby in some degree become outmoded, its many loyal friends are testimony to the strength of the case that can still be made for it.

Other considerations enter into editorial policy. The annual article is a species of a potentially numerous genus. It is anomalous standing alone. If there is one on constitutional law, why not one also on, say, the state of the public finances, or the activities of the President, or of the UN—all topics presumably of as much importance and general interest, and as hard to keep track of from day to day? More basically, it is anomalous because, alone among the articles it does not, by design, meet two of the criteria, novelty and a problem focus, that are applied to the others. But these objections would lie in principle against any service feature, and it would be dogmatic to rest on them entirely. All in all, sound policy at this stage appears to counsel, not abandonment, but a conclusion that the time is ripe for a period of experimentation with alternative approaches to the design and concept of the article and the purposes it may serve.

#### IV. OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY VS. SCIENCE

Most articles coming to the REVIEW embody the results of inquiries by their authors aimed at furthering our understanding of some politi-

cal ideas, institutions, interests, personalities or processes, singly or in combination, or of more effective ways of studying them: inquiries that may be called more or less scientific in a loose sense of that term. Depending on the subject—and on the perspicacity of authors and readers—they have a bearing more or less remote or immediate on practical concerns of the day, on public policy of the past and future; depending on the authors' interests, this bearing may be emphasized or subordinated; and depending on the authors' temperaments, their policy views may be expressed with judicious caution or passionate conviction. A concern for policy may have been the motivating inspiration of a study; more often it appears to be an incident to reflection on the significance of the results.

All this is proper and to be expected in a social science journal; and this is not the occasion for arguing fundamental questions of the relations between knowledge, opinion and action, between research and policy, or of the nature of science itself in social studies. A fair regard for the diversity of views on these matters, as well as the traditions, alike of individual scholarly responsibility and of the freedom of scholarly inquiry and expression, counsel a latitudinarian policy for the REVIEW. The editor may question particular phrases or passages in a manuscript as needless editorializing or as opinion masquerading as fact though unsupported by any evidence offered; but he is not a censor. If there is room for both behaviorists and philosophers in the profession, there is room for them both in the REVIEW.

Questions of editorial policy arise, however, in the appraisal of manuscripts that are explicitly pitched to argue issues of current public policy. A scholarly piece like Professor Osgood's recent study of the inner contradictions in American concepts and policies of deterrence is acceptable and accepted. A report of a scholarly advisory committee endorsing larger appropriations to the State Department's historical staff, to expedite publication of the series *Foreign Relations*, is a marginal case, legitimate if there is space for it. But an editorial criticizing, for instance, our policy toward Castro, or a plea for more federal aid for urban redevelopment, or a review of events, say in Algeria, leading to the conclusion that the French should or should not concede Algerian claims in the Sahara, or a speculative peering ahead into the next ten years of Sino-Soviet relations, will be rejected, no matter how closely it may correspond to the editor's personal views. How is the line to be drawn between these and the first example?

One part of it, not often needed, is suggested by the Association's self-denying constitutional prohibition against partisan political activities or commitments. Although the REVIEW disclaims responsibility for an author's views, it has no reason to provide a vehicle for views of that sort.

More cases can be disposed of on principles of the division of labor. The REVIEW's editorial and production processes span three to six months or more. Arguments on topics of the day are apt to lose their timeliness or to need recasting in the light of unfolding events during such a period: better leave them to the daily and weekly press that can move more nimbly.

The rest of the line is marked out by the differences between journalism and scholarship, between decision and proof, and between authority and evidence. A journal of opinion like *Foreign Affairs*, to take a distinguished contemporary example, may publish an article by a prominent or controversial public figure at home or abroad whose views are important because they are his views, whether or not they are persuasive; or an article, say, on British policy toward the Common Market because it is important whether Britain joins that organization. Allowing for some overlap at the margin, the REVIEW's criteria of importance are different: as the scholarly journal of a profession it is properly more concerned with the grounds and articulation and theoretical implications of an argument than with its sponsorship, its outcome or the practical stakes that hang on it.

#### V. THE ROOM FOR SPECIALISTS

Very few members, I suppose, even start to read all the articles in any issue of the REVIEW; the titles alone are enough to warn most readers away from many pieces as "outside their field" or "too specialized," and the savor of the first two or three paragraphs will lead them to abandon still others at that point. Very few authors, by the same token, choose topics (or if they choose them, are able to carry them off successfully) so evidently broad in scope or pervasive in significance as to command the general attention of the profession. Considering the diversity of the potential audience, what room should the REVIEW make for specialists who talk only to specialists?

A *reductio ad absurdum* response to the progress of specialization may not seem altogether fanciful after a glance into some scientific journals: let the REVIEW be converted into a sort of bibliographical telephone directory where authors list their names and the titles of their works. Then if some umpire made sure



that the titles were truly descriptive, each solitary reader by consulting the classified yellow pages could ring up the author who had something to say to him alone, and listen to it; and so the publication of tiresome articles might be avoided. But this solution disregards the interests of authors who want to be published more than they want to be read. The opposite solution, of rejecting anything that does not have something to say to at least a majority of the possible readers, is a more attractive goal but no more realistic. Specialization is here to stay.

One line of accommodation is to consider the provinces of more specialized journals and refer authors to them—to the regional journals, to the journals in history, philosophy, law, international law and politics, public administration, municipal affairs and so on. But no journal likes to think of itself as an outlet for hand-me-downs, so that direct referrals are seldom practicable. And while many authors, including established authorities, seek the journals in their specialties by preference—whether because these lead more surely to their selected audiences or because they present fewer uncertainties about the publication of specialized contributions—the REVIEW has prestige enough to attract a great many articles that, good or bad, would interest only a circumscribed clientele. If they seem good enough, the REVIEW will accept them even though more specialized journals, offered the chance, might gladly have taken them. The problem of editorial choice is sometimes but not usually solved by the existence of the other journals.

A more feasible accommodation is to distribute the selections so that in any particular issue there will be, if possible, at least one or two articles in each of the four or five main branches of the discipline. This is editorial policy, in order that each issue may offer something to nearly everyone, but it does not help much in choosing the articles that are to be so distributed.

No single criterion of excellence will settle that choice. No line distinguishes big facts from little ones objectively; the presence of a large idea helps, but does not guarantee that it will be effectively exploited. As Thomas Huxley demonstrated many years ago, in a celebrated essay *On a Piece of Chalk*, an author with insight and imagination can on occasion invest an apparently small thing with a large significance. Even an unpretentiously small point, written up with economy and elegance, can be a gem. A solid and lengthy study that exhausts a narrow subject in workmanlike fashion may

seem pedestrian by contrast, but may have compensating virtues too.

A useful distinction can sometimes be drawn between innovation and application. The REVIEW, for example, published two or three quantitative studies of Supreme Court decisions, and two political interpretations of Shakespearean plays—all controversial, but seemingly pioneering efforts—and then drew the line for a time against refinements and extensions of these themes, on the ground that their possibilities had now been shown and further exploitations in the same vein would interest only a limited number of specialists. For the same reason it might decline to take an extended series of local voting studies, or opinion poll analyses, all employing more or less the same method, even though conceivably some day the accumulation of such studies might furnish the basis for comparative generalizations.

A boundary facing in the opposite direction marks off prospectus from performance. While a brilliant bit of speculation is always welcome for its suggestiveness, an elaborate plan of work to be carried out in the future, especially if it is for someone else to do, is something else again—and particularly if the proposal is mainly methodological. As the utility of tools is proved in their use and plans are commonly changed in the course of their execution, it is in the ultimate interest of the author no less than of his audience to withhold publication in the REVIEW until he has some completed research to show. A better appraisal of the methodology can be made in the context of a substantive contribution, and a prospectus is not usually a ripe subject for a REVIEW article.

Apart from such considerations as these, and the standard criteria of scholarship, editorial policy toward highly specialized pieces can hardly go much beyond seeking the counsel of other specialists in the field in appraising their relative values, and perhaps tempering the wind somewhat in favor of articles from specialties that are infrequently represented in the incoming flow.

In a different vein, another question related to specialization arises in connection with articles by authors in cognate disciplines—by an economist, a lawyer, a sociologist or psychologist or anthropologist, or by a mathematician. Generally such an article seeks an outlet in a journal closer to the author's disciplinary home. But when one comes to the REVIEW, it is begging the question—or being chauvinistic or excessively mechanical about the division of labor—to dismiss it out of hand as belonging



elsewhere. For political scientists probably do too little reading in the journals of other disciplines: why should Mahomet not come to the mountain once in a while? The decisive question—assuming other standards are met—appears to be whether he comes talking to political scientists *qua* political scientists, *i.e.*, to illuminate our understanding of some essentially political phenomenon or problem, bringing the tools and skills of his discipline along for the help they can give in that endeavor; or is talking chiefly to his own kind or to undifferentiated laymen. If an affirmative answer can be given to the first branch of that question, his work is welcome in the pages of the REVIEW; this is so in regrettably few cases.

#### VI. A PROBLEM FOCUS: THE ROOM FOR DESCRIPTION

No other single shortcoming accounts for the rejection of so many manuscripts as that they are "purely descriptive" or narrative. The criterion that requires a problem focus and gives priority to an analytical treatment of a subject is what chiefly distinguishes a good article for the REVIEW from a good article for an encyclopedia. For the one, the author must give the reader a reason for staying with him; information alone will not usually hold him long unless his curiosity is engaged; and economy in the provision and use of facts is a virtue guarding against irrelevance. For the other, the reader brings his own questions with him; makes what he can, or needs to, from the information furnished; and is grateful for fullness.

A double reason justifies the criterion, the difficulty of abundance and the concerns of political science. On the one hand there are more millions of facts—events, transactions, recorded utterances, deeds, thoughts, etc.—than the REVIEW or any journal can possibly notice; some selection is inescapable and it is not enough to take only what comes handily to reach. A problem focus in an article supplies the standards of relevance and exclusion and suggests the organization of analysis. A working rule of editorial policy therefore calls upon the author, somewhere early in the introductory paragraphs of his paper, to state as explicitly as may be what he is up to: what problem he is addressing himself to, and why that problem matters. There are artists who can write an absorbing article—like a mystery story that builds suspense to the end—without being explicit about their intentions at the beginning; but these are exceptions.

On the other hand, a clear and accurate

statement of the problem often suffices to dispose of the article, by identifying it as within or without the boundaries of the significant professional concerns of an audience of political scientists. Not just any problem will do.

So, for example, if an author says in substance, "I have been looking into the subject of X, and let me tell you what I have found," the odds are overwhelming that what follows will be purely descriptive. If he says, "I mean to inquire whether the United States should have dropped the atomic bomb," or "I will argue that capital punishment is self-defeating," then he has a problem and the start of an editorial or a piece for a journal of opinion, but probably not an article for the REVIEW. If he poses a problem of fact, *e.g.*, "It is commonly supposed that Wilson was the father of the principle of self-determination, but I will show that the true origin was much earlier," then editorial judgment is suspended until it appears what answer he makes to the political scientist's demurrer, so what? An unsatisfactory answer here is a reason why historians so seldom succeed in placing articles in the REVIEW. Yet there is room, as Robert Dahl and others have lately urged, for many more studies that address a political scientist's questions to historical data.

Generally speaking, the problem needs to be political and it needs also to be intellectual. Whether it is one of substance or technique, whether it is a problem in theory, in doctrine or in behavior, it should invite the reader to join in a search for explanations and generalizations, hitherto unrecognized or unappreciated, about political phenomena past or present—phenomena that it is the business of political scientists to understand if they can.

Having stated this standard of editorial policy I should at once acknowledge that not all articles published in the REVIEW meet it, or meet it in equal degree. The border between information and analysis is not sharp. A study of an institution or of a doctrine may be more or less descriptive or critical. Expository treatments of such subjects ideally belong presumably in textbooks, but if these are inadequate a claim can be advanced for an article, similar to the claims on behalf of the service features already discussed.

#### VII. STYLE: THE SANCTITY OF AN AUTHOR'S WORDS

No one expects or wants a journal of articles by different authors to maintain a uniform English style except in its most mechanical aspects; and even in the form of footnote citations some diversity in authors' practices is

harmless. Questions of editorial policy respecting style consequently turn on two points: the minimum standards applicable to manuscripts submitted for consideration, and the sanctity of the author's language in an article that has been accepted—or, putting it the other way around, the extent of the Managing Editor's license to tinker with that language.

On the first point there is little to say. Minimum literary standards are a notable barrier to the serious consideration of articles by foreign authors whose native tongue is not English, and unless the REVIEW were to print in other languages this will probably remain true. In the past five years, six foreign authors have seen their articles published, only two or three of them from countries outside the English-speaking world, and two at least of these had been in the United States for extended periods. Literary deficiencies have been contributing factors in the rejection of a good many articles from domestic sources as well, but here, with one special type of exception, they are usually associated with other more fatal difficulties, of conception, logic, organization and the like. Standing alone, they can usually be ameliorated, at least, if the editor is willing and free to devote time to reworking sentences. The exception is professional jargon and takes me to the second point.

I have heard it argued, and with conviction, that an article manuscript is an author's property and inviolate; and that the business of a professional journal is to reproduce it untouched—unharmed, some might say—for who else knows better what he means to say, and how else can colleagues judge him if they cannot be sure that what appears under his name is altogether his?

An editor would be exceedingly fortunate, in my experience, who could afford to accept that position. In practice it yields to two other considerations. An editor who can ultimately reject a manuscript can also insist on stipulated

revisions before he accepts it, unless the author prefers to withdraw rather than revise. In turn, this power relationship evidently imposes professional and moral restraints on the editor, and with good will on both sides is generally understood and accepted. Beyond this is the fact that the editor has a responsibility to the audience as well as to the author, and because he is inevitably a reader himself, he may be more sensitive than the author to the audience's concern for a clear and readable style. In most cases these interests are not really in conflict and the editor does a service to both in helping an author to put his best foot forward with clarity, point and grace.

In this view, editorial policy should encourage the editor, in preparing a manuscript for the printer after it has been accepted—except in the case of state papers such as the presidential address—to improve on the language wherever he thinks he can, to clarify and simplify, to economize on the use of words, to sharpen points, etc., saving to the author the right to see and object to changes, and the right, after argument, not to have words put into his mouth against his will. In practice the likeliest of the infrequent occasions for unreconciled disagreement in this give-and-take process arises when an author wants to employ a technical vocabulary to express what the editor believes can as accurately and more simply and understandably be said in words that are closer to common speech. No formula will settle all these differences, but a clear and readable style ranks high enough among the criteria of excellence in the REVIEW to warrant a considerable prerogative in the editor to attain it.

If a conclusion can summarize in a single sentence the points this paper has touched, perhaps it can be phrased in a reversal of Gresham's law: let the editorial policy of the REVIEW throughout be to encourage the superior to drive out the not-so-good.

## TOWARD A DEFINITION OF BOOK REVIEW POLICY\*

AVERY LEISERSON\*\*

Vanderbilt University

A part-time book review editor is a sort of conscripted volunteer, and his problems resemble those of the amateur in any organized enterprise. He undergoes an educational experience in the course of which everyone hopes his mistakes will do as little harm as possible. He learns the things he can do something about and those he had better let alone, those things that have to be put in writing—when—and those things that shouldn't. Perhaps the best example of the first category is his decision to go to work; he is well advised to pick an editor-in-chief whose judgment and standards he respects implicitly, and whose idea of supervision is to create circumstances under which the book review editor can do his job better.† The second category consists largely of resisting the temptation to rewrite reviews. Apart from grammatical corrections, clarifying phraseology, and deletions based upon considerations of space, the book review editor should content himself with firm, polite reminders to reviewers, whose drafts he finds unsatisfactory, of the purpose of the review within the word limitation specified in the original invitation. This brings us to the two strategic principles upon which the B.R.E. in most cases can secure acceptance of his responsible judgment: (1) space allocation, translated into reasonable word limitations, and (2) time pressure, expressed in lead times to meet editorial deadlines. The same principles also operate to guide the B.R.E. in his correspondence; if he cannot speak his mind in one page there is apt to be something wrong with his thinking, and an administrative decision that cannot be satisfactorily stated in a public letter should probably be reconsidered.

*The Concept of the Book Review Section.* Pervasive and critical as it is, the space prin-

ciple does not determine what proportion of pages the book reviews should bear to the total non-commercial content of the journal. In this REVIEW the percentage varies between 40 and 50, including bibliographical matter; the other journals vary downward from one-fourth to one-seventh. Explanations of this variation turn on the inclusion of bibliography, on the personal history of the editorship-in-chief, the composition of the affiliated association and sources of financial support, and the scope and audience of the journal—whether it aims at a discipline-wide content, specializes in a cross-disciplinary area or concentrates on a sub-disciplinary field.

The book review sections may emphasize one or more of three "service" functions: (1) disciplinary notice, (2) professional criticism, (3) conceptual analysis and re-formulation. Each is important; none is a substitute for, or should be confused with, original research and advancement of knowledge. Thus the book review section and book review policy must be subordinated to the requirements of the member-readers in the Association, editorial perceptions of the scope and state of the discipline, and the demands of the journal's multiple or special constituency.

National and regional political science journals in the United States tend to emphasize subject-matter coverage and professional criticism. The analytical reviews in *Public Administration Review* and *World Politics* provide an outstanding and welcome contrast. But both these journals follow an extremely discriminating policy in selecting books and they employ a format of joint reviews that approach articles of journal length. Such a policy implies the existence of other journals performing the coverage function, a special constituency, and a somewhat rare acceptance of the journal's pedagogical authority. If it be admitted that political science needs both broad coverage of single books in brief reviews and the review-essay, the two vehicles probably should not be combined in the same journal. The principal alternatives are bibliographical articles on special subjects, or periodic surveys of the literature in established sub-fields or interdisciplinary subjects in the manner of the *Psychological Bulletin*. Such an enterprise on any kind of comprehensive scale would require a full-time journal editor (the B.R.E. could be dispensed with),

\* Presented at a special panel at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 8, 1961.

\*\* A former Book Review Editor of this REVIEW, and now editor of the *Journal of Politics*. [Man. Ed.]

† I should add that the B.R.E. is fortunate indeed, as I was, to have a predecessor who had not only systematized the procedures of the job, but knew how to "swing" the replacement into the rhythm of the journal, in the manner of the runner handling over the baton in a relay race.

who would in turn appoint a special editor-analyst for each such study.

*Selection of Books and Criteria for Reviews.* When a book review editor is in the position of choosing among many books submitted by publishers, conventional practice permits him to adopt a two-fold classification consisting of "reviews" and a list of "other books received." Within his space allocation, he may differentiate between reviews and "briefer notices." What makes a book worthy of review is a compound of (1) the fundamental character and significance of the problem attacked, (2) the quality of data, analysis and interpretation, and (3) the author's achieved status and reputation. If the workmanlike research monograph of Ph.D. caliber is visualized as the norm for briefer notices, review status may be accorded any work which has the additional qualities of philosophic universality, relevance, timeliness, analytic insight and penetration, and brilliance and originality of presentation. Fortunately or unfortunately, the B.R.E. must assign review status, designate word limits and strive to maintain a balance among the fields of the profession *in advance* of reading the book or the review manuscript. It is in exercising this discretion, and in the selection of reviewers, that he has whatever responsibility he enjoys of "making policy" in his own right.

In the general political science journal, "review status" means 750-1500 words; a "briefer notice" may range from 200-400 words to the lower limit of reviews; "review articles" seem to vary from 2000 words up. Each format has its merits. I should underscore the value to the reviewer, as well as to the author and the profession at large, of the two shorter review-forms, when carefully and competently rather than casually done. The criteria of excellence do not substantially differ for reviews and briefer notices. The concise, accurate statement of the author's conception of the problem, what he did and how he did it, and the reviewer's objectively technical judgment of the author's contribution—these are the criteria, *not* extended analysis, *not* elaboration of alternative perspectives and methods, above all *not* personalised argument over the rectitude and acceptability of the author's position. The book review section of a professional journal is important not only as the place where productive entrepreneurs receive recognition and evaluation from their colleagues for their published work. It is also a significant testing ground of the reviewer and the level of professional discussion in the discipline. If I may hazard another personal opinion, a good research man or productive writer is not neces-

sarily a good reviewer, but I do not know a good political scientist who is not a good reviewer in the sense defined above—if he wants to be. Which brings me to the final set of considerations pertinent to a statement of policy for book review editors.

*The Selection of Reviewers.* The practice of review by invitation poses a nice problem of "matching" for the book review editor. There is an objective appropriateness in the relation between book and reviewer that can only be estimated in advance. Many things complicate the matching process: the busy-ness of competent reviewers, the author's legitimate expectation of reasonable timeliness, the desirability of giving young members of the profession a chance to show their mettle, and the author's sensitivities to the quality of the man chosen to appraise his precious work. Every book review editor has to rely upon his friends and acquaintances, but he cannot possibly presume to impose upon them exclusively, or even primarily, when he has to assign for review 200 books or more a year published in at least eight subject-matter specialties within political science and a number of related disciplines. So he maintains, and at every opportunity solicits suggestions for, lists of potential reviewers classified by fields of interest. Certain books and authors will be snapped up by the first invitee, but in my experience it more frequently takes two, three and sometimes four requests to secure an acceptance.

Volunteer reviewers who indicate their willingness and availability are welcome and usually prove to be helpful, but volunteers who want to review specific books must be watched carefully. This is particularly true in the case of textbooks and research studies with which the volunteer has somehow acquired a personal animus that he does not divulge to the editor. On the other side, I found a high degree of objectivity and competence among persons who were associated in an advisory or consultative capacity with complex, collaborative research enterprises; the problem there was to overcome their feelings of conflict-of-interest.

Invitation to do a job implies acceptance of the competently done manuscript, and this binds the editor as well as the contributor. A part-time editor cannot afford the time to engage in running battles or disagreements over manuscripts, and this makes the original invitation all the more important. It occasions trouble when respondents are slow in answering mail; in my impatience to secure acceptances, I would sometimes send out another invitation after two or three weeks and then find myself with two reviewers for the same book. Perhaps

debatably, I always honored the original solicitation.

Young reviewers and men on the make may take comfort in the fact that their better established colleagues are frequently uninterested in doing reviews; and the sensitive editor would much prefer to have an able, conscientious review than one which is done resentfully or superficially under pressure. I can happily testify to an experience with the older members of the profession of frank, regretful refusals when they are too busy or unable to respond to a request; but this would usually be more than made up on another occasion. Political scientists are almost invariably generous and aware of their professional obligations. This is indeed the principal compensation of an unpaid book review editor, together with the satisfaction he can take in a stimulating, rewarding, improving book review section.

One last point that the book review editor

should keep in mind is that the lines of communication should be kept open between reviewers and his editor-in-chief; while the latter should not be a constant source of editorial intervention in disputes between the B.R.E. and the reviewer, or the author, it is appropriate for both to have a sort of appeal to higher authority over a reviewer's opinionatedness or a book review editor's arbitrariness. The editor-in-chief's control over the "Communications" or "Views and Opinions" section provides an excellent forum of appeal, and the best thing a review editor can do is to minimize appeals of the personalised variety, and reduce the chief editor's problems in this area to limited and definable situations. In the last analysis this comes back to finding the right man to review the right books. The book review editor capable of living with these ambiguities will probably not enjoy his job too much, but he ought not to disparage himself for what he does either.

## COMMUNICATIONS

### TO THE EDITOR:

I must protest against some of the points that Professor John A. Armstrong saw fit to raise in his review of my *A History of the Cold War* (Sept. 1961). About John Foster Dulles I wrote that "from his racial background, this Dutch American, an early admirer of the Boers against England, unusually sympathetic toward Germany, brought with him an enduring small core of distrust against England." This, I believe, is a reasonable expression of well-known conditions; yet Mr. Armstrong calls it an "extreme, almost ludicrous deduction." I wrote that "Stalin's ambitions were expansive; but they were national rather than international, Russian rather than revolutionary": Mr. Armstrong calls this a "drastic oversimplification." Why "drastic"? I did not write that Stalin's ambitions were *not* international and *not* revolutionary; I wrote that they were national *rather* than international, Russian *rather* than revolutionary. Mr. Armstrong says that I accepted "the myth" that "many thousands of Russians, Ukrainians and Tatars moved spontaneously over to the Germans' side" in the early phase of the German-Russian war. The "myth" to which Mr. Armstrong refers (and I emphatically agree with him) is the current notion that millions of dissatisfied Soviet citizens deserted to the Nazis: but I said *thousands*, not millions. All of the preceding are quotes from my book exactly as they were cited by Mr. Armstrong

in his review. I can only deduce that he has not read them well enough.

The most serious—and perhaps the only really serious—charge in Professor Armstrong's review is the assumption of my "spotty acquaintance with the mass of critical material, scholarly and memoir, on postwar events." With *what* materials? The memoirs of, say, Sherman Adams? The New York Times Index? Or State Department propaganda releases? Or the politico-psycho-strategical *magna opera* produced by the RAND Corporation, by Messrs. Kissinger, Kahn, *et al.*? Or the clipping calendars compiled by the Brookings Institution? Or the papers of six hundred symposia from Pugwash or Arden or from some other dear park? Professor Armstrong was generous enough to mention my "massive" and scholarly *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe*, a book that contained 125 pages of footnotes, a bibliography of more than a thousand entries, and a 31-page index, a book that, incidentally, sold seven hundred copies since its publication eight years ago, and from which dozens of reputable scholars have borrowed and stolen ever since. I can only presume that Professor Armstrong was set aback by the now unorthodox condition that in *A History of the Cold War* I put not many referential footnotes, and no bibliography at all. Nor did Macaulay. Or Tocqueville. Or Churchill.

JOHN LUKACS

Chestnut Hill and La Salle Colleges

TO THE EDITOR:

It is obvious that part of the difficulty in interpreting Professor Lukacs' work arises from his singular word usage. I am unconvinced, however, that the principal point at issue is semantic. I shall not take the space here to demonstrate further that his central interpretative theme is the dominance of national characteristics, including "racial" ones, for his

insistence on interpreting Dulles' allegedly pro-German and anti-British policy by reference to his Dutch ancestry seems ample evidence on this point. But I should suggest that Professor Lukacs test the validity of this line of interpretation by applying it to that other Dutch-American, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

*University of Wisconsin*

## ON NORMS, ROLES AND FOLKWAYS

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Donald Matthews is right to correct my interpretation of his book: I certainly would not have attributed so extreme a position to him as he has now taken in his "Communication" to this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (December, 1961), pp. 882-883. I readily concede that his "folkways" of the Senate are widely shared among senators—they are, after all, pretty much like the little rules for getting ahead which obtain in most institutionalized groups—and that going against them is not the way to popularity in the body. But I doubt very much that he has discovered all the patterns of acceptable behavior in the Senate, and I think he is mistaken to reify the Man of Accommodation as the only effective senator.

My suggestion that the "Outsider" role in the Senate is legitimate is helped by the example Matthews has mentioned of genuinely deviant

behavior, prostitution. The fallen lady is and always has been stigmatized by society and usually has been subject to punishment by law. This hardly fits the situation of a Proxmire or a LaFollette in the Senate. Furthermore, when the picture of a known prostitute is hung in a public building as an outstanding example of American womanhood I will say that prostitution, too, has become a legitimate role.

As for my general argument, I am glad to let my article stand on its own. It is common knowledge in the discipline, I think, that the concepts "norm" and "role" can be defined several ways, which is why they are useful for different analytical purposes, and both have a behavioral dimension. It is common sense that a person in choosing a role may take more than one factor into account, including his own temperament.

RALPH K. HUTT

*University of Wisconsin*

## BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### REVIEWS OF BOOKS

<i>Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.</i> HEINZ EULAU.....	144
<i>Newman, Recognition of Communist China?</i> ROBERT B. STAUFFER....	145
<i>Matthews, The Cuban Story.</i> JAMES L. BUSEY.....	146
<i>Kennan, Russia and The West Under Lenin and Stalin.</i> ANDREW GYORGY	148
A Report on Social Security Programs in the Soviet Union, Prepared by the U. S. Team that Visited the U.S.S.R. Under the East-West Ex- change Program in August-September 1958. HERMAN M. SOMERS	149
<i>Banfield, Political Influence.</i> HARRY M. SCOBLE.....	151
<i>Bollens, Ed., Exploring the Metropolitan Community.</i> LEE S. GREENE..	152
<i>Berelson, Graduate Education in the United States.</i> LYNTON K. CALDWELL	153

### BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY	156
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS.....	172
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT.....	191
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION.....	208
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED.....	225

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.* BY ROBERT A. DAHL. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. vii, 355. \$7.50.)

One is tempted, on first thought, to locate Professor Dahl's research on New Haven's influence structures and processes in the polemical context of other community studies—from the Lynds' Middletown through Warner's Yankee City and Jonesville to Hunter's Regional City and beyond. At least it is not far-fetched to predict that some reviewers will appraise this book in just that context. And I have no doubt that the book will join the classical community studies as a classic in its own right. But as Professor Dahl himself hardly touches on the possible comparisons with other community studies which could be made (though we know, from some of his other writings and those of his associates, that he is quite self-conscious about it), I shall resist the temptation of dwelling on the obvious. For doing so, it seems to me, would only detract from what I feel is the central importance of the book. This is the problem of the relationship between the findings of empirical research on political behavior and the theory of democracy.

Some years ago, the authors of a well-known study of voting behavior, on reviewing their findings, came to the shocking conclusion—shocking, at least, to them—that not all was well with democratic theory. It is easy, from the vantage point of hindsight, to charge them with naivete. But for decades it has been fashionable to blame the practices of democratic politics rather than the theory of democracy for what were more or less vaguely felt as lasting shortcomings, and to accept what one could not do much about as a kind of price for the luxury of indulging one's fantasies about an unperturbed democratic system as it might exist in a Platonic heaven.

On the other hand, the relationship between political theory and the facts of political life is such that, if one does not wish to blame the facts, one may easily tailor one's theory to fit the facts. Conservative thought and, indeed, some empirical formulations of politics in equilibrium terms, come at times close to doing just that. I don't think, and I'm at last coming back to the book under review here, that Professor Dahl can be accused of either the normative or the naturalistic fallacy. He has left, in the last ten years, a too clearly discernible and distinguished trail of his theoretical journey. If

the journey ends, for the time being, in New Haven, it is, in part, because that is Professor Dahl's home town, a convenient real-life setting for testing or at least demonstrating some of his propositions about the political process in a pluralist democracy. The choice of New Haven as a research site, or the contribution the book makes to community research, seem to me rather secondary considerations. Any other research site or situation might have served equally well what I sense to be the book's critical objective.

In the present stage of behavioral research, on the one hand, and development of political theory on the other hand, neither can be allowed to become a strait jacket for the other. Professor Dahl successfully avoids falling into this trap. He presents not only a series of proofs which, of course, require theoretical stability, but also a series of fresh hypotheses, especially regarding the twin problem of stability and change and the problem of democratic consensus. In other words, Professor Dahl's empiricism is not a *cul-de-sac* of specious objectivity. I say this because my own inclination, unlike Professor Dahl's, would be to withhold certain speculations, no matter how empirically relevant, from the public gaze until more evidence is in. But this, I suspect, is more a matter of temperament than of methodological etiquette.

Professor Dahl's approach in studying the politics of influence in a pluralistic system with, in his own words, noncumulative or dispersed inequalities, is as plural as the political order he investigates. Three broad research strategies serve his purposes. First, a historical analysis of the transformations of New Haven's ruling groups. Second, case analyses of three arenas of policy-making—party nominations to public office, urban redevelopment, and public education. And third, a cross-sectional analysis of the distribution of resources among New Haven's citizenry. This cutting into the research pie from quite different angles is dictated by Professor Dahl's complex model of the democratic order in a competitive environment—a political system in which the politics of influence is not a zero-sum game, but a function of highly fragmented patterns of more or less direct influence, of reciprocal relations between leaders, sub-leaders and constituents, of shifting coalitions and bargaining between more or less overlapping networks of influentials who specialize in different issue areas, of varying structures of influence



such as "executive-centered coalition" or "rival sovereignties," and of different and unequal distributions of those resources whose successful mobilization is the task of politics. As a result, Professor Dahl manages to escape, on the one hand, the fallacious conception which confuses the bases of influence with its scope, and, on the other hand, the equally fallacious notion that, because influence has been exerted, it is, of necessity, an all-pervasive and unified phenomenon. On the contrary, Professor Dahl shows that influence can be fragmented, both with regard to control over resources and with regard to issues, and yet can be mobilized, under certain conditions, for effective decision-making in a plural-democratic order.

With its broad-gauged theory, but middle-range empiricism, Professor Dahl's book is more than just another community study. It is a sophisticated and undogmatic treatise on democratic politics. Only in the concluding chapter does Professor Dahl take the role of the pundit who, with authority but usually with less supportive data than Professor Dahl commands, speaks about power elites, mass democracy or countervailing powers. And so we hear about *the* political stratum and *the* ordinary citizen. But fortunately, Professor Dahl is aware of the pitfalls of empirical generalization. Speaking of the function of beliefs in the engineering of consensus—"a recurring *process* of interchange among political professionals, the political stratum, and the great bulk of the population"—Professor Dahl is quick to point out that consensus is not a static and unchanging attribute, but "a variable element in a complex and more or less continuous process."

This, then, is a book in political science, more than a book about local politics in an American city, which no political scientist, whatever his area of specialization—international, comparative or domestic—can afford to miss. Because of its generic character, it is rather unfortunate—and I don't want to sound stuffy—that the book's index is so unsatisfactory. Some of Professor Dahl's most interesting concepts and usages have been omitted.

HEINZ EULAU

*Stanford University*

*Recognition of Communist China?* By ROBERT P. NEWMAN. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961. Pp. ix, 318. Cloth, \$4.95; paper, \$1.95.)

During the winter of 1954-1955, college debate teams throughout the United States

had assigned to them the subject: "Should the United States Recognize Communist China?" The topic was obviously a rather foolhardy choice considering the recent military clash between armies of the two nations in Korea, and the temper of domestic politics. At that juncture in time, the subject of recognition of Communist China was not "debatable" in the United States. That it was not was illustrated even within the forensic fraternity: West Point, Annapolis, the other Service academies and a number of Roman Catholic colleges refused to permit their teams to debate the topic.

We can, however, be thankful for the brashness of those who, in 1954, chose the highly controversial theme, since the debate began the involvement of speech professor Robert P. Newman in the subject of United States' recognition policy toward the Chinese People's Republic. Seven years later we have his book on the subject; it is an excellent contribution to the continuing debate.

The merits of the book are many. By breaking the argument down into a number of subdivisions, and by ordering the great mass of data around these points, he makes it possible for rational processes to begin to operate again on this emotion-laden question. In his presentation of the material he is careful to let the protagonists speak for themselves, although his skill in weaving the quoted evidence together overcomes what might well have been a major handicap to readability. Furthermore, it is obvious that a high sense of moral purpose guides his research and writing. Because he sets such high standards for himself, he is distressed when he finds that others do not always follow equally puritanical codes. For example, he is concerned that the late John Foster Dulles seemingly repudiated an early pro-recognition stand as the price for the position as Secretary of State. And Newman, discussing the 1957 edition of Dulles' *War or Peace*, comments: "His facility for incorporating two irreconcilable positions [on recognition of Communist China] within the covers of one and the same book is indeed amazing."

It is in the statements of top State Department personnel that the author finds the greatest degree of biased argument. He makes note of the complete absence of any reference in State Department publications to the highly probable beneficial effects of United States' recognition of Communist China on our relations with a number of nations such as Japan, Great Britain, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, etc., as well as on neutral nations. He carefully compares the legal arguments made during the Eisenhower Administration by such

officials as Walter S. Robertson and Walter P. McCaughy with all the recognized authorities on the subject of recognition and concludes that the Department of State has "attempted to apply wholly spurious criteria to recognition." That partisanship is not behind this analysis is suggested by his recalling that it was during the Truman Administration that the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, on May 18, 1951, made public the nonrecognition policy for the first time, and developed many of the arguments that were to become the stock in trade of the Department for the next decade. Furthermore, Newman points out that in 1961 Dean Rusk, as the new Secretary of State, supported the nonrecognition policy with the argument that "recognition of Red China would require abandonment of the National Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek," an argument that, by implying more than it says, becomes a distortion of reality. Recognition of Communist China would, of course, mean giving up support of Chiang's claims to being the government of mainland China; it would not mean abandoning Chiang and his regime on Taiwan.

The substantive conclusions reached fall under three clusters of questions relating to different phases of the argument on recognition. These are grouped under the headings: (1) moral issues; (2) political issues; and (3) issues of law. Space does not permit a detailed review of the fifteen questions into which these three are broken. However, a brief summary might at least be suggestive of Newman's approach.

He analyzes the moral arguments under, first, the comparative merit of the two rival regimes; secondly, the question of America's word of honor, involved as it is through our pledges to the Nationalist regime; and lastly, the broad matter of support for the rule of law. He decides that on the first, Nationalist China has a slight edge, on the last that the rule of law would be supported by recognition, and that the issue of honor breaks about evenly. He concludes that the moral arguments may be interpreted to support continued nonrecognition but by such a narrow margin as to be inconclusive.

The second group of issues, the political, comprises the largest of the three with some eleven different arguments analyzed. On four Newman finds that the evidence is clearly in favor of recognition. These are: to improve communication and negotiation; to improve our stature and influence in world affairs; to avoid defeat on the representation of China

issue in the United Nations; and to face political reality by not continuing to view Communist China as a passing phenomenon. On another four he concludes that the arguments support a moderate pro-recognition stand. These include the need to convince the rest of the world that we are not sabotaging a possible disarmament agreement; to bring China into the world network of international organizations; to expand trade; and to put mainland China on the spot for being the one that is guilty of preventing a normalization of relations in the Far East. This last would result from China's likely rejection of any United States' unilateral recognition offer. And lastly, the author finds that on three other political issues the evidence is not clear-cut. The three indecisive issues are: the effect on our Asian allies; the possibility that recognition might increase subversive activities in Southeast Asia; and the impact on Soviet-Chinese relations.

In reviewing the conclusions on the final set of issues, those of law, the author's words succinctly summarize his findings: "Both the force of American precedent and the requirements of international law support recognition of any government with effective and reasonably permanent control of its territory—and this does include Communist China."

On the basis of the strong pro-recognition conclusions to the political and legal sets of questions, and the near-split on the moral, the author concludes his exercise in the rational analysis of political argument with a strong recommendation for United States' recognition of the Communist Government of China, adding, "with or without a guarantee of reciprocity, with or without agreement on Peking's part to renounce all claim to sovereignty over Taiwan."

I find myself in complete agreement with the author. He has done a superb job of presenting all salient aspects of a tough, and politically touchy, problem in our foreign and domestic politics. I doubt, however, if the American public is much closer to accepting his conclusions today than it was to listening to the collegiate debaters in 1954.

ROBERT B. STAUFFER

*University of Hawaii*

*The Cuban Story.* By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS. (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1961. Pp. 318. \$4.50.)

This is a book-length news story and editorial, written in both haste and heat, about a series of events for which Mr. Matthews of the *New York Times* conceives an exaggerated

personal responsibility. *The Cuban Story*, or rather the Cuba-Matthews-Castro story, opens with the author's famed interview with the elusive Fidel, on February 17, 1957. It does not follow from the achievement of this notable scoop that one must agree with all the journalist's interpretations of subsequent Cuban developments; or even that the people (such as this reviewer) who sensed before Matthews did that the Communists were moving in on *fidelismo*, were all "at best naïve and at worst fools, simpletons, or knaves."

Though Matthews covers the critics of *fidelismo* with purple invective and fugitive innuendo, he never does really come to precise grips with detailed, critical reports that were available to him when he wrote the book—such, for example, as the Draper studies, to which Matthews makes isolated references where they suit his purposes. Except for a devious and labored argument that seems to say that democratic Latin American reformist leaders are afraid of losing prestige to *fidelista* movements, Matthews never offers a substantive answer to the criticisms of notable former Castro supporters such as José Figueres, Rómulo Betancourt, and Luis Muñoz Marín.

The political scientist or historian may agree with journalist Matthews that on January 1, 1959, the *fidelista* revolution was not Communist, and was not *hecha en Moscú*; or that in many blundering ways before 1959, U. S. conduct in Cuba made it inevitable that the republic would undergo a wave of anti-gringoism. One may warmly endorse the author's plea for greater U. S. awareness and understanding of the bursting social revolution in this hemisphere. The political scientist may take only mild exception to the Matthews view that the *fidelistas* turned to totalitarian socialism as late as summer or autumn of 1960, or even to the threadbare argument that Fidel was somehow "forced" into the Communist sphere by mistakes committed by the United States after the revolution.

On two other counts that are more profound, many political scientists are likely to part company with Herbert L. Matthews.

First, despite all his years on a great newspaper, Matthews never seems to grasp the nature of the deep conflict that now engulfs the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and the rôle of the Cuban forward position of the U.S.S.R. in that conflict. At one point late in the book, the author confesses that *if* it should turn out that the Cuban regime is "actively playing a rôle on the side of the Sino-Soviet bloc against the United States," then the *fidelista* government "will have to be destroyed." But this, like

many similar contradictory statements whereby the author may hedge against his critics, is totally out of character with the dominant *motif* of the book. The treatment of the U. S.-Cuba question goes rather in this style: (1) Cuba is not yet Communist, (2) acceptance of Communism by Cuba need not mean its participation in the Sino-Soviet bloc, (3) in any event it is not yet in the Sino-Soviet bloc, (4) even if it were, we should be able to live with it, (5) if we interfere, it might cause a holocaust, and (6) there is no point in interfering because the Soviet leaders wouldn't fight a war over a region so far from the U.S.S.R. In response to this bewildering argument, political scientists might have something to say about the implications and goals of competition between two behemoths in a world of bipolarized power; and logicians might wish to add a few words about internal coherence and about arguing from the conclusion to the premises.

Secondly, it is startling that Matthews, of all people, reveals no comprehension of the meaning of the age-old struggle between liberty and tyranny. The journalist presents Fidel's self-righteousness and messianism almost as though they were virtues. Even Castro's interminable speeches are "effective, clearly reasoned, interesting, and well organized." There are the inevitable brief allusions to certain defects, which a determined defender of Matthews might twist out of context as evidence the journalist is really quite anti-Castro; but these run contrary to the prevailing message: Fidel is a prophet, *fidelismo* is the wave of the future, we'd better adjust ourselves to the facts of life, and the facts of life are not so bad anyhow.

No anti-democratic practice of the regime is so revolting as to be unworthy of Matthews' praise or at least his apology. He can even find something good to say for the 30-year imprisonment of Huber Matos, and for the executions ("By revolutionary standards, this has not been a sanguinary affair."). It is central to Matthews' theme that Cuba is undergoing a "real revolution"; that a revolution "is not a tea party"; and that a social revolution cannot tolerate either elections or liberty. The author repeatedly assures us that Cubans are not Anglo-Saxons, and cannot take one hundred years (as it allegedly took us) to bring their revolution to fruition—as though it takes a century to create a multitude of independent proprietors or to organize an election. The meaning of the recent pamphlet, *No hay revolución sin libertad*, by Costa Rican left-wing political leader Luis Alberto Monge, would be lost on today's Herbert L. Matthews. As in Greek tragedy, there is here a distressing flaw.

It is the flaw whereby a sympathy for despotism as a means to attain their goals throws certain great liberals into the same camp with the most tyrannically minded reactionaries.

The truth is that there is ample evidence on every continent that distribution of the economic, social and political instrumentalities of power, and creation of a pluralist society, is *not* just a Yankee gadget, is applicable everywhere, and *must* be the primordial beginning point for the fruition of any popular social revolution. In fact, it can be argued that until the day comes when Cuba, and much of the rest of the world including Russia and China, have undergone their revolutions against feudalism-collectivism and for the individual liberation of man from the chains of monolithic political and economic power, they will not have had any revolutions at all. One hopes the great journalists of the world will help to hasten that day by catching up on their homework.

JAMES L. BUSEY

*University of Colorado*

*Russia and The West Under Lenin and Stalin.*

By GEORGE F. KENNAN. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960, 1961. Pp. x, 411. \$5.75.)

Originally prepared as a series of illuminating lectures delivered at Oxford University in 1957-58 and at Harvard University in the spring of 1960, George Kennan's book brilliantly combines the best of two worlds. In the depth of its scholarship it clearly reflects the author's association with the Institute for Advanced Study, while in its more informal asides and colorful personal recollections it convincingly portrays Ambassador Kennan's long and significant diplomatic service. The reviewer is indeed struck by the steadily recurring dichotomy of this valuable book. One sector of it is based on a scholarly investigation of the nature and limits of Soviet totalitarian government under Lenin and Stalin as projected into the complex domestic and foreign relations of the Russian state, while the other presents a series of lively profiles of the leading figures of the last four decades of world politics. In effect, these beautifully drawn personality portraits lend the book a liveliness and vividness most unusual in the world of the historian's scholarship. As the dramatic narrative progresses from one of these historic vignettes to the next, the absorbed reader is reminded of William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* which pursues—although on a far different and considerably more popularized level—a similar approach to the intricacies of

contemporary international relations.

Kennan's discursive method reflects the author's original intent: to present the 1917 to 1945 period of Soviet development in the form of a series of loosely and leisurely organized lectures, each devoted to a narrow central theme while indirectly also dealing with a broader world political setting. The lecture form itself then implies a great deal of summarizing, a certain amount of repetitiousness and colloquial asides which have been conspicuously absent from Kennan's other writings. A delightful sense of informality pervades this important work and guarantees in advance a long and healthy tenure on the national non-fiction best-seller list.

The book is divided into twenty-five chapters of which the first fifteen concentrate on the Leninist period, with the sixteenth (a most sophisticated essay on the importance and relevance of Great Britain as a continuing "Soviet target") serving as a transition-link between Lenin and his successor. The next eight chapters offer a scintillating insight into the operational details and political structure of Stalin's regime. The final lecture ("Keeping a World Intact") is frankly a puzzler since it so openly conflicts with Kennan's entire philosophy as lucidly expressed throughout his work. Maybe the cautious historian has yielded his place here to the exuberant diplomat turned *voyeur*, an uninhibited forecaster of future trends in the development of Soviet-American relations. Throughout his lectures Kennan firmly stressed his inner conviction that despite their multiple acts of recognition, business talks and endless political conversations, the leaders of the Soviet Union were firmly and inflexibly devoted to the total ultimate destruction of the capitalist world and to the final and complete victory of Communism. Yet here we are suddenly reminded that what the author has patiently described in previous chapters was merely "the eras of Lenin and of Stalin, and not that of Khrushchev," and that the differences between these periods of Russian history are both relevant and fundamental. Suddenly, and for no obvious reason, the Soviet regime's basic assumptions and strategic expectations seem to have altered with major consequences for American diplomacy and for our national posture. We must give up our previous, Stalin-based preconceptions and prejudices *vis-à-vis* today's Soviet Union and compare instead our present relationship to the Soviet leadership with "the national level of recalcitrance, of sheer orneriness and unreasonableness, which *we encounter in the behavior of states anywhere.*" (Italics mine.)

While this conclusion might be tenable in the context of a different type of analytical treatment, it is unacceptable as a prescription for conflict-resolution after the systematic and lengthy theorizing to-the-contrary in the previous twenty-four chapters (or lectures).

This concluding "sermon" cannot detract, however, from the overall merit of the historic gems which punctuate *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*. This reviewer was particularly impressed by the scope and sweep of "The Siberian Intervention" (Chapter 7) including the vivid story of the Czechoslovak Corps or Legion; by the gripping and colorful vignette on Stalin ("Stalin as a Statesman," Chapter 17) forcefully applied to the murky and mysterious Sino-Soviet relationships ("Stalin and China," Chapter 18) and by the original—and occasionally debatable—analysis of the Soviet-German "Nonaggression Pact" (Chapter 21). But while one may take exception to Kennan's portrayal of Hitler, and future historians are bound to disagree with some of his value-judgments, no one could perform a more scintillating piece of diplomatic surgery (or postmortem) on the anatomy of the Hitler-Stalin pact. "The ultimate aims of Stalin's Russia were contrary to the wartime purposes of both the great warring parties in the West. Hitler, with his brutal realism, recognized this, and was reconciled from the start to the instability of the German-Soviet relationship—to the fact that there would soon come a day when it would have served its purpose and would have to end."

ANDREW GYORGY

*Boston University*

*A Report on Social Security Programs in the Soviet Union.* Prepared by the U. S. Team that Visited the U.S.S.R. Under the East-West Exchange Program in August-September 1958. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961. Pp. 157. \$1.00.)

Social security programs have now become important institutions in all but the least developed nations of the world, despite widely varying political and economic systems. The underdeveloped nations are also expressing intense interest in the programs of the more advanced countries. They look upon the extent and quality of a nation's social welfare institutions as one significant measure of its character.

As our own social security system matures and faces increasingly difficult decisions, it becomes more important to have specific

knowledge of systems elsewhere. Relatively little of a detailed nature has been known in this country regarding these vital institutions behind the iron curtain. We have cause for gratitude that an agreement between the Department of State and Soviet officials under the East-West Exchange Program made possible a visit to the Soviet Union by a team of U. S. social security experts for an intensive 30-day on-the-spot investigation of the U.S.S.R. system. The resulting Report is correct in its claim that it constitutes "the most complete statement of certain aspects of the social security system of the U.S.S.R. in the English language." Moreover, the extraordinary talents of our investigating team, made up of five high officials of the Social Security Administration, resulted in an unusually sophisticated and pertinent inquiry.

Although the authors point out that the different economic and political conditions of the U.S.S.R. require a social security system different from ours, this reader found the similarities remarkably striking. The basic problems of income maintenance against the hazards of old-age, death, disability, illness, and unemployment are universal. The response to these problems in industrial societies does not appear to vary very greatly and the methods available for dealing with them are not limitless.

The Report makes clear that the material needs of families in the U.S.S.R. are being planned for and met through a widely developed and extensive social security system which is uniform throughout the 15 republics. The cash benefit programs cover a broader range than our public programs. They include: sickness benefits, with no waiting period and no limit on duration, at 50-90 percent of most recent earnings; maternity benefits for a 16-week period at 100 percent of pay; industrial injury and disease benefits at full pay; family allowances for children in large families and for unmarried mothers at relatively low levels; retirement pensions which average about 65-70 percent of past earnings; disability pensions which are graded by degree of disability; survivorship benefits which are similar in amount to disability pensions.

There is no program of unemployment benefits on the theory that there is no unemployment in the U.S.S.R. On the whole a condition of full employment does exist, but there are of course inescapable episodes of frictional and structural unemployment, and less formalized means are available for providing for people temporarily out of work.

The national system is largely concentrated

on urban dwellers. Most peasants—those who live on collective farms and constitute about 40 percent of the labor force—are outside the basic system, although collective farmers and their families have the same provisions for medical care and for family allowances as the remainder of the population. In addition, modest benefits are provided through mutual benefit societies established at each collective farm.

Because public medical care programs are administered by the Ministry of Health rather than by the Ministry of Social Security, the study team did not investigate those programs. This results in a significant gap in the picture furnished by the Report as medical care is basic to judging the adequacy and balance of many other social security provisions. For example, it does not appear possible to measure the value of retirement benefits for the aged without reference to the costs of medical care which they are expected to shoulder.

Among the findings which the study team regards as especially noteworthy for the United States are: 1) the idealization of productive work on the part of every individual capable of working has resulted in development of programs and techniques for employing the aged, the physically handicapped, and many others unable to perform in competition with more able-bodied workers. 2) Emphasis on research in disability and welfare programs is apparently yielding results in making such people more nearly self-supporting. Research in social security has been accepted by Soviet officials as essential for effective and economical administration. 3) Despite political and economic centralization in Moscow, there is substantial decentralization of administrative authority and responsibility although not of policy. 4) Research institutes are engaged in developing guides for physicians and medical examining commissions for determination of disability for purposes of eligibility to social security benefits. "This is an area of scientific endeavor which is of considerable importance to disability insurance programs in all countries."

5) Experience recently convinced the Soviets of the necessity for instituting a retirement test for receipt of old age pensions. This has been fundamental from the beginning in the United States program, but there has been increasing pressure here to abandon it and it has been generally liberalized and completely removed for persons 72 and over. It is doubtful that many advocates here have considered the additional costs which a removal of the retirement test would incur. Soviet authorities found it

too expensive and "stated that a more equitable distribution of funds could result if fully employed persons did not have a full pension in addition to their wages."

This reader was also impressed by the fact that benefits under the Soviet system are, like ours, based upon individual past earnings. They are, like ours, generally weighted so that those with low earnings receive relatively higher benefits. Although pensions are available at lower ages—60 for men and 55 for women, reflecting the different age structure of the Soviet population—the average retirement age is between three and four years above the statutory minimum age, which is similar to our experience.

Unlike ours, financing of the entire Soviet programs is non-contributory for the workers, being entirely paid for by contributions of the employing enterprise and the government. All sickness and disability programs are related to encouraging recovery and job adjustment and reemployment where necessary. In such programs there is administrative concern with the quality and relevance of medical care, not frequently enough the case in this country. Unlike this country, the system is in part used to furnish incentives to direct people to occupations in which the government wants them.

The Report is both fact-filled and analytical. Social security is thoughtfully related to other economic and social conditions such as wages, hours and working conditions, including some data which the reviewer has not encountered in other sources. The authors not only evince a high regard for accuracy and thoroughness but attempt to be scrupulously fair. They point out that the system is highly regarded by the Soviet people and that it is "well administered with a genuine concern for the people's material welfare on the part of the social security officials." There are, however, places where the authors give way to a tendency to compare the general run of benefits under the Soviet programs with the very best available in this country. The total picture is creditable in comparison with most western countries and would have been even more impressive had medical benefits not been omitted.

The great value of this Report suggests that it would be profitable to our general understanding of comparative government if we had more explorations of the detailed experience of specific operating programs in many countries. The realities of comparative public policy and public administration will not become clear without them. This report can be studied with benefit by students of comparative administra-

tion, government, economics and social welfare not only for its information but as a model for competent inquiry.

HERMAN M. SOMERS

*Haverford College*

*Political Influence.* BY EDWARD C. BANFIELD.  
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961. Pp. vi, 354.  
\$6.00.)

Professor Banfield's book examines political influence in the "Second City." His treatment is undertaken on three levels. The first section comprises descriptive narratives of six controversies in Chicago: the effort to build a branch of the County Hospital (unsuccessful); the absorption of the city Welfare Department by the County Welfare Department; the attempt to gain state subsidization of the Chicago Transit Authority (unsuccessful); the Fort Dearborn Project to revitalize the central business district (unsuccessful); the effort to establish a Chicago campus of the University of Illinois (also unsuccessful); and the building of an Exhibition Hall. Banfield then devotes his second section to generalizing from the case studies to the structure, process, and mythology of influence; and in his third he attempts a general model of power and coordination in metropolitan politics and a normative evaluation of how the present system now serves the public interest *vis-à-vis* alternative structures.

In reviewing this work, I should like to examine four problems. First, Banfield genuflects to the cry popular among us all for "systematic comparative analysis." At the minimum this would seem to require that each researcher self-consciously articulate his research design. But the reader here is left uninformed as to the criteria for defining the universe of controversies "of city-wide or more than city-wide importance" or as to what is left out and why when one has only "virtually a 100 percent sample." On a different level, three of the controversies, and perhaps a fourth, are site controversies. Does this mean the disputes as to land-use provide the unifying focus of metropolitan politics in Chicago? Does it mean that site-questions constitute a *phase* in the life-cycle of political issues, a new potential veto point to which initially defeated opponents inevitably retire? Alternatively, if land-use disputes are the stuff of influence attempts in Chicago, then this cries out for further inquiry. Why doesn't the social structure of the city give rise to disputes based on ethnic, religious, class, generational, etc., conflict? If we are to work toward comparative analysis, then we must begin to sort out and tentatively

rank independent and intervening variables. Is the incidence of higher formal education, of blue-collar jobs, etc., different in Chicago from that in other major American cities? If not, then does the political structure operate as an intervening variable to depoliticize identifications and demands that elsewhere become highly politicized? What is—what are—the possible relation(s) between political structure and social structure? This is not something the author does not concern himself with: Banfield at several points draws attention to the impressive strength of the Democratic machine in Chicago and explicitly contrasts this with New York. Why has the machine persisted in Chicago? Where are we going to place our bets?

A second question arises concerning the use of role theory. If role is position and positions have occupants, then doesn't systematic comparative analysis require inventories or samples of alternative role occupants? For example, the civic leaders in Chicago are characterized as overwhelmingly Republican in national politics yet inactive in local Republican politics. Why? And what about national Democrats or local Republican activists? Why are they so? Are there functional (sub-role?) consequences? Alternatively, are these civic leaders high stationary or upwardly mobile? Do factional alignments exist among them on local issues? Are they to be characterized by a political ideology with content, cohesion, and dominance in the system? We learn little in response to such questions. Perhaps this is a consequence of the author's studiously non-statistical approach; but a cost of this apparent choice is the high risk of drowning one's reader in the welter of discrete names, places, dates that make up case study narratives.

This lack of statistics is associated with what I see as a third problem. In his chapter on the mythology of influence, Banfield does not hesitate to attribute a concrete view of the power structure to Chicagoans. Yet he employed no survey instrument, no adult sample. If he is generalizing from the informal interviews with the civic leaders *et al.* then I suspect it would be more useful for us to determine not (a) that most or many hold a monolithic image in their minds but (b) that differences in power images are (or are not) associated with different roles, different kinds of power, differing degrees of influence. But this requires more systematic data-gathering and analysis.

As it is, Banfield imposes an interpretation upon his data without providing us with much for assisting independent judgment as to whether they bear such burden. He informs us



that civic controversy in Chicago arises out of the survival needs of large formal organizations—and not from group interests (among other causes rejected); yet the examples given seem to this reviewer to fit entirely within the group approach, and I think we ought not to become intrigued with terminological distinctions unless the advocate can demonstrate some net increment in understanding or research utility. In this same light, Banfield generalizes a business-transaction model. Whether this model is useful will be proven in the marketplace of future research proposals; whether it is different—except in terminology—will be evident to those familiar with the political economists' control-process models of hierarchy, polyarchy, bargaining, and price system.

Other readers undoubtedly will discern different virtues and faults. But there will be other readers, I am sure, because the book comes as a welcome addition to the meager, and far less satisfactory, literature on urban and especially metropolitan politics. The questions are raised precisely in the hope that more political scientists will follow in Banfield's pioneering attempt, for Banfield has torn our attention away from the navel of small towns and has also correctly avoided the sociological approach to community power structure associated with Floyd Hunter. But in reaction to what might now be accorded a decent death, there is a danger that we draw back too far from useful tools of other social sciences.

HARRY M. SCOBLE

*University of Wisconsin*

*Exploring the Metropolitan Community.* EDITED BY JOHN C. BOLLENS. Contributors: John C. Bollens, Scott Greer, Werner Z. Hirsch, Carl A. McCandless, Henry J. Schmandt. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. xvii, 492. \$7.50.)

The metropolitan area, variously defined in detail, but presenting a reasonably clear concept to most social scientists, has become the focus of a considerable body of study in the past few years, an expansion of an already sufficiently formidable literature. Many of these studies and their reports have been oriented towards reform (a matter which is somehow suspect and distasteful to many members of the political science profession). Some have been entirely informative or diagnostic. This present volume is one of the products of the widely known and intensive study of the St. Louis area, which attempted to combine with an action and reform-oriented pro-

gram a careful and detailed analysis of certain economic features of the area, an examination of the opinion climate, and the measurement of local governmental services. Surveys in other cities have resulted in recent reports of similar character based on areas such as those of Cleveland and New York.

The Ford Foundation was the major angel of the St. Louis study, which was conducted jointly by Washington and St. Louis Universities, under the immediate direction of Professors Thomas H. Eliot and Paul Steinbicker. The full-time staff of the survey was directed by John C. Bollens. The contributors to the present volume are noted above.

Discussion of the governmental setting in the St. Louis area provides no surprises. This survey went further than some do in providing information on the economic and business background of the area. The "government and politics" portions of this section of the book show a heavy emphasis on governmental structure and distribution of services, with some material on the extra-legal political devices—party, pressure, and opinion organs—which supposedly animate the governmental machine. Critics of conventional metropolitan surveys, who have been numerous and vocal (often unnecessarily so) have been insistent in their clamor for going back of the formal machine. The St. Louis study meets these demands, but, I think, not completely. Perhaps it is most productive in its examination of participation and attitudes. In Part I the following quotation, in view of the emerging dogma of some critics, seems to me especially significant:

Attempts at structural reorganization in a metropolitan community are frequently met with the argument that government must be kept close to the people. Those who advance this position maintain that small units of government stimulate the interest of the people and provide them with the opportunity to participate actively in the affairs of their local community.

If it is true that small governments foster a high degree of political action, widespread grass-roots opposition might be expected to any movement designed to lessen local autonomy. The viability of this principle, in other words, would act as a severe check on governmental coordination and make more difficult the functioning of a metropolitan area. Several studies made by the Survey, however, raise serious doubts about the validity of the belief that small political units constitute the best means of keeping government in the control of the people. In fact, these studies indicate that the "small government" argument is in many respects a myth. [Pp. 86, 87.]



The reform proposals which came out of the survey were, on the whole, fairly conventional. This is no surprise and no criticism. The structural options available for local government are limited in number. The Survey decided to recommend the creation of a multipurpose metropolitan district. In effect this is the federal plan which has become a sort of rainbow shining through the rain of "metro" reports. With the example of some federations and many proposals (a recent report on rearranging the London federation follows this same line) before my eyes, I cannot summon much conviction of the viability of the federal approach in local affairs. It does have the merit of acceptability, for it seems to preserve local institutions (and this acceptability was acknowledged to be a strong persuader for the St. Louis Survey), but it seems to me to be an illusion. If an effective centralization develops, significant functions cannot be left to component units and I cannot see how the normal citizen can be heavily involved in insignificant functions. If we really think that political participation is closely connected with size (which seems to be doubtful or, at least, not proven) then we ought to live in villages. We can see the St. Louis Survey itself involved in the transfer of important matters to the central agency in the proposed federation at the point of planning and zoning—a fundamental point. If you are to have coordination, the really significant choices can't be decentralized. What remains is pap.

The attempt of the Survey to preserve local autonomy while still upgrading performance became, in my judgment, most strained when a scheme was created to establish minimum service levels which would be enforced by such means as tax rebates. This all seems to me excessively complicated. Establishing a minimum standard would be a difficult matter. The whole scheme would provide a happy hunting ground for the manipulator and the pressure group. And to what end? We already have enough of this sort of thing in federal-state and state-local arrangements.

Part Three of the volume is entitled Citizen Participation and Attitudes. Appendix C describes the methodology of the sample survey employed to secure data used in the report. This appendix should be very useful to students, as is indeed true of other appendices. I am in no position to quarrel with the findings of the Survey on citizen activities and attitudes. In seeking this material the Survey is in line with the practices recommended by students of metropolitan problems. I cannot entirely suppress doubts in my own mind whether the findings justify the expenditures

required to secure them. For example, the report notes that "awareness of metropolitan problems should increase with social rank, and it does." Does this contribute significantly to our existing knowledge? Does it help in formulating recommendations? It is true, certainly, that general knowledge would not permit us to predict all the conclusions which the Survey reached. For example, "Older persons are more likely to prefer merger in both areas, but particularly in the County; younger persons are more likely to prefer *status quo* only in the City." Are such generalities really useful? Can they have any effect on the action program? If not, can they serve the purpose of contributing to a general knowledge of voting behavior? I suppose we have no certain answer to this question. The Survey faced the same problems as many other voting surveys. We can all hope that careful study of and long familiarity with material of this type may permit scholars to reach some general conclusions, but anxiety on this score persists.

Part Four is devoted to Measurement and Economic Studies. Again, the methodology of the Survey is detailed in a way which should be useful to students. Generally I believe the findings will not be surprising to persons familiar with municipal affairs, but the Survey performs a service in pinning certain matters down. No major economies are visible as the result of scale of operation, which will give aid and comfort to the anti-efficiency theorists. (Many metropolitan reformers are, of course, not troubled by this, but wish to shift the burden of costs.) That wealthy areas can and do spend more and that "the expenditures of some communities are low because they cannot afford more" is surely to be expected. Perhaps the real question is the ethical one: what should be done about the community that can't afford more?

The Survey wrestled with the very elusive problem of measuring local services. Standards in this field are likely to be highly subjective, but not much fault can be found, I think, with the Survey's approach and again some useful, although not unusual, conclusions were reached.

LEE S. GREENE

*The University of Tennessee*

*Graduate Education in the United States.* By BERNARD BERELSON. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960. Pp. vi, 346. \$6.95.)

Berelson's study (one of the Carnegie Series in American Education) is as thorough and systematic a general study of graduate education in the United States as has yet appeared.

The book is divided into three parts and a comprehensive appendix. Part One deals with the historical background of graduate education in the United States. Part Two deals with the present and is subdivided into chapters dealing with the purposes of graduate education, with institutions, students and programs. Part Three consists of conclusions, commentary and recommendations.

The Appendix includes a classified bibliography and data descriptive of the methods used in the study. Among these data are descriptions of the actual studies undertaken, samples of questionnaires, responses to criticisms and reforms of graduate education and a list of consultants from the various academic and professional disciplines. The author has thus provided the reader with some basis for testing the validity of the observations and conclusions.

The author has also been careful to discriminate between the reporting and analysis of evidence and his own recommendations. His study gains much in significance and value because he has placed his findings into context. For example, he identifies various factors in the history of American higher learning that give rise to a pervasive mood of dissatisfaction with the state of graduate education. Among these factors are social attitudes and institutional traditions that, while not elements in the substantive quality of graduate education, nevertheless influence that substance and quality.

Criticisms of graduate education are therefore not always to be taken at face value. Berelson detects attitudes of perfectionism, frustration and dissatisfaction with disciplinary focus as factors influencing adverse evaluations of graduate education. It would not advance our understanding of the present state of graduate education merely to know the evaluations of it in the academic community and throughout society generally. One needs also to know, as best he can, what these evaluations actually mean. As a case in point, Berelson's findings with respect to political science offer grounds for some interesting speculations concerning the attitudes and expectations of those professing the discipline called political science.

To the political scientist dissatisfied with the state of his discipline Berelson's study offers evidence that he is not alone in his concern. Of graduate faculty members and recent recipients of Ph.D.'s in eighteen academic and professional fields, Berelson found that the proportion of political scientists describing the state of their discipline as "very satisfactory" was

substantially the lowest. Only six percent of graduate faculties in political science and thirteen percent of recent Ph.D.'s considered the state of political science as "very satisfactory." In contrast the proportions in physics were sixty-four percent among graduate faculties and fifty-eight percent among recent Ph.D.'s. Among the social sciences, political science stood conspicuously below the related disciplines of sociology, history and economics.

As might be expected, the proportion of graduate faculty in political science dissatisfied with the state of graduate teaching was conversely high. In contrast to the physical sciences, dissatisfaction with graduate education was high among all social sciences, but only in economics (fifty percent) was the reported dissatisfaction greater than in political science (forty-eight percent). Berelson's concern being with graduate education generally, he did not undertake to analyze in detail the reasons for the sharp contrasts in satisfaction among the several academic and professional disciplines. Nevertheless his study contains some observations regarding the condition of the social sciences, and political science may present an exaggerated illustration of difficulties affecting the social sciences generally.

Before considering the relevance of Berelson's findings to political science, one other possibly significant piece of evidence regarding the state of political science emerges from his study. Among twenty-two academic and professional disciplines surveyed, the longest doctoral dissertations were in political science (median length 357 pages) contrasted with the "number disciplines" of mathematics, bacteriology and physics (71, 88 and 96 pages respectively). In comparison with other "word disciplines" the contrast is much less great, but nevertheless distinct. For example:

	Range		Middle Half of Cases Fall Between
	Low	High	
Sociology	61	989	178-352
Economics	60	811	197-339
Political Science	147	863	268-443

It may of course be argued that human behavior in politics is more complex than in other aspects of life, that documentation of dissertations in political science is unavoidably encumbered by a greater variety of data than in other disciplines, that political scientists tend to include a more complete presentation

of background data than other disciplines. None of these arguments is thoroughly convincing either as to what is or what should be. A comparative study of Ph.D. dissertations in political science would be needed to provide an adequate explanation of their length. One plausible hypothesis, however, is that inadequate sharpness of focus in the study of politics has induced wordiness. It is difficult to be concise in matters about which one cannot be precise.

Berelson's study suggests that something is amiss with the discipline called "political science." Examination of Charles Hyneman's *The Study of Politics* (notably chapters I, VII, and VIII) suggests a probable basis of dissatisfaction in the lack of clarity and direction of effort in the field. On the evidence of Berelson's study political scientists appear to be less satisfied with graduate education and with the state of their discipline than almost any other academic group. Berelson's belief is that dislike of the "present character of their field" is the root of dissatisfaction. If this is so, it impairs among political scientists the things that Berelson says that American academic life needs most, "... a sense of pride, of *esprit de corps*, of profession in the best sense."

There may be no simple explanation of the failure of political science to achieve a focus and integrity as adequate as its effectiveness and

reputation as a discipline would seem to require. Dissatisfaction with the field of study is not conclusive evidence that the field is not yielding results—is not creative. Political scientists have taken the lead in developing several important areas of study that because of the special (one might say increasingly peculiar) conditions of American society had not found a home elsewhere in the university. Public law and public administration are two of these areas that have an obvious relevance to the study of politics, but have ties of equal or perhaps greater significance to other disciplines. The same may be said for certain aspects of international affairs.

Is it because political science as a discipline attracts a disproportionately large number of vicarious politicians with empire building proclivities that it blurs its focus and fragments its purpose through a jealous retention of so-called "fields" that might more profitably be organized as separate disciplines or as interdisciplinary programs? Perhaps what the discipline of political science now needs most is a psychological study of political scientists. Perhaps here might be found the basic reason for the dissatisfactions reported by Bernard Berelson and the slowness in achieving clarity and direction of purpose as noted by Charles Hyneman.

LYNTON K. CALDWELL

*Indiana University*

## BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

*The Predicament of Democratic Man.* By EDMOND CAHN. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. 164. \$3.95.)

Professor Cahn's new book investigates the moral implications of democracy. His central problem, examined with the keen sensitivity that characterized *The Sense of Injustice* and *The Moral Decision*, is whether it is possible to live in a democracy without becoming tainted by the wrongs and misdeeds of the government.

A feeling of moral guilt by citizens, for injustices perpetrated by governmental officials, is not prompted by the internal organization of despotic states. It becomes crucial, however, in systems of free government which rest authority upon consent; for then the citizens, as participants in making public decisions, are ultimately responsible for what the government does. Because control over the state is lodged in their hands, the state becomes their agent and they consequently share in its misdeeds. This moral involvement of the populace in the injustices of government constitutes for Professor Cahn the predicament of democratic man.

In wrestling with this question, Professor Cahn shuns abstract theories of automatic and universal guilt. Collectively, the populace's obligation is threefold: to prevent the occurrence of injustice, particularly those types of social injury (such as racial discrimination) which are beyond the reach of later recompense; to provide reparation for political injuries which do occur; and to protest continually against injustice, wherever it may be found.

In assessing individual responsibilities for governmental wrongdoing, Professor Cahn asks each person to determine for himself whether he is guilty or innocent of inciting an official to commit a wrong, authorizing it, helping to install a dangerous public instrument, remaining passive when the injury might have been prevented, ratifying and knowingly accepting its fruits, suppressing the truth about it, and contributing to the vulnerability of the victim. Withdrawal from civic life, the author emphasizes, is no escape from this moral confrontation.

Following this negative approach to the problem, the book then discusses what positively may be done to assure self-fulfillment and diminish the incidence of injustice. Democracy, Professor Cahn asserts, both demands and encourages equality in the political order and quality on the

part of citizens and public officials. These are the moral incentives which contribute to the better life.

Equality has two manifestations. Its "passive" aspect calls for the preservation of a minimum status for all people. Its "active" expression requires opportunities for personal advancement, with no regard in particular for a person's race or nationality. Quality on the part of the citizen necessitates good judgment, courage to dissent, and a willingness to cooperate. On the part of public officials, it requires justice.

Professor Cahn's elaboration is obviously one which makes high ideals normative for politics. But his approach is neither utopian nor sentimental. Throughout, the argument is based upon a realistic assessment of man's limits which emphasizes the inadequate grip of all men upon both truth and righteousness.

What makes protest necessary is the fallibility of those who exercise political power. They err. Their special interests give them an "official" perspective which differs from the "consumer" perspective of the citizens upon whom government impinges. The democratic temper, therefore, must be marked by "a sort of briny irreverence towards officials." Even majorities in a democracy deserve no exemption from this skepticism; for they too are not always right, and the democratic freedom to dissent is therefore a corrective necessity.

Human fallibility means that men ought to continually reconsider their political and social conclusions. Most beliefs, upon which political man acts, are non-verified; and the more free they are from corroboration, the less they should form the grounds for political coercion. In the legal sphere, man's fallibility thus warns us to avoid harsh accusations and strict penalties (such as capital punishment) which are beyond later correction.

Above all, a recognition of man's ignorance and the partiality of his virtues calls for political "modesty." A person must never be "moved to infer that he is categorically right in his choices and they [other people] are wrong." Justice soon flees whenever humanity is thus viewed as divided between the morally pure, on the one hand, and the contaminated on the other. Political solutions based upon compromise are far preferable.

What emerges in this book is thus a defense of democracy grounded upon an awareness of both

man's capacities for justice and the obstacles which his moral limits pose to the attainment of that high end. As such, the work contributes significantly to our understanding of democratic man and the essential foundations upon which the democratic order stands.—DONALD K. MCKEE, *Uppsala College*.

*Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development*. EDITED BY RALPH BRAIBANTI AND JOSEPH J. SPENGLER. (Durham: Duke University Press and London: Cambridge University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 305. \$6.00.)

This volume, the subject matter of which is "the effect of tradition and values in socio-economic development," contains contributions by Wilbert E. Moore (Princeton), Bert F. Hoselitz (Chicago), Melville J. Herskovits (Northwestern), Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi (Pakistan), John D. Montgomery (Boston U.), Mason Wade (Rochester), and the distinguished editors, Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (Duke). Each addresses himself to several aspects of this topic, though the essays conform to no standard format. In many respects they complement one another and overlap without very much repetition. Taken together the papers explore an array of concepts, define a range of problems, and outline some issues that, though unevenly developed, suggest some thought-provoking confrontations of an intellectual and practical nature in this complex area.

Frequently in a work of this type the editors expound a central concern, but the authors, however much they share it and strive to deal with it, tend to go off on their professional tangents. In this instance, they stick to their assignment more faithfully than usually happens, thus enhancing advantages and rewards accruing to the reader. While addressing themselves to the multi-dimensional processes of change, the contributors venture well beyond, into the examination of such items as ideologies, traditions, theory, and cultural dynamics, to mention only a few. It is not for sheer originality of conceptualizations that one will take up this collection—most of the authors have published their views elsewhere—but for the complex relationships indicated and refinements worked out.

Though the volume is organized by chapters, the contributions of Professors Spengler, Moore, Hoselitz, and Herskovits contain enough in common to form a distinct section by themselves. No one thread runs consistently through all of them, but in their own ways these authors have much to say about what has come to be designated strategic access in the developmental process. Their expositions illuminate strategic access into minds, social structures, cultures, and economies

where change is being deliberately promoted and where there is direction or administration for this purpose. Such facets as the points of penetration, timing, internal and external sources of support, retardation and advancement factors, multiplier and ripple effects, and forces that influence the patterning of the evolving or transplanted institutions are brought under discussion from different vantage points. There are some inevitable gaps that are by no means the fault of the authors but reflect the degree of non-contiguity of the several social sciences. Where the respective approaches are based on academic disciplines, there is a slight distortion of emphasis which the chapters as a whole tend to correct.

It is Professor Spengler who explicitly deals with "the content of men's minds . . . as the potentially dynamic element, as the source whence issue change and novelty, in a world or universe that is otherwise essentially passive." He postulates that both rate and direction of development for a society "depends largely upon what is in the minds of its members, and above all upon the content of the minds of its elites. . . ." Employing optimal activity and rational selection of alternatives as operational criteria for development, he prefers the value-orientation of scientific objectivity to that of ideology on the ground that the former means flexibility (with opportunities for the private sector) and the latter rigidity (which he identifies with the predominance of the state in economic life). How his treatment of ideology squares with the Mannheimian distinctions is one question of some theoretical importance, but how valid is his operational credo, in light of the strictures in Professor Herskovits' chapter on culture, is a more serious issue.

Institutions or social structures constitute the activational universe for Professor Moore as does culture for Professor Herskovits. In the former, mobility has a function comparable to that of cultural dynamics in the latter. Here is where a synthesis or fusion is called for, some analytic turn that allows these processes to be treated as continuous or at least on the same plane of action, perhaps with emphasis on the first as the more general (here I deliberately avoid the words "universal" or "empirical") and on the second as particularistic, or *vice versa*. However, this is far too simple, and both are entitled to demur.

Professor Hoselitz, by his discriminating insights into the various types of tradition, meets an obvious need with skill. It is his conclusion that "economic development and tradition are not aspects of social action which are necessarily antagonistic." His use of tradition provides a workable referent that crosses discipline boundaries.

In his essay, Professor Braibanti offers some observations on "The Relevance of Political Science to the Study of Underdeveloped Areas." He notes, as has Professor Apter in another study, that no subdiscipline of political development or growth has yet evolved within the field of political science, though he credits comparative government and public administration with "substantial progress" in this regard. It is his position that a quite respectable subdiscipline might emerge from serious consideration of six principal issues in political development, namely, the character of exogenous ideas and structure, process of transmission, facilitation and impedance of internal factors, prediction of ideological and structural variants, adequacy of variants to satisfy the expectations of modern constitutional government, and verification of hypotheses of a political process and emergence of laws of politics.

Some years ago a reviewer for this journal wrote to the effect that the book under consideration was of less interest to the student of political science than to the student of social institutions. How many political scientists today can accept the explicit differentiation or the implicit injunction contained in the observation? Surely Professor Braibanti is not likely to enter among them. It can be contended that the trend to subsume under political science what is called cross-cultural or transnational institution-building, especially in the context of development, has already enriched the pool of political data and increased awareness of institutional variability in politics, but is political science as a discipline better off as a consequence?

Professor Braibanti elaborates his case for this new departure for political science in a highly convincing manner. However, by doing so, he raises a critical problem of a practical nature. There is still a grave need—perhaps it is now greater than ever—for political science to carry out its primary task, to put it simply, to increase and deepen understanding of how communities govern themselves or are ruled and what, for the community are the political consequences of the constitution it lives by, laws it enacts, and policies it supports. Here is the area where the strength of political science lies, in which it is best equipped to probe and explain. Here is where it has a foundation on which to grow and where it can stir peoples to pose to themselves questions about the nature of the political environments they inhabit in the nuclear and space age. How political institutions are selected for export, transferred, and implanted are not to be downgraded or dismissed as insubstantial matters, but political science, as it has matured, cannot claim to shed bright light on them. Whether it will form interdisciplinary alliances, as Professor Braibanti fore-

casts, depends largely upon individual inclinations and efforts and incentives from foundations, but the cost to the discipline may be steep if political scientists, as a result, pay less and less attention to the great issues of political life.

It is, therefore, a pleasure to read Dr. Qureshi's double contribution that is befitting a political scientist. Regrettably, lack of space does not permit comments on the separate, distinctive essays prepared by Professors Wade and Montgomery.—JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN, *Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University*.

*Marxism, an Historical and Critical Study.* By GEORGE LICHTHEIM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 412, \$8.50.)

Forty-five years ago the name of Marx was scarcely mentioned, any more than that of Mrs. Eddy, in our major universities. It was possible to be regarded as a fully educated man without having heard of him. Lenin was the name of a disreputable revolutionary who had let down the Allied cause of making the world safe for democracy. Their names did not occur in scholarly examination papers, which were only concerned with the "classics" and revolutionaries of yesteryear. Today the Marx literature, criticisms, comments, and work of glossators achieve the elephantine proportions of the Goethe and Shakespeare literature. Dr. Lichtheim wisely abstains from providing a bibliography, which would run to many pages. He compensates by ample footnote references. He acknowledges his debt to that remarkable man, Franz Borkenau, and calls our attention to such indispensable studies as the *Dialectical Materialism* of Father Gustav Wetter. The little *Karl Marx* which is perhaps the best known work of Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin, oddly enough he does not mention.

Today, then, there is a mountain of secondary writings analyzing, criticizing and proving wrong the thesis of Karl Marx. Still, however, for all these darts the "Red Prussian" stands. Why? He was obviously an unbalanced, if learned, fanatic, sizzling with hate. It seems to make no odds. Every American schoolboy is brought up to revere the principles of Thomas Jefferson (also a revolutionary). Yet, as Dr. Lichtheim writes: "between 1776—when Adam Smith and Thomas Jefferson simultaneously summed up the Eighteenth Century doctrine of society—and 1848, when Marx challenged that doctrine, the 'bourgeois revolution' in the West had run its course." This may give us one clue: How much of our accepted political thought is indeed too archaic and "Eighteenth Century"—too lacking in realism—to put up effective resistance? Dr. Lichtheim offers another clue, in this really remarkably thorough book. His purpose, he states, is "to present an

integrated account of Marxist theory since its first formulation"; to trace its development in the "union of theory and practice"; and to note how it was shaped by "the impact of the industrial revolution on European society." This economic and technological impact, taken by Lichtheim in historical rather than metaphysical survey, damages traditional Liberal doctrine, leaves John Stuart Mill a remote figure, and gives body to the Marxist movement. It does so peculiarly in underdeveloped countries, such as Russia itself, where the situation asks for rapid technological development; and it is aided by the tendency to centralizing techniques of bureaucracy in modern society—although this last, in Stalinism, ends in a profound and unsolved crisis for Marxism itself. Indeed, in one sense, Marx, a product of a Liberal age and bearing its stigmata, is not a contemporary Marxist.

The criticism can be made that Dr. Lichtheim here accepts too much—accepts too much of Marxism in his interpretation of Marxism. But the explanation of political behaviour is not solely economic and historical; it is also psychological and recurrent. It is interesting to note that Marx was preoccupied with philosophy before, as a Rhineland editor, for good professional reasons he became concerned with economics and later, in Britain after his French political period, preoccupied with it. At first, like many another, he spent his time defending his doctoral thesis on materialism. What often yet escapes notice is that Marx is the philosophic child of the Liberal early Nineteenth Century in yet another sense. He inherited uncritically the psychology of the French Hedonists, which psychology at a slightly earlier date was also shaping Benthamism, different although its mood was. This hedonism traces lineally from the crude "over-under," dominative psychology of Hobbes; and Marx is a truer, and more uncritical, child of Hobbes than Bentham. So are Lenin and Stalin. It is to Hobbes that fundamental political analyses should look. Not pleasure, but fear, resentment and obsessive need for power take first place. Here is the citadel of Marxist theory. "No man can be neutral."

This is not the place to discuss a new dynamism. Perhaps it will be found in the idealism to shape some new Western regional organization with power. In the alternative, the probability is high that Marxism will dominate the world, partly due to a Puritanism which meets decadence with a steel hand, and partly due to sheer military and diplomatic might. But this will not be the Marxism of Marx—which we can either say with Dr. Lichtheim has "ossified" or we can say will become a Sunday religion. Most of the history of the world is of tyranny confronting cowardice, comfort and anarchy; and the effective Marxism will

be that of Moscow and the more intolerable variety of Peking. We may, indeed, (with George Kennan) "seek to understand," and realize that understanding is seldom in terms of ink-black and pure white.

We may come to see that although scientific sociologists may show that Marx' central concept of "class" was unforgiveably vague, yet for the layman it is the immemorial distinction between rich and poor, Dives and Lazarus; that the early Marxists, *frères-ennemis* of Liberalism (especially in the Continental sense) yet shared with it the errors, which still curse our times, of secularist humanism; that Marx himself was an eminent Victorian; and that Marxism, along with Leninism, had the great advantage of being an aristocratic theory.

To this understanding Dr. Lichtheim has contributed in a not unduly long, scholarly, refreshing and highly readable book. His chapter on Engels is critically quite invaluable. Dr. Lichtheim's own view seems to be that of an ardent secularist and primitive Marxist, pre-Trotskyite, who regards the Anglo-Saxon political tradition as today negligible compared with that which derives from the Jacobins and Blanqui, and one to be cheerfully put, along with Thomist rationalism, into the trash-bin. Stalin's deviation makes this offhand disposal more difficult. Perhaps, just as early Marxism was dismissed by academics as disprovable error, so Dr. Lichtheim too readily dismisses contemporary Marxism as "a grotesque distortion," "a travesty." Nevertheless, it is with this Marx-Leninism, not with Marx-Engels, that we have to co-exist; and it is this which bourgeois democracy has to understand and confront.—GEORGE E. G. CATLIN.

*The Religious Factor.* By GERHARD LENSKE. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961. Pp. xvi, 381. \$5.95.)

It must be accounted as somewhat anomalous that the modern intellectual, especially as social scientist, so often refuses to take seriously the possibility that ideas and beliefs may have practical consequences. A case in point is the fact that the great majority of standard textbooks and original studies in public opinion, parties and such have in effect ignored the factor of religious belief as a possible determinant of political attitudes and behavior. In recent years the sample survey technique has taken this subject a step beyond the offhand paragraph about Al Smith and the 1928 election. But even so the apparent correlations of religious loyalties with political opinion have been interpreted as probably accidents of history, or at most as indicating mere religious reinforcement of the genuine "prime determinants."

Gerhard Lenski's *The Religious Factor* stakes out a bold claim for religion as one of the more potent independent, causal variables operative in not only political but also economic and family life. On the whole, the claim is rigorously justified in the findings of this unusually careful, wide-ranging and clearly written study in empirical sociology.

The data for the study come primarily from sample survey interviews with 656 representative Detroit residents, conducted as the 1958 project of the Detroit Area Study, a facility of the University of Michigan. Professor Lenski, a sociologist, checks and supplements these materials by data from interviews with the clergymen of a sample of the churches attended by his original respondents, and from surveys by the D.A.S. in several earlier years.

The four socio-religious groups studied are white Protestants, Catholics, Jews and Negro Protestants. A number of the 185 questions on the interview schedule are aimed at uncovering the types and degrees of religious commitment within these groups. Involvement in the religious association (the church) is treated separately from involvement in the accompanying, larger religious subcommunity, and two religious "orientations" (doctrinal orthodoxy and devotionism) within each group are distinguished and studied. As one result, very considerable light is thrown on the present vitality and cohesiveness of the groups, intergroup images, the theological and social beliefs of the clergy, and on the impact of social change on the groups—including evidence relevant to the Herberg thesis.

But the central hypothesis is that these differences in religious belief and commitment really *cause* differences in the attitudes and behavior of people in their daily lives—in secular activities such as politics, economics, family life and education. Here Lenski is deliberately building upon Durkheim and Weber, particularly the latter's thesis about the relationship of Protestant values to the emergence of capitalism. Lenski finds that, while certain of the specific elements in the "Protestant ethic" seem to have disappeared, there is in this contemporary survey of an American metropolis striking support for the basic proposition that each major religion develops its own distinctive orientation toward a wide range of secular activities, and exercises significant influence in shaping the behavior of its adherents with relation to secular institutions. He concludes that "socio-religious group membership is a variable comparable in importance to class, both with respect to its potency and with respect to the range, or extent, of its influence." This finding rests not only on painstaking research design, exacting methodology, and strong correlations;

Lenski has also applied to his causal hypothesis every feasible test of controlled data, temporal sequence, intragroup comparison of activist and marginal members, and the check of other relevant research.

Lenski's substantive results are of course too numerous and complex to summarize; but a few examples may suggest their character. On most of the items identifiable with the "spirit of capitalism"—a positive attitude toward work, identification with businessmen, entrepreneurial spirit, importance of saving, etc.—Protestants (especially white Protestants and church activists) and Jews rank considerably higher than Catholics. Catholics enjoy stronger family solidarity than Protestants, have a more rapidly increasing birth rate, and emphasize personal autonomy much less in the rearing of their children. White Protestants are much more likely to vote Republican than Catholics, even when father's party preference and class position of both respondent and father are held constant. Church activists (both Protestant and Catholic) are substantially more likely than others to favor government by law rather than by men. Of all the groups, middle class white Protestants are clearly most likely to oppose the welfare state and to support freedom of speech.

Readers may of course quarrel with Lenski about the framing of some of his questions and the nuances of interpretation of the responses. For example, in his questions regarding theological orientation, his "orthodoxy" category makes no room for the crucial distinction between "neo-orthodoxy" and "fundamentalism." More seriously, he sometimes presses his concern for white Protestant-Catholic differences to somewhat debatable conclusions, and to the relative neglect of striking data about the Jewish and Negro positions.

Minor complaints aside, Lenski's work will surely stand as a sound and pioneering venture in the sociology of religion and society. It clears many channels of potential traffic between theoretical formulations and hard data in the study of the religious factor. It is to be hoped that the grip of positivism is loosening enough to permit an increasing number of political scientists to take up the argument on both the theoretical and data-gathering sides. There are multiple ironies in a situation which requires behavioral science to recall attention to the reality of religion.—HARRY R. DAVIS, *Beloit College*.

*H. G. Wells and the World State.* By W. WARREN WAGAR. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. 301. \$6.00.)

H. G. Wells was a man who found it easy to speak for himself. In some hundred and ten books



and several hundred articles, published over a span of more than 50 years, he tirelessly gave the millions his opinions on all subjects. Now comes W. Warren Wagar to speak for him. The question is, what is worth saying?

Of the many messages of H. G. Wells, Wagar has chosen to present the one which, presumably, has the greatest bearing on our condition. He writes of Wells the diagnostician of the modern sickness, and of Wells the planner and propagandist of a future world order and world civilization. Wagar does in his one book what Wells never had the time for in his hundred: he relays the message clearly and in good order. He also presents it fully, and that is the virtue of this book. It is all here—that whole vast jumble of an evolutionist metaphysics, a biologicistic ethics, and a technocratic politics which was the mind of H. G. Wells. The reader who wants a good presentation of Wells' ideas on the world state will find it in Wagar's book.

But the question remains: was it worth saying? Wells had no sense of the political. He was not an original thinker: much of his work, as Ezra Pound said, was "chewed up newspaper." Nor was he a distinguished thinker. He lacked discrimination and he gave little care to style. He seemed as comfortable with the outlandish as with the hackneyed; and he could on one page offer a snappy criticism of Victorian sexual customs and a grandiose vision of the coming world order. What does it all come out to?

Wagar does not address that question. His work is primarily descriptive. He does not attempt a sustained critique of Wells' ideas on the present disorder and the coming order, although it is clear that he thinks they have great merit, which men may soon come to realize. Indeed, one can get the impression that Wagar sees himself in the vanguard of a rising army of Wellsians: "The wheels are turning. . . . The heyday of the symbol-mongers and the literary technicians cannot last much longer; it is time again for Wells."

When Wagar does turn to analysis it is analysis of a curious kind. He addresses the question, how successful was Wells as a "prophet"? And by success he means influence over the opinions of other men. Wagar justifies this approach to the task of criticism by describing himself as an intellectual historian. In this view, an intellectual historian is one who is concerned only with the question of who thought what, and not with the quality of what was thought. That definition does not fit the vocation of any of the great intellectual historians.

Wagar's analysis of Wells' success reaches two conclusions. Wells was a failure in that he lost his audience; and he lost his audience because he made the foolish error of speaking to masses

instead of directing his appeal "to the elite groups who would, ultimately, have to manage a Wellsian world revolution." Wells was a success in that he did stimulate many men to think, and in that many of his ideas are commonplace today. Furthermore, Wagar suspects that Wells will soon be awarded the high place which is rightly his: "in another generation or two . . . when the anguished disillusionment of mid-century men has ripened into sober resolution, H. G. Wells will be acknowledged as a crucial intermediary between the intellectual inheritance of the West and the coming world civilization."

To this, I must make that most presumptuous of all replies: perhaps . . .

Wells was not an intermediary. He discarded the whole past as outmoded, leaving only the future. When a man calls us to the future we must examine most earnestly his vision of that future. Wagar persists in calling Wells a prophet, but he never asks the questions which really matter in the discussion of prophets. Perhaps Wells failed because he was not a prophet but merely a magician, or a propagandist. Or perhaps he was a false prophet. Perhaps men have found reason to suspect that the god for whom Wells spoke, the god of the machine, is a Janus-faced god at best, and an empty idol at the worst.

The "miracles of science," we say; and Wells was one of the men who taught us to say it. He was one of the publicists who led men to believe that those miracles were their own justification, and that the power that worked them had the right to our worship. We have come to doubt that. When a rocket goes up from Cape Canaveral we no longer believe in our hearts that it rises up to the heavens. It blasts off into empty space, and it may one day return to destroy. And for all of Wells' astounding images of the coming world technocracy, we have come to fear that there may be no room in that huge order for mere men.

Wells lost his faith at the end, and announced man's doom. And since the blockheads would not listen, they deserved not only their destruction, but the teacher's curse as well. According to Sir Ernest Barker, Wells wanted his epitaph to read: "God damn you all: I told you so." Perhaps in another generation or two, "when the anguished disillusionment of mid-century men has ripened into sober resolution," that curse will be thrown back upon Wells as the prophet of a false god.

Perhaps these matters have something to do with the failure of Wells the prophet. They are surely the matters that any reader of Wells must ponder today. They are not pondered in this book.—JOHN H. SCHAAER, *University of California* (Berkeley).

*The Political Context of Sociology.* BY LEON

BRAMSON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. v, 164. \$4.00.)

Perhaps a more apt title for this methodological essay would be *The Ideological Context of Sociology*. It is nonetheless relevant to students of politics. Mr. Bramson's purpose is to indicate how some theory in sociology, ostensibly derived empirically, originates instead in the culture-bound beliefs and personal values of the theorists. The author, in supporting his thesis, offers us a useful bit of intellectual history that searches out the cultural and philosophical bases of a modern scholarly discipline. The body of social theory he uses as illustration is the conception of "mass" behavior and "mass society" of European and American sociologists and social psychologists. That sociology itself is culturally relative is convincingly demonstrated in the comparison of European and American varieties. For the European sociologist, there is *the* social problem of class conflict, while for the American there are many social problems—crime, divorce, minority problems, poverty—which exemplify a society that has achieved a basic consensus but is wrestling with side effects of urbanism and industrialization. Similarly the idea of "mass" is laden with a variety of cultural and philosophical meanings; and conclusions about the nature of mass society often are conclusions by sociologists, or ideologists, of the left or right, European or American.

The science of today's presumably value-free empiricists is permeated no less by the writers' conceptual systems than was the work of the more obvious ideologists in early American sociology. As modern evidence for his thesis Mr. Bramson finds that the social and political philosophies of contemporary mass theorists (Adorno, et al., Reich, Fromm, Marcuse) unconsciously became mixed with their work leaving the validity of their results uncertain. These scholars' descriptions of the relationship between so-called mass behavior and the growth of totalitarianism, Mr. Bramson believes (echoing many others before him), have been tainted by their own experiences with Hitlerism and by their attachment to a liberal socialism to the point where they fit their evidence into their own belief and value frameworks. What is unacceptable, we are told (in another chapter that can be added to a growing list on the subject), is the carelessness of social scientists who disguise value judgments as facts. The author's own resolution of the old fact-value problem (which he rightly describes as probably no solution at all) is a compromise of the natural law and the positivist positions. The values and the total cultural experience of the observer inevitably color his

perceptions at every stage of his research; but this simply requires more strenuous efforts at impartiality by the researcher, more emphasis on the testing of his formulations by others, and a continuing search for "intersubjectively verifiable criteria for checking his generalizations." It is at this point that some ambiguity in the author's purpose becomes troublesome. His "solution" clearly offers nothing more than is found in traditional scientific procedure. But if the history of modern sociology tells us that an attachment to this procedure has not been sufficient to keep subjectivity, individual or cultural, from distorting the results of investigation, it is hard to see how a reaffirmation of these ancient rules can solve the problem. How does an observer achieve impartiality if all his perceptions are the partial ones of his culture and how, in these circumstances, can "intersubjectively verifiable" criteria of validation be discovered? If, instead, Mr. Bramson's criticism is of social scientists who select and interpret evidence so that it will bear out their conceptions about the way things are or ought to be, then we simply are privy to an unexceptionable criticism of bad research—and another exhortation to social scientists to be careful certainly can do no harm.

That the social scientist's conceptual framework, wherever derived, affects his perceptions certainly is true. That some social scientists use their social-political values to guide their selection of data and the conclusions they draw from them undoubtedly can be shown. But the second does not necessarily follow from the first. For the social scientist seeking support for his values there is no real remedy other than exposure. For the social scientist who mistakes the part of the world that he has seen for the totality, the remedy is to look outside. A general causal analysis clearly is faulty if it is derived from the observer's own limited experience or from his own value preferences. But such analyses are outside of social science. In such cases the solution is not *more* science, but *just* science.

The reader may have difficulty following all of the author's argument to his conclusions, but his scholarly review of the philosophical bases of one social science clearly has relevance to others and earns for the book a place in a sparse literature on the subject.—SEYMOUR SCHER, *University of Rochester*.

*The Russian Revolution*. BY NICOLAS BERDYAEV. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961, pp. 91. \$1.75.)

*Terrorism and Communism*. BY LEON TROTSKY. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961, pp. 193. \$1.95.)

*The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?*

By ROSA LUXEMBURG. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961, pp. 109. \$1.65.)

These are the first three in a new series of "Ann Arbor Paperbacks for the Study of Communism and Marxism." Sidney Hook's *From Hegel To Marx*, Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, and Karl Kautsky's *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat* are expected to be published in 1962 and other works will follow.

In the period of the final disintegration of Marxism, it is fascinating to recall the diversity of ideas encompassed by it in the early part of this century. We owe a debt of gratitude to the

publishers of this imaginatively planned series for making available such writings, for long most difficult to obtain, as Rosa Luxemburg's biting attacks of 1904 on Lenin's "ultra-centralism" and her friendly but highly critical appraisal in 1918 of the Russian Revolution, Karl Kautsky's vigorous assault of the same year on the anti-democratic character of the Bolshevik revolution and Leon Trotsky's spirited counter-attack of 1919 on Kautsky in defense of terrorism. Such works are essential for an understanding of the Marxian tradition and the ideological background of modern Communism.—JOHN H. KAUTSKY, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

## POLITICAL THEORY

CECELIA M. KENYON

*Smith College*

Ahmad, Aziz. Political and Religious Ideas of Shah Wali-Ullah. *The Muslim World*. January, 1962.

Albert, Hans. Ethik und Metaethik. *Archiv für Philosophie*. October, 1961.

Alexander, Robert J. Nationalism, Latin America's Predominant Ideology. *Journal of International Affairs*. XV, 2, 1961.

Allen, R. E. The Argument from Opposites in Republic V. *The Review of Metaphysics*. December, 1961.

Allen, Richard V. Religión, Filosofía y Revolución: Carlos Marx y la libertad. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1961.

Althusser, Louis. "Sur le Jeune Marx" (Questions de théorie). *La Pensée*. March-April, 1961.

Aranda, Luis Rodriguez. El racionalismo en el pensamiento político español. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1961.

Arendt, Hannah, et al. The Cold War and the West: A Symposium. (Some comments pertain to contemporary ideology or theory.) *Partisan Review*. Winter, 1962.

Ascher, Abraham. "Radical" Imperialism Within German Social Democracy, 1912-1918. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Aubenque, Pierre. Aristoteles und das Problem der Metaphysik. *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*. July-September, 1961.

Bahm, Archie J. The New Conservatism. *The Humanist*. September-October, 1961.

Bailyn, Bernard. Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century America. *American Historical Review*. January, 1962.

Bedau, Hugo A. On Civil Disobedience. *Journal of Philosophy*. October 12, 1961.

Beneyto, Juan. La interacción informativa en la órbita del poder del Estado. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1961.

Bestor, Arthur. State Sovereignty and Slavery—A Reinterpretation of Pro-slavery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860. *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*. Summer, 1961.

Bien, David D. Religious Persecution in the French Enlightenment. *Church History*. September, 1961.

Bobbio, N. Teoria e ricerca politica in Italia. *Il Politico*. June, 1961.

Brown, Stuart M., Jr. Civil Disobedience. *Journal of Philosophy*. October 26, 1961.

Brown, Stuart M., Jr. Has Kant a Philosophy of Law? *The Philosophical Review*. January, 1962.

Bruhat, Jean. Un retour aux sources: colonialisme et anticolonialisme au temps de Robespierre. *La Pensée*. November-December, 1961.

Cantimori, Delio. Il "Machiavelli." *Belfagor*. 30 November 1961.

Cohen, Arthur A. How Original is "Maoism"? *Problems of Communism*. November-December, 1961.

Collinet, Michel. The Idea of Progress in the Nineteenth Century. *Diogenes*. Spring, 1961.

Conilh, Jean. Vers un pluralisme marxiste? *Esprit*. January, 1962.

Cornu, Auguste. Karl Marx à Paris (octobre 1843-fevrier 1845). *La Pensée*. November-December, 1961.

Davies, James C. Toward a Theory of Revolu-

- tion. *American Sociological Review*. February, 1962.
- Deininter, W. T. Political Power and Ideological Analysis. *Il Politico*. June, 1961.
- Demos, Raphael. Some Remarks on Aristotle's Doctrine of Practical Reason. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. December, 1961.
- Dhondt, Urbain. Fondements d'une éthique sociale. *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*. August, 1961.
- Easton, Lloyd D. Alienation and History in the Early Marx. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. December, 1961.
- Eitner, Hans-Jürgen. Mao Tse-tungs Kriegsphilosophie. *Schweizer Monatshefte*.
- Le fait et le droit*. Several articles in a single issue devoted to this subject, by R. Dekkers, K. Englisch, P. Foriers, W. Hallemans, A. Bayart, T. Ascarelli, J. Rivero. H. Buch, G. Boland, M. Domont, L. Morgenthal, M. Motte, C. Perelman. *Dialectica*. Vol. 16, No. 3/4, 1961.
- Fisichella, D. Il metodo scientifico nella politica di Auguste Comte. *Studi Politici*. April-June, 1961.
- Foriers, Paul. Réflexions sur l'argumentation juridique. *Revue internationale de Philosophie*. 4/XV/1961.
- Fragata, Julio. Materialismo Dialéctico e Mundo Contemporâneo. *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*. January-March, 1962.
- Fueyo Alvarez, Jesús F. El principio de autoridad en la crisis de la sociedad contemporánea. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1961.
- Goldstein, Leon J. The Meaning of "State" in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. *Philosophical Quarterly*. January, 1962.
- Goodman, Elliot R. East Against West in Communist Ideology. *Journal of International Affairs*. XV, 2, 1961.
- Gusfield, Joseph R. Mass Society and Extremist Politics. *American Sociological Review*. February, 1962.
- Haring, Ellen S. Aristotle's Physical Philosophy. *Review of Metaphysics*. December, 1961.
- Hassner, Pierre. Les concepts de guerre et de paix chez Kant. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. September, 1961.
- Hause, E. Malcolm. India under the Impact of Western Political Ideas and Institutions. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.
- Hensel, Donald W. Religion and the Writing of the Colorado Constitution. *Church History*. September, 1961.
- Iribarne, Manuel Fraga. La evolución de las ideas de Bolívar sobre los poderes del Estado y sus relaciones. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-August, 1961.
- Jansen, Theo. Thielicke—ein führender Ideologie der Bonner Kriegspartei in der Evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 10/IX/1961.
- Kateb, George. Aspects of Rousseau's Political Thought. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.
- Kendall, Willmoore. Natural Law and "Natural Right." *Modern Age*. Winter, 1961-1962.
- Landau, Martin. On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis. *Social Research*. Autumn, 1961.
- Larroque, Enrique. Retorno a la Revolución. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1961.
- Leñero, José Pérez. Concepto y valoración del trabajo en la Filosofía. *Revista de Política Social*. July-September, 1961.
- Lively, J. F. Power and Ideology in Soviet Politics. *Il Politico*. June, 1961.
- Manasse, Ernest Moritz. Bucher über Plato: II, Werke in Englischer Sprache. *Philosophische Rundschau*. October, 1961.
- May, William E. The Nicomachean Ethics. *The New Scholasticism*. January, 1962.
- Meynaud, J. A propos de la technocratie. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. September, 1961.
- Minar, David W. Ideology and Political Behavior. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1961.
- Mollnau, Karl A. Die Negation der Demokratie in der Klerikalen Staatslehre. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 10/IX/1961.
- Mouloud, N. Logique de l'Essence et logique de l'Entendement chez Hegel. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. January-June, 1961.
- Morgan, Edmund S. Essay Review: John Adams and the Puritan Tradition. *New England Quarterly*. December, 1961.
- Murphree, Idus L. Culture, Values and Political Theory: A Reply to Professor Jaffa. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1961.
- Neal, Fred Warner. Titoist Theory and Titoist Practice. *Journal of International Affairs*. 2/XV/1961.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. Consensus in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. September, 1961.
- Niemeyer, Gerhart. The Ideological Motivation of Communists. *Modern Age*. Fall, 1961.
- Oakley, Francis. Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature. *Church History*. December, 1961.
- Oetzel, E. Die humanistische Grundhaltung unseres Staates als Ausdruck seiner Rechtmässigkeit. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 10/IX/1961.
- Oliver, Revilo P. Conservatism and Reality. *Modern Age*. Fall, 1961.
- Ollero, Carlos. El sistema representativo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1961.

- Ortega, Augusto A. Iglesia y Estado. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-August, 1961.
- Parella, J. Roura. La filosofía política de Nicolai Hartmann. *Revista Brasileira de Filosofia*. April-June, 1961.
- Partridge, P. H. Politics, Philosophy, Ideology. *Political Studies*. October, 1961.
- Petrachik, A. Les problèmes de l'humanisme dans les premières oeuvres de Marx. *La Pensée*. March-April, 1961.
- Riedel, Jost. Gemeinwohl und Person. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. September, 1961.
- Roberts, Warren, Jr. Bentham's Conception of Political Change. *Political Studies*. October, 1961.
- Rose, H. J. World Ages and the Body Politic. *The Harvard Theological Review*. July, 1961.
- Rothman, Stanley. Modernity and Tradition in Britain. *Social Research*. Autumn, 1961.
- Sánchez-Barba, Mario Hernández. Los problemas de la Democracia en Hispano-america. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1961.
- Schiavone, G. Adamo Ferguson e la società civile. *Studi Politici*. April-June, 1961.
- Schmitt, Carl. La tiranía de los valores. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1961.
- Smith, Constance I. Locke and John Austin on the Idea of Morality. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. January-March, 1962.
- Solt, Leo F. The Fifth Monarchy Men: Politics and the Millennium. *Church History*. September, 1961.
- Swart, Koenraad W. "Individualism" in the Mid-XIXth Century (1826-1860). *Journal of the History of Ideas*. January-March, 1962.
- Szegedi, Mihaly. "New Class" or Classless Society? *The Review*. 3/III/1961.
- Teles, A. Xavier. Ideologia e realidade brasileira. *Revista Brasileira de Filosofia*. July-September 1961.
- Thorson, Thomas L. Political Values and Analytical Philosophy. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1961.
- Uscatescu, George. Tres meditaciones sobre el comunismo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1961.
- Viano, Carlo Augusta. L'abbozzo originario e gli stadi di composizione di "An Essay Concerning Toleration" e la nascita delle teorie politico-religiose di John Locke. *Revista di Filosofia*. July, 1961.
- Vissi, George. Political Ethics and Liberty. *The Review*. 3/III/1961.
- Wasserstrom, Richard. Disobeying the Law. *Journal of Philosophy*. October 12, 1961.
- Zolla Elemire. Proust e la politica di potenza. *Nuovi Argomenti*. March-June, 1961.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

JULIAN FELDMAN  
*University of California, Berkeley*

### Philosophy of Social Science

- Cole, M. The Webbs and social theory. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 12, 93, June.
- Gross, L. Preface to a metatheoretical framework for sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 125, September.
- Sargent, H. D. Intrapsychic change: methodological problems in psychotherapy research. *Psychiatry*, 1961, 24, 93, May.
- Simey, T. S. The contribution of Sidney and Beatrice Webb to sociology. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 12, 106, June.
- Stark, W., Herbert Spencer's three sociologies. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 515, August.

### Research Methods

- Anderson, N. H. Scales and statistics: parametric and nonparametric. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 305, July.

- Anderson, N. S. Comments on the use of computers in psychological research. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 266, July.

- Andrews, R. S., Lebo, D., and Lucier, O. A pragmatic validation of a simple, status free measure of intellectual ability. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 273, August.

- Berman, L. H., and Freedman, L. Z. Clinical perception of sexual deviates. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 157, July.

- Brinton, J. E. Deriving an attitude scale from semantic differential data. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 289, Summer.

- Burroughs, G. E. R., and Miller, H. W. L. The rotation of principal components. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 35, May.

- Coan, R. W. Basic forms of covariation and concomitance designs. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 317, July.

- Crespi, I. Use of a scaling technique in surveys. *Journal of Marketing*, 1961, 25, 69, July.

- Crowell, L., and Scheidel, T. M. Categories for analysis of idea development in discussion groups. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 155, June.
- Dadayan, V., and Chernyak, Y. Mathematical methods in economics. *Management Science*, 1961, 7, 323, July.
- Davison, W. P. A public opinion game. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 210, Summer.
- Drechsler, R. J., and Shapiro, M. I. A procedure for direct observation of family interaction in a child guidance clinic. *Psychiatry*, 1961, 24, 163, May.
- Fulkerson, S. C., and Barry, J. R. Methodology and research on the prognostic use of psychological tests. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 177, May.
- Gilmer, B. V. H. Toward cutaneous electro-pulse communication. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 211, July.
- Greene, J. E., Sr., and Greene, J. E., Jr. Illustrative uses of the "incomplete" sentence technique in investigating certain attitudes of middle management personnel. *Personnel Psychology*, 1961, 14, 305, Autumn.
- Hagen, E. E. Analytical models in the study of social systems. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 144, September.
- Kaiser, H. F. A note on Guttman's Lower Bound for the Number of Common Factors. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 1, May.
- Kircher, P. Translator's note on "Mathematical methods in economics." *Management Science*, 1961, 7, 335, July.
- Koenigsberg, E. Some industrial applications of linear programming. *Operational Research Quarterly*, 1961, 12, 105, June.
- Lewis, J. W., and Caldwell, W. E. A psycholinguistic investigation of verbal psychological tests. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 137, July.
- Mason, W. S., Dressel, R. J., and Bain, R. K. An experimental study of factors affecting response to a mail survey of beginning teachers. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 296, Summer.
- Maxwell, A. E. Canonical variate analysis when the variables are dichotomous. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1961, 21, 259, Summer.
- Miller, C. R., Eyman, R. K., and Dingman, H. F. Factor analysis, latent structure analysis and mental typology. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 29, May.
- Parsons, T. Preface to a metatheoretical framework for sociology: Comment. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 136, September.
- Peterson, R. A. A technique for the detection of blind checking in questionnaire research. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1961, 21, 361, Summer.
- Pool, I. de S., and Abelson, R. The simulmatics project. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 167, Summer.
- Ronning, R. R., and Horrocks, J. E. A method of estimating effectiveness of groups in a "group" teaching situation. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1961, 21, 331, Summer.
- Schuessler, K. F. A note on statistical significance of scalogram. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 312, September.
- Starbuck, W. H. Testing case-descriptive models. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 191, July.
- Stone, M. Subjective discrimination as a statistical method. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 25, May.
- Turner, W. S. A reexamination of the two kinds of scientific conjecture. *Psychological Record*, 1961, 11, 279, July.
- Waters, L. K., and Wherry, R. J., Jr. Evaluation of two forced-choice response formats. *Personnel Psychology*, 1961, 14, 285, Autumn.
- Webster, F. M., Jr. Why management games? *Data Processing*, 1961, 3, 9, August.
- Willis, R. H. Data-collection procedures for the method of controlled marginals. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 367, August.

#### Motivation and Personality

- Babladelis, G. Personality and verbal conditioning effects. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 41, January.
- Bindra, D. Components of general activity and the analysis of behavior. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 205, May.
- Bovard, E. W. A note on the threshold for emotional stress. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 216, May.
- Cowen, E. L., Staiman, M. G., and Wolitzky, D. The social desirability of trait descriptive terms: applications to a schizophrenic sample. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 37, June.
- Dillon, D. J. The variation of choice reaction time among groups of hospitalized psychiatric patients. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 105, July.
- Guertin, W. H. Medical and statistical-psychological models for research in schizophrenia. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 200, July.
- Haywood, H. C. Relationships among anxiety, seeking of novel stimuli, and level of unassimilated percepts. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 105, June.
- Heilbrun, A. B., Jr., and Goodstein, L. D. The relationships between individually defined and group defined social desirability and performance on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1961, 25, 200, June.
- Hilgard, E. R., and Hommel, L. S. Selective

amnesia for events within hypnosis in relation to repression. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 205, June.

Hunt, J. McV., and Quay, H. C. Early vibratory experience and the question of innate reinforcement value of vibration and other stimuli: a limitation on the discrepancy (burnt soup) principle in motivation. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 149, May.

Jessor, R. Issues in the phenomenological approach to personality. *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1961, 17, 27, May.

Kagan, J., and Moss, H. A. The availability of conflictful ideas: a neglected parameter in assessing projective test responses. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 217, June.

Keehn, J. D. Response sets and the Maudsley Personality Inventory. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 141, June.

Kilpatrick, F. P. Personality in transactional psychology. *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1961, 17, 12, May.

Knapp, R. H., and Green, H. B. The judgment of music-filled intervals and  $n$  achievement. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 263, August.

Krause, M. W., The measurement of transitory anxiety. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 178, May.

Linn, E. L. Tolerance of deviant behavior. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 92, Summer.

Lowe, C. M. The self-concept: fact or artifact? *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 325, July.

Luchins, A. S. Some aspects of Wertheimer's approach to personality. *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1961, 17, 20, May.

Luckey, E. B. Perceptual congruence of self and family concepts as related to marital interaction. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 234, September.

Martin, B. The assessment of anxiety by physiological behavioral measures. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 234, May.

Merrifield, P. R., Guilford, J. P., Christensen, P. R., and Frick, J. W. Interrelationships between certain abilities and certain traits of motivation and temperament. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 57, July.

Messick, S., and Jackson, D. N. Acquiescence and the factorial interpretation of the MMPI. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 299, July.

Patterson, C. H. The self in recent Rogerian Theory. *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1961, 17, 5, May.

Perloe, S. I. Assimilation as a consequence of categorization. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 148, June.

Prentice, W. C. H. Some cognitive aspects of motivation. *American Psychologist*, 1961, 16, 503, July.

Rees, M. E., and Goldman, M. Some relation-

ships between creativity and personality. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 145, July.

Reese, H. W. Manifest anxiety and achievement test performance. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 132, June.

Reitman, W. R. Need achievement, fear of failure, and selective recall. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 142, January.

Rosen, B. C. Family structure and achievement motivation. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 574, August.

Rudin, S. A. The relationship between rational and irrational authoritarianism. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 179, July.

Stotland, E. Motivation for security, certainty, and self-esteem. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 75, July.

Sutton, R. S. An analysis of factors related to educational achievement. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1961, 98, 193, June.

Taylor, J. A., and Rennie, B. Recovery from approach-avoidance conflict as a function of escape and displacement experiences. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 275, June.

#### Opinions and Attitudes

Bloom, L., De Crespigny, A. R. C., and Spence, J. E. An inter-disciplinary study of social, moral, and political attitudes of white and non-white South African university students. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 3, June.

Deutsch, M., and Proshansky, H. Information and opinion during an international crisis. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 169, June.

Garrison, K. C. Worldminded attitudes of college students in a southern university. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 147, June.

Greenberg, H. M. The development of an integration attitude scale. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 103, June.

Joseph, J. Research note: attitudes of 600 adolescent girls to work and marriage. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 12, 176, June.

Lang, K., and Lang, G. E. Ordeal by debate: viewer reactions. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 277, Summer.

Lawton, M. P., and Goldman, A. E. Cigarette smoking and attitude toward the etiology of lung cancer. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 235, August.

Markham, J. W. Foreign news in the United States and South American press. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 249, Summer.

McKenna, H. V. Religious attitudes and personality traits. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 379, August.

McLachlan, D., Jr. Communication networks

and monitoring. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 194, Summer.

Merrill, I. R. Broadcast viewing and listening by children. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 263, Summer.

Roper, E. College ambitions and parental planning. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 159, Summer.

Stearns, B. J. Five fallacies about women. *Journal of Marketing*, 1961, 25, 50, July.

Westerstahl, J., Sarlvik, B., and Janson, E. An experiment with information pamphlets on civil defense. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 236, Summer.

#### Cognitive Processes and Individual Decision Making

Adams, J. A. The second facet of forgetting: a review of warm-up decrement. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 257, July.

Aldis, O. Of pigeons and men. *Harvard Business Review*, 1961, 39, 59, July-August.

Barmack, J. E., and Payne, D. E. Injury-producing private motor vehicle accidents among airmen: psychological models of accident-generating processes. *Journal of Psychology* 1961, 52, 3, July.

Baron, A., and Littman, R. A. Studies of individual and paired interactional problem-solving behavior of rats: II. Solitary and social controls. *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1961, 64, 129, August.

Bloom, J. M., and Capaldi, E. J. The behavior of rats in relation to complex patterns of partial reinforcement. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 261, June.

Bourne, L. E., Jr., and Beier, E. G. Effect of duration of inspection upon kinesthetic figural aftereffects. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 163, July.

Burt, C. Intelligence and social mobility. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 3, May.

Cadoret, R. J. Some applications of information theory to card-calling performance in ESP. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 89, July.

Christiansen, K. C. Response duration as a measure of ambivalent response tendencies. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 115, June.

Cline, V. B., and Richards, J. M., Jr. A comparison of individuals versus groups in judging personality. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 150, June.

Cohen, A. R. Cognitive tuning as a factor affecting impression formation. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 235, June.

Cotton, J. W., and Jensen, G. D. Extinction and reacquisition after differential numbers of

acquisition sessions. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 189, July.

Crane, R. R. The place of scientific techniques in mergers and acquisitions. *The Controller*, 1961, 29, 326, July.

Davis, R., Sutherland, N. W., and Judd, B. R. Information content in recognition and recall. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 61, 422, May.

Dyer, D. W., and Harcum, E. R. Visual perception of binary patterns by preschool children and by school children. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 161, June.

Edwards, W. Costs and payoffs are instructions. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 275, July.

Eisenberg, E. Aggregation of utility functions. *Management Science*, 1961, 7, 337, July.

Elkind, D. Children's discovery of the conservation of mass, weight, and volume: Piaget Replication Study II. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1961, 98, 219, June.

Epstein, W., and De Shazo, D. Recency as a function of perceptual oscillation. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 215, June.

Estes, W. K. A descriptive approach to the dynamics of choice behavior. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 177, July.

Feigenbaum, E. A., and Simon, H. A. Comment: The distinctiveness of stimuli. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 285, July.

Fey, C. F. An investigation of some mathematical models for learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 61, 455, June.

Fillenbaum, S. Own position in relation to estimates of average standing and desirability for more and less self-comparable objects. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 195, June.

Fillenbaum, S. How fat is fat? Some consequences of similarity between judge and judged object. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 133, July.

Frey, A. H. Human behavior and atmospheric ions. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 225, May.

Gaito, J. A biochemical approach to learning and memory. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 288, July.

Gardner, R. A. Multiple-choice decision-behavior with dummy choices. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 205, June.

Gemelli, A., and Alberoni, F. Experimental studies of the concept of chance. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 3, July.

Glickman, S. E. Perseverative neural processes and consolidation of the memory trace. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 218, May.

Goss, A. E., Verbal mediating responses and concept formation. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 248, July.

Guilford, J. P., Christensen, P. R., Frick, J. W., and Merrifield, P. R. Factors of interest in think-



- ing. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 39, July.
- Harleston, B. W., and Cunningham, S. M. Task difficulty and anxiety level as factors affecting performance in a verbal learning situation. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 77, July.
- Helm, C. E., Messick, S., and Tucker, L. R. Psychological models for relating discrimination and magnitude estimation scales. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 167, May.
- Hodgden, L. H. Variability of behavior as a function of intelligence and incentive. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 183, June.
- Jensen, A. R. On the reformulation of inhibitions in Hull's System. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 274, July.
- Jensen, B. J., Tilton, J. R., and Anderson, D. N. Differential effects of knowledge of results and discussion. *Ergonomics*, 1961, 4, 183, April.
- Johnson, D. M., and Hall, E. R. Organization of relevant and irrelevant words in the solution of verbal problems. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 99, July.
- Johnson, J. I., Jr. Double alternation by raccoons. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 248, June.
- Kamano, D. K., and Drew, J. E. Selectivity in memory of personally significant material. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 25, July.
- Kanfer, F. H., and McBrearty, J. F. Verbal conditioning: discrimination and awareness. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 115, July.
- Karn, H. W., and Gregg, L. W. Acquisition of perceptual responses as a function of loading, location, and repetition. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 62, July.
- Kaufman, H., and Becker, G. M. The empirical determination of game-theoretical strategies. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 61, 462, June.
- Kellner, A. D. Can "response set" be controlled? *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 171, July.
- Kendler, T. S., and Kendler, H. H. Inferential behavior in children: II. The influence of order of presentation. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 61, 442, May.
- Kenkel, W. F. Dominance, persistence, self-confidence, and spousal roles in decision making. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 349, August.
- Kidd, J. S. A comparison of two methods of training in a complex task by means of task simulation. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 165, June.
- Klausmeier, H. J., and Loughlin, L. J. Behaviors during problem solving among children of low, average, and high intelligence. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 148, June.
- Llewellyn, R. W. A game-information theoretic decision model. *Journal of Industrial Engineering*, 1961, 12, 159, May-June.
- Luchins, A. S., and Luchins, E. H. Imitation by rote and by understanding. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 175, June.
- McCollough, C. Forming and acting on impressions. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 63, July.
- Messick, S. The perceived structure of political relationships. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 270, September.
- Miller, L. B., and Estes, B. W. Monetary reward and motivation in discrimination learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 61, 501, June.
- Miner, J. B. On the use of a short vocabulary test to measure general intelligence. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 157, June.
- Neimark, E. D. Information-gathering in diagnostic problem-solving: a preliminary report. *Psychological Record*, 1961, 11, 243, July.
- Nettler, G. Good men, bad men, and the perception of reality. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 279, September.
- Noble, C. E. Meaningfulness ( $m$ ) and transfer phenomena in serial verbal learning. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 201, July.
- Osler, S. F., and Fivel, M. W. Concept Attainment: I. The role of age and intelligence in concept attainment by induction. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 1, July.
- Osler, S. F., and Trautman, G. E. Concept attainment: II. Effect of stimulus complexity upon concept attainment at two levels of intelligence. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 9, July.
- Parnes, S. J. Effects of extended effort in creative problem solving. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 117, June.
- Postman, L., and Sassenrath, J. The automatic action of verbal rewards and punishments. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 109, July.
- Prokasy, W. F., Jr. Nonrandom stimulus sampling in statistical learning theory. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 219, May.
- Pronko, N. H. Perspectives in psychology: XVIII. Some reflections on perception. *Psychological Record*, 1961, 11, 311, July.
- Rasmussen, E. A., and Archer, E. J. Concept identification as a function of language pretraining and task complexity. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 61, 437, May.
- Rosenberg, S. Retroactive inhibition in incidental learning. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 283, June.
- Rotter, J. B., Liverant, S., and Crowne, D. P. The growth and extinction of expectancies in chance controlled and skilled tasks. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 161, July.

Scharf, B. Complex sounds and critical bands. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 205, May.

Schoonard, J. W., and Restle, F. Analysis of double alternation in terms of patterns of stimuli and responses. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 61, 365, May.

Scodel, A. Value orientations and preference for a minimax strategy. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 62, 55, July.

Silberman, H. F., Melaragno, R. J., Coulson, J. E., and Estavan, D. Fixed sequence versus branching autoinstructional methods. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 166, June.

Staats, A. W. Verbal habit-families, concepts, and the operant conditioning of word classes. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 190, May.

Sutton, S., Hakerem, G., Zubin, J., and Portnoy, M. The effect of shift of sensory modality on serial reaction-time: a comparison of schizophrenics and normals. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 224, June.

Tullock, G. Utility, strategy, and social decision rules: Comment. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1961, 75, 493, August.

Underwood, B. J. Ten years of massed practice on distributed practice. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 229, July.

Vickrey, W. Risk, utility, and social policy. *Social Research*, 1961, 28, 205, Summer.

Vickrey, W. Utility, strategy, and social decision rules: Reply. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1961, 75, 496, August.

Wilson, W. R., and Becknell, J. C. The relation between the association value, pronunciability, and affectivity of nonsense syllables. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 47, July.

Wright, B. "Goals" and "values" revaluated. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 310, June.

Zeigler, H. P. Learning-set formation in pigeons. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 252, June.

#### Interpersonal Influence

Adams, J. S. Reduction of cognitive dissonance by seeking consonant information. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 74, January.

Allyn, J., and Festinger, L. The effectiveness of unanticipated persuasive communications. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 35, January.

Attowe, J. M., Jr. Interpersonal decision making: the resolution of a dyadic conflict. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 114, January.

Cervin, V. B., and Henderson, G. P. Statistical theory of persuasion. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 157, May.

Gardner, R. W. Cognitive controls of attention deployment as determinants of visual illusions. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 120, January.

Luchins, A. S., and Luchins, E. H. Social influences on impressions of personality. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 111, June.

Luchins, A. S., and Luchins, E. H. Social influences on judgment of changing evidence. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 13, June.

Osgood, C. E., Ware, E. E., and Morris, C. Analysis of the connotative meanings of a variety of human values as expressed by American college students. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 62, January.

Pilisuk, M. Cognitive balance and the reception of unpleasant information: an exploratory study. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, August.

Tuddenham, R. D. The influence of a distorted group norm upon judgments of adults and children. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 231, July.

Weiss, W. The effects of a communication attitude change and scale judgments. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 133, January.

#### Group Behavior

Bach, M. L. Factors related to student participation in campus social organizations. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 337, August.

Blake, R. R., and Mouton, J. S. Reactions to intergroup competition under win-lose conditions. *Management Science*, 1961, 7, 420, July.

Borgatta, E. F. Role-playing specification, personality, and performance. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 218, September.

Freeman, H. E., and Simmons, O. G. Consensus and coalition in the release of mental patients. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 89, Summer.

Gamson, W. A. An experimental test of a theory of coalition formation. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 565, August.

Gellert, E. Stability and fluctuation in the power relationships of young children. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 8, January.

Goldman, M., Bolen, M. E., and Martin, R. B. Some conditions under which groups operate and how this affects their performance. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 47, June.

Gruen, W. Some factors in the etiology of social interaction and group formation. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 57, June.

Hamblin, R. L., Miller, K., and Wiggins, J. A. Group morale and competence of the leader. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 295, September.

Hare, A. P. Computer simulation of interaction in small groups. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 261, July.

Jackson, D. D., and Weakland, J. H. Conjoint family therapy: some considerations on theory, technique, and results. *Psychiatry*, 1961, 24, 30, May (supplement).

Kenkel, W. F. Husband-wife interaction in decision making and decision choices. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 255, August.

Kiessling, R. J., and Kalish, R. A. Correlates of success in leaderless group discussion. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 359, August.

Luchins, A. S., and Luchins, E. H. Intentional and unintentional models in social learning. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 321, August.

Sechrest, L., and Jackson, D. N. Social intelligence and accuracy of interpersonal predictions. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 167, June.

Shaw, M. E. A serial position effect in social influence on group decisions. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 83, June.

Sprunger, J. A. The ability of the individual to contribute to his group. *Personnel Psychology*, 1961, 14, 317, Autumn.

Stevenson, H. W., and Cruse, D. B. The effectiveness of social reinforcement with normal and feeble-minded children. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 124, June.

Stevenson, H. W., and Fahel, L. S. The effect of social reinforcement on the performance of institutionalized and noninstitutionalized normal and feeble-minded children. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 136, June.

Tannenbaum, A. S. Control and effectiveness in a voluntary organization. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 33, July.

Ullmann, L. P., Krasner, L., and Collins, B. J. Modification of behavior through verbal conditioning: effects in group therapy. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 128, January.

Winick, C., and Holt, H. Seating position as nonverbal communication in group analysis. *Psychiatry*, 1961, 24, 171, May.

#### Organizational Behavior

Baumgartel, H., and Goldstein, G. Some human consequences of change. *Personnel Administration*, 1961, 24, 32, July-August.

Baumhart, R. C. How ethical are businessmen? *Harvard Business Review*, 1961, 39, 6, July-August.

Carlson, R. O. Succession and performance among school superintendents. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 210, September.

Clark, P. B., and Wilson, J. Q. Incentive systems: a theory of organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 129, September.

Colvard, R. Foundations and professions: the organizational defense of autonomy. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 167, September.

Crozier, M. Human relations at the management level. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 51, Summer.

Daiute, R. J. Mary Parker Follett: philosopher of business. *Advanced Management*, 1961, 26, 18, July-August.

Elling, R. H., and Halebsky, S. Organizational differentiation and support: a conceptual framework. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 185, September.

Evan, W. M. Organization man and due process of law. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 540, August.

Giedt, F. H., and Thomsen, M. J. Formal organization, ideological structure, and patterns of communication among a hospital special service staff. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 249, August.

Golembiewski, R. T. Three styles of leadership and their uses. *Personnel*, 1961, 38, 34, July-August.

Haberstroh, C. J. Administration of safety in the steel industry. *Management Science*, 1961, 7, 436, July.

Indik, B. P. Organization size and member participation. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, August.

Krugman, H. E. Organization structure and the organization man. *Personnel*, 1961, 38, 18, March-April.

Litwak, E. Models of bureaucracy which permit conflict. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 177, September.

Malmgren, H. B. Information, expectations and the theory of the firm. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1961, 75, 399, August.

Mann, J. W. Group relations in hierarchies. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 283, August.

Marsh, R. M. Formal organization and promotion in a pre-industrial society. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 547, August.

Massey, R. J., and Suojanen, W. W. Bureaucracy, command, or management. *Advanced Management*, 1961, 26, 24, July-August.

Meier, R. L. Explorations in the realm of organization theory. IV: The simulation of social organization. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 232, July.

Parkinson, C. N. The art of being no. 2. *Fortune*, 1961, 63, 123, September.

Rosen, H. Desirable attributes of work: four levels of management describe their job environments. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 156, June.

Trow, D. B. Executive succession in small companies. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 228, September.

Weinwurm, G. F. Computer management control systems through the looking glass. *Management Science*, 1961, 7, 411, July.

White, H. Management conflict and sociometric structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 185, September.

Wilson, H. B. The "functionaline" organization plan. *The Office*, 1961, 54, 14, July.

#### Voting Behavior

Frost, R. T. Stability and change in local party politics. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 221, Summer.

McPhee, W. N. Abstract of empirical inputs in a voting model. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 265, July.

McPhee, W. N. Note on a campaign simulator. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 184, Summer.

White, H. B. The processed voter and the new political science. *Social Research*, 1961, 28, 127, Summer.

#### Culture and Institutions

Abu-Lughod, J. Migrant adjustment to city life: the Egyptian case. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 22, July.

Beattie, J. H. M. Culture contact and social change. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 12, 165, June.

Bernberg, R. E. The measurement of two personality traits within a socio-cultural framework. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1961, 21, 349, Summer.

Croog, S. H. Ethnic origins and responses to a health questionnaire. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 65, Summer.

Fischer, J. L. The Japanese schools for the natives of Truk. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 83, Summer.

Golstein, B., and Eichhorn, R. L. The changing Protestant Ethic: rural patterns in health, work, and leisure. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 557, August.

Goody, J. Religion and ritual: the definitional problem. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 12, 142, June.

Katz, E. The social itinerary of technical change. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 70, Summer.

Lopreato, J. Social stratification and mobility in a South Italian town. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 585, August.

MacLay, H., and Ware, E. E. Cross-cultural use of the semantic differential. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 185, July.

Marsh, R. M., and O'Hara, A. R. Attitudes toward marriage and the family in Taiwan. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 1, July.

Park, G. K., and Soltow, L. Politics and social structure in a Norwegian village. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 152, September.

Prentice, N. M. Ethnic attitudes, neuroticism, and culture. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 75, June.

Rogler, L. H., and Hollingshead, A. B. The Puerto Rican spiritualist as a psychiatrist. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 17, July.

Steinmann, A. The vocational roles of older married women. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 54, 93, June.

Wechsler, H. Community growth, depressive disorders, and suicide. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 9, July.

West, S. S. Class origin of scientists. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 251, September.

Wilensky, H. L. Orderly careers and social participation: the impact of work history on social integration in the middle class. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 521, August.

Winick, C. Anthropology's contributions to marketing. *Journal of Marketing*, 1961, 25, 53, July.

Works, E. The prejudice-interaction hypothesis from the point of view of the negro minority group. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 47, July.

Young, M., and Geertz, H. Old age in London and San Francisco: some families compared. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 12, 124, June.

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties.* By CLYDE E. JACOBS. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 265. \$5.00.)

The constitutional issues of paramount importance confronting the Supreme Court of our times are those arising under the guarantees of individual rights against oppressive acts of government. The search for the well-springs of the philosophical, intellectual and emotional forces which shape the thinking of individual

members of the Court and cause them oftentimes to take sharply opposed positions on issues of this kind presents a continuing challenge to legal scholars. Inquiries of this kind lead inevitably to an examination of the constitutional jurisprudence of the two justices who currently represent a polarization of viewpoints on such issues on the present Court, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black. The work here dealt with is a worthy addition to a rapidly growing body of scholarly research of this kind.

Professor Jacobs' approach to his task is direct and logical. An introductory chapter entitled "Libertarian Activist," reviews briefly the pre-Court career of Frankfurter as a champion of what were then deemed liberal causes. It may come as a surprise to some of his recent critics to learn, for example, that he was one of the founders of the American Civil Liberties Union. The next seven chapters are devoted to a systematic analysis, in depth, of Justice Frankfurter's opinions—majority, concurring and dissenting—in cases involving civil liberties issues. Race discrimination cases arising under the equal protection clause are not covered, however, since the Court has been able to speak on such issues with relatively little disagreement among its members. A concluding chapter is given over to a general summary of Frankfurter's conception of the role of the Court in the area of civil liberties. There is a complete documentation of sources, along with a useful index and table of cases; but the devotee of the mathematically-oriented approach to the study of judicial behavior will be disappointed—as the non-mathematically inclined will no doubt be relieved—to note there are no scalograms, scattergrams, Guttman scales, indices of cohesion, etc., to over-simplify the subject matter and to mystify and impress the uninitiated.

There emerges a kind of profile of Justice Frankfurter in this area of constitutional interpretation against a background supplied by the views of his colleagues. To some extent, this profile necessarily takes on a Frankfurter *vs.* Black character; but this is by no means the general theme. The author's viewpoint is that of a detached, objective analyst rather than that of champion and advocate; but his analysis is characterized by a sympathetic understanding and appreciation of Justice Frankfurter's views on civil liberties issues. There is much in this volume that is not fresh and new to anyone who has followed the course of constitutional construction by the Court fairly closely in recent years. What the author does beyond this is to present Frankfurter as a Supreme Court justice with a generally consistent concept of the function of the Court in dealing with the complex issues presented in civil liberties cases, as a judge who is able to subordinate his own personal views on the merits of the public policy issues involved to his higher responsibility to the law and its orderly development.

Frankfurter's approach is that of the pragmatic-empiricist rather than that of the idealist. This is perhaps best illustrated in his rejection of the simplistic formulas of Justices Black and Douglas in favor of a more complex system of evaluation of relevant factors in freedom of speech cases. In general, it is his view that there are a variety

of constitutionally valid ends and principles that must be recognized and, if possible, harmonized in a rational way in civil liberties cases. Along with the individual's claims to a constitutionally guaranteed immunity there must be taken into account such equally valid considerations as those arising out of the principles of separation of powers, federalism, and respect for continuity in the evolution of the law and for the judgments on social values made by the politically responsible agencies of government. Frankfurter's is a relatively modest view of the capacity of the Court to save the people from their own follies under a democratic scheme of government. Its duty is to dispense justice *under the law*, not to dispense justice as the individual members of the Court perceive it in the abstract. He recognizes that the role of the individual judge necessarily must be that of a high priest of the law; but he should behave as a priest conscious of his own infirmities, of his human fallibility and of his somewhat clouded claim to apostolic authority.

Justice Frankfurter, according to some of his critics, has "no feel for the dominant issues." He is, in their eyes, a mere "weaver of crochet patterns of legalism on the fringes of the case," a practitioner of "petty skills," a "narrow academician engrossed in the trivia of formal legal propriety." This thoughtful, well-balanced and scholarly analysis of Frankfurter's constitutional jurisprudence in the area of civil liberties is an effective answer to those who would dismiss so lightly his claim to pre-eminence as a craftsman of the law.—JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH, *University of Michigan*.

*Presidential Transitions.* BY LAURIN L. HENRY. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960. Pp. 755. \$7.50.)

As Laurin Henry demonstrates in this volume, a presidential "transition" encompasses an elusively indefinite span of time. The formal period of transition, between the election and the president's inauguration, is laden with ambiguities, among them the existence of a president-elect without authority, a party in office that has been repudiated by the electorate, and a civil service partially disengaged from policies which it is still obliged to administer. But, as the author makes clear, this is not the only period of confusion and uncertainty. The actual process of transition begins weeks before the nominating conventions and invariably extends well into the year following the inaugural ceremony. The ample time perspective together with another lesson implicit in the volume (that custom, personality, and circumstance rather than institutional formalities mold the transfer of power) sets the tone of an excellent study. As the author's chronology

makes clear, where once the transfer of power could be leisurely, the necessities of a continuing national security emergency give a compelling urgency to preparations for the assumption of power by the incoming administration and constructive cooperation by the weary incumbents.

Four periods of transition are discussed at length. All of them—the Taft-Wilson, Wilson-Harding, Hoover-Roosevelt, and Truman-Eisenhower transitions—occurred in the twentieth century and all were characterized by a change of party control in the White House. The author describes in detail the political environment and the personalities of the important actors in each of these transitional situations. While in each instance many administrators in the lower echelons succeeded in establishing contact to ease the transition, the presidents and presidents-elect were not always as successful. Woodrow Wilson was respectfully uncooperative both in 1912 and 1920. In 1932 and 1952 there seemed to be presidential awareness of the need for contact, but efforts at cooperation at the highest level were marked by muted disrespect. In the latter transitions cooperation was made more difficult by bitterness stirred up in the campaign, a strong element of personal antagonism, and, typically, misapplied self-assuredness on the part of the newly elected leadership.

The administrative disruption inherent in all presidential transitions seems to defy any clear solution. Beyond the desirable goal of continuity and the expectation of reasonable foresight on the part of both presidential candidates as to what they will do "if," there are few specific guidelines. The proposals made in this volume are necessarily vague, largely because a truly effective transition will depend on such unpredictable variables as personality, the residue of partisan rancor, or the flow of international events. Not the least important is the fact that a president-elect can learn to govern only when full presidential power is finally in his hands. For this reason, perhaps the most significant period of transition occurs after the president's inauguration.

Within the range of these uncertainties, the author seems to conclude that the president can initiate measures which will help to train the president-elect, while the president-elect can exercise foresight by appointing a staff early in the campaign which will help him to arrange the mechanics of change. Both of these requirements were anticipated by President-elect Kennedy and President Eisenhower. It is to be hoped that the Brookings Institution will publish an evaluation of this latest presidential transition.

All in all, *Presidential Transitions* is an impressive example of sound administrative history. The documentation is thorough and the author's

style is clear and readable. It may be of some interest to those attentive to shifting methodological sands that the author seems to give a slight bow of apology to political "behaviorists" in his preface. He remarks that he did not adopt a more rigorous "formal analysis" because it "might add little real enlightenment and lose much of the color and 'feel' of inherently interesting events." In this instance, certainly, the reason seems sufficient.—RICHARD P. LONGAKER, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

*Problems of American Economic Growth.* By BRUCE R. MORRIS. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 279. \$2.50.)

Some of us want growth so that we can "beat the Russians"; others want economic growth to improve the American standard of living. But few in recent years would consider growth unimportant. The economists have responded with increased attention to the problems of growth, although their attention has perhaps been predominantly directed toward the somewhat different situation of achieving growth in underdeveloped economies.

The present book does not pretend to report original research by its author, but to "bring the problems we face to the attention of beginning students and of the adult population." To the clientele for this laudable objective, we may add political scientists. For the problems, it turns out, are as much political as economic.

Defining growth as an increase in the per capita annual output of goods and services, Morris devotes a chapter to each of the major determining factors of the growth rate, emphasizing the obstacles or complexities to be faced. The factors studied are: raw materials, population trends and the supply of workers; capital formation; technological change and entrepreneurship; consumer demand; government expenditure; and foreign trade. Concerning consumer demand, by way of illustration, the author notes the tight-rope to be walked between over-consumption at the expense of investment, and over-investment at the cost of insufficient purchasing power to take goods off the market. The economic problem is to find the optimal relationship. The political (or politico-economic) problems include the distribution of income and the pattern of taxation. Will the ethically optimal degree of income equality, or income inequality, also be best for growth? If the two conflict, how is the value conflict to be resolved? Does our political system have the capacity for economic rationality that policies for growth may require? Such questions arise in each chapter, although the author does not make explicit all of the political issues contained in his analysis.

When the author summarizes the "few most vital factors" in achieving growth, however, these turn out to be primarily matters of governmental policy: promotion of education; "solving" the problem of income distribution; "settlement" of the "relative powers of the groups into which we have formed"; "determining" our role in international society; and deciding the place of growth among our national objectives. As the words in quotation suggest, Morris' political analysis tends to be static as well as sketchy; yet he may have served a useful if not fully intended purpose if his list of policy factors awakens political scientists to the vast tasks of power and value analysis imbedded in this area of economics. Growth may be almost universally thought good, but its achievement will test severely American capacity for integrated policy formation, and may create notable conflicts with other revered values: social and economic stability, equity in the distribution of rewards and hardships, and ever-increasing private consumption.

Unfortunately, one's pleasure with the utility of the book as a primer for understanding (by one's self or one's students) is somewhat diminished by certain aspects of its style. To this reviewer, at least, the author seems to be writing down. He is also maddeningly vague at times: e.g., "the device of seniority has merits and defects and must be studied so that it can be fitted into the needs of a growing society." And some sentences are almost meaningless: e.g., "In the last decade we were quite prosperous except for several recessions." In short, Morris has given us a useful book in a crucially important area of government economic policy, but it could be a better one within its own frame of reference. And, because that frame is economic, political scientists will continue to hope that one or more of their own number will provide a companion primer on the *politics* of economic growth.—MICHAEL D. REAGAN, *Syracuse University*.

*Secrecy and Publicity Dilemmas of Democracy.* By FRANCIS E. ROURKE. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Pp. x, 236. \$5.00.)

It is a curious fact that two of the major threats to democracy in the United States are secrecy in government and publicity by government. The former may prevent the public and even Congress from receiving enough information or the kind of information necessary for making rational decisions. The latter may be a device for coercing or punishing private firms or individuals who cannot be successfully prosecuted in the courts. Publicity may also be a means of manipulating public opinion rather than informing it.

Professor Rourke makes clear in his excellent study of these twin evils of government that

neither is new in American life. Both, however, have been accentuated by the development of big bureaucracy and the invention of vastly improved means of mass communication.

The problem that has received the most attention over the years has been that of secrecy in the executive branch. President Washington refused to give Congress materials relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty. Jefferson declined to provide either Congress or the courts with documents concerning the Burr case on the grounds that some of the materials were merely unevaluated rumors and might therefore be misleading. Most of the strong presidents and some of the lesser ones since Jefferson's time have refused to deliver documents requested by Congress. This action has been accepted, sometimes reluctantly, as essential to the efficient conduct of administration. The effort of the bureaucracy to hide its mistakes and misdeeds from public gaze has, of course, been less well received.

The problem of secrecy has grown more acute in recent years because of the increasing importance of military and foreign affairs. Closely related to these two areas of governmental action has been the inquiry into the loyalty and security of government employees. The executive has consistently refused access to security files to congressional investigating committees.

Congress and the press have been the two major institutions which have sought to break down the policy of secrecy in administration. Both have been aided by that special instrument of the Washington bureaucratic internal welfare—"the leak." In spite of a few celebrated decisions, the courts seem to have played a relatively minor role in limiting government secrecy.

Neither Congress nor the press has consistently pursued a policy of seeking the reduction of executive secrecy. The House Subcommittee on Government Information, for example, found 172 statutes permitting executive agencies to withhold information from the public. Some elements of the press were very vigorous in their demand that Congress enact legislation to counteract the Supreme Court's decision in the *Jencks* case.

While commending the press for its service in breaking down excessive government secrecy, Professor Rourke notes that the press sometimes fails to recognize any right to privacy. James R. Wiggins, Managing Editor of *The Washington Post*, he notes, has even criticized the government for withholding the names of persons killed in plane crashes until after the next of kin have been notified. This zeal for the sensational clearly is unrelated to the fundamental problems of governmental secrecy.

If secrecy has been a traditional device used by the bureaucracy to cover its sins of commis-

sion and omission, publicity by government agencies has been an executive instrument equally dangerous to the public good. Publicity and the threat of publicity frequently have been the means used by regulatory agencies to force industries to comply with their desires. Sometimes this threat has been legitimate, but sometimes it has been simply an unjustified instrument of coercion. Professor Rourke cites a number of instances to make this latter point clear.

Special attention is given in the book to those congressional investigating committees which have used public hearings and press conferences to prosecute persons appearing before the committees. The author points out, however, that the problem is more complicated than it appears to those who glibly criticize all investigating committees for "exposure for exposure's sake." He notes that Congress may have to expose in order to get at an understanding of the organizations and activities which are the real objects of its hearings. "It becomes improper only when a legislative committee arrogates to itself a judicial function, and deliberately sets itself up to determine the guilt or innocence of particular individuals."

Professor Rourke finds that government publicity and secrecy in the areas of foreign policy and defense raise particularly difficult questions. The author seems to accept the views of those scientists who have asserted that secrecy is actually a hindrance to American scientific development without protecting national security. He also suggests that "it is not at all certain that a community should not choose, from the point of view of its own value system, to tolerate some measure of insecurity in order to gain access to information it needs in order to exercise influence over decisions of vital public policy."

This review has been able to touch on only a few of the many questions raised by Professor Rourke. Throughout the study he has presented the problems fully. His judgments are thoughtful and moderate. The book is well worth a careful reading by scholars concerned with democratic theory and practice.—HOWARD PENNIMAN, *Georgetown University*.

*An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century.* EDITED BY NORMAN A. GRAEBNER. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961. Pp. 341. \$6.95.)

Given the dismal state of the world, and a healthy interest in getting out of it alive, people may understandably be attracted to this study of modern American leadership in foreign affairs. One might expect to find in it some retrospective analysis of how we came to our present condition, or some discussion of the types or qualities of

leadership in which we might invest more than passing hopes in the years ahead; indeed, the title itself suggests that the study of the diplomatic uncertainties of the past might give us some clues to a more purposive future. But if these are one's hopes or expectations, one is likely to be disappointed, for this passing parade of American statesmanship adds very little to our understanding in any of these respects.

It is hard to come to grips with a collection of essays written by fourteen people, and impossible to do equal justice to each. The authors, mostly historians, labored under a severe space limitation: they seem to have aimed at about twenty pages each. As a result, they have revealed as much about themselves as authors as about their subjects as Secretaries of State. One is tempted to choose his favorites from both lists, but there is little to be gained by so doing: with one or two exceptions, the quality of the individual essays is generally even, reflecting a common approach to the subject. It is this approach that deserves comment here. Structurally, the book contains an historical introduction to our diplomatic status in the year 1898, followed by chapters on fourteen "important" Secretaries from Hay to Dulles. There is no analytical introduction, or conclusion of any kind. The two major defects of the volume, which seriously impair its usefulness to any student of foreign policy or of political science generally, may be summarized as a lack of explicit criteria of judgment and evaluation, and a lack of explicit comparison. These are related, in that it is difficult to make explicit comparisons without explicit criteria of evaluation, but for our present purposes we can look at these separately.

The lack of explicit criteria of evaluation may be translated as the absence of any explicit theoretical structure with respect to foreign policy, the role of the Secretary of State, and diplomacy which would lend meaning and importance to discrete events. As a consequence, the reader moves through fourteen different sets of implicit theories, and confronts an exasperating array of imprecise, undefined judgments; for example: "... it would seem that Kellogg's preoccupation with lawyers resulted in his being less well served by his assistants than he might have been. . . ." "For the new Secretary the issue was clear: one day he would be forced to choose between expediency and principle." "Hughes set out to protect the national interest. . . ." These words tell us nothing, because their precise content is part of an unarticulated structure of theories and values.

The absence of explicit theory and explicit criteria is nowhere felt so keenly as in those parts of each essay in which the authors grope with the question that one may be forgiven for regarding



as absolutely central to a study of Secretaries of State: viz., what do we mean by a "good" Secretary? What are the qualities—of person, institution, setting, and so forth—that are associated with "superior performance" in the conduct of foreign affairs? Secretary Knox, we are told, "failed because he lacked the depth of knowledge and the stature needed to be a great Secretary of State." After a brief discussion of Stimson's breeding, military service, academic record, law career, and prior record of public service, it is said that, "Thus, on the whole, he had a reasonably good preparation for his Secretarial post. . . ." Hughes' qualifications are said to have laid "more in his general characteristics of high intelligence, unquestioned integrity, and political availability than in any expert knowledge of international relations." The trouble with such observations and evaluations is that they fail absolutely to do what they seem to do: to distinguish the factors that account for success from those that lead to failure in the job of Secretary of State. How can one get a grasp on the subject when we read that "Skill in the art of politics may or may not be an asset for a State Department head." Or that "What was probably a lifelong habit of caution sometimes stood him in good stead and sometimes stood in the way of needed action?" It is too much to ask, in such short compass, that each author provide his own theories that would clarify and give content to these meaningless generalities; but one would hope that an editor of such a volume would provide a handy set for his authors, or, failing that, would contribute one of his own to integrate the work of his authors. There is some circumstantial evidence in the volume that the editor hoped to use the notion of "national interest" as a unifying theme (it would be too much to call it a theory), but even that term is, mercifully, lost as the authors pay it little beyond lip service.

It is equally incredible that a history of recent American Secretaries of State is nowhere informed by an explicit—not to say a common—definition of diplomacy! The word is used differently in different places; for example, "Hay's deft diplomacy made such a retreat far easier for the British leaders." "Root . . . retained his basic distrust of diplomacy." How is one to relate a man's qualities to his performance of his manifest job, or an important segment of his manifest job, if no effort is made to specify what the latter consists of?

The lack of explicit comparison in the volume constitutes its second major defect. No attempt is made to bring together any relevant aspects of the experiences of Secretaries of State, so that one might hazard tentative generalizations about their significance. The book tells us nothing ex-

plicit about the institution of the Secretary of State; it only tells us about fourteen Secretaries who were apparently alike in some respects, and apparently unlike in others. In this context the absence of a chapter that gives, or even attempts, some overview is particularly regrettable. The amount of variation among Secretaries in background, in *modus operandi*, in operational experiences, in the judgments of "history," is tremendous, and this volume misses an equally tremendous opportunity to try to introduce some order into the subject.

Finally, one is tempted into a further reflection on the uses of the historical method in this particular volume. The life of a Secretary of State during most of the twentieth century has been a succession of awesome choices, where the costs and risks have been high, the moral components not especially attractive, the amount of relevant information inadequate to the demands put on it, and the stars not particularly auspicious. He works from the present into dim and inscrutable futures. His biographer, on the other hand, knows how it all comes out, and has an apparently inescapable tendency to write with a sense of predestination. My guess is that most of the Secretaries who are impaled in this book viewed the problems of their day rather differently than these essays suggest. But this, too, is another way of saying that we need new modes of fact-gathering in the service of more relevant theories.—BERNARD C. COHEN, *University of Wisconsin*.

*Professional Diplomacy in the United States: 1779-1939.* BY WARREN FREDERICK ILCHMAN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp. 254. \$6.00.)

To the growing list of titles in the newly-emergent field of administrative history must be added this volume, identified by the author as "part of a larger study tracing the growth of professional diplomacy in the United States." The intent here is to "document the evolution of a career service for foreign affairs." Later studies are to deal with numerous issues not covered here, such as the influence of administrative changes in the upper diplomatic ranks upon decision-making. Ultimately, "the effect of professional diplomacy on American foreign policy will be considered." Painstaking and scholarly analyses of such issues will make overdue additions to the literature on American foreign policy.

Professor Ilchman's study is based upon exhaustive research into the administrative development of the diplomatic and consular services during the period 1779-1939. The author reveals full command of his subject and intimate acquaintance with sources bearing upon it, to a

degree which is perhaps outstanding for one writing in a comparatively new field. Brief as it is, this is an invaluable sourcebook for students interested in the evolution of American diplomatic machinery. If promised companion volumes are forthcoming, the series will doubtless become a standard reference work in the field. Regarding a book intended as part of a still-uncompleted series, both the author and reviewers are perhaps under disadvantage not present in more normal circumstances. For it may well be that implications of the subject treated briefly (sometimes superficially) here will be covered more satisfactorily in forthcoming studies; the author's terse statement of questions deliberately deferred makes it difficult always to be certain. In many instances, this is no doubt the intention. In others, it is difficult to see how it can be attempted smoothly and logically, without placing an impossible burden upon the reader to remember factual materials presented early in this first book. Meticulous as he is in tracing out successive statutes, executive orders, precedents, and other developments bearing upon his subject, throughout the process the author frequently leaves the question: what have these things to do with the actual *formulation and operation* of American foreign policy? What was their overall *impact* upon the foreign policy process?

This seems the book's principal weakness. Facts are presented in abundance, if not sometimes to the point of tedium. Documentation is impressive and as comprehensive as could be desired. Interpretation is kept to a minimum—indeed, the reader is left to wonder about the lasting *significance* of major and minor developments. The reader senses a recurrent reluctance on the part of the author to cut loose from his sources and quotations and to give his judgments about the evidence he has so carefully sifted.

Stylistically, the reader may also hope for some beneficial changes in future studies. One of these might be greater effort by the author in discriminating between important and relatively unimportant aspects of his subjects. It is not always evident to the reader, because sometimes it does not seem evident to the author, which is which. The readability of this book sometimes suffers acutely from a lack of priority in this respect. Another suggestion is that the author endeavor to avoid laboring his points. Even this short work could be made more interesting, particularly for the non-specialist, if needless reiteration of points and multiple quotations saying substantially the same thing were pruned.—CECIL V. CRABB, JR., *Vassar College*.

*Cases in State and Local Government*. RICHARD T. FROST, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp. xii, 361. \$3.95.)

Debate over the utility of case studies rages at two levels. The first has to do with means of advancing scientific frontiers, the second with techniques of teaching. *Cases in State and Local Government* clearly makes its claims at the second level. The case studies which compose it are short and relatively simple. Introductory notes indicate that each case is intended to illustrate some widely accepted proposition from the textbook literature on state and local government.

Richard T. Frost, in his preface, suggests that case studies are valuable because they can impart "a 'feel' for the governing of men." He does not deal, however, with the perennial question raised by critics of case studies as tools of science: how can one evaluate them? The better writer may not be the more perceptive observer. The case author generally feels no obligation to place his facts in the broad context of his discipline, to indicate how typical or how significant they are. The "feel" conveyed by a smoothly written book of case studies may, therefore, be neither accurate, applicable, nor profound.

In the final analysis, all case studies must be judged by their relationship to theory. This is true on both levels of debate. Case research is useful at the frontiers of social science if it inspires pregnant explanatory hypotheses. Well-written case studies can vividly illustrate such hypotheses. Cases intended as teaching implements should meet the test of illustrating well the complex relationships and important controversies of social life as described by the hypotheses which currently pass in the scholarly world for knowledge.

Most of the case studies under review are, unfortunately, pitched at a highly superficial level. Frost has endeavored to illustrate a very wide range of theories in relatively few pages. The twenty-seven cases presented average forty-five hundred words each. In general, this space limitation has precluded the development of relationships in detail. The "facts" of most of the cases are presented in bare outline and then "explained" in textbook fashion. Readers without background in the subject are likely to experience a constant sense of disorientation. Some teachers will wish to exploit this, of course, but they may find themselves doing the work of any good text writer rather than leading discussions of more difficult and controversial matter.

This reviewer is further troubled by the prominence of author biases in some of these cases. It is frequently claimed that case studies can provoke students by presenting the various sides of controversial issues colorfully and persuasively. This potential no doubt exists. But a number of contributors to this volume have chosen to dissipate it by presenting controversies as battles between the enlightened and the entrenched. The force of their partisanship is accentuated by the fact that

many of these writers participated in the controversies they describe. It should be noted, however, that Frost considers the involvement of his collaborators an advantage, enabling them to have "a good grip on the events."

In a volume as diverse as this, criticism of the whole is inevitably unjust to some of the parts. A number of cases struck this reviewer as overcoming the space handicap and telling provocative stories very well indeed, notably: "The New York Fluoridation Dispute," by Gerald Pomper; "The Special Case of Public Education," by Alan Rosenthal; "Chairman and Superintendent," by Frank Sorauf; "Old and New in the Old South," by James Prothro; "The Legislature Redistricts Illinois," by Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove; "The Davis High School Principal," by Robert Sinclair (a pseudonym); and "Water for Wauwatosa," by David Gladfelter.—ALAN ALTSHULER, *Makerere College (East Africa).*

*Preprimary Endorsements in California Politics.*

By LEONARD ROWE. (Berkeley: University of California, Bureau of Public Administration, 1961. Pp. ix, 85. \$2.00.)

In 1959 California abolished the system of candidate cross-filing for the nomination of more than one party in the primary election. This event naturally suggested analysis of the informal practices now prevailing of selecting candidates prior to the primary. The legal situation in California is that state law neither authorizes nor prohibits endorsements by official party committees; in practice, most official party committees do not make endorsements. Leonard Rowe has reviewed the origins and experience with "preprimary endorsements" by informal party groups, meeting in district and state conventions. The principal party groups are the California Republican Assembly and the California Democratic Council. He finds that preprimary endorsements have had "a healthy effect" on California politics. They have not reduced but contributed to an increase of voter participation in state primaries from less than 50 to over 60 per cent over the past twenty years. He believes that preprimary conventions provide a means by which the importance of money in making nominations *may be* reduced, and that they open as well as shut the door to able candidates. They have "broadened the nomination process" by restoring mass organization and delegate conventions at the county, district and state levels. The major criticism that Rowe levels against preprimary endorsements as practiced in California is that the formulas used for selecting delegates to endorsing conventions are based upon the informal "club membership" in the counties and districts rather than upon "party registration or voting strength." He suggests that thought be given to revising these

representation formulas, to the possibility of multiple endorsements, and to the idea of requiring a fixed percentage of the convention vote to secure place on the primary ballot.—AVERY LEISERSON, *Vanderbilt University.*

*American Perspectives.* EDITED BY ROBERT E. SPILLER AND ERIC LARRABEE. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. vii, 216. \$4.75.)

The Knights of the Round Table discovered many things, depending on what kind of men they were and what they had the capacity to see. Yet none, as I recollect, in fact found the Holy Grail they sought.

Just so in this book, where ten specialists were commissioned to find together the American national character for a volume to be entitled *The Image of America in the Twentieth Century*. Each finds something, but when set together, no recognizable national character emerges. The editors recognized this when they received the essays, and rather than ordering rewriting or doing it themselves, they printed the whole under the present less pretentious title.

Ralph H. Gabriel provides a quick (16 page) historiography since 1800, with the usual unstated assumption that the battle of intellects somehow reflects the attitudes of the people about whom history is written. Morton White discusses controversies regarding the definition of pragmatism, and asserts that the ambiguities at the top levels of science mirror the ambiguities of society. Spiller himself provides a history of literary criticism as Edward N. Waters does for music, painting, and sculpture, and Reuel Denney for popular culture.

Only two of the authors deal directly with the problem at hand—the national image. Thomas C. Cochran reports on what representative social scientists have said about the American character, although he warns that these social scientists selected what they regarded as important and Cochran does not attempt to judge the accuracy of their observations. Economist Kenneth E. Boulding is the only contributor who actually reports scientific data about what the general public—the consumers of ideas rather than the merchants—think. Even so, he concludes with his own impressions that economic conflicts are lessening, and that everyone is truly in the great middle class.

No political scientist is among the contributors. John M. Blum, Yale history professor, in the chapter on politics, sees the ever forming and dissolving coalitions of two-party politics as the attempt of a conciliatory middle class to protect itself by resolving through compromise the several antitheses of American life. To Blum, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Coolidge, Franklin

Roosevelt, and Eisenhower all expressed the public image of the middle class—a changing image, to be sure, as the middle class felt threatened in turn by corruption, big business, reform, depression, and change. Now, he finds, “leveling-up” has progressed so far that group conflict is spent, leaving the parties on dead center. He hopes that the middle class will reform itself and regain a missionary spirit to solve the remaining problems of racial discrimination and foreign policy.

The principal merit of this book to political scientists will be to counteract a tendency to overestimate the place of their discipline and subject matter in American life. Politics is after all only a rather marginal concern for many people. It is useful to know what else is occupying the minds of intellectuals and those about whom and for whom intellectuals think.—CHARLES H. BACKSTROM, *University of Minnesota*.

*The New America: Politics and Society in the Age of the Smooth Deal.* BY KARL E. MEYER. (New York: Basic Books, 1961. Pp. 206. \$4.50.)

Sometimes a book review should be a warning. The imposing title of this book, and the memory some members of the profession may have of Mr. Meyer's striking article on the “Smooth Dealers” in *Commentary* a few years ago, may lead them to expect an important study of new developments in American politics.

Unfortunately, the book does not fulfill this promise. It is a discursive, occasionally pointed, entertaining, but generally superficial *pastiche*, in which the author offers impressions and opinions concerning political phenomena from the role of the presidency to the ways of contemporary political journalism. His basic argument is that our politics has grown too bland, too “Smooth Dealing,” too little concerned with a vigorous and controversial approach to the serious issues of the day as he sees them. The book is divided into a first part on “symptoms,” and a second part on “sources”; but the portion on sources is not analytical and remains an again superficial sketch of trends. They range from the conversion of the American “melting pot” into the “pressure cooker,” in which the variety of ethnic stocks is converted into a standard-American pattern, to the decline of the *elan* of the progressive movement as an aspect of the decline of a forthright political commitment. The author's address is generally New Dealish-liberal, though by no means dogmatic.

In many ways the book reminds one of the work of Mr. Meyer's cartoonist-colleague on the *Washington Post*, Herb Block. It does not have quite enough seriousness relief, however, to enable it to live up to its title or make it really worth-

while.—WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

*Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service: A Study of Labor-Management Relations in United States Government.* BY WILSON R. HART. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. xi, 302. \$6.50.)

Mr. Hart's qualifications for dealing with this complex subject are impressive. He has directed the personnel and labor relations program for the U. S. Army and is currently president of a public employees' union, the American Federation of Government Employees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

As Hart points out, the traditional approach to labor-management relations in the federal service is essentially negative. Agency directives acknowledge the right of the employees to organize, but they do so in coldly neutral terms. The regulations spell out in detail the limitations within which employee organizations must operate. The attitude of the federal executive is usually one of “spontaneous hostility bred from the conviction that the personnel director and the union leader are natural antagonists with irreconcilable conflicts of interest. The shibboleth of the conventional personnel director is, ‘If you run a good personnel program you won't have any union to deal with.’”

As a result of these personnel policies the United States government has often been accused of engaging in “unfair labor practices.” In general, critics argue that the government's labor-management relations policies are out of date in the light of recent developments in human relations and industrial relations, that it is morally indefensible for the federal government to refuse to grant the privilege of collective bargaining to its employees when it compels private employers to engage in collective bargaining with their employees and that the best public personnel programs are found in those federal agencies which have the strongest employee organizations. The federal government's existing labor-management policies are defended most strongly by managerial personnel in the executive branch who argue that the sovereign nature of the government prevents it from entering into a genuine collective-bargaining relationship with its employees that the major decisions concerning wages, hours, and working conditions are made by Congress and that the federal service has already voluntarily granted to its employees the same privileges which employees in private industry have under collective bargaining.

Hart considers these arguments at length and concludes that those which support present federal personnel policies are weak indeed. On the

issue of sovereignty, he argues that while it is true that a sovereign cannot be compelled to bargain with its employees there is nothing to prevent legislative or executive authorities from voluntarily granting such a right. As for the assertion that Congress has fixed the conditions of employment, Hart shows that the executive branch has considerable discretion even in the vitally important matter of determining salaries. The claim that federal employees now enjoy the privileges that employees in private industry enjoy under collective bargaining, Hart rejects. Even if this were true, he argues, benevolent paternalism is a poor substitute for genuine participation, poor for the employees and poorer still for the public service. Further, Hart points out that there are government agencies, notably the TVA, that have experimented successfully with collective bargaining. In sum, Hart concludes that there is nothing about collective bargaining in the public service which is inherently illegal, or offensive to public policy.

Hart has made an impressive case for collective bargaining. But while agreeing with his conclusions it is still possible to raise questions of interpretation and emphasis. For example, there are doubtless those who would question whether the federal Civil Service Commission, "is part and parcel of the executive branch." Also open to challenge is the assertion that "when the government of the United States hires a new employee, it has no problem of motivation." In general the discussion of sovereignty is inadequate. The issues involved are much more complex than Hart suggests. Even more serious is the argument that staff proliferation is based on the executive's fear that one of his subordinates may commit "an impropriety or indiscretion for which he will ultimately be held accountable and by which he may be tarnished." This view seems to be based on an unduly narrow concept of the staff function.

But in the main Hart's presentation is impressive. Much of what he says has been said before, but he brings the discussion up to date and summarizes the major arguments in eminently readable fashion.—ROBERT J. MCNEILL, *Purdue University*.

*The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U. S. Information Service.* BY WILSON P. DIZARD. (Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 213. \$4.50.)

Dizard's study is essentially a descriptive account of the world wide operations of the United States Information Service (USIS). It does not pretend to do anything more than bring us up to date on developments within USIS since those black days when the late Senator McCarthy hammered headlines out of hapless USIS person-

nel. It is enough, however, that Dizard can report in confident tones of the Information Service's comeback. No longer the gaudy trumpet of messianic crusades nor the target of even gaudier accusations, USIS has entered into a stable bureaucratic existence. "The new stability that exists in the Agency's relations with Congress permits it to operate at the steady pace essential to its success."

Dizard suggests two causes for USIS' fine recovery. First, the American people, especially their Congressmen, have finally accepted the idea that the United States needs an information and culture program as part of its cold war strategy.

Equally important, USIS has developed a more professional attitude and personnel. Both the "Madison Avenue" and "psychwar" overtones that marred the early development of the Voice of America have been subdued. In place of the "hard sell" and in resistance to harebrained psychwar schemes which promised to wrest the propaganda initiative from the Communists by techniques which could not possibly stand the test of time, the Information Service has settled down to the task of projecting an image of America that will wear well year in and year out, crisis in and crisis out. Such an approach aims at creating an image that is compatible with our society and with the policies we are likely to espouse; one which will carry us through crisis periods when our policies, for reasons of national interest, are out of harmony with dominant world opinion. "We are not going to be defeated by what the world thinks of our tariff laws or our China policy. The decision will hang on the validity of our total claim as a democratic world leader and on the concurrence of our interests with those of other people."

The new professionalism of which Dizard speaks takes several forms. The Information Service has become less dependent on amateurs and people from outside its own ranks. In emulation of the Foreign Service, USIS now recruits a steady stream of people who regard themselves as professional civil servants. It remains to be seen if the function of status-building implicit in the drive toward greater professionalization on the model of the Foreign Service will serve the Information Service to its best advantage.

A more sober sense of reality also characterizes USIS operations. The strident ideological tone of earlier years has been muted in favor of objective news reporting and cultural and educational programs. The central effort now is to inform and persuade opinion leaders and opinion makers in foreign countries as the most satisfactory mode of reaching the larger public. Far from taking a dim view of what Hollywood contributes to the cultural image of America, USIS concentrates on

supplementing and balancing the ever popular Hollywood diet with more serious and representative films of American life and achievements.

One of the most interesting shifts of emphasis concerns the role Dizard attributes to Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS). RFE is privately operated while RIAS, broadcasting to East Germany, is under USIS guidance. Their mission is no longer to contribute fuel to the revolutionary fires in Eastern Europe; instead, their function is to "exert an influence on Communist leadership to modify its repressive policies." In short we are no longer operating on the premise that the walls of Jericho will fall before our trumpet blast.

It is also heartening to know that perhaps our greatest successes have been achieved by our musicians and artists, for it is they who have brought America of age in the eyes of foreigners prepared to dismiss us as barbarians and materialists. The role of culture in the cold war still awaits a more profound study, but Dizard has at least given us an interesting account of the present direction of America's information and cultural activities.—DAVID S. McLELLAN, *University of California* (Riverside.)

*A History of the United States Weather Bureau.*

By DONALD R. WHITNAH. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. Pp. vii & ix, 240. \$6.00.)

The crucial role of the scientist in making governmental decisions is beginning to attract wide attention. It has been dramatized by Sir Charles P. Snow in his novels, and clearly stated in his lectures at Harvard in 1960 (published now by Harvard University Press under the title *Science and Government*). Of course it is the application of science to warfare and defense which has drawn most public attention. However, a small group of social scientists have observed for some time the expanding role of scientists in decision-making at all levels of government. Dean Don K. Price's *Government and Science* (1954), a pioneer effort by a political scientist, points up this new role in American government as no other study has done. We may expect other fruitful studies from social scientists of various disciplines.

Donald R. Whitnah's *A History of the United States Weather Bureau* is a study of the science-government phenomenon within the context of the historical evolution of a government bureau. It is a valuable reference book, especially for students of public administration. It traces the United States Weather Bureau from its inception in 1870 to 1960, with a major emphasis upon its history prior to World War II. Dr. Whitnah, now Professor of History at Iowa State Teachers College, writes the story with a thorough under-

standing of meteorology as well as history, having served as a weather observer and analyst from 1951-56 with the Illinois State Water Survey Division at Urbana.

The political scientist interested in the evolution of a governmental agency concerned primarily with scientific investigations will find Professor Whitnah's study valuable. It contains a wealth of well documented information on the development of meteorology as a special study and the importance of the Weather Bureau in that development.

The reader of this running account of the Weather Bureau will discover how it emerged from the active interests of meteorologists as pure scientists who through their professional organizations aroused public interest in weather reports and predictions and how one of their number, Professor Cleveland Abbe, led the movement for a federal agency and became the most important single figure throughout its formative twenty-one years. Although he was not regarded as an outstanding meteorologist by his colleagues in the field, Abbe's ability to organize scientific research and to arouse civic interest was outstanding. He argued from the first for a civilian agency; but practical considerations caused H. E. Paine, Representative from Wisconsin, to introduce a bill in 1869 which assigned the task of gathering information on weather to the Army Signal Corps. The period of military control from 1870 to 1891 proved not to be a happy one for the Army. The study and predictions on weather were too new and the instruments inadequate for accurate predictions. The service was subjected to ridicule and congressional investigations. Although the first ten years under the leadership of Colonel A. J. Meyer were peaceful ones, after 1880 the weather service of the Signal Corps fell into the hands of military men who had no special aptitude or interest. General William B. Hazen's administration which lasted only six years (1880-86) was one of administrative ineptitude and scandal. His attempt to apply military discipline to this scientific enterprise brought great upheaval and ultimately congressional investigations. His successor, General A. W. Greeley, proved to be little better. General Greeley's failures increased public criticism and led him to conclude that it would be best to be rid of the meteorological branch of the Signal Corps. Secretary of Agriculture Jeremiah M. Rusk was just as interested in securing the service. The upshot of the situation was a transfer of functions to the Department of Agriculture in 1890, and the establishment of the Weather Bureau.

Willis Luther Moore, the Bureau's second director, aroused Congressional criticism by his failure to give strict account of expenditures.

Investigation failed to disclose a misuse of funds but resulted in a realization by Congress of the high quality of scientific workmanship of the Bureau. However, Moore clashed too many times with the Secretary of Agriculture and finally deserted science and administration for politics. He openly tried to secure promise of appointment as Secretary of Agriculture from Woodrow Wilson. His political activity caused such a furor that he was threatened with prosecution and was ultimately removed by Wilson in 1913.

Professor Whitnah tells us little of the dynamics of administration within the Bureau after 1913. The two wars increased public interest in information on weather with a higher regard for its services as scientific instruments became more accurate and predictions more reliable. The Bureau's clientele expanded from anxious farmers and sea captains to the press which capitalized on weather information, to air lines, and even to commercial outdoor sports which depended heavily upon clear weather for large crowds. It would have been of interest if the author had given more attention to the use and misuse of meteorological information by numerous radio broadcasting stations. Partially trained weathermen who gained their knowledge in the military service during the second World War appear in competition with the Bureau on radio and television almost every hour of the day, arousing the

criticism of Bureau meteorologists. For the first time criticisms are flowing both ways, the Bureau being charged with attempting to monopolize information on the weather.

*A History of the United States Weather Bureau* indicates some problems of administration of an agency devoted to science and information. These could be developed as dramatically as was the "Glavis-Ballinger Dispute" by Winifred McCulloch in *Public Administration and Policy Development* under Harold Stein's editorship. More facts would have to be obtained but the industrious case writer might find his efforts rewarding if he followed some of the leads marked out by Donald Whitnah.

The story of the United States Weather Bureau provides another illustration for Dean Price's thesis in his *Government and Science* of (1) the importance of professional organizations of scientists in advancing certain types of administration and (2) the inadequacies of old and established government agencies as a dynamic force in new situations. With the second World War, although the Bureau had grown in importance as a source of weather information, it was subjected to competition both within and outside the Federal Government. Perhaps its greatest future will lie in its research in outer space and less with weather per se, in which case it may be cast in a new scientific role.—LASHLEY G. HARVEY, *Boston University*.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE  
*University of Maryland*

### ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

#### National Government

Fulbright, J. William. American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century under an 18th-Century Constitution. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Fall, 1961.

Howell, Wilbur Samuel. The Declaration of Independence and Eighteenth-Century Logic. *William and Mary Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Kraft, Joseph. The Comeback of the State Department. *Harper's Magazine*. November, 1961.

Miller, Arthur S. Toward a Concept of National Responsibility. *Yale Review*. Winter, 1962.

Proposal to Establish a New Federal Department of Urban Affairs and Housing. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest*. November, 1961.

Ward, C. D. A Department of Urban Affairs. *County Officer*. October, 1961.

#### State Government

Action by the Legislatures: 1961. *State Government*. Autumn, 1961.

American State Legislatures in Mid-Twentieth Century. *Ibid*.

A Comparison of the Organization and Procedures of Six State Constitutional Conventions. Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 1961.

Darrah, Earl L., and Orville F. Poland. The Fifty State Governments: A Compilation of State Executive Organization Charts. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1961.

Hensel, Donald W. Religion and the Writing of the Colorado Constitution. *Church History*. September, 1961.

Kauper, Paul G. The State Constitution: Its

Nature and Purpose. Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 1961.

Lombardi, Frank. State Planning in Hawaii. *State Government*. Autumn, 1961.

Mason, Bruce B., and Heinz R. Hink. Revision of the Arizona Constitution: A Commentary. Bureau of Government Research, Arizona State University. 1961.

Nelson, Gaylord A. Planning and Developing Our Resources: A Critical Task for State Action. *State Government*. Autumn, 1961.

Scroggs, Jack B. Carpetbagger Constitutional Reform in the South Atlantic States, 1867-1868. *Journal of Southern History*. November, 1961.

#### Local Government

Childs, Richard S. Quest for Leadership [in Council-Manager Cities]. *National Civic Review*. November, 1961.

Evans, S. Howard. Encouraging Effective Citizen Participation in Community Development. *Public Management*. November, 1961.

Grant, Daniel S., and Lee S. Greene. Surveys, Dust, Action [on Nashville Annexation]. *National Civic Review*. October, 1961.

Hagensick, A. Clarke. Municipal Home Rule in Wisconsin. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1961.

Moes, John E. The Subsidization of Industry by Local Communities in the South. *Southern Economic Journal*. October, 1961.

Palmer, Philip F. The Allouez Study: Governmental Organization for the Town of Allouez. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1961.

Peterson, Glen R. The Corporate Public Affairs Movement and Council-Manager Government. *Public Management*. November, 1961.

Ricketts, E. F., Compensating City Administrators. *Ibid.* October, 1961.

Riethmayer, Leo C. The Urban Gap. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Sherbenou, Edgar L. Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan. *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1961.

Taylor, Milton C. Local Income Taxes as a Source of Revenue for Michigan Communities. Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University. 1961.

Williamson, C. Glen. New Supersonic Crisis [for Cities from Air Transport]. *National Civic Review*. November, 1961.

Ylvisaker, Paul N. The Miraculous City. *Ibid.* December, 1961.

#### Intergovernmental Relations

Benson, George C. S., and Harold F. McClelland. Consolidated Grants: A Means of Main-

taining Fiscal Responsibility. American Enterprise Association. 1961.

Colman, William G. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. *County Officer*. October, 1961.

Estep, Samuel D., and Martin Adelman. State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem. *Michigan Law Review*. December, 1961.

Federal-State Cooperation in the Atomic Energy Field. [Symposium.] *Kentucky Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.

Gere, Edwin A., Jr. Some Aspects of Massachusetts Public Finance: A Survey of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Commonwealth. Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachusetts. 1961.

Hein, Clarence J. Metropolitan Government: Residents Outside the Central Urban Areas. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Humphrey, Hubert H. To Aid the Small City [by a Department of Urban Affairs]. *National Civic Review*. December, 1961.

Leach, Richard H. New Urban Challenge [Metropolitan Areas]. *Ibid.* October, 1961.

McLaughlin, Patrick H. Congressional Actions Affecting Cities. *Public Management*. December, 1961.

A Policies Plan for the Year 2000: The Nation's Capital. National Capital Planning Commission and National Capital Planning Council. 1961.

State Aid to Local Government. Bureau of Statistical Services, Division of Municipal Affairs, Department of Audit and Control, State of New York. 1961.

Tobin, Robert W. The Interstate Metropolitan District and Cooperative Federalism. *Tulane Law Review*. December, 1961.

Van Tassel, Roger C. State Regulation of Boston's Financial Administration. Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachusetts. 1961.

1961 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Metropolitan Areas Study to the Legislature of the State of New York. Legislation Doc. No. 18. 1961.

#### Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Alfange, Dean, Jr. Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court. *University of Cincinnati Law Review*. Spring, 1961.

Bartholomew, Paul C. Movie Censorship and the Supreme Court. *Michigan State Bar Journal*. August, 1961.

Byrd, Elbert M., Jr. Constitutional Limits on International Agreements in the Space Age. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March-April, 1961.



- Cahn, Edmond. The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle. *New York University Law Review*. November, 1961.
- Downey, Arthur T., III. Rights of Witness before Congressional Investigating Committee. *Villanova Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Ehmke, Horst P. "Delegata Potestas non Potest Delegari," a Maxim of American Constitutional Law. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Fall, 1961.
- Fisher, Walter T. Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Summer, 1961.
- Hopson, Dan, Jr. Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit. *Ibid.* Autumn, 1961.
- Jaffe, Louis L. Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions. *Harvard Law Review*. December, 1961.
- Kauper, Paul G. Church and State: Cooperative Separatism. *Michigan Law Review*. December, 1961.
- Kurland, Philip B. Of Church and State and the Supreme Court. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Autumn, 1961.
- Lewis, Thomas P. *Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority*—A Case Without Precedent. *Columbia Law Review*. December, 1961.
- Magrath, C. Peter. "Nine Deliberative Bodies." *Commentary*. November, 1961.
- Mandamus to Review Judgments of Acquittal in Federal Courts. *Yale Law Journal*. November, 1961.
- Property Rights of Aliens Under Iowa and Federal Law. *Iowa Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Rackow, Felix. The Federal Loyalty Program: Politics and Civil Liberty. *Western Reserve Law Review*. September, 1961.
- Ruja, Harry. The Communist Menace, the Supreme Court, and Academic Freedom. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1961.
- Schmidhauser, John R. Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis of 1837-1860. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1961.
- Schubert, Glendon. A Psychometric Model of the Supreme Court. *American Behavioral Scientist*. November, 1961.
- Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Summer, 1961.
- The Supreme Court, 1960 Term. *Harvard Law Review*. November, 1961.
- Zuckerman, George David. A Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Fordham Law Review*. October, 1961.
- Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement Appealability in the Federal Courts. *Harvard Law Review*. December, 1961.
- Banks, Louis. The Crisis in the Courts. *Fortune*. December, 1961.
- Bethea, J. W. The Action Program for Highway Safety. *Public Management*. December, 1961.
- Boyd, William L. Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory Requirements of Probate Notice to Consuls and Aliens. *Iowa Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Bullock, Henry Allen. Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences. *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*. November-December, 1961.
- Byrd, Elbert M., Jr. The Judicial Process in Maryland. Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland. 1961.
- Cook, James M. Texas Corporation Courts. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1961.
- The Exclusionary Rule Regarding Illegally Seized Evidence. [Symposium.] *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*. September-October, 1961.
- Fox, Sanford J. Statutory Criminal Law: The Neglected Part. *Ibid.* November-December, 1961.
- Goldfarb, Ronald L. The Varieties of the Contempt Power. *Syracuse Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Henn, Harry G. "Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact." *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Fall, 1961.
- Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. November, 1961.
- Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime—A Problem in the Law of Sanctions. *Yale Law Journal*. December, 1961.
- Isaacs, Norman E. The Crime of Present Day Crime Reporting. *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*. November-December, 1961.
- The Judicial Process Revisited. [Symposium.] *Yale Law Journal*. December, 1961.
- Mueller, Gerhard O. W. M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in the Law of Incapacity. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.
- . Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. November, 1961.
- Orfield, Lester B. Early Federal Criminal Procedure. *Wayne Law Review*. Summer, 1961.
- . Indictment and Information in Federal Criminal Procedure. *Syracuse Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Origins and Development of Modern Escheat. *Columbia Law Review*. November, 1961.
- Parsons, Malcolm B. Violence and Caste in Southern Justice. *South Atlantic Quarterly*. Autumn, 1961.
- Prettyman, E. Barrett. Three Modern Problems in Criminal Law. *Washington and Lee Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

The Right to Counsel: A Symposium. *Minnesota Law Review*. April, 1961.

Rosenberg, Maurice, and Robert H. Chanin. Auditors in Massachusetts as Antidotes for Delayed Civil Courts. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. November, 1961.

Seidelson, David E. The Federal Non-Capital Statute of Limitations and Public Law 769—Stare Decisis by Accretion. *George Washington Law Review*. October, 1961.

Shapiro, Martin. Morals and the Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders. *Minnesota Law Review*. May, 1961.

Tort Damages. [Symposium.] *Boston University Law Review*. Summer, 1961.

#### Public Administration and Administrative Law

Accounting, Auditing and Budgeting. [Symposium.] *Municipal Finance*. November, 1961.

Administrative Regulation. [Symposium.] *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Spring, 1961.

Administrative Rule-Making in the States. Council of State Governments. 1961.

Bosworth, Jerry C. How the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority Responds to Its Public. Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan. 1961.

The Case for Cooperative or Centralized Purchasing. *County Officer*. November, 1961.

Conflict of Interests: State Government Employees. *Virginia Law Review*. October, 1961.

Corson, John J. What the Personnel Man Should Know about Organization. *Public Personnel Review*. October, 1961.

Cox, David M. How Much Public Relations in Government? *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1961.

Davis, Kenneth Culp. Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. June, 1961.

Engel, H. M. Administrative Adjudication in New York State. *Public Personnel Review*. October, 1961.

Heimbucher, Clifford V. Fifty-three Jurisdictions [for Regulation of Accountants]. *Journal of Accountancy*. November, 1961.

Labor Relations in the Public Service. *Harvard Law Review*. December, 1961.

Leys, Wayne A. R. Ethics, Social Science, and "Conflict of Interest." *American Behavioral Scientist*. November, 1961.

Macy, John W., Jr. Public Service and Understanding. *Public Personnel Review*. October, 1961.

Mahoney, J. Daniel. The Conduct of a Renegotiation Case. *American Bar Association Journal*. September, 1961.

McKay, Robert B. An Administrative Code of Ethics: Principles and Implementation. *Ibid.*

Mueller, Marjorie S. Retirement Plans for

State and Local Employees. *Monthly Labor Review*. November, 1961.

Penniman, Clara. Reorganization and the Internal Revenue Service. *Public Administration Review*. Summer, 1961.

Planning State Pre-retirement Systems. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1961.

Procedural Safeguards for Licensees: Section 9(B) of the APA. *Harvard Law Review*. December, 1961.

Rollman, Robert O. Recent Developments Respecting the Sovereign Immunity of the Federal Government from State and Local Taxes. *Air Force Judge Advocate General's Bulletin*. November, 1961.

Scher, Seymour. Regulatory Agency Control through Appointment: The Case of the Eisenhower Administration and the NLRB. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1961.

Schlesinger, Edward, and William J. Williams, Jr. The Federal Tax Lien—A Practitioner's Guide to the Resolution and Avoidance of Priority Problems. *New York University Law Review*. November, 1961.

Shadoan, Arlene Theuer. Organization, Role, and Staffing of State Budget Offices. Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky. 1961.

Symposium on Implications of Electronic Data Processing for Tax Administration and Tax Policy. *National Tax Journal*. September, 1961.

Tompkins, Dorothy Campbell. Conflict of Interest in the Federal Government: A Bibliography. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1961.

Van Riper, Paul P. Public Personnel Literature: The Last Decade. *Public Personnel Review*. October, 1961.

Wengert, Egbert S. Approaches to the Study of Technical Assistance. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*. July, 1961.

Woll, Peter. Administrative Justice: Formal Prescription and Informal Adjudication. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1961.

#### Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Abramson, Martin. Want to Be Elected? *National Civic Review*. December, 1961.

Booth, David A. A Guide to Local Politics. Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University. 1961.

———, and Charles R. Adrian. Simplifying the Discovery of Elites. *American Behavioral Scientist*. October, 1961.

Branscomb, Anne W. Should Political Broadcasting Be Fair or Equal? A Reappraisal of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act. *George Washington Law Review*. October, 1961.

Dahl, Robert A. Who Participated in Local

[New Haven] Politics and Why? *Science*. October 27, 1961.

Danielson, Wayne A., and John B. Adams. Completeness of Press Coverage of the 1960 Campaign. *Journalism Quarterly*. Autumn, 1961.

Duberman, Martin B. Some Notes on the Beginnings of the Republican Party in Massachusetts. *New England Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Goedecke, Robert. Feelings, Facts, and Politics. *Ethics*. October, 1961.

Greene, Jack P. The Role of the Lower Houses of Assembly in Eighteenth-Century Politics. *Journal of Southern History*. November, 1961.

Haney, John B. Public Opinion on Tax-Supported Television. *Journal of Broadcasting*. Fall, 1961.

Harned, Louise. Authoritarian Attitudes and Party Activity. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1961.

Hennessy, Bernard C., and Erna R. Hennessy. The Prediction of Close Elections: Comments on Some 1960 Polls. *Ibid.*

Hutchison, Earl R. Kennedy and the Press: the First Six Months. *Journalism Quarterly*. Autumn, 1961.

Kaloupek, Walter E., and Henry J. Tomasek. Administration of Election Laws in North Dakota. Governmental Research Bureau, University of North Dakota. 1960. [1961.]

Key, V. O., Jr. Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Autumn, 1961.

Lawton, Edward P. Northern Liberals and Southern Bourbons. *Georgia Review*. Fall, 1961.

McCormack, Thelma. Social Theory and the Mass Media. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. November, 1961.

Minar, David W. Ideology and Political Behavior. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1961.

Montgomery, David. Radical Republicanism in Pennsylvania, 1866-1873. *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*. October, 1961.

Morley, Felix. Democracy and the Electoral College. *Modern Age*. Fall, 1961.

Patterson, Samuel C., and Robert S. Walker. The Political Attitudes of Oklahoma Newspaper Editors: The Prohibition Issue. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Rowe, Leonard. Preprimary Endorsements in California Politics. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1961.

Rubin, Bernard. Propaganda and Ideological Conflicts, 1917-1945: The Need for Psychological Peacefare—I. *Contemporary Review*. December, 1961.

Ward, Benjamin. Majority Rule and Allocation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. December, 1961.

Watson, Richard A., and John H. Romani. Metropolitan Government for Metropolitan Cleveland: An Analysis of the Voting Record. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1961.

Wells, Henry. Government Financing of Political Parties in Puerto Rico. Citizens' Research Foundation, Princeton, N. J. 1961.

White, John P. 1960 Supplement, Michigan Votes: Election Statistics, 1928-1956. Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan. 1961.

Wilkening, E. A., and Ralph K. Huitt. Political Participation among Farmers as Related to Socioeconomic Status and Perception of the Political Process. *Rural Sociology*. December, 1961.

#### Economic and Social Functions

##### *National Economy*

Blackburn, John O. A Flexible Income-Consumption-Savings Tax. *Southern Economic Journal*. October, 1961.

Clark, Colin. Growthmanship. Institute of Economic Affairs, 66A Eaton Sq., London SW1. 1961.

Culbertson, J. M. The Use of Monetary Policy. *Southern Economic Journal*. October, 1961.

Dorfman, Joseph. Chancellor Kent and the Developing American Economy. *Columbia Law Review*. November, 1961.

Federal Fiscal Issues. Tax Foundation. 1961.

Wallich, Henry C., and Bela Balassa. New Look at Money and Credit. *Harvard Business Review*. November-December, 1961.

##### *Natural Resources*

The Case for a Department of Natural Resources. *Natural Resources Journal*. November, 1961.

Controversy over Proposal to Establish a Wilderness Area System. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest*. December, 1961.

Cooter, Harriet Holt. To Stay out of Floods [through Land Use]. *National Civic Review*. November, 1961.

Engelbert, Ernest A. Political Parties and Natural Resources Policies: An Historical Evaluation, 1790-1950. *Natural Resources Journal*. November, 1961.

Forer, Lois G. Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation. *Harvard Law Review*. December, 1961.

Knetsch, Jack L., and William J. Hart. The Watershed as an Entity for Development Planning. *Journal of Farm Economics*. November, 1961.

Starr, Warren A. Multiple Land Use Management. *Natural Resources Journal*. November, 1961.

Water Resources Planning and Development. Two-Year Report of the Temporary State Commission on Water Resources Planning. Legislative Doc. No. 42, State of New York. 1961.

Water Rights and Uses. [Symposium.] *Buffalo Law Review*. Spring, 1961.

Wengert, Norman. Resource Development and the Public Interest: A Challenge for Research. *Natural Resources Journal*. November, 1961.

#### *Business and Labor*

Affeldt, Robert J. The Right of Association and Labor Law. *Villanova Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

The Agency Shop, Federal Law, and the Right-to-Work States. *Yale Law Journal*. December, 1961.

Barron, Jerome A. The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation. *George Washington Law Review*. October, 1961.

Booth, Philip. Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961—A Legislative History. *Labor Law Journal*. October, 1961.

Cohen, George M. Congress Clears the Labor No Man's Land: A Long-Awaited Solution Spawns a Host of New Problems. *Northwestern University Law Review*. July-August, 1961.

The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation. *Columbia Law Review*. December, 1961.

Daykin, Walter L. Runaway Shops: The Problem and Treatment. *Labor Law Journal*. November, 1961.

Dinces, Stephen L. Statutory and Contractual Restrictions on the Right to Strike during the Term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. *Yale Law Journal*. July, 1961.

Eberharter, Herman P., Jr., and Wayne L. Emery. The NLRB as Arbiter of Work-Assignment Disputes under 10(k). *Georgetown Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.

Fleming, R. W. The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith. *Virginia Law Review*. October, 1961.

Gottlieb, Gerald H. The Tentative Commandments of Antitrust. *Southern California Law Review*. Summer, 1961.

Graham, James J. Taft-Hartley's Enigmatic Section 8(b)(2). *Labor Law Journal*. November, 1961.

Hale, G. E., and Rosemary D. Hale. Competition or Control V: Production and Distribution of Electric Energy. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. November, 1961.

Handler, Milton. Recent Antitrust Developments. *Yale Law Journal*. November, 1961.

Hanslowe, Kurt L. Regulation by Visible

Public and Invisible Private Government. *Texas Law Review*. November, 1961.

Hot Cargo Clauses: The Scope of Section 8(e). *Yale Law Journal*. November, 1961.

Karmel, Roberta S. Labor Law, International Law and the Panlibhon Fleet. *New York University Law Review*. November, 1961.

Kennedy, R. E. The SBIC: A New Concept in Finance. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Koretz, Robert F. Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts—A Third Chapter. *Syracuse Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

Kovarsky, Irving. The Jurisdictional Dispute under Taft-Hartley. *Labor Law Journal*. October, 1961.

Lawford, H. J. Treaties and Rights of Transit on the St. Lawrence. *Canadian Bar Review*. December, 1961.

Lawlor, Reed C. The Public Interest: Government Patent Policy and Equity. *American Bar Association Journal*. October, 1961.

Levin, Harvey J. Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.

Maloney, Walter H., Jr. Racial and Religious Discrimination in Employment and the Role of the NLRB. *Maryland Law Review*. Summer, 1961.

Mayer, Erwin S. Union Security and the Taft-Hartley Act. *Duke Law Journal*. Autumn, 1961.

McGregor, Jack E. Broadcast Licensee's Past Conduct as a Determinant of the Public Interest. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*. October, 1961.

McGuinn, John A. Injunctive Powers of the Federal Courts in Cases Involving Disputes under the Railway Labor Act. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.

Milroy, Robert R., Donald F. Istvan, and Ray M. Powell. The Tax Depreciation Muddle. *Accounting Review*. October, 1961.

National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Carriers. *Yale Law Journal*. December, 1961.

Oppenheimer, Robert H. Insurance and the Antitrust Laws. *Insurance Law Journal*. December, 1961.

Redford, Emmette S. The Significance of Belief Patterns in Economic Regulation. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Riesenfeld, Stefan A. Efficacy and Costs of Workmen's Compensation. *California Law Review*. October, 1961.

Ronan, William J. State Help for Railroads. *State Government*. Autumn, 1961.

Rothman, Stuart. Judicial Interpretation of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members. *Minnesota Law Review*. May, 1961.

Rowe, Frederick M. Mergers and the Law: New Directions for the Sixties. *American Bar Association Journal*. November, 1961.

Spradin, T. Richard. The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Program—Review and Reform. I. *George Washington Law Review*. October, 1961.

Sturges, Wesley A. "Compulsory Arbitration"—What Is It? *Fordham Law Review*. October, 1961.

Summers, Clyde W. Judicial Regulation of Union Elections. *Yale Law Journal*. July, 1961.

Watkins, Myron W. Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases—Their Implications for Government and for Business. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Autumn, 1961.

Whiting, Richard A. Antitrust and the Corporate Executive. *Virginia Law Review*. October, 1961.

Worsnop, Richard L. Railroad Subsidies. *Editorial Research Reports*. November 17, 1961.

Zimmerman, Lawrence T. Secondary Picketing and the Reserved Gate: The *General Electric* Doctrine. *Virginia Law Review*. November, 1961.

#### Health, Education, and Welfare

Baumann, Ruth. Facing the '60s—The Public Library in Wisconsin. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1961.

Billington, Ray Allen. Government and the Arts: The W. P. A. Experience. *American Quarterly*. Winter, 1961.

Bressler, Marvin. Meeting Health Needs by Social Action. [Symposium.] *Annals*. September, 1961.

Burdette, Franklin L., Jerold N. Willmore, and John V. Witherspoon. Political Science: A Selected Bibliography of Books in Print, with Annotations [for Students and Libraries]. Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland. 1961.

Hunt, Thomas C. Behavioral Science for Whom? *American Behavioral Scientist*. November, 1961.

Trigger for Community Conflict: The Case of Fluoridation. *Journal of Social Issues*. Vol. XVII, No. 4. 1961.

#### Military Affairs and National Security

Blair, Richard E. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Retired Regulars: An Unwarranted Extension of Military Power. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.

Civil Defense: Continuity of Government. *County Officer*. October, 1961.

Gordon, Bernard K. The Military Budget: Congressional Phase. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1961.

Psychology and Policy in a Nuclear Age. [Symposium.] *Journal of Social Issues*. Vol. XVII, No. 3. 1961.

Singer, J. David. Deterrence and Shelters. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. October, 1961.

Van de Water, John R. Applications of Labor Law to Construction and Equipping of United States Missile Bases. *Labor Law Journal*. November, 1961.

#### Government Documents

##### Congress

House. Committee on Armed Services. Contract-Out Procedures. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Military Base Closures. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Overpricing of Government Contracts. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Sole Source Procurement. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. National Bank Legislation. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Education and Labor. Construction Site Picketing. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Labor-Management Irregularities. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Mine Safety (Metallic and Nonmetallic Mines). Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. School Lunch Program. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Special Education and Rehabilitation. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies (Telephone Monitoring). House Report No. 1215. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Civil Defense—1961. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Consumer Protection Activities of Federal Departments and Agencies. House Report No. 1241. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Executive Branch Practices in Withholding Information from Congressional Committees. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Health Research and Training. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Use and Disposition of Railroad Right-of-

Way Grants. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Crimes on Board Aircraft. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Intrastate Motor Carriers in Interstate Commerce. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. War Claims and Enemy Property Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Constitutional Amendments for Continuity of Representative Government during Emergency. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Increasing the Membership of the House of Representatives and Redistricting Congressional Districts. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Legislation Relating to Organized Crime. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Registration and Protection of Trademarks. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Extending Apportionment Requirement to Temporary Summer Employment. Hearing. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Public Works. Flood Control—1961. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Miscellaneous Highway Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Miscellaneous River and Harbor Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Public Buildings Bills—1961. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Watershed Development—1961. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Communications Satellites. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Establishment of a National Science Academy. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Patent Policies Relating to Aeronautical and Space Research. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Hearings Relating to H. R. 4700, to Amend Section 11 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, as Amended (The Fund for Social Analysis). 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Hearings Relating to Revision of H. R. 9120 and H. R. 5751, to Amend the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Ways and Means. Health Services for the Aged under the Social Security System. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Taxation of Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan Associations. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Small Business Problems in the Poultry Industry. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

House and Senate. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Operations under the Indemnity Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Radiation Safety and Regulation. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Joint Economic Committee. Progress Made by the Department of Defense in Reducing the Impact of Military Procurement on the Economy. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Review of Report of the Commission on Money and Credit. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Watershed Projects. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Miscellaneous Civil Defense Bills. Hearing. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Secondary Market for Industrial Mortgages in Redevelopment Areas. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Truth in Lending Bill. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Commerce. Fishery Research and Rehabilitation. Hearing. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Space Communications and Allocation of Radio Spectrum. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Finance. Distribution of Stock Pursuant to Orders Enforcing the Antitrust Laws. Hearing. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Foreign Relations. Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1961. Hearing. Also Senate Report No. 989. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Alleged Threats to Influence Testimony Concerning the Administration's Farm Legislation. Hear-

ing before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1116. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Federal Budgeting for Research and Development. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Gambling and Organized Crime. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Saline Water Conversion. Hearing. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

——— and Committee on Public Works. Water Resources Planning Act of 1961. Joint Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Design Protection. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Drug Industry Antitrust Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. The Electoral College: Operation and Effect of Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Memorandum. Committee Print. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Export of Ball Bearing Machines to Russia. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Government Patent Policy. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Registration and Protection of Trademarks. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. The Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United States. Senate Report No. 1098. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Space Satellite Communications. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Special Committee on Aging. Retirement Income of the Aging. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

#### *Other Federal*

Civil Service Commission. Occupations of Federal White-Collar Workers. 1961.

Commission on Civil Rights. 1961 Report, 5 vols.: 1. Voting. 2. Education. 3. Employment. 4. Housing. 5. Justice. 1961.

Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Governments Division. Detail of State Tax Collections in 1961. 1961.

———. Governmental Finances in 1960. 1961.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Office of Education. Placement Services for Personnel in Higher Education. By Lanora G. Lewis. 1961.

———. Trends in Financing Public Education, 1929-30 to 1959-60. 1961.

Federal Aviation Agency. President's Task Force on Air Traffic Control. Report: A Study of the Safe and Efficient Utilization of Airspace. 1961.

President's Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal Service. A Policy for Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service. 1961.

## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*The Red Phoenix: Russia Since World War II.* BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. xii, 427. \$6.00.)

One of America's best known journalist-analysts of the U.S.S.R. has written a book to express and justify his gloom. For a decade he has been reaching the conclusion that the test of history has shown Stalin and Khrushchev more imaginative, wiser planners and more skillful organizers for the cold war than leaders of the United States. He sees only danger in prolonged continuation of the disparity and fears defeat for the United States unless we appreciate his reasons for concern and translate that concern into effective action.

The methodology of this book is disquieting to the reader who is accustomed to a fully reasoned argument written as of a given moment and rely-

ing upon carefully and logically organized fact in support of the conclusions. This Dr. Schwartz does not do. He has taken his columns in the *New York Times* over the past decade and set them forth essentially as they were written, with brief connecting paragraphs in italics to make the necessary transitions. Only at the outset and the end has he written chapters especially for the volume.

For those who have experimented with teaching history and political science by presenting to students who know nothing of the reasons for indecision the issues as they appeared to the statesmen of the time, this book is admirable. It is too easy for students to see the crisis of today and wonder why the men in Washington or elsewhere failed to see the handwriting in time and take appropriate measures. Dr. Schwartz makes it pos-

sible to present the feeling of the day when issues emerged and before any one could tell where they might lead. No one now, for example, thinks much of Malenkov's brief interlude of power; but there were mornings when the readers of the *Times* had reason to wonder with whom the United States would have to contend in another five years. Malenkov is given, consequently, far more space than he would receive if an author were to consider the problems of today.

Dr. Schwartz's method also conveys the constant flux of the Soviet scene better than the analysis that is made at a given moment. He permits his reader to live through Soviet indecision with regard to Tito, the unclear menacing form of China as it loomed upon the horizon long before the open break of the XXII Communist Party Congress, the rise of Khrushchev from relative obscurity to a position of great power. He is able to quote a Soviet doctor he met in 1955 who warned that when the Soviet leaders had power, they would destroy the United States, and that Americans should not underestimate the speed with which that power was growing. From a vantage point in 1961, with the atomic fall-out from the 50 megaton bomb still circling the globe, such advice should have put America on notice, but for many of those who were making policy in 1955, the possibility of such a threat in 1961 seemed remote.

Sources of major change are discerned by Dr. Schwartz in the decision to develop a more rational economic system even if it meant reversing long held views, the shift in generations which in his view is likely to direct attention away from the goal of the international communist movement to purely Russian nationalist aims, the achievement of a substantially improved standard of living, and the impact of an ever stronger China. Soviet policy makers must, he believes, decide whether China should be helped to strength, and here appears the possible conflict between nationalist and internationalist communist goals, for reasons that the author sets forth.

For this reviewer, at least, Dr. Schwartz's warnings at the breakfast table have long been heard, and it has been hard to disagree with his conclusion that in spite of its economic system and its lack of democratic government the U.S.S.R. has been increasing its economic and political power. Even today there is surprise in the United States that so many Soviet citizens have been willing to declare before Stalin's now-empty mausoleum that they revered him, as many assuredly did, whether won over by his propaganda apparatus or by the personal benefit they had gained themselves by appealing to his secretariat for a favor. Assuredly, there has been

much underestimation of Soviet strength. Still, it is hard to accept Dr. Schwartz's gloomy view of the future, for it becomes apparent that Soviet leadership can overplay its hand as it has done with excessive atomic testing, or in splitting violently with its Chinese comrades in arms. This book will perform a service if it persuades doubters to take the Russians seriously and prepare for competition of the most bitter kind on every front, but it should not be taken as a blue print of what will happen. There are imponderables on the Soviet side that can change the picture, and at present the chief of these is China.

JOHN N. HAZARD, *Columbia University.*

*Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Study of Soviet Dynasties.* By R. CONQUEST. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961. Pp. x, 485. \$7.95.)

The primary concern of this volume is dual in nature. It is concerned simultaneously with general theory and with specific application, and is therefore of interest both to the theorist and to the Soviet specialist. On the one hand, Mr. Conquest believes that "this study forms, or should form a separate discipline—'dynasties'" and he hopes "to establish a general method for the interpretation of Soviet events." On the other hand he states that "the main theme of this book is Soviet politics in the decade just past" and clearly aims at presenting a detailed study and interpretation of the struggle for power at the top of the Soviet hierarchy.

Few areas of contemporary politics offer as much temptation to push speculation beyond the available evidence. It is, then, hardly surprising that for the serious student the "Kremlinologist" has, in the author's words "always been a somewhat disreputable figure." Robert Conquest sets out to rescue both Kremlinology and future Kremlinologists from such disrepute. Since he has unquestionably produced a serious, realistic, well-documented, and, by academic standards, eminently respectable study of the Soviet power struggle, it would be hard to deny that he has succeeded in his immediate objective. Whether, however, he can or ought to succeed in his effort to raise Kremlinology or Soviet dynasties to the status of a separate academic discipline is another matter entirely.

The book could hardly have been published at a more appropriate time in view of its stated objectives. The fact that the changes which accompany such events as the XXII Congress tend to push the Soviet specialist into the role of Kremlinologist, even if only temporarily or partially, could indeed lead to a greater appreciation of the utility, and perhaps even the unavoidability of Kremlinology in some form. The appearance of a



model of careful Kremlinology like Mr. Conquest's is doubly important at a time like the present because it provides both an example for rasher Kremlinologists to emulate and a set of hypotheses which can now be subjected to further testing. Mr. Conquest's proposal for a specialized journal in the field which would both register relevant facts and compare speculative theory may also be aided by recent events which indicate its utility.

The organization of the book reflects its dual purpose. Part One presents the basic theoretical framework including a detailed treatment of questions of evidence and an attempt to identify the basic forces and pressures in Soviet politics. The remainder of the book involves both the expansion and the testing of the theory in terms of its detailed application to conflicts in the U.S.S.R. since 1949. These include the Leningrad Case, the agricultural disputes, the XIX Congress, the death of Stalin, the fall of Beria, Malenkov's premiership, the XX Congress, the Anti-Party Group, Khrushchev's Ascendancy, and the XX Congress.

It is clearly impossible in a review of this length to deal with even the main lines of a sophisticated interpretation of such a complex series of events. Indeed, if, as the author contends, the main temptation in the field is that of simplifying too much, it is clear not only that he has not succumbed to temptation, but that it would be manifestly unfair for a reviewer to attempt to reduce his elaborate series of hypotheses to some artificial schematic outline.

A few general comments may indicate some of the points most open to criticism. First, Mr. Conquest's self-imposed restriction of relying in principle exclusively upon official evidence does not seem essential for respectable work in the field. Different criteria may have to be developed for evaluating official, quasi-official, and unofficial evidence, but there seems to be insufficient reason to exclude all but purely official evidence. Indeed, Mr. Conquest himself finds it necessary to justify his own acceptance of Khrushchev's Secret Speech as "official." Moreover, the virtually complete exclusion of Communist China from consideration is not, I think, a procedure which future workers in this field will be willing to accept. Again, in view of the book's implicit reliance upon essentially constant patterns of Soviet behavior, the meaning and implications of the author's cryptic remarks near the end of the book about future enormous changes in and possible democratization of the regime certainly need elaboration and clarification.

Nevertheless, the book's merits are substantial. To the theorist it offers a highly sophisticated example of empirical theory—careful, cautious,

constantly striving to be aware of its own assumptions and to stress the tentative and hypothetical nature of the inquiry. To the Soviet specialist it offers a wealth of information (some of it in the appendices) combined with informed speculation on its meaning. To all it offers a fascinating attempt to penetrate the mysteries of the Soviet struggle for power.—L. GERALD BURSEY, *North-eastern University*.

*Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960.* By EDWARD TABORSKY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 628. \$12.50.)

This book will remain for some time to come the standard work on the postwar Czechoslovak communist regime. It is scholarly, thorough and detailed, with a wealth of information from primary sources.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party, the governmental structure, the economic performance of the regime and "the making of the new communist man" are discussed in the four parts of the book. Despite the breadth of these topics, the author is not overwhelmed by the sheer weight of data amassed. Although Professor Taborsky makes no use of explicit analytical frameworks, his discussion is intuitively structured to present a meaningful panorama of the regime.

His comprehensive discussion of the Party includes its organizational structure, functions and policies, its membership, cohesiveness, partisan roles and motivations. The development of the Party is analyzed, the Great Purge discussed and the pernicious Party *isms*, ranging from "revisionism" to local "Masarykism," considered. Particularly insightful portraits are drawn of the ruling oligarchs and their relationship to the rank-and-file. Much in this section of the book, as elsewhere, must have a familiar ring for students of the Soviet system, even for those totally unacquainted with the Czechoslovak scene. For the Soviet image casts its long shadow over every aspect of Czechoslovakia's communist regime.

Perhaps the best portion of the book is the discussion of the "communist transmission belts of formal government." Taborsky presents the reader with a thorough picture of the two constitutions, the ever-changing, shapeless machinery of communist government and its operational code. At the same time the empty shell of communist institutional and constitutional devices is exposed: the legislature does not legislate, the executive branch does not make decisions, the voter does not choose the office-holders. One could muse ironically that the state indeed is withering away (as Engels predicted) but is leaving the power monopoly of the Party in its stead.

The third part of the book attempts to evaluate the regime's performance in the economic and

social welfare spheres. Czechoslovakia is considered to be Moscow's "showcase of communism." Unravelling the maze of communist statistics, the author is aware of the pitfalls involved in comparing a regimented, totalitarian society with a free Western nation. Nevertheless he makes some assessments: in the industrial sector the regime is not a failure although the claim of "outproducing capitalism" is a myth. In agriculture, a dismal failure has been reaped. This particular section gives a disturbing picture of the human and social cost of a communist experiment: the workers facing the production norms, the *kulaks* caught in the "class struggle" of the villages, the peasants being regimented into collective farms.

The last portion of the study concentrates on the ways and means of indoctrination. Among the topics discussed, the "sky-high Iron Curtain . . . to serve . . . the purposes . . . of collectivizing the mind of a whole nation" is particularly interesting. However, in comparison to other portions of the book, one might complain that the fascinating topic, "the making of the new communist man," is not given sufficiently intensive treatment. In general, if this book warrants criticism, it is because Taborsky focuses his analysis on the pattern of government rather than on the pattern of politics. The "transmission belts of formal government" are excellently scrutinized but the informal controls and the associational patterns of Czechoslovak society are neglected. The fate of a pluralistic society as remodelled by the Party receives skimpy treatment. Thus also the picture of revolution and social change in Czechoslovakia comes through only in faint colors.

Among Taborsky's findings and conclusions, perhaps the single most striking is the constant emulation of the Soviet model in all spheres of Czechoslovak life. By the end of the twelfth year, Czechoslovakia shows itself as a miniature replica of the Soviet Union. If it rains in Moscow one may count upon the communists in Prague to open their umbrellas. Faithfulness and discipline, of course, are traits of the communist international movement. Furthermore, for the Czechoslovak Communist Party the Kremlin in the last analysis is the supreme guarantee of their rule and totalitarian system. Sycophantism thus becomes the Czechoslovak *raison d'état*.

In the concluding chapter Taborsky submits that Marx-Leninism has in fact failed in Czechoslovakia. The dynamism of the Party has eroded, the Party as a social movement has become less attractive and there are fewer true communists in the country today than in the past. Party members are opportunist rather than dedicated, fearful rather than activist. The people are resigned or patient but certainly unimpressed, accepting the tyranny of necessity but without conviction. It

seems that this very weakness of the regime is also the source of its stability. Czechoslovak stability is the *immobilisme* of a Party devoid of creative energy, incapable of the revisionism that elsewhere in the satellites brought turmoil, hopeful change and relaxation of the Kremlin's controls. Taborsky feels that for Czechoslovakia such a renaissance is unlikely. Only if fundamental changes occur in the Russian regime may Czechoslovakia show that its communist veneer is but skin deep.—Ivo K. FEIERABEND, *San Diego State College*.

*Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom.* BY ALAN T. PEACOCK AND JACK WISEMAN ASSISTED BY JINDRICH VEVERKA. A Study by the National Bureau of Economic Research. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xxxi, 213. \$5.00.)

This is an extremely useful book. From it any attentive reader may learn the significant facts about the growth of public expenditures in the United Kingdom from 1890 through 1955. This growth is carefully expressed in money expenditures at current prices, in real cost by conversion to 1900 prices, in percentages of the gross national product, and in several series of index numbers. To give a perspective which runs back of 1890, the authors have prepared figures for selected years as far back as 1792. All series are expressed in per capita figures, as well as in total amounts. Finally, charts and diagrams give a general picture of magnitudes involved, and detailed figures are set forth in tables in the text and an appendix.

Totals are broken down into categories. Tables and charts compare local government expenditures to national, and tables and charts show expenditures on welfare programs, national defense, and nationalized industries. Rates of growth for these categories may therefore be seen as part of the total growth, and all may be compared with the growth of population and national income.

The authors' initial purpose was "the filling of a gap in the existing economic statistics of public expenditures in the United Kingdom during the last sixty years" (Preface, p. xix). The work of assembling and analyzing data, a formidable task, led them to formulate a theory which would explain the increase of expenditures. Total expenditure by 1955 had increased forty-seven times over 1890, reckoned in current prices, and had increased sevenfold in terms of 1900 prices. Expressed as a percentage of gross national product, it had risen from 7 to 37 percent during these years.

Their explanation of this increase depends largely on "the displacement effect" of two world wars. After each war total public expenditure fell

from its wartime peak, but did not return to its prewar level. The authors are equally interested in "the concentration process" which put more and more of the total expenditure into the hands of the central government. Having examined the forces which led to the growth of spending, they devote their final chapter to a forecast of probable future trends.

They predict that expenditures on education, the national health scheme, national insurance, and a few other similar services are likely to expand. At the same time, family allowances, national assistance, war pensions, and agricultural and food subsidies will probably contract. Defense, national debt service, housing, and a few other services are likely to remain stationary. The total amount of government expenditure will increase, according to their estimates, by approximately 6 percent in the twenty-five years from 1956 to 1981. The share of the gross national product taken by government, then, is likely to decrease from 37 percent in 1955 to perhaps 21 percent in 1981.

A brief summary cannot do justice to the care and thoroughness which has been expended upon assembling and collating data, and to the caution with which hypotheses have been formulated. Indeed, the authors' caution at one place seems to set a record for academic reserve: "Without straining our thesis too far, however, it is possible to argue that World War II cannot be dismissed as an irrelevance." The tables and charts which they present have a high value for the student of public finance, and the interested citizen—and this includes the interested citizen of other nations than the United Kingdom. What the authors have assessed is the cost of maintaining the services of the modern state.

The interested citizen is entitled to one small complaint. He would be grateful if some of the terms used were explained more fully: such things, for example, as the constituent elements of the gross national product, and something of the structure of the index numbers. This could have been added to the explanation of terms in the Appendix, and would have made the meaning of the analysis more accessible to the average reader.

The great value of this book is the careful examination and analysis of the record since 1890, which makes possible a cautious but informed forecast of future prospects. The authors' forecasts, and any other forecast, are and must be based on the firm foundation of the facts which they have made available by a great deal of painstaking labor. Not only economists, but political scientists and public-spirited citizens can make a great deal of use of the figures, and of the discussion of the meaning of the figures.—*PHILIP W. BUCK, Stanford University.*

*London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants.*

By RUTH GLASS, ASSISTED BY HAROLD POLINS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xiii, 278. \$4.00.)

In 1958 there was established at University College, London, a Centre for Urban Studies. In addition to the study projects which it initiates or assists, this Centre has the purpose of bringing together the contributions of social scientists and of workers in other fields such as town planning and public health.

*London's Newcomers* constitutes Report Number 1 of the Centre. Its author, Mrs. Ruth Glass, is the Centre's Director of Research. She gives us a detailed and stimulating study of one segment of the life of a great metropolis.

As the sub-title indicates, the author and her assistant are concerned with one group of migrants only, those coming from the British West Indies. Their problems cannot be kept entirely separate from those of colored migrants to Great Britain from other British dominions. However, West Indians now constitute a majority of Britain's colored residents, they are mostly recent arrivals (since 1953), and for most of them English is the main language. Such considerations motivated and justify this separate treatment.

Further, it was against West Indians that the most publicized racial rioting took place. These were the outbreaks of 1958, first in Nottingham and then in the Notting Dale district of north-western London. They were not the first, or the last, anti-colored riots in England nor, as demonstrated by more recent despatches from Middlesbrough, have the West Indians been the only victims.

The first few chapters of the book are devoted to a careful analysis of the characteristics of the migrants and their distribution in London. In these studies use is made of available figures from the census, records of arrivals in Great Britain, and the reports of the Migrant Service Division of the West Indies Commission. These the author finds in some respects inadequate and incomplete. They are supplemented by extensive personal investigations and by other sources. The usefulness of this study is enhanced by three maps showing the distribution of West Indians in London.

The first section of the book demolishes some of the notions that have been popularized by newspaper headlines and radio commentators. Thus the number of West Indians (or of other colored persons for that matter) in London is small. Most are found in two rather large sections of London, one in northwest London stretching west from Paddington station; the other in the Brixton area of south central London. The concentration is not dense and with the possible exception of a very few blocks in south London nothing resembling

even a tiny "Harlem" can be said to exist. Further, only a small minority of the migrants are rated as unskilled labor, although many find themselves downgraded in obtaining work in London.

The two middle sections of the book deal with problems of adjustment and with attitudes. The three main problems considered are those connected with housing, schools, and employment. The nature of these two sections makes a certain amount of repetition inevitable.

Mrs. Glass makes frequent general comparisons with the racial problem in the United States. It is perhaps this which leads to the inclusion of schools among problems of adjustment. In this field the absence of any real discrimination is the salient feature. In connection with the other two problems, the studies of discrimination in employment and especially in housing are carefully developed. The author is obviously keenly aware of the difficulty in determining to what extent discrimination is due to color or to competition for jobs and resentment at the arrival of additional residents in already badly overcrowded sections of the city. The nature of the treatment does tend to magnify the importance of color as a factor.

The last section of the book deals with reactions to the Notting Dale riots of 1958 and to the murder of a West Indian in the same general area in the spring of 1959. These include the reactions in Parliament and in the courts, in the press and among people generally. Attention is given to organizations on both sides—the anti-color groups and the groups actively working for tolerance and mutual respect.

In her preface the author states her definite opposition to racial discrimination and her belief in tolerance in an active, not merely a passive, sense. This has not prevented what is, with rare if any exceptions, an objective marshalling of the facts. Thus, while apparently convinced that the 1959 murder of the West Indian was due to color, she duly lists the facts according to which this must be labelled "not proven." Whether the facts justify all her conclusions is another matter. Racial discrimination has never been accepted by English law nor is it a respectable doctrine for political or trade union leaders. Most persons would accept the conclusion that labor and political leaders should more actively move against color discrimination. To what extent existing law against discrimination by private persons should be strengthened is something else again.

The limited scope of Mrs. Glass's book does not permit the exhaustive study and discussion of certain larger issues suggested by her immediate problem. She does, however, touch briefly upon the big problem of empire migration and the na-

ture of the Commonwealth itself. Citizens of all parts of the Commonwealth are British citizens and as such entitled freely to enter and settle in Great Britain. Discussions so far in Parliament and statements of political leaders as summarized by Mrs. Glass indicated, then, no intention to change this. Whether, considering the vastly changed nature and size of the new British Commonwealth, her belief in this principle is sound is an important subject for future broad investigations and discussion. But this of course could not be included within the limited scope of the work under review.—JAMES Q. DEALEY, *University of Toledo*.

*A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America.* By F. BENHAM AND H. A. HOLLEY. (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1960. Pp. x, 169. \$2.90.)

This work by two British economists is one of a growing series of monographic studies devoted to Latin America under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Each of the others (except for R. A. Humphreys' bibliographical guide to Latin American history) has been an examination of the institutions of an individual state. This latest work, however, attempts a survey of the region as a whole. In common with the earlier monographs the authors of this one have produced a concise and contemporaneous study. In the preface it is stressed that their purpose was to present "a first introduction" to the economy of Latin America for the relatively uninformed reader rather than to deal exhaustively or profoundly with the subject.

The book is divided into two parts. The first, by Frederic Benham, is a descriptive catalogue of the entire region of Latin America under such headings as agriculture, forestry and fisheries, oil and other minerals, transport and power, manufacturing, international trade, and economic prospects. The second part, by H. A. Holley, provides a description and analysis of the economies of seven of the Latin American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela). Altogether the authors have managed to compress much useful information between the covers of this small book, though its readability has suffered in the process.

As an "introduction" to the subject no attempt has been made in this work to break new ground in economic research or analysis. The source material consists almost wholly, especially in Part I, of public documents of the United Nations, its Economic Commission for Latin America, and the specialized agencies. The rather considerable domestic economic literature that this tormented and much-probed area of the world has produced

appears not to have been consulted except peripherally. The heavy reliance upon the documents of international agencies, records that are notorious for their avoidance of embarrassing political conclusions, has had the effect of leaving some matters relatively untouched, such as the adverse result of heavy military appropriations upon underdeveloped economies, the relationship of the general social structure to the economic ills of the area, or the question of whether broadened participation in the fruits of an economy may help to promote democratic institutions. In general it appeared to a political scientist that much of the potential value of this book was lost by failing to explain why certain political facts of Latin America have caused many of the existing un-economic conditions and continue to act as partial barriers to an economically-rational solution by politically-neutral foreign consultants.

One specific misstatement by Holley in his examination of the Argentine economy needs correction. It was Peron's insistence upon *ratification* of the Standard Oil of California contract in 1955 that was a factor in his downfall rather than the subsequent symptomatic disapproval of the concession by the *peronista* Congress. In the study on Brazil it would have been well to have included some mention of the severely depressed north-eastern region as well as the arguments concerning the financial feasibility of the erection of Brasilia at this time. At the same time the most able chapter of the book, in the mind of this reader, was the very incisive explanation by Holley of the fiscal problems peculiar to Chile. The book ends with a statistical appendix on the international trade of the Latin American nations.

In conclusion it should be repeated that this is a very worthwhile work within the limited scope that the authors set for themselves. It is regrettable, however, that they did not attempt a larger frame of reference as a basis for their efforts. Finally, the recent initiation of the inter-American "Alliance for Progress" reveals that the field of comparative economics also suffers from the same hazard of "dating" that exists in our area of comparative politics.—FRANK M. LEWIS, *State University of South Dakota*.

*Sun Yat-sen and Communism*. BY SHAO CHUAN LENG AND NORMAN D. PALMER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960. Pp. viii, 234. \$6.00.)

Sun Yat-sen's alliance with Soviet Russia in 1923 has often been regarded as a major historical event leading to the conquest of the Chinese mainland by the Communists. Professors Shao and Palmer's illuminating book brings to the fore again this controversial event and its political consequences, naming Sun as the first leader of a

nation to fall for the fallacy of the "United Front."

The book contains a concise but comprehensive analysis of Sun's early contact with the West. It builds an impressive defense for his fateful move to befriend the Soviets. However, the discussion still leaves largely unanswered two questions which have often been raised. Was Sun's position before the alliance so desperate that he had to seek Russian help? Could he have been too naive about Communism, viewing Russia more as a champion of equality for oppressed nations than as an apostle of Marx whose advocacy of class struggle he explicitly rejected?

Chapter 4 of the book gives a succinct description of the nature and scope of the Kuomintang-Soviet alliance, the inherent differences between the two, and the extent to which the founder of the Chinese Republic changed his doctrines under the Soviet influence. In evaluating this alliance, the authors agree that Sun did China a great disservice by "giving aid and comfort" to the Communists. In the opinion of the reviewer, the damage the alliance did to China was not so much in helping Communism to become entrenched in that country as it was in making Sun's own party, the Kuomintang, intrinsically incapable of fulfilling his ideals. By revitalizing the Kuomintang with Soviet methods, tactics, and organization, he also made it more authoritarian, thus crippling from the outset its ability to be an effective agent for democracy. The reviewer therefore cannot subscribe to the authors' rather casual remark that the failure of the Nationalists to carry on the revolution "is not due to any deficiencies in Sun's efforts or teachings."

The book has a very interesting account of Chinese Communists' interpretations of Sun's doctrines and policies. In a chapter which compares Sun Yat-senism and Chinese Communism, the authors rightly point out that the latter is a genuine development of Marxism-Leninism (and Stalinism, the reviewer would add), an ideology quite different from the democratic principles of the West, which contributed much to Sun Yat-senism. The reviewer feels however that an adequate understanding of Sun's ideas requires also a study of the interpretations and practice of the Chinese Nationalists, who have always considered themselves as his true followers. Such a study would add depth to the comparison of Sun Yat-senism and Chinese Communism.

Between the two isms, it is not difficult to detect where the sympathy of the authors lie. They are appalled by Red China's new system of communes. Without going into a detailed analysis of this system, they conclude *a priori* that Dr. Sun envisioned a very different future for his country and that "Communism, and not Sun Yat-senism,

may yet prove to be a passing phase, rather than the climax, of the Chinese revolution."—JEFFREY Y. MAO, *Central College*.

*Political Change in Morocco*. By DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xi, 432. \$8.50.)

This is the first detailed study of the internal politics of the newly born state of Morocco written by an American scholar. Dr. Ashford, who is intimately acquainted with the people and the leaders of the country, writes not only from published source material, but also from his own personal experiences. His study may well be regarded as a model for comparable works on other North African countries.

The author's aim, as set forth in the introductory chapter, is to describe and analyze the structure of national politics, the modes of political expression and participation of the people, and the forces acting on the working of political institutions. As an introduction for his study, the author begins by tracing the origins of nationalism and the establishment of the present regime. It seems to the present reviewer that here is where Ashford's treatment of the movement is not quite clear. He is right in stating that Moroccan nationalists (and this is true of all North African nationalists, including Egypt) sought the support of religious movements, Pan-Islamism in particular. Ashford, however, vaguely indicated that this was because nationalism in North Africa emerged as a reaction to Christian powers, not against the domination of a Muslim power (the Ottoman Empire) as in the case of the Eastern Arab World, and therefore sought the support of religious groupings not favorable to Christian domination.

The author's detailed study of the structure and operation of the party system, the Istiqlal (independence) Party in particular, constitutes a real contribution to our knowledge of North African politics. However, Ashford seems to rely in his treatment of this subject largely on French rather than on native Arabic sources. He also followed the French transliteration system rather than that accepted by Arabists. These remarks are of small significance regarding a thorough study which may confidently be recommended as a reliable guide.—MAJID KHADDURI, *Johns Hopkins University*.

*Congo Disaster*. By COLIN LEGUM. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961. Pp. 174. 85¢.)

Knowing Colin Legum's professional background—he is a journalist who has spent most of his adult life in and writing about Africa—makes the strengths and weaknesses of his book more understandable. Though it is filled with sharp ob-

servations and keen insights, it lacks the organization and analysis which one expects from a trained political scientist.

The thesis of the book is, "The roots of the Congo's tragedy go deep; they belong perhaps, more to the past than to the present." Though Legum does not conceptualize these roots in terms of stylistic and communicative influences upon Congo nationalism, I believe that his material is best viewed in this way.

The *style* of Congo nationalism has its roots in the brutality of the rule of King Leopold II, 1884–1908, and in the benevolent paternalism of the following Belgian colonial period. Discussing such acts as cutting off laborers' hands or feet for not fulfilling work quotas, Legum writes, "Here was his worst crime; Leopold had replaced the natives' fear of the slaver with a fear of the white man." Legum does not make the explicit connection, but one can see echoes of this fear when later in the book he reports that during the 1959 Leopoldville riots "for the first time hatred of whites came into the open" and during the chaotic days following independence "raping of women was often accompanied by acts intended to *humiliate* them. Ill-treatment of men was usually calculated to *degrade* them." (Emphasis supplied.)

A policy of physical welfare for the Congolese was the manifestation of Belgian benevolent paternalism. Food, clothing, housing, and medical care were provided for most workers; elementary and religious education, technical training, and agricultural reforms were widespread. On the other hand, there were few intellectual or emotional satisfactions derived from the Belgian world. Speech, press, and association were restricted. Few students were allowed to attend secondary school and until 1952 none were allowed to attend a university. It was virtually impossible for a Congolese to attain a position of importance within the ruling power triumvirate of the Belgian Colonial Administration, Big Business, and the Catholic Church. In the social sphere the "superior" whites and the "inferior" blacks were kept apart. The assumption upon which this benevolent paternalism rested was that it would create a politically content, vocationally efficient, and spiritually saved population. This was, of course, a misunderstanding of the nature of man.

Legum suggests that the result of this policy was a population inexperienced and therefore unprepared for power. To this I would add that they had not experienced that transformation of the self which comes from being exposed to modern intellectual culture; also, their bases of judgment were too little dependent upon internal mechanisms and too much upon external authority.

I believe that one can, from Legum's material, perceive a *communicative* influence upon Congo

nationalism. First there was isolation which was a corollary of benevolent paternalism; second there were contacts, for which there were increasing opportunities during and after the Second World War. The emergent Congo elites were isolated from each other because of the distances between the country's urban centers and because of colonial restrictions. They were isolated from the Belgians because of class differences and paternalistic and racial attitudes. And they were isolated from the outside world, physically because of administrative and financial restrictions, intellectually because of educational deficiencies.

One can also view the developments in Congo nationalism in terms of increasing contacts. The broadened perspectives gained from service in the war (in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa) were in large part responsible for the proliferation of associations from 1946 through 1950. During the 1950-1955 period "the circles of the elite began to voice demands for social, economic, and political reforms." I would maintain that this behavior was essentially pre-national and pre-political, the result of associational contacts. The push "towards open political activities" took place from 1955 through 1958. This politicization may be traced to a change in the Belgian Government which led to the projection of metropolitan politics upon the colony, and to Professor van Bilsen's widely disseminated "radical" publication, *Vers l'Indépendance du Congo et du Ruanda-Urundi*. Three events took place during 1958 which sped the pace of the Congo's rush to independence: DeGaulle gave a speech in Brazzaville offering the French Congo autonomy or independence; Congolese leaders were invited to the Brussels Exhibition, providing many with a first opportunity to meet their confreres; and the First Pan-African Conference was held in Accra, three Congo leaders attending.

At the January-February 1960 Round Table Conference in Brussels aimed to discuss the future of the Congo, the Belgian Government surprised almost everyone—including the Congo representatives—by granting independence as of June 30. Legum suggests two reasons for this abandonment, certainly a significant part of the Congo's history. First, the Belgians "completely misjudged the speed of events, and the extent to which it was necessary to make concessions." Second, the former "blue chip" colony had become a financial burden to the Belgians because of the 1956 drop in world commodity prices.

The final chapters of *Congo Disaster* are devoted to internal and international politics during the first months of independence. Legum believes that the "crux" of the country's internal politics is the division between the centralists and the federalists. Lumumba, former leader of the central-

ist faction, is described as inexperienced, opportunistic out of political desperation, and "inflexible only on one important issue: the need for a strong central government." An interesting speculation is offered about Kasavubu, who since publication has switched from federalist to centralist: his "passionate Bakongo patriotism might perhaps be his way of compensating for not being pure Bakongo himself. His grandfather was a Chinese labourer." About the United Nations, Legum writes, "If there is neither chaos nor anarchy today, it is solely due to the UN operations." He is most critical of the U.N.'s failure to restore unity in the country and its impartiality towards legal and rebel governments. Presumably Legum hailed the motives behind the U.N.'s recent military effort in the Katanga but suffered during its unfolding.—WILLIAM HANNA, *Michigan State University*.

*The Political Kingdom in Uganda*. By DAVID E. APTER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. 498. \$10.00.)

This work is a highly sophisticated presentation representing a successful blending of accurate historical description, political insight and contemporary sociological theory. Professor Apter approaches his subject from the broad perspective of his previous work on the Gold Coast; as a student of comparative political institutions in Africa he has few peers. Within an over-all historical context he lays bare the intertwining forces that have shaped Buganda's emergence into a restless mid-twentieth century Africa. The mass of data in this study makes it valuable as a reference work. The footnotes provide an extremely valuable source of bibliographic materials and are readable and perceptive adjuncts to the main text. Among the increasing number of American political scientists seriously studying Africa David Apter emerges as one of the few original thinkers.—EUGENE P. DVORIN, *Los Angeles State College*.

*Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History*. By GEORGE E. KIRK. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 231. \$1.95.)

George Kirk's new book shares many attributes of his previous writings: it is written in swift-flowing prose, it is never dull, and it attests to the author's mastery of the subject. Both internal and international aspects of the current revolution in the Arab East are treated. Professor Kirk, an established authority on the area and a man known for his outspokenness, presents in this volume his views, his preferences, and his dislikes even more forcefully than usual. The book begins with the discussion of the Arab "Myth of the Fourteenth Century," which, as the author re-



gretfully notes, has repudiated its early liberalism and has instead espoused narrow nationalist radicalism and a megalomania apt to distort facts and values. In the author's eyes this new brand of nationalism, best exemplified by Nasser of Egypt, is destructive and negative. But, according to him, "it was the impatient Zionists, limited in their vision, who played a large part in wrecking the chances for keeping post-war Middle Eastern nationalism at a relatively moderate level." Thus the Palestine war of 1948 constituted a "great divide" of contemporary Middle Eastern history. The "Seven Pillars" of the British-conceived conservatism and stability in the Middle East were irrevocably sapped and the world was exposed to a chain reaction of events, each more catastrophic than its predecessor.

The United States, according to Kirk, bears no small part of the blame for these misfortunes because of its "irresponsibility and sheer ignorance," its courting of Zionism, and above everything, its refusal to stand loyally by Britain on such issues as the Buraimi dispute and the Suez crisis. The author devotes the whole of a chapter to the latter, terming it appropriately, "The Great Divorce." Supporting his argument with copious quotations from Anthony Eden's memoirs, he does not conceal his dismay at the way Secretary Dulles did his utmost first to mislead and then to cajole the British into a virtual surrender to Nasser.

Mr. Kirk is emphatic in his indictment of Nasserism. With a penchant for pithy (and sometimes prophetic) statements, he describes the Cairo-Damascus union as "the smothering of Syria" and follows it by an eloquent account of Egyptian-sponsored subversion in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Although he avoids the all-too-frequent oversimplification of equating Nasserism with Communism, he points out how in many instances the policies of the Cairo-influenced Pan-Arabists ran parallel to those of the Communists, both trying to upset the conservative and pro-Western regimes in the area.

Although the principal "devils" in the Middle Eastern political game are, according to the author, the Zionists, the Nasserists, and the confused-plus-perfidious Americans, he has hardly any kind words to say about the British liberals and Labourites (except, perhaps, Ernest Bevin) whose "progressive irresponsibility" and "half-informed emotionalism" have also contributed to the weakening, if not a collapse, of British supremacy in the Arab East.

To conclude: this is a highly informative, well written, and well documented book by an author who has a discerning eye for what is politically relevant and interesting. But it is at the same time a strong and bitter indictment of men and

policies responsible for what the author believes to be the present sad plight of the Middle East and its unpromising future.—GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, *University of California* (Berkeley).

*History of the Islamic Peoples.* By CARL BROCKELMANN. Translated by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960. Pp. v, 582. \$1.95.)

Professor Brockelmann's Syriac dictionary and his work in Semitic comparative grammar and comparative Arabic literature made him one of Germany's foremost Semitic (particularly Arabic) scholars. Many were surprised at his writing of a history of the Islamic peoples, not only because of his background, but also because of its late occurrence.

The author has attempted what is essentially a political history of the Islamic peoples from their beginning until 1939. This is not an easy task, for the history of Islam suffers from a lack of original and critical data. More important, this history unfolded so rapidly and over such a wide and heterogeneous area as to appear to be not one but many parallel histories connected by the one tenuous link of a common religion. For the most part Professor Brockelmann has overcome these difficulties and in so doing has given the contemporary reader an excellent one-volume account of the political history of the major Islamic peoples.

The book is divided into five sections. The first opens with a brief chapter dealing with the Arabian Peninsula prior to the rise of Islam, followed by a chapter on the life of Muhammad. Chapter 3 attempts a summary of the tenets of Islam. Part I continues with the founding and expansion of the Islamic Empire, the rise and fall of the Umayyad Caliphate, the origin of the Shi'ha, and the founding of the Abbasid Caliphate. Part II describes the Abbasid Caliphate, its decay, and the rise of the numerous and ephemeral dynasties throughout the empire. Following this is a chapter dealing with the origins of the Turks and Persians. Chapter 4 deals with Islam in North Africa, and its revitalization in Spain under the Umayyads and Almohads. The remaining two chapters deal with the Crusades, the rise of the Mamluks in Egypt, and the Mongol invasions. The third section of the book deals with the rise and decay of the Ottoman Empire to the end of the eighteenth century. There is also a short chapter on the origin and decline of the Persian Empire. Part IV concerns Islam in the nineteenth century and thus is primarily taken up with the decay of the Ottoman position in Egypt and North Africa. The last chapter of this section takes up Persia from the late eighteenth century through World War I. The last section of the book examines Turkey, Egypt, the Fertile Cres-



cent, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and Afghanistan following the war and through the 1930's. Professor Perlmann has added a supplementary review of events for the period 1939-1947. This is followed by a chronological table and an index.

The *History of the Islamic Peoples*, rather than being an original contribution to the field, is a summary of the available literature. The translators have added footnotes indicating more recent sources. The arts and sciences are given scant coverage in this volume. When they are discussed it appears to be on an almost ad hoc basis. The maps in this edition are quite poor. A major but perhaps inevitable criticism of Professor Brockelmann's work is that at times it shifts from person, to battle, to tribe, to dynasty, to location, to year with such rapidity as to render the period unintelligible to the non-specialist. This is most evident in those chapters dealing with the Abassid Caliphate and its dissolution. There are a number of other minor criticisms that might be made—e.g., geographical errors, inconsistencies, and the often stilted English of the translators,—but despite these and other criticisms this volume offers the general reader a sound and complete account of a most difficult history.—JOHN A. FITZGERALD, *Whitman College*.

*Storm Over Laos—A Contemporary History*. By SISOUK NA CHAMPASSAK. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. x, 202. \$5.00.)

Considering the paltry amount of information available on Laos, Prince Sisouk's thin volume should be a welcome addition to the bibliography of the average student of Southeast Asian affairs. The specialist, on the other hand, who will try to find in *Storm Over Laos* a rational explanation of the horrible mess which at present prevails in that remote corner of the world, will unfortunately have to look elsewhere, for the present book gives no sources, deals only in generalizations, cites only facts (many of them dubious) which already have been reported in the world press, and does not even have an index or a bibliography. It is little else but a plea *pro domo* for the official viewpoint of the Laotian regime of Prince Boun Oum and of pro-American strongman Gen. Phoumi Nosavan.

And it could not have been otherwise, since the author is a noble relative of Prince Boun Oum Na Champassak and for the past two years the United Nations delegate of his country. The book thus represents a more or less official viewpoint—and that is what makes its reading worthwhile after all. Another interesting aspect of the book is a comparison with its French edition *Tempête Sur Le Laos*, an operation that in many political books seems to become increasingly necessary if one does not wish to fall victim to brainwashing

by deliberate mistranslation.\* The French edition is dedicated to the author's family and to "a neutral and independent Laos," i.e., along the policy lines dear to the *Quai d'Orsay*. The United States edition is dedicated to the above *plus* the late Dr. Tom Dooley!—a sure-fire "tear-jerker" item probably included to counter-balance whatever upsetting effect the word "neutrality" may have had. Other changes may have been due to accidental mistranslations [e.g., the French *métropole* (homeland) into "capital" on p. 26], but it can be said in all fairness that the French text has a slightly less americanophile flavor to it than the U.S. edition, while the latter, conversely, manages to be slightly more critical of the French.

The best parts of the book are those in which the author gives the reader the benefit of his own personal experience, such as his voyage to Red China as part of a Lao government delegation or while acting in a ministerial capacity in Vientiane during the 1959 crisis; or those in which the author quite involuntarily gives us the views of a lowland Laotian on his own compatriots from the jungle hills. Yet even those parts, if read without any background knowledge of what went on, will do little but confuse the issues involved. For example, the 1956 trip of then Premier Souvanna Phouma to Red China is described in a series of little anecdotes in which not one cliché on the (admittedly) Big Bad Chinese Wolf is missing—including the assertion that it was to the Lao delegation that Peng Te-Huai had declared that China could afford to lose 400 million people in a nuclear war. Nowhere, however, does Sisouk mention what *real* and unique victories the trip to Peking had achieved: temporary isolation of the *Pathet-Lao* from their Communist backers and a formal, written, assurance that Red China had no objection to the two French bases in Laos permitted under the 1954 Geneva Agreements—the only case on record in which Peking subscribed to the existence of Western bases in its backyard. Considering the situation in Laos then and what is likely to be achieved by the West at Geneva now on the same subject, one could have rightfully rejoiced at those well-earned fruits of Lao diplomacy. But as Sisouk quite forthrightly notes, Washington was distinctly unhappy with that turn of events and expressed its unhappiness in a statement which, "reaching Vientiane in the midst of her rejoicing, [. . .] created the worst possible effect for the U.S., one of selfish ill-temper."

Sisouk also does not hesitate to speak, although in most general terms, of the shameless squander-

\* A typical example of this is the recent translation of the French anthropologist and Algeria expert Germaine Tillon's book *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies*, in which "*partage de l'Algérie*" (the partitioning of Algeria) is being rendered as "the segregation (!) of the Algerians."

ing of American aid which "reached such proportions that the Pathet-Lao needed no propaganda to turn the rural population against the townspeople." This is *one* clue to what went wrong in Laos. Another clue is given a few pages later, again unintentionally, when Sisouk describes the ethnic composition of the Pathet-Lao troops: "a strange mixture of Thai, Meo, Kha, and a minority of Lao . . . they compensated for their disparate dialects and customs with an iron discipline and an absolute faith in their leaders." To Sisouk, a lowland Lao from the deep south of his country, his own countrymen from the hills were "a strange mixture;" he describes the proto-Malay tribesmen who make up nearly one-half of his country's population and, in any case, occupy two-thirds of its land, as *Kha*—the pejorative lowland Lao term meaning "slave."

Between the "city-country gap" and the "lowland-upland gap" lie 90 per cent of the causes of why both the Vientiane government and its American backers never quite came to grips with what made Laos "go Communist" right under their own feet. Theoretical Marxism had nothing to do with Communist penetration in Laos. By completely ignoring the mountaineers until a forlorn attempt was made as of May 1961 (when all else had failed) to set up Meo-U.S. guerrilla *maquis* behind Pathet-Lao lines, we simply delivered Laos to the Communists on a silver platter. This Sisouk does not say—because he does not understand it himself and because, as a lowland Lao, he is committed to the predominance of his ethnic group even if it means losing all that is strategically worthwhile in Laos (the mountain areas) while holding on to what is militarily useless (the Mekong valley).

Once this essential gap in the author's thinking is clearly understood, all else becomes perfectly clear—including the author's and the United States' misreading of the non-proven "invasion" of 1959 and the complete botching of policies in Laos in 1960-62. Since the mountaineers counted for naught in Washington's policy calculations, their military effect was blithely discounted; thus, when the Laotian Army was almost hacked to pieces in a series of swift guerrilla operations, the only sane explanation seemed to be a "foreign invasion" . . . *quod eram demonstrandum*. The failure on the part of the Laotians to prove that invasion even to a U.N. commission that was pro-Western slanted (Italy, Argentina, Japan and Tunisia) leaves Sisouk with a tough propaganda nut to crack: after announcing fantastic totals of North Vietnamese prisoners as proof of invasion, the number of those prisoners, like the proverbial little Indians or the alleged Communists in a certain Government department, diminished steadily. In fact there were none at all.

Undaunted, Sisouk explains this by stating that the Lao soldiers usually "liquidated" the Viet-Minh whom they had captured. This is one case of Oriental face-saving in which a Free World government rather admits to a war crime than to a fib. Coming from a high Lao official, it is surprising that the Communists have not yet made propaganda hay out of the whole affair.

Thus, Prince Sisouk's book, while valuable at short range, cannot be considered a contemporary history in the strict sense of the term; but as a modest contribution to contemporary history it should not be overlooked altogether.—BERNARD B. FALL, *Howard University*.

*A Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution, Volume One: General Principles of Organization.* By SIRDAR D. K. SEN. (Calcutta: Orient Longmans. 1960. Pp. xxiii, 382. \$7.50.)

Sirdar Sen, in his study of the Indian Constitution, has endeavored to set forth the basic principles which underlie this complex and lengthy document and then to examine them in the light of the constitutional laws and practices of other states. He has served both as a teacher and a practitioner of the law, the latter experience being largely for the rulers of several of the Indian princely states before independence. What Mr. Sen has produced is a most curious volume, marked by evidences of considerable scholarship, but often sterile in character, laboring long yet adding little to our knowledge of Indian constitutionalism.

The works of some scholars in the newly independent nations are at times colored by chauvinistic considerations. Not so that of Mr. Sen. With a remarkable display of impartiality he has chosen virtually to ignore the very considerable body of existing commentary on the Indian Constitution by both Indian and Western scholars. Ivor Jennings is refuted on four brief occasions, Das Basu is dismissed in two minor notes, and the writings of Alexandrowicz, Gledhill, Pylee, etc. are mentioned neither in the text nor the bibliography. We are also left without any understanding of whether he has consulted the major documentary sources on Indian constitutionalism, such as the Constituent Assembly debates and committee reports. Nor is there any evidence that he has sought out the writings of the more important founding fathers.

His failure to consult this considerable body of literature is reflected in his treatment of center-state relations, a major theme which runs through this volume on general principles of organization. Sen's contention that India is "not only a federation but also a decentralised unitary State" is in sharp contrast to the generally accepted inter-

pretations in this regard, and the evidence he offers in support of his view is weak.

Sen takes Ivor Jennings to task for making "ex cathedra observations," yet on the very next page we find: "There has so far been no occasion on which the Government of the Republic have had to take any important decision in connection with the working of the Constitution." Presumably such actions as the amendment of Article 31, the Union Government's decision to invoke President's Rule in Kerala where the existing State Government still controlled a majority in the State Legislature, and the creation of the Planning Commission and the National Development Council are minor matters, since their implications for Indian constitutionalism receive little or no comment in Sirdar Sen's work.

His estimation of the extent to which the Indian princely states exercised sovereign powers, and his judgment that with the transfer of power India ceased to exist in international law and her place was taken by the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan, are contentions which will be strongly disputed by scholars.

In summary, Sirdar Sen has given us a most disappointing volume which adds little to our knowledge of Indian constitutionalism.—RALPH H. RETZLAFF, *University of California* (Berkeley).

*Modern Swedish Government.* BY NILS ANDRÉN. (Stockholm: Haeggström, 1961. Pp. 252. Paper-back: 15 Sw.kr.; bound: 19.50 Sw.kr.)

*Danmarks Folketing: om dets hus og historie.* BY SVEND THORSEN. (Copenhagen: Schultz, 1961. Pp. 189. 65 D.kr.)

*Stortinget på naert hold.* BY PER ØISANG. (Oslo: Fabritius, 1961. Pp. 56. 7.50 N.kr.)

*Modern Swedish Government* is a textbook well-described by its title. The qualification of modernity means that there is little emphasis on historical development. Consistently with the title, no comprehensive exposition of local government is attempted. As an introduction to the contemporary national government of Sweden, then, the following topics are treated: political parties, the electoral system, the legislature, the executive,

administrative organs, and legislative-executive relations. The courts are mentioned only in passing.

The most recent of the English-language multi-nation surveys of Scandinavian government and politics are now at least ten years old. These surveys are Arneson, *The Democratic Monarchies of Scandinavia* (1949), Scott, *The United States and Scandinavia* (1950), and the Royal Institute of International Affairs' *The Scandinavian States and Finland* (1951). (In the Selected Bibliography to Andrén's book, the first of these is incorrectly dated and the latter two are not included.) The availability of more up-to-date works on Sweden—Gunnar Heckscher, Elis Håstad, Dankwart Rustow and Douglas Verney have also published in English—may result in disproportionate attention being paid that country. However, it would be unkind to complain of the addition of this good general text on Swedish political institutions. Dr. Andrén is on the political science faculty at Stockholm University.

Denmark and Norway are underdeveloped lands in their own languages as well, as far as the literature of government and politics is concerned. Nor have the books here under review remedied that situation. The title of Thorsen's book, "Denmark's Parliament," might lead one to hope the contrary, but the sub-title, "its house and history," is language of strict limitation. *Danmarks Folketing* is concerned with the buildings in which the Danish parliament has met. There are 80 pages of pictures. Many discursive details of parliamentary life are incidentally included. Per Øisang has written a handbook on the Norwegian parliament, meant to serve as a guide to those who visit the *Storting*. The basic information contained in this booklet is of interest to political scientists.

Øisang and Thorsen are journalists, and should hardly be blamed for not having written as political scientists. Each has done well what he set out to do. But the studies on Denmark and Norway comparable to those on Sweden have yet to be written—in any language.—STANLEY V. ANDERSON, *University of California*, (Santa Barbara).

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

HIRAM M. STOUT  
Washington, D. C.

### General

Pearcy, G. Etzel. Forty Newly Independent States: Some Politicogeographic Observations.

*Department of State Bulletin*. October 9, 1961.

Peschel, Kurt. Council Chambers of the Great Parliaments. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1961.

## United Kingdom and Commonwealth

Abrams, Mark. Class and Politics: Another Look at the British Electorate. *Encounter*. October, 1961.

Abrams, Mark. Social Class and British Politics. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1961.

Berrington, Hugh. The Conservative Party: Revolts and Pressures—1955–1961. *Political Quarterly*. October–December, 1961.

Bromhead, Peter. Mr. Wedgwood Benn, the Peerage and the Constitution. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1961.

Buck, Philip W. M.P.'s in Ministerial Office, 1918–55 and 1955–9. *Political Studies*. October, 1961.

Catlin, George E. Gordon. Political Parties: Democratic Instruments or Religious Conventicles? *Contemporary Review*. October, 1961.

Craig, J. T. The Working of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1961.

Fairlie, Henry. On the Monarchy. *Encounter*. October, 1961.

Harries, O. Faith in the Summit: Some British Attitudes. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.

Johnson, Nevil. Parliamentary Questions and the Conduct of Administration. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1961.

Miller, Bruce. The Colonial Office and the Estimates Committee. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1961.

Platt, D. C. M. The Commercial and Industrial Interests of Ministers of the Crown. *Political Studies*. October, 1961.

Political Advance in the United Kingdom Dependencies. Rev. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (R.F. P. 4805).

Rothman, Stanley. British Labor's "New Left." *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Rothman, Stanley. Modernity and Tradition in Britain. *Social Research*. Autumn, 1961.

Schneider, Fred D. The Study of Parliamentary Government in the Commonwealth. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1961.

Simmons, Robert H. The Role of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industry in Parliament. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Strutt, Sir Austin. The Home Office: an Introduction to Its Early History. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1961.

The British Civil Service. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (R. 4985).

## Western Europe

Arrowsmith, William, ed. Image of Italy; a Special Issue. *Texas Quarterly*. Summer, 1961.

Atlantic Report on France. *Atlantic*. December, 1961.

Atlantic Report on Portugal. *Atlantic*. October, 1961.

Bexelius, Alfred. The Swedish Institution of the Justitieombudsman. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3, 1961.

Braunthal, Gerard. European Socialism at the Crossroads. *Massachusetts Review*. Summer, 1961.

Cappadocia, Ezio. The Christian Democratic Party in Italian Politics. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1961.

Chileote, Ronald H. Politics in Portugal and her Empire. *World Today*. September, 1961.

Hughes, H. Stuart. The Socialist Dilemma in Europe. *Dissent*. Autumn, 1961.

Kelly, George A. The French Army Re-enters Politics, 1940–1955. *Political Science Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Kerr, Walter. The French Army in Trouble. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.

McWhinney, Edward. Judicial Restraint and the West German Constitutional Court. *Harvard Law Review*. November, 1961.

Parker, Reginald. Administrative Law Through Foreign Glasses: the Austrian Experience. *Rutgers Law Review*. Summer, 1961.

Reich, Nathan. The Political 'Dilemma' of German Trade Unionism. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. July, 1961.

Rothman, Stanley. The Future of German Politics: An Analysis. *The South Atlantic Quarterly*. Autumn, 1961.

Schneider, Fernand. L'Allemagne a Voté . . . *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

The Constitution of the Italian Republic: Its Juridical Structure. *Italian Affairs*. May–June, 1961.

Velen, Victor A. The New Left in France. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.

## Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Akhminov, Herman. Internal Tension Grows. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. September, 1961.

Akhminov, Herman. Obituaries as a Key to the Soviet Elite. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. July, 1961.

Atlantic Report on East Germany. *Atlantic*. October, 1961.

Atlantic Report on Poland. *Atlantic*. November, 1961.

Balinky, Alexander S. The Proclaimed Emergence of Communism in the USSR. *Social Research*. Autumn, 1961.

Biddleford, James. Deadlock in the Party Presidium. *New Leader*. October 16, 1961.

Brinkley, George. Foreign Policy and the Transition to Communism. *Survey: A Journal of*

- Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Bromke, Adam. From 'Falanga' to 'Pax.' *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. December, 1961.
- Brown, J. F. et al. Bulgaria. A symposium. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. December, 1961.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Nature of the Soviet System. *Slavic Review*. October, 1961.
- Clubb, O. Edmund. Soviet Communism vs. Chinese. *Military Review*. November, 1961.
- Dallin, David J. Methods of Soviet Diplomacy. *Modern Age*. Fall, 1961.
- Directory of Soviet Officials. Department of State. Division of Biographic Information. Washington, 1961. (Biographic Directory No. 278).
- Fejtő, Francois. La Hongrie, Cinq Ans Après. *Preuves*. November, 1961.
- From the Public Discussion of the Party Program. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. October 4, 1961.
- Hulicka, Karel. The Judicial System in the U.S.S.R. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1961.
- Jacobs, Walter Darnell. The Red Army's Role in Building Communism. *Military Review*. September, 1961.
- Jasny, Naum. Plan and Superplan. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Labeledz, Leopold. The new CPSU Programme. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Marin, Yuri. The New Party Program and Statutes. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. September, 1961.
- May, Ernst. Cities of the Future. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Meyer, Alfred G. Twenty Years On. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Party Congress: Central Inspection Commission Report. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. November 22, 1961.
- Ramm, Thilo. The Utopian Tradition. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Regulations and Norms for the Planning and Construction of Cities. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1961. (JPRS: 9891).
- Ritvo, Herbert. Twenty-first Party Congress—Before and After (Part two). *Slavic Review*. October, 1961.
- Russia and China. I. Two Roads to Communism by Donald S. Zagoria; II. A Study in Economic Strategy by Alexander Eckstein; III. The Roots of Social Policy by H. F. Schurmann. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Schapiro, Leonard. The Party and the State. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Sosnovy, Timothy. Town Planning and Housing. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Staar, Richard. The Communist Party Leadership in Poland; a Study in Elite Stability. Washington, Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University, 1961.
- The Central Committee Report by Khrushchev—I–IV. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. November 1, 8, 15, 22, 1961.
- The Opening of the 22nd Party Congress. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. November 1, 1961.
- The Withering Away of the State. I. Philosophy and Practice by George L. Kline; II. The Function of Law by John Hazard; III. The Role of Social Institutions by Robert Osborn. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Tomasie, D. A. The Rumanian Communist Leadership. *Slavic Review*. October, 1961.
- Utechin, S. V. Educating the New Man. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Wiles, Peter. Man and the Ideal Economy. *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*. October, 1961.
- Zalar, Charles. Yugoslav Communism; a Critical Study. Prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 87th Cong., 1st sess. October 18, 1961. Washington, G.P.O., 1961.
- Middle East and Arab North Africa
- Atlantic Report on Iran. *Atlantic*. September, 1961.
- Atlantic Report on Morocco. *Atlantic*. November, 1961.
- Barbour, Nevill. Two Problems in Modern Morocco. *Civilisations*. No. 3, 1961.
- Crow, Ralph E., and Iskandar, Adnan. Administrative Reform in Lebanon, 1958–1959. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3, 1961.
- Cyprus. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (No. R 4931).
- Devereux, Robert. Society and Culture in the Second Turkish Republic (The New Constitution). *Middle Eastern Affairs*. October, 1961.
- Eren, Nuri. Turkey: Problems, Policies, Parties. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.
- Gutmann, Emanuel E. Some Observations on

Politics and Parties in Israel. *India Quarterly*. January-March, 1961.

Harvey, Donald J. Algeria: Tiger by the Tail. *Current History*. October, 1961.

Israel; a Special Supplement. *Atlantic*. November, 1961.

Lacouture, Jean. Morocco—Monarchy and Revolution. *Africa South in Exile*. October-December, 1961.

Lewis, Geoffrey. Democracy—by Order. *Listener*. September 14, 1961.

Luft, Gerda. Israel's Conservative Voters. *Commentary*. November, 1961.

Mackay, Mercedes. Cyprus: the First Year. *New Commonwealth*. October, 1961.

Pickles, Dorothy. The Seven-year Struggle in Algeria; Retrospect and Prospect. *World Today*. November, 1961.

Rondot, Pierre. La Crise Syrienne: Causes et Conséquences. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

Seale, Patrick. The Break-up of the United Arab Republic. *World Today*. November, 1961.

#### Africa

Austin, Dennis. Ghana since Independence. *World Today*. October, 1961.

Bertola, Arnaldo. Religion et Droits de l'Homme dans la Constitution de la Somalie. *Civilisations*. No. 3, 1961.

Blondel, J. Constitutional Changes in Former French Black Africa. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1961.

Church, R. J. Harrison. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania. *Focus*. November, 1961.

Crozier, Brian. Six Africans in Search of a Personality. *Encounter*. May, 1961.

Devernois, Guy. The Evolution of the African Countries of French Civilisation. *Civilisations*. No. 2, 1961.

Hamon, Léo. Formes et Perspectives de la Démocratie en Afrique. *Civilisations*. No. 3, 1961.

Hodgkin, Thomas, and Huxley, Elspeth. What Future for Africa? *Encounter*. June, 1961.

Horrell, Muriel. La Politique de l'Union Sud-Africaine à la Lumière de l'Opinion Mondiale. *Civilisations*. No. 2, 1961.

Irvine, Keith. The Franco-African Community in Transition. *Current History*. October, 1961.

Jones, Edward A. Togo, West Africa—an Appraisal by an Afro-American. *Phylon*. Fall, 1961.

Jésman, Czeslaw. Ruanda and Urundi in Transition. *British Survey*. Main Series, n.s., No. 149. August, 1961.

Jung, Hermann. Schwarz oder Weiss in Angola? *Aussenpolitik*. August, 1961.

Land, Harry. Nigeria Puts First Things First. *New Commonwealth*. October, 1961.

Landis, Elizabeth S. South African Apartheid Legislation; I: Fundamental Structure. *Yale Law Journal*. November, 1961.

La Sierre Leone. Paris, Documentation Française, 1961. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2809).

Leys, Colin. Evolution in British Africa. *Current History*. October, 1961.

Logan, Rayford W. Will African Federalism Work? *Current History*. October, 1961.

Lovell, Colin Rhys. Winds of Change in Southern Africa. *Current History*. October, 1961.

Merriam, Alan P. The Congo's First Year of Independence. *Current History*. October, 1961.

Milsome, J. R. Liberia—Africa's Veteran Republic. *West African Review*. November, 1961.

Olympio, Sylvanus E. African Problems and the Cold War. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.

Perin, Francois. La Crise Congolaise et les Institutions Politiques Africaines. *Civilisations*. No. 3, 1961.

Pierson-Mathy, P. L'Évolution Politique de l'Afrique. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère*. January-May, 1961.

Post, Ken. Nigeria—the First Decade. *Africa South in Exile*. October-December, 1961.

Report of the Gambia Constitutional Conference, 1961. London, H.M.S.O., 1961. (Cmd. 1469).

Schwarz, Walter. Houphouët's Ivory Tower. *West African Review*. November, 1961.

Shepperson, George A. External Factors in the Development of African Nationalism, with Particular Reference to British Central Africa. *Phylon*. Fall, 1961.

Stauffer, Robert B., and Colebrook, Mulford J. Economic Assistance and Ethiopia's Foreign Policy. *Orbis*. Fall, 1961.

Tanganyika: the Making of a Nation. British Information Services. Reference Division. London, 1961. (R.F. P. 5074).

Wallis, L. G. Coke. The Public Service Commission: Its Role and Development in Western Nigeria. *African Affairs*. October, 1961.

#### South and Southeast Asia

Atlantic Report on Indonesia. *Atlantic*. December, 1961.

Atlantic Report on Singapore. *Atlantic*. November, 1961.

Atlantic Report on South Vietnam. *Atlantic*. October, 1961.

Atmosudirdjo, Prajudi. Central Services to Local Governments. *Eropa Review*. June, 1961.

Authoritarianism in Ceylon: Government by Emergency Powers. *Round Table*. September, 1961.

Chi-ch'ing Yao. Local Self-government in Southeast Asia. *Eropa Review*. June, 1961.

- Corley, Francis J. The President in the Constitution of the Republic of Viet-Nam. *Pacific Affairs*. Summer, 1961.
- Egger, Rowland A. Ministerial and Departmental Organization and Management in the Government of Pakistan. *Public Administration*. Summer, 1961.
- Ennis, Thomas E. Lights and Shadows on Vietnam. *Current History*. December, 1961.
- Gross, Ernest A. Tibetans Plan for Tomorrow. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.
- Harrison, Selig S. Wird die Indische Union Halten? *Aussenpolitik*. September, 1961.
- Hollstein, Milton. The Press in Burma: Its Hopes and Problems. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1961.
- Huvanandana, Mailai. Public Administration in Thailand. *Eropa Review*. June, 1961.
- Katrak, Savak. India's Communist Party Split. *China Quarterly*. July-September, 1961.
- Lynch, C. J. Constitutional Developments in Papua and New Guinea 1960-61. *Australian Outlook*. August, 1961.
- Mayer, Adrian C. Rural Leaders and the Indian General Election. *Asian Survey*. October, 1961.
- Mellema, R. L. The Basic Democracies System in Pakistan. *Asian Survey*. August, 1961.
- Pauker, Guy J. Indonesia's Eight-year Development Plan. *Pacific Affairs*. Summer, 1961.
- Purcell, Victor. Notes sur la Fédération de Malaisie et Singapour. *Civilisations*. No. 2, 1961.
- Sayeed, Khalid B. How Goes Democracy in South-east Asia? *New Commonwealth*. October, 1961.
- Sayeed, Khalid B. Pakistan's Basic Democracy. *Middle East Journal*. Summer, 1961.
- Singhal, D. P. The United States of Malaysia. *Asian Survey*. October, 1961.
- Vandenbosch, Amry. "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia. *Current History*. December, 1961.
- Van der Kroef, Justus M. Nasution, Sukarno and the West New Guinea Dispute. *Asian Survey*. August, 1961.
- Van der Kroef, Justus M. The West New Guinea Problem. *World Today*. November, 1961.
- Williams, L. F. Rushbrook. "Grass-Roots" Democracy in Pakistan. *Quarterly Review*. October, 1961.
- mentation Française, 1961. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2815.)
- Dore, R. P. The Japanese Socialist Party and "Structural Reform." *Asian Survey*. October, 1961.
- Fukuda, Takeo. New Policy of Liberal-Democratic Party. *Contemporary Japan*. May, 1961.
- Ginsburgs, George. Local Government in the Mongolian People's Republic, 1940-1960. *Journal of Asian Studies*. August, 1961.
- Ginsburgs, George. Mongolia's "Socialist" Constitution. *Pacific Affairs*. Summer, 1961.
- Handbook on Administrative Divisions of the People's Republic of China. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1961. (JPRS: 10342).
- Ikematsu, Fumio. 29th General Election and the Second Ikeda Cabinet. *Contemporary Japan*. May, 1961.
- Jacobini, H. B. Western Political Forms: Their Adaptation to the Philippines. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1961.
- Klein, Donald W. Peking's Leaders: a Study in Isolation. *China Quarterly*. July-September, 1961.
- Lange, William. Das Pak-Regime in Südkorea. *Aussenpolitik*. September, 1961.
- Larsen, William F. Government Administration in the Republic of Korea: Problems of Organization, Methods, and Personnel. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. No. 3, 1961.
- Linebarger, Paul M. A. The New Japan in a Troubled Asia. *Current History*. December, 1961.
- Meadows, Martin. An Interpretation of Philippine Politics. *India Quarterly*. January-March, 1961.
- Nishio, Suehiro. Democratic-Socialist Party: Its Status and Policy. *Contemporary Japan*. May, 1961.
- Padover, Saul K. Japan Puts Democracy to the Test. *New York Times Magazine*. August 20, 1961.
- Park, No-Yong. Should We Impose Democracy on Korea? *Current History*. December, 1961.
- Steck, Fritz. Questionable Stabilization in South Korea. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. October, 1961.
- Wagner, Edward W. Failure in Korea. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.
- Wordsworth, K. C. The Legal System of the Republic of China. *Canadian Bar Journal*. August, 1961.

## Far East

- Atlantic Report on North Korea. *Atlantic*. September, 1961.
- Chandrasekhar, S. Red China's Population Problem. *Atlantic*. December, 1961.
- Chiu, S. M. Political Control in the Chinese Communist Army. *Military Review*. August, 1961.
- Constitution de la République de Corée (17 Juillet 1948-29 Novembre 1960). Paris, Docu-

## Australia and New Zealand

- Downer, Alexander R. The Influence of Migration on Australian Foreign Policy. *Migration*. January-March, 1961.

Linge, G. J. R. Canberra after Fifty Years. *Geographical Review*. October, 1961.

#### Latin America and West Indies

Alisky, Marvin. The End of Nicaragua's Radio Freedom. *Journal of Broadcasting*. Fall, 1961.

Constitution de la République Dominicaine (2 Décembre 1960). Paris, Documentation Française, 1961. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2831.)

Cosío Villegas, Daniel. Change in Latin America; the Mexican and Cuban Revolutions. Lincoln, University of Nebraska, 1961.

Drayton, Geoffrey. Venezuela's Uneasy Revolution. *Listener*. September 28, 1961.

Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Colombia as a Laboratory for Change. *Civilisations*. No. 2, 1961.

Geiger, Theodore. Social Reform and Revolution. *Foreign Service Journal*. September, 1961.

Glick, Edward B. Castro and the Church. *The Commonweal*. October 13, 1961.

Goldenberg, Boris. Die Fata Morgana eines Kubanischen Sozialismus. *Aussenpolitik*. August, 1961.

Lieuwen, Edwin. The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. October, 1961.

Potash, Robert A. The Changing Role of the Military in Argentina. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. October, 1961.

Quadros, Jânio. Brazil's New Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*. October, 1961.

Villanueva del Campo, Armando. Partidos Democrático-Revolucionarios en Indoamérica. *Combate*. September-October, 1961.

#### Canada

Keith-Lucas, B. Metropolitan Local Government in Canada. *Public Administration*. Autumn, 1961.

McWhinney, Edward. The New Canadian Bill of Rights. *American Journal of Comparative Law*. Winter-Spring, 1961.

### INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

*Europe's Needs and Resources*. By J. FREDERIC DEWHURST, JOHN O. COPPOCK, P. LAMARTINE YATES and ASSOCIATES. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. Pp. xxvi, 1198. \$12.00.)

This massive volume of double-columned material represents five years of study, by a staff headquartered at Geneva, of the economic life and related activities of eighteen countries of Western Europe and their projected development to 1970. The area corresponds to that of the O. E. C. D. including Finland and excluding Turkey.

The format of the present volume generally corresponds to that of Dewhurst's 1947 and 1955 studies of *America's Needs and Resources* (also for the Twentieth Century Fund) and like the earlier studies represents a considerable contribution to social scientists, members of the business community and the informed public. Probably no other single and conveniently arranged source exists covering this area so thoroughly. Even if one happens to have such relatively specialized interests as the number of tractors per thousand hectares of Ireland's agricultural land or what proportion of the fish marketed for human consumption in Iceland is (deliberately) frozen, this is the place where he can be satisfied.

"Resources" include both human (population, manpower and education) and physical (land, agricultural, forest, ocean, energy, mineral . . .) "Needs" are taken—at least at an articulate

level—in the non-normative sense of what people actually choose to consume. This explicitly excludes the question of what they "ought to consume in terms of their physiological, mental or spiritual requirements." However, it does not seem to be the case that concern for human physiological needs in the normative sense is absent. It is unlikely that the principal authors' enthusiasm for a more responsible and restrained capitalism, their approval of a trend away from sharp differences in distribution of income and services, etc., represents only the traditional economic desire to maximize productive levels and to attain the most efficient economic distribution. Rather it suggests more than this: the desire to satisfy basic and minimal human wants. In other words, I am not certain that the definition of "needs" in non-normative terms really represents the authors' basic position, especially as the earlier study of America's economy was based explicitly on a normative definition of "needs." This, of course, is not a crucial objection, but the 1955 formulation does seem more accurate.

The analysis of these needs and resources is designed primarily in terms of the eighteen states taken as an economic entity rather than in terms of the various component national economies. This approach seems justified in terms of the emerging economic integration of the area and the importance of trans-national regional similarities and problems. This integrated or inter-national approach, and the vast scope of the



volume, prevent it from being (nor is it intended to be) a substitute for the more intensive studies existing of several of the national economies. However, through judicious use of the index and lists of tables and charts a good picture of the various national economies is obtainable.

The projections made to 1970 from the base year 1955 (=100) indicate the population will stand at 108.4, output per worker hour 149.4, total G. N. P. 154.8, and the per capita G. N. P. 142.8. The projections are accompanied by the usual hedges and disclaimers, but even so the awe of the reader is aroused when the forecasts are made concerning a politically complex area in which several of the larger elements are unstable politically. Be that as it may, the projections convey the general confidence in the area's economic structure which permeates the study. This confidence rests on the principal authors' evaluation of certain fundamental trends which they discern in the socio-economic structure of the area, the weakening of economic stratification, the growth of "managerial capitalism," a more favorable attitude towards economic competition, the economic integration of the area, etc. This confidence is, in the words of August Heckscher's foreword, the "chief message to be drawn from this book."

The project is marked by an admirable breadth. Few economic surveys have devoted such attention to political and social developments. In execution, however, the consideration given these non-economic matters falls somewhat short of the mark. For the specialist at least, much of this could be excluded without significant loss and certainly one could wish for a more compact study. However, this stricture probably represents a parochial interest and is not meant to detract from what is a splendid accomplishment.—  
WILLIAM A. RITCHIE, *University of Delaware*.

*The International Status of the United Nations.* By GUENTER WEISSBERG. (New York: Oceana Publications, and London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1961. Pp. xii, 228. \$7.50.)

That the United Nations is in some sense and to some degree an international legal personality will strike most readers as neither a surprising nor a controversial proposition. The contribution of Weissberg's book is to provide a meticulously documented account of "the foundation, connotation and development of this characteristic." The author describes the breaking down of the dogma that states alone can be subjects of international law, and examines the status which international organizations have gradually acquired within the international legal system, with particular emphasis upon the position of the United Nations. Beginning with an analysis of the pro-

visions and implications of the Charter, he then devotes chapters to the treaty-making capability of the United Nations, the organization's operative role in the Korean and Suez cases, the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, and its capacity to espouse international claims.

Within this framework, Weissberg ably mobilizes the scattered evidence that international agencies, and most notably the United Nations, have come to share with states many of the attributes of international legal entities. He is aware that the status of international organizations is not identical with that of states, and that the former have a relatively limited claim to subjecthood in the international legal system. Nevertheless, he contends that international organizations are sufficiently endowed with the basic characteristic of international personality, "the ability to undertake international legal relations," to justify the International Court of Justice in regarding them as states for the purposes of Article 34 (1) of its statute. That is to say, his reaction to the regrettable provision that only states may be parties in cases before the Court is to suggest revision by judicial expansion of the concept of the state rather than by formal amendment.

The author clearly regards the international legal personality of the United Nations as something more than the sum of the manifestations of status and competence to which he draws attention. He considers that personality as the basis for creative potential—the foundation upon which an increasingly significant institutional structure can be erected. In this sense, Weissberg goes beyond legal analysis to the consideration of political potentiality.

In general, however, the book exhibits the limitations of the "purely legal" approach; it largely neglects the considerable part of reality which is customarily described as political. The author serves us well by demonstrating that the United Nations is "somebody" in the legal sense. He contributes little to our understanding of "who," in the political sense, that new-style "somebody" is now, or may become. Legal analysis is a useful tool for establishing the fact that the United Nations has an identity of its own. The more fascinating and important task of the *identification* of the United Nations evidently demands an analytical approach of a different order.—INIS L. CLAUDE, *University of Michigan*.

*Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process.* By J. DAVID SINGER. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. Pp. xvi, 185. 14.50 guilders.)

A major cause of the breakdown of the Amer-

ican Confederation was its inability to raise by assessments the money needed to pay its obligations. As a result the Confederation had to borrow to keep going, and its credit soon reached the vanishing point. The Federal Constitution met this difficulty by giving the new government direct power of taxation. The League of Nations had a somewhat similar financial problem, though it was not comparable in degree. Most of the members paid their dues fairly promptly, and the working capital funds the League built up were usually sufficient to take care of the arrears in dues. But the unwillingness of its members to pay from their own treasuries a fair share of the reasonable cost of adequate international cooperation was always a serious handicap to the League's work.

This being the case, a book describing the United Nations Budget process is important, for it enables us to compare the present situation with past difficulties. Mr. Singer's book discusses in detail how the financial problems were handled in writing the Charter and setting up the Organization, and then traces the process by which the Budget is formed—the departmental planning in the Secretariat (based on policy decisions in the other U. N. organs); the coordination, consolidation, and cutting by the Secretary General and his financial officers; further cutting by the Advisory Committee (which roughly corresponds to our Appropriations Committee in Congress); and consideration by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. There are also chapters on how the revenues are raised, and the actual execution of the Budget and the auditing procedures.

As Mr. Singer says, the book is a reference work as well as a discussion of U. N. Budget procedures. Considering the subject matter, it is surprisingly readable, perhaps largely because the author does not hesitate to bring out the political considerations which frequently influence the actions of the delegates. The Communists always try to cut the Budget substantially. The members of the Advisory Committee are supposed to be financial experts appointed in their individual capacities, but in practice they often act merely to protect their countries' immediate interests. Mr. Singer gives the impression that he thinks most of the delegates in the Fifth Committee are much more interested in cutting a half cent per capita off their assessments than they are in seeing that the U. N. as a whole does a good job. And this despite the fact that the United States' annual assessment is about 12 cents per capita, the Soviet Union's about 4 cents, and India's under half a cent. (U. S. per capita military expenditures are over \$235.)

This reviewer would have liked a few changes.

He wishes the author had given more definite information on the League of Nations experience; there are several tantalizing references without any of the details. Mr. Singer emphasizes how much the Fifth Committee tends to cut the Budget presented by the Secretary General and the Advisory Committee, but he does not explain how it happens that in thirteen years out of sixteen the General Assembly has appropriated more money than the Advisory Committee recommended. Possibly this is due to some supplementary expenditures getting into the regular Budget between the time of the Advisory Committee Report and the final passage of the Budget by the General Assembly. Lastly, there might have been some discussion of how special funds or voluntary contributions (such as the Congo, the Emergency Force, or technical assistance) fit into the Budget, and how the decision is made whether an item is to be part of the regular Budget or of some special fund.

However, despite these criticisms, Mr. Singer has done a good job, and the student of international organization is greatly indebted to him for this study.—CHASE KIMBALL, *Suffolk University*.

*A Forward Strategy for America.* BY ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPE, WILLIAM R. KINTNER, AND STEFAN T. POSSONY. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. xii, 450. \$5.95.)

This is a "prescriptive treatment of the problems posed" in the authors' 1959 analysis of communist strategy, *Protracted Conflict*. It starts from the same premises, that "the United States and the Free World have steadily lost ground in the international struggle with communism . . . and that the struggle hangs in the balance." Since it covers a broad range of our foreign policy problems (though not the "full" range as claimed by the authors in the preface), the study is essentially a synthesis with prefatory credit given to important contributions. The result is a complex, coordinated though somewhat unbalanced survey of factors and problems in foreign policy making and implementation. The range is indicated by the titles of chapters 3 through 11: Building the Free World; The Technological Factor; Military Strategy, Power and Policy; Economic Framework of Strategy; Diplomatic Arm of Strategy; Psychological Operations; Security Through Arms Control?; Strategy of Ways and Means; and Structure for Strategy.

Within their frame of reference the authors have done a job which will be hailed by many in superlatives. However, their view of the world situation as a "systemic (sic) revolution" complicated primarily by an irreconcilable Communist vs. Free World conflict is an inadequate state-

ment of our country's strategic problem today. Were the situation as simple as that, the authors' prescription could be applied, and free man would be saved.

"Three distinct but related strategic tasks confront the United States: (1) to seek a more effective partnership with those nations in Europe and elsewhere who share its political values and cultural heritage; (2) to find a new basis for mutual respect and cooperation with nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America; and (3) to frustrate communist plans to establish the emerging world order in the image of communist society . . . the success of the first two tasks requires the successful conduct of the third . . ." (italics supplied).

But doesn't the achievement of the third require the successful achievement of the first two? In the authors' view the prevention of communist expansion comes first and whatever helps to achieve it must be done even if it interferes with achievement of the others. However, the actual strategic problem facing the country is much more complicated, since a variety of goals in addition to stopping communist expansion must be pursued simultaneously.

The fundamental value of the book, and it is fundamentally valuable, lies in the studies of the separate factors and aspects of national strategy. To be sure, the authors' offering of the federative principle and freedom of the individual, as the two universally applicable principles on which to organize the free world, is wishful in the face of actual institutional systems in the world and in the light of social value systems in which status interrelationships rather than individualism provide man's anchor. But there is desperate need for "Building the Free World" into a more viable, mutually integrated human system. This is necessary, and not only to beat the Communists.—H. ROWLAND LUDDEN, *George Washington University*.

*Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow.*

By WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1961. Pp. vi., 191. \$4.00.)

In the September 1961 issue of this REVIEW, Robert McCloskey wrote, "Publishers these days are increasingly prone to ornament books with titles more cosmic than their contents." The McCloskey Principle of Titular Inflation applies to this book. Instead of a rigorous analysis of the requirements or the problems of contemporary intelligence, the reader is given a smorgasbord of miscellaneous facts and unsupported opinions—all very interesting, but not very edifying to the serious student. The informal style, with its sweeping generalizations and its constant use of the first person singular, evokes the image of the expert-turned-home who offers impromptu observations to an admiring audience.

At the outset, to be sure, one gains quite the opposite impression. The dust jacket announces a

Do-It-Yourself CIA Kit: "To determine how any country will react in a given set of circumstances, it is only necessary to understand: first, the nation itself; and second, its relationships with other countries. When evaluating the individual nation, the three important areas to consider are its economics, ethnology, and ideology. Dr. McGovern explores each area, and enumerates the salient characteristics to be observed."

Accordingly, Part I of the book is entitled "Strategic Intelligence," and its chapters deal respectively with secret, economic, ethnological and ideological intelligence. These chapters, which form the main body of the book, indicate the wide range of data relevant to the intelligence enterprise. They are spiced with innumerable tidbits of information gleaned in the course of an active life (McGovern spent many years abroad, and served as intelligence officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, before joining the faculty of Northwestern University). Surely every reader will learn *something* here that he had not known before: about the Nazi attempt to cut off the United States' supply of bauxite in 1942, for example; the unheeded warning sent by Allen Dulles, from Switzerland, presaging the Battle of the Bulge; China's economic dependence on Southeast Asia; the love not lost between Northern and Southern Italians; the similarities and differences among certain languages; the place where the world's worst-tasting beverage is brewed; numerous occasions in which the author's predictions were borne out by events. One can learn all this and much, much more. But it adds up to a fireside chat on One Hundred and One Interesting Things to Know, not a systematic treatise on the making of estimates. Nor is there any analysis of the present state of our intelligence system.

In addition to assorted facts, the McGovern smorgasbord offers a potpourri of conclusions and speculations which the reader may take or leave. Thus: "The same amount of drink which would put the average Japanese under the table would scarcely make the average Chinese merry. Again I do not know the reason for this fact. Possibly it has something to do with the small stature of the Japanese (p. 84). . . . Speaking in general terms, we may say that the Asiatic nationalist is four or five times as fanatical as the ordinary European nationalist (p. 116). . . . I do not believe that Nehru wishes to see the United States completely destroyed, but he would thoroughly enjoy the spectacle of our losing a great deal of prestige. If I may be permitted to use a rather vulgar phrase, I would say that he would be delighted to see us soundly kicked in the rear end—especially if some Asiatic people, such as the Chinese, were to do the kicking (p. 129). . . .

The only reason that Sukarno does not definitely place his country in the Communist camp is that many of the officers of the Indonesian army are opposed to such a step (p. 156). . . . For various reasons which I cannot go into here, the National Security Council has never performed as well as had been hoped. I sincerely trust that in the next few years the National Security Council will be permitted and required to function more effectively (p. 169)."

Part II, "The Shape of Tomorrow," does not represent a disciplined, systematic application of the principles of Part I. Given the casual nature of Part I, this is hardly surprising. But the book may be satisfactory to the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, which sponsored it in the interest of "public information and debate." Undoubtedly one finds here a great deal of information as well as many topics for debate.—GORDON L. SHULL, *College of Wooster*.

*Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953.* By GENE M. LYONS. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961. Pp. 298. \$4.50.)

A year or so ago an economist observed that the intention of the United States aid program in Korea seemed to have been to produce "an agricultural country with a huge standing army and a first class railway system." Although this is a caricature of the results of Korean-American economic cooperation and conflict, there is more than enough recognizability in the sketch to excite curiosity about the antecedent policies (both Korean and American) which helped to create today's military, political, and economic patterns in Korea and their consequences. In this book Professor Lyons has made a solid contribution to the satisfaction of such curiosity.

In what is essentially a case study of the attempt to develop the field operations of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), the book provides massive documentation of an early and consistent subordination of economic rehabilitation efforts to military objectives. The issue for American policy, so carefully and insightfully posed by Professor Lyons, was the question of how to reconcile Defense Department insistence on the principle of command responsibility for all matters within the Korean theater of operations and less vigorous State Department insistence that the maintenance of the principle of international responsibility for Korea, which had been one of the bases of American Korean policy since 1947, required an autonomous sphere of UNKRA action. For UNKRA the resolution of this issue was a matter of life and death since "what UNKRA was, was

essentially what the United States wanted it to be."

By the time of the Korean Armistice in 1953, less than three years after its establishment, UNKRA had begun to "wither away." The fate of the international agency as the vehicle of Korean postwar reconstruction was sealed by the American decision—which was taken after the assumption of the presidency by Dwight D. Eisenhower and which was part of the price for obtaining the acquiescence of Syngman Rhee in the cessation of hostilities—to follow a concept of bilateral defense support aid. The chapter in which Professor Lyons describes the shift to a bilateral policy is a brilliant essay on American policy toward Korea from the presidential election of 1952 to the Korean Armistice. The preceding chapters which describe the partially successful attempt to build an effective international agency for economic assistance to Korea reveal the UNKRA Agent General balancing precariously between and negotiating with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Advisory Committee established by the General Assembly, the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Unified Command in Washington, the United Nations Command in Tokyo, the Eighth United States Army in Korea, and the Government of the Republic of Korea.

This book is first rate reading for students of international administration. It owes its "feel" for problems of policy and administration both to the author's five years of experience with UNKRA (from 1951 to 1956) and to the fact that it is based to a considerable extent on the personal papers of J. Donald Kingsley who served as the first Agent General from 1951 to 1953. Political scientists are indebted to Mr. Kingsley for his cooperation in this scholarly endeavor, although they may not all agree with his concept, as *Agent General*, of UNKRA as "an instrument of American policy."

Something needs to be said about what the book is not. It is not an analysis of the impact of military policy and economic aid upon the Korean economy. Such a study remains to be made, hopefully in conjunction with research on the nature and results of Sino-Soviet bloc aid to North Korea. The book does, however, contain materials which are relevant for such an analysis; e.g., a discussion of the perennial problem of the exchange rate to which many Koreans continue to attribute most of their economic ills, and a discussion of anti-inflationary military policies which discouraged investment in industrial development at an early stage. Professor Lyons' purposes are "to analyze the roots of [the] twin

forces [of commitment to the principles of command and international responsibility], to isolate and study the principal factors in the formulation of policies to meet the conflict of these two forces, and, finally, to judge whether the outcome has been in the interests of the United States." The book does not really do the latter; nor does it specify the criteria by which such a judgment could be made. It raises important issues, however.

The book can serve as a source for the derivation or the partial confirmation of propositions in several areas of political science concern: *e.g.*, in international organization (The longer the delay in implementing an economic aid program by an international agency, the greater the divergence of the interests of the contributing states, the less their financial contributions, and the greater the discrepancy between actual and potential agency accomplishments), in American foreign policy (Given the goal of keeping allies out of the Communist bloc: the weaker an ally and the more chauvinistic its leaders, the less stringent the measures which can be employed to influence its decisions, and the greater its influence upon American policy), and in civil-military relations (The more the international situation is defined in terms of combat conditions the broader the definition of environmental aspects as relevant to the principle of command responsibility, and the stronger the military resistance to civilian efforts to define spheres of autonomous action).

The book will be of great interest in Korea and, unless suppressed by someone as being "too controversial," may well be translated into Korean. It is to be hoped that a Korean scholar might be permitted and encouraged to undertake a companion study of the decisions of the Republic of Korea Government with respect to military policy and economic aid from 1950 to 1953. Perhaps such a project would interest the faculty of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University.—GLENN D. PAIGE, *Princeton University*.

*Grants, Loans, and Local Currencies: Their Role in Foreign Aid*, By ROBERT E. ASHER. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961. Pp. ix, 142. Paper \$1.50; cloth \$2.50.)

Not the capacity nor the misgivings of the country giving aid but the need of the receiving country is the main point of emphasis in the present study. Assuming, of course, that the recipient country can discipline its economy sufficiently to justify outside aid—and that it has absorptive capacity in terms of technical and administrative skills—the need is that which is

required to sustain a progressive increase in national output. To that end, the author feels that the United States can afford to do its part, uninhibited by doubts about its capacity or by cautious restrictions imposed by Congress. Published in May, 1961, the study supports the Administration's comprehensive proposals for revising the machinery and procedures of United States foreign aid. Through clarification of what is involved in the various types of aid, it seeks to clear the way for a more dynamic prosecution of a policy, which, in shifting contexts, has been pursued for more than fifteen years and which seems likely to continue indefinitely.

It is interesting that even in absolute terms the volume of American aid has been declining: from \$5.7 billion in 1949 to \$3.7 billion in 1959 (these figures being "net" after subtraction of any returns in interest and principal). Moreover, the ratio of foreign aid expenditure to gross national product declined from 2.5 percent in 1946 and 1947 to 2 percent in 1950, 1 percent in 1955, and 0.8 percent in 1959.

Nevertheless, the total volume of foreign grants and credits provided by the United States government from July 1, 1945 to December 21, 1960 is not inconsiderable, amounting to a gross of \$85 billion. The net over-all figure—after adjustment for returns—is \$75 billion. But because of various exclusions—notably the investment of the United States in certain international institutions—this total is an understatement of about \$7 billion. On the other hand, "the inclusion of expenditures that would almost certainly have been made by the Government for military equipment and agricultural commodities, even if there were no foreign aid programs, probably inflates the burden by \$10 to \$20 billion."

The author is not persuaded that grants as compared with loans are demoralizing and he makes a good case in support of his contention. He strongly opposes the shift in American policy in the past few years which favors, as a matter of principle, loans over grants. Preferring that the form of aid be determined by the circumstances of each recipient country, he recognizes that in not a few instances exclusion of the grant would mean abandonment of any prospect of significant growth in the national output, for him the touchstone of a defensible policy.

There is delusion, the author feels, in payment by the foreign government for our agricultural surpluses in its own currency and also in use of its own currency in repayment of "soft" loans. This dodge merely gives what is essentially a grant the appearance of a loan and has the added disadvantage of placing in American hands ever mounting sums within foreign countries (for example, in India by 1963 rupees the equivalent

of \$2.5 billion), which can only result in serious political embarrassment.

The author treats foreign aid primarily from the economic point of view. Our sister discipline has made impressive progress in coping with the complexities of moving the underdeveloped countries into the stream of modernity. Aid, however, is not defensible merely in economic terms. Many of us feel, like the author, that there is a connection between foreign aid and a stable world: that ultimately such a policy can and must be justified in terms of the political interest of the United States. The reviewer, however, knows of no successful endeavor to spell out the precise nature of the connection. To assert, as the author does, that democracy is the goal is overly simple. At the very least it is still far off in most underdeveloped countries; nor would its achievement seem to be an absolute prerequisite to stability. The political scientist has yet to chart the devious paths and pitfalls of foreign aid as it relates to ultimate political consequences.—EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, *Indiana University*.

*The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study in Politics and Diplomacy.* BY WILLIAM R. WILLOUGHBY. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961. Pp. xiv, 381. \$6.00.)

The St. Lawrence-Great Lakes water system has always had a peculiar fascination for historians who have been prompted by the same urge as the early explorers to pursue the long trail of romance and adventure up its waters into the very heart of a gigantic continent. But for the student of economics and politics it has added attractions. The system by no means provides the easy, natural admission to the centre of the continent which a superficial glance at the map might suggest. Many obstructions block the path and become more, rather than less, serious as technological advances bring ever larger ships and introduce competing forms of transportation. For the economic historian these constitute the interesting facts of life surrounding the St. Lawrence system. But, for the student of politics, the most significant feature is that the system happens, also, to form a large part of the boundary line between two nations; and, thereby, as Professor Willoughby's detailed study shows, hangs a long and complex tale.

Many scholars have dealt with specific aspects of this story, but Professor Willoughby has now given us for the first time a full panorama sweeping over a century-and-a-half, the focus shifting now to the American and now to the Canadian side of the border. The rigorous chronological approach tends to produce considerable repetition but the tale, nevertheless, is one of sustained interest and even (although we now know the

denouement) of suspense over the eventual outcome. The author has ransacked the archives and other unplumbed sources on both sides of the border in order to follow the intricate diplomatic and political maneuvering associated with the negotiations which always accompanied any joint or even unilateral undertaking on each stretch of the great waterway. He provides ample documentation for Franklin Roosevelt's succinct commentary on the difficulties inherent in these projects: "we have not been able to arrange matters so that both peoples have had the same idea at the same time."

After-dinner orators, American and Canadian patriots alike, have been wont to sing the praises of the "great undefended border" of which the St. Lawrence waterway makes up a major part. But what is clear from Professor Willoughby's analysis is that this has been a border along which a variety of deeply-entrenched economic interests have developed and where fierce partisan and patriotic emotions have had free play. When we add to this picture of sensitive nationalism and opposing economic interests the further features of two federal systems having to contend with states' rights or provincial politicians and, over the course of time, a variety of domestic regulatory bodies and international commissions, we have a political "mix" which lends itself to almost infinite permutations and combinations. These have provided the off-set balance wheels which have responded so differently at particular points of time to what Professor Willoughby (making effective use of a phrase employed by John Gaus) calls the "coercive" forces in society. The wonder is that all of these disjunctive forces have, from time to time, been brought into phase and that cooperative action has been possible.

As an experiment in international regional planning for a great waterways basin, along the lines of the T. V. A., for example, the record is far from reassuring. Undoubtedly, narrow, nationalistic considerations and even military precautions contributed to the repeated failures recorded in this study. Perhaps, too, if the basin had divided two unitary, rather than two federal, states the achievements would have come sooner and more sensibly. But, the more one examines this story the clearer it becomes that the international political machinery for dealing with the issues arising between the two countries was seldom at fault. One might even hazard the guess that if this basin, rather than dividing two nations, had fallen completely within the boundaries of one country, the development of its transportation and power potential would probably not have been accomplished much sooner than it, in fact, was. The economic forces lined up on each side of the river system were frequently in complete

agreement; the difficulties were being created by competing domestic forces lying behind and around them. One of the most useful features of Professor Willoughby's study is the manner in which he has brought all these contradictory elements into the open and revealed their true part in prolonging or blocking decisions about the waterway.

The two national protagonists in Professor Willoughby's epic may derive a moral and a lesson from his story. The tensions and conflict of interests between—and within—nations, even under what must be considered promising conditions in this far from ideal world, are not easily or quickly resolved. The patience, persistence and dedication of political leaders will always be strained by the intransigent forces of self-interest, pride and fear seeking to resist the logical coercive forces of society. And, if this be true of two old national friends, how much more is this the case in the larger family of nations now seated uneasily around the tables of the United Nations!—J. E. HODGETTS, *Queen's University* (Kingston, Ontario).

*France, Europe, and the Two World Wars.* By RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. 346. \$7.00.)

This useful book retells in summary form the events which led to World War I and then concentrates on the period between the two wars. In this it produces no new discoveries and the author had no such intentions, as is indicated by his use of primarily secondary sources. What he actually attempts is to place the relationship of France and Germany, as well as the internal evolution in both countries, into the context of the search for a method to stabilize and to organize Europe. This book is the story of the failure of this search.

In zeroing in on the Franco-German conflict, the author does not just select a detail. He sees in the twentieth century a great transitional passage comparable to the sixteenth. It followed a century which, while far from static, was rather stable, and whose stability appeared even greater in comparison to what followed. It was characterized by the unleashing of popular forces furthered by the French and the Industrial Revolutions. But this phenomenon was virtually confined to Europe (and to the United States which remained long concerned with her own and the hemisphere's development) and hence Europe became virtually the mistress of the world outside the Western Hemisphere. This mastery was achieved, not by Europe working in concert, but by individual European states locked in intense competition with one another. Thus the conflict for the mastery of Europe had as its prize the claim for the mastery of most of the world. With so

much power concentrated in so small an area the seeds of deadly conflict were laid, despite the very real consciousness of a common heritage which existed among the combatants, at least those of World War I.

Because the nineteenth century had been so relatively peaceful the Powers had perhaps thought that they had learned how to accommodate their differences: 1914 destroyed that illusion. What followed then was an attempt to return to the interrupted normalcy of the pre-World War I period, a futile attempt as the author shows, because there had been more than a great war. An order had died and nothing could revive it. The participants in this drama were too close to it to understand this and their inability to deal with this situation marked the uneasy twenty years which ended in 1939. World Wars I and II therefore constitute, in the opinion of the author, a single period.

World War I was not just a Franco-German quarrel. But it showed the potential of German power and thus made the issue of the control of that power the central problem of the interwar period. France, on the other hand, had not been the sole belligerent of World War I on the allied side, but geography decreed that the war should primarily be fought on her territory. This caused France's main preoccupation with security from Germany. Moreover, the revolution in Russia as well as Britain's and America's limited objectives made France the principal executor of the policy of containing Germany.

The author, whose familiarity with French events is quite evidently greater than his penetration into the intricacies of German politics, has come to the conclusion that France's fears were well founded but that her policy appeared to Britain and even more to America as if it were solely dictated by the will to keep the fruits of victory. In reality, says the author, France had neither the power, nor even the will to carry out such a role; in fact she flexed her muscles only when it was safe to do so, as for instance in the Ruhr episode, but recoiled when it was really necessary but risky. The result was surrender to the incompetent British leadership of 1936.

This thesis is well and persuasively presented in a readable manner. Evidently the author intended to cover a wide range of audience because this book contains both quite technical passages and explanations which could be considered necessary only for the total neophyte. This is sometimes irritating but does not otherwise detract from the work.

In a book of this sort it is easy enough to point out differences of interpretations, especially in the sections on Germany. But they are more than outweighed by a generally fair and dispassionate



treatment interspersed with passages of considerable insight, like the statement that the peace treaties which closed World War I were instruments that could have been used in a variety of ways and that it was their use, rather than the nature of the treaties themselves which were of such pivotal importance.

The book ends with a brief essay on France since 1945, the value of which does not measure up to the main body of the book. It touches on far more issues than can be accommodated in so few pages, and would perhaps have been better omitted.

In general, however, this book is challenging and interesting. For a political scientist it is difficult to read this narrative without emotion; 1939 is not so long ago and this reviewer belongs to the generation which fought in World War II. Yet, so fast is the pace of our times that it seems very remote and the account of the struggle for hegemony in Europe and by European powers seems curiously unreal. But that is certainly not the fault of the author.—ROBERT G. NEUMANN, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

*Mr. Europe, A Political Biography of Henri Spaak.*

By J. H. HUIZINGA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 248. \$6.50.)

This book is a fast-moving and readable biography of Paul Henri Spaak by an experienced Dutch journalist. Mr. Huizinga very perceptively suggests that Spaak continued in the Jacobin tradition of Paul Janson, his maternal grandfather, who was Belgium's most distinguished tribune of the last third of the nineteenth century. Eventually Spaak also became his country's leading tribune. However, whereas Janson practiced politics in a time of relative calm, his grandson's political career unfolded during Europe's fifty years' crisis.

In spite of himself, Huizinga is forced to record that Spaak's success as a politician was largely due to his ability to set his political sails to rapidly changing political winds. Without moral qualms or psychic strains Spaak changed from a radical Liberal to a moderate Socialist in the twenties; from a moderate to a radical Socialist in the early thirties; from an extreme anti-ministerial Socialist to a Cabinet member in an overwhelmingly anti-Socialist ministry in the second half of the thirties; from an ardent champion of the League of Nations into an eloquent neutralist and Munichite; from an appeaser to an ardent opponent of Hitler soon after the fall of France; from a close friend of King Leopold into the King's enemy; and from an expedient cooperator with the Communists in the early thirties to a flaming anti-Bolshevik after World War Two.

On two occasions Spaak actually came close to

missing out. In a chapter significantly entitled "Saved by the King" the author shows that Leopold's refusal to accept his Cabinet's bid for an accommodation rather than fundamental opposition to Nazism drove Spaak and his colleagues into exile after the fall of France. And in 1949-50 Spaak pressed for Leopold's abdication only after his own Socialist party threatened direct, extra-parliamentary action. In this instance Spaak decided to take the leadership of the anti-Leopold movement not only in order to prevent it from getting out of hand but also so as not to be left without a political following.

Spaak emerges from this narrow political biography as an expert politician whose major assets are his oratorical skills and his sharp sense of the possible and the expedient, and whose underlying motivation is a passion for political action and power. Perhaps he became the first president of the U. N. General Assembly, the Ministerial Committee of OEEC, and the European Assembly in Strasbourg not so much because his talents and achievements were recognized both inside and outside Belgium, but rather because the major powers desperately need politicians from small nations who will deftly preside over inter-allied and inter-coalition organizations.

Since Huizinga does not claim to have written a scholarly book there is no need to take him to task for his inadequate documentation and his pedestrian political and social analysis. On the other hand, the publisher should be criticized for calling this book *Mr. Europe* when the author devotes only a bare fifteen pages to Spaak's all-European activities.—ARNO J. MAYER, *Princeton University*.

*Population Control—The Imminent World Crisis.*

EDITED BY MELVIN G. SCHIMM. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1961. Pp. 253.

Preoccupation with the drag exerted by the population explosion in economically underdeveloped areas upon their prospects for escape from age-old scourges of poverty, disease, and illiteracy, has in recent years been yielding a rising tide of publications concerning various aspects of the population problem.

Every reader of Schimm's symposium will remain indebted to him and the seventeen contributors for the successful accomplishment of their assignment. As the editor stated, this book is directed "to the end that we may perceive the full dimensions of this momentous impending challenge and be prepared to respond appropriately to it."

Statistical data concerning current rates of growth and aggregate increments in human numbers are reviewed by Robert C. Cook, director of the Population Reference Bureau, in the opening



chapter "World Population Growth," while A. J. Jaffe's contribution bears upon "Population Trends and Controls in Underdeveloped Countries." Both bring out the historically unprecedented nature of contemporary demographic phenomena. Drawing on his research findings in Puerto Rico, Jaffe stresses the ability of an economy launched upon the path of modernization to raise output without requiring additional labor. In attempting to explain this seeming paradox, Jaffe provides an incomplete answer: he considers only the effect upon employment resulting from transfer of labor out of traditional, low productivity sectors of the economy into "newly-opened factory" employment characterized by high levels of productivity; his explanation thus fails to include the displacement effect, caused by continuous improvements in productivity in modern sectors of the economy, which further stems the absorptive capacity for labor.

After pointing out that output of food in developed continents increased from the mid-30's to the mid-50's more rapidly than the growth of their populations, while in underdeveloped continents the picture, with insignificant exceptions, was the reverse, Jaffe concludes that "the people in underdeveloped areas consume, on a per capita basis, between one quarter and one third less food than do the people of the developed areas." As such, the statement is misleading for it disregards the difference in caloric origin of the respective diets—if the high proportion of our food consumption derived from secondary calories were translated back into primary calories the differential in per capita consumption would not be of an order of merely 30 per cent but closer to a ratio of 3:1 in our favor.

The broad foundations laid by Cook and Jaffe support individual country studies dealing with population control in Japan, Puerto Rico and India.

No symposium on population control could fail to come to grips with the dominant religious viewpoints within Western Society. "A Roman Catholic View of Population Control" is presented by Norman St. John-Stevás. As spokesman of a relatively conciliatory stand on a number of side issues, he concedes, for instance, that "an almost universal skepticism [with respect to the Roman Catholic concept of natural law] should be treated as relevant when a policy of enforcing the precept by means of civil legislation [e.g., the Connecticut statute] is considered," and advances the claim that "the practice of family planning is enjoined [by the Roman Catholic Church] as a duty, the dispute with contemporaries being confined to the means employed." Yet, although the risk of pregnancy, according to the data he quotes, may be five times as great for women who follow the

rhythm method as compared to those using contraceptives, St. John-Stevás reiterates that "the methods of family planning acceptable to the Roman Catholic Church are limited to abstinence and use of the safe period" and that "the medical experiments now in progress to develop a contraceptive pill, even if successful, will not lessen Roman Catholic-Protestant conflict over birth control, since such a pill is subject to the same condemnation by Roman Catholic theologians as other forms of contraception."

As for emigration as a solution for over-population problems, St. John-Stevás quotes Pius XII: "If then, in some locality the land offers the possibility of supporting a large number of people, the sovereignty of the state, although it must be respected, cannot be exaggerated to the point that access to this land is, for inadequate or unjustified reasons, denied to needy and decent people from other nations. . . ." In the decade of the 60's, in the course of which China's population alone will increase by as many people as the total population of the United States, more specific operational guidance seems to be required for statesmen both in Washington and Moscow.

On the recently made recommendation [Draper Report] calling for aid in birth control techniques upon request of the recipient government, St. John-Stevás states: ". . . nor should foreign aid funds be used to implement such a program, even at the request of the designated state."

Richard M. Fagley, author of the well-known *Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility*, presents the Protestant viewpoint on "responsible parenthood." Salient Protestant teaching is summed up as follows: "The implication is that the medical knowledge that enables a couple to avert conception is no more 'artificial' or 'unnatural' than the medical knowledge vouchsafed for the reduction of disease and premature death."

Readers of this journal may find of greatest interest to them the last chapter of the symposium—"Some Observations on the Political Economy of Population Growth" contributed by Arthur S. Miller. He formulates his central thesis as "the relatively simple proposition that population growth will create the need for more organization, which, in turn, will result in further enhancement of group (including societal), rather than individual, values." For an illustration of his reasoning: ". . . if the time ever comes when saturation of population exists and . . . satellites are pressed into use to siphon off some of the pressure, that, too, would require governmental control, both to produce the satellites and to choose those who would be banished (or allowed to escape, depending on one's viewpoint) to live on an orbiting mechanical planet. The end is more control, whichever way the knife cuts." Being

pessimistic about the survival of individual freedoms in a world of mass population and greatly increased organization, Miller advocates a conscious American policy directed toward "attainment of the size of population that would be reasonably likely to produce the conditions (economic, political, and social) enabling the maintenance of a society in which democratic values are maximized."

To sum up, this is an excellent book dealing with one of the gravest problems of our time.—STOMA KAGAN, *University of Oregon*.

*The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and in the United States.* By L. ERADES AND WESLEY L. GOULD. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1961. Pp. 510. \$11.00.)

This book is the first of two projected volumes on the subject, and it is therefore difficult to evaluate its contribution and the extent to which it fulfills its ambitious title. It is built around the proposition that international law is more subject to change by the decisions of national courts than by those of international tribunals. Since the decisions of national courts are inevitably influenced by the constitutions, institutions, laws and traditions of each country, the main body of the work is prefaced by a long discussion of the national and municipal institutions and legal framework of the Netherlands and the United States.

This introduction is followed by chapters dealing with the extent to which domestic courts are bound to apply treaties and other international agreements. Then follows a similar section dealing with customary international law. There is also a discussion of the conflict between municipal law and international law, and two chapters dealing with the effect of antecedent and subsequent legislation upon treaties. The final section deals with conflicts between constitutions and international law. In each instance, the topics are discussed from a historical point of view. Thus we are told, for example, what various courts, judges and other legal authorities have said at various times on a particular subject. These many citations, quotations and dicta occasionally make it

difficult to find out what the contemporary practice is in each country. The index is not sufficiently detailed to remedy this situation.

Judge Erades, who contributes most of the sections dealing with the Netherlands, is more of a legalist than his confrere Professor Gould. His point of departure is usually the relevant articles of the present, or of some past constitution of the Netherlands. Mr. Gould, while maintaining high standards, is a trifle less cautious, and happily is not afraid to raise certain questions that he is not always able fully to answer.

Throughout the book, the authors attempt to go beyond the "comparative approach" of yesteryear. Thus, this is not a series of unconnected essays. Although each topic is discussed separately, country by country, the section is invariably terminated by an attempt to synthesize, to compare, to contrast the relevant findings. Impressive though they be, one is bound to ask whether Professor Gould's "comparative summaries" go far enough. Unless and until comparative studies of this kind come to some tentative theoretical conclusions, which may in due course facilitate the formulation of more explicit hypotheses, research in international law will not keep pace with the important work now firmly under way in other branches of public law.

Perhaps because this is a trans-atlantic undertaking, the style is often complex, and sometimes verbose. Both authors have obviously done a great deal of research. With the exception of the first few chapters, where it is uneven and inadequate, the documentation is profuse. An English translation has thoughtfully been provided to the titles of the Dutch works cited in the footnotes. The text is unfortunately marred by an unusually large number of typographical errors.

Students of public law in the United States, the Netherlands and elsewhere owe a considerable debt to Messrs. Erades and Gould for having undertaken this work. A reasonable expectation is that the second volume, which will deal with case law on substantive issues of international law in both countries, will complete the picture, and thus lay a solid foundation for similar studies in this area.—DAVID A. BOOTH, *Michigan State University*.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

*Catholic University of America*

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

*General*

Bell, H. H. Modern Analytical Techniques. *Foreign Service Journal*. October, 1961.

Bennett, J. C. The Nuclear Dilemma—a Discussion. *Christianity and Crisis*. November, 1961.

Engelhardt, H. Der Ökumenische Rat der Kirchen. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. September, 1961.

Fuller, J. F. C. World Revolution and War. *Ordnance*. November, 1961.

The Future of the Cold War; after Berlin—. *Nation's Business*. October, 1961.

Galkin, A. Some Aspects of the Problem of Peace and War. *International Affairs* (Moscow). November, 1961.

Guiron, R. J. Das Zustandekommen der Afro-Asiatischen Zusammenarbeit. *Europa Archiv*. June 25, 1961.

Gyorgy, A. Nationalism as a Factor in International Relations. *JAG Journal*. June, 1961.

Henle, G. Grundfragen der Aussenpolitik Heute. Ein Weltpolitischer Rundblick. *Europa Archiv*. August 10, 1961.

Hull, W. J. Growing Pains of International Technical Co-operation. *International Labour Review*. October, 1961.

Inozemtsev, N. Results and Prospects of the Development of International Relations. *International Affairs* (Moscow). November, 1961.

Jack, H. A. The Belgrade Conference. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. November, 1961.

Knorr, K. The International System; Theoretical Essays. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

Korovin, Y. Semantic Camouflage of Imperialistic Politics. *International Affairs* (Moscow). November, 1961.

Lowenthal, R. The Points of the Compass. *Encounter*. September, 1960.

Maresca, A. La Convenzione di Vienna sulla Relazioni Diplomatiche. *La Comunità Internazionale*. April, 1961.

Peters, R. The Future of International Science. *New Scientist*. September, 1961.

Rabinowitch, E. The Stowe Conferences. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. November, 1961.

S., R. La Conférence des Pays Non-Alignés à Belgrade. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

Scheel, W. Weltpolitische Perspektiven der Europäisch-Afrikanischen Zusammenarbeit. *Europa Archiv*. October 25, 1961.

Schleicher, H. Sozialismus und Krieg. Betrachtungen über die Ideologische Auseinandersetzung der Jugoslawischen und Chinesischen Kommunisten. *Europa Archiv*. May 25, 1961.

Von Imhoff, C. Die Russische Orthodoxie beim Ökumenischen Rat. *Aussenpolitik*. November, 1961.

Weaver, G. The International Labor Conference of 1961. *Monthly Labor Review*. September, 1961.

Wheeler, G. E. Propaganda and Counter-Propaganda in Asia. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. July, 1961.

Worsnop, R. L. East-West Negotiations. *Editorial Research Reports*. October 11, 1961.

*Military and Functional Questions*

Coser, L. A. The Termination of Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. December, 1961.

Dougherty, J. E. The Disarmament Debate: a Review of Current Literature (Part One). *Orbis*. Fall, 1961.

Dudley, P. L. Views on Arms Control. *JAG Journal*. June, 1961.

Frank, J. D. Atomic Arms and Pre-Atomic Man. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. November, 1961.

Harrigan, A. Seapower in the Sixties: Deterrent and Determinant. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. June, 1961.

Kecskemeti, P. Disarmament, Arms Control, and Strategic Analysis. *Science*. December, 1961.

Lindsay, F. A. Unconventional Warfare. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

Miksche, F. O. The Case for Nuclear Sharing. *Orbis*. Fall, 1961.

Ney, V. Guerrilla Warfare: Annotated Bibliography. *Military Review*. November, 1961.

Read, T. Command and Control. Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1961.

Problems of Anti-Bacteriological Defense: According to Data from Foreign Literature—USSR. Washington, U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1961.

Rothschild, J. H. Can Peace Be Guaranteed? *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. November, 1961.

Schelling, T. C. The Future of Arms Control. *Operations Research*. September, 1961.

Schuman, F. L. The Impasse of Disarmament. *Current History*. November, 1961.

Sheynin, Y. Disarmament or 'Balance of Terror'. *Survival*. November, 1961.

Singer, J. D. Weapons Technology and International Stability. *Centennial Review*. Fall, 1961.  
 ———. From Deterrence to Disarmament. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1961.

Watkins, T. H. The Congo Airlift. *Air University Quarterly Review*. Summer, 1961.

Wohlstetter, A. Über die Teilnahme an der Nuklearen Rüstung. *Europa Archiv*. June 10, 1961.

Yeager, P. B. The New Age of the Sea. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. June, 1961.

Zuckerman, S. Judgment and Control in Modern Warfare. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

#### United States

Emerson, R. American Policy in Africa. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

Eliot, T. L., Jr. Schooling for Foreign Economic Policymakers. *Foreign Service Journal*. December, 1961.

Foreign Trade and the National Interest. Washington, Committee for a National Trade Policy, 1961.

Haskins, C. P. Technology, Science and American Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

Hester, H. B. Our Foreign Policy and Propaganda. *Journal of Human Relations*. Autumn, 1961.

Huntington, S. P. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in American Military Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Jones, R. W. Administration in a Changing World. *Foreign Service Journal*. December, 1961.

Kaplan, M. A. United States Foreign Policy in a Revolutionary Age. Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1961.

Kraft, J. The Comeback of the State Department. *Harper's Magazine*. November, 1961.

Mathews, E. G. The FSO and High Policy. *Foreign Service Journal*. November, 1961.

Miller, F. P. The Role of the Department of State in Educational and Cultural Affairs. *Department of State Bulletin*. November 13, 1961.

Montgomery, J. D. Aid to Africa: New Test for U. S. Policy. New York, Foreign Policy Association—World Affairs Center, 1961.

Rivkin, A. Principal Elements of U. S. Policy towards Under-Developed Countries. *International Affairs* (London). October, 1961.

Schilling, W. R. The H-Bomb Decision. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1961.

Smith, P. A. Opinions, Publics, and World Affairs in the United States. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1961.

Templin, R. T. American Foreign Policy in Our World Today. *Journal of Human Relations*. Autumn, 1961.

#### Latin America

Doeker, G. The Montevideo Treaty and the European Economic Community: a Comparative Legal Analysis. *Australian Outlook*. August, 1961.

Draper, T. Cubans and Americans; a Report from New York. *Encounter*. July, 1961.

Feder, E. Some Reflections on Latin America's "Common Market." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. July, 1961.

Harbron, J. D. Castro in the Americas. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1961.

Vallet, R. L'Amérique Latine après la Conférence de Punta-del-Este. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

X. Autour de la Mer des Antilles. *Revue Militaire Générale*. October, 1961.

#### United Kingdom

The Common Market and the United Kingdom. London, Westminster Bank, 1961.

Day, A. The Economic Case for Britain Joining the Common Market. *Listener*. October 19, 1961.

Kitzinger, U. Für und Wider den Beitritt Grossbritanniens zur EWG. *Europa Archiv*. July 25, 1961.

Merigot, J. G. La "Conversion" de la Grande-Bretagne à la Communauté Économique Européenne. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

#### Western Europe

Erler, F. Probleme und Perspektiven der Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik nach dem 13. August 1961. *Europa Archiv*. November 25, 1961.

Furniss E. G., Jr. De Gaulle's France and NATO: an Interpretation. *International Organization*. Summer, 1961.

Schütze, W. Die Französische Atombewaffnung im Spiegel der Parlamentarischen Debatten. *Europa Archiv*. May 10, 1961.

#### Central Europe

Bentzien, J. Die Luft-Korridore von und nach Berlin. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1961.

Cornides, W. Berlin—und Was Dann. *Europa Archiv*. July 25, 1961.

Dalma, A. The Third Berlin Offensive of the Cold War. *Military Review*. December, 1961.

Hottelet, R. C. Berlin and Beyond. *Orbis*. Fall, 1961.

Rauschming, D. Die Berlin-Frage im Neueren Schrifttum (Review Article). *Europa Archiv*. November 25, 1961.

Vernant, J. Berlin: les Rouages de l'Affaire. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

Von Studnitz, H. G. Zur Inventur der Deut-

schen Aussenpolitik. *Aussenpolitik*. November, 1961.

Zemanek, K. Neutral Austria in the United Nations. *International Organization*. Summer, 1961.

#### *Southern Europe and Mediterranean*

Austria in the South Tyrol Conflict. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. September, 1961.

Issawi, C. The Christian-Muslim Frontier in the Mediterranean: a History of Two Peninsulas. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Savory, D. Crisis in South Tyrol—the Cause. *Contemporary Review*. October, 1961.

Nobre de Mello, M. Aspects Juridiques Fondamentaux de la "Question Portugaise" à l'O.N.U. *Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January, 1961.

Von Zitzewitz, H. Spanien zwischen NATO und Neutralität. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1961.

#### *Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

Balinky, A. S. The Proclaimed Emergence of Communism in the USSR. *Social Research*. Autumn, 1961.

Barker, C. N. An Assessment of Soviet Communist Aims Viewed from "the Enemy's Position." *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*. October, 1961.

Berkes, R. N. The Soviet Union in the United Nations. *Current History*. November, 1961.

Brinkley, G. Foreign Policy and the Transition to Communism. *Survey*. October, 1961.

Gapanovich, J. J. Russian Diplomacy, Old and New. *Australian Outlook*. August, 1961.

Hayter, W. Totalitarian Approaches to Diplomacy. *Listener*. November 9, 1961.

Höpker, W. The Black Sea an Inland "Red" Sea? *NATO's Fifteen Nations*. October, 1961.

Kertesz, S. D. The U.S.S.R. and the Communist Bloc. *Current History*. November, 1961.

Kordt, E. Zur Kommunistischen Weltpolitik und Ihren Inneren Voraussetzungen. Hinweise auf Neuerscheinungen seit dem 20. Parteikongress. *Europa Archiv*. May 10, 1961.

Labin, S. La Technique de la Propagande Communiste. La Guerre Politique Soviétique. *Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. April, 1961.

Morris, B. Sino-Soviet Relations; a Summing Up. *Survey*. December, 1961.

Moseley, P. E. Khrushchev's Party Congress. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

Ray, H. Das Geheimnis der Sowjetfolge in Asien-Afrika. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1961.

Russia and China. *Survey*. October, 1961.

Russia and the Western Powers: a Chronology since the Vienna Meeting of 3 and 4 June. *World Today*. December, 1961.

Sojak, V. Peaceful Coexistence—the Only Way

to European Security. *International Affairs* (Moscow). July, 1961.

Soviet-American Bilateral Disarmament Negotiations. *New Times* (Moscow). October, 1961.

Stackelberg, G. A. Renewed Attacks on the National Bourgeoisie. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. August, 1961.

St. John, A. Russia and Red China—Mutual Nemeses. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. August, 1961.

On Thermonuclear Coexistence. *Survey*. December, 1961.

Valluy, J. Au Sujet du Manifeste des 81. *Revue Militaire Générale*. October, 1961.

USSR Technical Assistance to Foreign Countries. Washington, U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1961.

Von Huebbenet, G. Polen als Statist der Weltpolitik. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1961.

Zagoria, D. S. The 1957 Moscow Conference and the Sino-Soviet Dispute. *China Quarterly*. July, 1961.

#### *Middle East and Africa*

Alexandre, P. L'Afrique Noire et le Mythe Chinois. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

Arden-Clarke, C. The West and Africa's Challenge. *African Affairs*. October, 1961.

Clinton, E. J. The United Nations and the Congo. *American Bar Association Journal*. November, 1961.

Cohen, A. The New Africa and the United Nations. *African Affairs*. October, 1961.

Cox, I. Crisis of Colonialism in Central Africa. *International Affairs* (Moscow). July, 1961.

Grandchamp, R. Les Méandres de la Politique Soviétique au Moyen-Orient. *Revue Militaire d'Information*. October, 1961.

Guiton, R. J. Die Auswärtige Politik Tunesiens. *Europa Archiv*. November 25, 1961.

Keita, M. The Foreign Policy of Mali. *International Affairs* (London). October, 1961.

Kuwait-Iraq Dispute, 1961. New York, International Review Service, 1961.

Mohan, J. South Africa and the Suez Crisis. *International Journal*. Autumn, 1961.

Stauffer, R. B. Economic Assistance and Ethiopia's Foreign Policy. *Orbis*. Fall, 1961.

Tunisian-French Dispute; Bizerta; Sahara; UN Action. New York, International Review Service, 1961.

Woodhouse, C. M. Middle Eastern Prospects: a Confession of Cautious Optimism. *Encounter*. April, 1961.

#### *South and Southeast Asia*

Caroe, O. The North-West Frontier, Old and New. *Royal Central Asian Journal*. July, 1961.

Crozier, B. Peking and the Laotian Crisis: an Interim Appraisal. *China Quarterly*. July, 1961.

Labin, S. Entretiens en Asie. *Revue Militaire Générale*. October, 1961.

Roll, C. Thailand. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1961.

#### *Far East and Pacific*

Bishop, P. V. Anzus: Shield or Shroud? *International Journal*. Autumn, 1961.

Contemporary China: a Bibliography. New York, U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1961.

Dorsey, G. L. Chinese Recognition: Law and Policy in Perspective. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*. October, 1961.

Eitner, H. J. China als Künftige Militärmacht. *Aussenpolitik*. November, 1961.

Falk, S. L. Organization and Military Power: the Japanese High Command in World War II. *Political Science Quarterly*. September and December, 1961.

Halpern, A. M. The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model. *China Quarterly*. July, 1961.

Jacobini, H. B. Main Patterns of Philippine Foreign Policy. *Review of Politics*. October, 1961.

Kindermann, G. K. Paradoxien der Inneren und Auswärtigen Politik Japans. *Europa Archiv*. July 10, 1961.

Levi, W. Formosa and "the China Issue." *Current History*. December, 1961.

McConaughy, W. P. The American Image of Japan. *Department of State Bulletin*. October 23, 1961.

Passin, H. Sino-Indian Cultural Relations. *China Quarterly*. July, 1961.

Seidensticker, E. Will Japan Turn to Neutralism? *Life International*. October 9, 1961.

Steiner, H. A. Communist China in the World Community. *International Conciliation*. September, 1961.

Warnbrunn, W. Observations of Education and International Exchange in Asia. A Report of a Study Trip, September to December, 1960. New York, National Association of Foreign Student Advisers, 1961.

#### International Economic Policy and Relations

Frank, I. The OECD and Aid to the Lesser Developed Countries. *SAIS Review*. Autumn, 1961.

Gilbert, R. S. World Payments and the IMF: —the Problem for Vienna. *Banker*. September, 1961.

Grotewold, A. Some Aspects of the Geography of International Trade. *Economic Geography*. October, 1961.

Hultman, C. W. Agricultural Disposals as Foreign Aid: an Appraisal. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. October, 1961.

Ködderitzsch, W. Entwicklungsländer und Wirtschaftswachstum. *Europa Archiv*. June 25, 1961.

New Thinking at the Fund. *Banker*. October, 1961.

#### International Law

Accioly, H. Das Asylrecht. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. September, 1961.

Air and Space Law. Report of the Forty-Ninth Conference. London, International Law Association, 1961.

Andrassy, J. L'Utilisation des Eaux des Bassins Fluviaux Internationaux. *Egyptian Review of International Law*, 1960.

Aversa, A. As Determined by the United States of America. *American University Law Review*. June, 1961.

Azzam, I. A. The Justiciability of International Disputes. *Egyptian Review of International Law*, 1960.

B., G. Sulla Personalità delle Organizzazioni Internazionali. *Diritto Internazionale*. January, 1961.

Baade, H. W. The Eichmann Trial: Some Legal Aspects. *Duke Law Journal*. Summer, 1961.

Bains, J. S. The Diversion of International Rivers. *Indian Journal of International Law*. July, 1960.

Baxter, R. R. The Definition of War. *Egyptian Review of International Law*, 1960.

Bierzanek, R. La Nature Juridique de la Haute Mer. *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*. April, 1961.

Bracht, H. W. Die Auslegung Internationaler Verträge in der Sowjetischen Völkerrechtslehre. *Osteuropa Recht*. June, 1961.

Byrd, E. M., Jr. Constitutional Limits on International Agreements in the Space Age. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March, 1961.

Christol, C. Q. Remedies for Individuals under World Law. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March, 1961.

Connell, H. P. United States Protection of Private Foreign Investment through Treaties of Commerce and Navigation. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. September, 1961.

Cooper, J. C. Outer Space and the Law: an Engineering Problem. *Astronautics*. October, 1961.

De Visscher, C. L'Affaire du Droit de Passage sur Territoire Indien devant la Cour Internationale de Justice. *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*. October, 1960.

Current Developments in Air Space and Outer Space: Law, Science and Policy. Symposium.

*Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1961.

Dietze, G. The Disregard for Property in International Law. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March, 1961.

Duclos, P. Exploration d'Une Catégorie Juridique Naissante. *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*. April, 1961.

Gasteyger, C. Theorie und Praxis im Sowjetischen Völkerrecht. *Europa Archiv*. August 10, 1961.

Harris, D. J. European Court of Human Rights—the Lawless Case. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1961.

Hartwig, B. Der Israelisch-Ägyptische Streit um den Golf von Akaba. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. January, 1961.

The IMCO Opinion: A Study in Treaty Interpretation. *Duke Law Journal*. Spring, 1961.

Jessup, P. C. Trends and Developments in International Law in the Twentieth Century. *Indian Journal of International Law*. October, 1960.

Juridical Aspects of Co-existence. Report of the Forty-Ninth Conference. London, International Law Association, 1961.

Juridical Aspects of Nationalization and Foreign Property. Report of the Forty-Ninth Conference. London, International Law Association, 1961.

Kipp, H. Das Verbot der Diskriminierung im Modernen Friedensvölkerrecht. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. April, 1961.

Korovin, Y. International Law Today. *International Affairs* (Moscow). July, 1961.

Kunz, J. L. Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1961.

Lauterpacht, E. The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law—Survey and Comment. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1961.

Law of International Waterways. Report of the Forty-Ninth Conference. London, International Law Association, 1961.

Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer Space. *Columbia Law Review*. June, 1961.

Legal Problems of a United Nations Force. Report of the Forty-Ninth Conference. London, International Law Association, 1961.

Leifer, M. Human Rights in the European Community. *Australian Outlook*. August, 1961.

Lombard, L. M. African Conference on the Rule of Law Held at Lagos, Nigeria, in January. *American Bar Association Journal*. June, 1961.

Münch, I. Zur Objektivität in der Völkerrechtswissenschaft. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. January, 1961.

Opsahl, T. An "International Constitutional

Law?" *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, October, 1961.

P. G. B. La Prima Sentenza della Corte Europea di Diritto dell'Uomo. *Diritto Internazionale*. January, 1961.

Pallieri, G. B. La Comunità Europea e gli Ordinamenti Interni degli Stati Membri. *Diritto Internazionale*. January, 1961.

Panhuy, H. F. Regional or General International Law? A Misleading Dilemma. *Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht*. April, 1961.

Rao, K. K. The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. *Indian Journal of International Law*. July, 1960.

Die Rechtsfragen der Europäischen Einigung. *Europa Archiv*. October 25, 1961.

Richardson, G. L. A State of War and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. *American Bar Association Journal*. August, 1961.

Rosenne, S. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's Concept of the Task of the International Judge. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1961.

Roy, S. N. G. Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law? *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1961.

Satterfield, J. C. The San Jose Conference on World Peace through Law. *American Bar Association Journal*. October, 1961.

Schick, F. B. Space Law and Space Politics. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Simmonds, K. R. The Interhandel Case. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1961.

Smit, H. International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure. *Columbia Law Review*. June, 1961.

Sottile, A. Ideological and Economic Aggression. *Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January, 1961.

Sovereignty and International Responsibility, 1960. Symposium. *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1961.

Stein, E. Ist die "Deutsche Demokratische Republik" ein Staat? *Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts*. April, 1961.

Taylor, T. Large Questions in the Eichmann Case. *Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*. January, 1961.

Timberg, S. Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March, 1961.

Váli, F. A. The Santa Maria Case. *Northwestern University Law Review*. April, 1961.

Verzijl, J. H. W. La Cour Internationale de Justice en 1960. Affaire de la Sentence Arbitrale Rendue par le Roi d'Espagne le 23 Decembre 1906 (Honduras c. Nicaragua). *Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht*. April, 1961.

Von der Heydte, F. A. Atomare Kriegführung und Völkerrecht. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. April, 1961.

Webb, J. E. International Relations and Space. *Vital Speeches of the Day*. October 1, 1961.

Wright, Q. Some Legal Aspects of the Berlin Crisis. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1961.

#### International Organizations

##### *United Nations and Specialized Agencies*

Alexy, H. Die Inanspruchnahme des IGH durch die Organe der Vereinten Nationen. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. July, 1961.

Castrén, E. Some Aspects of the Future Activity of the United Nations. *Indian Journal of International Law*. October, 1960.

Claude, I. L. The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations. *International Organization*. Spring, 1961.

Delmas, C. Les Nations-Unies: Rêves et Réalités. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. November, 1961.

Goldstein, W. The Price of Keeping the U.N. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. October, 1961.

Holmes, J. The United Nations in the Congo. *International Journal*. Winter, 1960-61.

Jennings, R. Y. The United Nations, Force, and the Congo. *Listener*. October 19, 1961.

Johnson, D. H. N. The United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1961.

Kerley, E. L. The Powers of Investigation of the United Nations Security Council. *American Journal of International Law*. October, 1961.

Kunzmann, K. H. Die Generalakte von New York und Genf als Streitschlichtungsvertrag der Vereinten Nationen. *Friedens-Warte*, 1961.

Pedersen, R. J. National Representation in the United Nations. *International Organization*. Spring, 1961.

Sharp, W. R. Trends in United Nations Administration. *International Organization*. Summer, 1961.

Steinitz, H. Mitarbeit und Mitsprache Deutschlands bei der UNO. *Aussenpolitik*. October, 1961.

Vershinin, V. U. N.: Its Possibilities and Prospects. *International Affairs* (Moscow). November, 1961.

Virally, M. Vers Une Reforme du Secretariat des Nations Unies? *International Organization*. Spring, 1961.

##### *Regional and Collective Security Organizations*

Allardt, H. Praktische Möglichkeiten der Ent-

wicklungshilfe in Africa. *Europa Archiv*. July 25, 1961.

Buchan, A. The Reform of NATO. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

Grayson, L. E. Coordinated Energy Policy in the Common Market: the Guidance-Price Plan. *Social Research*. Autumn, 1961.

Haas, E. B. International Integration; the European and the Universal Process. *International Organization*. Summer, 1961.

Hamlin, F. NATO's Technical Centers: International Cooperation for the Free World's Technical Problems. *Armed Forces Management*. October, 1961.

Husemann, H. Defense of the British Commonwealth in North America and Europe. *Military Review*. December, 1961.

Kahn-Freund, O. Social Policy and the Common Market. *Political Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Kaplan, L. S. NATO Retrospect. *Review of Politics*. October, 1961.

Kohlhase, N. Zum Politischen Charakter der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. *Europa Archiv*. July 10, 1961.

———. Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. *Europa Archiv*. November 10, 1961.

Mora, J. A. The Role of the Organization of American States. *Record*. May, 1961.

Schneider, H. Die Haltung der Commonwealth-Länder zur Europäischen Integration. *Europa Archiv*. May 10, 1961.

Valentine, D. G. The Agreement Creating an Association between the European Free Trade Association. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1961.

#### DOCUMENTS

##### General and Miscellaneous

Disarmament. Probleme der Allgemeinen Abrüstung. *Europa Archiv*. November 10, 1961.

EWG. Die Zusammenarbeit Afrikanischer Staaten mit der EWG. *Europa Archiv*. October 25, 1961.

United Kingdom. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. Fact Sheets on the Colombo Plan. London, 1961.

———. The Pattern of Commonwealth Trade. London, 1961.

##### United States

Unless otherwise indicated, all entries under this heading bear the imprint: "Washington, Government Printing Office."

##### Congress

House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Report on the Activities of the Committee on . . . 87th Cong., 1st sess.



———. Research and Development in Aeronautics. Report (House Rep. No. 1277.) 87th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Commercial Applications of Space Communications Systems. Report. (House Rep. No. 1279.) 87th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Subcommittee No. 3. Establishment of a National Science Academy. Hearings. March 28 . . . May 25, 1961. 87th Cong., 1st sess.

Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. Organization for National Security. The Bureau of the Budget and the Budgetary Process. Study. 87th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson. 87th Cong., 1st sess.

———. Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. The Bang-Jensen Case. Hearing. September 14, 1961. 87th Cong., 1st sess.

Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy. Economic Policies Toward Less-Developed Countries. Study. 87th Cong., 1st sess.

#### Executive

Department of State. The Threat of Soviet Economic Policy. (Publication No. 7234.) 1961.

President. Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance. The Act for International Development; a Program for the Decade of Development—Objectives, concepts, and Proposed Program. 1961.

### OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

ADAIR, DOUGLASS AND SCHUTZ, JOHN A. Editors. *Peter Oliver's Origin and Progress of the American Rebellion: A Tory View*. (San Marino: The Huntington Library. 1961. Pp. xxi, 171. \$5.00.)

ADAMS, ARTHUR E. Editor. *Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy*. (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co. 1961. Pp. v, 420. \$3.85.)

ALLEN, SIR C. K. *Law in the Making*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. xxxix, 645. Paper \$2.50.)

ALLEN, H. C. *The Anglo-American Predicament*. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1960. Pp. xiv, 241. \$6.75.)

ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE. *Le Referendum de Septembre et les Elections de Novembre 1958*. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1960. Pp. xxiii, 390.)

AUBREY, HENRY G. WITH ASSISTANCE OF DARMSTADTER, JOEL. *Coexistence: Economic Challenge and Response*. (Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association. 1961. Pp. xiv, 324. \$5.00.)

BABEAU, ANDRÉ. *Les Conseils Ouvriers en Pologne*. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1960. Pp. xiv, 308.)

BARKER, SIR ERNEST. *Principles of Social and Political Theory*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 284. Paper \$1.85.)

BARNES, WILLIAM AND MORGAN, JOHN HEATH. *The Foreign Service of the United States*. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1961. Pp. xiii, 430. \$3.50.)

BARNETT, GEORGE AND OTIS, JACK. *Corporation, Society and Education: The Philosophy of Elijah Jordan*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1962. Pp. x, 297. \$7.50.)

BAYLEY, C. C. *War and Society in Renaissance Florence*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. 440. \$8.00.)

BEARCE, GEORGE D. *British Attitudes towards India 1784-1858*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 315. \$5.60.)

BECKER, JOSEPH M., S.J. *The Adequacy of the Benefit Amount in Unemployment Insurance*. (Kalamazoo, Michigan: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 1961. Pp. 64. Paper.)

BEER, KENNETH E. Editor. *The U.S.A. Answers: A Guide to Understanding*. (New York: U. S. and World Publications, Inc. [Guide to U. S. for Foreigners] 1961. Pp. vii, 248. Paper \$2.50. Cloth \$5.00.)

BERG, IRWIN A. AND BASS, BERNARD M. Editors. *Conformity and Deviation*. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1961. Pp. viii, 449. \$6.50.)

BERGSON, ABRAM. *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 1928*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1961. Pp. xix, 472. \$8.75.)

BERGSTRAESSER, ARNOLD. *Führung in des Modernen Welt*. (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach. 1961. Paper 5.80 DM.)

BIBBY, CYRIL. *Race, Prejudice and Education*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 90. Paper \$1.25. Cloth \$2.50.)

BLANCHARD, ROBERT, MEYER, RICHARD, AND MORLEY, BLAINE. *Presidential Elections 1948-1960. Research Monograph No. 4*. (Salt Lake City: Institute of Government, University of Utah. 1961. Pp. 58. \$1.50.)

BLETON, PIERRE. *le Capitalisme en Pratique*. (Paris: Economie et Humaines, Les Editions Ouvrières. Pp. 302. 12,90 N.F. Paper.)

- BLUM, JEROME. *Lord and Peasant in Russia from the 9th to 19th Century*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. x, 656. \$12.50.)
- BOYD, JULIAN P. Editor. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson—Nov. 1789 to July 1790*. Vol. 16. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. x/iii, 675. \$12.50.)
- BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. *The Study of Public Problems (A Report on Activities of the Brookings Institution 1954-1961)*. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1961. Pp. xiii, 154.)
- BROWNE, ROBERT S. *Race Relations in International Affairs*. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. iv, 62.)
- BUNYAN, JAMES AND FISHER, H. H. *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961. Pp. 735. \$10.00.)
- BURKS, ARDATH. *The Government of Japan*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1961. Pp. xvi, 269. Paper \$1.95.)
- BURN, DUNCAN. *The Steel Industry 1939-1959*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1961. Pp. 728. \$14.50.)
- CAMPAIGNE, JAMESON G. *Check-Off*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1961. Pp. 248. \$4.95.)
- CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE. *Issues before the 16th General Assembly*. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. 224. Paper \$0.50.)
- CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE. *Perspectives on Peace 1910-1960*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1960. Pp. viii, 202. \$3.00.)
- CARRIEL, MARY TURNER. *The Life of Jonathan Baldwin Taylor*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. xviii, 267. \$5.50.)
- CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, MIT. *Investment Criteria & Economic Growth*. (New York: Asia Publishing House. 1961. Pp. 161. \$5.00.)
- CH'EN, JEROME. *Yuan Shih-K'ai 1859-1916*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961. Pp. 290. \$6.00.)
- CHEVALIER, MICHAEL. *Society, Manners and Politics in the United States*. (New York: Doubleday & Company. 1961. Pp. 419. \$1.45.)
- CHRISTMAN, HENRY M. Editor. *Walter P. Reuther: Selected Papers*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1961. Pp. xi, 330. \$5.95.)
- COHEN, FELIX I. Edited and selected by Lucy Kramer Cohen. *The Legal Conscience*. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1960. Pp. xvii, 505. \$12.50.)
- COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL. *Reason and Law*. (New York: Collier Books. 1961. Pp. 224. Paper \$1.50.)
- COMMISSION ON MONEY AND CREDIT. *Money & Credit: Their Influences on Jobs, Prices & Growth*. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiv, 285. Paper \$2.00. Cloth \$3.95.)
- CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION STAFF OF COLUMBIA COLLEGE. Editors. *Chapters in Western Civilization Vol. 1*, Third Edition. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. x, 591. \$6.00.)
- COOKE, HELEN J. *The Role of Debt in the Economy*. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 115. \$3.25.)
- COUNCIL OF EUROPE. *Statistical Data 1960*. (Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Pp. 459. Paper.)
- CREIGHTON, T. R. M. *Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 258. \$5.75.)
- DARRAH, EARL L. AND POLAND, ORVILLE F. *The Fifty State Governments: A Compilation of Executive Organization Charts*. (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Paper \$3.00.)
- DERAN, ELIZABETH Y. *Financing Capital Improvements: The "Pay-As-You-Go" Approach*. 1961 Legislative Problems Series: No. 4. (Berkeley: University of California, Bureau of Public Administration. 1961. Pp. iii, 62. \$2.00.)
- DILLON, MERTON L. *Elijah P. Lovejoy*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 190. \$4.75.)
- DISHMAN, ROBERT B. *State Constitutions: The Shape of the Document*. (New York: National Municipal League. 1960. Pp. viii, 48. Paper \$1.50.)
- DODGE, DOROTHY. *Internationalism-Isolationism in Minnesota. A Study of the Roll Call Votes of the Minnesota Congressional Delegation 1940-1960*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota World Affairs Center. Pp. 47. Paper \$1.00.)
- DOWNS, ROBERT B. *Moulders of the Modern Mind*. (New York: Barnes & Noble. 1961. Pp. xx, 396. Paper \$2.25. Cloth \$6.00.)
- DUBIN, ROBERT. *Human Relations in Administration*. 2nd edition. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. xix, 635. \$8.75.)
- DURKHEIM, EMILE. Edited by Kurt H. Wolff. *Emile Durkheim 1858-1917*. (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press. 1960. Pp. xiv, 463. \$7.50.)
- DUROSELLE, JEAN-BAPTISTE. *de Wilson à Roosevelt 1913-1945*. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1960. Pp. 495.)
- EELLS, RICHARD AND WALTON, CLARENCE. *Conceptual Foundations of Business*. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 533. \$7.00.)
- EHMKE, HORST. *Wirtschaft und Verfassung*. (Karlsruhe: Verlag C. F. Hüller. 1961. Pp. xix, 829. 71 D.M.)
- EISENSTEIN, LOUIS. *The Ideologies of Taxation*.

- (New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1961. Pp. vii, 263. \$5.00.)
- EMME, EUGENE M. *Aeronautics & Astronautics*. (Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1961. Pp. ix, 240. \$1.75.)
- ENTERRIA, EDUARDO GARCIA DE. *La Administracion Espanola*. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos. 1961. Pp. 239. Paper.)
- EVANS, M. STAUFER. *Revolt on the Campus*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1961. Pp. 248. \$4.50.)
- FALLS, CYRIL. *The Art of War*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 240. \$1.50.)
- FARNSWORTH, HELEN C. *American Wheat Exports: Policies & Prospects*. (Stanford: Food Research Institute Studies. Reprinted from Vol. I, No. 2. May, 1960. Pp. 59. Paper \$1.00.)
- FAUSOLD, MARTIN L. *Giffort Pinchot*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1961. Pp. 270. \$4.50.)
- FERGUSON, LERNER, MCGEE et al. *The Economic Value of the U. S. Merchant Marine*. (Evanston: The Transportation Center at Northwestern University. 1961. Pp. xxii, 545.)
- FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE STUDIES. (Stanford University. Vol. I, May 1960. No. 2. Paper \$2.50.)
- FORNELL, EARL WESLEY. *The Galveston Era: The Texas Crescent on the Eve of Secession*. (Austin: The University of Texas Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 355. \$5.00.)
- FOX, SANFORD. *The Era of Continuous Prosperity*. (New York: The William-Frederick Press. 1961. Pp. 128.)
- FRANK, ISAIAH. *The European Common Market: An Analysis of Commercial Policy*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 324. \$8.50.)
- FRANK, JOHN P. *Lincoln as a Lawyer*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. x, 190. \$4.75.)
- FREEDMAN, LEONARD AND COTTER, CORNELIUS P. Editors. *Issues of the Sixties*. (San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc. 1961. Pp. xiv, 412. Paper.)
- FRIEDRICH, CARL J. AND BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW K. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Reissue. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xii, 346. Paper \$1.95.)
- FULLER, MAJOR GENERAL J. F. C. *The Conduct of War 1789-1961*. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Pp. 352. \$6.00.)
- GALLAHER, ART JR. *Plainville Fifteen Years Later*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. xvi, 301. \$5.00.)
- GALVAO, HENRIQUE. *Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal*. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. 246. \$4.50.)
- GEIGER, THEODORE. *The Premium Gold Controversy in the International Monetary Fund*. (University: University of Alabama Press. Inter-University Case Program #63. 1961. Pp. 59. Paper \$1.50.)
- GERMAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION. *Political Quarterly*. Vol. 1, No. 1. (Cologne: West German Publishing House. 1960.)
- GHOBASHY, OMAR Z. *The Caughnawaga Indians and the St. Lawrence Seaway*. (New York: The Devin-Adair Co. 1961. Pp. xi, 137. \$3.00. Paper \$2.00.)
- GODFREY, E. DREXEL, JR. *The Government of France*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1961. Pp. vi, 186. Paper \$1.95.)
- GOODRICH, CARTER. *Canals and American Economic Development*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. vi, 303. \$7.50.)
- GOODRICH, NORMA L. *The Medieval Myths*. (New York: New American Library. 1961. Pp. 224. \$0.50. Paper.)
- GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS. *Metropolitan California*. (Sacramento: Governor's Commission on Metropolitan Area Problems. 1961. Pp. vii, 180. Paper \$5.00. Cloth \$6.00.)
- GRAEBNER, NORMAN A. Editor. *Politics and the Crisis of 1860*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 156. \$3.00.)
- GREENHUT, MELVIN L. *Full Employment, Inflation and Common Stock*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. vi, 87. \$3.25.)
- GRIFFITH, BRIG. GENERAL SAMUEL B. Translation and Introduction. *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 114. \$4.50.)
- GROSECLOSE, ELGIN. *Money and Man*. (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. viii, 305. Paper \$1.75.)
- GRUMM, JOHN G. *A State Agency for Local Affairs?* (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California. 1961. Pp. viii, 48. Paper \$2.00.)
- GUEVARA, CHE. *Guerrilla Warfare*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xxxiii, 85. \$3.95.)
- HANCOCK, SIR W. KEITH. *Four Studies of War and Peace in this Century*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1961. Pp. vii, 129. \$3.75.)
- HANDLIN, OSCAR et al. *Education and American History*. Vol. 31, No. 2. (Cambridge: Harvard Educational Review. 1961. Pp. 232. Paper \$1.10.)
- HARRIS, H. S. *The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1960. Pp. ix, 387. \$5.75.)
- HARRIS, SEYMOUR E., Editor. *The Dollar in Crisis*.

- (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 309. Paper \$3.75.)
- HARRISON, JOHN P. *Guide to Materials on Latin America in the National Archives*. (Washington: The National Archives. 1961. Pp. x, 246. Paper.)
- HAYS, DENYS. *The Italian Renaissance*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 218. \$5.50.)
- HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY. U. S. Senate. *Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill*. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1961.)
- HEIDENHEIMER, ARNOLD J. *The Governments of Germany*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1961. Pp. xii, 224. Paper \$1.95.)
- HEILBRONER, ROBERT L. *The Future as History*. (New York: Grove Press Inc. 1961. Pp. 217. Paper \$1.75.)
- HERMET, GUY AND MARQUET, JACQUELINE. *Emigrants Saisonniers Espagnols en France*. (Paris: Centre D'Etude des Relations Internationales. 1961. Pp. 60. Paper.)
- HERRING, FRANCES W. Editor. *Regional Parks and Open Space*. (Berkeley: University of California. 1961. Pp. 142. Paper \$2.50.)
- HIGHAM, ROBIN. *Britain's Imperial Air Routes*. (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press. 1961. Pp. 407. \$10.00.)
- HILBERG, PAUL. *The Destruction of the European Jews*. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 788, \$17.50.)
- HILL, HENRY BERTRAM. Translator. *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1961. Pp. xx, 128. \$3.75.)
- HINDUS, MAURICE. *House without a Roof*. (New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc. 1961. Pp. xiv, 562. \$6.95.)
- HOOS, IDA R. *Automation in the Office*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. 138. \$4.50.)
- HOWARD, JOHN EDRED. Translator. *Letters and Documents of Napoleon: Vol. I*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. 540. \$8.80.)
- HUCKER, CHARLES O. *The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times (1368-1644)*. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 1961. Pp. 85. Paper \$1.75. Cloth \$3.50.)
- HUNT, ELGIN F. *Social Science—An Introduction to the Study of Society*. 2nd edition. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1961. Pp. 857. \$8.50.)
- HURSTFIELD, JOEL. *Elizabeth I and the Unity of England*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1961. Pp. ix, 226. \$2.50.)
- HUSS, JOHN E. *Senator for the South: A Biography of Olin P. Johnston*. (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1961. Pp. 238. \$4.95.)
- INSTITUTE OF ELECTORAL RESEARCH. *A Review of Elections*. (Northwood, Middlesex: The Scorpion Press. 1961. Pp. 28. Paper 4 shillings.)
- INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. *Organization Chart: The State Government of Texas*. (Austin: University of Texas, Institute of Public Affairs. 1961. \$1.00.)
- INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. *Proceedings of the Seventh Governmental Accounting and Finance Institute*. (Austin: University of Texas. 1961. Pp. v, 72.)
- INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL. *Recent Research on Racial Relations*. Vol. XIII No. 2. (Paris: UNESCO. 1961. Pp. 374. \$2.00 Quarterly.)
- JAPAN SCIENCE REVIEW. *Law and Politics: List of Articles 1958-59*. (Tokyo: Maruzen Co., Ltd. 1961. Pp. 105. \$1.50.)
- JOHANNSEN, ROBERT W. Editor. *Letters of Stephen A. Douglas*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. xxxi, 558. \$10.00.)
- JOHNSON, A. C., COLEMAN-NORTON, P. R., AND BOURNE, F. C. *Ancient Roman Statutes*. (Austin: University of Texas Press. 1961. Pp. xxxi. \$15.00.)
- KAMENETSKY, IHOR. *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe*. (New York: Bookman Associates, Inc. Pp. 263. \$5.00.)
- KEDOURIE, ELIE. *Nationalism*. (Revised Edition.) (First Publication in 1960.) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 151. \$1.65.)
- KEETON, G. W. AND SCHWARZENBERGER, GEORGE. *Yearbook of World Affairs*. Vol. 15 (London Institute of World Affairs). (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1961. Pp. xviii, 435. \$12.50.)
- KAMPNER, ROBERT M. W. *Eichmann und Komplizen*. (Zurich: Europa Verlag. 1961. Pp. 452.)
- KENRICK, JOHN W. *Productivity Trends in the U. S.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. lii, 630. \$12.50.)
- KERNODLE, R. WAYNE. Editor. *Values, Decisions and the American Economy*. (Williamsburg, Va.: The College of William and Mary. 1961. Pp. 92. Paper.)
- KHAN, M. A. *India's Economic Development and International Economic Relations*. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. 163. \$5.00.)
- KIRWIN, HARRY W. Editor. *The Search for Democracy—A Documentary Record of The American Republic*. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1959. Paper \$1.45.)
- KOHN, CLYDE F. Editor. *Urban Responses to Agricultural Change*. (Iowa City: State University of Iowa. 1961. Pp. viii, 207. \$4.00.)
- KOHN, HANS. *The Idea of Nationalism*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1961. Paper \$2.95.)
- KOVNER, MILTON. *The Challenge of Coexistence*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. vi, 130. \$3.25.)
- KRENZ, FRANK E. *International Enclaves and*

- Rights of Passage*. (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz. 1961. Pp. 197.)
- KUHN, JAMES W. *Bargaining in Grievance Settlement*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 206. \$4.50.)
- LANG, KIRT AND LANG, GLADYS ENGEL. *Collective Dynamics*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1961. Pp. xii, 563. \$7.25.)
- LATHAM, ATKESON, HARDING, et al. *Management's Stake in Tax Administration*. (Princeton: Princeton Tax Institute. 1961. Pp. 260. \$6.00.)
- LAURENT, FRANCIS W. *The Business of a Trial Court—100 Years of Cases*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1959. Pp. xxxiv, 314. \$6.00.)
- LEE, LUKE T. *Consular Law and Practice*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Pp. xxii, 431. \$17.50.)
- LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY. *Veterans Bonus: Estimated Cost*. (Frankfort, Ky.: Legislative Research Commission. 1960. Pp. 34.)
- LEVIN, HARVEY J. *Broadcast Regulation and Joint Ownership of Media*. (New York: New York University Press. 1960. Pp. xviii, 219. \$4.50.)
- LEVIN, JONATHAN V. *The Export Economies*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Harvard Law School. 1960. Pp. xv, 347. \$6.75.)
- LINDER, STAFFAN BURENSTAM. *An Essay on Trade and Transformation*. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1961. Pp. 167. \$5.00.)
- LIPPMAN, WALTER. *Drift and Mastery*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 177. Paper \$1.95. Cloth \$3.95.)
- LONDON INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS. *Yearbook of World Affairs*. (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1961. Pp. vii, 481. L3, 3s.)
- MACE, RUTH L. *Municipal Cost-Revenue Research in the U. S.* (Chapel Hill: Institute of Government, University of North Carolina. 1961. Pp. xiv, 201. Paper \$3.00.)
- MACLURE, MILLAR AND ANGLIN, DOUGLAS. Editors. *Africa: The Political Pattern*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. 124. \$2.50.)
- MADDOK, RUSSELL W. JR., AND FUQUAY, ROBERT F. *State and Local Governments*. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 712. \$7.75.)
- MAGDA, JARO. Editor. *Atomic Energy and Law: Inter-American Symposium*. (San Juan: University of Puerto Rico School of Law. 1960. Pp. xi, 258.)
- MALIN, JAMES C. *Confounded Rot about Napoleon*. (Lawrence, Kansas: The author. 1961. Pp. viii, 254. \$3.00.)
- MALONE, DUMAS. *The Public Life of Thomas Cooper 1783-1839*. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1961. Pp. xv, 434. \$5.00.)
- MANSSELL, GERARD. *Tragedy in Algeria*. (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. 76. Paper \$1.00.)
- MARKMANN, CHARLES LAIN AND SHERWIN, MARK. *John F. Kennedy: A Sense of Purpose*. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1961. Pp. 346. \$4.95.)
- MARSTON, THOMAS E. *Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area 1800-1878*. (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press. 1961. Pp. xiii, 550. \$10.00.)
- MARTIN, JAMES W. *Administrative Action for Efficient Debt Management: The Kentucky Case*. (Kentucky Law Journal Vol. 49. Summer 1961. No. 4. Pp. 13. Paper.)
- MASON, PHILIP. *Common Sense about Race*. (New York: The MacMillan Co. 1961. Pp. 173. \$2.95.)
- MASUR, GERHARD. *Prophets of Yesterday: Studies in European Culture 1890-1914*. (New York: The MacMillan Co. 1961. Pp. x, 481. \$7.50.)
- MCCRACKEN, HARLAN L. *Keynesian Economics in the Stream of Economic Thought*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1961. Pp. xv, 201. \$5.00.)
- McKINNEY, FRANCIS F. *Education in Violence: The Life of George H. Thomas and the History of the Army of the Cumberland*. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1961. Pp. 544. \$9.50.)
- MCLAUGHLIN, KATHLEEN. *What's the U.N. Doing There? Some Success Stories of U.N. Technical Assistance*. (New York: Institute for International Order. 1961. Pp. 80.)
- MEERLOO, JOOST A. M. *The Difficult Peace*. (Great Neck, New York: Channel Press. 1961. Pp. 190. Paper \$1.95. \$3.50.)
- MERIDIAN PERIODICAL. *History 4*. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. 167. Paper \$1.50.)
- MOODIE, GRAEME. *The Government of Great Britain*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1961. Pp. x, 207. Paper \$1.95.)
- MORRAY, J. P. *From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate*. (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 368. \$8.50.)
- MORRIS, RUBY TURNER. *Student Workshop for Fundamentals of Economics*. (New York: The Ronald Press. 1961. Pp. 28. Paper \$2.75.)
- MORRIS, RUBY TURNER. *Fundamentals of Economics Instructor's Manual*. (New York: The Ronald Press. 1961. Pp. 207. Paper.)
- MORRIS, RUBY TURNER. *Fundamentals of Economics*. (New York: The Ronald Press. 1961. Pp. xvi, 859. \$7.00.)
- MORTON, W. L. *The Canadian Identity*. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 125. Paper \$1.50. Cloth \$3.50.)
- MOSHER, FREDERICK C. *Recent Trends in Governmental Finances in the U. S.* (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California. 1961. Pp. 76. \$2.00.)

- NOVE, ALEC. *The Soviet Economy*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 328. \$6.75.)
- NUCHTERLEIN, DONALD E. *Iceland: Reluctant Ally*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1961. Pp. xiii, 213. \$4.50.)
- ODEGARD, PETER H. *Structure & Functions of American Government*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Co. 1961. Pp. 60. Paper \$1.00.)
- ODEGARD, CARR, BERNSTEIN, MORRISON. *American Government*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1961. xi, 468. Paper \$4.00.)
- ODEGARD, PETER H. AND ROSENBLUM, VICTOR. *American Government—Documents and Readings*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1961. Pp. viii, 246. Paper \$2.50.)
- PANAGAPoulos, E. P. Editor. *Alexander Hamilton's Pay Book*. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 128. \$3.00.)
- PARKER, REGINALD. *A Guide to Labor Law*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 134. Paper \$1.75. Cloth \$4.50.)
- PEFFER, E. LOUISE. *The Argentine Cattle Industry under Peron*. (Stanford: Food Research Institute Studies—reprinted from Vol. I. May 1960. No. 2. Pp. 33. Paper \$1.00.)
- PENDLE, GEORGE. *Argentina*—2nd edition. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. 208. \$4.00.)
- PERHAM, MARGERY. *Lugard: The Years of Authority, Maker of Modern Nigeria*. (London: Collins. 1960. Pp. xx, 748. \$8.00.)
- PERKINS, BRADFORD. *Prologue to War: England and the U. S., 1805–1812*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1961. Pp. x, 457. \$7.95.)
- PETERSEN, WILLIAM. *Population*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1961. Pp. xx, 652. \$7.95.)
- PETROV, VLADIMIR. *What China Policy?* (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 141. \$4.50.)
- PHILADELPHIA ECONOMY LEAGUE. *Philadelphia's Capital Programming Procedures*. (Philadelphia: Economy League. Bureau of Municipal Research. 1961. Pp. xi, 76. Paper \$2.00.)
- POLAK, FRED L. *The Image of the Future*. 2 vols. (New York: Oceana Publications. 1961. Pp. 456, 376. \$12.50.)
- POWICKE, SIR MAURICE. *The Loss of Normandy: Studies in the History of the Angevin Empire, 1189–1204*. (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1961. First pub. in 1913. Pp. xv, 424. \$9.00.)
- PUTNAM, CARLETON. *Race and Reason. A Yankee View*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 125. \$3.25.)
- RANKIN, ROBERT S. *State Constitutions: Bill of Rights*. (New York: National Municipal League. 1960. Pp. v, 20. Paper \$0.75.)
- REDFORD, EMMETTE S. *Congress Passes the Federal Aviation Act of 1958*. (University: University of Alabama Press, Inter-University Case Program. 1961. Pp. 35. \$0.50.)
- REUTER, PAUL. *International Institutions*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 316. Paper \$2.25. Cloth \$5.50.)
- RICE, MADELEINE HOOKER. *Federal Street Pastor: The Life of W. E. Channing*. (New York: Bookman Associates, Inc. 1961. Pp. 360. \$6.00.)
- RICH, BENNETT W. *State Constitutions: The Governor*. (New York: National Municipal League. 1960. Pp. iv, 33. Paper \$1.00.)
- RIENOW, ROBERT. *Contemporary International Politics*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1961. Pp. xvi, 431. \$5.75.)
- RODENHAUSER, REINER AND RALPH R. NAPP. *Breaking Down the Barrier*. (Durham: The Seeman Printery, Inc. 1961. Pp. 145. \$3.95.)
- ROOSEVELT, THEODORE. *The New Nationalism*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. 173. Paper \$1.95. Cloth \$3.95.)
- RUBIN, SOL. *Crime and Juvenile Delinquency: A Rational Approach to Penal Problems*. 2nd edition. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1961. Pp. xix, 248. Paper \$1.85. Cloth \$5.00.)
- SALANT, WALTER S. AND VACCARA, BEATRICE N. *Import Liberalization and Employment*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1961. Pp. xix, 388. \$6.75.)
- SAMUELSSON, KURT. *Religion and Economic Action*. (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1961. Pp. xi, 156. \$3.75.)
- SANFORD, CHARLES L. *The Quest for Paradise*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. 282. \$5.00.)
- SCHNAPPER, M. B. Editor. *New Frontiers of the Kennedy Administration: The Texts of the Task Force Reports Prepared for the President*. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. iv, 170. \$3.75.)
- SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L. *Government in the Soviet Union*. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1961. Pp. xi, 190. Paper \$1.95.)
- SCHUTZ, JOHN A. *William Shirley—King's Governor of Massachusetts*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1961. Pp. vii, 292. \$6.00.)
- SCOTT, DEREK J. R. *Russian Political Institutions*. 2nd edition. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1961. Pp. 205. Paper \$2.25. Cloth \$6.25.)
- SEIDENBERG, RODERICK. *Anatomy of the Future*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1961. Pp. 173. \$3.50.)
- SETON-WATSON, HUGH. *The East European Revolution*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xix, 435. Paper \$2.25. \$6.00.)
- SHACKLE, G. L. S. *Decision, Order and Time in Human Affairs*. (New York: Cambridge Uni-

- versity Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 302. \$6.50.)
- SHADOAN, A. T. *Organization, Role and Staffing of State Budget Offices*. (Lexington: Bureau of Business Research. University of Kentucky. 1961. Pp. vii, 172. Free. Paper.)
- SHENTON, JAMES P. *Robert John Walker—A Politician from Jackson to Lincoln*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. xviii, 288. \$6.00.)
- SLICHTER, SUMNER H. *Economic Growth in the United States*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 195. \$5.00.)
- SMITH, ADAM. *The Wealth of Nations*. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1961. Pp. xxviii, 310. Paper \$1.45.)
- SMITH, T. V. AND DOBBINS, WILLIAM. *Constructive Ethics*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. vi, 118. Paper \$1.95.)
- SOREL, GEORGES. *Reflections on Violence*. (New York: Collier Books. 1961. Pp. 287. Paper \$1.50.)
- SPILLER, ROBERT E. AND LARRABEE, ERIC. *American Perspectives*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1961. Pp. 211. \$4.75.)
- SAHL, WALTER. *Education for Democracy in West Germany*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xi, 356. \$4.50.)
- STALEY, EUGENE. *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1961. Pp. xx, 483. Paper \$2.50. Cloth \$5.50.)
- STANTON, ROBERT. *Forces For Freedom*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. 111. \$3.25.)
- STAUDENRAUS, P. J. *The African Colonization Movement 1816-65*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 323. \$6.00.)
- STEBBINS, RICHARD P. *The United States in World Affairs 1960*. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1961. Pp. vii, 344. \$6.00.)
- STEWART, MICHAEL. *Modern Forms of Government*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 284. Paper \$2.25. Cloth \$5.75.)
- STILLINGER, JACK. Editor. *Early Draft of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. 218. \$5.50.)
- STRANG, LORD WILLIAM. *Britain in World Affairs: The Fluctuation in Power and Influence from Henry VIII to Elizabeth II*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 416. Paper \$2.25.)
- TANHAM, GEORGE K. *Communist Revolutionary Warfare—The Vietminh in Indo-China*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 166. \$5.00.)
- TAYLOR, A. J. P. *Lloyd George (The Leslie Stephens Lecture)*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1961. Pp. 39. Paper \$0.75.)
- TILLMAN, SETH P. *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. 442. \$8.50.)
- TOMPKINS, DOROTHY CAMPBELL. *Water Plans for California: A Bibliography*. (Berkeley: University of California Bureau of Public Administration. 1961. Pp. vi, 180. \$4.50.)
- TÖRNÜDD, KLAUS. *Soviet Attitudes Towards Non-Military Regional Cooperation*. (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munsgaards Forlag. 1961. Pp. 301. Mk 1500.)
- TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. *Between Oxus and Jumna—Journey in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 211. \$5.00.)
- TRUMAN, HARRY S. *Public Paper of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945*. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1961. Pp. 668. \$5.50.)
- TURNER, FREDERICK JACKSON. *Selected Essays: Frontier and Section*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. 171. Paper \$1.95. Cloth \$3.95.)
- UNESCO. *International Bibliography of Political Science*. (Paris: UNESCO; New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. 310. Paper \$2.00.)
- UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE. *Parlements*. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1961. Pp. 318. Paper NF 18.)
- UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961*. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1961. Pp. xii, 995. \$3.50.)
- VAN ALSTYNE, RICHARD. *The Rising American Empire*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. ix, 215. \$6.00.)
- VILLARI, SALVATORE. *L' Elezione Del Presidente*. (Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè-Editore. 1961. Pp. 455. Paper)
- VOEGELIN, ERIC. *Israel and Revelation*. Vol. 1 xiv, 533. *The World of the Polis*. Vol. 2 xviii, 389. *Plato and Aristotle*. Vol. 3. Pp. xvii, 383. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1958. \$6.00 each.)
- VOSS, EARL. et al. *The New Frontiersmen: Profiles of the Men Around Kennedy*. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. xix, 254. \$4.50.)
- WADE, MASON. Editor. *Canadian Dualism: La Dualité Canadienne*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. xxv, 417. \$8.50.)
- WALSH, VIVIAN CHARLES. *Scarcity and Evil*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Paper \$1.95. Cloth \$3.95.)
- WHITAKER, URBAN G. Editor. *Democracies and International Relations: Can Ours Survive?* 1961. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co. Pp. xiv, 223. Paper \$1.75.)

- WHITAKER, URBAN G. Editor. *Nationalism and International Progress*. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. xiv, 218. Paper \$1.75.)
- WHITTEMORE, CHARLES P. *A General of the Revolution—John Sullivan of New Hampshire*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 317. \$6.00.)
- WILSON, THOMAS. *Inflation*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1961. Pp. 280. \$5.50.)
- WILSON, WOODROW. *The New Freedom*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. 173. Paper \$1.95. Cloth \$3.95.)
- WINTER, WILLIAM O. Director. *Organization and Management of the Government of East St. Louis*. (Carbondale: Local Government Center, Southern Illinois University. 1961. Pp. x5. Paper \$2.00.)
- YAUKEY, DAVID. *Fertility Differences in a Modernizing Country—A Survey of Lebanese Couples*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. xviii, 204. \$4.00.)
- YESININ-VOLPIN, ALEKSANDR SERGEYEVICH. *A Leaf of Spring*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 173. \$3.00.)
- YOUNG, JAMES HARVEY. *The Toadstool Millionaires*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. 282. \$6.00.)



## NEWS AND NOTES

### ATHERTON PRESS PRIZE

The American Political Science Association announces the Atherton Press Prize of \$1000 for the best original manuscript in the field of political science submitted in an annual competition.

Manuscripts must be no longer than 200,000 words, must be submitted this year prior to June 1, 1962, and are to be mailed to:

The American Political Science Association  
Atherton Prize Committee  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

The manuscripts will be judged by an APSA Committee and the winner will be announced at the Annual Meeting of the Association in September, 1962. The Atherton Press will have first option on publication of manuscripts submitted for the prize. The American Political Science Association reserves the right to withhold the prize in 1962 if, in the opinion of the judges, no sufficiently meritorious manuscript is submitted.

### PROGRAM NOTICE

Two special sessions for graduate students and younger instructors will be held at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association in Washington, September 5-8, 1962. Harold D. Lasswell, Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University, and Arnold Brecht, emeritus Professor of Political Science, New School for Social Research, will lead discussions and answer questions at sessions scheduled September 6 and 7.

The meetings will be restricted to younger political scientists in order that they may have a fuller opportunity to meet and talk with these leading members of the profession.

### PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration held the first meeting of its executive council in Tokyo in October, 1961, with a concurrent seminar on urban administration and economic and social development. Eleven states in the Asian region were represented: Australia, Republic of China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, UAR, Republic of Vietnam. The Vice-Minister of Home Affairs, Yosoji Kobayashi of Japan, chaired the seminar. The United Nations was represented by Brigadier S. T. Divers (on duty in Nepal). Some twenty national and international associations were represented, including

the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, International Union of Local Authorities, International Federation for Housing and Planning and American Society for Public Administration. Dr. Luther H. Gulick, chairman of the institute of public administration, was an active participant.

Working papers were debated in some seven sessions, on Metropolitan Administration (Australia), City Administration and Citizen Participation (India), and Local Government and Economic Development (Japan).

EROPA hopes to present in one volume the papers and debates of this Seminar and of the

First General Assembly (Manila, 1960) on Strengthening Local Government for Social and Economic Development.

The theme for the Second General Assembly (October, 1962, probably in Thailand) will be Personnel. Working papers commissioned are: "Organization for Civil Service" (Philippines); "Training of Government Officials for Economic Development" (Thailand); "Academic Preparation of Government Officials" (Republic of China).

EROPA resolved to express its continuing interest in Asian local government by seeking to establish a Local Government Center in conjunction with the Local Autonomy College in Tokyo.

Individuals outside the Asian Region are eligible for corresponding membership. Dues of U.S. \$2.50 may be sent to the Secretary General, Dr. Carlos Ramos, Box 474, Manila, Philippines.

The Council Meeting of the International Federation for Housing and Planning attracted over 130 delegates from more than 20 countries to Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 2-9 September. This shrine of pilgrimage was the appropriate setting for debate of one of the principal themes: The Preservation and Use of Urban Monuments and Historic Areas. Prof. W. Ostrowski, Poland, presented a wide-ranging general report; excellent country reports were presented from Italy, Spain and Yugoslavia. The Federation set up a standing committee on Historic Buildings, with Prof. Ostrowski as chairman, to focus continuing international attention upon the problem.

The other theme: The Modernization of Existing Housing—Technical and Financial Limitations, was introduced by Dr. Ing. Bernhard Düttmann, of Düsseldorf. The recommendations resulting from the debates were referred to a newly created standing committee on urban renewal, of which Dr. George S. Duggar of the University of Pittsburgh is chairman. Members from 18 countries were identified during the meeting; others will be added.

Other standing committees had profitable sessions, including those on Professional Planners (S. J. van Embden, Netherlands, chairman); Rent and Family Income (L. Wynen, Belgium, chairman); Regional Planning (E. Parent, Belgium, chairman); Planning Education (F. Violich, acting chairman); International Glossary (H. Calsat, France, chairman); Housing Societies (M. Langlet, France, acting chairman); Traffic, (S. Dziewulski, Poland, chairman).

The Council heard reports of progress in preparation for the 26th Congress, to be held in Paris, 2-8 September, 1962, for which the American Institute of Planners is organizing two charter flights. The Council accepted the invitation of

Israel to be host to the 27th Congress in 1964.

Participants from the U.S.A. were Francis Violich, University of California; Charles S. Ascher, representative of IFHP at U.N.; Miss Cynthia Gubernick, who will serve an internship at IFHP headquarters as a Fulbright fellow; and Miss Constance Perin of Cambridge, Mass. Carlos Contreras, vice-president of IFHP from Mexico also attended.

The Round Table of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Lisbon, 11-16 September, attracted over 120 participants from 40 countries and 5 international organizations. The stated purpose of the debates was to help the General Reporters perfect their reports for the Congress to be held in 1962. For the theme, "Government Organization for Economic Development," the General Reporter, Professor G. Treves (Italy) had reports from the U.S.A. drafted by Gerhard Colm, National Planning Association, and Harvey Perloff, Resources for the Future, Inc., and from Puerto Rico drafted by Martin Clapp and Juan Labadie Eurite of the Puerto Rico Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration. Both of these reports had been subjected to critical review by special panels at the ASPA Conference at Philadelphia in April.

On the theme, "Experience with Technical Cooperation," the General Reporter, M. Vranken (Belgium) had a report from U.S.A. prepared by G. Wm. Lawson and associates at I.C.A., similarly reviewed at Philadelphia. The third theme, "Government Publications as an Element of Public Relations" had no report from U.S.A. Sir John Simpson (U.K.) served as chairman, Mme. Suzanne Honoré (France) as Reporter.

The standing Committee on Administrative Practices met under the chairmanship of G. W. Lawson, in place of Wm. F. Finan. The Scientific Committee, chaired by Henry Puget (France) had Dwight Waldo as U.S.A. member in place of Rowland Egger. Both Committees made proposals to strengthen the work of the Institute. Other committees meeting during the crowded working days included the Editorial Board of the International Review of Administrative Sciences, L. Lopez Rodó (Spain) chairman; the Committee on Contracts, Roger Grégoire (France) chairman, vice André Molitor (Belgium); the Committee on Comparative Administrative Cases, G. A. van Poelje (Netherlands) chairman, on which C. S. Ascher sat as alternate for Walter Gellhorn, member from U.S.A.

The Council of Administration, representing members states and national sections, adopted revisions of the statutes modifying the cycle of meetings to provide only one interim meeting between triennial Congresses and consequential

changes in the powers of the Executive Committee and the Council to render more effective the conduct of the affairs of the Institute.

Under the leadership of Dean Donald C. Stone of Pittsburgh, some 48 persons responsible for training administrators in more than 30 national institutions met for the first time to set the stage for continued collaboration and exchanges on common problems.

The Congress of 1962—an open meeting to which all interested persons are invited—will be held probably in the second half of July, at a place in Europe to be announced.

The 19th Annual Institute on World Affairs, under the direction of Professor Minos Generales, was held August 7-25, 1961 at San Diego State College. With the theme being "Coexistence," the Institute's academic speakers included: Ross Berkes, U.S.C.; Eugene Burdick, U.C.; Arthur S. Flemming, Oregon; Constantine Generales, New York Medical College; L. F. E. Goldie, U.C.; Paul Hadley, U.S.C.; John Hutchinson, Claremont Graduate School; Amos Jordan, U.S.M.A.; Karlin & Capper-Johnson, Lewis and Clark; James Kitchen, S.D.S.C.; Joseph Lauwerys, London; Deane Malott, Cornell; Charles Martin, Washington; Hans Morgenthau, Chicago; Fred Neal, Claremont Graduate School; Peter Rohn, Claremont Men's College; Robert Scalapino, U.C.; Charles Schleicher, Oregon; Edward Stainbrook, U.S.C.; Julian Towster, U.C.; Urban Whitaker, S.F.S.C.

Other speakers included: Brutus Coste, Assembly of Captive Nations; Kenneth Dadzie,

Ghana; John Denson, United Kingdom; Avraham Harman, Israel; Roger Hilsman, State Department; John McNaughton, Defense Department; Frank McCulloch, Los Angeles Times, Myron Rush, RAND.

The fifth annual meeting of the Missouri Political Science Association was held at the University of Missouri, Columbia, on October 13, 1961. Sessions were devoted to politics in council-managing cities, the politics of public education, and ethics in government. George A. Bell, assistant state budget director, was elected president of the association for 1962. The association now comprises 140 members.

A Mid-America Assembly on the topic "The Secretary of State" was held at the University of Missouri on November 16-19, 1961, under the co-sponsorship of that university and the American Assembly. Sixty persons prominent in business, government, and professional circles were in attendance. Principal addresses were delivered by Harlan Cleveland of the Department of State and Norman A. Graebner of the University of Illinois.

A section on War and Peace Studies will be included in the 1962 annual meetings of the American Sociological Association to take place in Washington, D.C., at the end of August. Persons interested in submitting papers should contact the Chairman of the session, Professor Amitai Etzioni, at Columbia University.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

The University of Michigan has received a grant of approximately \$3,000,000 from the Ford Foundation to be spent over the next ten years in area and international studies. The terms of the grant provide for a total of \$1,800,000 for the Chinese, Japanese and Middle Eastern Centers for the ten year period. \$500,000 of the grant is to be divided over the next five years by the Russian Studies and Southern Asian Centers for the development of research and graduate instructional programs. The remaining \$700,000 is to be spent over the next five years chiefly by the Law School, Business School, Center for Economic Development, and Center for Conflict Resolution in research and graduate instruction in international studies.

Under State Department contract, Indiana University is playing host to a group of chairmen

of Indian political science departments during 1962—February, March and April. Following study, observation, and discussions at Indiana University, each visitor will spend some time on several other campuses. While in Bloomington, the Indian political scientists will also present a public lecture series and assist in an Indian Government and Politics course conducted by Richard F. Crabbs who is coordinating the special program. The Indian visitors are: Narayan R. Deshpande, Nagpur University; Avadh Behari Lal, Allahabad University; Indra D. Sharma, Punjab University; Abdulkarim H. Somjee, University of Baroda; Hari Shanker Srivastava, Gorakhpur University; Kopparti V. Rao, Utkal University; V. Venkata Rao, Gauhati University.

The Mershon National Security Center at Ohio State University awarded the 1961 prize of \$2,500

for the best book-length manuscript on national security submitted in 1961 to George Stambuk, department of government, Indiana University.

Arthur H. Dean, President of the American Society of International Law, announced that the Society has received a grant of \$500,000 from the Ford Foundation, and will now undertake long-term studies on the legal aspects of arms control and disarmament, foreign investment and economic development, space activities, and federalism in the emerging nations.

Ambassador Dean is the Chairman of the U.S. delegation at the nuclear test ban conference in Geneva and a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations for the current session of the General Assembly. He is senior partner of the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.

The Ford Foundation grant will be used to expand the activities of the 55-year-old Society, known for its annual meetings and its *American Journal of International Law*, which goes to 5000 members and subscribers in 91 countries around the world.

Charles S. Ascher of Brooklyn College has been elected president of the conference of non-governmental organizations with consultative status at the U.N. He chaired a meeting of its bureau in Geneva in August, 1961.

George M. Belknap has accepted appointment as visiting associate professor of government at Dartmouth College.

Paul C. Bartholomew, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, served during the past summer as a consultant to the Republican National Committee at its headquarters in Washington, D. C. in the current reorganization under the new chairman, Representative William E. Miller of New York.

Martin Birnbach, formerly of the University of Puerto Rico, has been appointed visiting instructor at the University of Nebraska.

Herbert W. Briggs, Goldwin Smith Professor of International Law at Cornell University and Editor-in-Chief of the *American Journal of International Law*, was recently elected by the United Nations to be a member of the U.N. International Law Commission.

Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia participated in the Wilton Park Conference held in November in England. This year the subject of the conference was "The Western Alliance and 'Competitive Co-existence'."

Frederic N. Cleaveland, chairman of the department of political science, University of North Carolina, participated in a conference in Santiago, Chile, from September 24 through October 7, 1961. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and the Latin American faculty of the social sciences (FLACSO). Professor Cleaveland served as a consultant for the public administration program.

Walter C. Clemens, who received his Ph.D. from Columbia University (Russian Institute) has been appointed acting assistant professor at University of California, Santa Barbara, for 1961-1962.

Percy E. Corbett, professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia gave the address at the Founder's Day Convocation at McGill University on October 6. McGill University conferred the honorary degree of D.C.L. on Professor Corbett on the same occasion.

Martin David Dubin, assistant professor of political science, has been awarded a 1961-1962 Roosevelt University faculty fellowship with leave to do research in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland, on the theory and history of international organization.

The University of Idaho's Borah Foundation Lecturer during the first semester of 1961-1962 was Francisco Garcia-Amador, former Cuban Ambassador and presently a consultant for the Pan American Union. The theme of this series of lectures was "Democratic Counteroffensive in Latin America."

Ralph M. Goldman of Michigan State University is visiting professor of political science at the University of Chicago for the academic year 1961-1962.

Franz B. Gross of Pennsylvania Military College is serving as a visiting associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania in the political science department.

George Y. Harvey of the University of Missouri has been appointed, by Secretary Ribicoff, chairman of a second citizens advisory committee to study the Food and Drug Administration and make recommendations to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and to the Administration.

Russell H. Fifield of the University of Michigan has been appointed secretary of the association for Asian studies and a member of its executive committee.

John N. Hazard, professor of public law and government at Columbia University, has been spending 1961-62 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and will serve as visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, during the spring semester, 1962.

Robert J. Horgan, chairman of the political science department at Clarke College in Dubuque, Iowa, was elected November 8 to the Dubuque City Council, for a term of four years.

Will Irwin, Colorado State University, is associate director for the Citizenship Clearing House, 1961-62.

Stephen P. Koff, assistant professor of political science at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, has been granted a two-year leave of absence in order to become resident administrator of the Syracuse semester in Italy program.

Fred Krinsky, associate professor at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, is a visiting associate professor in political science at the University of Southern California for the academic year 1961-62. Mr. Krinsky replaces Professor Carlton C. Rodee, who is on sabbatical leave.

Leslie Lipson, professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley, is serving as acting executive secretary of the institute of international studies of the University, during 1961-62.

Vernon McKay, professor of African studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D. C., was elected president of the African Studies Association at the annual meeting held in New York City, October 20-22. He also served as conference chairman for the Eighth National Conference of the United States National Commission for UNESCO in Boston, October 22-26. This conference, attended by 2000 U.S. and African delegates, dealt with the theme, "Africa and the United States—Images and Realities." While in Boston, Dr. McKay was elected a member of the executive committee of the United States National Commission for UNESCO.

Roy Macridis, professor of political science at Washington University is on leave during 1961-62 studying the Fifth Republic in France under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Laurence Martin has been appointed as visiting associate professor in European Diplomacy at the school of advanced international studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, D. C. Dr. Martin has also been appointed a research associate at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, which is affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies.

Robert Moses of New York City presented the second annual lecture in The Herman G. James Lectures on Municipal Government at Ohio University on November 9, 1961. This lectureship was established a year ago in honor of Dr. James, a former president of Ohio University.

Morris S. Ogul, assistant professor of political science, has been appointed senior research associate at the administrative science center at the University of Pittsburgh, for the 1961-1962 academic year.

Robert C. Osgood has been appointed as visiting professor of American Diplomacy and research associate of the Washington Center of foreign policy research at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, D. C. He is on leave from the University of Chicago where he is professor of political science and research associate of the Center for the study of American foreign policy.

Joseph A. Peters, assistant professor of government and history, of Beaver College is serving as lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania in the political science department.

Robert J. Pitchell, acting director of the Bureau of government research at Indiana University has been named editor of the *Indiana Municipal Manual*; the first annual edition is scheduled for publication in March of 1962.

Vasant D. Rao of the University of Bombay is visiting lecturer in political science and history, San Diego State College.

S. Grover Rich, professor of political science and director of the Institute of International Studies, University of Utah, is on leave during the academic year 1961-62 while serving as professor of foreign affairs on the faculty of the National War College in Washington, D. C.

Carlton C. Rodee of the University of Southern California, is on sabbatical leave for the academic year of 1961-62.

E. E. Schattschneider, emeritus professor of government at Wesleyan University, is teaching during the 1961-62 academic year in Wesleyan's experimental college of social studies.

Charles P. Schleicher, professor of political science at the University of Oregon is acting department head for the current year during the absence of E. S. Wengert, who is on leave, concluding a study of the Agency of International Development for the Inter-University Case Program.

Paul Seabury, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, is on sabbatical leave during the fall of 1961, and holds a Guggenheim Fellowship during spring, 1962.

Glenn Tinder of the University of Massachusetts will spend the year 1961-62 on sabbatical.

Frank N. Trager, professor of international affairs, New York University, is serving as a visiting professor of political science at the National War College, Washington, D. C. during 1961-62. He will also, for the third year in succession, be in charge of the course on southeast Asia at the

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Robert C. Tucker has been appointed as visiting professor of Soviet affairs at the school of advanced international studies of Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Tucker has also been appointed a research associate at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, which is affiliated with the school of advanced international studies in Washington. He is on leave from the University of Indiana where he is professor of government.

Maurice Waters has received a two year appointment as visiting assistant professor at Antioch College.

York Willbern, director of the bureau of government research at Indiana University, is engaged in a special research project for the year 1961-62 with a grant from the Social Science Research Council. Robert J. Pitchell, associate director of the Bureau, is serving as acting director.

Sheldon Wolin, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, is on leave for the year 1961-62.

## APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Stanley V. Anderson, who received both a law degree and his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Paul M. Bernstein has been appointed instructor in the political science department, University of Pennsylvania.

Thompson Black, formerly head of the department of government, has been promoted to chairman of the social sciences division at Los Angeles State College.

Donald Bray upon completion of his Ph.D. at Stanford, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor at Los Angeles State College.

H. Carl Camp has been appointed as assistant professor at Tulane.

William G. Carleton has been appointed professor emeritus of political science at the University of Florida to enable him to devote full time to a program of research, writing and lecturing.

Daniel S. Cheever has been appointed associate professor in the department of political science and in the graduate school of public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh.

Milton Colvin, formerly of Vanderbilt University and the University of Chicago, has accepted an appointment as associate professor of political science at Washington and Lee University.

Frank Dinka has been appointed as associate professor at Southwest Missouri State College, Springfield, Missouri.

Clair Doubrovsky has become a member of the department of political science at Mount Holyoke.

George S. Duggar has been named associate professor of Municipal-Metropolitan Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh.

Eugene P. Dvorin has been promoted to associate professor and appointed head of the government department at Los Angeles State College.

Milton Feder has been promoted to associate professor of government at Beloit College.

Martin Fleisher, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Brooklyn College.

John F. Gallagher, formerly of UCLA, has been appointed acting assistant professor of political science in the University of California at Davis.

Betty Glad has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Brooklyn College.

Edward M. Goldberg who taught at San Diego State College last year, has been appointed assistant professor at Los Angeles State College.

Walter Goldstein, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Brooklyn College.

Elisha Greifer, formerly of Vassar College, is director of the Argentine-North American Cultural Institute, Tucuman, Argentina. This was facilitated by a grant from the United States Information Agency.

Jean Grossholtz has joined the department at Mount Holyoke as instructor.

John M. De Grove has been promoted from assistant professor to associate professor of political science at the University of Florida.

Myron Q. Hale has been appointed an assistant professor at the Ohio State University.

William J. Hanna, joined the department in January, 1961, as an instructor at Michigan State.

Alice Henkin has been appointed instructor in the political science department, University of Pennsylvania.

Henry Janssen has been promoted to professor, San Diego State College.

James D. Johnson has joined the department of government, University of Oklahoma, as an instructor.

Ned V. Joy has been promoted to professor, San Diego State College.

Will Irwin has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Colorado State University.

Richard C. C. Kim of the University of Oklahoma, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Hardin-Simmons University, in Abilene, Texas.

William R. Kintner has been appointed professor of political science at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania.

Stanley Kochanek has been appointed instructor in the political science department, University of Pennsylvania.

Merle Kling has been promoted to professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

James R. Klonoski, formerly research associate at Brookings Institution, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Oregon.

William O. Lewis, doctoral candidate at the University of Oregon, has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Idaho.

Victor T. LeVine has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

Noah Lucatz has been appointed assistant professor at Southern Illinois University, East St. Louis campus.

Robert A. Lystad has been appointed as associate professor of African studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University located in Washington, D. C.

Austin F. Macdonald, returned in August, 1961, as professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

Joseph C. McKenna, S.J. has been appointed chairman of Fordham University's department of political philosophy and government.

Ruth McQuown has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida.

Gerard J. Mangone of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, has been appointed executive assistant to Dean Stephen K. Bailey, Maxwell School.

Henry L. Mason has been promoted to the

rank of full professor of political science at Tulane.

Warner E. Mills, Jr. has been promoted to associate professor of government at Beloit College.

Steven Muller has been appointed associate director for Cornell University's new Center for International Studies.

Edwin B. Morrell, who is completing his doctoral dissertation at Harvard University, has been named assistant professor of political science at Brigham Young University.

Lloyd D. Musolf, recently returned from Saigon, and has been promoted to the rank of professor at Michigan State.

Charles R. Naef has been made instructor in political science at Colgate University.

Felix Nigro has been appointed professor of political science, San Diego State College.

John Norman, professor of history and government at Fairfield University was chairman of a bipartisan Fairfield Charter Revision Commission (1960-1961). -

Frederic D. Ogden, formerly of the University of Alabama, has accepted a position as head, with rank of professor, of the recently established department of political science at Eastern Kentucky State College.

Felix Oppenheim has been appointed professor of government at the University of Massachusetts.

Don Piper, Duke University, is a research associate at Duke University for 1961-62.

John W. Price has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida.

J. Harris Proctor has been promoted to associate professor at Duke University.

Eugene Pyziur, who received his doctorate in June at Notre Dame University, has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at St. Louis University.

Peter Remec of Fordham University has been advanced to the rank of associate professor of international law.

David RePass is now instructor in political science at Mount Holyoke.

Richard F. Schier, who has been on leave for the past year, returned to Franklin and Marshall College as associate professor and chairman of the department of government.

Edward V. Schten joined the staff of the bureau of government of the University of Wisconsin on November 1, 1961 as an assistant professor of political science and as an assistant director of the Bureau. He will be in charge of the Education and Training activities of the Bureau at Milwaukee.

John W. Schwada, recently Comptroller and Budget Director for the State of Missouri, has returned to the University of Missouri as dean of faculties and acting dean of the school of business and public administration.

Robert A. Scalapino, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, assumed the chairmanship of the department in February, 1962, on his return from leave.

John C. Sherry has been promoted to professor, social sciences, at Pace College.

K. H. Silvert has accepted appointment as professor of government at Dartmouth College. He will also continue to serve as a senior associate of the American Universities Field Staff.

Marshall Singer has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Brooklyn College.

Baljit Singh has joined the department as an assistant professor at Michigan State University.

George Stambuk has been appointed assistant professor of government at Indiana University.

T. Noel Stern, former president of West Chester State College in Pennsylvania, has been appointed research associate in the bureau of government research at Indiana University.

James A. Storing, professor of political science has been appointed to be dean of faculty, Colgate University, beginning in the fall, 1961-62.

Harry P. Stumpf has been named instructor in political science at Colorado State University.

Ivan Taborsky is now instructor in government at Arlington (Texas) State College.

Phillip B. Taylor, Jr. has been appointed as



associate professor of Latin American Studies at the school of advanced international studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, D. C.

Manoucher Vahdat is presently employed at Northwestern State College, Alva, Oklahoma as associate professor of political science.

Ferenc Vali, formerly professor of international law, University of Budapest, Hungary, and recently research associate at the Harvard Center for International Studies, has been appointed associate professor of government at the University of Massachusetts.

William R. Vizzard, Jr., has joined the department of government, University of Oklahoma, as an assistant professor.

Tully Warren has been promoted to associate professor at Los Angeles State College.

Wilfred D. Webb of the University of Texas has been named associate dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.

Alex Weilenmann, University of Zurich, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Oregon.

Herbert R. Winter has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Hartwick College.

David M. Wood has been promoted to assistant professor at the University of Missouri.

### IN MEMORIAM

SELDEN GALE LOWRIE, age 77, died on November 2, 1961, in Cincinnati. He was born in Mt. Sterling, Illinois, and educated at Knox College, the University of Illinois and the University of Wisconsin. He had become in 1912 a member of the faculty of the University of Cincinnati, and there he had for forty years served as a teacher and head of the Department of Political Science. During those years he had been active also as a consultant and adviser in connection with matters of local and state concern in the fields of legislation and administration.

In World War I he served as a Captain, U. S. Army, with assignments in Washington. In 1919 he served as a representative of the Red Cross in Turkey. Thereafter he travelled in the Far East

and lectured in colleges in China. Later he lectured at Clark University, at Syracuse University, and, on a Fulbright grant, at the University of Hawaii.

A member of Phi Beta Kappa and of Phi Delta Theta, author of *The Budget* and of many articles in professional journals, admitted to the Bar in 1921, he was long active in the American Political Science Association and in the Cincinnati branch of the Foreign Policy Association. His interest in legal and political developments persisted up to the moment of his last and very brief illness.

The Gale and the Lowrie families were intimately connected with the founding and the early development of Galesburg, Illinois, and of Knox College.—STANLEY K. HORNBECK

OFFICERS OF THE  
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

*President*

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN  
Indiana University

*President-Elect*

CARL J. FRIEDRICH  
Harvard University

*Vice Presidents*

GABRIEL A. ALMOND  
Yale University

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT  
University of Chicago

DWIGHT WALDO  
University of California

*Secretary*

MARIAN IRISH  
Florida State University

*Treasurer*

MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
Washington, D. C.

*Executive Director*

EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK  
1726 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.  
Washington 6, D. C.

*Assistant Director*

JOHN G. STEWART

*Managing Editor, APSR*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD  
The Ohio State University

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ec officiis*

LAWRENCE DURISCH  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
WILLIAM O. FARBER  
University of South Dakota  
IVAN H. HINDERAKER  
University of California, Los Angeles  
JOHN T. HOLDEN  
University of New Hampshire  
GLADYS M. KAMMERER  
University of Florida  
RICHARD C. SNYDER  
Northwestern University  
KENNETH W. THOMPSON  
Rockefeller Foundation  
JOHN D. WILLIAMS  
University of Utah

ALFRED DEGRAZIA  
New York University  
JOHN HALLOWELL  
Duke University  
SIGMUND NEUMANN  
Wesleyan University  
LEO C. RIETHMAYER  
University of Colorado  
LESTER G. SELIGMAN  
University of Oregon  
VERNON VAN DYKE  
State University of Iowa  
ROBERT E. WARD  
University of Michigan  
BRYCE WOOD  
Social Science Research Council

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW  
ALBERT SHAW  
FREDERIC N. JUDSON  
JAMES BRYCE  
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL  
WOODROW WILSON  
SIMEON E. BALDWIN  
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART  
W. W. WILLOUGHBY  
JOHN BASSETT MOORE  
ERNST FREUND  
JESSE MACY  
MUNROE SMITH  
HENRY JONES FORD  
PAUL S. REINSCH  
LEO S. ROWE  
WILLIAM A. DUNNING  
HARRY A. GARFIELD  
JAMES W. GARNER

CHARLES E. MERRIAM  
CHARLES A. BEARD  
WILLIAM B. MUNRO  
JESSE S. REEVES  
JOHN A. FAIRLIE  
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH  
EDWARD S. CORWIN  
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY  
ISIDOR LOEB  
WALTER J. SHEPARD  
FRANCIS W. COKER  
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE  
THOMAS REED POWELL  
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA  
CHARLES GROVE HAINES  
ROBERT C. BROOKS  
FREDERIC A. OGG  
WILLIAM ANDERSON

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN  
LEONARD D. WHITE  
JOHN M. GAUS  
WALTER F. DODD  
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON  
HENRY R. SPENCER  
QUINCY WRIGHT  
JAMES POLLOCK  
PETER H. ODEGARD  
LUTHER H. GULICK  
PENDLETON HERRING  
RALPH J. BUNCHE  
CHARLES MCKINLEY  
HAROLD D. LASSWELL  
E. E. SCHATTSCHEIDER  
V. O. KEY, JR.  
R. TAYLOR COLE  
CARL B. SWISHER  
EMMETTE S. REDFORD

# *Purchase of Back Issues of* **THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**

The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,  
Washington 6, D.C., will buy the following issues of the *Review* for \$1.00 each:

Vol.	No.	Date	Vol.	No.	Date
1	1	November, 1906	30	2	April, 1936
1	2	February, 1907	30	3	June, 1936
1	3	May, 1907	30	4	August, 1936
1	4	August, 1907	30	5	October, 1936
2	Title page and Contents		30	6	December, 1936
		1907-1908	31	1	February, 1937
2	1	November, 1907	31	2	April, 1937
2	2	February, 1908	31	4	August, 1937
2	3	May, 1908	31	5	October, 1937
2	4	November, 1908	34	1	February, 1940
3	1	February, 1909	34	2	April, 1940
3	2	May, 1909	34	5	October, 1940
3	3	August, 1909	34	6	December, 1940
3	4	November, 1909	35	1	February, 1941
4	1	February, 1910	37	3	June, 1943
4	2	May, 1910	37	4	August, 1943
4	3	August, 1910	37	5	October, 1943
4	4	November, 1910	37	6	December, 1943
5	1	February, 1911	37	Title page and Index	
5	2	May, 1911			1943
5	3	August, 1911	38	1	February, 1944
5	4	November, 1911	38	2	April, 1944
10	1	February, 1916	38	3	June, 1944
10	2 (1-2-3)	May, 1916	38	4	August, 1944
10	3	August, 1916	38	5	October, 1944
11	1	February, 1917	39	1	February, 1945
11	3	August, 1917	39	2	April, 1945
		(Supplement)	39	3	June, 1945
12	1	February, 1918	39	4	August, 1945
18	4	November, 1924	39	5	October, 1945
19	1	February, 1925	40	1	February, 1946
19	2	May, 1925	40	2	April, 1946
19	3	August, 1925	40	3	June, 1946
19	4	November, 1925	40	4	August, 1946
21	1	February, 1927	40	5	October, 1946
21	2	May, 1927	41	1	February, 1947
21	4	November, 1927	42	1	February, 1948
22	1	February, 1928	42	2	April, 1948
22	4	November, 1928	42	3	June, 1948
23	2	May, 1929	42	5	October, 1948
23	3	August, 1929	43	1	February, 1949
23	4	November, 1929	43	2	April, 1949
24	4	November, 1930	44	1	March, 1950
25	1	February, 1931	44	3	September, 1950
25	4	November, 1931			(Supplement)
26	1	February, 1932	46	1	March, 1952
28	1	February, 1934	46	2	June, 1952
28	3	June, 1934	46	3	September, 1952
28	4	August, 1934	48	1	March, 1954
28	5	October, 1934	48	2	June, 1954
28	6	December, 1934	49	1	March, 1955
29	1	February, 1935	49	2	June, 1955
29	2	April, 1935	49	3	September, 1955
29	3	June, 1935	49	4	December, 1955
29	4	August, 1935	51	1	March, 1957
29	5	October, 1935	51	4	December, 1957
29	6	December, 1935	52	1	March, 1958
30	1	February, 1936	53	1	March, 1959

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

*Announcement*  
of the  
1962 APSA  
ANNUAL MEETING

The Executive Committee of the Association again has voted to extend the length of the Annual Meeting to a four-day period—September 5 through September 8, 1962. The Mayflower Hotel will serve as Annual Meeting headquarters.

Byrum E. Carter, Department of Government, Indiana University, is Chairman of the 1962 Annual Meeting Program Committee. His Committee is composed of the following:

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: Professor David Smith, Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: Professor James Prothro, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT: Professor Lucian Pye, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: Mr. Charles L. Clapp, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Professor Ethan Allen, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Professor James Robinson, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Professor Vincent Ostrom, Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: Professor Vernon Van Dyke, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.

SPECIAL GRADUATE SEMINARS: Professor Howard Penniman, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

PANEL ON POLITICS AND FICTION: Professor Alex Gottfried, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.

*(A Preliminary Program will be mailed to APSA members in May)*



**BOOKS**

## **THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW**

by MORTON A. KAPLAN and NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH,  
*both of The University of Chicago*

"It is excellent. It is the most sensible textbook on international law I've seen for a long while."

—Frederick S. Dunn, *Bryn Mawr College*

"A well-integrated and solid treatise absorbing what the traditional approach has to offer and yet producing a fresh, original, realistic and modern system of analysis."

—*The American Behavioral Scientist*

"Kaplan and Katzenbach make two especial contributions that I should like to identify at once. First, [the book] demonstrates the value of systems analysis for the study of international law. . . . Second, without sacrificing the sophistication of the legal realists, [the authors] manage to restore one's confidence in the capacity of legal norms to generate stable limits. . . . *Political Foundations* strikes me as almost certain to exercise a helpful influence upon serious thinking about international law in the generation ahead. Not many books give occasion for such a prediction."

—Richard A. Falk, *World Politics*

**1961**

**372 pages**

**\$6.95**

*Send for an examination copy.*

**JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.**

**440 Park Avenue South**

**New York 16, N.Y.**

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## CITIZENS AS SOVEREIGNS

PAUL H. APPLEBY

Foreword by W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

An "old pro" in government and politics turns an X-ray eye on the American citizen and what he thinks about his government, examining fact and popular fancy about government structure, the national debt, the "welfare state," the press, political parties, and the citizen's role in our democracy. An important book written with barbed good humor, this is recommended reading for courses in Citizenship and for every citizen old enough to vote.

*Paul Appleby has served as Undersecretary of Agriculture under F.D.R., Director of Budget for New York State under Averell Harriman, and Dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He has been a newspaper publisher and is the author of many books in the field of government.*

\$5.50

## SOVIET POTENTIALS: A GEOGRAPHIC APPRAISAL

GEORGE B. CRESSEY

An international authority surveys the assets and liabilities of Soviet geography—land, raw materials, people—in relation to the political and economic potential of the U.S.S.R. An invaluable aid to an informed assessment of the Soviet Union's ability to achieve declared goals. 70 photographs, maps, tables, index.

*George Cressey is Maxwell Professor of Geography at Syracuse University. He is a past president of the International Geographical Union, and has traveled more extensively in the U.S.S.R. than any other non-Soviet geographer. He is the author of many books on Soviet and Asian geography.*

\$5.75

## FESSENDEN OF MAINE: CIVIL WAR SENATOR

CHARLES A. JELLISON

This is the first full biography of William Pitt Fessenden, U. S. Senator from 1854 to 1869, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee during the Civil War, and a key figure in the defeat of Andrew Johnson's impeachment. Superbly written and authoritative.

\$5.50

ORDER FROM YOUR BOOKSTORE OR  
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS  
SYRACUSE 10, NEW YORK

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

*Announcing*

the Addition of  
**300 ARTICLES**  
from Political Science!

---

The Bobbs-Merrill  
**REPRINT SERIES IN THE  
SOCIAL SCIENCES.**

These outstanding articles from leading academic journals were selected by a committee of Political Scientists—Heinz Eulau, Stanford University; William Gore, Indiana University; Andrew Hacker, Cornell University; James Robinson, Northwestern University; Robert Wood, Massachusetts Institute of Technology—for addition to The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, which now contains over 1,000 Reprints from Anthropology, Political Science, Psychology and Sociology.

**PRICE:** 25¢ for articles 32 pp. or less  
50¢ for articles 33 pp. to 64 pp.

**FORMAT:** Each article is reprinted separately as an 8½" x 11" pamphlet, punched to fit a standard two or three ring binder.

Examine this unique Series before you plan your Fall courses. Write for a complete Catalogue and sample Reprint today to:

College Division



**THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY, INC.**  
A SUBSIDIARY OF HOWARD W. SAMS & CO., INC.  
1720 EAST 38TH STREET • INDIANAPOLIS 6, INDIANA

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## Books from Harcourt, Brace & World

### *New Titles . . .*

#### **THE USES OF POWER: 7 Cases in American Politics**

General Editor, ALAN F. WESTIN, *Columbia University*

Here for the undergraduate student of American government is an authoritative new paperback study with a clear, lively picture of American politics in operation. Each of the seven original case studies reveals crucial power struggles within one of the major centers of political control. The narratives provide a wealth of valuable, often little-known sidelights that illuminate the complex workings of government and place in sharp focus the issues at stake and the roles played by important personalities—those who use power, those who pursue it, those who veto it, and those who referee power struggles.

**Hugh Douglas Price:** the congressional response to President Kennedy's aid-to-education bills.

**Louis W. Koenig:** President Truman's position on the question of foreign aid to Yugoslavia and Spain in 1950.

**Alan F. Westin:** judicial reactions to electronic eavesdropping on a petty bookmaker by Los Angeles police.

**Victor G. Rosenblum:** the FCC's ruling on Channel 10 in Miami and the uproar that followed it.

**Allan P. Sindler:** the "loyalty fight" over ideology and party primacy between Southerners and non-Southerners in the Democratic Party.

**John P. Mallan and George Blackwood:** Governor Foster Furcolo's campaign for a sales tax to finance state social welfare programs.

**Andrew Hacker:** pressure politics in Pennsylvania: the lobbying contest between the railroads and the trucking industry.

376 pages, \$2.95

#### **THE DOLLAR IN CRISIS**

Edited, with an introduction,

by SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, *Lucius Littauer*

*Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University*

In this recently published collection of essays, thirteen foremost authorities in international economics present up-to-date analyses of the pressing dollar and gold problem and the resulting dilemma faced by America's governmental policies. Nearly all the writings were specially commissioned for this book; they contain influential, often conflicting points of view and give the kind of detailed interpretations that are suitable for a variety of courses. *Paperbound*, 309 pages, \$3.45



**for Courses in Political Science and Government**

*Soon to be published . . .*

**MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS:  
Fourth Edition**

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER, *Smith College*

JOHN M. HERZ, *The City College, New York*

When first published in 1949, *Major Foreign Powers* was acclaimed a classic in the field of comparative government. This newly revised edition presents afresh a comprehensive survey of the four leading nations—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and France. Following the parallel, flexible organization of the previous editions, the authors appraise the governments of these countries not as isolated units, but as institutions reflecting the historical, economic, and social influences of the past, and an intensified comparative theme is carried throughout the book. The text, as well as all maps and charts, has been completely redesigned and reset. Other outstanding features include a highly readable narrative, a treatment of current issues and events that is virtually up-to-the-minute, and an exhaustive bibliography. *May, 768 pages, prob. \$8.50*

**WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY:  
The Modern Age**

LEE C. McDONALD, *Pomona College*

This new survey of modern political thought combines a penetrating grasp of the materials with a vivid prose style to afford the student a study in depth of the main political theorists, set against the background of the age in which they lived. The chapters concentrating on the centuries are general and far-reaching in scope; the chapters on individuals depict in precise terms the characteristic outlook of each theorist. Throughout, the book maintains an interpretative approach: important issues are carefully related to present political realities and there are many lengthy quotations from original sources which convey the temper and style of the theorists as well as their ideas. *April, 544 pages, prob. \$6.50*

Please write for examination copies.

**HARCOURT, BRACE & WORLD, INC.**



750 Third Avenue, New York 17, New York  
1855 Rollins Road, Burlingame, California

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



Little, Brown and Company

## LEGISLATIVE POLITICS U.S.A.:

*Congress and the Forces that Shape It*

REPRESENTATION AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS—this selection of provocative readings on representative government and the legislative process treats the system from the standpoint of the representative assembly and bears on the question of how Congress affects and is affected by all the other political participants and forces. The only brief, basic, inexpensive collection available, it includes a general introduction and combines general readings, readings on the American Congress and case studies of specific issues.

in paper      5 x 8      about 300 pages      Spring, 1962

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: *Readings and Cases*

Peter Woll, University of California at Los Angeles

BASIC READINGS AND CASES IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT—designed to introduce the student to the theoretical underpinnings of our system, aspects of its growth and development, factors and issues in its everyday operation and some problems confronting it today. Brief and flexible, this distinctive book covers all major areas of government and is organized into topics as an aid to study and discussion. Concise connecting commentary guides the student but does not overshadow the readings. Suitable for courses of varying emphasis and for use with any basic text.

in paper      5½ x 8¾      448 pages      Spring, 1962

## THE COURTS: *A Reader in the Judicial Process*

Robert Scigliano, Michigan State University

A CORE SELECTION FOR STUDENTS, this book approaches the judicial process as part of the process of American government, through selected articles and connecting comments. Readings and explanations make clear the continuity in policy-resolution across the three branches of government, the manner in which these conflicts are brought into the courts, the stages through which they pass, and the discretion exercised in resolving these conflicts. Can be used alone as a substantial treatment of the judicial process or an effective supplement to the traditional case-book.

in paper      5½ x 8¾      504 pages      January, 1962

## THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ARENA: *Selected Readings*

Joseph R. Fiszman, University of Oregon

FOR AN EXCITING, MATURE COURSE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, this reader reflects the best of modern as well as traditional approaches to the study of American politics. The emphasis is on concepts about the political process at the national and local levels and in private group life, with sharp focus on such themes as public versus private interest, political values and value conflicts, plurality of group membership, conflict and consensus, and decision-making in the shaping of public policy. Introductions by the editor provide background and guidelines for the student.

in paper      6¾ x 9¼      about 600 pages      Spring, 1962

BOSTON

TORONTO

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

---

---

**MURRAY N. ROTHBARD**  
**MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE**

In this comprehensive and systematic treatise on economics, the author draws the conclusions logically implied in the fundamental axiom of human action. Written for students and laymen with no prior knowledge of economics as well as for the economists, its clear graphical representations of the major types of economic inter-relationships are an invaluable contribution to the two volume text.

**Vol. I**—leads step-by-step to an understanding of the structure of varied economies and an examination of the unhampered market. 496 pages

**Vol. II**—considers the problems of dynamic change and entrepreneurship in a free economy, presents a new theory of monopoly, and refutes the dominant economic fallacies of our age. 544 pages

the two volumes \$20.00

at your bookstore **Van Nostrand** Princeton, New Jersey

---

---

---

---

**THE ANNALS**

*of The American Academy of  
Political and Social Science*

**A** bi-monthly journal devoted to the discussion of political, social and economic problems. Presents the *January 1962* issue as a study of the American system of criminal law, its strength and deficiencies.

**Crime and the American Penal System**

Edited by Professor LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ,  
University of Pennsylvania Law School

- Criminal Conduct
  - Enforcement and Administration
  - Sentence and Treatment

For full information write to:

**3937 Chestnut Street  
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania**

Single Copies  
Nonmembers \$2.00  
Members \$1.50

---

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# ANNOUNCING...

T  
W  
E  
L  
F  
T  
H  
  
E  
D  
I  
T  
I  
O  
N

## OGG and RAY'S

### Introduction to American Government

By WILLIAM H. YOUNG, University of Wisconsin

In the twelfth edition of this well-known best seller, some of the more notable features are the completely rewritten and expanded chapters on civil rights, elections, foreign affairs, and the national defense. A new chapter has been added on government in metropolitan areas, while the chapter on territorial government has been eliminated. The book is wholly up-to-date, including the major new programs, policies, and events of 1961.

The sections on state government and on local government have been completely rewritten. The thirteen chapters of these sections have been compressed into eleven by eliminating any descriptive matter also found in the large section on the national government. The similarities and differences in the governmental levels are highlighted by the frequent references made in the state and local sections to the national section.

Several weeks after the publication of this text, the twelfth edition of Ogg and Ray's *Introduction to American Government, The National Government* will be published.

*Introduction to American Government: Ready in April. About 992 pages, illustrated. Tentative price: \$8.00*

*The section on The National Government: About 768 pages, illustrated. Tentative price: \$7.50*

## APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS, INC.

34 West 33rd Street, New York 1, New York

DIVISION OF MEREDITH PUBLISHING COMPANY

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## New and recent **OXFORD** books

.....

### **THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE**

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

In this objective, up-to-date analysis, emphasis is on the American judiciary, especially the Supreme Court. Also included is an extended comparative discussion of the court systems in England and France, with a note on the U.S.S.R. Graphs and charts clarify the institutions discussed and substantial bibliographies invite further study of pertinent topics.

Spring 1962                                      384 pp.                                      paperbound \$2.25

### **THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE**

Edited by JOSEPH TUSSMAN, Professor of Philosophy of Law, Wesleyan University

This important collection includes twenty-nine of the most significant decisions of the United States Supreme Court regarding the church-state relationship. Following a penetrating introductory essay, the opinions recorded cover such topics as freedom of religious belief and worship, the politically-minded church, religion and freedom of action, and secularism and neutrality.

January 1962                                      329 pp.                                      paperbound \$1.95

### **OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC**

By Joseph Tussman,  
Wesleyan University  
1961    152 pp.    paperbound \$1.50

### **READINGS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

Edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with  
Gerald Stourzh and  
Marvin Zetterbaum  
1959    792 pp.    paperbound \$2.75

### **READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS**

Edited by H. C. Harlan  
1961    704 pp.    paperbound \$2.75

### **READINGS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

Edited by Robert A. Goldwin  
and Gerald Stourzh  
1959    712 pp.    paperbound \$2.75

### **READINGS IN WORLD POLITICS**

Edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with  
Ralph Lerner and Gerald Stourzh  
1959    496 pp.    paperbound \$2.25

### **READINGS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY**

Edited by Gerald Stourzh  
and Ralph Lerner  
1959    496 pp.    paperbound \$2.25

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

417 Fifth Avenue, New York 16, N.Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

from the Council on Foreign Relations

## **POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1962**

*Parliaments, Parties and Press*

**W**ALTER H. MALLORY, *Editor*. "Comment on this familiar publication is unnecessary. One can only say tritely that it has become an indispensable reference book for all students of comparative government."—*American Political Science Review*.

*Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers.*

March, \$4.95

## **THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

*Political Implications of Economic Development*

REVISED EDITION

**E**UGENE STALEY. This revised edition brings a classic in the field up to date by dealing first with world-wide trends since 1953, then with developments in U.S. policy, and finally with the necessity for rethinking and reorienting our policy. "No better book could be recommended for discussion and study groups concerned with American foreign policy."—*The New York Times*.

*Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers.*

November, 1961 \$5.50

## **ARMS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA**

REVISED EDITION

**E**DWIN LIEUWEN. A new chapter on the recent events in Cuba and elsewhere is included in this revised edition within the context of the book's general theme: the role of the military in Latin America and its relation to the basic aim of the United States to advance the security of the hemisphere and of the Western world. In the new material, as in the rest of the book, the author offers informed and lucid discussion of this complex problem so important to our own future. "One of the most important publications about Latin America ever written."—*Saturday Review*.

*Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.*

January, 1962 \$5.00

**COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**

58 EAST 68TH STREET

•

NEW YORK 21, N.Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND THE  
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA PRESENT  
THE FIRST TWO VOLUMES OF  
THE PAPERS OF  
*James Madison*

---

Chief architect of the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights, Jefferson's Secretary of State, our fourth President — Madison played key roles in American history for nearly sixty years. His views were eagerly sought in his day, and their wisdom remains fresh and timely in our own.

In 1956 the University of Chicago and the University of Virginia began preparation of the first definitive edition of the papers of James Madison. The complete edition will consist of some twenty volumes.

EDITORS:  
WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON (Chicago)  
WILLIAM M. E. RACHAL (Virginia)  
and others

---

*Volume I: 1751-1779, Volume II: 1780-1781*  
Each volume 360 pages, 8 plates, \$10.00

*A discount of 10% is offered to those who subscribe to the entire series*  
A detailed descriptive circular on the  
entire series is available upon request.

---

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS  
Chicago and London

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

**OXFORD BOOKS**  
OF EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST

---

**ANDREW JACKSON**

*Symbol for an Age*

By JOHN WILLIAM WARD. A fascinating account of early America and of the man who dramatized its destiny. The author sheds light on the psychology of myth and hero-making and, in so doing, succeeds in separating some fact from fiction hitherto accepted as fact. A Galaxy paperbound (GB 73) \$1.75

**THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM**

*Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925*

By CHARLES FORCEY. A brilliant study of the rise of a new American liberal philosophy, and of the men and magazine—*The New Republic*—that advanced it and were caught in its contradictions. "One of those rare contributions to history which open up important but almost forgotten movements by critical yet sympathetic understanding."—JAMES T. SHOTWELL. \$7.00

**THE EMERGING SOUTH**

By THOMAS D. CLARK. A study of the social and economic revolution which has occurred in the South since 1920, by one of the region's foremost historians. "No one who wishes to understand the South as it really is today can afford to miss this book."—JONATHAN DANIELS. \$6.00

**THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND**

By MERRILL D. PETERSON. *Winner of the Bancroft Prize for American History, 1961.* Professor Peterson's important book traces the evolution of the Jefferson image and its tremendous impact on America's thought and imagination. "Commended to anyone who would penetrate the meaning of the historic American experience."—DUMAS MALONE. A Galaxy paperbound (GB 71) \$2.65

*At all bookstores*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**New York 16**



## **OXFORD BOOKS**

### **OF EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST**

---

#### **THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM**

By M. J. C. VILE. This is a lucid, non-technical explanation of the relationship between the constitutional structure of the American federal system and the way that that system works out in the practical world of politics. Explaining the mechanics of our system at all levels, the author offers fine insights into such areas as: the political plight of the American city; the Supreme Court and public opinion; and sectional feeling. \$4.00

#### **DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1958**

Edited by GILLIAN KING. This latest volume in the series covers such events as the renewal of the Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu; the threat to the independence of Lebanon and Jordan; and the Soviet demand for the speedy termination of the four-power occupation of Berlin. Documentation is also provided on relations between members of the Communist bloc and of the Western Alliance. (*Royal Institute of International Affairs*) \$13.45

#### **UNITED STATES FISCAL POLICY, 1945-1949**

##### *Its Contribution to Economic Stability*

By A. E. HOLMANS. An English economist who spent a year in this country analyzes recent American fiscal policy and its effect upon our economy and stability from both the "inside" and the "outside." He discusses the strengths of our policy and what seem to him its foibles with equal thoroughness, concluding with a treatment of the recession and recovery of 1957-59. \$6.40

#### **PARLIAMENTARY REFORM 1933-1960**

##### *A Survey of Suggested Reforms*


During the past thirty years much thought has been given to the question of the adequacy of current British Parliamentary methods. In this volume the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government has for the first time drawn together a representative collection of the many suggestions made since 1933 for the reform of the House of Commons, linked together by objective comments at the end of each chapter. \$4.00

*At all bookstores*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**New York 16**

**"A tough, meaty book, one eminently suited for the parlous times ahead."  
—Drew Middleton, in *The New York Times Book Review*.**



# AMERICA IN BRITAIN'S PLACE

**The Leadership of the West and  
Anglo-American Unity**

**By Lionel Gelber**

Mr. Gelber, a widely recognized authority on Anglo-American relations, has analyzed with keen perception one of the momentous events of our century—the shift of free-world leadership from Britain to the United States. In reassessing the implications and responsibilities of America's position as leader of the Western Alliance, the author contends that the breakneck tempo of political and military developments, highlighted by the Berlin crisis, makes unity between the United States and Britain imperative.

*At all bookstores \$5.00*

**FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publisher**

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

District Administration in India by S. S. Khara .....	\$0.60
Staff Councils and Associations in the U.K. and India .....	\$0.50
The Development and Impact of British Administration in India—A Bibliographic Essay by Bernard S. Cohn .....	\$1.00
The Press, The Public and The Administration by V. K. Narasimhan .....	\$1.00
Planning in India (Mimeographed) .....	\$1.00
A Bibliography on Public Enterprises in India (Mimeographed) .....	\$0.50

For fuller information, please write to: The Administrative Officer, Indian Institute  
of Public Administration, Indraprastha Estate, Ring Road, New Delhi-1.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# PRAEGER PAPERBACKS

the most comprehensive series of paperbacks  
covering the history and politics of our time

AN ATLAS OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS <i>Andrew Boyd &amp; Patrick van Rensburg</i>	\$1.75	PAN-AFRICANISM <i>Colin Legum</i>	\$1.95
COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY <i>R. G. Boyd</i>	\$1.75	ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL A Symposium <i>Edited by Ernest W. Lefever</i>	\$1.95
RUSSIA UNDER KHRUSHCHEV An Anthology from <i>Problems of Communism</i> <i>Edited by Abraham Brumberg</i>	\$2.50	ARMS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rev. Ed., 1961) <i>Edwin Lieuwen</i>	\$1.85
IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN SOVIET POLITICS <i>Zbigniew K. Brzezinski</i>	\$1.75	GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN JAPAN The Road to Democracy <i>John M. Maki</i>	\$1.95
THE AFRICAN NATIONS AND WORLD SOLIDARITY <i>Mamadou Dia</i>	\$1.85	LENINISM <i>Alfred G. Meyer</i>	\$2.25
CASTRO'S REVOLUTION Myths and Realities <i>Theodore Draper</i>	\$1.75	THE SOVIET ECONOMY An Introduction <i>Alec Nove</i>	\$2.25
SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (Rev. Ed., 1962) <i>Raymond Garthoff</i>	\$2.25	AFRICA AND THE WEST Elements of Free-Wold Policy <i>Arnold Rivkin</i>	\$1.95
AN ATLAS OF AFRICA (Rev. Ed., 1961) <i>J. F. Horrabin</i>	\$1.45	RUSSIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (Rev. Ed., 1961) <i>Derek J. R. Scott</i>	\$2.25
THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY A Critical History <i>Irving Howe &amp; Lewis Coser</i>	\$2.75	AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II (Rev. Ed., 1962) <i>John W. Spanier</i>	\$1.95
THE FUTURE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY <i>Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur &amp; Leopold Labedz</i>	\$1.75	SPAIN AND DEFENSE OF WEST Ally and Liability <i>Arthur P. Whitaker</i>	\$2.25
<i>For a complete listing of current and forthcoming titles please write to the publisher</i>		THE SOVIET UNION TODAY A Concise Handbook <i>Kenneth R. Whiting</i>	\$2.25

**FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publisher**  
64 University Place, New York 3, N.Y.



**Books  
That  
Matter**

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers.



**BOOKS**

## **Political Change In Underdeveloped Countries**

**Nationalism and Communism**

*Edited with an original essay by John H. Kautsky, Washington University. This is an important new work which attempts to formulate a general theory of politics and political change in underdeveloped countries. It seeks to arrive at some broad generalizations and hypotheses about the political effects of industrialization, applicable in all underdeveloped countries, through an analysis of the role of various groups (and particularly the intellectuals) in politics. Explaining the nature of and relationship between nationalism and Communism, these outstanding articles provide the reader with a unified and comprehensive picture of the subject. 1962. 347 pages. Prob. \$4.95.*

## **The Legislative System**

**Explorations in Legislative Behavior**

*By J. C. Wahlke, Vanderbilt University; H. Eulau, Stanford University; W. Buchanan, University of Southern California; and L. C. Ferguson, Michigan State University. Reports the results of a comprehensive research undertaking, providing novel information and insights concerning the functioning of legislatures and the behavior of legislators. Using material gathered from research in four American states, this book considers more generic problems concerning the functions of similar legislatures in other democratic countries as well as other American states. These institutions are analyzed as they are seen through the eyes of the legislators who compose them. 1962. Approx. 644 pages. Prob. \$10.25\*.*

## **The Action Française**

**Die-Hard Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century France**


*By Edward R. Tannenbaum, Rutgers University. The mid-1950's marked the alarming resurgence of the Extreme Right in France. In order to furnish a background to these developments, the author here explores the history of the most important Rightist movement during the first half of the twentieth century, and analyzes it in terms of social composition, psychology, tactics, and ideology. In so doing, he portrays the kinds of people attracted to the reactionary "cause" and provides both illuminating and timely insights into their character and motives. 1962. Approx. 288 pages. Prob. \$7.50.*

*\* Also available in textbook edition for college adoption.*

*Send for examination copies.*

**JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.** 440 Park Avenue South, New York 16, N.Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## Population and World Power

by KATHERINE ORGANSKI and A. F. K. ORGANSKI, *Brooklyn College*

This interdisciplinary study gives a concise account of the impact of population problems on international relations. Treating population as one of the chief determinants of national power, the authors show with forceful logic the implications for the free world of demographic changes taking place today.

1961. 281 pp. \$3.50 text

## Modern Organization

by VICTOR A. THOMPSON, *Illinois Institute of Technology*

Professor Thompson has written an unusually good presentation and integration of modern behavioral science findings with public administration and traditional organizational theory. Not only are there many insightful ideas which will supply researchers with many hypotheses, but perhaps more important Professor Thompson is developing a theoretical framework that is of much promise. — Chris Argyris, *Yale University*.

1961 192 pp. \$3.75

## Public Opinion and American Democracy

by V. O. KEY, JR., *Harvard University*

Borrowing analytical techniques from several disciplines, Dr. Key identifies in broad terms the processes involved in the formation of public opinion and clarifies the relationship between popular attitudes and governmental action.

1961 672 pp. \$7.50

TO BE PUBLISHED:

## Organizations of Nations

by THOMAS HOVET, JR., *New York University*  
and W. HARTLEY CLARK, *Carleton College*


**ALFRED A. KNOPF, *Publisher***

College Department

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



**modern texts  
take a  
world's-eye  
view  
of politics**

---

**The Relations of Nations, Second Edition**  
Frederick H. Hartmann, University of Florida



The newest edition of this text is an up-to-the-moment survey of international politics. A new chapter contains fresh material on Africa and other recently developed areas, as well as an expanded treatment of the Middle East. There are twice as many maps and numerous tables and diagrams. March

---

**World In Crisis: Readings in  
International Relations, Second Edition**  
Frederick H. Hartmann



The author has carefully compiled forty-seven stimulating readings, many of them classics. Selections range from the work of Thucydides to contemporary crises as seen by Churchill and Kennan. A variety of contrasting opinions appear, along with the approaches of different eras juxtaposed to illustrate the evolution of opinion over the years. March

---

**The Dynamics of International Politics**  
Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  
and George A. Lincoln, United States Military Academy



Although addressed primarily to the present world scene, this encyclopedic new text offers a method of systematic analysis applicable to the world order of any specific time in history. Concepts and approaches to international politics are thoroughly analyzed, with an eye to its complex and dynamic character. Contemporary issues receive special attention — population explosion, the impact of technology on weapons and communications, problems of economic assistance, and the changing nature of the security problem. February

**The Macmillan Company,** 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York  
A Division of The Crowell-Collier Publishing Company

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## **NATO: The Entangling Alliance**

*By Robert E. Osgood.* Because NATO is the outstanding political instrument of American security, the author sees the military-strategic decisions it demands as a matter of high politics. He argues that a major strategic revision is necessary, that it must be instigated by the U.S., and that it must increase European responsibility for NATO plans and decisions. Index. \$7.50

## **Congress and the Court**

*By Walter F. Murphy.* Direct observation and sharp characterization enliven this first-rate assessment of the balance of power between Congress and the Supreme Court. Focusing on the crucial years 1954-59, when the increasing liberalism of the Warren court stirred rightist antagonism, Mr. Murphy shrewdly sketches the tactics and the conflicting pressures that influence Court action. Index. \$6.95

## **Black Nationalism:**

### **A SEARCH FOR AN IDENTITY IN AMERICA**

*By E. U. Essien-Udom.* An African assesses the Muslim movement in America and the nature of its appeal to the urban Negro. Writing from first-hand acquaintance with the Chicago leader, Elijah Muhammad, and many of his followers, he discusses the religious and educational activities of the movement and analyzes its social, psychological, and political implications. Illus. \$6.95

## **The Illusion of Neutrality**

*By Robert A. Divine.* The first full-scale account of the struggle between isolationists and internationalists in the U.S. in the 1930's. Centering around FDR and the arms embargo issue, this study throws much necessary light on the era that saw the defeat of a hard-dying illusion. Mr. Divine deals most skillfully with the many complexities of the shifting national mood. Index. \$6.50

Through your bookseller

**UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**

5750 Ellis Avenue  
Chicago 37, Illinois

# from RANDOM

*An*  
outstanding series of books in  
*Political Science*

## *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy*

The Theoretical Foundations  
by CARL COHEN  
University of Michigan  
704 pages; paperbound; \$3.95 text  
1962

## *America's Foreign Policy*

by HAROLD K. JACOBSON  
University of Michigan  
756 pages; \$6.50 text  
1960

## *People, Power, and Politics*

An Introductory Reader  
by LYMAN J. GOULD and  
E. WILLIAM STEELE  
both of the University of Vermont  
725 pages; paperbound; \$3.95 text

## *The Might of Nations*

World Politics in Our Time  
by JOHN G. STOEßINGER  
Hunter College  
468 pages; \$6.25 text  
1961

## *Courts, Judges, and Politics*

An Introduction to the  
Judicial Process  
by WALTER F. MURPHY  
Princeton University  
and  
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT  
University of Chicago  
707 pages; \$6.75 text 1961

## *Swords into Plowshares*

The Problems and Progress  
of International Organization  
by INIS L. CLAUDE  
University of Michigan  
Revised Edition  
551 pages; \$6.50 text

## To be revised *Patterns of Government*

The Major Political Systems  
of Europe  
by Samuel H. Beer, Adam B.  
Ulam, and Nicholas Wahl, Har-  
vard University, Harry H. Eck-  
stein, Princeton University, and  
Herbert J. Spiro, Amherst College  
Approx. 700 pages

## *State and Local Government and Politics*

by ROBERT S. BABCOCK  
University of Vermont  
430 pages; \$5.50 text

## To be published *Power and International Relations*

by INIS L. CLAUDE  
University of Michigan  
Spring 1962; approx. 600 pages;  
\$5.95 text

*The College Department*

# RANDOM

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers





# HOUSE

.....

## NEW

*and Forthcoming STUDIES IN*  
**POLITICAL SCIENCE**

*Public Opinion  
and Foreign Policy*  
by JAMES N. ROSENAU  
\$1.35

*The Role of  
Congress*  
in American  
Foreign Policy  
by STEPHEN P. GIBERT

*Government and  
Politics in Africa*  
South of the Sahara  
by THOMAS R. ADAM  
\$1.65

*Courts  
and Rights*  
by JOHN P. ROCHE  
\$1.35

*The Constitution  
and the Court*  
by ROBERT S. HIRSCHFIELD

*Japanese  
Politics*  
by JOSEPH L. SUTTON

*Contemporary  
Southeast Asia*  
by ROBERT C. BONE

*Small City  
Government*  
Seven Cases in  
Decision Making  
by WARNER E. MILLS, JR.  
and HARRY R. DAVIS

*The Fifth  
Republic*  
France's New  
Political System  
by NICHOLAS WAHL

*The State  
Legislature*  
by MALCOLM E. JEWELL

*Send for a list* of Random House Studies  
in Political Science, a series of original works, at-  
tractively bound in paper covers from 95¢

.....

# HOUSE

501 Madison Avenue • New York 22

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## DIXON-YATES

### *A Study in Power Politics*

BY AARON WILDAVSKY. One of the most widely debated political controversies in recent years, the Dixon-Yates case offers a panoramic view of American politics under the Eisenhower Administration. From the extensive documentation on this case and from a hundred personal interviews, Mr. Wildavsky skillfully reconstructs the extraordinary sequence of events involving crucial issues of public policy: public versus private power and conflict of interest. Many fundamental issues relating to the functioning of the American political system are also involved: the executive decision-making process; coalition politics in a system of fragmented powers; the right of executive privilege to withhold information from Congress; and the role of the regulatory agencies. \$6.75

## POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND NATION BUILDING

### *Burma's Search for Identity*

BY LUCIAN W. PYE. This study of the search for personal and political identity in Burma brings to light some of the great difficulties which confront a transitional society in creating a modern state system. Mr. Pye examines Burma's political culture, exploring both the historical evolution of the society and the psychological reactions to change. He deals with problems such as the inhibitions thwarting modernization, the tendency toward ideological agitation, and the roles of colonialism and nationalism in the complex process of transformation. \$7.50

## THE FAR EASTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

BY A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD. First published in 1938, this is a reissue of an engrossing and authoritative chronicle of forty years of American diplomacy beginning with the annexation of the Philippines in 1898 and running through the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1938. \$10.00

### *Selected Yale Paperbounds*

<i>The Framing of the Constitution of the United States</i> by Max Farrand	\$1.75
<i>Journey to America</i> by Alexis de Tocqueville	\$1.75

Yale University Press

Canadian orders:



New Haven and London

McGill University Press, Montreal 25

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

Princeton

UNIVERSITY PRESS



## The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961

By Donald S. Zagoria

Donald S. Zagoria, who was from 1951 to 1961 an analyst of Communist Bloc politics for the U.S. Government, traces the development of serious conflict between the U.S.S.R. and China from the 20th Party Congress in 1956 to the 22nd Party Congress in late 1961. This conflict has enveloped three major areas—global strategy, domestic policy, and intra-bloc relations. Differences have plagued the relations between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung and have affected their attitudes toward de-Stalinization, the communes, Yugoslavia, Taiwan, and the developing African and Asian nations. This analysis is in itself an important contribution to all future evaluations of Communist intentions.

550 pages. \$8.50

## Tocqueville and the Old Regime:

Aristocracy, Democracy, or Tyranny?

By Richard Herr

Distressed by the despotism of the Second Empire in France, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his historical masterpiece, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Richard Herr here interprets the ideas in *Old Regime* in a critical study. He probes Tocqueville's earlier thoughts on French history from his notions as a young judge under Charles X through the writing of *Democracy in America* and his years in the Chamber of Deputies. The book then gives a sensitive account of Tocqueville's last eight years.

150 pages. \$3.50

## The Twilight of Federalism

The Disintegration of the Federalist Party, 1815-1830

By Shaw Livermore, Jr.

This work concerns the disintegration of the Federalist Party in the early history of the United States. The Federalist Party had been the party of such founding fathers as Washington, Hamilton, and Adams. In spite of the substantial numbers of able men who identified themselves with the Party during the period following 1815, it went into decline. The author here explores the reason why.

280 pages. \$6.00

Order from your bookstore, or  
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS  
Princeton, N.J.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

---

*The Galleon Series*

---

*Just Out*

**CANADA VOTES. Handbook of Federal and Provincial  
Election Data**

By Howard A. Scarrow \$12.00

*The Conflict Society: REACTION AND REVOLUTION  
IN LATIN AMERICA*

By Kalman H. Silvert \$7.50

*Recent Publications*

**EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA**

By G. V. La Forest \$6.50

**THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS, A British View:  
The Journal of Major C. R. Forrest**

Hugh F. Rankin, ed. \$2.00

**U.S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

By Robert R. Wilson \$6.50

**THE CATHOLIC VOTE**

By John H. Fenton \$4.75

**CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS**

By Carl Beck \$4.50

Wartime Origins of the East-West

**DILEMMA OVER GERMANY**

By John L. Snell \$7.00

**POLITICS IN THE BORDER STATES**

By John H. Fenton \$5.50

*Once Again Available*

*A Distinguished Text*

**AN INTRODUCTION TO PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY**


By James K. Feibleman \$7.00

**THE HAUSER PRESS**

720 Poydras St.  
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# POLITICAL SCIENCE BOOKS




Books, New Revisions, Spectrum  Paperbacks, 1961 Publications, Outstanding Best

PUBLISHED BY PRENTICE-HALL, INC., ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NEW JERSEY

# NEW

from PRENTICE-HALL



## CASES IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Edited by Edwin Bock, Staff Director, and Alan K. Campbell, Staff Member, Inter-University Case Program

Published under the auspices of the Inter-University Case Program. Features 18 cases, researched and written by teachers experienced in using the case method approach in teaching. Focuses on communicating the realities of government to students. Combines and handles the structure and problems of government within the case method framework. May, 1962, Approx. 384 pages, Paperbound, Text price: \$3.95

## CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR

Edited by Sidney Mailick, New York University, and E. H. Van Ness

Enlightened and challenging examination of administrative behavior organized around the decision-making process which gives understanding and insight into the principles and practices of administration. Includes both empirically-oriented studies and theoretical analyses of administrative and organization behavior.

May, 1962, Approx. 208 pages, Text price: \$4.95

## SIMULATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: Readings

Edited by Harold Guetzkow, Northwestern University

Discusses a new research technique, the use of simulation, as a tool for research and education in social science. Contains a collection of readings to introduce laymen and students to simulation in social science. The book explains the nature and purpose of simulation, reports on a variety of cases using simulation, and explores the techniques, values, and problems involved in its use in social science.

Forthcoming, Approx. 176 pages, Text price: \$3.95

## THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICS: Ideas and Issues

By Harold W. Thumm, Bates College, and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, University of Pennsylvania

Unique synthesis of theory and practice which transcends the usual parochial emphasis on western societies. Provides an unusually broad range of readings encompassing the western democracies and including selections on underdeveloped countries, non-western societies and their processes of government, the Soviet Union and Communist China, and totalitarian ideologies and systems.

1961, 359 pages, Text price: \$4.25

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Cooperation and Conflict

By Charles P. Schleicher, University of Oregon

Designed for use in classes in international relations or international politics at the undergraduate level. Offers a comprehensive treatment of the major aspects of international society. Is organized to carry the student through a series of logical steps to a consideration of a number of cases centering around the United States and its world relationships.

April, 1962, Approx. 608 pages, Text price: \$8.50

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SIMULATION

Edited by Robert Noel in collaboration with Harold Guetzkow, both at Northwestern University

New approach to the teaching of international relations. Hand computed and ideally suited for undergraduates. During the last several years the simulation technique has been employed at Northwestern University to vividly illustrate the abstract concepts and practices of international relations.

Forthcoming, Price to be announced

## SIGNIFICANT REVISIONS IN 1962

### THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 2nd

Edited by Marian D. Irish, Florida State University, and James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina

A realistic view of the American political scene, examining both sides of controversial subjects without bias or evasion. Coordinates behavioral findings and interpretations of American politics with legal and constitutional matters.

April, 1962, Approx. 672 pages, Text price: \$7.50

### PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 4th

Edited by Albert B. Saye, Merritt B. Pound, both at University of Georgia, and John F. Allums, Foreign Affairs Specialist, Office of the Secretary of Defense

A concise, straight-forward account of the basic features of American government with emphasis on constitutional principles. January, 1962, 512 pages, Text price: \$5.95

### PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2nd

Edited by Andrew Gyorgy and Hubert S. Gibbs, both at Boston University

A systematic application of the problem method to the field of international relations. Fifteen authorities contribute 25 carefully selected cases.

May, 1962, Approx. 384 pages, Text price: \$4.95

### FOREIGN POLICY IN WORLD POLITICS, 2nd

By Roy Macridis, Washington University

A scholarly study of the foreign policy of the major contemporary political systems examined both with reference to domestic factors and to world relations.

January, 1962, 374 pages, Text price: \$4.95

### AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ANALYSIS: Problems in American Government

Edited by Robert E. Lane, Fred I. Greenstein, and James D. Barber, all at Yale University

A revision of *Problems in American Government*.

Actual case data in workbook form. Students develop principles from factual material, interpret processes and institutions, and make appraisals. Teacher's Manual available on adoption.

June, 1962, Text price: \$4.95

### FUNCTIONS AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 2nd

Edited by Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois, and James M. Burns, Williams College

A series of integrated essays on the policies and functions of American government and their history.

April, 1962, Approx. 480 pages, Text price: \$5.95

## SPECTRUM PAPERBACKS

### JUST PUBLISHED

**Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society**—Edited by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 1962, approx. 224 pp., Text price: \$1.95, Cloth: \$3.95 (S-AA-5)

**Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics**—By J. Stefan Dupré and Sanford Lakoff, both at Harvard University; 1962, approx. 175 pp., Text price: \$1.95, Cloth: \$3.95 (S-25)

**Politics of Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara**—By Herbert J. Spiro, Harvard University; 1962, approx. 192 pp., Text price: \$1.95, Cloth: \$3.95 (S-26)

### RECENTLY PUBLISHED

**Goals for Americans**—Report of the President's Commission on National Goals; 1960, 372 pp., Text price: \$1.00 (S-AA-3)

**The Secretary of State**—Edited by Don K. Price, Harvard University; 1960, 200 pp., Text price: \$1.95\* (S-AA-2)

**Arms Control: Issues for the Public**—Edited by Louis Henkin, University of Pennsylvania; 1961, 224 pp., Text price: \$1.95\* (S-AA-4)

**The Federal Government and Higher Education**—Edited by Douglas M. Knight, Lawrence College; 1960, 205 pp., Text price: \$1.95\* (S-AA-1)

**What Price Economic Growth?**—By Klaus Knorr and William Baumol, both at Princeton University; 1961, 174 pp., Text price: \$1.95, Cloth: \$3.95 (S-11)

**Money and Credit: Their Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth**—Report of the Commission on Money and Credit; 1961, 256 pp., Text price: \$2.00†

\* An American Assembly Book (also available in cloth—\$3.50)  
† Not a Spectrum Book but available in paperback form

### OUTSTANDING BESTSELLERS

**Government by the People: The Dynamics of American Government, 4th**—By James M. Burns, Williams College, and Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois; *National Edition: 1960, 804 pp., Text price: \$7.75; National, State, and Local Edition: 1960, 948 pp., Text price: \$7.95*

**American Government: The Clash of Issues**—By James Burkhart, Stephens College, Henry C. Bush, Wayne State University, Samuel Krislov, Michigan State University and Raymond L. Lee, Indiana State College, Pa.; *1960, 422 pp., paperbound, Text price: \$3.95*

### 1961 PUBLICATIONS


**Cases in State and Local Government**—Edited by Richard T. Frost, Reed College; *1961, 362 pp., paperbound, Text price: \$3.95*

**Foreign Policy of the American People, 2nd**—By Charles O. Lerche, Jr., American University; *1961, 524 pp., Text price: \$7.95*

**Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism, 3rd**—By William Ebenstein, Princeton University; *1961, 243 pp., paperbound, Text price: \$2.95*

**Texas: Its Government and Politics**—By Wilbourn E. Benton, Texas A & M College; *1961, 662 pp., Text price: \$6.75*

**Sociology, The Progress of a Decade: A Collection of Articles**—Edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Neil J. Smelser, both at University of California (Berkeley). In the P-H Sociology Series, Edited by Herbert Blumer; *1961, 635 pp., A source book, Text price: \$7.95*



For approval copies, please write:

**PRENTICE-HALL, INC.**

**Box 903, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NEW JERSEY**



## GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

- 1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a three-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review*.

(Membership in the Association for three years and subscription to the *Review* will be only \$1.00. Applicants should write directly to The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. Payment may be made in UNESCO coupons or in any way convenient and acceptable under the exchange regulations of the country concerned. The privilege is extended to graduate students as well as to established political scientists.)

- 2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

(The cost of a three-year institutional subscription will be \$2.00, payable as above.)

- 3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 5-8, 1962, in the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.

(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any Asian country from Afghanistan eastward. Applications should be sent to The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. In his request the applicant should give his regular academic position, the nature of his study or visit in the United States, and the sum necessary for travel to and from the meeting.)

## **GOVERNMENT IN MODERN SOCIETY**

With Emphasis on American Institutions

**R. Wallace Brewster**

Meeting the needs of both majors and students who will take no further courses in political science, this text is the first to present a conceptual introduction to principles and problems of modern government primarily within the matrix of American institutions.

619 pages

1958

\$7.25

## **CAPITOL, COURTHOUSE, AND CITY HALL—Second Edition**

Readings in American State and Local Government

**Edited by Robert L. Morlan**

Drawing on sources as widely separate as the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* and the *Saturday Evening Post*, this edition—containing more than one-third new material—incorporates many suggestions made by users of the first edition.

348 pages, paperbound

1960

\$3.50

## **PROFILE OF AMERICAN POLITICS**

Readings in American Government

**Edited by Ernest W. Lefever and  
Walter V. Hohenstein**

Ninety-nine essays by political spokesmen, past and present, from Tom Paine to Adlai Stevenson and Dwight Eisenhower.

367 pages, paperbound

1960

\$3.50



# *Houghton Mifflin Company*

BOSTON • NEW YORK • ATLANTA • GENEVA, ILL. • DALLAS • PALO ALTO

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## **POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS**

Readings in Political Science

**Howard D. Hamilton**

Designed to supplement the standard textbooks for courses in the survey of American government and introduction to political science, this book contains 117 journal articles, documents, and essays spanning the time from Aristotle to the Freedom Riders and selected for their intrinsic merit as well as for their illumination of the basic institutions, processes, and functions of government. An introduction and study questions preface each selection, and a chart correlating the readings with major basic texts will be available.

*About 375 pages, paperbound*

*7<sup>5</sup>/<sub>8</sub> x 10 3/16"*

*An April Publication*

## **SOVIET SOCIETY: A Book of Readings**

**Edited by Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger**

Seventy-three articles, most of them by Western scholars, provide a comprehensive picture of the development of all the major social institutions of the Soviet Union from the Revolution to the present.

*703 pages*

*1961*

*\$7.50*



**Houghton Mifflin Company**

BOSTON • NEW YORK • ATLANTA • GENEVA, ILL. • DALLAS • PALO ALTO

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

*Selected RONALD Books . . .*

---

## **European Politics and Government**

*A Comparative Approach*

**Clifford A. L. Rich, Oklahoma State University; Robert O. Gibbon, Wisconsin State University; Lowell G. Noonan, San Fernando Valley State College; Helmut Bader, El Camino College; and Karel Hulicka, University of Buffalo**

*Edited by Clifford A. L. Rich*

**Ready in March!** Designed for the first course in comparative government, this book presents a detailed, comprehensive, and balanced account of the politics and government of five major European powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S.S.R. Specialists on each country analyze the casual determinants of political action, providing the student with

a sound basis for drawing comparative conclusions. The book systematically focuses attention on the governing process in order to impart a clear understanding of how the major European systems compare to that of the United States. The final chapter summarizes the politics and institutions of European Union. 1962. 800 pp., *illus.* \$8.00

## **Government and Politics in Latin America**

*Edited by Harold Eugene Davis, The American University  
Prepared by 11 Contributing Authorities*

A comparative survey of the political institutions of Latin America—their structure, operation, strengths, and weaknesses. Book presents the rapidly changing, frequently violent political and social life of Latin America in which emergent political forces are taking shape in movements of reform and new power

structures. The institutions of government are analyzed in relation to power structures and in terms of their functions against a background of half a century of Latin American experience. The book concludes with an evaluation of democratic trends and prospects. 1958. 539 pp., *illus.* \$7.50

## **Public Administration**

**John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California; and  
Robert V. Presthus, Cornell University**

Standard textbook provides a comprehensive account of public administration today. It integrates the descriptive-institutional material of administrative science and the behavioral analyses of administration in action. Book analyzes the nature of public bureaucracy and the political environment with its attendant

pressures on the public administrator; incorporates material on decision-making and data-processing in fact-finding and planning; reflects recent research in group behavior, individual motivation, leadership dynamics, etc. 4th Ed., 1960. 570 pp. \$7.50

## **Public Finance**

**Earl R. Rolph and George F. Break—both University of California, Berkeley**

This outstanding textbook sets forth the theoretical issues in public finance involved at all levels of government. It effectively demonstrates how economic intelligence can be applied to illuminate the problems of public finance; provides a descriptive-historical analysis of government finance today and its role

in the economy. Book draws mainly on American experience in fiscal affairs, but, where applicable, it incorporates evidence from other countries. It examines current social security programs, problems arising from metropolitan growth, fiscal theory and policy, etc. 1961. 586 pp. \$7.50

---

# **THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY**

**15 East 26th Street, New York 10, New York**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



### **VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda**

Edited by REO M. CHRISTENSON, Miami University, Ohio; and ROBERT O. McWILLIAMS, Eastern Michigan University. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. Just published

This readable anthology on public opinion and propaganda is designed for nonspecialists and students planning further study. The book includes: a discussion of the nature of public opinion; the dynamics of its process; and its role in a democracy. This is followed by a consideration of factors which influence or determine opinion. Propaganda principles, techniques and effects, plus types of propaganda are examined. Contributors include: Walter Lippmann, Bertrand Russell, Richard M. Nixon, James Bryce, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., George Gallup, Carl Sandberg.

### **LATIN AMERICA: An Interpretative History**

By DONALD MARQUAND DOZER, University of California, Santa Barbara.  
Available May

This new text offers an important step away from the traditional nation-by-nation treatment of Latin American history and offers an organized and integrated interpretative history of the area. The treatment is generally chronological and covers the entire span of Latin American history. It avoids the encyclopedic detail that clutters much of the Latin American historiography and instead stresses relationships, currents of development, and the most significant events.

### **CRIME AND ITS DEFENDERS**

By ARNOLD W. GREEN, formerly of The Pennsylvania State University. 240 pages, \$5.95 (cloth), \$2.75 (paper)

This essay explores the consequences of the theory that society is responsible for crime; discussing its place in today's mobile political, economic, and legal framework. Written within an historical framework, the author's objective is to show that crime is an inevitable accompaniment of a social system. He believes the problems cannot be solved in terms the crime defenders—social workers, psychiatrists, and criminologists—choose. There are thorough discussions on social theory, and the lives and works of such men as Max Weber, Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, Huxley.

### **ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Fifth Edition**

By JOHN H. FERGUSON, The Pennsylvania State University; and DEAN E. McHENRY, University of California, Los Angeles. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 512 pages, \$6.95

This book concisely discusses national, state, and local government by introducing background and principles and then institutions and their operation in practice. There is new and updated information on: Alaska and Hawaii as new states; election of 1960 and its aftermath; reapportionment of 1961; the Kennedy Administration; recent Supreme Court decisions on contempt of Congress; federal finance; new drive for state constitutional modernization.



**McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.**  
330 West 42nd Street  
New York 36, N.Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

*From the Free Press*

**CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY POLITICS**

*Edited by Samuel P. Huntington*

*Volume III in the Series, The International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research.* A discussion of new problems in civil-military relations. The studies presented analyze the balance of terror, the decline of empire, the processes of technological development, and new collective security arrangements. Contributors to this book are Samuel P. Huntington, Harold D. Lasswell, David Rapoport, Laurence I. Radway, Raoul Giradet, Philip Abrams, and Martha Derthick.

**\$7.50**

**THE POLITICS OF URBAN RENEWAL: The Chicago Findings**

*By Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler*

In this review of the political aspects of community development, the authors offer a valuable report on the influence local citizens and organizations may exert in an urban renewal project. Research was conducted in Hyde Park-Kenwood, a deteriorating community on the South Side of Chicago, where the citizens effected a workable plan for conservation and renewal.

**\$6.00**

**THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER**

*By Morris Janowitz*

An analysis of the professional life, organizational setting, and leadership of the American military as they have evolved over the first half of this century. "A brilliant, original work."—*The New Yorker*

**\$6.75**

*Coming in May*

**FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: An Approach to the Study of International Politics**

*Edited by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin*

What are the intellectual foundations of the field of international politics? What are the strategies for a science of international politics, and how are they applied in demanding situations? The editors of this collection investigated these and other questions through the Foreign Policy Analysis Project administered by Princeton University. Here they study decision making in international politics.

**\$5.00**

**THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE**

A DIVISION OF THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

60 Fifth Avenue, New York

## ***American Indian Policy in the Formative Years***

THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834

*By Francis P. Prucha, S.J.* Drawn from official records and emphasizing gradual evolution of policy, this is the first full account of federal Indian law from the first statute in 1783 to the definitive laws of 1834. Relevant events are recreated and history analyzed to give an insight into current Indian policy. \$6.75

## ***The Promised City***

NEW YORK'S JEWS 1870-1914

*By Moses Rischin.* New York's first great encounter with the social and cultural problems of the modern city is told here through the dramatic story of the great migration of East European Jews to the nation's largest metropolis. \$7.50

## ***The Economy of Cyprus***

*By A. J. Meyer with Simos Vassiliou.* A brief analysis to acquaint the general reader with this significant island. Its smallness, its indigenous socio-economic structure, and its British legacy make Cyprus important as a laboratory of Middle Eastern development. \$3.50

## ***Fire and Water***

SCIENTIFIC HERESY IN THE FOREST SERVICE

*By Ashley L. Schiff.* An analysis of United States Forest Service procedures and the problematic relationship of research to its administration. \$5.00

## ***Medical Service Corporations in the State of Washington***

A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF PHYSICIAN-SPONSORED  
PREPAID MEDICAL CARE

*By George A. Shipman, Robert J. Lampman, and S. Frank Miyamoto.* A study of two county medical service corporations in the State of Washington—physician-sponsored, non-profit, voluntary health insurance organizations—that have major experimental significance. Published for the *Health Information Foundation*. \$6.50

**H**ARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

---

## **DODD, MEAD BOOKS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

*Advisory Editor: DAVID FELLMAN, University of Wisconsin*

---

### **Hitchner and Harbold**

#### **MODERN GOVERNMENT: A Survey of Political Science**

By DELL G. HITCHNER and WILLIAM H. HARBOLD, *The University of Washington*. \$  
(Instructor's Manual available free to teachers.)

The authors achieve a new level of generalization and theory, appropriately illustrated from history and contemporary experiences of diverse national political systems, and make a distinguished contribution to the introductory course.

"A student who has conscientiously gone through this book—*studied* it—would really have an of the nature and problems of modern government that no other book can supply." Robert McCloskey, Harvard University

"... far ahead of anything else that's offered for a course in introduction to government." Robert Karsch, University of Missouri

---

### **Eliot**

#### **GOVERNING AMERICA: The Politics of a Free People**

By THOMAS H. ELIOT, *Washington University*

NOW AVAILABLE IN TWO EDITIONS:

NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDITION. \$7.75

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EDITION. 7.50

(Instructor's Manual, both editions, available free to teachers.)

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPLEMENT (*available separately in paperback*). 2.50

"The author's uncanny ability to relate theory and politics is enriching and refreshing." Philip Bosserman, Baker University

"The material is presented in such a manner that it fits the 'frame of reference' of our generation." Francis R. Gilmore, Phillips University

"The text has a realism not often found, an almost conversational style that is unique. Professor Eliot has written a balanced, incisive text." Charles Kerr, Westminster College

---

### **Eliot, Chambers, and Salisbury**

#### **AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Readings and Problems for Analysis**

By THOMAS H. ELIOT, WILLIAM N. CHAMBERS, and ROBERT H. SALISBURY, *Washington University*. \$2.95

This "second" book, the most widely adopted in its field, is an ingenious combination of up-to-date readings, culled from 38 sources, together with 40 specified problems related to these readings.

---

### **Mendelson**

#### **THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT**

By WALLACE MENDELSON, *The University of Texas*. \$7.00

Containing 101 cases and readings, this book may be successfully employed in either a one- or two-semester course.

---

## **DODD, MEAD & COMPANY, INC.**

432 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



# **Important New Texts in Political Science . . .**

## ***Essentials of American Government***

1962

Cortez A. M. Ewing, *University of Oklahoma*  
Jewell Cass Phillips, *University of Pennsylvania*

The basic principles of national, state, and local government are thoroughly explored in this outstanding new treatment.

- Strong combination of social processes and structure.
- Stimulating chapters on politics and government and America's role in international affairs.
- A separate treatment of metropolitan government.
- Study aids include charts and graphs, tables, a Glossary of terms, and end-of-chapter references.
- Contemporary cartoons.

## ***Essentials of National Government***

Contains the first nineteen chapters of *Essentials of American Government* in a convenient paper-bound volume.

**INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL**

**available for both books**

**College Division** 55 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, New York

**American Book Company**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## A New Van Nostrand Series Of Comparative Government Books

William G. Andrews, Assistant Professor of Government at Tufts University, is editing a series of readers in comparative government as part of the Van Nostrand Political Science Series. These will provide a fresh, up-to-date, comprehensive approach to the study of contemporary political systems. By March three titles in this sub-series will be available.

### CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

by William G. Andrews. "This is an excellent and most useful contribution to the field of comparative government. Teachers and students alike will find this collection of pertinent texts almost indispensable, especially since no other work of the kind is in print. The editor's notes are enlightening and precise." Professor Henry W. Ehrmann, Dartmouth College.

"Very useful for any courses that deal with constitutions only in part or in passing. The material is well selected and annotated." Professor Daniel Lerner, Professor of Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1961, 192 pages, paperbound, \$1.50.

### EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

#### A Comparative Government Reader

by William G. Andrews. This collection of 57 readings presents the principal political institutions of Great Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union—included are essays by top-level government leaders. The readings, grouped under five categories (governmental systems, political parties, elections, legislatures, executives) vividly portray the style and values of the respective political systems. About 385 pages, paperbound, March 1962.

### AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

#### Some Key Readings

by William G. Andrews. As complement to *European Political Institutions*, this text provides in convenient form some "core" readings concerning the American government. Like its companion volume, it is organized around key concepts of government (fundamental principles, political parties, congress, the presidency, and the supreme court). It includes selections from the Federalist Papers, de Tocqueville's classic, *Democracy in America*, some key Supreme Court decisions, and discussions of the Presidency by William H. Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy. About 205 pages, paperbound, about \$1.50, March 1962.

## D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.

120 Alexander St.

Princeton, N.J.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO and Related Documents

**Dan N. Jacobs, Miami University, Editor.** In the Second Edition, Professor Jacobs has added the Program of CPSU, first published in draft form on July 30, 1961, and here included in final form as ratified by the Party Congress XXII on October 31, 1961.

The documents in the original edition, all of which are still included, are: The New Communist Manifesto of 1960, Khrushchev's "secret" address to the Party Congress XX, Lenin's Testament with the codicil, the original Communist Manifesto, The 1957 Declaration of the Communist and workers' parties delegates, Mao's "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom" speech, and extracts from Edvard Kardelj's "Socialism and War." *Second Edition, 256 pp. Paper, \$1.45*

---

### POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT

**Loren P. Beth, University of Massachusetts.** An introduction to the study of constitutional law, this book emphasizes the things that political science students should know about our judiciary: the role it plays in our political system, the reasons why it has been given such a role, and how it performs. Primarily useful as a supplement to the usual case or text materials used in the constitutional law course, and may also be used as supplementary reading in other courses. *About 192 pp. Probably \$2.00.*

---

### THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE

**Benjamin Munn Ziegler, Amherst College.** A collection of thirty-seven land-mark decisions of the Supreme Court, touching all phases of the relationships between government and business. Concisely excised opinions, clearly introduced. *288 pp. \$2.40.*

---

Examination copies available upon request to teachers of the appropriate courses.

---

**HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS**  
Home office: 49 East 33rd Street, New York, New York

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

---

# THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

*Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association*

## EDITORIAL BOARD

- HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Managing Editor, Ohio State University*  
WALLACE S. SAYRE, *Associate Editor, Columbia University (on leave)* DWIGHT WALDO, *University of California Berkeley (at Bologna, Italy)*  
SAMUEL H. BEER, *Associate Editor, Harvard University* HAROLD STEIN, *University of Michigan*  
ALEXANDER HEARD, *University of North Carolina*  
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University* JOHN D. LEWIS, *Oberlin College*

## EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

- THOMAS H. ELIOT, *Book Review Editor, Washington University (St. Louis)* WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, *Catholic University*  
CECELIA M. KENYON, *Smith College*  
RALPH A. STRAETZ, *News and Notes Editor, New York University* JULIAN FELDMAN, *University of California (Berkeley)*  
FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, *University of Maryland*  
HIRAM M. STOUT, *Washington, D.C.*

## EDITORIAL OFFICE

*Managing Editor, APSA*  
100 University Hall, Ohio State  
University, 216 N. Oval Dr.,  
Columbus 10, Ohio

## EXECUTIVE OFFICE

*Executive Director, APSA*  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

---

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are \$15.00 a year (\$6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of \$1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at \$3.75 per copy. Prices of other issues are furnished on request.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. Notices of change of address should be received in the Washington office by the 5th day of the month of publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Harvey C. Mansfield, 100 University Hall, 216 N. Oval Dr., Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio; books intended for review, Victor T. LeVine, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.; News and Notes items, to Ralph Straetz, Department of Political Science, New York University, University Heights, New York, N.Y.; advertising correspondence, to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The *International Index to Periodicals* indexes current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 300 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

---

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1962, by The American Political Science Association.

*books you like*

## ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS

Herbert J. Storing, (Ed.) *University of Chicago*; Walter Berns, *Cornell University*;  
Robert Horwitz, *Michigan State University*; Leo Strauss, *University of Chicago*;  
Leo Weinstein, *Smith College*

• "This is a thoroughly first-class book. It is scholarly, very interestingly written and broad in coverage. Its point of view, though somewhat unorthodox, is refreshing and surely stimulating." *Paul G. Steinbicker, St. Louis Univ.* • "An excellent and long needed analysis of the current scientific approach to the study of politics." *H. M. MacDonald, Univ. of Texas* • "... raises many interesting questions, offers many illuminating insights." *Daniel Lerner, M.I.T.* • "... a valuable contribution to the discussion of the methodology of political science." *John Herz, City College of N.Y.* • "This is a book that should be read by anyone who has any pretension to being a political scientist." *Howard White, Miami Univ., Ohio* Jan. 1962, 340 pp., \$5.50

## THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY

Thomas Landon Thorson, *University of Wisconsin*

"This book is one long past due in the area of political philosophy. Professor Thorson is to be commended for showing that democracy is a philosophical problem, and hence can best be discussed and tentatively solved through an analysis and constructive criticism of what political scientists, philosophers, and men in the street hold the values of democracy to be." *William Toland, Baylor Univ.* Jan. 1962, 176 pp., \$2.25 paper

*and will like*

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ANNUAL, 1962-63

Ivan Hinderaker, (Ed.) *University of California, Los Angeles*

Articles include: Communism, Socialism, Democracy: Perspectives—Thorson; The President and the Civil Rights of Negroes—Longaker; Politics and Reform in American Cities—Wilson; Kennedy and the 87th Congress—Koenig; American Foreign Policy—Gerberding; The Supreme Court and Issues for the Sixties—Beaney. May 1962, 128 pp., \$1.95 paper.

## THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY

Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, both of *Western Michigan University*

Over 1100 terms, agencies, court cases, and statutes are defined and described in terms of their significance to the problems, practices, and institutions of American government. An important aid in all courses dealing with American government. Aug. 1962, 384 pp., \$5.95 casebound, \$2.95 paper, tentative



*Holt, Rinehart and Winston*  
383 Madison Ave., New York 17

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

# **ANNOUNCING *new for 1962***

## **MODERN GOVERNMENTS, Second Edition**

by Harold Zink, *Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University*

The four major powers of Europe—Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union—and also, Norway, Sweden, Canada, the Latin American countries, Japan and India, are offered in a balanced picture of world political institutions. By considering recent developments in such areas as the welfare state, nationalization of industry, and the rising clamor for independence among colonial peoples, this new edition presents a meaningful appraisal of current trends. The new 1962 edition incorporates current facts and figures, and has new additions to the bibliographies. The section on France has been thoroughly expanded and revised to reflect the major political developments and the Fifth Republic, Algeria, and the French Constitution. Material on Germany and the USSR has also been extensively revised. 824 pages, prob. \$6.95

### ***New Books of Exceptional Interest:***

#### **GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST in the Twentieth Century**

by H. B. Sharabi, *Associate Professor of History and Government,  
Georgetown University*

This important new text clearly describes the structure, functioning, and politics of contemporary Middle Eastern governments. One pre-publication reviewer comments: "This is an excellent piece of work and would make a first-rate textbook . . . the volume is better designed for political science courses on the Middle East than any book on the market at the present time . . . Sharabi handles the English language with deftness and precision. His style is clear, economical, and eminently readable. . . ." 309 pages, text ed. \$6.50

#### **THE IMPERIALISM READER**

##### ***Documents and Readings on Modern Expansionism***

by Louis L. Snyder, *Professor of History, The City College of New York*

The many-faceted problems relating to imperialism are explored in this comprehensive collection of 178 readings and documents. In an extensive introductory essay Professor Snyder authoritatively discusses each phase of modern expansionism. Brief introductory notes before each selection place the wide variety of official documents, eye-witness reports, essays and arguments in proper perspective. Of special interest is the timely and balanced section on Communist imperialism. 636 pages, text ed. \$6.75

#### **NEW ANVIL BOOKS**

#58 **COLD WAR DIPLOMACY: American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960** \$1.25  
by Norman A. Graebner, *Professor of History, University of Illinois*

#59 **MOVEMENTS OF SOCIAL DISSENT IN MODERN TIMES** \$1.25  
by J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Professor Emeritus of History, The City College of New York*

#### **D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.**

120 Alexander Street • Princeton, New Jersey

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



# The American Political Science Review

VOL. LVI

JUNE, 1962

NO. 2

## SCIENTISTS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND POLITICS

WARNER R. SCHILLING  
*Columbia University*

*... we must take, so far as we can, a picture of the world into our minds. Is it not a startling circumstance for one thing that the great discoveries of science, that the quiet study of men in laboratories, that the thoughtful developments which have taken place in quiet lecture rooms, have now been turned to the destruction of civilization? ... The enemy whom we have just overcome had at its seats of learning some of the principal centres of scientific study and discovery, and used them in order to make destruction sudden and complete; and only the watchful, continuous cooperation of men can see to it that science, as well as armed men, is kept within the harness of civilization.<sup>1</sup>*

### I

These words were spoken in Paris in January 1919 by Woodrow Wilson, addressing the second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference. Wilson believed he had found a watchdog for civilization in the League of Nations. In this he was sadly mistaken. Science and armed men have indeed been harnessed, but in order to promote and maintain the goals of conflicting politics. Whether in the pursuit of these ends the cause of civilization will yet be served remains, we may hope, an open question.

The cooperation of scientists and armed men was not a new relationship, even in Wilson's day. In the United States, for example, the president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science had declared in 1861:

... it is easy to see that there are few applications of science which do not bear on the interests

<sup>1</sup> U. S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Peace Conference*, 13 vols. (Washington, 1942-1947), vol. 3, p. 179.

An earlier version of this paper was prepared for discussion at the Fifth Congress of the International Political Science Association in Paris, September, 1961. The points made in it owe much to the comment and counsel of William T. R. Fox.

of commerce and navigation, naval or military concerns, the customs, the lighthouses, the public lands, post offices or post roads, either directly or remotely. If all examination is refused ... the Government may lose a most important advantage.<sup>2</sup>

As a result of the interest of a number of American scientists and government officials, the National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 for the purpose of providing scientific advice to the United States Government. The use made of this Academy by the War Department between 1863 and 1913 speaks a bygone era. During those years the Department requested the Academy to constitute scientific committees on exactly five matters:

On the Question of Tests for the Purity of Whiskey; On the Preservation of Paint on Army Knapsacks; On Galvanic Action from Association of Zinc and Iron; On the Exploration of the Yellowstone; On questions of Meteorological Science and its Applications.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in *Science and Technology Act of 1958*, Staff Study of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, 1958, p. 110.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

It would be unfair to presume from this list that the War Department was uninterested in new weapons systems. Until about the turn of the century, military technology, like industrial technology, generally developed independently of advances in basic scientific knowledge. Thus, in 1915, when Wilson's Secretary of the Navy decided to establish a "Department of Invention and Development" in the hope of securing effective weapons with which to combat that "new and terrible engine of warfare . . . the submarine," it was the inventor, Thomas Edison, who was asked to head the new organization.<sup>4</sup> Although the contributions of university and industrial scientists to the fighting of World War I were marked enough to have caught Wilson's imagination, it was not until a generation later, with the advent of World War II, that the mobilization of scientists brought military results which were of great and in some instances decisive importance to the course of combat.

What has transformed the relationship between science and war has been the fact that in the twentieth century the development of technology has become increasingly dependent upon advances in basic knowledge about the physical world. Moreover, in the technically advanced nations, both the rate of technological innovation and the growth of new scientific knowledge have been increasing exponentially. As crudely measured by the volume of scientific publication, scientific knowledge has been doubling every ten to fifteen years.<sup>5</sup> In a non-Wilsonian world, the consequences of these conditions for national security policy have been as necessary as they are obvious. As the United States and the Soviet Union throw one weapons system after another into the effort to maintain at least a balance of terror, neither dares fall behind in either the discovery of new physical relationships or in the application of scientific knowledge to military hardware and political-military strategy. Thus, by the end of the first decade of the Cold War, about 50 per cent of the engineers in the United States and 25 per cent of the scientists were employed by the Federal government, either directly or on contract, and about 65 per cent of the scientific research in universities and 57 per cent of that

in private industry was government-financed.<sup>6</sup>

Indicative of the new relationship between science and war, figures and graphs comparing the Great Powers in numbers of scientists and engineers have become as familiar as those in the 1930s which compared the Powers in their output of steel, coal, and oil. Nor is it only in the military field that science and technology have become vital to the course of foreign policy. Science has been harnessed to the advancement of foreign policy goals in such diverse fields as the exploration of space, birth and disease control, weather modification, economic development, and global communications.<sup>7</sup>

Present, prospective, and future developments in science and technology are certain to bring a host of problems and opportunities to those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. In recognition of this fact, the governments of the major Powers have endeavored to find ways to make themselves more alert to such developments and more active in determining the course of science and technology. The United States and the Soviet Union are the most extensively engaged in this effort, but it should not be forgotten that the nations of Western and Central Europe were among the pioneers in cultivating the relationship between science and government. The three elements that have revolutionized current military technology and strategy (electronics, missiles, and nuclear weapons) had their harbingers in the World War II development of British radar, the German V-2, and the American A-bomb, and it is noteworthy that the two European developments were conceived, initiated, and directed by officials and employees of established government organizations. In contrast, the American A-bomb was the result of conceptions and initiatives that came from outside the government—and primarily from exiled Europeans at that.

As an integral part of the efforts of governments to become both more responsive to and responsible for the development of science and

<sup>4</sup> See Daniels' letter to Edison, in Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 491.

<sup>5</sup> Ellis A. Johnson, "The Crisis in Science and Technology and its Effect on Military Development," *Operations Research*, January-February 1958, pp. 14-15.

<sup>6</sup> See Lee A. DuBridge, "The American Scientist: 1955," *Yale Review*, Spring 1955, p. 13, and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1957, p. 82, and May-June 1961, p. 254. The figure for private industry is for the year 1959; the others are for the year 1955.

<sup>7</sup> For a more detailed treatment of some of the points in the preceding paragraphs and a general discussion of the effect of science on international relations, see the present writer's "Science, Technology, and Foreign Policy," *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 1959, pp. 7-18.



technology, scientists have been invited into the highest councils of government, and it is with some of the problems occasioned by the presence of these "new" participants in the making of national policy that the remainder of this article will be concerned. Although some illustrative material will be drawn from the experience of other governments, the paper focuses on problems associated with the participation of scientists in the American policy process.

Needless to say, the problems in policy-making that may arise will vary greatly with the kind of scientist participating (oceanographer, theoretical physicist, specialist in space medicine, industrial chemist), with the nature of the policy issue at stake (weapons development, science education, public health, the exploration of space, the allocation of funds for basic research), and with the manner in which the scientist is involved in the policy process (member of the attentive public, adviser to the President, worker in a government laboratory, official in an executive department or agency). This article will make no attempt to deal systematically with the combinations possible among these three variables (profession, issue, and involvement). The discussion will be confined to a few of the central problems that the layman and the scientist are likely to encounter in working together on national security issues; and the treatment, as will become evident, will be of a very general and suggestive order.

In their general character, the problems occasioned by the participation of scientists in the determination of high policy are not nearly so novel as is generally supposed. The scientist has been brought into the councils of government because he possesses specialized skills and information believed relevant to the identification and resolution of particular policy problems. His relationship to the policy process is therefore a familiar one, that of an expert. Just as Sputnik I precipitated the establishment of a Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, so the earlier problems of fighting World War II and insuring postwar employment had brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Council of Economic Advisers into the Offices of the President.

The central problems in policy-making posed by the entry of scientists into the policy process are thus formally no different from those associated with any other expert involved in the determination of national security policy. In particular, four such problems can be noted. (1) Like all experts, scientists will at times disagree, and the non-scientist (be he politician,

administrator, or an expert in some other field) will confront the problem of choosing a course of action in the face of conflicting scientific advice. (2) Like all experts, scientists will at times evince certain predispositions toward the resolution of the policy problems on which their advice is sought, and the non-scientist will confront the problem of identifying the policy predilections peculiar to scientists and being on his guard against them. (3) The non-scientist and scientist will confront one problem in common, and that is how to organize themselves to maximize the contribution that science can make to the government's programs, opportunities, and choices. Finally, (4) the scientist will confront a problem common to all experts who participate in the American policy process, and that is how to engage in politics without debasing the coinage of his own expertise.

## II

The difficulties the non-scientist confronts in choosing a course of action in the face of conflicting scientific advice seem inherently no more formidable than those a non-expert would face in deciding what to do in the event of conflicting advice from economists, soldiers, or specialists on Soviet foreign policy. There are at least seven procedures that the non-expert can follow in such circumstances, singly or in combination, and they appear to have about the same promise, for better or for worse, regardless of the kind of experts involved.<sup>8</sup>

The first step the non-scientist can take is to make certain that it is really conflicting *scientific* advice he is receiving. In the fall of 1949 President Truman asked Secretary Acheson to look into the disputes then current within the Atomic Energy Commission and elsewhere about the consequences of undertaking an intensive effort to make an H-bomb. Upon investigation the Secretary of State concluded that the scientists involved were not really very far apart except on the foreign policy issues that were his and Truman's responsibility to decide.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the implication in the following remarks of Glenn T. Seaborg, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission: "Scientists don't necessarily have to make the final political decisions, but it might be easier to let a capable scientist learn political reality than to teach a politician science." Quoted in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1961, p. 79.

<sup>9</sup> In this and subsequent undocumented references the present writer has drawn upon personal interviews during 1956-1958 with participants in the H-bomb decision.

Procedures two and three are simple: the non-scientist may be guided by quantitative or qualitative features of the division (he can side with the majority, or with that side whose past record is the more confidence-inspiring). Failing these, there is, four, the "principle of least harm" and, five, the "principle of minimal choice." In the former, one chooses that course of action which appears to involve the least cost if the technical premise on which it is based proves to be wrong. Thus in World War II, given the American belief that the Germans were hard at work on an A-bomb, it seemed more sensible to spend \$2 billion on the assumption that the bomb could be made than to do little or nothing on the assumption that it could not. In the case of the "principle of minimal choice," one chooses that course of action which seems to close off the least number of future alternatives. This was the character of President Truman's first decision on the H-bomb. He decided to go ahead in the effort to explore the feasibility of an H-bomb, but nothing was decided about technical steps of a greater political or military consequence (for example, testing a device if one were fabricated, or preparing to produce the materials that would be required for weapons production in the event of a successful test).<sup>10</sup>

In the case of procedure six the non-scientist can make his choice among conflicting scientists on the basis of whichever technical estimate is most in accord with policy on which he was already intent. (In contrast to the first procedure, where the non-scientist endeavors to factor out of the conflict the policy preferences of the scientists, here he is factoring into the conflict his own policy preferences.) In the spring of 1942, the British scientists Henry Tizard and F. A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell) diverged greatly in their estimates of the destruction that could be accomplished by an intensive bombing of the homes of the German working class. There was general agreement among the soldiers and politicians involved that if the lower estimate were correct there were better military uses for the resources the bombing campaign would require, but in the end the campaign was made in the expectation that the higher estimate would prove to be the more accurate (which it did not). This choice was clearly influenced by Churchill's interest

in presenting the Russians with a dramatically visible contribution to the war against Germany and by the fact that British air doctrine had long presumed the efficacy of strategic bombing.<sup>11</sup>

In procedure seven the non-scientist is guided by his own sense for the scientific and technical problems involved. In the 1949 H-bomb debate, some of the politicians involved were little deterred by the fact that the scientists were by no means confident that they could make such a weapon and by the possibility that an all-out but failing effort might entail very high costs for the A-bomb program. These politicians were willing to press ahead in part because of their belief that the scientists were not really aware of their own potential. Similarly, when the German soldiers, scientists, and engineers engaged in the development of the V-2 divided on the question of whether it should be launched from mobile or fixed batteries, Hitler's own technical enthusiasm for large, hardened bunkers led him, unwisely as it turned out, to decide on behalf of the latter.<sup>12</sup>

In concluding this survey of the problem of conflicting advice, it should be noted that one of the more likely outcomes is that the actions of the contending scientists may prove much more influential than the procedures followed by the non-scientist. Divided experts will not always be equal in their physical or personal access to the decision-maker, in the persistence with which they state their case, or in the force and clarity of their arguments. Thus, in the H-bomb debate, there were instances where equally qualified scientists differed greatly in the time and energy they spent circulating their views of the technical (and political) prospects, and such differences were by no means without consequence for the judgments of others.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> See C. P. Snow, *Science and Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 47-51, the review of this book by P. M. S. Blackett in *Scientific American*, April 1961, pp. 192-194, and Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 281. For British air doctrine see also Herbert S. Dinnerstein, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene, 1933-1940," *Military Affairs*, Summer 1955, pp. 67-68.

<sup>12</sup> Maj. Gen. Walter Dornberger, *V-2* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1954), pp. 97, 158-160, and Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York, 1958), pp. 76-77.

<sup>13</sup> Note should also be taken of the problem the policy-maker faces when all his experts are agreed. The present writer is unable to suggest a useful

<sup>10</sup> For the "principle of least harm," see Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," *World Politics*, July 1949, p. 479n. On the H-bomb choice, see the present writer's "The H-Bomb Decision: How To Decide Without Actually Choosing," *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1961, pp. 37-38.

## III

The discussion of the policy predispositions displayed by scientists must be entered with considerable caution. The major theoretical premise involved is that all experts will evidence certain predilections with regard to policy and policy-making which are the result of the character of their expertise: their skills, knowledge, and experience. Since experts differ in the skills, knowledge, and experience they command (or in the responsibilities with which they are charged), they will differ in the biases they characteristically exhibit. Thus scientists, soldiers, and diplomats jointly concerned with a policy problem are likely to approach the question of how and in what manner it should be resolved with rather dissimilar predispositions.

These points, however, are easier stated than demonstrated. To begin with, it should be clear that, insofar as policy is concerned, "the scientific mind" is as much a chimera as "the military mind." Scientists, like soldiers and the rest of us, differ greatly in the ideas they have about the political world and the things that will (or ought to) happen in it, and their views on foreign policy matters are far more likely to be reflective of these differences than conditioned by their common professional skills and interests. Moreover, even if differences in expertise or responsibility were the only factors determining the views of policy-makers (and they certainly are not), one would still have to take account of the fact that scientists are as varied in their professional skills and pursuits as soldiers. The perspectives of a theoretical

---

procedure here (other than variations on numbers five, six, and seven above); but that the problem is a real one can be seen in the conclusion of the German physicists that it would be infeasible for any Power to develop an atomic bomb during World War II. Some of the German scientists later stated that political considerations were partly responsible for their advice and for the fact that they made so little progress themselves on an A-bomb (*cf.* procedure one).

The German work on the A-bomb during World War II is described in Samuel A. Goudsmit, *Alsos* (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1947). For various appraisals of the influence exercised by political considerations, see Robert Jungk, *Brighter than a Thousand Suns* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), pp. 88-104, Hans Bethe in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1958, p. 427, and William L. Laurence, *Men and Atoms* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 90-93.

physicist engaged in basic research are no more to be equated with those of an organic chemist engaged in applying extant knowledge to the improvement of an industrial product than is the outlook of a staff officer in Washington drafting a war plan to be considered identical with that of a general in charge of a theatre of operations.

In addition to these difficulties, analysis must also contend with the fact that it is directed toward a moving target. The policy perspectives that a physicist may have developed as a result of two decades in a university laboratory are unlikely to endure without change after a few years on a Washington advisory committee. Many American scientists are well along the same route that transformed the policy perspectives of large numbers of the American military profession during the war and immediate postwar years. As a result of new problems and new responsibilities, these soldiers acquired new skills, knowledge, and experience. In consequence, with regard to their approach to foreign policy, some are, for all practical purposes, interchangeable between the Pentagon and the State Department, and one could wish that there were more diplomats equally well equipped to work on both sides of the Potomac.

With these reservations in mind, six policy perspectives will be presented here which seem moderately characteristic of many scientists, most of them physicists, who have participated in national security policy in recent times. Most of these predispositions were first evidenced during their work with the military during World War II, and the extent and manner in which they have been later operative in reference to larger foreign policy issues is not always easy to document, since most of the sources are still classified. Needless to say, in outlining these predispositions, one is presenting a cross between a caricature and a Weberian ideal type, not describing real people. In discussing these predispositions, the present writer does not mean to convey the impression that they are either "good" or "bad" from the point of view of policy or policy-making, or that one or another of these predispositions may not also be evidenced by groups other than scientists. The point to this discussion is that if certain orders of scientists are indeed prone to these or other policy predispositions, the non-scientist will be wise to be alert to them, even if in the event he should conclude that they are all for the good.

*Naive utopianism or naive belligerency.* C.P. Snow has described the scientist as an impatient optimist in his approach to social wrongs; he is quick to search for something to do and

inclined to expect favorable results.<sup>14</sup> Certainly, the scientist's profession inclines him to look at problems in terms of searching for a solution to them. When this perspective is turned to problems of international politics, however, the scientist's approach often appears open to the characterization of "naive utopianism or naive belligerency."<sup>15</sup> His approach to international relations appears simplistic and mechanistic. It is almost as if he conceives of policy being made primarily by forward-looking, solution-oriented, rational-thinking types like himself.

In these perspectives the scientist is likely to find little in common with the diplomat (who is inclined to believe that most of his problems have no solution, and who is in any event too busy with the crises of the day to plan for tomorrow), or with the politician (whose approach to problems is so spasmodic as to seem neither analytical nor rational, and whose policy positions are anyway soon blurred by his efforts to accommodate to the positions of others), or with the professional student of international politics (who, when the opportunity permits, lectures the scientist on the elegant complexity of the political process, but who never seems, to the scientist at least, to have any really good ideas about what to do). It is perhaps these differences in perspective that lead the scientist on occasion to seem "intellectually arrogant"; it is as if he concludes that those who have no promising solutions or are not seeking them cannot be very bright. In his predisposition toward action and solutions, the scientist comes closest to sharing the predilection of the soldier for decision, which may be one reason why their partnership has been so spectacularly successful.

*The whole problem approach.* The first grant made by the United States Government for experimental research was in 1832 to the Franklin Institute. The scientists were asked to investigate the reasons for explosions in steamboat boilers. They reported back not only with a technical explanation but with a draft bill to provide for Federal regulation of steamboats.<sup>16</sup> In this they evidenced the scientist's predilection for the "whole problem approach." The reluctance of scientists to apply their expertise to mere fragments of the total problem, especially under conditions where those

who prescribe the fragments do not reveal the whole of which they are a part, was evident in the work of both British and American scientists during World War II. Military officials initially approached the scientists with requests for the development of particular weapons and devices without revealing the military problems or reasoning responsible for their requests. The scientists objected to this procedure, and they were eventually able to persuade the soldiers to inform them of the general military problems involved in order that the scientists might reach their own conclusions about the kinds of weapons and devices the military would need to meet those problems.<sup>17</sup>

In 1952, in connection with an Air Force project on air defense, a group of American scientists were asked to review the prospects for improving the nation's continental air defense. The scientists concluded that some new and promising systems were possible, and they submitted an estimate of what the developments might cost. They also recommended that the money be spent. The Air Force did not approve the recommendation, and as is customary in Washington the disputants on both sides began to search for allies and to leak their cases to the press. Certain Air Force officials, who feared that additional funds for air defense would come at the expense of dollars otherwise available for the Strategic Air Command and who were convinced that this would be militarily undesirable, charged that the scientists by entering into matters of military strategy and budget policy had exceeded both their assignment and their expertise. Commenting on this charge, one of the scientists involved later explained that he would have little interest in working on a study project that did not have the potential for leading into the question of whether the conclusions should be acted upon.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> This persuasion was largely accomplished through demonstrations of the military utility of the scientists' taking such an approach, although in the early history of the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory a certain amount of polite bargaining was apparently practiced. One scientist involved, whenever told that the reason for a request was a problem for Washington, not him, to worry about, adopted the practice of working on something else until he was given a description of the problem involved. For a brief summary of the British experience, see Alexander Haddow, "The Scientist as Citizen," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1956, p. 247.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the following exchange between Gordon Gray and Jerrold Zacharias during the Oppen-

<sup>14</sup> C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 9-11.

<sup>15</sup> I am indebted to Hans Speier for the phrasing of this point.

<sup>16</sup> Don K. Price, *Government and Science* (New York: New York University Press, 1954), pp. 10-11.

The predisposition to want to be told and to deal with the whole problem no doubt has its base in the professional experience of scientists (and one of the central credos of science) that good ideas on a problem may come from the most unexpected quarters and that the widest possible dissemination of information about a problem will significantly enhance its chances for an early solution.<sup>19</sup> Still, there are problems and problems; some are open to determinate solutions, and others can be resolved only through the exercise of political power. The point about the "whole problem approach," as the air defense example illustrates, is that it not only helps propel the scientists from an advisory to a political role but it serves to make the scientist somewhat blind to the fact that he is so moving. In its most extreme form, the "whole problem approach" coupled with the "intellectual arrogance" perspective can lead to such instances as when, on one high-level advisory committee concerned with several areas of national security policy, a scientist whose formal claim to participation was a knowledge of infra-red ray phenomena was reportedly quite free with his proposals for

what political policies should be adopted with regard to the United Nations.

*Quantum jumps versus improvements.* A number of scientists have advanced the proposition that the military tend to be more interested in improving existing weapons than in developing radically new ones, and they have urged that a separate civilian agency be established to undertake such development. Both scientists and soldiers have explained this difference in their approach to military research and development, "quantum jumps versus improvements," with the hypothesis that the soldier's interest in developing entirely new weapons must always be inhibited by his concern for the possibility that war may come in the near future, since in this event his interests are best served by improving existing weapons. It has also been suggested that military leaders, who must be prepared at any time to ask others to take up the weapons at hand and fight with them, cannot afford to let themselves or others become too impressed with the deficiencies of those weapons as compared with others that might have been had.<sup>20</sup>

An explanation less flattering to the military for this difference is the occasional assertion by scientists that theirs is a profession which stimulates original and creative thought, while that of the military tends to develop minds which accept the existing situation without too much question. As indicated in the discussion of the first predilection, this is a judgment which the scientist may extend to the diplomat and the politician as well. The structure of both the domestic and the international political process is normally such as to make "quantum jumps" in policy infeasible. Diplomats and politicians are accustomed to seeing the same old policy problems come around year after year, and they are generally intent on policies which promise only slow and modest change. Scientists, on the other hand, have been demanding and searching for quantum jumps in foreign policy ever since the end of World War II. It is symptomatic that the first proposal developed by the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology to the Democratic National Advisory Council, established in 1959, was for the creation of a new scientific agency, independent of the State and Defense Departments, whose function would be "to face all the problems of disarmament."<sup>21</sup>

*Technology for its own sweet sake.* In the sum-

heimer hearing. Gray: "If you were directing a study which had to do with electronics, a pretty clearly defined field, and it started to come up with recommendations with respect to foreign policy, would you feel that an official of the Defense Department who urged that you stick to electronics was acting with impropriety?" Zacharias: "I think I would not direct a project that was as restrictive as that, sir, as to be restricted only to electronics." U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board*, Washington, 1954, p. 930.

For some of the issues involved in the 1952 air defense study, see *ibid.*, pp. 598-99, 749-50, 763-65, 923-24, 930-31, 935, 938, and also the account in Price, *Government and Science*, pp. 136-38.

<sup>19</sup> General Leslie Groves, who directed the Manhattan project, was especially sensitive to the scientists' tendency to take on the whole problem. (Some even advised him on how the garbage should be collected at Los Alamos, an act which may possibly have reflected self- rather than scientific interest.) One reason for his effort to compartmentalize the work scientists were doing was his fear that "if I brought them into the whole project, they would never do their own job. There was just too much of scientific interest, and they would just be frittering from one thing to another." *Oppenheimer Transcript*, p. 164.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Lloyd V. Berkner, "Science and National Strength," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1953, pp. 155, 180.

<sup>21</sup> See the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1959, p. 412.

mer of 1945, after the A-bomb had been tested but before the first drop on Japan, the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, J. Robert Oppenheimer, suggested to his superior, General Leslie Groves, that if some improvements were made in the design of the bomb it would be more effective. Groves decided against the improvements because he did not want to incur any delay in the use of the bomb, which he expected would end the war with Japan. In the summer of 1943, after the Director of the German V-2 project, General Dornberger, had finally secured a first-class priority for the use of the weapon, those responsible for producing it in quantity were increasingly handicapped by the scientists and engineers who kept improving but changing its design. Dornberger was finally obliged to issue a flat order against any further improvements.<sup>22</sup>

There was nothing irresponsible in these scientists' actions. Charged with the technical development of weapons, they would have been remiss in their responsibilities if they had failed to call attention to the prospects for improvement. The point to the examples is that scientists and engineers, in the pursuit of their own responsibilities and interests, may easily lose sight of those of the policy maker.

The scientists on the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission who recommended against the development of an H-bomb in 1949 did so in part because of their concern for the foreign-policy consequences of introducing a weapon of such destructive power into the world. Oppenheimer, the Chairman of the Committee, later stated that the thermonuclear design developed by Edward Teller in 1951 was "technically so sweet" that, if it had been available in 1949, the Committee would probably not have made the recommendation that it did. Since, with a technically more promising design at hand, one might suppose that the Committee's foreign-policy concerns would have been all the greater, some observers have concluded that in the pursuit of his technical interests the scientist can also easily lose sight of his own policy concerns.<sup>23</sup>

Such a judgment ignores the complexity of the Committee's position. For example, one of the reasons why the Committee thought the United States should take the initiative in renouncing the H-bomb was precisely because

the device then in view seemed likely to be both difficult to make and of dubious military value. It was thought that for this reason the Russians might be willing to follow the American example and that, if they did not, the United States would not have risked much by the delay. These were considerations which obviously would have been changed if a technically more promising design had been available in 1949.<sup>24</sup> Still, the comments of several scientists close to these events are not without relevance. It is their feeling that there are times when the technician does take over, that when the scientist is faced with an interesting and challenging problem his inclination is to get to work on it, and that under these circumstances he should not be the first person to be expected to keep larger policy considerations in balance.

This predisposition, "technology for its own sweet sake," appears to have its roots in two more of science's central credos: the belief in the value of pursuing knowledge for its own sake, and the belief that the best motivation for the direction of research is the strength and character of individual curiosities. But the direction and strength of scientific interests and curiosities is not necessarily coincident with the requirements of military or foreign policy. One of the most recent examples of the scientist's capacity to get caught up in a challenging problem (assigned, to be sure, by policy-makers) is afforded by the ingenious techniques scientists conceived for evading nuclear-test detection systems and for the design of new systems to meet those evasions. In the light of the later course of negotiations, an American statesman who believed there was considerable foreign-policy gain in a test-ban treaty and who believed that the Russians were at one time seriously interested in such a treaty might well conclude that the formula developed by Watson-Watt, the scientist who fathered radar, with reference to the problem of meeting wartime military requirements was not without its implications for meeting peacetime foreign policy requirements: "Give them the third best to go with; the second comes too late, the best never comes."<sup>25</sup> This observation is not intended as an argument that the interests of the United States would have been better served by a test-ban treaty with a "third best" detec-

<sup>22</sup> *Oppenheimer Transcript*, p. 33, and Dornberger, V-2, pp. 134-137.

<sup>23</sup> *Oppenheimer Transcript*, p. 251. For an extreme judgment, see Jungk, *Brighter Than a Thousand Suns*, p. 296.

<sup>24</sup> See Oppenheimer's statements in *Oppenheimer Transcript*, pp. 81, 251, 897, and "The H-bomb Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," *loc. cit.*, pp. 30-36.

<sup>25</sup> Sir Robert Watson-Watt, *Three Steps to Victory* (London: Odhams, 1957), p. 74.

tion system than by no treaty at all. The point is that the policy maker must be sensitive to the prospect that, because of the constant advance of technology, his only real choices may be of this order.

*The sense for paradise lost.* This predisposition is likely to be more characteristic of the scientists who had their graduate training and early professional experience in the years before World War II than of those who have known only war or Cold War conditions.<sup>26</sup> The prewar scientists took it as an article of faith that certain conditions were essential for the progress of science, in particular that scientists be free to select their research problems and that both scientists and scientific information be free to move among as well as within nations.<sup>27</sup> All of these conditions were violated during World War II, and as a result of the Cold War they were never fully re-established. The nuclear physicists had had perhaps the most highly developed sense of international community. They were relatively few in number, had intimate personal relationships at home and abroad, and had been experiencing an exciting exchange of discoveries since Rutherford identified the nucleus in 1911. They also lost the most, for theirs was militarily the most sensitive knowledge, and the pages of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* offer eloquent testimony to their ideological disturbance.

The result is that the senior scientists tend to be especially sensitive to possibilities which hold some promise for restoring the former order. They may usually be found on the side (or in front) of those urging freer exchange of scientific and military information with allied governments, less secrecy in the circulation of scientific (and sometimes military) information, and more extensive cultural, and especially scientific, exchanges with the Soviet Union. Similarly, the major activities of the Foreign Policy Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee and of the Office of the Science Adviser to the Secretary of State have been in connection with the Science Attaché program, the facilitation of international scientific pro-

grams and conferences, and the exchange of scientists with the Soviet Union.<sup>28</sup>

*Science serves mankind.* For at least 300 years the western scientific tradition has assumed that the unrestricted generation of new knowledge about the world was a social good. Over these years science in its purest form (the discovery of the facts of nature for knowledge's sake alone) became increasingly an autonomous social institution; research scientists were largely disassociated from the practical applications of their discoveries, but they took it for granted that these discoveries would ultimately benefit mankind.<sup>29</sup> The advent of nuclear and bacteriological weapons systems which have the potential of destroying so much of mankind and his works has called this faith sharply into question. It does not take much imagination to wonder if man, in view of his apparent inability to escape from the order of conflicts which have historically resulted in war, would not be better off in a world where the knowledge that has made the new weapons possible did not exist. For some of the senior nuclear physicists this is more than a philosophical question. They are unable to avoid a sense of real personal responsibility; they reason from the premise that they were few, and if they had acted differently weapons development might not have taken the turn it did.

In the immediate postwar years, the apparent contradiction between the good of science and the evil of war was resolved by the expectation that the very destructiveness of the new weapons would lead man to renounce at last the folly of war. The course of foreign policy in later years has weakened these expectations but not destroyed them, as the recent flurry of arms-control proposals premised on the rational self-interest of both sides in avoiding mutual destruction testifies.

The need to preserve their sense of service to mankind led some American scientists to refuse to work on weapons. Similarly, there are reports that several Russian scientists were imprisoned, exiled, or placed under surveillance

<sup>26</sup> In 1955 slightly more than half of the active research physicists in the United States were under forty years of age and had received their doctorates after December 7, 1941. Lee A. DuBridge, "The American Scientist: 1955," *Yale Review*, September 1955, p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> These assumptions are excellently set forth in Margret Smith Stahl, "Splits and Schisms: Nuclear and Social," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1946, ch. 4.

<sup>28</sup> For the activities of the Panel and the Office, see James R. Killian, "Science and Public Policy," Address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 29, 1958, as printed in *Science Program—86th Congress*, Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959), pp. 12-13, and *The Science Adviser of the Department of State*, Department of State Publication 7056 (Washington, 1960).

<sup>29</sup> See Stahl, *op. cit.*, ch. 4.



for refusing to participate in weapons work between 1945 and 1953, and in 1957 a number of Germany's elite physicists announced that they would have no part in nuclear weapons work.<sup>30</sup> Such cases are dramatic, but nowhere have they prevented the development of weapons on which governments were determined. The more consequential resolutions have been those in which scientists have simply identified the good of mankind with the strength of their nation or have endeavored to develop new weapons systems which would be as effective as the old in promoting national policy but which would result in less slaughter if used. This was part of the rationale behind the recommendation made by a group of American scientists in 1951 that the government undertake the development and production of a large number of A-bombs for tactical use in the ground defense of Western Europe. Their hope was that such an innovation would relieve the United States of the burden of having to rely solely on the threat of strategic bombing to contain the Red Army.<sup>31</sup>

The failure of the United States to orbit a satellite before the Soviet Union did was the result of the State Department's insensitivity to the political implications of the event and the decision of the President and the Secretary of Defense not to let a satellite program interfere with military missile programs. A small part of the story, however, is to be found in the reluctance of some of the American scientists involved in the programming of the International Geophysical Year to see an American IGY satellite propelled by an operational military weapon. Their preference for the less developed but non-military Vanguard over the Army's Redstone appears to have reflected a combination of the "sense for paradise lost" and the "science serves mankind" predispositions, in this case an interest in showing the world the peaceful side of science and in demonstrating that the scientists of the world could cooperate in the interests of knowledge as well as compete in the interests of nations.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> See Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 105. Kramish states that it is not certain whether the objections of the Russian scientists were technical or political. For the declaration of the German physicists, see the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1957, p. 228.

<sup>31</sup> *Oppenheimer Transcript*, pp. 584, 594-95, 891-94.

<sup>32</sup> See Walter Sullivan, *Assault on the Unknown* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 79-81.

#### IV

With regard to the two remaining problems to be discussed—how to organize relations between science and government, and how the scientist can participate in policy-making and still keep his expert standing—four points seem deserving of special emphasis: (A) the problem of organization, especially in the area of foreign policy, is still very much in the research and development stage, and so it may long remain, considering the precedent set by the problem of how to relate military experts and foreign policy; (B) in many areas of policy it will never be possible to specify what constitutes "the best" organization; the way in which policy-makers are organized is not without influence on the kind of policies they will produce, and so long as there are differences over policy there will be no agreement about organization; (C) in the American political system, at least, the science expert at the high-policy level has no real hope of keeping out of politics; his only choice is in the character of his political style; and finally, (D) it should not be forgotten that organization and policy-making are not the same as policy; successful instances of foreign policy capitalizing on or guiding developments in science and technology will not automatically follow just because scientists have been liberally injected into the policy-making process.

*Organization.* Current American organization in the area of science and foreign policy still reflects the emergency responses to the Russian ICBM and Sputnik I. One effect of these events was that scientists were rushed to the most important single center of power, the Office of the President, by means of the creation of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee.

The President certainly needs men around him sensitive to the areas of interaction between science and foreign policy. But a case can be made for the proposition that the center of gravity for the input of scientific advice into the policy-making process should be at a lower level than the White House. The President's political interests lie in keeping the staff about him small and generalized. Well-developed plans and programs will have a better chance of maturing in the larger and more diversified facilities that departments and agencies can provide. Secondly, as C. P. Snow concludes in his account of the differences between Tizard and Lindemann, there are risks in having a single science adviser sitting next to the center of political power. Although it should be noted



that Churchill fared better with a single science adviser than Hitler did with none ("The Führer has dreamed," Dornberger was told, "that no [V-2] will ever reach England"), Snow's point has merit and it holds for institutions as well as for individuals.<sup>33</sup> The President will generally find his choices facilitated by the existence of multiple and independent sources of scientific advice.

This is a condition that already prevails in the case of many of the departments and agencies whose actions have significant foreign policy consequences, especially in the use of scientists by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It is, however, a condition notably absent in the case of the Department of State. As it now stands, the President has more scientists to advise him on the scientific and technical aspects of various foreign policy issues, particularly in the national security field, than has the Secretary of State.

Excluding the science attachés overseas, the Department of State's Office of the Science Adviser numbers six people of whom three, including the director, are professional scientists. There are no scientists, full or part-time, in the Department's offices for policy planning, space and atomic energy, or political-military affairs. As might be inferred from these arrangements, many of the policy-makers concerned believe that their needs for scientific advice are adequately met through formal and informal communication with scientists employed in the operating agencies and departments and with the President's own Science Advisory Committee. (It should also be noted that in at least one office the need for additional political personnel is clearly more urgent than the need for scientists.) The Department's Science Adviser, who participates in the work of both the President's Committee and the Federal Council on Science and Technology, serves to facilitate such communication; otherwise both the demands placed on the Office and its own interests have limited its activity, as previously noted, to a relatively narrow range of foreign policy problems.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Snow, *Science and Government*, pp. 66-68, and Dornberger, *V-2*, p. 87.

<sup>34</sup> There are eighteen scientists on the President's Science Advisory Committee; its working panels also contain participants from outside the committee. In December 1958 the Committee and the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology had together some 75 scientists

Whether the interests of the Department of State would be better served by a larger "in-house" scientific competence is a question that an outside observer cannot easily answer. Much depends on the validity of the expectations that the Department can rely on the scientists of the operating agencies to alert it to developments and information relevant to foreign policy. Even more depends on how determined the Department is to play an active and influential part in shaping the scientific and technical programs of the government to conform to its own conception of national needs and priorities.<sup>35</sup> Should this determination be high, it is difficult to avoid the hypothesis that if the President has found it useful to have a relatively large science advisory body to help him monitor and direct the course of science and technology as they affect foreign and domestic policy, so too might the Secretary of State in the area of his own more limited but still extensive responsibilities.

*Organization and purpose.* Since administrative organizations exist for the purpose of serving policy goals and implementing policy programs, it is to be expected that those who differ on the goals and programs of policy will differ about the proper design of administrative organizations. The desire of many scientists in 1945 to see atomic energy used for peaceful rather than military purposes was one of the reasons for their political campaign to place the postwar atomic energy program in the hands of a civilian commission instead of the War De-

and engineers serving part time. See Killian, "Science and Public Policy," *loc. cit.*, p. 8. The work of the Committee and the Office are additionally described and appraised in *Science Organization and the President's Office*, Staff Study of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961).

The information presented about the Department of State is based on U. S. Department of State, *The Science Adviser of the Department of State*, and interviews with several Department officials in February 1962. Needless to say, the description and interpretation made above are entirely the present writer's responsibility.

<sup>35</sup> These two conditions are not unrelated. The more influence the Department exercises in determining the goals and programs of other agencies, the more confident it can be that scientists in those agencies will call the Department's attention to goals and programs which they believe to be receiving too much or too little attention.

partment. Similarly, more recent differences about how to organize the government's space effort reflect, in part, policy differences about whether space will or should be an area for major military operations.

The same point can be seen in the proposal to create a Department of Science and Technology which would include the variety of "little" science programs now scattered throughout the Executive structure (for example, those of the Weather Bureau, National Bureau of Standards, the Antarctic Office) but would exclude those of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Space Administration. The hope behind this proposal is that, combined together, the "little" programs would be able to compete more effectively in the struggle for government dollars with the "big" science programs of the military, atomic energy, and space organizations.<sup>36</sup>

The question of the "best" science organization is thus inescapably tied to the question of what is the "best" science policy. But who can demonstrate whether science and foreign policy would be better served by allocating dollars to a program to control weather or to a program to explore Mars? There are no determinate solutions to problems of this order. Neither, for that matter, is there any "one right amount" of the nation's scientific resources that should be allocated to basic as compared to applied research. Differences on policy questions such as these are unavoidable among scientists and non-scientists alike, and they can be resolved in but one manner: through the interplay of power and interest in a political arena.

This condition, plus the increasing dependence of scientific programs and research on government funds, plus the increasing consequences of the choices the government makes in allocating those funds, all promise to put the politicians and the scientists under increasing pressure. As the opportunities for further development in each of a thousand different scientific fields mushroom with the acceleration of scientific knowledge, whatever the government decides to support, it will be deciding *not* to support more. Indeed, it is not too difficult to see the scientists becoming practiced advocates and lobbyists for the government's support of their cherished fields and projects, or to imagine the day when the politicians start to complain about "interscience rivalry" and

begin to fancy that, if only there were a single Chief of Science, competition and duplication could be ended and the nation could have an integrated science policy.

*Scientists in politics.* The American political system is not one that insulates its experts from the politics of choice.<sup>37</sup> The scientist involved in high-policy matters is likely to find himself propelled into the political arena, either by a push from behind or by his own interest in seeing that the "right" choices are made. Some of the incentives the scientist may have, to follow up his advice with an effort to see that it is accepted (and to take a hand in a few other matters while he is at it), were outlined and illustrated in the preceding section. It is equally important to recognize that the scientist may find himself on the political firing line, placed there by a politician interested in using the scientist's prestige as an "expert" to disarm the critics of his (the politician's) choices.

Thus, prior to the moratorium on nuclear tests, the Eisenhower administration appeared to be using scientists and their scientific facts on fall-out as a means of justifying and defending a policy that was obviously compounded of a variety of considerations besides that of the radiological hazard. The comparison with Truman's use of the prestige of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to defend his choices in the Korean War comes easily to mind. So, too, do the statements of various Republican leaders that they had lost confidence in the Joint Chiefs and their determination, when they came to power, to get rid of the "Democratic" Chiefs and to appoint Chiefs in sympathy with Republican policies.

The scientist, in short, is not likely to orbit the centers of political power emitting upon request "beeps" of purely technical information. He will inevitably be pulled into the political arena. If his participation there is to be either productive or personally satisfying, both the scientist and the non-scientist need to be highly conscious of the character of their activity and the problems involved. The scientist (and many a non-scientist) must learn that the making of foreign policy is not a quest for the "right" answers to the problems of our time. There are only hard choices, the consequences of which will be uncertain and the making of which will often seem interminable

<sup>36</sup> See Lloyd V. Berkner, "National Science Policy and the Future," Address at Johns Hopkins University, December 16, 1958, as printed in *Science Program—86th Congress*, pp. 116-18.

<sup>37</sup> This point, especially as it relates to science experts, is discussed in Price, *Government and Science*, pp. 61-62, and in Herman Finer, "Government and the Expert," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1956, pp. 331-32.

in time and irrational in procedure.

The debate and disagreement over these choices will be heated and confused under the best of circumstances, but emotion and misunderstanding can be eased if scientists and non-scientists are both alert to the limits as well as the potential of the scientist's contribution. On the scientist's part, there is the obvious need to exercise the utmost care in making clear to himself and to others the areas where he speaks as a concerned citizen and those where he speaks as a professional expert. More difficult will be the task of learning how and to whom to address himself in each of these capacities when he is dissatisfied with the outcome of a policy decision in which he has participated. There is, as Don Price has pointed out, no clear code in Washington to govern the conduct of dissenting experts, only a "flexible" set of possible relationships with one's immediate superiors and those whose authority competes with or exceeds that of one's superiors. In contrast to the soldier, who can find some although not complete guidance in the doctrine of "civilian control," the very nature of the scientist's intellectual habits and many of his policy predispositions may make especially difficult his task in determining the limits to which he can stretch his dissent.<sup>38</sup>

On their part, the non-scientists need to recognize that scientists can hardly be expected to remain politically indifferent or inactive about the policy issues with which they are involved (especially when no one else in Washington practices such restraint). It was the naivete of this expectation that was so appalling in the conclusion of the Gray Board that Oppenheimer was a security risk because (among other reasons) "he may have departed his role as scientific adviser to exercise highly persuasive influence in matters in which his convictions were not necessarily a reflection of technical judgment, and also not necessarily related to the protection of the strongest offensive military interests of the country."<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> See the discussion in Price, *Government and Science*, pp. 131, 133, 138-42. The point about the scientists' lacking a tradition of "civilian control" was suggested by William T. R. Fox.

<sup>39</sup> U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Texts of Principal Documents and Letters* (Washington, 1954), pp. 19-20. Note the policy predisposition in the phrase "strongest offensive military interests."

It should not be comfortable for an American to reflect on the career of Peter Kapitsa, a Soviet physicist who was a student of Rutherford

It is unlikely that "civil-scientist" relations will ever get any worse than this. With time and experience one can expect many of these problems to be eased, but it would be unrealistic to expect them to disappear. Military experts have participated in the making of foreign policy far longer than scientists, and the question of how they can best do so is still the subject of more than a little disagreement.

*Policy processes and policy.* In closing this discussion of scientists and the problems of their organizational and political relationships to others engaged in the determination of foreign policy, it is important to remember that the policy process can bring minds together but it cannot make them think. It is worth noting that, in the political and administrative structure of the Soviet Union, no scientist is as institutionally close to the Premier as is the Special Assistant for Science and Technology to the President of the United States and that there is no equivalent of the Science Advisory Office in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>40</sup> Yet one would not say that the

and who worked in England from 1922 to 1934 and then returned to the Soviet Union. Kapitsa was placed under house arrest in 1947 and remained there until after Stalin's death. Kapitsa has told western scientists and newsmen that his arrest was the result of his refusal to work on nuclear energy for military purposes. Kramish believes that his arrest was due to the government's dissatisfaction with his advice on certain technical approaches to weapons development. In either event, it is noteworthy that Kapitsa is believed to have recently been, on an informal basis, one of Khrushchev's main science advisers.

On the matter of his arrest, see the report by Harrison Salisbury in the *New York Times*, July 11, 1956; the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1957, p. 38; and Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*, pp. 109-110. The information on his recent activity was supplied by the staff of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senate Committee on Government Operations.

<sup>40</sup> On Soviet government and science organization, see *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union*, Report of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 86th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1949), pp. 24-35, 59-62, and Nicholas DeWitt, "Reorganization of Science and Research in the U.S.S.R.," *Science*, June 23, 1961, pp. 1981-91. The points made above were additionally confirmed by the staff of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.

foreign policy of the Soviet Union has appeared either ineffectual or insensitive in its response to developments in science and technology.

The circumstances attendant on the development of radar by the British from 1935 to 1940 provide a useful insight into both the potential and the limits of effective organization. Essential, obviously, were the scientific and technical ideas that Watson-Watt and his colleagues had in mind in 1935, ideas which in turn were the result of the earlier years of research they had been free to conduct in the facilities of a government laboratory. Certainly, it was important that there were administrative scientists in the Air Ministry who were so alert to the military problems of the Air Force that they could see on their own initiative the need to establish a special scientific committee for the study of air defense (the Tizard Committee) and who were so alert to the work of the scientific community that they made their first request for information to Watson-Watt.<sup>41</sup> Of consequence, too, was the fact that the personal and political relations of the members of the Tizard committee with the members of the military, administrative, and political hierarchies whose interest and cooperation were vital for the subsequent progress of the research and development program were relations characterized by mutual ease, respect, and understanding.

But these conditions would not have led from the formation of the Tizard Committee in 1935 to a chain of operational radar stations by 1940 and a Fighter Command practiced in their use if it had not been for the military ideas

of members of the Royal Air Force. It was they who first thought of the formation of a committee to look specifically into the problem of detection, they who recommended more funds than those first proposed by the Tizard Committee for the development of an electromagnetic detection system, and they who were responsible for the decision to start constructing the stations and training the personnel while the equipment was still under development.<sup>42</sup> The explanation for this interest and support is to be found in their theories about the next World War. They believed the Germans were planning to engage in the strategic bombing of Great Britain, and they wished to be prepared for it.<sup>43</sup>

The point is obvious but important. British scientists and science organization were in the final measure but ready tools. They were good tools, but the use to which they were put was the result of the kind of ideas the military men had about war. The same will hold in the other areas in which science may affect foreign policy. The contributions that science and technology will bring to international politics will largely turn, not so much on the particular arrangements of scientists in the policy-making process, but on the purposes of statesmen and the theories they have about the political world in which they live.

<sup>42</sup> For the development of radar, see *ibid.*, pp. 108-09; C. P. Snow, *Science and Government*, pp. 24-38, 60-61, 74-75; P. M. S. Blackett, "Tizard and the Science of War," *Nature*, March 5, 1960, pp. 648-49; and Basil Collier, *The Defense of the United Kingdom* (London: H.M.S.O., 1957), pp. 33, 36-39.

<sup>43</sup> Ironically, the British were mistaken in their theory. The German Air Force had no such strategy in mind, and in 1940 when it tried to improvise a strategic bombing campaign it had neither the equipment nor the doctrine with which to conduct the campaign effectively. See Herbert Dinnerstein, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene: 1933-1940," *Military Affairs*, Summer 1955, pp. 65-71; Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), pp. 24-30; and Adolf Galland, *The First and the Last* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1954), chs. 2-5.

<sup>41</sup> The circumstances provide an interesting variation of the "whole problem approach." The Tizard Committee was initially interested in techniques for destroying aircraft or their crews, and Watson-Watt was asked in 1935 to investigate the possibility of using electromagnetic radiation for this purpose. He reported that such a use was apparently infeasible. In any event, he went on to note, the aircraft would first have to be located, and if anyone was interested electromagnetic radiation might be useful for this. Watson-Watt, *Three Steps to Victory*, pp. 81-83.

sional committee analysis in terms of functional problems such as this one.

# I

Five important characteristics of the Appropriations Committee which help explain Committee integration are (1) the existence of a well-articulated and deeply rooted consensus on Committee goals or tasks; (2) the nature of the Committee's subject matter; (3) the legislative orientation of its members; (4) the attractiveness of the Committee for its members; and (5) the stability of Committee membership.

*Consensus.* The Appropriations Committee sees its tasks as taking form within the broad guidelines set by its parent body, the House of Representatives. For it is the primary condition of the Committee's existence that it was created by the House for the purpose of assisting the House in the performance of House legislative tasks dealing with appropriations. Committee members agree that their fundamental duty is to serve the House in the manner and with the substantive results that the House prescribes. Given, however, the imprecision of House expectations and the permissiveness of House surveillance, the Committee must elaborate for itself a definition of tasks plus a supporting set of perceptions (of itself and of others) explicit enough to furnish day-to-day guidance.

The Committee's view begins with the preeminence of the House—often mistakenly attributed to the Constitution ("all bills for raising revenue," Art. I, sec. 7) but nevertheless firmly sanctioned by custom—in appropriations affairs.

It moves easily to the conviction that, as the efficient part of the House in this matter, the Constitution has endowed it with special obligations and special prerogatives. It ends in the view that the Committee on Appropriations, far from being merely one among many units in a complicated legislative-executive system, is the most important, most responsible unit in the whole appropriations process.<sup>4</sup> Hand in hand

with the consensus on their primacy goes a consensus that all of their House-prescribed tasks can be fulfilled by superimposing upon them one, single, paramount task—to guard the *Federal Treasury*. Committee members state their goals in the essentially negative terms of guardianship—screening requests for money, checking against ill-advised expenditures, and protecting the taxpayer's dollar. In the language of the Committee's official history, the job of each member is, "constantly and courageously to protect the Federal Treasury against thousands of appeals and imperative demands for unnecessary, unwise, and excessive expenditures."<sup>5</sup>

To buttress its self-image as guardian of public funds the Committee elaborates a set of perceptions about other participants in the appropriations process to which most members hold most of the time. Each executive official, for example, is seen to be interested in the expansion of his own particular program. Each one asks, therefore, for more money than he really needs, in view of the total picture, to run an adequate program. This and other Committee perceptions—of the Budget Bureau, of the Senate, and of their fellow Representatives—help to shape and support the Committee members in their belief that most budget estimates can, should and must be reduced and that, since no one else can be relied upon, the House Committee must do the job. To the consensus on the main task of protecting the Treasury is added, therefore, a consensus on the instrumental task of *cutting whatever budget estimates are submitted*.

As an immediate goal, Committee members agree that they must strike a highly critical, aggressive posture toward budget requests, and that they should, on principle, reduce them. In the words of the Committee's veterans: "There has never been a budget submitted to the Congress that couldn't be cut." "There isn't a budget that can't be cut 10 per cent immediately." "I've been on the Committee for 17 years. No subcommittee of which I have been a member

<sup>4</sup> This and all other generalizations about member attitudes and perceptions depend heavily on extensive interviews with Committee members. Semi-structured interviews, averaging 45 minutes in length were held with 45 of the 50 Committee members during the 86th Congress. Certain key questions, all open-ended, were asked of all respondents. The schedule was kept very flexible, however, in order to permit particular topics to be explored with those individuals best equipped to discuss them. In a few cases, where respon-

dents encouraged it, notes taken during the interviews. In most cases notes were not taken, but were transcribed immediately after the interview. Where unattributed quotations occur in the text, therefore, they are as nearly verbatim as the author's power of immediate recall could make them. These techniques were all used so as to improve rapport between interviewer and respondent.

<sup>5</sup> "History of the Committee on Appropriations," House Doc. 299, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941-1942, p. 11.

has ever reported out a bill without a cut in the budget. I'm proud of that record." The aim of budget-cutting is strongly internalized for the Committee member. "It's a tradition in the Appropriations Committee to cut." "You're grounded in it. . . . It's ingrained in you from the time you get on the Committee." For the purposes of a larger study, the appropriations case histories of 37 executive bureaus have been examined for a 12-year period, 1947-1959.<sup>6</sup> Of 443 separate bureau estimates, the Committee reduced 77.2 per cent (342) of them.

It is a mark of the intensity and self-consciousness of the Committee consensus on budget-cutting that it is couched in a distinctive vocabulary. The workaday lingo of the Committee member is replete with negative verbs, undesirable objects of attention, and effective instruments of action. Agency budgets are said to be filled with "fat," "padding," "grease," "pork," "oleaginous substance," "water," "oil," "cushions," "avoirdufois," "waste tissue," and "soft spots." The action verbs most commonly used are "cut," "carve," "slice," "prune," "whittle," "squeeze," "wring," "trim," "lop off," "chop," "slash," "pare," "shave," "fry," and "whack." The tools of the trade are appropriately referred to as "knife," "blade," "meat axe," "scalpel," "meat cleaver," "hatchet," "shears," "wringer," and "fine-tooth comb." Members are hailed by their fellows as being "pretty sharp with the knife." Agencies may "have the meat axe thrown at them." Executives are urged to put their agencies "on a fat boy's diet." Budgets are praised when they are "cut to the bone." And members agree that "You can always get a little more fat out of a piece of pork if you fry it a little longer and a little harder."

To the major task of protecting the Treasury and the instrumental task of cutting budget estimates, each Committee member adds, usually by way of exception, a third task—*serving the constituency to which he owes his election*. This creates no problem for him when, as is sometimes the case, he can serve his district best by cutting the budget requests of a federal agency whose program is in conflict with the demands of his constituency.<sup>6a</sup> Normally, how-

ever, members find that their most common role-conflict is between a Committee-oriented budget-reducing role and a constituency-oriented budget-increasing role. Committee ideology resolves the conflict by assigning top, long-run priority to the budget-cutting task and making of the constituency service a permissible, short-run exception. No member is expected to commit electoral suicide; but no member is expected to allow his district's desire for federal funds to dominate his Committee behavior.

*Subject Matter.* Appropriations Committee integration is facilitated by the subject matter with which the group deals. The Committee makes decisions on the same controversial issues as do the committees handling substantive legislation. But a money decision—however vitally it affects national policy—is, or at least seems to be, less directly a policy decision. Since they deal immediately with dollars and cents, it is easy for the members to hold to the idea that they are not dealing with programmatic questions, that theirs is a "business" rather than a "policy" committee. The subject matter, furthermore, keeps Committee members relatively free agents, which promotes intra-Committee maneuvering and, hence, conflict avoidance. Members do not commit themselves to their constituents in terms of precise money amounts, and no dollar sum is sacred—it can always be adjusted without conceding that a principle has been breached. By contrast, members of committees dealing directly with controversial issues are often pressured into taking concrete stands on these issues; consequently, they may come to their committee work with fixed and hardened attitudes. This leads to unavoidable, head-on intra-committee conflict and renders integrative mechanisms relatively ineffective.

The fact of an annual appropriations process means the Committee members repeat the same operations with respect to the same subject matters year after year—and frequently more than once in a given year. Substantive and procedural repetition promotes familiarity with key problems and provides ample opportunity to test and confirm the most satisfactory methods of dealing with them. And the absolute necessity that appropriations bills do ultimately pass gives urgency to the search for such methods. Furthermore, the House rule that no member of the Committee can serve on another standing committee is a deterrent against a fragmentation of Committee member

<sup>6</sup> The bureaus being studied are all concerned with domestic policy and are situated in the Agriculture, Interior, Labor, Commerce, Treasury, Justice and Health, Education and Welfare Departments. For a similar pattern of Committee decisions in foreign affairs, see Holbert Carroll, *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs* (Pittsburgh, 1958), ch. 9.

<sup>6a</sup> See, for example, Philip A. Foss, "The Graz-

ing Fee Dilemma," *Inter-University Case Program*, No. 57 (University, Alabama, 1960).

activity which could be a source of difficulty in holding the group together. If a committee has developed (as this one has) a number of norms designed to foster integration, repeated and concentrated exposure to them increases the likelihood that they will be understood, accepted and followed.

*Legislative Orientation.* The recruitment of members for the Appropriations Committee produces a group of individuals with an orientation especially conducive to Committee integration. Those who make the selection pay special attention to the characteristics which Masters has described as those of the "responsible legislator"—approval of and conformity to the norms of the legislative process and of the House of Representatives.<sup>7</sup>

Key selectors speak of wanting, for the Appropriations Committee, "the kind of man you can deal with" or "a fellow who is well-balanced and won't go off half-cocked on things." A Northern liberal Democrat felt that he had been chosen over eight competitors because, "I had made a lot of friends and was known as a nice guy"—especially, he noted, among Southern Congressmen. Another Democrat explained, "I got the blessing of the Speaker and the leadership. It's personal friendships. I had done a lot of things for them in the past, and when I went to them and asked them, they gave it to me." A Republican chosen for the Committee in his first term recalled,

The Chairman [Rep. Taber] I guess did some checking around in my area. After all, I was new and he didn't know me. People told me that they were called to see if I was—well, unstable or apt to go off on tangents . . . to see whether or not I had any preconceived notions about things and would not be flexible—whether I would oppose things even though it was obvious.

A key criterion in each of the cases mentioned was a demonstrable record of, or an assumed predisposition toward, legislative give-and-take.

The 106 Appropriations Committee members serving between 1947 and 1961 spent an average of 3.6 years on other House committees before coming to the Committee. Only 17 of the 106 were selected as first term Congressmen. A House apprenticeship (which Appropriations maintains more successfully than all committees save Ways and Means and Rules<sup>8</sup>) pro-

vides the time in which legislative reputations can be established by the member and an assessment of that reputation in terms of Appropriations Committee requirements can be made. Moreover, the mere fact that a member survives for a couple of terms is some indication of an electoral situation conducive to his "responsible" legislative behavior. The optimum bet for the Committee is a member from a sufficiently safe district to permit him freedom of maneuver inside the House without fear of reprisal at the polls.<sup>9</sup> The degree of responsiveness to House norms which the Committee selectors value may be the product of a safe district as well as an individual temperament.

*Attractiveness.* A fourth factor is the extraordinarily high degree of attractiveness which the Committee holds for its members—as measured by the low rate of departure from it. Committee members do not leave it for service on other committees. To the contrary, they are attracted to it from nearly every other committee.<sup>10</sup> Of the 106 members in the 1947–1961 period, only two men left the Committee voluntarily; and neither of them initiated the move.<sup>11</sup> Committee attractiveness is a measure of its capacity to satisfy individual member

to 86th Congress) 79 separate appointments were made to the Appropriations Committee, with 14 going to freshmen. The Committee filled, in other words, 17.7 per cent of its vacancies with freshmen. The Rules Committee had 26 vacancies and selected no freshmen at all. The Ways and Means Committee had 36 vacancies and selected 2 freshmen (5.6 per cent). All other Committees had a higher percentage of freshmen appointments. Armed Services ranked fourth, with 45 vacancies and 12 freshmen appointed, for a percentage of 26.7. Foreign affairs figures were 46 and 14, or 30.4 per cent; UnAmerican Activities figures were 22 and 7, or 31.8 per cent. cf. Masters, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> In the 1960 elections, 41 out of the current 50 members received more than 55.1 per cent of the vote in their districts. By a common definition, that is, only 9 of the 50 came from marginal districts.

<sup>10</sup> The 106 members came to Appropriations from every committee except Ways and Means.

<sup>11</sup> One was personally requested by the Speaker to move to Ways and Means. The other was chosen by a caucus of regional Congressmen to be his party's representative on the Rules Committee. Of the 21 members who were forced off the Committee for lack of seniority during a change in party control, or who were defeated for reelection and later returned, 20 sought to regain Committee membership at the earliest opportunity.

<sup>7</sup> Nicholas A. Masters, "House Committee Assignments," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 345–357.

<sup>8</sup> In the period from 1947 through 1959, (80th



needs—for power, prestige, recognition, respect, self-esteem, friendship, etc. Such satisfaction in turn increases the likelihood that members will behave in such a way as to hold the group together.

The most frequently mentioned source of Committee attractiveness is its power—based on its control of financial resources. “Where the money is, that’s where the power is,” sums up the feeling of the members. They prize their ability to reward or punish so many other participants in the political process—executive officials, fellow Congressmen, constituents and other clientele groups. In the eyes of its own members, the Committee is either the most powerful in the House or it is on a par with Ways and Means or, less frequently, on a par with Ways and Means and Rules. The second important ingredient in member satisfaction is the government-wide scope of Committee activity. The ordinary Congressman may feel that he has too little knowledge of and too little control over his environment. Membership on this Committee compensates for this feeling of helplessness by the wider contacts, the greater amount of information, and the sense of being “in the middle of things” which are consequent, if not to subcommittee activity, at least to the full Committee’s overview of the federal government.

Thirdly, Committee attractiveness is heightened by the group’s recognizable and distinctive political style—one that is, moreover, highly valued in American political culture. The style is that of *hard work*; and the Committee’s self-image is that of “the hardest working Committee in Congress.” His willingness to work is the Committee member’s badge of identification, and it is proudly worn. It colors his perceptions of others and their perceptions of him.<sup>11a</sup> It is

<sup>11a</sup> A sidelight on this attitude is displayed in a current feud between the House and Senate Appropriations Committees over the meeting place for their conference committees. The House Committee is trying to break the century-old custom that conferences to resolve differences on money bills are always held on the Senate side of the Capitol. House Committee members “complain that they often have to trudge back to the House two or three times to answer roll calls during a conference. They say they go over in a body to work, while Senators flit in and out . . . . The House Appropriations Committee feels that it does all the hard work listening to witnesses for months on each bill, only to have the Senate Committee sit as a court of appeals and, with little more than a cursory glance, restore most of the funds cut.” *Washington Post*, April 24, 1962, p. 1.

a cherished axiom of all members that, “This Committee is no place for a man who doesn’t work. They have to be hard working. It’s a way of life. It isn’t just a job; it’s a way of life.”

The mere existence of some identifiable and valued style or “way of life” is a cohesive force for a group. But the particular style of hard work is one which increases group morale and group identification twice over. Hard work means a long, dull, and tedious application to detail, via the technique of “dig, dig, dig, day after day behind closed doors”—in an estimated 460 subcommittee and full committee meetings a year. And virtually all of these meetings are in executive session. By adopting the style of hard work, the Committee discourages highly individualized forms of legislative behavior, which could be disruptive within the Committee. It rewards its members with power, but it is power based rather on work inside the Committee than on the political glamour of activities carried on in the limelight of the mass media. Prolonged daily work together encourages sentiments of mutual regard, sympathy and solidarity. This *esprit* is, in turn, functional for integration on the Committee. A Republican leader summed up,

I think it’s more closely knit than any other committee. Yet it’s the biggest committee, and you’d think it would be the reverse. I know on my subcommittee, you sit together day after day. You get better acquainted. You have sympathy when other fellows go off to play golf. There’s a lot of *esprit de corps* in the Committee.

The strong attraction which members have for the Committee increases the influence which the Committee and its norms exercise on all of them. It increases the susceptibility of the newcomer to Committee socialization and of the veteran to Committee sanctions applicable against deviant behavior.<sup>12</sup>

*Membership Stability.* Members of the Appropriations Committee are strongly attracted to it; they also have, which bears out their selection as “responsible legislators,” a strong attraction for a career in the House of Representatives. The 50 members on the Committee in 1961 had served an average of 13.1 years in the House. These twin attractions produce a noteworthy stability of Committee membership. In the period from the 80th to the 87th

<sup>12</sup> This proposition is spelled out at some length in J. Thibaut and H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York, 1959), p. 247, and in D. Cartwright and A. Zander, *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Evanston, 1953), p. 420.



Congress, 35.7 per cent of the Committee's membership remained constant. That is to say, 15 of the 42 members on the Committee in March, 1947, were still on the Committee in March, 1961.<sup>13</sup> The 50 members of the Committee in 1961 averaged 9.3 years of prior service on that Committee. In no single year during the last fourteen has the Committee had to absorb an influx of new members totalling more than one-quarter of its membership. At all times, in other words, at least three-fourths of the members have had previous Committee experience. This extraordinary stability of personnel extends into the staff as well. As of June 1961, its 15 professionals had served an average of 10.7 years with the Committee.<sup>14</sup>

The opportunity exists, therefore, for the development of a stable leadership group, a set of traditional norms for the regulation of internal Committee behavior, and informal techniques of personal accommodation. Time is provided in which new members can learn and internalize Committee norms before they attain high seniority rankings. The Committee does not suffer from the potentially disruptive consequences of rapid changeovers in its leadership group, nor of sudden impositions of new sets of norms governing internal Committee behavior.

## II

If one considers the main activity of a political system to be decision-making, the acid test of its internal integration is its capacity to make collective decisions without flying apart in the process. Analysis of Committee integration should focus directly, therefore, upon its subgroups and the roles of its members. Two kinds of subgroups are of central importance—subcommittees and majority or minority party groups. The roles which are most relevant derive from: (1) positions which each member holds by virtue of his subgroup attachments, *e.g.*, as subcommittee member, majority (or minority) party member; (2) positions which relate to full Committee membership, *e.g.*, Committee member, and the seniority rankings of veteran, man of moderate experience, and

newcomer;<sup>15</sup> (3) positions which relate to both subgroup and full Committee membership, *e.g.*, Chairman of the Committee, ranking minority member of the Committee, subcommittee chairman, ranking subcommittee member. Clusters of norms state the expectations about subgroup and role behavior. The description which follows treats the ways in which these norms and their associated behaviors mesh and clash. It treats, also, the internal control mechanisms by which behavior is brought into reasonable conformity with expectations.

*Subgroup Integration.* The day-to-day work of the Committee is carried on in its subcommittees each of which is given jurisdiction over a number of related governmental units. The number of subcommittees is determined by the Committee Chairman, and has varied recently from a low of 9 in 1949 to a high of 15 in 1959. The present total of 14 reflects, as always, a set of strategic and personal judgments by the Chairman balanced against the limitations placed on him by Committee tradition and member wishes. The Chairman also determines subcommittee jurisdiction, appoints subcommittee chairmen and selects the majority party members of each group. The ranking minority member of the Committee exercises similar control over subcommittee assignments on his side of the aisle.

Each subcommittee holds hearings on the budget estimates of the agencies assigned to it, meets in executive session to decide what figures and what language to recommend to the full Committee (to "mark up" the bill), defends its recommendations before the full Committee, writes the Committee's report to the House, dominates the debate on the floor, and bargains for the House in conference committee. Within its jurisdiction, each subcommittee functions independently of the others and guards its autonomy jealously. The Chairman and ranking minority member of the full Committee have, as we shall see, certain opportunities to oversee and dip into the operations of all subcommittees. But their intervention is expected to be minimal. Moreover, they themselves operate importantly within the subcommittee framework by sitting as chairman or ranking minority member of the subcommittee in which they are most inter-

<sup>13</sup> This figure is 9 per cent greater than the next most stable House Committee during this particular period. The top four, in order, were Appropriations (35.7%), Agriculture (26.7%), Armed Services (25%), Foreign Affairs (20.8%).

<sup>14</sup> The Committee's permanent and well integrated professional staff (as distinguished from its temporary investigating staff) might be considered as part of the subsystem though it will not be treated in this paper.

<sup>15</sup> "Newcomers" are defined as men who have served no more than two terms on the Committee. "Men of moderate experience" are those with 3-5 terms of service. "Veterans" are those who have 6 or more terms of Committee service.

ested. Each subcommittee, under the guidance of its chairman, transacts its business in considerable isolation from every other one. One subcommittee chairman exclaimed,

Why, you'd be branded an impostor if you went into one of those other sub-committee meetings. The only time I go is by appointment, by arrangement with the chairman at a special time. I'm as much a stranger in another subcommittee as I would be in the legislative Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Each one does its work apart from all others.

All members of all subcommittees are expected to behave in similar fashion in the role of subcommittee member. Three main norms define this role; to the extent that they are observed, they promote harmony and reduce conflict among subcommittees.<sup>16</sup> Subcommittee autonomy gives to the House norm of *specialization* an intensified application on the Appropriations Committee. Each member is expected to play the role of specialist in the activities of one subcommittee. He will sit on from one to four subcommittees, but normally will specialize in the work, or a portion of the work, of only one. Except for the Chairman, ranking minority member and their confidants, a Committee member's time, energy, contacts and experience are devoted to his subcommittees. Specialization is, therefore, among the earliest and most compelling of the Committee norms to which a newcomer is exposed. Within the Committee, respect, deference and power are earned through subcommittee activity and, hence to a degree, through specialization. Specialization is valued further because it is well suited to the task of guarding the Treasury. Only by specializing, Committee members believe, can they unearth the volume of factual information necessary for the intelligent screening of budget requests. Since "the facts" are acquired only through industry an effective specialist will, perforce, adopt and promote the Committee's style of hard work.

Committee-wide acceptance of specialization is an integrative force in decision-making because it helps support a second norm—*reciprocity*. The stage at which a subcommittee makes

its recommendations is a potential point of internal friction. Conflict among subcommittees (or between one subcommittee and the rest of the Committee) is minimized by the deference traditionally accorded to the recommendation of the subcommittee which has specialized in the area, has worked hard, and has "the facts." "It's a matter of 'You respect my work and I'll respect yours.'" "It's frowned upon if you offer an amendment in the full Committee if you aren't on the subcommittee. It's considered presumptuous to pose as an expert if you aren't on the subcommittee." Though records of full Committee decisions are not available, members agree that subcommittee recommendations are "very rarely changed," "almost always approved," "changed one time in fifty," "very seldom changed," etc.

No subcommittee is likely to keep the deference of the full Committee for long unless its recommendations have widespread support among its own members. To this end, a third norm—*subcommittee unity*—is expected to be observed by subcommittee members. Unity means a willingness to support (or not to oppose) the recommendations of one's own subcommittee. Reciprocity and unity are closely dependent upon one another. Reciprocity is difficult to maintain when subcommittees themselves are badly divided; and unity has little appeal unless reciprocity will subsequently be observed. The norm of reciprocity functions to minimize inter-subcommittee conflict. The norm of unity functions to minimize intra-subcommittee conflict. Both are deemed essential to subcommittee influence.

One payoff for the original selection of "responsible legislators" is their special willingness to compromise in pursuit of subcommittee unity. The impulse to this end is registered most strongly at the time when the subcommittee meets in executive session to mark up the bill. Two ranking minority members explained this aspect of markup procedure in their subcommittees:

If there's agreement, we go right along. If there's a lot of controversy we put the item aside and go on. Then, after a day or two, we may have a list of ten controversial items. We give and take and pound them down till we get agreement.

We have a unanimous agreement on everything. If a fellow enters an objection and we can't talk him out of it—and sometimes we can get him to go along—that's it. We put it in there.

Once the bargain is struck, the subcommittee is expected to "stick together."

It is, of course, easier to achieve unity among

<sup>16</sup> A statement of expected behavior was taken to be a Committee norm when it was expressed by a substantial number of respondents (a dozen or so) who represented both parties, and varying degrees of experience. In nearly every case, moreover, no refutation of them was encountered, and ample confirmation of their existence can be found in the public record. Their articulation came most frequently from the veterans of the group.

the five, seven, or nine members of a subcommittee than among the fifty members of the full Committee. But members are expected wherever possible to observe the norm of unity in the full Committee as well. That is, they should not only defer to the recommendations of the subcommittee involved, but they should support (or not oppose) that recommendation when it reaches the floor in the form of a Committee decision. On the floor, Committee members believe, their power and prestige depend largely on the degree to which the norms of reciprocity and unity continue to be observed. Members warn each other that if they go to the floor in disarray they will be "rolled," "jumped," or "run over" by the membership. It is a cardinal maxim among Committee members that "You can't turn an appropriations bill loose on the floor." Two senior subcommittee chairmen explain,

We iron out our differences in Committee. We argue it out and usually have a meeting of the minds, a composite view of the Committee. . . . If we went on the floor in wide disagreement, they would say, 'If you can't agree after listening to the testimony and discussing it, how can we understand it? We'll just vote on the basis of who we like the best.'

I tell them (the full Committee) we should have a united front. If there are any objections or changes, we ought to hear it now, and not wash our dirty linen out on the floor. If we don't have a bill that we can all agree on and support, we ought not to report it out. To do that is like throwing a piece of meat to a bunch of hungry animals.

One of the most functional Committee practices supporting the norm of unity is the tradition against minority reports in the subcommittee and in the full Committee. It is symptomatic of Committee integration that custom should proscribe the use of the most formal and irrevocable symbol of congressional committee disunity—the minority report. A few have been written—but only 9 out of a possible 141 during the 11 years, 1947–1957. That is to say, 95 per cent of all original appropriations bills in this period were reported out without dissent. The technique of "reserving" is the Committee member's equivalent for the registering of dissent. In subcommittee or Committee, when a member reserves, he goes on record informally by informing his colleagues that he reserves the right to disagree on a specified item later on in the proceedings. He may seek a change or support a change in that particular item in full Committee or on the floor. But he does not publicize his dissent. The subcommittee or the

full Committee can then make an unopposed recommendation. The individual retains some freedom of maneuver without firm commitment. Often a member reserves on an appropriations item but takes no further action. A member explained how the procedure operates in subcommittee,

If there's something I feel too strongly about, and just can't go along, I'll say, 'Mr. Chairman, we can have a unanimous report, but I reserve the right to bring this up in full Committee. I feel duty bound to make a play for it and see if I can't sell it to the other members.' But if I don't say anything, or don't reserve this right, and then I bring it up in full Committee, they'll say, 'Who are you trying to embarrass? You're a member of the team, aren't you? That's not the way to get along.'

Disagreement cannot, of course, be eliminated from the Committee. But the Committee has accepted a method for ventilating it which produces a minimum of internal disruption. And members believe that the greater their internal unity, the greater the likelihood that their recommendations will pass the House.

The degree to which the role of the subcommittee member can be so played and subcommittee conflict thereby minimized depends upon the minimization of conflict between the majority and minority party subgroups. Nothing would be more disruptive to the Committee's work than bitter and extended partisan controversy. It is, therefore, important to Appropriations Committee integration that a fourth norm—*minimal partisanship*—should be observed by members of both party contingents. Nearly every respondent emphasized, with approval, that "very little" or "not much" partisanship prevailed on the Committee. One subcommittee chairman stated flatly, "My job is to keep down partisanship." A ranking minority member said, "You might think that we Republicans would defend the Administration and the budget, but we don't." Majority and minority party ratios are constant and do not change (i.e., in 1958) to reflect changes in the strength of the controlling party. The Committee operates with a completely non-partisan professional staff, which does not change in tune with shifts in party control. Requests for studies by the Committee's investigating staff must be made by the Chairman and ranking minority member of the full Committee and by the Chairman and ranking minority member of the subcommittee involved. Subcommittees can produce recommendations without dissent and the full Committee can adopt reports without dissent pre-

cisely because party conflict is (during the period 1947-1961) the exception rather than the rule.

The Committee is in no sense immune from the temperature of party conflict, but it does have a relatively high specific heat. Intense party strife or a strongly taken presidential position will get reflected in subcommittee and in Committee recommendations. Sharp divisions in party policy were carried, with disruptive impact, into some areas of Committee activity during the 80th Congress and subsequently, by way of reaction, into the 81st Congress.<sup>17</sup> During the Eisenhower years, extraordinary presidential pleas, especially concerning foreign aid, were given special heed by the Republican members of the Committee.<sup>18</sup> Partisanship is normally generated from the environment and not from within the Committee's party groups. Partisanship is, therefore, likely to be least evident in subcommittee activity, stronger in the full Committee, and most potent at the floor stage. Studies which have focussed on roll-call analysis have stressed the influence of party in legislative decision-making.<sup>19</sup> In the appropriations process, at any rate, the floor stage probably represents party influence at its maximum. Our examination, by interview, of decision-making at the subcommittee and full Committee level would stress the influence of Committee-oriented norms—the strength of which tends to vary inversely with that of party bonds. In the secrecy and intimacy of the subcommittee and full Committee hearing rooms, the member finds it easy to compromise on questions of more or less, to take money from one program and give it to another and, in general, to avoid yes-or-no type party stands. These decisions, taken in response to the integrative norms of the Committee are the most important ones in the entire appropriations process.

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, the internal conflict on the subcommittee dealing with the Labor Department. 93 *Cong. Record*, pp. 2465-2562 passim; 94 *Cong. Record*, pp. 7605-7607.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, the unusual minority report of Committee Republicans on the foreign aid appropriations bill in 1960. Their protest against Committee cuts in the budget estimates was the result of strenuous urging by the Eisenhower Administration. House Report No. 1798, *Mutual Security and Related Agency Appropriation Bill*, 1961, 86 Cong. 2d sess. 1960.

<sup>19</sup> David Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959); Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951).

*Role Integration.* The roles of subcommittee member and party member are common to all.

Other more specific decision-making positions are allocated among the members. Different positions produce different roles, and in an integrated system, these too must fit together. Integration, in other words, must be achieved through the complementarity or reciprocity of roles as well as through a similarity of roles. This may mean a pattern in which expectations are so different that there is very little contact between individuals; or it may mean a pattern in which contacts require the working out of an involved system of exchange of obligations and rewards.<sup>20</sup> In either case, the desired result is the minimization of conflict among prominent Committee roles. Two crucial instances of role reciprocity on the Committee involve the seniority positions of old-timer and newcomer and the leadership positions of Chairman and ranking minority member, on both the full Committee and on each subcommittee.

The differentiation between senior and junior members is the broadest definition of who shall and who shall not actively participate in Committee decisions. Of a junior member, it will be said, "Oh, he doesn't count—what I mean is, he hasn't been on the Committee long enough." He is not expected to and ordinarily does not have much influence. His role is that of apprentice. He is expected to learn the business and the norms of the Committee by applying himself to its work. He is expected to acquiesce in an arrangement which gives most influence (except in affairs involving him locally) to the veterans of the group. Newcomers will be advised to "follow the chairman until you get your bearings. For the first two years, follow the chairman. He knows." "Work hard, keep quiet and attend the Committee sessions. We don't want to listen to some new person coming in here." And newcomers perceive their role in identical terms: "You have to sit in the back seat and edge up little by little." "You just go to subcommittee meetings and assimilate the routine. The new members are made to feel welcome, but you have a lot of rope-learning to do before you carry much weight."

At every stage of Committee work, this

<sup>20</sup> The ideas of "reciprocity" and "complementarity," which are used interchangeably here, are discussed in Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," *American Sociological Review* (April, 1960). Most helpful in explaining the idea of a role system has been the work of J. Wahlke, H. Eulau, W. Buchanan, L. Ferguson. See their study, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962), esp. Intro.

differentiation prevails. There is remarkable agreement on the radically different sets of expectations involved. During the hearings, the view of the elders is that, "Newcomers . . . don't know what the score is and they don't have enough information to ask intelligent questions." A newcomer described his behavior in typically similar terms: "I attended all the hearings and studied and collected information that I can use next year. I'm just marking time now." During the crucial subcommittee markup, the newcomer will have little opportunity to speak—save in locally important matters. A subcommittee chairman stated the norm from his viewpoint this way: "When we get a compromise, nobody's going to break that up. If someone tries, we sit on him fast. We don't want young people who throw bricks or slow things down." And a newcomer reciprocated, describing his markup conduct: "I'm not provocative. I'm in there for information. They're the experts in the field. I go along." In full Committee, on the floor, and in conference committee, the Committee's senior members take the lead and the junior members are expected to follow. The apprentice role is common to all new members of the House. But it is wrong to assume that each Committee will give it the same emphasis. Some pay it scant heed.<sup>21</sup> The Appropriations Committee makes it a cornerstone of its internal structure.

Among the Committee's veterans, the key roles are those of Committee Chairman and ranking minority member, and their counterparts in every subcommittee. It is a measure of Committee integration and the low degree of partisanship that considerable reciprocity obtains between these roles. Their partisan status nevertheless sets limits to the degree of possible integration. The Chairman is given certain authority which he and only he can exercise. But save in times of extreme party controversy, the expectation is that consultation and cooperation between the chairman-ranking minority member shall lubricate the Committee's entire work. For example, by Committee tradition, its Chairman and ranking minority member are both *ex officio* voting members of each subcommittee and of every conference committee. The two of them thus have joint access at every stage of the internal process. A subcommittee chairman, too, is expected to discuss matters of scheduling and agenda with his opposite minority number. He is expected to work with him during the markup session and to give him (and, normally, only him) an oppor-

tunity to read and comment on the subcommittee report.<sup>22</sup> A ranking minority member described his subcommittee markup procedure approvingly:

Frequently the chairman has a figure which he states. Sometimes he will have no figure, and he'll turn to me and say, '—, what do you think?' Maybe I'll have a figure. It's very flexible. Everyone has a chance to say what he thinks, and we'll move it around. Sometimes it takes a long time. . . . He's a rapid partisan on the floor, but he is a very fair man in the subcommittee.

Where influence is shared, an important exchange of rewards occurs. The chairman gains support for his leadership and the ranking minority member gains intra-Committee power. The Committee as a whole insures against the possibility of drastic change in its internal structure by giving to its key minority members a stake in its operation. Chairmen and ranking minority members will, in the course of time, exchange positions; and it is expected that such a switch will produce no form of retribution nor any drastic change in the functioning of the Committee. Reciprocity of roles, in this case, promotes continued integration. A ranking minority member testified to one successful arrangement when he took the floor in the 83d Congress to say:

The gentleman and I have been see sawing back and forth on this committee for some time. He was chairman in the 80th Congress. I had the privilege of serving as chairman in the 81st and 82nd Congresses. Now he is back in the saddle. I can say that he has never failed to give me his utmost cooperation, and I have tried to give him the same cooperation during his service as chairman of this Committee. We seldom disagree, but we have found out that we can disagree without being disagreeable. Consequently, we have unusual harmony on this committee.<sup>23</sup>

Reciprocity between chairmen and ranking minority members on the Appropriations Committee is to some incalculable degree a function of the stability of membership which allows a pair of particular individuals to work out the kind of personal accommodation described above. The close working relationship of Clarence Cannon and John Taber, whose service on the Committee totals 68 years and who have been changing places as Chairman and ranking minority member for 19 years, highlights and sustains a pattern of majority-

<sup>21</sup> For example, the Committee on Education and Labor, see footnote 26.

<sup>22</sup> See the exchange in 101 *Cong. Rec.* pp. 3832, 3844, 3874.

<sup>23</sup> 99 *Cong. Rec.*, p. 4933.

minority reciprocity throughout the group.

*Internal Control Mechanisms.* The expectations which apply to subcommittee, to party, to veterans and to newcomers, to chairmen and to ranking minority members prescribe highly integrative behaviors. We have concentrated on these expectations, and have both illustrated and assumed the close correlation between expected and actual behavior. This does not mean that all the norms of the Committee have been canvassed. Nor does it mean that deviation from the integrative norms does not occur. It does. From what can be gathered, however, from piecing together a study of the public record on appropriations from 1947 to 1961 with interview materials, the Committee has been markedly successful in maintaining a stable internal structure over time. As might be expected, therefore, changes and threats of change have been generated more from the environment—when outsiders consider the Committee as unresponsive—than from inside the subsystem itself. One source of internal stability, and an added reason for assuming a correlation between expected and actual behavior, is the existence of what appear to be reasonably effective internal control mechanisms. Two of these are the socialization processes applied to newcomers and the sanctioning mechanisms applicable to all Committee members.

Socialization is in part a training in perception. Before members of a group can be expected to behave in accordance with its norms, they must learn to see and interpret the world around them with reasonable similarity. The socialization of the Committee newcomer during his term or two of apprenticeship serves to bring his perceptions and his attitudes sufficiently into line with those of the other members to serve as a basis for Committee integration. The Committee, as we have seen, is chosen from Congressmen whose political flexibility connotes an aptitude for learning new lessons of power. Furthermore, the high degree of satisfaction of its members with the group increases their susceptibility to its processes of learning and training.

For example, one half of the Committee's Democrats are Northerners and Westerners from urban constituencies, whose voting records are just as "liberal" on behalf of domestic social welfare programs as non-Committee Democrats from like constituencies. They come to the Committee favorably disposed toward the high level of federal spending necessary to support such programs, and with no sense of urgency about the Committee's tasks of guarding the Treasury or reducing budget estimates. Given the criteria governing their selection,

however, they come without rigid preconceptions and with a built-in responsiveness to the socialization processes of any legislative group of which they are members. It is crucial to Committee integration that they learn to temper their potentially disruptive welfare-state ideology with a conservative's concern for saving money. They must change their perceptions and attitudes sufficiently to view the Committee's tasks in nearly the same terms as their more conservative Southern Democratic and Republican colleagues. What their elders perceive as reality (i.e., the disposition of executives to ask for more money than is necessary) they, too, must see as reality. A subcommittee chairman explained:

When you have sat on the Committee, you see that these bureaus are always asking for more money—always up, never down. They want to build up their organization. You reach the point—I have—where it sickens you, where you rebel against it. Year after year, they want more money. They say, 'Only \$50,000 this year'; but you know the pattern. Next year they'll be back for \$100,000, then \$200,000. The younger members haven't been on the Committee long enough, haven't had the experience to know this.

The younger men, in this case the younger liberals, do learn from their Committee experience. Within one or two terms, they are differentiating between themselves and the "wild-eyed spenders" or the "free spenders" in the House. "Some of these guys would spend you through the roof," exclaimed one liberal of moderate seniority. Repeated exposure to Committee work and to fellow members has altered their perceptions and their attitudes in money matters. Half a dozen Northern Democrats of low or moderate seniority agreed with one of their number who said: "Yes, it's true. I can see it myself. I suppose I came here a flaming liberal; but as the years go by I get more conservative. You just hate like hell to spend all this money. . . . You come to the point where you say, 'By God, this is enough jobs.'" These men will remain more inclined toward spending than their Committee colleagues, but their perceptions and hence their attitudes have been brought close enough to the others to support a consensus on tasks. They are responsive to appeals on budget-cutting grounds that would not have registered earlier and which remain meaningless to liberals outside the Committee. In cases, therefore, where Committee selection does not and cannot initially produce individuals with a predisposition toward protecting the Treasury, the same result is achieved by socialization.

Socialization is a training in behavior as well as in perception. For the newcomer, conformity to norms in specific situations is insured through the appropriate application, by the Committee veterans, of rewards and punishments. For the Committee member who serves his apprenticeship creditably, the passage of time holds the promise that he will inherit a position of influence. He may, as an incentive, be given some small reward early in his Committee career. One man, in his second year, had been assigned the task of specializing in one particular program. However narrow the scope of his specialization, it had placed him on the road to influence within the Committee. He explained with evident pleasure:

The first year, you let things go by. You can't participate. But you learn by watching the others operate. The next year, you know what you're interested in and when to step in. . . . For instance, I've become an expert on the — program. The chairman said to me, 'This is something you ought to get interested in.' I did; and now I'm the expert on the Committee. Whatever I say on that, the other members listen to me and do what I want.

At some later date, provided he continues to observe Committee norms, he will be granted additional influence, perhaps through a prominent floor role. A model Committee man of moderate seniority who had just attained to this stage of accomplishment, and who had suffered through several political campaigns back home fending off charges that he was a do-nothing Congressman, spoke about the rewards he was beginning to reap.

When you perform well on the floor when you bring out a bill, and Members know that you know the bill, you develop prestige with other Members of Congress. They come over and ask you what you think, because they know you've studied it. You begin to get a reputation beyond your subcommittee. And you get inner satisfaction, too. You don't feel that you're down here doing nothing.

The first taste of influence which comes to men on this Committee is compensation for the frustrations of apprenticeship. Committee integration in general, and the meshing of roles between elders and newcomers in particular, rests on the fact that conformity to role expectations over time does guarantee to the young positive rewards—the very kind of rewards of power, prestige, and personal satisfaction which led most of them to seek Committee membership in the first place.

The important function of apprenticeship

is that it provides the necessary time during which socialization can go forward. And teaching proceeds with the aid of punishments as well as rewards. Should a new member inadvertently or deliberately run afoul of Committee norms during his apprenticeship, he will find himself confronted with negative sanctions ranging in subtlety from "jaundiced eyes" to a changed subcommittee assignment. Several members, for example, recalled their earliest encounter with the norm of unity and the tradition against minority reports. One remembered his attempt to file a minority report. "The Chairman was pretty upset about it. It's just a tradition, I guess, not to have minority reports. I didn't know it was a tradition. When I said I was going to write a minority report, some eyebrows were raised. The Chairman said it just wasn't the thing to do. Nothing more was said about it. But it wasn't a very popular thing to do, I guess." He added that he had not filed one since.

Some younger members have congenital difficulty in observing the norms of the apprentice's role. In the 86th Congress, these types tended to come from the Republican minority. The minority newcomers (described by one of the men who selected them as "eight young, energetic, fighting conservatives") were a group of economy-minded individuals some of whom chafed against any barrier which kept them from immediate influence on Committee policy. Their reaction was quite different from that of the young Democrats, whose difficulty was in learning to become economy-minded, but who did not actively resent their lack of influence. One freshman, who felt that "The appropriations system is lousy, inadequate and old fashioned," recalled that he had spoken out in full Committee against the recommendations of a subcommittee of which he was not a member. Having failed, he continued to oppose the recommendation during floor debate. By speaking up, speaking in relation to the work of another subcommittee and by opposing a Committee recommendation, he had violated the particular norms of his apprentice role as well of the generally applicable norms of reciprocity and unity. He explained what he had learned, but remained only partially socialized:

They want to wash their dirty linen in the Committee and they want no opposition afterward. They let me say my piece in Committee. . . . But I just couldn't keep quiet. I said some things on the floor, and I found out that's about all they would take. . . . If you don't get along with your Committee and have their support, you don't get anything accomplished around here. . . . I'm



trying to be a loyal, cooperative member of the Committee. You hate to be a stinker; but I'm still picking at the little things because I can't work on the big things. There's nothing for the new men to do, so they have to find places to needle in order to take some part in it.

Another freshman, who had deliberately violated apprenticeship norms by trying to ask "as many questions as the chairman" during subcommittee hearings, reported a story of unremitting counteraction against his deviation:

In the hearings, I have to wait sometimes nine or ten hours for a chance; and he hopes I'll get tired and stay home. I've had to wait till some pretty unreasonable hours. Once I've gotten the floor, though, I've been able to make a good case. Sometimes I've been the only person there. . . . He's all powerful. He's got all the power. He wouldn't think of taking me on a trip with him when he goes to hold hearings. Last year, he went to——. He wouldn't give me a nudge there. And in the hearings, when I'm questioning a witness, he'll keep butting in so that my case won't appear to be too rosy.

Carried on over a period of two years, this behavior resulted in considerable personal friction between a Committee elder and the newcomer. Other members of his subcommittee pointedly gave him a great lack of support for his non-conformity. "They tried to slow him down and tone him down a little," not because he and his subcommittee chairman disagreed, but on the grounds that the Committee has developed accepted ways of disagreeing which minimize, rather than exacerbate, interpersonal friction.

One internal threat to Committee integration comes from new members who from untutored perceptions, from ignorance of norms, or from dissatisfaction with the apprentice role may not act in accordance with Committee expectations. The seriousness of this threat is minimized, however, by the fact that the deviant newcomer does not possess sufficient resources to affect adversely the operation of the system. Even if he does not respond immediately to the application of sanctions, he can be held in check and subjected to an extended and (given the frequency of interaction among members) intensive period of socialization. The success of Committee socialization is indicated by the fact that whereas wholesale criticism of Committee operations was frequently voiced among junior members, it had disappeared among the men of moderate experience. And what these middle seniority members now accept as the facts of Committee

life, the veterans vigorously assert and defend as the essentials of a smoothly functioning system. Satisfaction with the Committee's internal structure increases with length of Committee service.

An important reason for changing member attitudes is that those who have attained leadership positions have learned, as newcomers characteristically have not, that their conformity to Committee norms is the ultimate source of their influence inside the group. Freshman members do not as readily perceive the degree to which interpersonal influence is rooted in obedience to group norms. They seem to convert their own sense of powerlessness into the view that the Committee's leaders possess, by virtue of their positions, arbitrary, absolute, and awesome power. Typically, they say: "If you're a subcommittee chairman, it's your Committee." "The Chairman runs the show. He gets what he wants. He decides what he wants and gets it through." Older members of the Committee, however, view the power of the leaders as a highly contingent and revocable grant, tendered by the Committee for so long and only so long as their leaders abide by Committee expectations. In commenting on internal influence, their typical reaction is: "Of course, the Committee wouldn't follow him if it didn't want to. He has a great deal of respect. He's an able man, a hard-working man." "He knows the bill backwards and forwards. He works hard, awfully hard and the members know it." Committee leaders have an imposing set of formal prerogatives. But they can capitalize on them only if they command the respect, confidence and deference of their colleagues.

It is basic to Committee integration that members who have the greatest power to change the system evidence the least disposition to do so. Despite their institutional conservatism, however, Committee elders do occasionally violate the norms applicable to them and hence represent a potential threat to successful integration. Excessive deviation from Committee expectations by some leaders will bring counter-measures by other leaders. Thus, for example, the Chairman and his subcommittee chairmen exercise reciprocal controls over one another's behavior. The Chairman has the authority to appoint the chairman and members of each subcommittee and fix its jurisdiction. "He runs the Committee. He has a lot of power," agrees one subcommittee chairman. "But it's all done on the basis of personal friendship. If he tries to get too big, the members can whack him down by majority vote."



In the 84th Congress, Chairman Cannon attempted an unusually broad reorganization of subcommittee jurisdictions. The subcommittee chairman most adversely affected rallied his senior colleagues against the Chairman's action—on the ground that it was an excessive violation of role expectations and threatening to subcommittee autonomy. Faced with the prospect of a negative Committee vote, the Chairman was forced to act in closer conformity to the expectations of the other leaders. As one participant described the episode,

Mr. Cannon, for reasons of his own, tried to bust up one of the subcommittees. We didn't like that. . . . He was breaking up the whole Committee. A couple of weeks later, a few of the senior members got together and worked out a compromise. By that time, he had seen a few things, so we went to him and talked to him and worked it out."

On the subcommittees, too, it is the veterans of both parties who will levy sanctions against an offending chairman. It is they who speak of "cutting down to size" and "trimming the whiskers" of leaders who become "too cocky," "too stubborn" or who "do things wrong too often." Committee integration is underwritten by the fact that no member high or low is permanently immune from the operation of its sanctioning mechanisms.

### III

Data concerning internal committee activity can be organized and presented in various ways. One way is to use key functional problems like integration as the focal points for descriptive analysis. On the basis of our analysis (and without, for the time being, having devised any precise measure of integration), we are led to the summary observation that the House Appropriations Committee appears to be a well integrated, if not an extremely well integrated, committee. The question arises as to whether anything can be gained from this study other than a description of one property of one political subsystem. If it is reasonable to assume that the internal life of a congressional committee affects all legislative activity involving that committee, and if it is reasonable to assume that the analysis of a committee's internal relationships will produce useful knowledge about legislative behavior, some broader implications for this study are indicated.

In the first place, the success of the House Appropriations Committee in solving the problem of integration probably does have important consequences for the appropriations process. Some of the possible relationships can be stated as hypotheses and tested; others can

be suggested as possible guides to understanding. All of them require further research. Of primary interest is the relationship between integration and the power of the Committee. There is little doubt about the fact of Committee power. Of the 443 separate case histories of bureau appropriations examined, the House accepted Committee recommendations in 387, or 87.4 per cent of them; and in 159, or 33.6 per cent of the cases, the House Committee's original recommendations on money amounts were the exact ones enacted into law. The hypothesis that the greater the degree of Committee unity the greater the probability that its recommendations will be accepted is being tested as part of a larger study.<sup>24</sup> House Committee integration may be a key factor in producing House victories in conference committee. This relationship, too, might be tested. Integration appears to help provide the House conferees with a feeling of confidence and superiority which is one of their important advantages in the mix of psychological factors affecting conference deliberations.

Another suggested consequence of high integration is that party groups have a relatively small influence upon appropriations decisions. It suggests, too, that Committee-oriented behavior should be duly emphasized in any analysis of Congressional oversight of administrative activity by this Committee. Successful integration promotes the achievement of the Committee's goals, and doubtless helps account for the fairly consistent production of budget-cutting decisions. Another consequence will be found in the strategies adopted by people seeking favorable Committee decisions. For example, the characteristic lines of contact from executive officials to the Committee will run to the chairman and the ranking minority member (and to the professional staff man) of the single subcommittee handling their agency's appropriations. The ways in which the Committee achieves integration may even affect the success or failure of a bureau in getting its appropriations. Committee members, for instance, will react more favorably toward an administrator who conforms to their self-image of the hard-working master-of-detail than to one who does not—and Committee response to individual administrators bulks large in their determinations.

Finally, the internal integration of this Committee helps to explain the extraordinary stability, since 1920, of appropriations pro-

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Dwaine Marvick, "Congressional Appropriations Politics," unpublished manuscript (Columbia, 1952).

cedures—in the face of repeated proposals to change them through omnibus appropriations, legislative budgets, new budgetary forms, item veto, Treasury borrowing, etc. Integration is a stabilizing force, and the stability of the House Appropriations Committee has been a force for stabilization throughout the entire process. It was, for example, the disagreement between Cannon and Taber which led to the indecisiveness reflected in the short-lived experiment with a single appropriations bill.<sup>25</sup> One need only examine the conditions most likely to decrease Committee integration to ascertain some of the critical factors for producing changes in the appropriations process. A description of integration is also an excellent base-line from which to analyze changes in internal structure.

All of these are speculative propositions which call for further research. But they suggest, as a second implication, that committee integration does have important consequences for legislative activity and, hence, that it is a key variable in the study of legislative politics. It would seem, therefore, to be a fruitful focal point for the study of other congressional committees.<sup>26</sup> Comparative committee analysis

could usefully be devoted to (1) the factors which tend to increase or decrease integration; (2) the degree to which integration is achieved; and (3) the consequences of varying degrees of integration for committee behavior and influence. If analyses of committee integration are of any value, they should encourage the analysis and the classification of congressional committees along functional lines. And they should lead to the discussion of interrelated problems of committee survival. Functional classifications of committees (*i.e.*, well or poorly integrated) derived from a large number of descriptive analyses of several functional problems, may prove helpful in constructing more general propositions about the legislative process.

parative success in meeting the problem of integration. The House Committee on Education and Labor appears to be a poorly integrated committee. Its internal structure is characterized by a great deal of subgroup conflict, relatively little role reciprocity, and minimally effective internal control mechanisms. External concerns, like those of party, constituency and clientele groups, are probably more effective in determining its decisions than is likely to be the case in a well-integrated committee. An analysis of the internal life of the Committee on Education and Labor, drawn partly from interviews with 19 members of that group, will appear in a forthcoming study, *Federal Aid to Education and National Politics*, by Professor Frank Munger and the author, to be published by Syracuse University Press. See also Nicholas R. Masters, *op. cit.*, note 7 above, pp. 354–555, and Seymour Scher, "Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case Study," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (December 1960), pp. 911–920.

<sup>25</sup> See Dalmas Nelson, "The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950," *Journal of Politics* (May, 1953).

<sup>26</sup> This view has been confirmed by the results of interviews conducted by the author with members of the House Committee on Education and Labor, together with an examination of that Committee's activity in one policy area. They indicate very significant contrasts between the internal structure of that Committee and the Appropriations Committee—contrasts which center around their com-

## SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR IN RACIAL EXCLUSION CASES: 1935-1960

S. SIDNEY ULMER  
*Michigan State University*

The United States Supreme Court is often guided by rules of law which make the disposition of cases depend upon singular combinations of circumstances. It is a relatively simple procedure to go through the cases in a subject matter area and compile a list of the facts the justices seem to have considered material to their solution of the issue at hand. But the identification of the peculiar combinations of events which push the decisions in one direction or the other is more difficult. The number of possible combinations is almost endless: with as few as twenty specified circumstances there are more than one million possible combinations. And the weight of a particular circumstance may depend on the combination of factors in which it appears.

Fred Kort has pointed to the "concrete differentiation of factual elements" which seem decisive in cases involving such procedural civil rights as protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, coerced confessions, and unfair trial procedures.<sup>1</sup>

This paper does not employ the methods developed by Kort, but its point of departure is also a recognition of the fundamental importance of factual elements in certain kinds of cases. The subject area here is the type of unfair trial procedure at issue in cases involving the exclusion of Negroes from jury service in state courts. Supreme Court decisions on this issue are well known and the general topic has been well plowed by students of constitutional law. My purpose is to see whether inferences about Supreme Court behavior in racial exclusion cases can be sharpened by a shift from the traditional method of analysis. The shift in method involves no change in focus since my investigation will use the same facts chosen as material by those employing other workways. But my aim is quantitative generalization.

### I

Racial exclusion in the Federal courts has been barred by a congressional statute for many years and since 1875 state officials discriminating against Negroes in determining

<sup>1</sup> Fred Kort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the Right to Counsel Cases," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (March, 1957), pp. 1-12.

jury service in state courts have been subject to a fine of not more than \$5,000.<sup>2</sup> But the vindication of Negro rights in this area has depended not on prosecutions under this statute but primarily on appeals to the Supreme Court invoking the Fourteenth Amendment against convictions in state courts obtained from juries from which Negroes are said to have been systematically excluded. In deciding these appeals the Court has developed the concept of a "representative" jury that is "an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the community."

As Black put it in *Smith v. Texas*:

It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution . . . but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.<sup>3</sup>

The Court has held that this principle entitles the Negro to a jury system in which Negroes are not intentionally and systematically excluded solely on account of race or color. But whether exclusion is intentional and systematic and solely on the basis of race or color must be determined on the facts.<sup>4</sup> If the facts suggest a *prima facie* case of discrimination, the burden is on the state to rebut the presumption. In deciding whether a *prima facie* case has been made out the Court has chosen to focus on a particular type of fact, *i.e.*,—as David Fellman has expressed it—"Usually it is a matter of numbers."<sup>5</sup> The crucial facts, in short, seem to be qualitative variables, the variations in which may be represented numerically. A judgment as to discrimination is a rebuttable inference from a particular combination of numerically expressed facts or factual relationships. The lawyer, by necessity, must be interested in

<sup>2</sup> 18 USC at 243.

<sup>3</sup> 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).

<sup>4</sup> As Black expressed it in *Patton v. Mississippi*: "Whether there has been systematic racial discrimination . . . in the selection of jurors is a question to be determined from the facts in each particular case." 332 U. S. 463 at 466.

<sup>5</sup> David Fellman, *The Defendant's Rights* (1958), p. 103.

identifying the criteria which guide the formulation of such a judgment. The political scientist specializing in public law may equally have an interest if he would explain the Court's actions. The test which the Court has used to distinguish the combinations of circumstances which show unconstitutional exclusion seems to have been clearly stated on several occasions by several different justices.

In *Smith v. Texas*, for instance, Justice Black declared that "Chance and accident alone could hardly have brought about the listing for grand jury service of so few negroes from among the thousands shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications for jury service."<sup>6</sup> Stone remarked in *Hill v. Texas* that "... chance or accident could hardly have accounted for the continuous omission of negroes from the grand jury lists for so long a period as sixteen years or more."<sup>7</sup> And as late as 1958, Black, speaking for a unanimous Court in *Eubanks v. Louisiana* said, "... the uniform and long-continued exclusion of Negroes from grand juries shown by this record cannot be attributed to chance [or] to accident..."<sup>8</sup>

These statements, and others like them, suggest that while the Court sees the event of exclusion as a juncture of innumerable forces, a distinction is made between determinative and chance factors. When convictions have been upset in exclusion cases, the Court has found that intentional and purposeful racial discrimination has determined the exclusion. It seems perfectly clear at the same time that exclusion resulting from chance factors constitutes no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In deciding whether a particular exclusion of Negroes from some part of the jury system is a chance occurrence, the Court has been careful to note two types of statistics. One is the ratio of qualified Negroes to qualified whites in the jurisdiction involved. In determining this ratio the Court has utilized such measures as the percentage of Negro taxpayers, the percentage literate, the percentage of Negro males 21 years and older, and the percentage of Negroes in the total population of the county. It has not, however, considered all these factors in every case. In fact, the only statistic running through all cases is the raw population figure.

The second type of statistic the Court has looked at is the ratio of Negroes to whites in the area of service from which exclusion is charged. The ratio chosen for emphasis usually depends on the nature of the claim, since exclusion from

petit juries, grand juries, or jury lists may be involved.

Evidently, we have here an application of the statistical concept of sampling, and it suggests a testable hypothesis, namely, that the outcome in racial exclusion cases depends upon the relationship of a sample to a population on a particular attribute—racial heterogeneity (RH). The population consists of the Negroes and whites from which the sample (read jury or jury list) is drawn. The play in the joints of the judicial machine is of great importance here. For whether the racial heterogeneity of a sample is representative of a population is a meaningful question only if the population and sample are relevant for each other.

The racial heterogeneity of a population or a sample may be measured by an index of qualitative variation. This method essentially counts differences. The greater the number of differences among a set of items, the more heterogeneous the aggregate and hence the greater the variation in it. By counting the differences between each item and every other item in a set, we get a total number of differences in the aggregate. This becomes meaningful when we relate the observed differences to the maximum number of differences possible. The index of qualitative variation is the ratio of total observed differences to maximum possible differences, a ratio that can vary between zero and 100 per cent.

## II

An idea of what the court has been doing in exclusion cases can be gained by comparing the racial heterogeneity of the populations and samples to which the court has paid attention. RH values for populations and samples are presented in Table I for the 13 cases decided in the period 1935-1960. The table shows that the court has often used the racial composition of a total county population as a base for comparison with the racial composition of juries and jury lists. Yet, it is safe to say that in no county or state is the total population the relevant base for determining jury service. Total population always needs refining by the elimination of those who lack the requisite qualities and characteristics specified by the statutes. There is some tension between the notion of a representative cross-section of the community and the long lists of requirements and exemptions which characterize jury selection procedures in many states.<sup>9</sup> But as long as the Supreme Court

<sup>6</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>7</sup> 316 U. S. 400, 404.

<sup>8</sup> 356 U. S. 584, 587.

<sup>9</sup> For example, Alabama excludes those who are under age, habitual drunkards, permanently diseased or unfit because of physical weakness, il-

TABLE I. COMPARATIVE RACIAL HETEROGENEITY\* IN SELECTED POPULATIONS  
WITH ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES FOR BI-RACIAL SAMPLES

Case	Year	Out- come	RHP %	RHS %	P	Vote
Norris v. Alabama	1935	+	29.8(M)	0		8-0
Hale v. Kentucky	1938	+	41(Tx)	0		8-0
Pierre v. Louisiana	1939	+	88.8(R)	0		8-0
Smith v. Texas	1940	+	36(PT)	13.4(JL)	<.001	9-0
Smith v. Texas	1940	+	13.4(JL)	4.5(GJ)	<.05	
Hill v. Texas	1942	+	52.3(R)	0		9-0
Adkins v. Texas	1945	-	52.3(R)	23(JL)	<.05	6-3
Patton v. Mississippi	1947	+	92.1(R)	0		9-0
Brunson v. N. Carolina	1948	+	9.3(JP)	3.1(JL)	<.001	9-0
Cassell v. Texas	1950	+	24.3(PT)	25(GJ)	>.7	7-1
Cassell v. Texas	1950	+	24.3(PT)	24(GJ)	P <sub>21</sub> <.01	
Brown v. Allen	1953	-	53.7(Tx)	53.3(JL)	>.8	6-3
Brown v. Allen	1953	-	53.7(Tx)	34.4(JL)	>.16	
Speller v. Allen	1953	-	94.2(Tx)	26(JB)	<.001	6-3
Reece v. Georgia	1955	+	37.5(M)	4.3(JL)	<.001	9-0
Eubanks v. Louisiana	1958	+	88.8(R)	.07(GJ)	<.001	9-0

\* Distinguishing Negroes and Whites only.

Legend: + = decision for the Negro claimant

- = decision against the Negro claimant

RHP = racial heterogeneity of the relevant population

RHS = racial heterogeneity of the relevant sample

M = males, 21 and over

Tx = total tax paying population

R = raw population

PT = poll tax paying population

GJ = grand jury

JL = jury list

JP = jury pool

JB = jury box

P = probability of the difference between RHP and RHS occurring by chance

as not seen fit to prohibit such disqualifications, the representative jury should be interpreted as one which represents fairly the population of qualified prospects. And indeed, the justices have at times used a refined rather than a raw population count as a basis for their computations, though they have not been as careful to distinguish the one from the other as

operates (except property holders), and those convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Alabama exempts from jury service judges, attorneys, officers of the United States, officers of the Executive Department of the state, sheriffs, deputies, clerks of court, county commissioners, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, optometrists, teachers, actuaries, boat engineers, bus drivers, truck drivers (under jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission), railroad engineers, firemen, conductors, train dispatchers, bus dispatchers,

might be wished.<sup>10</sup>

In five of the 16 relationships examined, the court used total population statistics. In four of these the racial heterogeneity of the sample

railroad station agents, telegraph operators, reporters, embalmers, radiobroadcasting engineers and announcers, superintendents, doctors and regular employees of Bryce and Searcy Hospitals, officers and enlisted men of the National Guard and Naval Militia, convicts and prison guards. See *Anderson v. Alabama*, pending before the U. S. Supreme Court, 1961 Term, Docket No. 326.

<sup>10</sup> It is only fair to say that the necessary distinction with supporting statistical data has not often been presented in the parties' briefs. On several occasions, the court has apparently found it necessary to take judicial notice of census data in order to reach a determination.

population over extended periods of 16 years or more was zero. In the fifth case, the court used the county tax list to identify the qualified population, but here again exclusion was total over a period of 30 years. Since all five cases were decided against the state, it seems fair to conclude that where the Negro population is substantial (7.2 per cent or more), and exclusion from the sample absolute, the court has required no further test. Indeed, the language in the opinions occasionally suggests that proof of total exclusion alone may be sufficient for showing racial discrimination, assuming there were some qualified Negroes in the county. Typical of this view is the comment of Black in *Patton v. Mississippi* that

... whatever the precise number of qualified colored electors in the county, there were some. ... We hold that the state wholly failed to meet the very strong evidence of purposeful racial discrimination made out by the petitioner upon the uncontradicted showing that for thirty years or more no Negro had served as a juror in the criminal courts of Lauderdale County.<sup>11</sup>

Total exclusion cases, therefore, appear to require no further analysis, though problems could arise if the period of exclusion is sufficiently shortened. For the court has often asserted that exclusion of a race from a small enough sample is not sufficient for showing intentional and purposeful discrimination on a racial basis.<sup>12</sup>

The remaining cases raised problems of the type likely to plague the court in the future. In these cases the sample was racially heterogeneous as was also the population with which

<sup>11</sup> 332 U.S. 463, 468-469. This comment was in response to an attempt by the Mississippi Supreme Court to play the role of statistician. "Of the 25 qualified Negro male electors there would be left, therefore, as those not exempt, 12 or 13 available male negro electors as compared with 5,500 to 6,000 male white electors as to whom, after deducting 500 to 1,000 exempt, would leave a proportion of 5,000 non-exempt white jurors to 12 or 13 non-exempt negro jurors, or about one fourth of one per cent negro jurors,—400 to 1. . . . For the reasons already heretofore stated there was only a chance of 1 in 400 that a Negro would appear on such a venire and as this venire was of 100 jurors, the sheriff, had he brought in a negro, would have had to discriminate against white jurors, not against negroes,—he could not be expected to bring in one fourth of one Negro." (p. 467).

<sup>12</sup> *E. g.*, *Cassell v. Texas*, 339 U.S. 282, 286; *Akins v. Texas*, 325 U.S. 403.

it was compared. The question the court has been asking is whether the differences in degree of heterogeneity are due to chance or intentional racial policy. As Frankfurter put it *Cassell v. Texas*, the question is whether there was "a purposeful non-inclusion of Negro because of race or a merely symbolic representation, not the operation of an honest exercise of relevant judgment or the uncontrollable caprices of chance."<sup>13</sup> While the court has not publicly used statistical tests of significance for the differences observed, nothing prevents, from doing so in our search for a standard. Associated probabilities have been calculated for each of the bi-racial distributions in Table I. In *Smith v. Texas*, the grand jury list was rated 13.4 per cent on the RH factor as compared 36 per cent for the relevant population, composed of those paying poll taxes in the county. The chance expectation of such a difference is much less than 1 in 1,000. But when the grand jury list and the grand jury are compared on the same factor, the former exceeds the latter by a three-to-one ratio—a difference expected by chance less than five times in a hundred. In *Brunson v. North Carolina*,<sup>15</sup> *Reece v. Georgia*<sup>16</sup> and *Eubanks v. Louisiana*,<sup>17</sup> the differences observed have associated probabilities of considerably less than .001. In *Brown v. Allen*<sup>18</sup> on the other hand, the observed differences in drawing grand jury and petit jury lists would be expected by chance about nine times

<sup>13</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 291.

<sup>14</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all probability statistics used in this paper are two-tailed and were computed with the binomial expansion when N was small and with the binomial test and the Yates correction for continuity if N was large. The formula for the binomial expansion is

$$P(x) = \frac{(N)!}{(x)!(N-x)!} P^x Q^{N-x}$$

where P = proportion of cases expected in one category,

$$Q = 1 - P \text{ and } \frac{(N)!}{(x)!(N-x)!} = \frac{N!}{x!(N-x)!}$$

For large samples

$$(N > 25)Z = \frac{(x \pm .5) - NP}{\sqrt{NPQ}}$$

<sup>15</sup> 333 U.S. 851 (1948).

<sup>16</sup> 350 U.S. 85 (1955).

<sup>17</sup> 356 U.S. 584 (1954).

<sup>18</sup> 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

in ten for the latter and approximately 17 times in 100 for the former. Social scientists analyzing these data would be likely to reject chance as an explanation in the first three cases but not in the *Brown* case since .05 is the usual cutting point. In these cases, the Supreme Court consciously or unconsciously has chosen to use a region of rejection consistent with established statistical procedures. And in *Brown*, the decision is for the state, racial discrimination not having been proved.

The remaining three cases do not fit the same pattern. In *Cassell v. Texas*, the difference between the racial heterogeneity of the poll tax population and that of the grand jury is so minimal that its associated probability of occurrence is about eight times in ten. On that basis, we might expect a decision for Texas. In *Akins v. Texas*,<sup>19</sup> the disparity between the RH of the poll tax population and the jury list would be expected by chance less than five times in a hundred. We should therefore anticipate a decision for the Negro claimant. Contrary to these expectations, Texas won the decision in *Akins* but lost it in *Cassell*. The difficulties of squaring the two cases in terms of legal doctrine have been recognized. Herman Pritchett says that "the authority of the *Akins* ruling was subsequently impaired by the somewhat confused decision in *Cassell v. Texas*."<sup>20</sup> And it is true that the seven members of the majority in *Cassell* split 4-3 in choosing a rationale for their decision. The behavior of this majority, however, is entirely consistent with the statistical considerations previously introduced. For Reed, speaking for the court, was no more impressed by the differences in the racial heterogeneity of the poll tax population and that of the grand jury population than we are. And he declared, "Without more it cannot be said that Negroes had been left off grand-jury panels to such a degree as to establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination."<sup>21</sup>

The decision in the case turned, therefore, on the second charge that "the Dallas County grand-jury commissioners for 21 consecutive lists had consistently limited Negroes selected for grand-jury service to not more than one on each grand jury."<sup>22</sup> While the justices split 4-3 in agreeing with this charge, the decision for the Negro can be explained statistically since the associated probability of no more than one Negro on 21 consecutive grand juries is less

than .01. This explanation eliminates the confusion in Reed's opinion and makes the outcome in *Cassell* consistent with the outcome in the other cases. In *Akins*, on the other hand, the Negro claimant failed because his sample was too small, not because the observed differences between sample and population were insignificant. As Reed pointed out for the court, the only complaint was said "to consist of an arbitrary and purposeful limitation by the Grand Jury Commissioners of the number of Negroes to one who was to be placed upon the grand jury panel of sixteen for the term of court at which the indictment against petitioner was found. This is petitioner's only complaint as to racial discrimination."<sup>23</sup> If this is viewed as a claim for proportional representation, it would have no standing. If it is viewed as a claim of intentional racial discrimination, a sample of 16 persons containing one Negro was not sufficient to prove racial discrimination where Negroes constituted 15.5 per cent of the population sampled. The court, indeed, seems to have found the sample inadequate even when doubled to 32 persons including two Negroes. It may be surmised that had no more than one Negro name appeared on 21 consecutive lists, the sample would have been sufficiently large to support an inference consistent with that drawn in *Cassell*.

While the court has not been prone to use such terms as "sample size," an inference that such a factor is important in exclusion cases is entirely consonant with the data we have examined. The sample size in the 13 cases studied varied from 16 in *Akins* to 2,126 in *Speller*. And the sample in *Akins* was only about one-fourth the size of the next smallest sample. This alone is sufficient to put *Akins* in a class by itself. But even more striking is the fact that the court has decided no case in favor of a Negro claimant where the sample available numbered less than 252 names. It is also worth noting that a total of 25 different justices have compiled, over a period of 24 terms, a record of remarkable consistency in racial exclusion cases. For, as Table I shows, the 25 justices cast a total of 113 votes; all but 10 of these were cast consistently with the statistical explanations here advanced. This record shows that the liberal-conservative dichotomy which often characterizes the Supreme Court has not been operative in this area of litigation. It also shows that the court did not wait for Earl Warren to bring unanimity to one area of decision making of vital importance to those subjected to racial discrimination.

<sup>19</sup> 325 U.S. 398 (1945).

<sup>20</sup> C. Herman Pritchett, *The American Constitution* (1959), p. 546.

<sup>21</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 285-286.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 286.

<sup>23</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 400.

The final case, *Speller v. Allen*, is the only one not decided consistently with the statistical formulations we have advanced. In *Speller* no Negro had served on a Vance County, North Carolina jury in "recent" years. In examining the jury box, it was found that of 2,126 names, only 145 were those of Negroes. The majority of six justices (Vinson, Reed, Jackson, Burton, Clark and Minton) failed to find racial discrimination. Yet the probability of such an observed difference in the racial composition of the tax list and the jury box would be less than .001. *Speller*, therefore, is a deviant case not explained by our formulations. In terms of the standards seemingly used by the court before and after that decision it would appear, as Black and Frankfurter agreed, that there was "unconstitutional discrimination" in the make-up of the jury box in *Speller*.

### III

What may be concluded from all this? Basically, that it is now possible to formulate a set of explanatory hypotheses as follows:

(1) The total absence of Negroes from a state jury system or a part thereof is a violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment given two conditions:

- (a) The proportion of Negroes in the qualified population is substantial (*i.e.*, 7.2 per cent or more).
- (b) The period of exclusion is long (*i.e.*, 16 years or more).

(2) Partial absence of Negroes from a state jury system or a part thereof is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment given two conditions:

- (a) The racial heterogeneity of a sample population (read jury or jury list) differs from that of a qualified population to an extent expected by chance less than five times in one hundred.
- (b) The sample is sufficiently large (60 or more cases).

These hypotheses are not offered as final explanations or as complete explanations or as the only explanations for the Supreme Court's decisions in racial exclusion cases. They are submitted as explanations consonant with the data examined and are stated with sufficient precision to make empirical testing possible.



## KANT, LIBERALISM, AND WAR\*

KENNETH N. WALTZ

*Swarthmore College*

Many liberals of the nineteenth century, and their predecessors of the middle eighteenth, thought the natural condition of men to be one of harmony. Dissension and strife do not inhere in man and society; they arise instead from mistaken belief, inadequate knowledge, and defective governance. With the evils defined, the remedies become clear: educate men and their governors, strip away political abuses. This is one theme in the history of liberal thought. Urged by humane philosophers and supported by pacifistic economists, its appeal in Western society is immense and enduring.

There is in liberal thought another theme as well, which is often obscured though it goes back to the earliest philosophers who can fairly be called liberal. Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Kant made no easy assumptions about the rationality and goodness of man. Among men in nature and states in a world of states, they found not harmony and peace but hostility and war to be the natural condition.

The two liberal traditions are partly contradictory. Kant is often improperly placed in the first of them, which helps to account for many of the misinterpretations of his political philosophy. His essay *Eternal Peace* is seen as one of a succession of peace plans going back to Dante and Dubois in the early fourteenth century, encompassing the French monk Crucé and the abbé St. Pierre, and culminating in the League and the United Nations. Some emphasize the plan, that is, international organization; others the importance of its being based on republican or democratic governments. In his guise as a philosopher urging the peaceful proclivities of democracy, Kant has even infiltrated the State Department. Giving full credit to the analysis of Kant, George V. Allen, an assistant secretary, once said: "The United Nations, with all its virtues, has not yet been able to achieve freedom from fear. The reason is easy to understand. Its second most powerful member is not a democracy."<sup>1</sup>

Some have accepted such an interpretation not to applaud Kant's commanding vision and

high moral purpose but rather to decry his political naiveté and simple-minded optimism.<sup>2</sup> Kant's supposed conviction that a Europe of republics would be peaceful, Crane Brinton finds to be a pathetic relic of the Enlightenment.<sup>3</sup> The statement exposes one of the problems of interpretation. Kant is a child of the Enlightenment; he is also the father of a critical philosophy that goes beyond it. Sometimes he writes as though peace were inevitably coming; at other times, as though *Realpolitik* were the mode of the present and the future. One who cannot ignore the latter aspect may label it a Germanic aberration, as Gooch did in his work on Germany and the French Revolution.<sup>4</sup> While Kant may be seen as a backsliding liberal, he may also be considered a theorist of power politics who hid his Machiavellian ideas by hanging 'round them the fashionable garments of liberalism. Since he explained and in a sense accepted the practice of power politics in the relations of states, since he wrote of nature's plan and man's predetermined destiny, this interpretation too becomes plausible, the more so if his *Rechtsstaat* is taken to be a thinly disguised despotism with the sovereign supposedly limited by law but actually free of any human constraint.<sup>5</sup>

It is little trouble to collate passages that would support in turn each of the preceding interpretations of Kant, but the whole man would thereby elude us. There is a unity in his thought that is hard to grasp. His manner of thinking is foreign to social-science fashions, his mode of analysis rigorous and yet subtle, his style difficult but clear, his writing crabbed and still, as Goethe said, sometimes slyly ironic and even eloquent.

### I

"A true political philosophy . . . cannot advance a step without first paying homage to the principles of morals. . . ." <sup>6</sup> It is incumbent

<sup>2</sup> Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799* (New York, 1934), p. 261.

<sup>3</sup> G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution* (London, 1920), p. 271.

<sup>4</sup> For a recent example, see the lead review of *The Times Literary Supplement*, January 23, 1959.

<sup>5</sup> Kant, *Eternal Peace and other International Essays*, tr. W. Hastie (Boston, 1914), p. 118. This book contains: pp. 1-25, "The Natural

\* Prepared for delivery at the 1961 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Mo., September 1961.

<sup>1</sup> George V. Allen, "Perpetual Peace Through World-Wide Federation," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 20 (June 19, 1949), pp. 801-802.

upon us to take Kant at his word and begin by briefly discussing his moral philosophy. Kant was neither an empiricist nor an idealist. Empiricism he criticizes as leading to "merely contingent" knowledge; idealism as exceeding the bounds of reason. Man is a member of two worlds: the phenomenal and the noumenal. In the first, he is a creature of the senses, of impulse and desire. Utility or happiness as a standard of morals or legislation is mere caprice, for the object of action is taken from the realm of contingency. There can be no certainty nor universality of agreement. If your happiness is not mine, a government that presumes to tell either of us what objects we should seek and how we should seek them exceeds the bounds of permissible legislation. It undertakes to do what all men could not possibly have assented to.<sup>6</sup> This is the kernel of all liberalism, rigorously defined. It is expressed, for example, by Lord Acton in his argument that liberty is the only end of government that can be generally pursued without producing tyranny. In Kant's words: "No one may force anyone to be happy according to his manner of imagining the well-being of other men; instead, everyone may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him as long as he does not infringe on the freedom of others to pursue a similar purpose, when such freedom may co-exist with the freedom of every other man according to a possible and general law."<sup>7</sup> Where others have grounded the injunction more

pragmatically, Kant roots the limitation in a profound analysis of the nature of reason.

By his possession of reason, man is distinguished from all mere animals. Man's reasoning abilities are, however, circumscribed. He can know that noumena, things-in-themselves, exist; he cannot know their content. The imperative, which is the basis of morality and of legislation, is then necessarily without content. "Act according to a Maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a Universal Law."<sup>8</sup> My act is proper if everyone could, without contradiction and conflict, claim the right to act similarly. Men would always act in accordance with the categorical imperative if they were wholly creatures of reason. They are not. From the sensual nature of man conflict and violence arise. The contradiction between his condition and his potential gives the right to compel others to enter with him into a civil society in which his rights are secured, and with them the possibility of moral behavior.<sup>9</sup> The criterion of legislation is abstract in order that it may be, within the limits of reason, of general validity. The purpose of legislation is negative: to "hinder hindrances" to freedom so that each may enjoy his antecedently existing rights unmolested.

Each man is an end in himself. The rights of one man before the law are the same as the rights of another. Kant is sharply critical of all practice contrary to this dictum. In the state of nature men have possessions; in the civil state their possessions are secured to them by law and become property. Men have equal rights to property but in varying amounts depending on their situation and abilities. There can, by right, be no nobility of birth but only gradations of rank according to merit. Great inequalities of wealth may, however, limit or even destroy equality of opportunity, as Kant himself remarks. The remedy, negative and typically liberal, is to arrange the laws so as to lessen the perpetuation of family lands by inheritance.<sup>10</sup> To take another example and one that will incline our analysis toward the problem of war, Kant steadfastly opposed the impressment of subjects into military service. The practice was widespread. Karl Alexander, nephew of Frederick the Great, sold his regiments to England for the American War. At the bidding of his English mistress, he finally sold his principality to Prussia for cash and retired to England. In England impressment of sailors

Principle of the Political Order Considered in Connection with the Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitan History"; pp. 27-54, "The Principles of Political Right Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in Natural Law"; pp. 55-66, "The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law"; pp. 67-168, "Eternal Peace, A Philosophical Essay."

<sup>6</sup> See *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, esp. sec. 2; and in general, *Critical Examination of Practical Reason*. Both are in Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, tr., *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, 6th ed. (London, 1909). For the political parts of the argument, see "Principles of Political Right."

<sup>7</sup> Acton, "Nationality," *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London, 1907), pp. 270-300; Kant, "Theory and Practice: Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory But Does Not Apply to Practice," tr. Carl J. Friedrich, *The Philosophy of Kant* (New York, 1949), p. 416.

<sup>8</sup> *The Philosophy of Law*, tr. W. Hastie (Edinburgh, 1887), p. 34.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78, 157.

<sup>10</sup> "Principles of Political Right," pp. 34-39.

was regarded as an undeniable prerogative of the Crown, and the brutal and inefficient practice not eliminated until it was made unnecessary by the Continuous Service Scheme adopted in 1853.<sup>11</sup> In the face of such practices, Kant writes:

A State is not to be regarded as a property or patrimony like the soil on which it may be settled. It is a society of men, over which no one but itself has the right to rule . . . and to incorporate it as a graft in another State is to destroy its existence as a moral person; it is to reduce it to a thing, and thereby to contradict the idea of the original compact without which a right over a people is inconceivable.

Subjects are not, like the vegetables the farmer uproots and carts off to market, objects that the ruler can dispose of according to his whim. In many states the ruler does so treat them. Where war does not require of the ruler the least sacrifice of his pleasures he may

resolve for war from insignificant reasons, as if it were but a hunting expedition; and, as regards its propriety, he may leave the justification of it without concern to the diplomatic body, who are always too ready to give their services for that purpose.<sup>12</sup>

The practices of governments contradict the principles of right. How are the required limitations to be secured? The answer has two parts: first, the institutions that are appropriate, and then how they may come to exist. Only in a republic can it be hoped that the principles of right will prevail. In such a state the executive is made up of one or a few; separated from it is an assembly representing the self-dependent citizens, men of property, profession, or craft. The executive presents its proposed legislation, the assembly chants its ayes and nays. The question put to it is not, for example, is a 10 per cent tax on bread supportable as compared to a tax of 5 per cent? The question, in the manner of Rousseau, is simply this: Does the proposed law accord with the general will? Is it one that everyone, though he would have preferred the lower tax, could conceivably have agreed to? If it is such, then the idea of the original contract is preserved. Still, what if the assembly says "nay" and the executive refuses to listen?

Kant's philosophy, including his political

<sup>11</sup> Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, p. 12; Christopher Lloyd, *The Nation and the Navy* (London, 1954), pp. 131, 209.

<sup>12</sup> "Eternal Peace," pp. 70, 78; *Philosophy of Law*, p. 217.

philosophy, moves forward by resolving a series of antinomies or tensions. The enjoyment, as distinct from the possession, of rights depends on the state. However imperfect the state may be, it is greatly preferable to anarchy. On such grounds as these, revolution is absolutely enjoined. Yet one may, as Kant did, view with sympathy revolutions that according to the principles of right would stand condemned. There is no contradiction. He writes, one might say, sometimes noumenally and sometimes phenomenally, or, more accurately, with both aspects of human affairs clearly in his mind. Careful analysis and the clear specification of standards square easily in Kant's philosophy with caution, flexibility, and moderation in the judgment of human behavior.

The other institutional arrangement that is essential to proper governance is freedom of expression. Kant takes *Sapere Aude!* as the motto of the Enlightenment, and one of the most frequently quoted of his statements is that "the liberty of the press is the sole palladium of the rights of the people."<sup>13</sup> One hears a distinct reverberation from the Philosophes' Shield of Evidence or an echo, to take a German formulation, of Schlözer's dictum that statistics and despotism cannot coexist. In his own and his subjects' interest, the ruler ought to permit the widest freedom of expression; but again, if he does not, there is nothing that can rightfully be done about it.

At such points as these some have concluded that Kant's political theory is a defense of despotism coupled with a hope that the despot will rule by law. He does, it is true, reflect the widespread ideas of his time. But they were ideas shared by many who were liberals as well as by others. Only a government secure in its power, Hegel once wrote, can permit the conscientious objector to live by his scruples. Across the North Sea one finds Lord Hardinge, Secretary at War in Wellington's Cabinet, describing the army as

a protection rather than any detriment to Liberty. We permitted a licentiousness which under any other constitution might be fatal to the public peace. Meetings were held and language was used which no other empire would permit and which nothing but the confidence of the Crown in the Standing Army would justify even our Government in permitting."

Neither Hegel nor Hardinge were liberals, but they reflect the idea that Kant emphasizes: A

<sup>13</sup> "What is Enlightenment?" tr. Friedrich, *Philosophy of Kant*; "Principles of Political Right," p. 50.

government that while limited is strong in its sphere can permit a freedom to its subjects that would otherwise endanger the state. Thus Kant, with obvious reference to Frederick the Great, applauds the strength of the Prussian state upon which the individual's liberty depends.<sup>14</sup>

So long at least as the state "runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States," it must be powerful externally as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. The republican form is preferable, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; but despotisms are stronger—and no one would expect or wish to bring the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength.<sup>15</sup> Standing armies are dangerous, arms races themselves being a cause of war, but in the absence of an outside agency affording protection, each state must look to the effectiveness of its army.<sup>16</sup> A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies or to maintain itself as a commonwealth."<sup>17</sup> Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war.

Kant's concern with the strength and thus the safety of the state is part of his perception of the necessities of power politics. Among states in the world, as among individuals in the state of nature, there is constantly either violence or the threat of violence. States, like "lawless savages," are with each other "naturally in a nonjuridical condition."<sup>18</sup> There is no law above them; there is no judge among them; there is no legal process by which states can

pursue their rights. They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. A treaty of peace can end only a particular war; a pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as unjust; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."<sup>19</sup> More surely than those who extract and emphasize merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "War," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "is not fatalistically inevitable."<sup>20</sup>

Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.<sup>21</sup> He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or diplomatically composed codes have not, nor could have, the slightest legal force, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint. . . ."<sup>22</sup> His intention clearly is that the "oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

This is the culminating problem of Kant's philosophy. Men need the protection of law before they have any chance of leading the moral life to which their reason commands them. The civil state is not sufficient. Peace among, as well as within, states is essential to the development of uniquely human capacities. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."<sup>23</sup> This is the form of the imperative that is most appropriate here. The constant hostility of states and the pressures of recurring war make its fulfillment impossible. How can the problem be solved?

<sup>14</sup> Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, 1937), pp. 167-168; "What is Enlightenment?" p. 139.

<sup>15</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 108.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71. In a way that long remains typical of liberals, Kant, in effect, criticizes the army that has nobility as officers and rabble for its soldiers. He would prefer not the nation-in-arms but an army of citizen-soldiers periodically and voluntarily rehearsing their military duties.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99; "Principles of Political Right," pp. 42-43.

<sup>18</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, p. 214; cf. pp. 223-224: "Further, it may be said that the expression 'an unjust enemy in the state of Nature' is pleonastic; for the state of Nature is itself a state of injustice."

<sup>19</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 83; cf. p. 76.

<sup>20</sup> *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress. Cf. Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgement*, tr. James C. Meredith (Oxford, 1928), p. 96. Referring to "a system of all states that are in danger of acting injuriously to one another" Kant says: "In its absence, and with the obstacles that ambition, love of power, and avarice, especially on the part of those who hold the reins of authority, put in the way even of the possibility of such a scheme, war is inevitable."

<sup>21</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 219-225; "Eternal Peace," pp. 69-75.

<sup>22</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 83.

<sup>23</sup> *Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 47.

## II

As is well known, Kant proclaims the *Rechtsstaat*, or republic, as preeminently the peaceful form of the state. In a republic the unambiguous test of right is applied to every piece of legislation, and every act of the executive will in turn follow the universally established law.<sup>24</sup> Such a state could not undertake an aggressive war, for its sole purpose, a purpose guaranteed by its structure, is to further the moral life of its subjects by enacting and administering positive, general law.<sup>25</sup> There may be reasons for a republic to fight, but they are not internally generated. Kant records, as had Hume, the couplet from Pope's *Essay on Man*:

For Forms of Government let fools contest;  
Whate'er is best administered is best.

And, just as with Hume, he cites the thought in order to disagree with it. The point for both of them is that as the context of action varies, similar causes have different effects. Notice what Kant has done. With no comforting illusions about man, he seeks in the state, and among states as will be seen in a moment, the structure that will turn men's "unsocial sociability," their conflict and violence, toward a constructive result.<sup>26</sup>

How are the appropriate structures to come into being, nationally and in the world at large? Kant sees in history, indeed in the very horrors of war, "a deep-seated, maybe far-seeing, attempt on the part of supreme wisdom, if not to found, yet to prepare the way for a rule of law governing the freedom of states, and thus bring about their unity in a system established on a moral basis."<sup>27</sup> Aha! one may say, an overriding determinism, an uncritical teleology, an Hegelian world-spirit marching with benign purpose, a sterile optimism. Kant succumbs to none of these. He is neither determinist, uncritical, nor rosy-faced with hope. A universal plan of nature, unknowable in detail but dimly discernible in outline, must be assumed; it cannot be known. He is moving at the outermost

rim of reason to establish the necessity of an act of faith and its compatibility with his own critical philosophy. We can discern in nature "a design to bring forth concord out of the discord of men. . . ." This must be so if Kant's moral theory is correct, for only in concord can man follow the categorical imperative. But, he warns,

human reason, when dealing with the relation of effects to their causes, must keep within the limits of possible experience; and to speak of Providence as knowable by us in this relation would be putting on Icarian wings with presumptuous rashness in order to approach the mystery of His unfathomable purposes.<sup>28</sup>

His argument, both of limits and of possibilities, is established in the *Pure Reason* and elaborated in the *Practical Reason*. Along with its relation to moral philosophy, his reasoning is great with political implications.

The activities of bees and beavers, guided by instinct, produce regular patterns and predictable results. Citizens of a purely rational world, on the other hand, would act according to a preconcerted plan. Because men behave in neither of these ways, "no regular systematic history of mankind" appears to be possible. But if we take progress not as a final cause but as a postulate of the practical reason, "the cheerless gloom of chance" is illumined by "the guiding light of reason."<sup>29</sup> In the economic world of Adam Smith, men scratch and claw, each seeking his profit. The result is the greater good of all. If we look at the world and see discrete events, we are overwhelmed by the chaos: each event without cause and all events without meaning. But if we look at the aggregate of events with a proper organizing principle in our minds, we may see in the chaos, order; in the welter of events, a plan of nature. Newton, as Darwin said, did not explain why there is a gravitational force but that there is such a force. The cause, as Kant would put it, located in the bodies, is inaccessible to our reason; but the rules by which it operates can be discerned.<sup>30</sup> And so it is that out of the "universal violence" of the state of nature and "the necessity arising therefrom" comes the resolution of a people "to subject themselves to national law. . . ."<sup>31</sup> The juridical union itself is "a condition of [legal] equality . . . de-

<sup>24</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 210-211.

<sup>25</sup> "Principle of Progress," p. 64: Each republic "unable to injure any other by violence, must maintain itself by right alone; and it may hope on real grounds that the others being constituted like itself will then come, on occasions of need, to its aid."

<sup>26</sup> "That politics may be reduced to a science," *Hume's Political Discourses* (London, n.d.), pp. 229-243; Kant, "Eternal Peace," p. 80n.

<sup>27</sup> *Teleological Judgement*, p. 96.

<sup>28</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 91.

<sup>29</sup> "Principle of the Political Order," pp. 3-5.

<sup>30</sup> Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (London, 1928), p. 455.

<sup>31</sup> "Principle of the Political Order," pp. 15-17; "Principle of Progress," p. 62.

terminated by the action and reaction of free wills limiting one another. . . ."<sup>32</sup> And

even if a people were not compelled by internal discord to submit to the coercion of public laws, war as an external influence would effect this. For, according to the arrangement of nature already indicated, every people finds another pressing upon it in its neighborhood and it must form itself internally into a State in order to be equipped as a power so as to defend itself.<sup>33</sup>

Men and states seek their ends little knowing that they are by their actions producing a result that may have been no part of their intentions. Smith's invisible hand is at work in the realm of politics. The "planless aggregate" of human actions can be represented as "constituting a system," though the demonstrations of Kant in the realm of the political are necessarily vaguer, crasser, and less certain than are those of Smith.<sup>34</sup>

There is a sense of progress but not a naive optimism, for as we advance Kant sees that the dangers and difficulties also grow. The practical reason pronounces its irresistible veto: "There shall be no war."<sup>35</sup> Yet without war in the past, men now would be feeble types sheltering in caves and feeding on nuts and berries. The development as conceived by Kant is dialectic:

By the expenditure of all the resources of the commonwealth in military preparations against each other, by the devastations occasioned by war, and still more by the necessity of holding themselves continually in readiness for it, the full development of the capacities of mankind are undoubtedly retarded in their progress; but, on the other hand, the very evils which thus arise, compel men to find out means against them. A law of equilibrium is thus discovered for the regulation of the really wholesome antagonism of contiguous States as it springs up out of their freedom; and a united power, giving emphasis to this law, is constituted, whereby there is introduced a universal condition of public security among the nations.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> "Principles of Political Right," pp. 34-35.

<sup>33</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 95.

<sup>34</sup> "Principle of the Political Order," p. 22.

<sup>35</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, p. 230.

<sup>36</sup> "Principle of the Political Order," p. 17; cf. p. 23: "Applying the same method of study everywhere, both to the internal civil constitutions and laws of the States and to their external relations to each other, we see how in both relations the good they contained served for a certain period to elevate and glorify particular nations, and with themselves, their arts and sciences,—until the de-

Kant mentions, by way of suggestion, some of the ways in which peace may come out of war. The strength of a state is directly related to its general prosperity and well-being, and these in turn to the amount of liberty enjoyed by its subjects. "If the citizen is hindered in seeking his prosperity in any way suitable to himself that is consistent with the liberty of others, the activity of business is checked generally; and thereby the powers of the whole State are again weakened." Since states are in close competition, the sovereign, to avoid weakening his state, must grant a greater liberty to his subjects. Meanwhile the growing intensity of the competition among states leads them to spend larger amounts of money, even in time of peace; in military preparation. Prices rise, the national debt mounts, and finally the states are so weakened by this competition and by actual war that the sovereign is forced to give in peacefully to the people and place in their hands the power to choose between war and peace.<sup>37</sup> The attempt to win in the competition of states leads the sovereign to make some concessions; the impossibility of winning leads to the final concession, at which point, presumably, the republican form becomes the pattern of government throughout the world.

The manner of approach is immensely impressive. Its execution is accomplished with modesty, perception, and political sensibility. This is not to say that the vision is without flaw, the plan without blemish. Kant, if read from one point of view, can be taken as a study in the futility of the unsoundly based "ought." This was clear in his analysis of the individual in a state of nature where, he argued, the moral obligations, the "oughts" that apply to every rational being, cannot possibly be fulfilled. Prior to the establishment of a pacific federation, the "oughts" in international law turn out to mean as little as those applied to man in the state of nature. When the state of nature gives way to the civil state, the "oughts" applied to moral man take on a practical meaning. Those that apply to states can be taken seriously only if the environment of the state is similarly improved. For he says: "Every people, for the sake of its own security, thus may and ought to demand from any other that it shall enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil constitution, in which the right of each shall be secured."<sup>38</sup> The civil state is necessary for two reasons, because men are imperfect and be-

fects attaching to their institutions came in time to cause their overthrow."

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20; "Principle of Progress," p. 63.

<sup>38</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 81.

cause even good men may fall into dispute and require a legally established mediator. The universal law-state would seem to be necessary for a similar pair of reasons.

Yet in spite of a number of statements such as the one just quoted, Kant will not accept the "legal state of Society" on a grand scale, the world constitution "similar to the civil constitution," as a solution to the problem. Every time he uses such phrases he quickly adds qualifications that materially change their meaning. His "universal International State, or Union of Nations," turns out to be "a voluntary combination of different States that would be *dissoluble* at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble."<sup>39</sup> In such a voluntary organization, Kant says, the settlement of disputes among states can be conducted according to a civil process instead of by war. And yet he has also said in the clearest terms that against the evils of war and the general insecurity of states "there is no possible remedy but a system of international right founded upon public laws conjoined with power, to which every State must submit,—according to the analogy of the civil or political right of individuals in any one State."<sup>40</sup> The seeming contradiction calls for some explanation.

### III

Why does Kant, after having constructed an argument internally consistent, turn to the conclusion that not government but a voluntary organization is the solution to the problem of war? He gives two reasons. The first is partly a logical proposition resting on his definition of terms. States already have a legal constitution; it would be illogical to place them under another. Individuals in a condition of nature have a right to compel others to join with them to form a state. The right of a state to demand that other states submit to the rule of law is not comparably strong. As a matter of right, no state can interfere with the internal arrangements of another. Kant, in contrast to Mazzini and Woodrow Wilson, is a non-interventionist liberal.<sup>41</sup> One suspects that his second reason

for shying away from a world state is more important. He fears that such a state, once achieved, would be a greater evil than the wars it is designed to eliminate. It could so easily become a terrible despotism, stifle liberty, kill initiative, and in the end lapse into anarchy.<sup>42</sup>

States in the world are like individuals in the state of nature. They are neither perfectly good nor are they controlled by law. Consequently conflict and violence among them are inevitable. This statement does not lead Kant to the conclusion that a world state is the answer. Distrusting that solution, he casts about for another. The other possibility open to him is that all states so improve that they will act according to maxims that could be universally followed without conflict. While he fears the former solution, he is too cautious and critical to place his faith entirely in the latter. Instead he attempts to combine them. It is the aim of his political philosophy to establish the hope that states may improve enough and learn enough from the suffering and devastation of war to make possible a rule of law among them that is not backed by power but is voluntarily observed. The first factor is the internal improvement of states; the second, the external rule of law. But the second, being voluntary, is dependent on the perfection with which the first is realized. The "power" to enforce the law is derived not from external sanction but from internal perfection.

Can one sensibly expect all states gradually to conform to a pattern that, once universally established, would provide the basis for perpetual peace? At one point Kant says: "Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and then will your object, the benefit of perpetual peace, be added unto you."<sup>43</sup> This is a strange injunction to come from Kant, for he has pointed out, as we have several times noted, that it is only in the civil state that man has the possibility of living the moral life. The civil state made changes in man's behavior possible; it was not the other way around. And this is also the view that Kant takes of the relation between the internal and external affairs of states. In the 7th Proposition of his "Principle of the Political Order," for example, he avers that without the proper ordering of the external relations of states, the internal establishment of the perfect civil constitution is impossible.

see Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York, 1959), ch. 4.

<sup>42</sup> "Principle of Progress," pp. 62–63; "Eternal Peace," pp. 97–98.

<sup>43</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 114.

<sup>39</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, p. 225.

<sup>40</sup> "Principle of Progress," p. 65. Cf. "Eternal Peace," pp. 122–123; and *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 163–164, where Kant emphasizes that the federation must have the function of determining according to law, wherever there is a significant conflict, which interpretation of right should prevail.

<sup>41</sup> "Eternal Peace," p. 81; and see above, n. 9. For differences among liberals on this question,

For the moment, however, let us assume that, without profound change in their external relations, all states have become republics. Kant's conclusion is that at this point perpetual peace is established, at least approximately. The international rule of law is realized, for the law is voluntarily agreed upon and voluntarily obeyed. This whole system of voluntary universal law rests upon an equilibrium of forces that is the culmination of world history.

To show that the equilibrium, once realized, is bound to collapse, one need only refer to Kant's own analysis. He points out that in a state of nature, where each state must define its rights and prosecute them with its own power, no one country can be secure against any other. "Lesion of a less powerful country may be involved merely in the condition of a more powerful neighbor prior to any action at all; and in the State of Nature an attack under such circumstances would be warrantable." This is a logical justification of the right of preventive war. From it Kant derives the principle of the balance of power.<sup>44</sup> How, one may ask, does the final equilibrium of the voluntary federation among states differ from the equilibrium sometimes attained by balance-of-power politics, an equilibrium that Kant properly labelled precarious? It should be clear by now that it differs in only one of the two respects that Kant believes to be essential. He ridicules the balance of power by comparing it with "the house described by Swift, which was built by an architect so perfectly in accordance with all the laws of equilibrium that when a sparrow lighted upon it it immediately fell." Yet the same doubt would seem to apply to Kant's hope for a pacific world secured "not by the weakening of all the separate powers of the States, but by an equilibrium which is brought forth and guaranteed through their rivalry with each other."<sup>45</sup> It is, in Kant's impeccable logic, necessary to supersede the state of nature among states and establish the rule of law. It is, by the same logic, impossible for a voluntary international federation effectively to guarantee the peace. If equilibrium depends on spontaneous agreement or if equilibrium depends on a balance of

forces, the federation of Kant is either way doomed to be transitory and shifting. Just as the house designed by a Laputian would collapse under the weight of a sparrow so Kant's structure falls to the ground whenever one major state chooses to forsake the international federation and flout its universal law.

The difficulty is made all the clearer by noting how, in a republic, the general will pronounces on the question of war and peace. The unambiguous test of right is again applied to a proposed act of the executive. The question is, as with domestic legislation, abstractly put. The answer to it must be a simple yes or no. Since the point is important and generally overlooked, I quote the relevant passage.

If, for example, a proportioned war-tax were imposed on all the subjects, they are not entitled . . . to say that it is unjust because somehow, according to their opinion, the war was unnecessary. For they are not entitled to judge of this; whereas, because it is at least always possible that the war was inevitable and the tax indispensable, it must be regarded as rightful in the judgment of the subject.<sup>46</sup>

#### IV

Kant has held out a hope for perpetual peace, which upon closer scrutiny seems to disappear. Has he deluded himself with a false optimism, which has then been transferred to many of his interpreters? To answer the question we have to complete the circle and return to a consideration of his moral philosophy.

It is, Kant writes in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, "absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which" an act was purely moral. However, whether this or that takes place is not at all the question; but that reason of itself, independent on [sic] all experience, ordains what ought to take place, that accordingly actions of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example, the feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds everything on experience, are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by reason. . . .<sup>47</sup>

A moral act may never have been performed; yet moral behavior is a "necessary" or "practical" goal of mankind. When Kant uses such adjectives he means that the action described is the only action in accordance with man's noumenal nature, that its performance is a duty. Kant demonstrates that the categorical

<sup>44</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, p. 218, where in addition to what is quoted above, he writes: "This international relation is the foundation of the Right of Equilibrium, or of the 'balance of Power,' among all states that are in active contiguity to each other."

<sup>45</sup> "Principle of Progress," p. 65; "Eternal Peace," p. 98.

<sup>46</sup> "Principles of Political Right," p. 41n.

<sup>47</sup> *Metaphysic of Morals*, pp. 23-24.



imperative exists and that to follow it is not impossible; he does not imply that men will live according to it. From the moral duty inherent in man's noumenal nature arise other of Kant's postulates. He accords to man in the form of practical reason, or will, what he has denied to him in the form of pure reason. If we are ever to fulfil the moral law, we must assume the existence of progress, an immortal soul, a God.<sup>48</sup>

Kant approaches the problem of war in similar fashion. Perpetual peace is a particular reading of the postulate of progress, for if a condition of peace is not possible, then the prospect of one day realizing the ideal of moral behavior disappears. It is a partial and erroneous interpretation of Kant to say that he thought the realization of "necessary" or "practical" goals something that would occur in anyone's lifetime. Kant's analysis makes the conclusion that a universal rule of law can be achieved almost incomprehensible, but even this conclusion makes sense in his way of thinking; for to say that we can only "comprehend the incomprehensibility" of something is simply to face up to the inherent limitations of reason.<sup>49</sup>

The conclusion that follows from considering Kant's political philosophy in the context of his moral philosophy is borne out by many of his more purely political statements. In the *Philosophy of Law*, after one of his many iterations of the proposition that only in a universal state can man find security, he raises the argument that if the state is extended over too large an area it becomes physically incapable of protecting its members. "Hence," he says, the *Perpetual Peace*, which is the ultimate end of all the Right of Nations, becomes in fact an impracticable idea. The political principles, however, which aim at such an end, and which enjoin the formation of such unions among the States

as may promote a continuous approximation to a Perpetual Peace are not impracticable. . . .<sup>50</sup>

As he had demonstrated the possibility of moral behavior, so he must establish the possibility of perpetual peace. The second is the precondition of the first, and nothing that is impossible can be imperatively commanded. Peace is possible. This Kant has sought to prove. Its achievement remains an improbability.

Now, as a matter of fact, the morally practical Reason utters within us its irrevocable *Veto*: 'There shall be no War.' . . . Hence the question no longer is as to whether Perpetual Peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must *act* on the supposition of its being real. . . . And although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not deceive ourselves in adopting the maxim of action that will guide us in working incessantly for it; for it is a duty to do this.<sup>51</sup>

## V

Kant shares the major tenets of liberalism: the source of the individual's rights lies outside of the state; his freedom may be limited only when its exercise interferes with the rights of others; such limitation must be by known general laws before which all men stand equal; men's capacities are greater than is shown by their present accomplishments; and, finally, their potential will unfold in time, with education being one of the important means of progress. But Kant sees in combination what others have often separated—the defects, or as he says, the evil of men and the possibility of their living good lives, the strength of the state and the liberty of its subjects, progress amidst ever greater difficulties, the approach to peace as wars become fiercer and more frequent. He has, as many liberals do not, an appreciation of politics as struggle, an idea of possible equilibrium not as simple and automatic harmony but always as something perilously achieved out of conflict.

Let the philosophers scribble as they will, writes Kant at the beginning of "Eternal Peace." There is no danger, for rulers will not listen. This has been taken as criticism of states and condemnation of their rulers. But to the philosopher's advice rulers cannot listen, as Kant well knew. He was not engaged in the

<sup>48</sup> We must, for example, "postulate the existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*. . . ." *Practical Reason*, p. 221.

<sup>49</sup> *Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 84. This is a difficult problem. To put peace in the infinite future would be to demonstrate its impossibility. Kant must therefore think of sequences in the phenomenal world that are not infinite but do continue without end. This abstruse statement of the problem may help to make clear the philosophic context of Kant's political thought. For this resolution of the problem, I am indebted to S. Körner's superb little book, *Kant* (Penguin, 1955), pp. 163–174.

<sup>50</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, p. 224; cf. "Principle of the Political Order," p. 13.

<sup>51</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 229–230.

puerile task of telling men of affairs to stop behaving badly. Nor could he have been, for the dependence of behavior upon condition is one of his major theses. Taken as a King's Mirror, Kant's "Eternal Peace" is lost in futility. But so to take it requires a very unKantian interpretation. In describing what the states and the world will have to do and to become if moral behavior is to be possible, Kant makes understandable and in a sense excuses the failures of men and their rulers to achieve moral rectitude.

Many liberals of Kant's time and after have

looked upon war as annoyance or aberration, as something, one might say, that lies outside of history. Kant, in contrast, at once condemns war and demonstrates that its occurrence is expected rather than accidental. In the end we are left not with a confident foretelling of "the end of wars and the reign of international law"<sup>52</sup> but with a deeper appreciation of the causes of war and the immense difficulty of doing anything about them.

<sup>52</sup> Edwin D. Mead's introduction to the book cited above, n. 5.

## THE REVIVAL OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A CRITIQUE\*

STANLEY ROTHMAN  
*Smith College*

*If wishes were horses,  
Then beggars would ride . . .*

Perhaps no single individual has had as much impact on the discipline of political science during the past several years as has Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago. Both he and his disciples (and they are disciples in the "classical" sense) have engaged in a full scale attack upon the premises underlying the contemporary study of politics.<sup>1</sup>

Strauss argues that these premises are ill-founded and self-contradictory, and, if taken seriously, lead to moral nihilism. He contends, further, that another set of premises, those of "classical natural right," which treat man in terms of his natural end and his relation to the "mysterious whole," are capable of providing a more adequate foundation for the study of politics.

Given the vigor with which Strauss' criticisms have been developed, it is only legitimate that the attackers and the alternatives proposed be themselves subject to examination. The argument of this essay is that while Strauss raises a number of interesting and important questions, his own thinking is marked by at least as much confusion as that of those he criticizes. The essay will first summarize Strauss' position, along with some preliminary comments, and will then proceed to a more detailed examination of its assumptions, logic and implications.<sup>2</sup>

### I

According to Strauss, both contemporary political philosophy and contemporary political

science are in a state of "decay and perhaps of putrefaction."<sup>3</sup> Political philosophy, originally the attempt to understand man's social life as a "whole," has been replaced by narrow empirical studies which eschew value judgments as unscientific, and which tend to reduce the political to the sub-political, *i.e.*, to reduce politics to psychology or sociology and to explain political decisions in terms of primitive drives whose direction is determined by one's culture or epoch.<sup>4</sup>

The sources of this decay seem to lie in the abandonment of classical natural right and the domination of contemporary social science by positivism and historicism. These two sources are closely related, Strauss argues, for historicism is the logical consequence of positivism.<sup>5</sup>

Positivists, he argues, deriving their study of man from a "mechanical"<sup>6</sup> and materialistic view of natural science, maintain that values are matters of personal choice and hence not subject to discussion in terms of any natural standard. Thus, they argue that social science is incapable of passing upon questions of value. And, since values are not to be found in the nature of things, the sources of moral conceptions must be sought in the passions as these are channelled by environment. Hence the reductionist tendency of which we spoke earlier.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *WPP*, p. 17 and p. 25 f.

<sup>4</sup> *WPP*, p. 38. See also the epilogue by Strauss in Herbert J. Storing (ed.) *Essays on the Science of Politics* (New York, 1962), especially pp. 311, 322, 325; Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Sciences and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's *The Structure of Freedom*," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 55 (September, 1961), p. 550, and Joseph Cropsey, "On the Relation of Political Science and Economics," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 54 (March, 1960), pp. 3-14.

<sup>5</sup> *WPP*, pp. 18-25 and *passim*.

<sup>6</sup> By a "mechanical" interpretation of nature Strauss means one which attempts to understand the present in terms of the past (*i.e.*, in terms of efficient rather than "final causes"), and the complex in terms of the more simple (*i.e.*, the whole in terms of its parts).

<sup>7</sup> *WPP*, pp. 18-25 and *passim*.

\* I wish to thank Professors Cecelia M. Kenyon, Guenter Lewy, John Ladd and Felix Oppenheim, all of whom read an earlier version of this essay.

<sup>1</sup> The most articulate of Strauss' students include Walter Berns, Joseph Cropsey, Harry V. Jaffa and Allan Bloom.

<sup>2</sup> The bulk of Strauss' criticism of contemporary political theory and political science is to be found in three books: *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe, 1958), and *What Is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe, 1959). The last named is a collection of essays and book reviews which have appeared in various journals. Henceforth the volumes will be cited as *NRH*, *TM* and *WPP*, respectively.

Historicism, Strauss maintains, carries this one logical step further. If the whole is unknowable, if men's preferences, and hence the framework of men's preferences, are purely subjective, then neither ethical judgments nor the principles of science can be regarded as true for all times. Even the so-called facts of any epoch or culture (since these are determined by assumptions as to what constitutes a fact) must be regarded as purely subjective. The only valid historical proposition open to historicists, according to Strauss, is that one cannot develop valid historical propositions:

After having reached its full growth historicism is distinguished from positivism by the following characteristics. (1) It abandons the distinction between facts and values, because every understanding, however theoretical, implies specific evaluations. (2) It denies the authoritative character of modern science, which appears as only one form among many of man's thinking orientation in the world. (3) It refuses to regard the historical process as fundamentally progressive. . . . (4) It denies the relevance of the evolutionist thesis by contending that the evolution of man out of non-man cannot make intelligible man's humanity.<sup>8</sup>

The destruction of political philosophy by positivism and historicism has had practical as well as theoretical consequences.<sup>9a</sup> The denial of the possibility of judging between the "base" and the "noble" leads to nihilism and the glorification of personal self-aggrandisement at worst or a blind conformism at best.<sup>9</sup> (If American social scientists have maintained some integrity it is only because, failing to understand the consequences of their own position, they remain attached to humane values.<sup>10</sup>)

These practical consequences are disastrous and, according to Strauss, help explain the general character of the contemporary world, including the development of both National Socialism and Communist totalitarianism.<sup>11</sup> But, he admits, pointing this out is not sufficient. It is not enough to be appalled at the present state of social science and its consequences. One must demonstrate that political philosophy is possible, that it is possible to distinguish between the noble and the base. For if one cannot achieve this any hope for improve-

ment must remain a "wish," and "a wish is not a fact."<sup>12</sup>

One can demonstrate the possibility of political philosophy, in part, by demonstrating that the premises conventionally accepted by contemporary social scientists are not satisfactory for explaining what they purport to explain, or by proving that these premises are self-contradictory. The latter is quite clear in the case of historicism. Historicism, Strauss argues, leads inevitably to the conclusion that historicism itself is historically determined.

In other words, to maintain that all thought is historically determined is to be forced to admit that one's own thought is so determined. To argue that no statement possesses absolute validity is to argue that one's own statements lack absolute validity:

Only under one condition could historicism claim to have done away with all pretense to finality, if it presented the historicist thesis not as simply true, but as true for the time being only. In fact, if the historicist thesis is correct we cannot escape the consequence that the thesis itself is "historical" or valid because meaningful, for a specific historical situation only. Historicism is not a cab which one can stop at his convenience: historicism must be applied to itself.<sup>13</sup>

Positivist thought is characterized by a similar contradiction. Positivists claim to eschew value judgments, but they constantly bring these in through the backdoor, as when they use such terms as "the authoritarian personality," for example, or contrast the normal with the "neurotic."<sup>14</sup>

Further, it is not at all obvious that value judgments and descriptions belong to different realms of discourse. To prove such an assertion would require an effort comparable to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and such a critique has yet to be developed.<sup>15</sup> On the contrary, it can be shown that in general one cannot describe social acts—or at least talk significantly about important social acts—without evaluating them.<sup>16</sup> The very decision to define the political involves understanding the purpose of a society and hence admits the necessity of standards of judgment. And, even more narrowly, one cannot develop important propositions dealing with political events without making value judgments:

Scientific concern with political facts . . . requires

<sup>8</sup> WPP, p. 26.

<sup>9a</sup> Strauss differentiates "political philosophy" from both "political theory" and "political thought in general"; see WPP, pp. 11–15.

<sup>9</sup> WPP, p. 20, NRH, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> NRH, p. 4.

<sup>11</sup> WPP, pp. 41, 54, 55.

<sup>12</sup> NRH, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> WPP, pp. 72–3.

<sup>14</sup> WPP, p. 21.

<sup>15</sup> WPP, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> WPP, p. 21.

isolation of the phenomena which it is studying. But if this isolation is not to lead to irrelevant or misleading results, one must see the phenomena in question within the whole to which they belong.<sup>17</sup>

But it is impossible to define the political . . . or the "state," without answering the question of what constitutes this kind of society. Now a society cannot be defined without reference to its purpose. . . . But by defining the state, or rather civil society, with reference to its purpose, one admits a standard in the light of which one must judge political actions and institutions: the purpose of civil society necessarily functions as a standard for judging of civil societies.<sup>18</sup>

Or can one say anything relevant on public opinion polls, for example, without realizing the fact that many answers to the questionnaires are given by unintelligent, uninformed, deceitful, and irrational people, and that not a few questions are formulated by people of the same caliber—can one say anything relevant about public opinion polls without committing one value judgment after another?<sup>19</sup>

. . . if the historian shows, by objectively measuring the action of a statesman against the model of "rational action in the circumstances," that the statesman made one blunder after another, he makes an objective value judgment to the effect that the statesman was singularly inept. In another case the historian arrives by the same procedure at the equally objective value judgment that a general showed unusual resourcefulness, resolution and prudence. It is impossible to understand phenomena of this kind without being

aware of the standard of judgment that is inherent in the situation. . . .<sup>20</sup>

However, pointing out that positivists and historicists contradict themselves, or that description of social acts entails evaluation, is still not sufficient to establish the validity of classical natural right. It is, therefore, necessary to go further, *i.e.*, to demonstrate that classical natural right (or a philosophic position which takes its bearings from classical natural right) both resolves this dilemma and stands up against criticism which may be directed against it.<sup>21</sup> Strauss' major efforts have been directed to this dual task. These efforts will be summarized and evaluated later, but, at this point, certain preliminary comments are in order.

Strauss' analysis of the historicist implications of positivism (as he defines it) is not very convincing.<sup>22</sup> It is not a logical contradiction to accept the view that values are a matter of personal commitment, and at the same time to assert that empirical propositions can, in principle, be verified. In fact, on the face of it, the opposite position seems far more cogent, *i.e.*, it is only when men clearly differentiate between what is and what they feel should or must be that both natural and social science become possible. The failure of Greek science was partially the result of an attempt to tie science to a cosmology which insisted upon the fusion of the descriptive and the normative, and the rise of modern science was closely related to a break with that tradition.<sup>23</sup> Interestingly enough, Strauss does not carry his argument to its logical conclusion. If he had he would be forced to assert that a "mechanical"

<sup>17</sup> *WPP*, p. 24. As Walter Berns puts it: The political, generally speaking, is not visible to any of our senses, or even a combination of them. Racial segregation in the United States is seen by the observer because he can see the injustice of the practice; racial segregation in South Africa is seen by the same observer because of an understanding of justice and injustice that is not confined by a parochial "value system." Through the "eye of the mind" we are able to see the injustice and hence the political. Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Sciences. . . ." *Op. cit.*, p. 550.

The above example is, incidentally, rather surprising given the contention of Strauss and his disciples that the modern world is characterized by moral regression rather than moral progress. After all, it is only very recently in human history that dominant opinion has come to regard slavery itself as morally bad.

<sup>18</sup> *WPP*, p. 22.

<sup>19</sup> *NRH*, p. 53.

<sup>20</sup> *NRH*, p. 54.

<sup>21</sup> *NRH*, pp. 1-8. According to Strauss the dilemma is that: "The more we cultivate reason, the more we cultivate nihilism." (*Ibid.*, p. 6.)

<sup>22</sup> One wonders why, in these passages at least, Strauss identifies modern positivism, and related positions, with both materialism and a "mechanical" conception of natural science, rather than with the critique of the possibilities of knowledge which culminates in Hume. Certainly modern positivists as well as other "moderns" who take their bearings from the same tradition, would not accept his categories. See, for example, Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1953) and Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York, 1960).

<sup>23</sup> See Giorgio de Santillana, *The Origins of Scientific Thought* (New York, 1961), and Charles C. Gillispie, *The Edge of Objectivity* (Princeton, 1960).

conception of science makes science impossible. (It can be argued that the tendency of many social scientists to confuse personal commitments with empirical propositions is a major impediment to the development of the social sciences.)

Nor is the argument that one must understand the "whole" before one can develop empirical propositions any more convincing.<sup>24</sup> Again, the physical sciences have proceeded with considerable success on just the opposite assumption. In fact, it was only when "narrow" empirical studies were substituted for analysis of the "whole" that modern science was born.

It is true, of course, that the objects of investigation and even the very formulation of problems are shaped by personal interests or commitments, but just as the accuracy or meaningfulness of propositions dealing with the nature of cancer is logically independent of the universal desire to discover a cure for the disease, so the accuracy or meaningfulness of propositions dealing with the sources of racial prejudice is logically independent of ethical views on the subject. And, of course, many very significant investigations are motivated simply by the desire to understand or master nature. While the question of whether or not man should master nature may, under certain circumstances, become a moral question, the fact that all or most men desire to do so says nothing about propositions dealing with nature nor even, as Strauss must admit, about the moral rightness of engaging in this task.<sup>25</sup>

The direction of men's interests or commitments indicates only the direction of their interests or commitments, and the sources of this direction are a legitimate subject for investigation, although the uncovering of sources has little or nothing to do with the validity of propositions dealing with these interests or commitments.

<sup>24</sup> By the "whole" I assume Strauss means the "natural order" of the universe and man's place in that order.

<sup>25</sup> Although Strauss and his disciples often imply otherwise, they would certainly admit that one cannot argue from conventional standards to the existence of a natural order. Such an argument would be akin to maintaining, on the other side, that natural right cannot exist because people disagree as to the content of any number of very important moral imperatives.

Strauss' assertion, incidentally, that one cannot understand any society except in terms of its purpose, is merely an assertion. Most societies are characterized by the presence of many conflicting human purposes.

Strauss' argument that social scientists cannot develop significant propositions without evaluating is based on the conflation of terms which should be kept analytically distinct. No one in the empirical tradition would deny that normative judgments or evaluations are a legitimate part of scientific discourse. There is all the difference in the world, however, between talking about "deceitful" individuals and "neurotic" individuals. While both are evaluations the first is quite clearly a moral evaluation which carries with it heavy elements of condemnation. The latter, however, more nearly resembles what Nagel has aptly termed a "characterizing value judgment" and contains little or no moral content in conventional discourse, despite what Strauss has argued. In this sense it is little different from the statement "This is a healthy (or unhealthy) person" which also relates to standards having a descriptive function, and which can easily be reduced to purely descriptive terms.<sup>26</sup>

The case of the prudent general is a little more difficult, for the term "prudence" generally carries with it some element of commendation. However, the term is not generally thought to convey a moral connotation when used functionally. (It is certainly possible to argue that General X, an imprudent general, may be a more moral man than General Y who is quite prudent as a general.) The example closely resembles the statement "X is a good thief." In both instances the phrase involves commendation in terms of an evaluative standard which has very little direct relevance to moral concerns.

Further, both the statement "this is a prudent general" and "this is a deceitful person" imply that the speaker can offer reasons for the judgment, and these reasons are descriptive statements. General X is prudent because he knows how to place his men so as to keep casualties at a minimum, etc. Y is deceitful because he lies continuously, etc. Of course one could respond to a query as to why General X is prudent by offering reasons which themselves contain evaluative terms, but in that case

<sup>26</sup> The difficulty of formulating a definition of "normal" or "healthy" which would enable one to fully differentiate even between very close cases is not, as Strauss would admit, a legitimate argument against regarding the terms as primarily descriptive. For discussions of these issues see Nagel, *op. cit.*, pp. 485-502. See also R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (London, 1952); P. H. Noel-Smith, *Ethics* (Penguin Books Ltd.: Middlesex, 1954), and Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, 1958).

the questioner could still legitimately ask for further explication, and, in the last analysis, such explication would necessarily involve descriptive statements.<sup>27</sup>

Once the description was complete both the original speaker and the questioner might conceivably disagree as to whether the individual being described was indeed a prudent general or a deceitful person, depending on the standards which they accepted, and the discussion then would come to an end. The point is, however, that unless one can describe without at the same time evaluating, rational discussion cannot even begin.

The fact that Strauss and his disciples can point to many instances where social scientists use evaluative standards without clearly specifying this, or even make moral judgments without realizing that they are doing so, proves nothing except that some social scientists are mediocre. And the fact that conventional language sometimes makes it difficult to avoid such confusions proves nothing except that perhaps we require the development of a "meta-language" which eliminates such confusions.

"Characterizing evaluations" will continue to be used in both the social sciences and the sciences because they serve human purposes, *i.e.*, the description and control of the natural and social environment. It can be argued, too (and I think legitimately), that many evaluations which have a generally commendatory or even a moral connotation can be used in analysis, provided that the social scientist is aware of the standards on which they are based. Finally, social scientists will and should continue to explore problems which are related to a moral commitment.<sup>28</sup> But to argue from the fact that human beings develop evaluations which derive from their interests and standards, to the existence of an objective moral basis for such standards is only legitimate if it can be shown that these interests and standards cannot be understood except in terms of some norm which transcends them. But this is just what Strauss is trying to prove.

<sup>27</sup> Most discussions of this kind between individuals of similar cultural background do not proceed this far. However, one could not explain what one means by the expression "good" car to a Martian who only knew the referent of the word car, except by pointing to differences between existing cars.

<sup>28</sup> For a discussion of some of these issues see David Braybrooke, "The Relevance of Norms to Political Description," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (December, 1958), pp. 989-1006.

His critique of the modern position assumes what it must demonstrate.

And, finally, there remains a large core of propositions which are not evaluative in any sense of the term. Strauss' argument is ambiguous on this score, for he uses the words "in general" and "important." But most political scientists would accept the following, among myriads of others, as both value-free and significant propositions, though they might disagree with them: (1) "The Supreme Court has never struck down national legislation designed to curtail the key prerequisites to popular equality and popular sovereignty." (2) "The extent of consensus on the basic norms of democracy is a function of the extent of agreement on choices among policy alternatives."<sup>29</sup> However, given the possibility of disagreement, let us take an example which Strauss offers.

Strauss criticizes Max Weber's discussion of the relationship between Protestantism and Capitalism on two grounds: (1) Weber is forced to make moral judgments in his analysis in spite of himself. (2) Weber's refusal to make moral judgments leads to errors of analysis.<sup>30</sup> Weber is forced to make value judgments, Strauss argues, because he must admit that it was not Calvin's thinking but the thinking of "epigones" (intellectual descendants, generally of an inferior variety) which provided the justification of capitalist virtues. Again, the word epigone (if used simply to describe a person with, say, less capacity for abstraction) can be considered a descriptive evaluation rather than a moral judgment. The key point, however, is this: The logic of Strauss' position requires him to maintain that purely descriptive propositions are not merely wrong but rather that they are meaningless. His statement that Weber was "incorrect," however, implicitly accepts the possibility of developing purely descriptive proposition dealing with significant social action.

Beyond this, Strauss, in a footnote to these passages, gives a more correct interpretation of the developments which Weber was attempting to describe. What Weber failed to consider, Strauss notes, was that:

... in the course of the sixteenth century there was a conscious break with the whole philosophic

<sup>29</sup> The examples are from an article by Robert A. Dahl in which he makes just this point, in reply to a student of Strauss who had criticized his *Preface to Democratic Theory*. Robert A. Dahl, "A Rejoinder," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (December, 1957), p. 1060.

<sup>30</sup> *NRH*, pp. 59-61.

tradition, a break that took place on the plane of purely philosophic or rational or secular thought. This break was originated by Machiavelli, and it led to the moral teachings of Bacon and Hobbes. . . .<sup>31</sup>

While this self-admittedly significant proposition contains a number of evaluations it does not evaluate the break which occurred. In that sense, at least, it is a purely descriptive proposition.

The analysis of Strauss' thinking thus far has been incomplete in that it has concededly approached his critique of modern thought from the standpoint of modern thought. Since it may be argued that such an approach misses the point, it would seem wise to follow Strauss in his restatement of the implications of classical political philosophy and the modern break with that thought. The task is made difficult by the fact that Strauss seems to have shifted his position after completing *Natural Right and History*. I shall describe and evaluate his earlier position before turning to his later one.<sup>32</sup>

It is imperative that his restatement carry more conviction than his critique of modern thought. Having opened the eyes of American political scientists to the "nihilistic" and "Machiavellian" implications of their thought, he would indeed be subject to reproach if he did not draw them back from the abyss to whose edge he had led them.

## II

According to Strauss, classical political philosophers considered the universe a cosmos, that is, a purposively ordered whole.<sup>33</sup> Within this cosmos all things, including man, tend toward their natural place. For the order, while never completely realized, nevertheless tends toward realization. The natural order defines the good, and to understand the natural order one must examine it in terms of the purposes which infuse its parts. Thus heavy objects fall toward the center of the earth (and heavier objects fall more rapidly than lighter objects) because they aim toward their natural resting place. This mode of explanation applies equally to nature and to man. In fact the separation of man and nature, and the attempt to apply different modes of analysis

to each, was inconceivable to classical political philosophy, and is a product of the break with that philosophy. One can see why then, in classical political philosophy, every description was at the same time an evaluation. To describe a thing fully was to describe its natural (i.e., right or good) place in the cosmos.<sup>34</sup>

Thomistic philosophy, Strauss argues, continued the classical tradition. The differences between the two were designed to subordinate philosophy to theology and to make room for revelation and a transcendent personal God. However, while philosophy was subordinated to religion, religion was not divorced from philosophy. The existence of a natural purposive order is fundamental to the proof of God's existence, and, in general, to Thomistic ethics.<sup>35</sup>

The rejection of classical natural right and of classical political philosophy was based on the Hobbesian interpretation of the modern "scientific" outlook. While Machiavelli had "discovered" the new terrain, it was Hobbes who described it systematically. Machiavelli had rejected the classics because their idealism did not permit them to develop an effective social order. To achieve this a political science was necessary which began from an extreme rather than the ideal case.<sup>36</sup> Hobbes was encouraged or led (Strauss is unclear) to the systematic development of Machiavelli's insight, however, because the new science seemed to pave the way for a view of the universe based on scientific materialism and hence both a nominalistic and mechanical view of the world.<sup>37</sup>

Hobbes' analysis involved a fundamental attack upon classical philosophy. If the universe is to be understood mechanically, it lacks a purpose which informs its component parts, and one cannot evaluate the moral rightness of individual and collective purposes in terms of a given natural order. Under such circumstances only human passions and desires can serve as a basis for action and these passions and desires cannot be justified beyond the fact that they are wishes or passions.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *NRH*, pp. 81-164.

<sup>35</sup> *NRH*, pp. 163-4.

<sup>36</sup> *NRH*, pp. 77-181.

<sup>37</sup> According to Strauss, Hobbes recognized that a consistent materialism would lead to self-negating skepticism. Thus he adopted a "methodical" materialism. The natural world remains fundamentally unknowable. However, we can know the concepts we use to master the world, since they are our free creation. Hence science must always retain a hypothetical character. *NRH*, pp. 171-5.

<sup>38</sup> *NRH*, pp. 181-3 *passim*.

<sup>31</sup> *NRH*, p. 61.

<sup>32</sup> The break seems to have come with the publication of "What Is Political Philosophy," in the *Journal of Politics* in August, 1957. The essay is reprinted in an expanded form in the book of the same title.

<sup>33</sup> *NRH*, p. 7.



It is upon these premises that Hobbes sought to develop an axiology compatible with the method of the new science. If the desires of men are equally legitimate and not additive, the only "goods" are those which men call good, and these are, basically, the avoidance of pain and the achievement of pleasure. The only function of reason is to inform the passions, *i.e.*, to guide the passions to the achievement of these goals. The social good, thus, can only be that which all men agree is good (or would agree is good if their view of reality were not distorted by pride or false doctrine). For only that which all men agree is good can serve as a norm through which individual actions may be judged. And, of course, the one desire which all men share in common, and which is the most powerful of all, is the desire to avoid violent death.

Hobbes' efforts to construct a new social science and a new philosophy were too radical for the society of which he was part and his name was "justly decried." However, his thought, in disguised and more respectable garb, provided the basis for the philosophy of John Locke and hence for the development of modern natural right and modern Liberalism.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *NRH*, p. 181 and pp. 202-251. Most English and American political theorists, Strauss notes, fail to see that Locke is essentially a consistent (though more respectable) Hobbesian. Rather they assume that the contradictions which they seem to find in Locke's political philosophy are a sign of confusion and failure to realize the implications of his own thought. However, if one examines Locke carefully one recognizes that he was "cautious" rather than naive or stupid, and one can uncover his Hobbesian premises. Of course, contemporary historians of political philosophy, mistakenly believing that the history of political philosophy represents a progression, are all too inclined to misunderstand philosophers of the past, and to assume that they were victims of their epoch or culture. Thus, they fail to realize that the discovery of simple-minded errors is the beginning of the quest for the real intention of these philosophers. One can only recognize this if one takes the history of political philosophy seriously and becomes aware that Locke and Hobbes were giants. See *WPP*, pp. 221-232. (It is surprising that Strauss should so fully agree with contemporary historians of political philosophy on who the "greats" in the history of political philosophy really were. After all, given the inability of contemporary historians to understand not only classical political philosophy but most political philosophy, we might expect Strauss to come up with some seminal thinkers whom these historians had failed to notice.)

Locke's moral and political conclusions still dominate English and American political thought, even though American political thinkers have long since rejected his premises in favor of either positivism or historicism or both.

Hobbes provides the basis for Liberal democracy for this reason: If the interests of all men are equally legitimate, then the only justifiable basis upon which one man can exercise authority over another is if the latter is convinced that this authority is being exercised in his own interest. In other words, given the natural equality of the passions of all men, only direct or representative government is legitimate.<sup>40</sup> The classics, on the other hand, legitimized the rule of the wise, *i.e.*, of those who understand the cosmos, *i. e.*, the nature of the good.

Liberalism ends in positivism and historicism, according to Strauss, because its fundamental assumptions are untenable in the form in which Hobbes developed them. Rousseau rejected Hobbes because, on the basis of Hobbes' own premises, he was led to conclude that the laws of nature must be rooted directly in the passions of natural man. But since these passions are "sub-human," they cannot provide a norm for human beings. The ultimate results of Rousseau's critique are not only the nihilism of Nietzsche, but also the whole pattern of contemporary historicism and positivism.<sup>41</sup> Thus, Liberalism negates itself. At the same time, however, it serves as the basis of modern social science. Modern economics starts with the individual seeking to "rationally" maximize his non-rational passions, and political science and sociology concern themselves with an investigation of the social and cultural sources of values. For if values are largely a reflection of the direction given to the passions by the environment, the social sciences as disciplines turn quite naturally to understanding this relationship.<sup>42</sup>

And, finally, Liberalism gives rise to modern technology. The classics, if not hostile to technological change, at least regarded it as inimical to an ordered society. However, if the only goal is the satisfaction of individual and collective passions, then the development of

<sup>40</sup> *NRH*, p. 182 and p. 231.

<sup>41</sup> *NRH*, pp. 252-323 and *WPP*, pp. 41-55. I have used *WPP* because *NRH* carries the analysis only through Burke. The essential difference between Strauss' earlier and later work revolves about the relationship between Machiavelli and Hobbes, and does not seem to affect his interpretation of the consequences of their thinking.

<sup>42</sup> See Cropsey, *op. cit.*

technology becomes a supreme good.<sup>43</sup>

How does an examination of classical natural right and the modern break with the classical position enable us to overcome the dilemma into which modern thought has led us? Strauss himself sets the conditions:

We all are in the grip of the same difficulty. Natural right in its classic form is connected with a teleological view of the universe. All natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is good for them. In the case of man, reason is required for discerning these operations: reason determines what is by nature right with ultimate regard to man's natural end. The teleological view of the universe, of which the teleological view of man forms a part, would seem to have been destroyed by modern natural science. From the point of view of Aristotle—and who could dare to claim to be a better judge in this matter than Aristotle?—the issue between the mechanical and the teleological conception of the universe is decided by the manner in which the problem of the heavens, the heavenly bodies, and their motion is solved.<sup>44</sup>

Thus Strauss notes:

The fundamental dilemma, in whose grip we are, is caused by the victory of modern natural science. An adequate solution to the problem of natural right cannot be found before this basic problem has been solved.<sup>45</sup>

We see now why Strauss rejects the typically modern differentiation between evaluations which have a descriptive function and evaluations which have a commendatory function, and between evaluations in general and ethical evaluations. In the classical view *all* descriptions are evaluations and all evaluations are moral evaluations. If the universe is "purposively" ordered, then the normative and the descriptive are fused. It becomes more difficult, however, to understand why Strauss limited his demands to "important social acts." For if he agrees with the classics, not only all social acts but all phenomena can only be described in normative terms. Thus it logically follows from Strauss' analysis, though Strauss appears to miss the implication, that propositions such as  $e$  equals  $mc^2$ , or  $PV$  equals  $nRT$ , are either both descriptive and evaluative or else they are meaningless.

The modern mind undoubtedly finds it difficult to understand such a contention, or what is meant by a purposive universe, unless the universe as a whole is to be regarded as an

organism, or as the work of an intelligence which transcends it. However, evidence tending to support the argument that the universe is a cosmos will certainly win a hearing.<sup>46</sup> And "faith" is not admissible as proof, since Strauss identifies himself with the Aristotelian position (as against the Thomist) which maintains that the structure of the universe can be understood through human reason.<sup>47</sup>

And again, contrary to what Strauss has stated elsewhere, it is his task which is of Kantian dimensions. In fact it is a more difficult task than Kant set for himself. Kant, after all, accepted the picture of the universe offered by Newtonian physics. His effort was directed to providing a basis for both ethics and faith by demonstrating that Newtonian physics presupposes a cosmology which limits its competence, for he recognized that unless this were so, ethical statements would be little more than meaningless.<sup>48</sup>

Strauss rejects this solution, and thus his effort must be directed to proving that classical physics is superior to modern and contemporary physics.<sup>49</sup> But what does such proof involve? It certainly requires much more than indicating, after the fact, that the categories of classical physics are capable of subsuming

<sup>46</sup> We may leave aside some dilemmas which Strauss' position seems to involve, for example: In what sense is a norm which can be violated natural? In what sense can someone be called a "base" or evil person if his acts are the result of error rather than of willfulness? And, of course, why is the natural good? If the natural is good by definition, the statement that something is good because it is natural is a tautology and adds nothing. But, if the statement is not analytic, one can still legitimately ask why "the natural" is necessarily good.

<sup>47</sup> *NRH*, pp. 7-8. See also *NRH*, p. 164.

<sup>48</sup> At least this is the conventional view of Kant's efforts. Since Strauss seems to reject this view it is possible that he conceives of Kant having had another, more esoteric, enterprise.

<sup>49</sup> Modern writers generally use the term "classical physics" to describe the Newtonian world view, and the term "modern physics" to describe developments since quantum and relativity theory. In this essay classical physics refers to Aristotelian physics, Newtonian physics is referred to as modern physics, and post-Newtonian physics is referred to as contemporary physics.

Of course, the restoration of classical natural right would not resurrect creative political philosophy. Since it would be the "truth," all that would be left after this restoration would be the practical application of the "truth."

<sup>43</sup> *NRH*, p. 23 and pp. 244-5.

<sup>44</sup> *NRH*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

the discoveries of modern physics. With the proper juggling this is easily done. Rather it involves demonstrating that classical physics is superior in *creativity* to modern and contemporary physics. The test of a particular proposition lies in its empirical verification, and the choice of one conceptual scheme (or cosmology) over another is determined by the number and range of verifiable propositions to which it gives rise.

Newton's laws and the method associated with them were a landmark not only or even primarily because they enabled us to deal economically with the motion of the planets, but because they opened vistas. The concepts of force, mass acceleration, etc., as well as Newton's laws, served as the basis for the development of all of modern physics, and provided answers to question after question. Further, Newtonian physics, through Boyle's gas law and Avogadro's hypothesis, provided the basis for all of modern chemistry and, increasingly, for new breakthroughs in biology.

But nowhere in Strauss' writings do we find a systematic discussion of the relevance of the categories of classical physics to an understanding of the physical universe. We must then attempt to determine its relevance for ourselves as best we can.

Modern physics certainly developed categories which lead one to the conclusion that the universe is to be understood in terms of "efficient" causes. With this statement Strauss agrees, at least implicitly. But what about developments in contemporary physics? The great revolution in contemporary physics has been the development of quantum mechanics and relativity. But quantum mechanics arose out of, and still uses most of the concepts of, Newtonian physics (which, incidentally, remains applicable in very large areas). A conservative interpretation of the implications of quantum mechanics does not affect the Newtonian world view.<sup>50</sup> A more radical interpretation of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy gives rise to the possibility of elements of randomness on the micro-level.<sup>51</sup> But even if the more radical view were correct it would give no comfort to proponents of classical

natural right. For both the classics and Newtonian physics assumed a totally causal universe. In fact both also assume a continuous universe, and quantum mechanics would seem to destroy this view, for quanta of energy are emitted in discrete stages. Nor does field theory associated with the general theory of relativity and, more practically, as applied to electromagnetic phenomena, offer any encouragement to those who would restore a teleological universe. It is true that field theory is incompatible with a simple-minded mechanical view, but field theory possesses a deterministic structure, and changes in state over time are dealt with mechanically, if one regards "mechanism" as referring to analysis in terms of efficient causes.<sup>52</sup>

In fact, contemporary physics takes another step to complete the destruction of the possibility of a restoration of classical natural right. According to classical physics the fundamental tendency of the universe is toward order. However, the second law of thermodynamics tells us that the fundamental tendency of the universe is toward randomness or disorder. At very most it can only be argued that order and disorder are equally characteristic of the universe and that the pattern may be cyclical.

Nor do any of the other sciences offer much encouragement to the classical view. Chemistry is increasingly being reduced to physics, at least in its more creative aspects. And while it is true that, for some purposes, functional explanation of biology is more useful than mechanical explanation, it can be shown that: (1) Functional explanation is reducible to mechanical explanation.<sup>53</sup> (2) The most dynamic areas in biology today are those in which biological phenomena are being explained in terms of the more fundamental categories of chemistry and physics. It is this approach which has permitted the synthesis of amino acids and even proteins in the laboratory.

But unless Strauss can demonstrate the superiority of classical over modern and contemporary science, his whole case collapses, including his reinterpretation of the history of political thought. For example, the conventional interpreters of Locke are willing to accept the apparent contradictions in his thought as evidence of real confusion, and excuse him because he lived and wrote at a

<sup>50</sup> E. Nagel, "The Causal Character of Modern Physical Theory," in Feigl and Brodbeck (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 419-437. Incidentally, there seems to be little difference, for theoretical purposes, between a universe in which the fundamental categories are particles of matter and one in which matter and energy are interchangeable.

<sup>51</sup> Henry Morganau, *The Nature of Physical Reality: A Philosophy of Modern Physics* (New York, 1960).

<sup>52</sup> Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-288.

<sup>53</sup> E. Nagel, "Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems," in Feigl and Brodbeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-558.

time when progress in the physical and social sciences had not gone far enough to permit the development of insights which they now have. They admit that Locke was a giant, but argue that they are standing on the backs of giants. Strauss' contention that Locke did not contradict himself is based on the assumption that, if anything, the modern period has been marked by retrogression rather than progress. But, again, on Strauss' own conditions, this assumption does not seem to be tenable.<sup>54</sup>

In the foregoing light it is perhaps not surprising that in his later writing Strauss takes still another position, a position which seems to deny the dependence of classical natural right upon a teleological physics. One must still examine man in relation to the "mysterious whole" but, he argues:

... granted that there are no valid moral or political objections to classical political philosophy—is that political philosophy not bound up with an antiquated cosmology? Does not the very question of the nature of man point to the question of the nature of the whole, and therewith to one or the other specific cosmology? Whatever the significance of modern natural science may be, it cannot affect our understanding of what is human in man.<sup>55</sup>

This later position is unlikely to develop much appeal to any but the already convinced. We would want to know why Strauss rejected his earlier views, what evidence he can offer for this new view, and, finally, in what ways this new view differs from other "modern" views which separate man from the rest of nature. Without such an analysis, the implications of a purposeless universe still seem to involve moral skepticism.<sup>55a</sup>

<sup>54</sup> See footnote 39 above. Strauss' reinterpretation of political philosophy has another interesting implication. He asserts that while modern social scientists are pigmies compared to Locke, so Locke was a pigmy compared to Thomas or Aristotle. This we may indeed accept, but Strauss' position further entails the proposition that Locke and Hobbes were pigmies compared to Strauss and his disciples.

<sup>55</sup> *WPP*, p. 38.

<sup>55a</sup> In his epilogue to the *Storing* volume, *op. cit.*, which, unfortunately, came to my attention only after this essay had been written, Strauss seems to change front on a number of points. On the issue which concerns us here he cites Aristotle to prove that "the practical sciences do not depend on the theoretical sciences or are not derivative from them." (309). This is true because: "The principles of action (of the practical sciences) are the natural ends of man of which he has by nature some awareness." (*Ibid.*) The argu-

And, when we search (in either his earlier or his later writings) for a discussion of what Strauss considers the limits of the implications of modern science, all we find are a few brief and rather cryptic remarks. These seem to reveal an inadequate view of contemporary developments.

According to Strauss, "positivists" (a label which he never really defines with any precision) accept and are proud of the fact that they are concerned only with the "how?" rather than the "why?" of things.<sup>56</sup> Thus the universe remains unintelligible, for the admissibility of any proposition depends upon its contribution to our dominating the universe rather than to our understanding of it. The fruit of modern science is technology rather than wisdom.<sup>57</sup>

Again, the "modern" approach to science "implies a depreciation" of common sense or "pre-scientific" knowledge:

... positivism preserves in a scarcely disguised manner Descartes' universal doubt of pre-scientific knowledge. . . . This superstition fosters all sorts of sterile investigations or complicated idiocies. Things which every ten-year-old child of normal intelligence knows are regarded as being in need of scientific proof. . . .<sup>58</sup>

Finally, Strauss argues, those who accept the model of modern science attempt to understand man entirely in terms of the "sub-human" (in terms of his desires and passions). In these terms man is unknowable.<sup>59</sup>

Surely this is a caricature. While some "positivists" may hold some of the above positions, Strauss here has set up a straw man. First, whatever the philosophic origins of modern science, and whatever value one may set upon technology, contemporary philosophers of science do not make technological success the test of propositions. In fact the only requirements are certain criteria of verification, the most important of which demand that all propositions be stated in such form as to be capable of being validated by empirical procedures, and that propositions which form part of a system not contradict each other.<sup>60</sup>

ment is not very convincing, nor, for that matter, very clear.

<sup>56</sup> *WPP*, p. 18.

<sup>57</sup> *NRH*, p. 177 and pp. 285-6.

<sup>58</sup> *WPP*, p. 23.

<sup>59</sup> *NRH*, p. 8 and *WPP*, p. 38. Strauss' assertion that the passions and desires of men are "sub-human" is only an assertion.

<sup>60</sup> For a discussion of these rules of procedure see Felix Kaufman, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1944), pp. 33-66.

Second, those in the empirical tradition would deny that explanation in terms of efficient causes leads to an unintelligible universe. They would assert the opposite, *i.e.*, that modern science has led to an increasingly intelligible universe. Third, empiricists would regard as empty the distinction between the "how" and the "why" which Strauss seems to be making. Modern and contemporary science are certainly attempting to answer the why, and the answer is given either in terms of an "efficient cause" or in terms of a higher level of generality. Nor would they accept the argument that the classics had discovered the correct answer to any particular "why" which is unanswerable within a modern framework.

Fourth, modern science does not cultivate a spirit of universal doubt, nor does it "depreciate" common sense. Rather it builds on common sense, questioning "pre-scientific" knowledge only when it seems unsatisfactory. All that modern empiricists do assert is that no particular set of ideas is sacrosanct, and that some apparently obvious matters turn out, upon further investigation, not to be so, or to need refinement and qualification.

Finally, modern science does not necessarily imply that human behavior must be fully reduced to the desires or passions, whatever some scientists or social scientists may believe. In fact Weber, whom Strauss takes as epitomizing modern social science, deals seriously with human ideas as analytically independent variables, not entirely reducible to psychological or social and economic categories.

Whether or not the modern position is tenable, one cannot refute it by setting up straw men. Nor are a series of brief remarks a substitute for a detailed analysis of the issues involved.<sup>61</sup>

Associated with Strauss' revised position is a somewhat different interpretation of the development of modern political thought and the break with classical natural right. The rejection of classical natural right now seems to

stem almost entirely from Machiavelli's conviction that the classics, in developing an ideal model, reduced the possibility of achieving more limited goals. Thus Machiavelli, and following him Hobbes, *et. al.*, chose rather the extreme case in order that more limited goals might be attained. Under this interpretation Machiavelli becomes the central character and the development of modern physics plays little or no role. In fact, Strauss now argues that the idea of the controlled experiment (*i.e.*, "torturing nature," whatever that may mean) rose from shifts in political philosophy rather than *vice versa*.<sup>62</sup>

It now seems that Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc., rejected the classics because of the idealism of the classics. However, Strauss finds it very easy to prove (what no one denies) that the classics are practical, *i.e.*, that the development of an ideal model does not preclude satisfaction with lesser goals.<sup>63</sup> Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc. were indeed either stupid or naïve. But, if they were so, it seems equally plausible to believe that they were guilty of simple-minded self-contradictions, or that they were unable to recognize the full consequences of their own premises.

It would seem, then, that Strauss has not provided a solution to the dilemma in which we find ourselves and that the restoration of natural right remains only a "wish." But wishes are *not* horses and beggars do *not* ride.

### III

If I am right in thinking that Strauss' efforts have not been successful, the question remains, what is the source of his appeal? In part, I suggest, the readiness with which some political scientists accept Strauss' arguments reveals a regrettable illiteracy as to the nature and sources of modern and contemporary science. However this alone does not explain the attractiveness of his analysis. To understand this we must turn once again to his writings.

Strauss has made a fetish of the esoteric content of the writings of political philosophers. If a philosopher, he argues, notes that prudence may require esoteric writing, and speaks even once of the need for apparent contradiction, we must assume that the contradictions and obscurity we find in his writing are purposive rather than that he is naïve. Whether this argument is correct or not for most philosophers, we have some warrant to wonder whether it might be true for Strauss himself,

<sup>61</sup> For a general discussion of these issues which elaborates most of the points made above in answer to arguments developed by Maritain, Gilson, Wheelwright and other Catholic or "classical" thinkers, see Ernest Nagel, *Sovereign Reason* (New York, 1954), pp. 1-35. I have not developed the above points in detail, because it is almost impossible to determine where Strauss really stands. I am aware of Catholic and other conventional views of the classics, but, since Strauss' views are, he argues, unconventional, a criticism of conventional views might be wide of the mark.

<sup>62</sup> See *TM* and *WPP*, especially pp. 40-55 of the latter.

<sup>63</sup> *WPP*, pp. 27-40 and 78-94.

since concern with esoteric writing permeates the whole corpus of his work.<sup>64</sup>

Strauss argues that the classics, while not considering democracy an "ideal," are less hostile to democratic forms than one might suppose. He notes that, according to Plato, since the principle of democracy is freedom it permits all human types to develop freely, and hence in particular the best human type. After all, Socrates was permitted to live in democratic Athens for 70 years.<sup>65</sup> Here Strauss is evidently referring, in part, to the eighth book of the *Republic*, where Socrates compares democracy to a "garment of many colours."<sup>66</sup> But, reading this metaphor in context, it is quite clear that it is meant to be pejorative, and to help explain both why the worst types come to the surface in a democratic polity and why democracy is so readily transformed into tyranny. Further, while in the sixth book of the *Republic* Plato argues that no existing constitution is compatible with philosophy, he draws his examples entirely from democratic cities.<sup>67</sup> The implication would seem to be that democracy is the worst offender.

Further, Strauss makes much of the fact that, as he puts it, America is the only country which was founded on the basis of an anti-Machiavellian tradition, and he is fond (it often seems over-fond) of citing Jefferson or even Tom Paine to bolster particular philosophic points.<sup>68</sup> But the whole thrust of Strauss' analysis is that the American tradition stems from Hobbes and Locke.<sup>69</sup> In other words, the American tradition is Machiavellian.

How can we explain these seeming contradictions? One is strongly tempted to believe that Strauss is following the advice given by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*; that is, he is attempting to convince his audience that his basic premises do not differ from theirs. We are drawn to the further conclusion that this "prudence" is accompanied by the rejection of the values underlying the American experience, and is designed to prepare the way for that unlikely conjunction of philosophy and power which will place in power the philoso-

pher king and the guardians, i.e., Strauss and his disciples.

This analysis is not meant to be taken more than half-seriously, but it does open the way to an understanding of the peculiar attraction which classical natural right seems to hold for some of the current generation of intellectuals. The attraction of Marxism in the pre-war period stemmed from what appeared to be the failures of "liberal clichés" and the prospect that Marxism offered a comprehensive and (as vulgarly interpreted) simple key to the universe. The attraction of classical natural right stems, one suspects, from the continued rejection (for the opposite reasons) of "liberal clichés," the obvious failure of Marxism, and the prospect that it provides a different kind of comprehensive and simple key to the universe. In essence the attraction suggests a loss of nerve in the face of contemporary chaos, for this is when simple keys become the most attractive.

Unfortunately this particular key is even less relevant than the Marxist to understanding our world and its dilemmas. It is little wonder that while students of Strauss have found it so easy to criticize that naive combination of "Jacobinism" and positivism so characteristic of an earlier generation of political scientists (a task accomplished at least as effectively by events as well as by many "non-Straussian" political scientists), they have contributed little or nothing to the empirical work so necessary for understanding contemporary society. This is no accident, for they lack the conceptual tools adequate to this latter task. One cannot understand real men in a real environment with simple keys.

It is understandable that many intellectuals should feel that modernity has led to a blind alley. It does seem as if, having mastered the basic forces of the universe, we may use them to destroy ourselves. Further, it does seem that, having been able to bend nature to our purposes, we can find no rational basis for guiding these purposes. But, assuming all of this to be true, the problems will not be solved by wishing.

And even if the problems are insoluble, even if the world is really absurd, the great adventure which led us to our present predicament may still seem to have been worthwhile. Despite his concern with identifying the "true nature of man," Strauss' definition of the human, his longing for the "closed society" of Plato's ideal, is rather less than human. To me at least the essence of man (if we may speak of an essence) lies not in omphaloskepsis, but in his efforts to bend the universe to his will.

I stand with Prometheus against the gods.

<sup>64</sup> *WPP*, pp. 221-233.

<sup>65</sup> *WPP*, p. 36.

<sup>66</sup> *Republic*, VIII, 557.

<sup>67</sup> *Republic*, VI, 448-497.

<sup>68</sup> For example, *NRH*, p. 1; *TM*, p. 13, and *WPP*, pp. 85-6. See also Harry V. Jaffa, *Crisis of the House Divided* (New York, 1959), p. 409.

<sup>69</sup> For Strauss, see *NRH*, pp. 181-2, 245, and *WPP*, pp. 47 and 49. See also Jaffa, *op. cit.*, pp. 75 and 314, and W. Berns, *Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment* (Baton Rouge, 1957), p. 45.

## A REPLY TO ROTHMAN

JOSEPH CROPSY

*The University of Chicago*

Readers of Stanley Rothman's article "The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A Critique" will be aware that the title he has chosen does not indicate the full scope of his endeavor. He has in fact attempted to state and criticize the grounds of classical political and natural philosophy, and to state and in a certain measure defend the grounds of modern social and natural science. Exceptional resources of scholarship and analytic power would be needed to dispose of those tremendous themes, which I believe Rothman has not succeeded in doing. A prominent purpose of Rothman's paper is to criticize the work of Professor Leo Strauss and of some of his students, on the view that he, and after his instruction they, are the animators of the attempted revival of classical doctrines concerning natural right. The attempt to revive natural right is presented as complementary with a belief in the weakness of social science as now understood by the majority of academic and other professionals. The purpose of the present reflections on Rothman's article is to see how far he has made a valid criticism of the classics and of the men he regards as their attempted restorers; and to consider the soundness of his views on the received sciences.

Rothman's essay consists of five main parts, organized about the distinction between Mr. Strauss's writing on contemporary social science and his writing on classical and early modern political philosophy. In the former division are two main parts: a summary (pages 341-343) of Mr. Strauss's position on the question of contemporary social science; and a counter-statement (pages 343-346) in defense of social science, maintaining its consistency and validity on what is best known as the question of facts and values, including the "values" of the social scientists. In the latter division there is again an attempt to summarize (pp. 346-348) a long development of Mr. Strauss's, in this case on classical political philosophy and the early modern position that comprised the rebellion against antiquity. Then there is a counter-statement (pp. 348-351) arguing the superiority of modern over ancient natural science, and inferring therefrom the superiority of modern social science over the ancient. There is also an argument that Mr. Strauss at one time asserted and at a later time denied that classical political philosophy depended on classical natural philosophy. Finally there is a conclusion of a miscellaneous character.

The thesis of Rothman's paper could be said to be this: on the premise of modern scientific method it can be shown that there can and must be clear a distinction between "description" and "evaluation" in both social and natural science; and the denial or ignorance of this proposition is at the core both of classical philosophy and of the attempt to revive natural right on the foundation of a discredited teleologism. Unless this misrepresents Rothman's position, it follows that if natural right does not suppose, nor teleology imply, that description and evaluation are "fused" in Rothman's sense of the term, then this criticism of natural right would prove invalid and Rothman's thesis would have to be rejected. And if Mr. Strauss does not argue, and if it should not be true irrespective of Mr. Strauss's argument, that natural science determines political science, then not only would Rothman's statement of Mr. Strauss's self-contradiction prove incorrect but the basis of Rothman's argument in general would be falsified: for his paper as a whole stands or falls on the validity of adopting the premises and method of modern natural science for vindicating modern social science and for rejecting classical political philosophy as well as natural philosophy. Also rejected would be the vindication of modern natural science by the premises of modern natural science.

In taking up Rothman's argument, I will not discuss thematically his two summaries of Mr. Strauss's statements (in what I have described as the first and third divisions of his article). Rothman, in his second footnote, names *Natural Right and History*, *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, and *What Is Political Philosophy?* as the main sources of Mr. Strauss's views, adding "An Epilogue" from *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics*, ed. H. J. Storing (incorrectly cited) in footnote 4. Rothman's references to *What Is Political Philosophy?* are heavily concentrated in the first 27 pages, but extend to page 94 of that volume. His references to *Natural Right and History* are extensive but not always precise (e.g., "pp. 88-164," "pp. 77-181"). *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, a difficult book of about 300 pages, is referred to twice, once in footnote 62 ("See TM") and again in footnote 68 ("TM, p. 13"). There is no evidence that Rothman's argument is affected by *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, although his claim that there has been a shift in Mr. Strauss's position would have to rest upon a close reading of that book. How thoroughly Rothman has studied his opponent



is by no means an unimportant matter; but as far as possible I wish to leave that question open to the judgment of readers, believing that those who take the trouble to compare the original with the restatement will be struck by the disproportion between the solidity of the one and the looseness, if not unintelligible abbreviation of the other. Because Rothman's purpose is complex—not merely the criticism of natural right proper but the criticism of it in its revived form, under the influence of a scholar who has, as the ancients did not have, experience of modern circumstances—it will not be possible entirely to ignore the question of the accuracy of Rothman's representation of classical thought *as revived*.

Let us turn to Rothman's attack on natural right in the form of a defense of social science. Broadly, Rothman must refute this doctrine: that positivism and historicism are vitiated, positivism by its untenable position on values, and both historicism and positivism by the application of each to itself. The part of the question that pertains to historicism is not examined by Rothman. He does assert that "Strauss' analysis of the historicist implications of positivism (as he defines it) is not very convincing." (p. 6) This remark is supported by a footnote which does not mention the issue, but which contains, among other things, the reference: "See, for example, Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*. . . ." The Feigl and Brodbeck volume consists of 52 essays and almost 800 pages, and there is no direct manner of knowing in what way Rothman considers it to bear on the question. Let us, with Rothman, drop the problem of natural right and history and take up the question of whether positivistic social science is self-contradictory.

The position that Rothman contests may be taken to begin with this sentence on page 21 of *What Is Political Philosophy?*: "It is impossible to study social phenomena, *i.e.*, *all important social phenomena*, without making value judgments." (My italics) The argument of Mr. Strauss proceeds generally in this way: Social science which attempts to assimilate itself to natural science denies that there can be judgments of goodness or excellence, *i.e.*, of "value," exceeding bare preferences in cognitive standing. To the extent to which positivistic social science makes or implies such judgments, it contradicts its precept by its practice. It must contradict itself thus if it wishes to consider important questions; but it can avoid contradicting itself thus if it confines itself, for example, to purely technical questions *qua* technical, or to subordinate tasks of mere

enumeration, correlation, and so on. The untenability or the inutility of positivistic social science proceeds from its premise that judgments of value are not as intelligible or rational as are judgments of fact. Positivistic social science grants that men's preferences or values are themselves facts deducible from men's behavior, and may as such be described, enumerated, and so on; but it insists that there is no way of verifying, *i.e.*, establishing the truth of, a value judgment: only the existence but not the truth of value judgments is matter of fact.

Nothing in this characterization of positivistic social science can be taken as implying that there are no judgments as to fact which are not also judgments as to value. The point is rather that judgments as to value are not to be excluded from the class of judgments as to fact, and that such judgments as to value cannot be excised from social science without sterilizing it in more senses than the one intended. I am not now trying to argue the truth of this doctrine but only to establish what the position at issue is. The first part of the position can be stated thus, with bare brevity: values are factual, but not all facts are values (*e.g.*, "the cube root of 64 is less than half of 10" contains no element of discretion or judgment in the proper sense).<sup>1</sup>

Rothman, however, makes it clear that he takes the natural right position to imply the "fusion" of facts and values. On page 491 of *The Structure of Science*,<sup>2</sup> Ernest Nagel, discussing a passage by Mr. Strauss, denies that "fact and value are fused beyond the possibility of distinguishing them." Rothman has evidently taken up the understanding of natural right implicit in that denial, and made it fundamental to his own view. In the part of his article dealing thematically with social science, he builds up to the assertion (p. 345) that "one *can* describe without at the same time evaluating." (My italics) In the subsequent part of his article which could be said to have natural science as the theme, he asserts that "In the classical view *all* descriptions are evaluations and all evaluations are moral evaluations." (p. 348)

No evidence brought by Rothman supports the view that, according to Mr. Strauss or to anyone, all description is evaluation and all evaluation is moral evaluation. The *Statistical Abstract of the United States* could be regarded

<sup>1</sup> The reader should consult Walter Berns' Communication in this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (September, 1958), entitled "On Robert Dahl's 'Important Questions.'"

<sup>2</sup> See Rothman's footnote 26.



as a kind of description of this country, without moral judgements of any sort being expressed in its pages. No one could deny the importance of some or many of the undoubted facts contained in it. Also, buildings may be approved for their durability, horses for their swiftness, women for their beauty and men for their intelligence without any trace of moral evaluation entering. There is assuredly a difference between a broken-winded nag of great age and a vigorous plow horse in the prime of life, and as a difference which is essential to the nature of the horse it could be said to rest upon a norm of "natural right;" but what does that difference have to do with morality? Why should a man be said to make a moral evaluation when he judges a hound to have a good nose? Rothman's misrepresentation of the view he attempts to criticize must emanate from a failure to reflect on the difference between "right" and "moral."

The classical doctrine is that each thing is excellent in the degree to which it can do the things for which its species is naturally equipped. Later on, in footnote 46, Rothman will ask, why is the natural good? The answer is that there is neither a way nor a reason to prevent ourselves from distinguishing between useless and serviceable beasts, for example, and that the most empirical and also obvious, as well as rational standard of the serviceable, or the limit of the thing's activity, is set by its nature. We do not judge elephants to be good because they are natural; or because nature is morally good—whatever that would mean. We judge a particular elephant to be good by the light of what elephant nature makes it possible for elephants to do and to be. As long as we continue to base our judgments of beings on their natures, we will be preserved, for example, from expecting all men to become philosophers at the same time that we are preserved from being unable to distinguish good citizens from parasites and criminals. The common notion of natural right is that it is not empirical. Rothman distinguishes the men of the empirical tradition from those he criticizes. Like all understanding, that provided by the light of nature is of course not simply empirical. But it should be clear that greater scope can hardly be given to observation than to allow it to be the basis for our recognition of the species of things and their faculties. Whether teleology or some other principle lies behind the phenomena is a question that can be deferred for a while. For the present it suffices that Rothman's main argument in his rejoinder to the natural right argument against positivistic social science is made against a point that his opponent does not make.

A further argument thought by Rothman to be necessary for his case against natural right and for social science is this: it is not legitimate to object against social science that "the objects of investigation and even the very formulation of the problems are shaped by personal interests or commitments. . . ." (p. 344) I do not know (but will in a moment attempt to guess) what point of classical doctrine Rothman is attempting to refute with this argument, but its bearing can be determined in a general way. In his footnote 26, he draws attention to pages 485-502 of Ernest Nagel's *The Structure of Science*. Those pages comprise a section of a chapter on Methodological Problems of the Social Sciences. The section in question is entitled "The Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry." In it, Professor Nagel takes up, under four headings, "the alleged role of value judgments," i.e., of the social scientists' value judgments, in influencing the work of the social scientists. His first heading is, the alleged role of value judgments in the selection of problems. The position he brings under critical review is this: the possible field of interest of social scientists is determined by their culture and values, and therefore a strictly objective or scientific social science is impossible. We may note that he rejects the conclusion, arguing that investigation of value-indicated objects can still be perfectly scientific. Of interest to us is the fact that the writer who advanced the view that Nagel rejects is Max Weber. The situation is as follows. Weber is a powerful advocate of value-free social science, and is defended as such by Rothman against the criticisms of Mr. Strauss (pp. 345-346). But Weber believes that the possibility of value-free social science is unavoidably limited by the value-directedness of the social scientists' choice of subjects. Mr. Strauss denies both the possibility and the desirability of value-free social science and would certainly deny that an intelligent man's investigations are determined by his cultural values. Rothman here takes up Nagel's rebuttal against Weber, but mistakes the arguments against Weber for arguments against Mr. Strauss. This is especially damaging to Rothman for the reason that there is perhaps one point on which Mr. Strauss's position is more congenial to the claim of social science than is Max Weber's: Weber affirms and Mr. Strauss denies that the scientist is in principle culture-bound in the choice of topics. It is precisely on this point that Rothman imagines the refutation of Weber to be a refutation of Mr. Strauss; and, as it happens, he presents it as a refutation of an argument which Mr. Strauss did not make (namely, that there are no im-

portant value-free facts) and to which the supposed refutation would in any case be unrelated, as is evident. The obscurity of Rothman's position is increased by the fact that the position of Weber, to which he takes unwitting exception, is Rothman's own position expressed in other words. Rothman argues the impossibility of reducing interest and commitment to anything else: they simply are what they are. Weber, as Mr. Strauss remarks on page 46 of *Natural Right and History*, admits this and even gives it a respectability which Rothman does not try to do: "Excellence now means devotion to a cause, be it good or evil, and baseness means indifference to all causes."

If we try to reconstruct Rothman's reason for including his passage on "commitments," (p. 344) we may conjecture (he does not say it) that this is his argument against Mr. Strauss's view that positivistic social science is self-depreciatory to the point of being self-contradictory. In other words, value-free social science denies the objectivity or truth of the value-judgment that pronounces science itself to be more worthy than other pursuits. The highest wisdom about value judgments includes the judgment that there is no objective superiority in the pursuit of that highest wisdom, without which men would err concerning judgment itself. If Rothman's passage on page 344 is intended to be the rejoinder to this part of the natural right position, then it must be said that the rejoinder is a confirmation of the view it seeks to refute: he tells us that men's interests and commitments simply are what they are. That is to say, he admits precisely what he would have to refute in order to meet the argument against which he is contending. If Rothman's passage is not intended as I have supposed it, then it must be regarded as not to the point. The reader's attention should be drawn in passing to Rothman's use of "interests" in conjunction with "commitments." "Interests" is an ambiguous word; and it becomes clear later in his article that Rothman must be held to mean that investigators are directed not only by their interests in the sense of "what excites curiosity" but also by their interests as the word appears in the phrase "interested or selfish motives." The purification of science is inseparable from the incrimination of the scientists. It is an open question whether social scientists, of whatever opinion, will find this doctrine more contradictory than derogatory or *vice versa*. In any case, it is not an effective refutation of the charge that positivistic social science infects its own being with a fundamental weakness.

Rothman proceeds with a reference to Mr.

Strauss's position on Weber's thesis concerning the rise of capitalism. If what has been said above is correct, Rothman's remarks are not to the point, for he is still arguing that, according to the natural right position, "purely descriptive propositions are not merely wrong but rather . . . they are meaningless." (p. 345) In any case, the reader might wish to know that a fuller statement on the Weber thesis can be found in *Church History*, March, 1961: "The Weber Thesis Reexamined (W. S. Hudson) with Comment by Leo Strauss," against which Rothman's remarks can be checked.

Rothman prepares to bring this section of his article to a close by asserting "that Strauss seems to have shifted his position after completing *Natural Right and History*." This is one of the points we shall have to consider, as we turn to the part of his paper that Rothman describes as dealing with Mr. Strauss's "restatement of the implications of classical thought and the modern break with that thought," (p. 346), but which in effect contains Rothman's treatment of the problem of natural science.

The primary subject in part II of Rothman's paper is natural science and its relation to social science. The argument falls into divisions which are determined by the fact that Rothman is contending partly against classical philosophy and partly against the revival of classical philosophy. The difference between the two is produced by the intervention of modern natural science. Rothman's method is to adopt as his premise the decisive supersession of ancient physics by modern physics and then to argue (1) that both ancient and revived natural right, which depend upon the teleological view of nature, are invalid as ancient physics is because ancient physics depends upon the teleological view of nature; and (2) that Mr. Strauss in his earlier writings conceded the victory of modern natural science and with it, in effect, the victory of modern social science; but in his later writings denies that the victory of the former implies the victory of the latter. I shall try to show that there is no merit in the argument that natural right falls with ancient physics because both are teleological; and that Mr. Strauss did not assert what Rothman alleges him to have asserted, and therefore that the change of view which Rothman speaks of never occurred. The majority of Rothman's detailed points I shall have to leave to each reader's scrutiny, with the suggestion that they be tested by the rule, are they comprehensible if read very literally?

The point numbered (1) above would be valid if it were true not only that modern natural science has simply superseded ancient

natural science, but also that in the decisive respect, *i.e.*, on the ground of that supersession, natural right was simultaneously overthrown. What is the ground on which that supersession is thought, or is specifically thought by Rothman, to rest? It is that modern natural science is, whereas classical natural science is not, guided or dominated by the verification principle.<sup>3</sup> What is the verification principle? Rothman gives one form of it: "that all propositions be stated in such form as to be capable of being validated by empirical procedures, and that propositions which form part of a system not contradict each other." (p. 360) As to the latter condition, it is clear that the need to avoid self-contradiction is as much an element of ancient as of modern method, and consciously so.

The novelty of the ground of modern science is the condition, apparently, that propositions must be capable of empirical verification in order to be regarded as meaningful. As is well known, the acceptance of the empirical test for verification rests upon this belief: that the evidence of the senses is the most fundamental or most genuine evidence accessible to man; and that in turn is true because what is, is sensible and what is sensible, is. I do not wish to emphasize what is common knowledge, namely, that there is no empirical basis for the metaphysical doctrine that to be is to be sensible. I mean only to point out that this metaphysical principle does not overthrow (for it does not meet) the metaphysical principle "to be is to be intelligible"; it merely draws men's minds in a different direction. Ruling out certain questions as meaningless because not empirically verifiable, does no more than any abstention from an inquiry can do: it leaves the question open, in the minds of those who do not mistake the negative of a blank for a negation by refutation. It might be true that the order of nature, and the necessary culmination of that order in some principle that originates motion without itself being in motion, cannot be made a matter of empirical demonstration (if that expression is not a self-contradiction). But it might also be true, for anything the verification principle can adduce to the contrary, that an infinite regress of sources of motion in the universe is a contradiction of the profoundest sort; and that, therefore, to insist upon empirical verification and consistency of the system is meaningless. I am far from wishing to maintain that ancient physics is superior to modern physics. I wish only to suggest that the case against teleology is not made out by Rothman.

What of the collapse of natural right because

of its association with teleological physics? In order to consider this question, I will merge the remainder of point (1) with point (2) as they were numbered above. How closely are physics and moral philosophy linked? Rothman believes that they are inseparable. He writes, "... unless Strauss can demonstrate the superiority of classical over modern and contemporary science, his whole case collapses. ..." (p. 349) Why should this be so? Rothman does not say, but he gives the impression that if the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (not both the velocity and the position of the small quanta are determinate) and the second law of thermodynamics (on the irreversibility of energy transfers in the universe as a whole) are somehow true, then there are consequences for the possibility that man's end is related to his nature. But Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has precisely as much to do with the goodness of man's rational activity, for example, as the law of gravity has to do with the question, ought you to knock down an old lady in order to get a seat on the subway—neither more nor less. The principles of physics are relevant to the problems of human life to the extent that human life can be reduced to the motion of matter. This is true according to the self-understanding of modern science, at any rate, which, so far as it adopts the verification principle, adopts simple empiricism and with it materialism. On this score, Rothman's argument consists exclusively of his unsupported assertions.

But he claims that on this issue of the relation between natural science and natural right, it is Mr. Strauss who is inconsistent, having changed his views fundamentally. Rothman, summarizing Mr. Strauss's position, says, "... the separation of man and nature, and the attempt to apply different modes of analysis to each, was inconceivable to classical political philosophy, and is a product of the break with that philosophy." (p. 346) We leave altogether out of the account Spinoza's famous remark against the writers (by which he meant the traditional writers) who "conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom."<sup>4</sup> Let us turn to the presentation of the case in *Natural Right and History*, accepting it as at the same time a statement of the classical and revived natural right position:

Socrates was forced to raise the question as to what the human things as such are, or what the *ratio rerum humanarum* is. But it is impossible to grasp the distinctive character of human things as such without grasping the essential difference between

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 348, 349, 350 for example.

<sup>4</sup> *Ethics*, III, introduction.

human things and the things which are not human, *i.e.*, the divine or natural things. . . .

Contrary to appearances, Socrates' turn to the study of human things was based, not upon disregard of the divine or natural things, but upon a new approach to the understanding of all things. That approach was indeed of such a character that it permitted, and favored, the study of human things as such, *i.e.*, of the human things in so far as they are not reducible to the divine or natural things. Socrates deviated from his predecessors by identifying the science of the whole, or of everything that is, with the understanding of "what each of the beings is." For "to be" means "to be something" and hence to be different from things which are "something else"; "to be" means therefore "to be a part." Hence the whole cannot "be" in the same sense in which everything that is "something" "is"; the whole must be "beyond being."<sup>5</sup>

It simply is not true that the classics compromised their teaching concerning human things with a teaching concerning the non-human things—saying nothing further about the possible merit of that latter teaching. What then is the basis of Rothman's allegation that Mr. Strauss has shifted his position in an impossible way? It is this: early in *Natural Right and History* (pp. 7-8), Mr. Strauss refers to a "dilemma" that confronts modern men as a result of the great successes (*i.e.*, technological successes) of non-teleological science. Men believe either that they must accept non-teleological moral doctrine because of the success of non-teleological physical science; or that they can escape by arguing that the human things are intelligible teleologically and the non-human things non-teleologically. The former are positivists (and would include Rothman), the latter are Thomists and others who have broken with Aristotle, *i.e.*, with the classical tradition of natural right. Since it is perfectly obvious that Mr. Strauss is not in the course of associating himself with either party, it is equally clear that he means literally what he says toward the end of the Introduction to *Natural Right and History*: the book "will have to be limited to that aspect of the problem of natural right which can be clarified within the confines of the social sciences." Rothman's misinterpretation consists in this: he believed Mr. Strauss, or the natural right position (in fact both) to be themselves confined to the two horns of the dilemma. He did not realize that what follows, both in *Natural Right and History* and in the later works, is a statement that refuses the dilemma because what follows does

not concede that the issue between ancient and modern natural science is simply disposed of by arguing from the premises of modern natural science. Rothman's argument thus does not bear weight.

I deeply deplore the need to notice the concluding section of Rothman's paper. In it he continues in the tone he sets very early when he refers to Mr. Strauss's students as "disciples," a term of gratuitous offense that insinuates a combination of self-satisfied sectarianism and hypnotic influence. In the conclusion he permits himself to speculate on the basis of that influence, and easily satisfies himself that it is founded upon a susceptibility to "simple keys," and a lust for power. He does himself little credit by describing as simple the oldest and deepest philosophic tradition known to man, one which he shows no sign of having grasped. And as for the desire to seize power, what more does that half-serious allegation rest upon than a mixture of levity and the near-malevolence of hostile brooding upon motives? That same conjunction of levity and ill-temper could as well impute to Rothman an appetite to be known as climbing Jack in search of giants to slay; but the man who would write so of him would deserve the censure of scholars, for the charge would be mere speculation, and irrelevant to every genuine issue.

Rothman writes that Mr. Strauss "has made a fetish of the esoteric content of the writings of political philosophers." Mr. Strauss has not made a fetish of anything. He has done no more than to act on the principle that, when one reads the writings of great men, one should as long as possible abstain from concluding that what appears obscure or contradictory, *i.e.*, unintelligible, is really so. Any other approach to the great literature is sheerly presumptuous. Rothman does not refer to *Persecution and the Art of Writing*. Readers might be interested in consulting that statement of the issue by Mr. Strauss, in order to ascertain whether there are any traces of fetishism in it.

Rothman makes a particularly offensive and unjust insinuation when he depreciates the sincerity of the adherence of Mr. Strauss and his students to the principles of democracy and of the United States. The quality of Rothman's method of scholarship, and the wholesomeness of his intention can best be exposed by quoting the passage from *What Is Political Philosophy?* that he alludes to as he distorts it (see his footnote 65):

To speak first of the classics' attitude towards democracy, the premises: "the classics are good," and "democracy is good" do not validate the con-

<sup>5</sup> P. 122.

clusion "hence the classics were good democrats." It would be silly to deny that the classics rejected democracy as an inferior kind of regime. They were not blind to its advantages. The severest indictment of democracy that ever was written occurs in the eighth book of Plato's *Republic*. But even there, and precisely there, Plato makes it clear—by coordinating his arrangement of regimes with Hesiod's arrangement of the ages of the world—that democracy is, in a very important respect, equal to the best regime, which corresponds to Hesiod's golden age: since the principle of democracy is freedom, all human types can develop freely in a democracy, and hence in particular the best human type. . . .

Rothman hints at a sinister purpose underlying Mr. Strauss's "contradictory" attribution of American political institutions to "Machiavellian" and "anti-Machiavellian" sources. Rothman does not appear to realize

that the tradition of modern political philosophy is not a seamless web, but a complicated structure consisting of parts which are to some extent antagonistic. He might be expected to know that this is, at least, the view of Mr. Strauss, for the sixth chapter of *Natural Right and History* is called "The Crisis of Modern Natural Right," and begins with the remark that "The *first* crisis of modernity occurred in the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau." (My italics) Readers may conclude for themselves whether Rothman's presentation of the case was fair or well-informed.

The contest between ancients and moderns is bound to continue. It draws our attention to the deepest and grandest questions, in the presence of which there is no proper frame of mind but modesty and concentration upon the issues. To proceed in any other spirit is to show disrespect for scholarship and for the sovereign questions, and is altogether deplorable.

## THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ENGLISH PARTY ACTIVISTS\*

RICHARD ROSE

University of Manchester

If a democracy is to function successfully, the great mass of the population need instruments for communicating their views to political leaders. The chief channels for communication are parties and pressure groups. English politics provides much scope for study of these conduits, because both parties and pressure groups are highly organized and well articulated. Although the part played by party activists in policy formulation is only one small aspect of this network, the study of that part throws considerable light upon the interplay of parties and pressure groups, and challenges as well some prevailing notions about the policy demands of party activists.

Party activists in Britain have only comparatively recently been regarded as potentially capable of participating in discussions of public policy. Both the Conservatives and Liberals originated as small coterie of parliamentary notables who controlled, or were independent of rank-and-file party workers. Writing in 1908, A. Lawrence Lowell characterized the two party organizations as shams—the Liberals, with their formal devices for rank-and-file policy-making as an opaque sham, and the Conservatives as transparent shams.<sup>1</sup> He noted that in 1903 Conservative Party members were so deferential that when the Cabinet was split on tariff reform the annual membership conference “shrank from saying what it thought.” Both Conservative and Liberal parties have maintained this aloofness from activists in matters of policy discussion up to the present day. The official report on Conservative Party re-organization prepared after the 1945 debacle noted that the size of

the annual party conference made it “a demonstration of strength and enthusiasm” and made impossible “the more intimate circumstances necessary to thoughtful debate.”<sup>2</sup> Since the farcical intervention of activists in policy-making at the 1958 Liberal Assembly, Jc Grimond has successfully emphasized the need to keep Liberal policy-making in the hands of a small circle.

The Labour Party, in theory and to some extent in practice, has always stood for participation by rank-and-file party members in policy-making. A current party pamphlet states: “The right to a voice in determining policy is important to any member . . . The individual member has a chance to use the machinery of the party to secure support for ideas on every aspect of party policy.”<sup>3</sup> In recent years a harassed Labour leadership has begun to stress Robert T. McKenzie’s thesis that it is unconstitutional for party members to make policy to which MPs are bound, because MPs must be responsible to those who elect them and not to that allegedly unrepresentative fraction who constitute active party members. The Labour leadership is reverting to the Burkean position maintained by many Conservatives, that an MP owes his constituency party supporters nothing more than his informed and independent judgement.<sup>4</sup> Except for Ralph Miliband, who has argued that the influence of the active Labour minority should not be reduced because of the apathy of the majority,<sup>5</sup> there is a consensus among students of British politics that party activists cannot and should not make party policy, or ever influence it greatly.

\* This is a revised version of a paper read at the International UNESCO Seminar on Political Participation, held at the Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway in June, 1961.

The author is indebted to Mrs. T. Collins and her associates in the computer section of the University of Manchester for considerable assistance in tabulating the data discussed herein.

<sup>1</sup> A. L. Lowell, *The Government of England* (London, 1921 edition) Vol. I, pp. 578, 584. See also M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (London, 1902), Vol. I, p. 161 ff; J. L. Garvin, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London, 1932), Vol. I, ch. 14; W. S. Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill* (London, 1906), esp. chs. 6–8.

<sup>2</sup> *Final Report of the Committee on Party Organization* (National Union, London, 1949), p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> S. Barker, *How the Labour Party Works* (London, 1955), p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> See R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London, 1955), esp. chs. 1, 10; *Report of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (London, 1960), p. 159 ff, and Morgan Phillips’ *Memorandum on the Constitution of the Labour Party* (London, 1960).

<sup>5</sup> “Party Democracy and Parliamentary Government,” *Political Studies*, Vol. 6 (1958), pp. 170–74. Wilfrid Fienburgh, then research secretary of the Labour Party, implicitly took this position in “Put Policy on the Agenda,” *Fabian Journal*, No. 6 (1952), pp. 25–7.

It does not follow, however, that the views of party activists are of no interest. There are several reasons for analyzing them. First, activists may be mobilized to support a faction within the elite when there occurs what Michels treated as "The Struggle Among the Leadership Themselves."<sup>6</sup> Sometimes, a section of the counter-elite and of the activists appear to work together and respond to a common stimulus. Second, activists are a major channel of communication between MPs and party leaders and the electorate at large. Third, they are presumed to be the last stronghold of ideologues within the party system. Last but hardly least, there has never been any systematic study of the policy views of activists in Britain, although there has been no lack of generalizing on this subject.

Many students of political parties, most notably Duverger, have claimed that the views of activists differ significantly from those of most party voters; hence, the description of an activist as a militant.<sup>7</sup> (American experience would suggest that many active party workers are far from being ideologically militant, but this has not until recently been thought relevant to European politics.) Such leading writers on British politics as Bagehot, Lowell and McKenzie have also argued this with reference to Britain.<sup>8</sup> Leon Epstein has explained the alleged extremist views of these activists as follows:

The voluntary and amateur nature of these associations ensures that they attract zealots in the party cause, and particularly so at the local leadership level, where there are many routine political chores which only the devoted are likely to perform. Principles, not professional careers, are what matter here.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Political Parties* (Dover edition, New York, 1959), p. 164 ff. McKenzie ignores this phenomenon.

<sup>7</sup> *Political Parties* (London, 1954), p. 101 ff. Cf. A. Leiserson, *Parties and Politics* (New York, 1958), pp. 191, 274.

<sup>8</sup> Bagehot, quoted in N. Nicolson, *People and Parliament* (London, 1958), p. 166; A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, 1914), p. 92; R. T. McKenzie, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-7, p. 506. See also T. E. M. McKitterick, "The Membership of the [Labour] Party," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 31 (1960), p. 316 ff.

<sup>9</sup> "British MPs and their Local Parties: The Suez Case," this *Review*, Vol. 54 (1960), p. 385. Epstein wrongly suggests that rank-and-file extremism strengthens the position of party leaders. This is because he generalizes from the extremist

Nigel Nicolson, the victim while a Conservative MP of a constituency association which disowned him because of his centrist views, has argued that the extremist outlook of activists threatens to endanger parliamentary government, because Parliament is losing power to Cabinet and Cabinet is dominated by party. Nicolson claims that parliamentary leaders rightly see problems in terms of "the intrusive grey," whereas activists see things in black and white terms. Political activity only intensifies their militant beliefs. Hence, in the constituencies, warfare between the parties is "a grim reality."<sup>10</sup>

To use the terminology of Martin Lipset in *Political Man*, the influence of activists in party policy-making is said to give heavy emphasis to ideological cleavage without a compensating statement of consensus, whereas both the theory and practice of British government value consensus much more than cleavage. It is theoretically possible that constituency parties may act as a safety valve through which extremist pressures escape, but this argument has not been advanced. It is the crux of Nicolson's case that the steam being generated by extreme-minded activists threatens to scald the engine drivers of democracy and endanger all the passengers.

# I

Party activists have the same formal method of influencing policy in both parties—sending resolutions to the annual party conferences.<sup>11</sup> This is not sufficient proof of policy concern, but it is almost certainly a necessary condition which activists must meet if they wish their views to be considered by the national party leadership. The other major channel—lobbying one's MP—is informal and indirect. Furthermore, half the constituencies have an MP from the opposition party. There are no inhibitions surrounding conference resolutions. If anything, there is an expectation that resolutions will be used by extremists to voice complaints to and about leaders.

The circumstances in which policy resolutions are drafted, debated and approved differ widely from constituency to constituency. Resolutions are likely to originate in committee

position of the leadership on Suez; the instance is, however, exceptional.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 169. His fear is not new. Cf. Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 493 ff.

<sup>11</sup> See S. Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 7 ff; *Party Organization* (Conservative & Unionist Central Office, London, 1961), p. 23 ff; R. T. McKenzie, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-58, 532-46.

meetings of local parties; alternatively, suggestions or amendments may be made at party meetings, where attendance will invariably be only a small fraction of a constituency party's membership, and an extremely small fraction of the party vote in the constituency.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the method and setting facilitate domination by a small group determined to foster a particular set of ideas. The extent to which policy is discussed in local parties appears to vary considerably.<sup>13</sup> Motives for tabling resolutions may be mixed and several. Expressions of opinion may spontaneously originate within the local caucus from concern with an immediate event in the news. MPs or candidates may stimulate resolutions favouring views they wish to advance. Sometimes resolutions are presented in efforts to gain publicity, either for the local party or for the person who may be chosen to move it in an auditorium crowded with delegates.

The resolutions analyzed herein are those submitted to Conservative and Labour annual party conferences from 1955 to 1960 inclusive. No list of resolutions was published for the cancelled 1959 Conservative conference. The omission of one year's total from the sample is offset by the fact that there is no limit on the number of resolutions which a Conservative constituency may forward. In the Labour Party, a constituency normally may send only one resolution, and occasionally an amendment. Because of alterations to constituency boundaries prior to the 1955 election, the analysis could not be accurately carried further back in time.

Each resolution has been assigned to one of four categories—Right, Left, Partisan or Non-Partisan. Resolutions in the first three categories contain a distinctive element of partisan ideology; those in the last tend to reflect pressure group concerns or general cultural values not integrally a part of party ideology. The definitions follow, with examples taken from conference programs.

*Partisan:* Enunciation of an agreed party policy which is opposed to that of the other party and which has an ideological basis.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. reports of low participation by trade unionists in discussions of union policy, in B. C. Roberts, *Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain* (London, 1956), p. 95 ff; M. Harrison, *Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945* (London, 1960), ch. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. D. V. Donnison and D. E. G. Plowman, "The Functions of Local Labour Parties," *Political Studies*, Vol. 2 (1954), p. 156 ff; A. H. Birch, *Small-Town Politics* (Oxford, 1959), p. 44 ff.

Conservative example: "That this Conference congratulates the Government on its economic policy, which has resulted in full employment, stable prices and the highest standard of living in our history, but urges the removal of the many impediments still hindering the spread of ownership throughout the community." (No. 177, 1960)

Other favored Conservative themes include: requests for maximum economy in public expenditure, denunciation of further nationalization, protection of property rights in land compulsorily acquired by the state, support for the Commonwealth, and approval of the tripartite division of secondary education.

Labour example: "This Conference believes that a substantial measure of public ownership is essential for the nation's well-being. It therefore instructs the NEC to prepare for presentation to the 1961 Annual Conference a practical programme of public ownership for the next Labour Government, based on the needs of the economy, workers and consumers' interests." (No. 203, 1960)

Labour resolutions in this category often deal with: world disarmament through the United Nations, support for colonial freedom and attacks upon the Conservative colonial policy, attacks upon advertising, the need for economic planning and controls, demands for an end to profiteering in land prices, and support for a comprehensive secondary education system.

*Non-partisan:* Enunciation of a policy which is not the subject of controversy along party lines, either because it reflects the views of pressure groups working within both parties or because it is generally regarded as desirable within the culture. A non-partisan resolution is not necessarily non-political.

Conservative example: "That this Conference is of the opinion that in view of the statement made at the time of the General Election that old age pensioners were to share in the prosperity of the country, an increase in their pensions should now be made." (No. 126, 1960)

Other popular themes for non-party resolutions at Conservative conferences include: assistance for particular industries or for agriculture, calls for more teachers and smaller class sizes, demands for more roads and safer roads, tax relief for homeowners, changes to strengthen local government in its work, changes in electoral law to simplify the job of party workers, and improvements in party organization.<sup>14</sup>



Labour example: "This Conference urges the Government to grant an immediate increase for old age pensioners." (No. 344, 1960)

Among a welter of Labour themes that were basically non-ideological were: assistance for shipbuilding, coal, other industries and for agriculture, calls for more teachers and smaller class sizes, requests for more hospitals and removal of alleged anomalies in welfare services, changes to strengthen local government in its work, more roads and safer roads, better railway services, and relief of the housing shortage and need for slum clearance.

*Right-wing Conservative:* A policy statement which calls for widening the gap between the two parties through adoption of a reactionary variant of party policy.

Example: "That in the opinion of this Conference the monopoly of omnibus transport in large cities and towns should be abolished and that responsible operators be allowed to compete, thereby giving the public a better service." (No. 48, 1960)

Right-wing Conservatives concentrate upon: pleas for weakening taxes which tend to redistribute income, requests for laws to curb trade unions and strikers, demands for a return to flogging and heavy reliance upon capital punishment to fight crime, the absolute reduction of government spending and services, the denationalization of various industries, and reducing benefits available through welfare services.

*Left-wing Labour:* A statement calling for a radical transformation of the domestic mixed economy welfare state, or of the existing system of international relations, in order to make the breakthrough to a Socialist society. Such statements are usually out of harmony with the declared policy of the leadership.

Example: "This Conference instructs the National Executive Committee to appoint a sub-committee to investigate and report to the 1961 Annual Conference the most practical way in which all the means of production, distribution and exchange can be brought under public owner-

ship, ensuring that the workers and consumers alike can participate in the management of each industry." (No. 206, 1960)

Under this heading come resolutions: asking for unilateral nuclear disarmament, demanding large-scale extension of nationalization and/or workers' control, reaffirming Socialist principles in terms of root-and-branch rejection of a capitalist-influenced society, and those calling for compulsory closure of the public boarding schools.

*Left-wing Conservative/Right-wing Labour:* Statements of policy which deviate so markedly from conference policy that they tend to be in harmony with the policies of the opposing party.

Conservative example: "That this Conference requests the Minister of Housing and Local Government to examine the position of the tenants of furnished accommodation with a view to introducing legislation to guarantee an adequate standard of furnishings and fittings, and a reasonable security of tenure." (No. 331, 1960)

Labour example: "This Conference moves that the Labour Party, being a social and democratic movement, seeks to determine by means of a social-political survey, such questions as the image of the party in the minds of the electorate, their social habits and background, and their wishes concerning the fundamental issues of the day, with the aim of studying the results of such an enquiry and deciding to what extent they should influence future party policy." (No. 424, 1960)

The number of these resolutions is so few that one cannot generalize much. In the Conservative Party, left-wing resolutions seemed to come either from constituency parties in working-class areas, which voiced Labour-inclined views on social services and economic policy, or from constituencies where progressive Conservatives had some sympathies with Labour's overseas policy. Labour deviation seemed largely motivated by a desire to repudiate traditional Socialist ideology, with an occasional repudiation resulting in virtual alignment with Conservative positions.

Any system of categorizing data is open to criticism. The headings here employed have been designed to group together views which signify, either explicitly or by their nuance, association with one or another faction within the two parties. This is the standard used by many speakers on resolutions at party conferences, who discuss them in terms of left/right tendencies, and the same standard is characteristically employed in descriptions of conference debates by journalists.

<sup>14</sup> Resolutions dealing with the mechanics of party organization have been scored non-partisan because they show bureaucratic rather than ideological concerns. Interestingly, a number of resolutions ostensibly dealing with party principles are also non-ideological. They simply stress the need for unity on principle, or promoting principles, without any indication of which particular principles (if any) should be emphasized.

## II

The analysis immediately reveals that the description of local parties as a force constantly pressing extremist views upon national party leaders is false. The total proportion of ideological (*i.e.*, left-wing, right-wing and partisan) resolutions is 54 per cent; those which are non-ideological constitute 46 per cent of the total (Table IA). In other words, constituency parties are nearly as apt to be voicing views derived from general cultural values or from interest group links as they are to voice those clearly associated with a partisan ideology.

When the scores are analyzed according to parties, one finds that the Conservatives are more inclined to press non-partisan resolutions on their leaders than are Labour constituencies. But the differences are not great and Labour parties do not show strong partisanship; 42 per cent of their resolutions are non-partisan, compared with 50 per cent of Conservative ones (Table IB, IC). The variation in the number and orientation of resolutions from year to year appears to reflect the temper of the times. A party's adversity would seem to stimulate extremist views.

An analysis of the number of resolutions submitted by individual constituency parties reveals the existence of wide variations in concern with policy. Approximately one-third of Conservative constituency parties did not present a single resolution in the five-year period studied; only 26 per cent forwarded an average of one resolution or more a year (Table IIA). This disinterest in pressing policy views cannot be attributed to poor party organization, because virtually all English Conservative constituencies are sufficiently well organized to have a full-time party agent. It may well be related to the deferential relationship which exists, socially as well as politically, between party leaders and members. Balfour is reported to have said that he would as soon take orders from his valet as from a Conservative Party

TABLE IA. TOTAL SCORES FOR ALL  
CONSTITUENCY RESOLUTIONS

Type	No.	%
Extremist (Rt, Con; Left, Lab)	1398	30
Partisan (Con and Lab)	1013	22
Misplaced partisanship (Left, Con; Rt, Lab)	97	2
Non-partisan (Con and Lab)	2090	46
Totals	4598	100

TABLE IB. TOTAL SCORES OF CONSERVATIVE  
CONSTITUENCY RESOLUTIONS\*

Year	Right	Partisan	Left	Non- Partisan	Total
1955	50	52	17	173	292
1956	137	109	10	137	393
1957	130	60	6	216	412
1958	90	141	12	204	447
1959	(No resolutions published)				
1960	98	41	17	259	415
Totals No.	505	403	62	989	1959
Per Cent	26	21	3	50	100

\* This table, like IA and VA, includes resolutions filed by Welsh constituency parties and minor federated bodies, as well as those from English parties. Welsh resolutions are omitted from all other calculations because the party system there is not quite the same as in England; minor parties are twice as strong. The federated bodies are omitted because they are not comparable to Labour ones. Omitted groups have similar scores to those fully analysed. Scotland and Northern Ireland are not included in any Conservative tabulations, because these parties are separate and have their own conferences.

annual conference.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps some party members would equally regard it as wrong to depart from the obligations of their station in life.

In the Labour Party, concern with matters of policy is more widely diffused, as one might expect from a party which has always boasted of its ideological basis. The gap between individual constituency parties is not so great, because of the limit of one resolution and one amendment for each party at each conference. (Table IIB) Although the Labour Party has more constituencies which will sometimes file a resolution, there is little difference in terms of

TABLE IC. TOTAL SCORES OF LABOUR  
CONSTITUENCY RESOLUTIONS\*

Year	Left	Partisan	Right	Non- Partisan	Total
1955	123	98	5	198	424
1956	109	119	5	169	402
1957	127	140	4	172	443
1958	173	89	6	160	428
1959	152	73	3	186	414
1960	209	91	12	216	528
Totals No.	893	610	35	1101	2639
Per Cent	34	23	1	42	100

\* This table, like IA and VB, includes resolutions from Welsh and Scottish constituency parties, and from trade unions and other affiliated bodies. There is no significant variation in scores as between those groups fully analyzed and those omitted elsewhere.

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 82. See also Earl Balfour, *Chapters of Autobiography* (London, 1930), p. 158 ff.

heavy activity, insofar as different regulations permit of comparison. Among Conservative constituencies, 74 per cent file resolutions less than once a year on average; in the Labour Party, the proportion is 79 per cent.

Concern with questions of policy is not the same as partisanship. In order to isolate those constituencies which reflected particularly strong partisanship, the groups were divided into four categories, according to the extent to which they varied from the average party score. In the Conservative table, partisan views are those scored right or partisan; in the Labour table, those scored left or partisan. From this we find (Tables IIIA, IIIB) that the proportion of constituency parties which regularly press partisan views is less than one-quarter in each party. There is a skewed distribution among the Conservatives, for 59 per cent of the constituencies show less than average partisanship. Absence of partisanship does not, of course, mean absence of ideological commitments; it is evidence that parties so labeled are little interested in advocating ideological views. There is more interest in proclaiming partisan views in the Labour parties.

TABLE IIA. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESOLUTIONS FILED BY CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Number of resolutions	No. of parties*	% of all parties	Cumulative percentage†
0	165	32	32
1	90	18	50
2	49	10	60
3	42	8	68
4	29	6	74
5	23	5	79
6	22	4	83
7	14	3	86
8	15	3	89
9	12	2	91
10	7	1	92
11-20	33	6	98
21-30	4	0.8	98.8
31-40	3	0.6	99.4
46	1	0.2	99.6

\* Bolton West and Huddersfield West are omitted from this and subsequent calculations because they do not nominate parliamentary candidates, standing aside in favour of the Liberals.

† Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

TABLE IIB. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESOLUTIONS FILED BY LABOUR CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Number of resolutions	No. of parties	% of all parties	Cumulative percentage*
0	28	6	6
1	48	9	15
2	62	12	27
3	72	14	41
4	94	18	59
5	102	20	79
6	96	19	98
7	7	1.4	99.4
8	2	0.4	99.8

\* Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

TABLE IIIA. PARTISANSHIP IN CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUENCY PARTIES\*

Category	No.	Per cent
No partisan resolutions	164	35
Low (1-34%) partisanship	113	24
Average (35-64%) partisanship	120	26
High (65% or more) partisanship	71	15

\* Constituencies which submitted only one resolution in the period, and that one partisan, have been omitted, because this was regarded as insufficient evidence for categorization.

TABLE IIIB. PARTISANSHIP IN LABOUR CONSTITUENCY PARTIES\*

Category	No.	Per cent
No partisan resolutions	88	18
Low (12.5-40%) partisanship	83	17
Average (41-75%) partisanship†	208	42
High (above 75%) partisanship	113	23

\* Constituencies presenting only one resolution, and that partisan, have been omitted from this table.

† This category is not as large as it appears, for only seven parties could have scored between 41-49.9%.

The incidence of ideological partisanship is certainly no cause for concern; few could criticize party activists for pressing party policy upon their leaders, when the leaders ac-

TABLE IVA. EXTREMISM IN CONSERVATIVE PARTIES\*

Category	No.	Per-Cent
No extremist resolutions	314	66
Low (1-16.5%) extremism	20	4
Average (16.6-37.4%) extremism	92	19
High extremism (37.5% or more)	52†	11

\* Those constituencies submitting one extremist resolution and filing only one or two in the period are omitted.

† Consists of 24 parties submitting up to 5 resolutions each in the period and 28 parties submitting more than 5 resolutions each in the period.

cept the ideas, as well as many voters. Ideological extremism is a far greater force for social cleavage, but it is extremely limited in both parties. (Tables IVA, IVB) Even though the definition of high extremism in the Conservative Party does not require a constituency to express extremist views as much as half the time, only 11 per cent qualify for that appellation—and only 6 per cent are both extremist and quite active in pressing views. Although more Labour constituencies are extremist than Conservative, they form only 18 per cent of the total. The median Labour constituency will only forward one extremist resolution in a six-year period, and the median Conservative one will not even forward a single extremist resolution in a five-year period.

The foregoing tables indicate that party workers on opposite sides of the political fence are not so partisan as electoral contests suggest, and not so extremist as some theorists suggest. A breakdown of resolutions by subject matter and by policy orientation provides a list of areas of common agreement within both parties (Tables VA, VB). A notable feature of Conservative resolutions is concentration upon

TABLE IVB. EXTREMISM IN LABOUR PARTIES\*

Category	No.	Per-Cent
No extremist resolutions	191	38
Low extremism (20% or less)	47	9
Average (25-50%) extremism	172	35
High (above 50%) extremism	87	18

\* Those constituencies submitting only one resolution, and that extremist, have not been categorized.

domestic issues, notwithstanding the importance of international affairs to the government and to the electorate. Only 3 per cent of resolutions concerned foreign policy and defence questions, compared to 29 per cent in the Labour Party. The latter devotes less attention to politically important domestic questions. The virtual absence in both parties of expressions on highly explosive racial, religious and constitutional questions should not be overlooked.

Analysis by topics suggests that the partisanship and extremism of party activists is not so strong in several fields as the pull of interest group or general cultural standards.<sup>16</sup> In four areas of public concern—education, welfare services, transport and pensions—partisan standards are applied less than half the time by activists in both parties. When facing these questions they may ask for 'more schools' or 'higher pensions'; this is a cry of beneficiaries and benefactors, not of ideologues. This non-party emphasis is the more striking because there are clear ideological differences between the parties on education, welfare and transport. For instance, although the method of organizing secondary education is a point of sharp difference between the parties and affects the whole electorate, 64 per cent of Labour resolutions and 56 per cent of Conservative ones steer clear of all partisan controversy on education. The proportion of ideological resolutions rises in areas of economic policy, where interest group and ideological standards are likely to be the same for most activists; partisan ideology is thus intensified. For instance, all of the 19 Labour resolutions on industrial relations were partisan, and only 12 per cent of the 133 Conservative resolutions on this topic were non-partisan.

Some activists appear more concerned with the mechanics of party organization than with party policy. This shows in Conservative resolutions on party structure and on election law, and in organizational resolutions in the Labour Party, and resolutions asking for party unity—without any sign of preference concerning the program upon which unity should be based.

### III

Examination of conference resolutions has shown that constituency parties differ considerably in their political attitudes. The question is then raised: Do they differ in relation to other measurable social or political factors? Unfortunately, the data available for cross-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (1956), pp. 1-23.

TABLE VA. TOPICS FOR CONSERVATIVE RESOLUTIONS

Topic	Right	Partisan	Left	Non-Partisan	Total
Economic affairs	121	142	28	64	355
Housing	22	35	4	107	168
Industrial relations	73	37	7	16	133
Party organization	5	8	3	112	128
Education	33	18	2	72	125
Pensions	6	2	—	104	112
Taxes	56	17	—	29	102
Compulsory purchase	16	79	—	4	99
Crime	63	13	4	11	91
Transportation	5	1	—	82	88
Election law	—	—	—	85	85
Commonwealth, colonies	31	14	4	7	56
Local government	—	—	—	51	51
Welfare services	21	—	—	29	50
Agriculture	5	—	—	42	47
Foreign policy	6	16	5	5	32
Defence	1	18	2	7	28
Immigration	21	—	—	—	21
Party principles	9	2	—	6	17
Miscellaneous	11	1	3	156	171

tabulation is strictly limited,<sup>17</sup> but sufficient exists to test several important hypotheses.

<sup>17</sup> For instance, census data cannot be related to parliamentary constituencies because of boundary differences.

One hypothesis concerns the relationship between party strength and attitudes of activists. It has been argued<sup>18</sup> that in areas where

<sup>18</sup> *E.g.*, Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Queen's Government* (Harmondsworth, 1960), pp. 60-1.

TABLE VB. TOPICS FOR LABOUR RESOLUTIONS

Topic	Left	Partisan	Right	Non-Partisan	Total
Foreign policy, defence	594	145	14	20	773
Economic affairs	117	141	10	188	456
Housing and land	10	85	—	80	175
Party organization	14	4	1	130	148
Pensions	2	1	—	143	146
Welfare services	7	31	—	94	132
Education	17	19	—	64	100
Commonwealth & colonies	8	82	3	1	94
Local government	7	43	—	44	94
Socialist principles	57	15	2	5	79
Transportation	4	3	—	56	63
Party unity	18	2	1	31	52
Industrial relations	6	13	—	—	19
Miscellaneous	32	26	4	245	306

the strength of both parties is nearly equal, policies will tend to converge. In safe seats, extremist policies may be more readily found. The most important index of party strength is the margin by which a constituency is won or lost at the general election. A safe seat may conveniently be defined as one in which the winner had a majority of more than 10 per cent; a marginal seat as one in which the majority is less than that; and a hopeless seat one as in which a candidate lost by more than 10 per cent.<sup>19</sup> Nearly 85 per cent of English seats were either safe, marginal or hopeless at both the 1955 and 1959 elections. In what follows only these three major groups are discussed, because the numbers in the others are so small as to be of negligible significance. Safe Labour seats may be assumed to be heavily working-class; safe Conservative seats are likely to be disproportionately middleclass, though manual workers may still form a numerical majority in the constituency. It is probable that these differences in turn are reflected in the composition of party activists in different areas, although there is no conclusive evidence on this point.

The analysis shows no relation between partisanship in policy outlook and safety of seat in Conservative constituencies, and only a limited relationship in the Labour Party. (Tables VIA, VIB) In both parties there is a clear but strictly limited relationship between ideological extremism and electoral support. In the Conservative Party, safe seats display on average 9.1 per cent more extremist resolutions than hopeless seats. In the Labour Party, hopeless seats adopt 9.2 per cent more extremist resolutions than safe seats. A further check was made to test this finding because of its importance. Constituency parties were divided ac-

TABLE VIA. PARTISANSHIP, EXTREMISM AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Category	No. of seats	Total Resolutions	% Partisan	% Extremist
Safe	213	788	48.4	29.3
Marginal	123	512	49.8	25.0
Hopeless	110	193	49.7	20.2

<sup>19</sup> On electoral swing and margins of victory, see D. E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1955* (London, 1955), p. 202 ff; D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London, 1960), p. 236.

TABLE VIB. PARTISANSHIP, EXTREMISM AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR LABOUR CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Category	No. of seats	Total Resolutions	% Partisan	% Extremist
Safe	110	383	50.6	28.2
Marginal	123	462	55.2	32.7
Hopeless	217	829	60.0	37.4

cording to degrees of partisanship and extremism, as in Tables IIIA-B, IVA-B, to see whether each group had a fair cross-section of parties with strong, medium and weak electoral support. This was the case.

In both parties the variation between these two factors was of the order of one resolution in ten. But it takes a Conservative constituency party on average about 14 years to submit ten resolutions, and a Labour party about 12 years. The major conclusion must be that policy views are randomly distributed among constituency parties without regard to their electoral strength, for the statistical differences are of negligible political significance. One may note but hardly stress that parties in the most markedly middle-class areas are slightly more extremist on both sides than in working-class areas.

The author began his investigation with the hypothesis that the smaller a constituency party's membership, the higher the incidence of extremism. This was based upon the assumption that the number of extremist party supporters is very small, and that they could more easily dominate a small party. This hypothesis could only be tested for the Labour Party. There are 140 English parties which affiliate to headquarters on the minimum membership of 800; the extremism score for this group averaged 36 per cent. For the 61 parties with above average memberships ranging from 2,000 to 3,000, the extremism score averaged 34 per cent; for the 35 parties reporting membership above 3,000, the figure was 30 per cent. Similarly, parties with high extremism scores average 22 party members for every 1,000 electors, compared to a figure of 26 for those with average scores, and 25 for those with no extremist resolutions. The differences are hardly of a size to lend much support to the hypothesis.

Constituency parties may also seek to influence policy by pressing MPs or prospective candidates to act as spokesmen for the local party caucus. Candidates are selected by small

groups representing less than 1 per cent of the electorate, and these nominations cannot be effectively challenged. In a normal election, nomination is tantamount to election in at least three-quarters of the constituencies; nomination is virtually tantamount to election for life in upwards of half the constituencies. Most students of British politics have commented upon the failure of constituency parties to exercise their considerable potential powers over candidates in such a way as to produce MPs with views like their own.<sup>20</sup> This generalization needs testing by reference to extremism scores because these writers have usually assumed that constituency selection committees are dominated by extremists. The wide range of opinion within both parliamentary parties might reflect an absence of policy concern in the selection process—or it might reflect a tendency for constituency parties to adopt candidates with views compatible with their own.

The emergence of unilateral nuclear disarmament as a major factional issue within the Labour Party provides one test for the coincidence between extremism in candidates and in parties. We find that there is some relationship between extremism in a constituency party and a candidate who is extreme on this issue. Parties showing high extremism constitute 18 per cent of all local parties, but 29 per cent of those nominating unilateralist candidates. Unilateralist candidates are least likely to be found where extremism is low or non-existent (Table VII). Like many statistical findings, this one is only important if it is an indication of a trend. Further checks showed no tendency for unilateralist candidates to be nominated particularly for hopeless seats, nor were they especially favoured in the adoption of new candidates. Counterbalancing this absence of association was the tendency of constituencies with trade union sponsored candidates to score below average on extremism. Of 102 constituencies categorized, only 5 per cent were extremist, and 55 per cent had submitted no extremist resolutions in the period.

A similarly meaningful issue was not available for testing Conservative MPs. A rundown of the 16 Conservative MPs who took extremist positions on the Suez affair showed that two-thirds of their constituency parties scored below average on extremism. A check was made on Conservative parties which had Privy Councillors as MPs; it was assumed that the

TABLE VII. EXTREMISM AND THE NOMINATION OF UNILATERALIST CANDIDATES BY CONSTITUENCY LABOUR PARTIES

Category*	No. Candidates	No. Unilateralist	Per Cent Unilateralist
No extremism	191	14	7
Low extremism	47	5	11
Average extremism	172	31	18
High extremism	87	20	23
Totals	497	70	14

\* Constituency parties submitting only one resolution, and that one extremist, have not been categorized.

responsibility of these MPs, and their closer identification with generally moderate government policies, would damp down party extremism. In fact, the distribution of extremism scores among the 46 parties categorized was virtually identical with the distribution for all Conservative constituency parties. The most significant relationship found had on the face of it no connection with policy. It was that safe Conservative seats choose 84 per cent of their candidates from those with expensive public school educations, and only 31 per cent of the time take men with local connections. In hopeless seats, only 44 per cent have been at public schools, and 60 per cent of candidates have local connections. Marginal seats fall between these two groups. (No such pattern exists in the Labour Party.) One might speculate that the return of members of a national social-political elite by safe constituencies tends to increase the independence of MPs from constituency parties, for such persons are more likely to be independently minded, or influenced by a national peer group, than to submit to pressure from lower status activists.

#### IV

The fundamental conclusion which arises from this study is that attitudes on questions of policy are randomly distributed among constituency parties and, it may be tentatively assumed, among party activists as well. One cause of the diversity would appear to be the plurality of motives leading individuals to become active in party politics, together with the plurality of functions which local parties may perform.<sup>21</sup> The following list of motives is not

<sup>20</sup> See especially John Biffen, "The Constituency Leaders," *Crossbow*, Vol. 4, No. 13 (1960), p. 30.

<sup>21</sup> A. Leiserson, *op. cit.*, is notable for the allowance he makes for diversity. See also Robert E.

exhaustive, nor is any particular one meant to exclude the operation of others within the same individual.

*Motives for volunteer political work*

- A. Overtly political
  - Desire to advance party program
  - Desire to modify party program to bring it more into line with one's own ideological beliefs
  - Desire to modify party program to bring it more into line with the program of one's interest group
  - Local government concerns
  - Sense of civic duty
  - Ex officio* involvement—e.g., as trade union official.
- B. Non-political
  - Occupational careerism
  - Status seeking
  - Gratification of desire for power
  - Pleasure from group activities
  - Pleasure from a 'sporting' contest
  - Friendship with active party workers.

The functions which constituency parties fulfill are also numerous. Some have a bearing on national party policy, but others do not:

*Functions of English constituency parties*

- Propagate national party policy
- Advise upon national party policy
- Organize and conduct election contests
- Nominate parliamentary candidates
- Manage local government affairs
- Act as pressure group for local interests
- Provide social facilities for the community
- Finance and maintain local party office.

An immediate consequence of this diversity is the flexibility which it gives to party leaders. At annual party conferences leaders are not faced with a mass of extreme-minded activists, demanding the adoption of socially divisive policies as the price of continuing to do menial work.<sup>22</sup> Opposition comes from only a fraction of the rank-and-file. Another portion is likely to support the leadership and a significant group may have no clear views, or even interest,

Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, 1959), for much evidence on motives for political participation.

<sup>22</sup> Some British politicians still regard local party organizations with the respect they received in the days of open voting and bribery. The Nuffield studies find no evidence to support this. See most recently D. E. Butler and R. Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London, 1960), pp. 143, 232 ff.

in questions of party policy. In such circumstances support of the rank-and-file assembly may be gained simply by giving a clear policy lead. Lacking firm anchorage in an ideological position, constituency parties may be willing to trust their leaders wherever they lead. The pressure from above, the effect as it were of the gardener's lawnmower upon the grass roots activists, is considerable. The classic illustration occurred when the Conservative government was able to keep the party virtually united behind it when it unexpectedly attacked Egypt, and again when it abruptly accepted a cease-fire there in 1956. This flexibility is less in the Labour Party; a small contributing factor is the greater attachment which activists have to ideological standards.

Robert T. McKenzie has suggested that representative democracy presupposes a near identity in views between persons at different levels in parties, and half-suggested that democratic parties should have views tending towards identity.<sup>23</sup> Hence, his polemics against the participation of alleged extreme-minded activists in party policy-making. But on the basis of their resolutions, constituency parties do not seem to be pulling the parties apart. While recognizing the simplifications involved, one might consider party differences as being ranked on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being extreme right-wing and 100 being left-wing extremism. Simple consensus based upon an identity of views within and between parties would occur if all opinion rested at 50; more realistically, consensus would result if the center of gravity of opinion<sup>24</sup> within both parties was at 50. But a situation of balanced disagreement would operate if one of the parties centered at 60 and the other at 40, assuming a normal distribution frequency. An imbalance would result only if one party tended towards the center while the other balanced near an extreme. Balance, of course, is not a good in itself. Theoretically, a balance would occur if one party rested at 90 and another at 10. Furthermore, balance could produce stagnation when a radical shift in one direction was required by objective social circumstances. If we distribute

<sup>23</sup> See especially "Parties, Pressure Groups and the British Political Process," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1958), p. 12 f; and "The 'Political Activists' and Some Problems of 'Inner Party' Democracy in Britain" (mimeo, International Political Science Association, Paris, 1961), p. 5 ff.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. D. E. Butler "The Paradox of Party Difference" *American Behavioral Scientist*, IV: 3 (1960), pp. 3-5, where the concept of centers of party gravity is developed.



resolutions along such an axis, we see that much of the weight of constituency views is closer to the center than to the extremes. The leftward bias is largely the result of the greater frequency of Labour resolutions. When a correction is made for differences in expressing views as between the parties, the point of balance turns out to be three per cent to the left of center.

There has been no systematic investigation of political attitudes in an effort to find out what differences, if any, exist between voters, activists, MPs, and leaders in parties. There is evidence to indicate that the spread of opinion is wide at all levels of both parties. For instance, a 1959 national survey found that 45 per cent of Conservative sympathizers accepted the *status quo* in the nationalized industries, and 40 per cent wished to denationalize one or more industries. In addition, 42 per cent of Labour sympathizers were opposed to further nationalization, whereas 36 per cent supported it.<sup>25</sup> In 1960, when 34 per cent of constituency party resolutions were extremist, 33 per cent of Labour MPs voted against Hugh Gaitskell in a contested election for the parliamentary party

<sup>25</sup> See D. E. Butler and R. Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 244, and also p. 71. The opinion surveys regularly reported in the monthly *Gallup Political Index* (London) by the British Institute of Public Opinion, and by Mark Abrams, in M. Abrams and R. Rose, *Must Labour Lose?* (Harmondsworth, 1960) also bear out the point that party sympathizers are divided into partisans, extremists, deviants and indifferents on almost all issues. Cf. also S. E. Finer, H. Berrington and D. Bartholomew, *Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59* (London, 1961).

TABLE VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POLICY VIEWS OF ACTIVISTS\*

Scale:	0	25	50	75	100
	Rt. Con.	Parti-san Con.	Non-parti-san	Parti-san Lab.	Left Lab.
No. of resolutions	505	438	2090	672	893
Per Cent of resolutions	11	10	45	15	19

\* Resolutions showing misplaced partisanship are assigned to the partisanship category for the other party.

leadership. During the past decade the resignations of such leading Cabinet ministers as Aneurin Bevan, Lord Salisbury and Peter Thorneycroft have provided public evidence of the frequent suspicions of sharp divisions within a theoretically united Cabinet. Thus, it appears that the dilemma which David Butler has posed for party leaders—"their most loyal and devoted followers tend to have more extreme views than they have themselves, and to be still farther removed from the mass of those who actually provide the vote"<sup>26</sup>—does not really exist. Differences in policy exist within parties, and conflict is sometimes great, but this is not conflict between a monolithic bloc of activists and a monolithic leadership. Rather, it would seem that factional disputes divide parties vertically, joining some Privy Counsellors, MPs, lobbyists, activists and voters into a faction which is in conflict with another which also contains members drawn from all ranks of the party.

<sup>26</sup> D. E. Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 5

## THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY: A CASE STUDY IN FACTIONAL CONFLICT\*

RAPHAEL ZARISKI  
*University of Nebraska*

The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) is one of the three major groupings—the Social Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists—that have cultivated the ground to the left of center (*i.e.*, to the left of the ruling Christian Democrats) in Italian politics since World War II. As recently as 1951, the PSI appeared to be inextricably linked with the Communists; but the Socialists have gradually worked themselves around to the position, early in 1962, of openly supporting a Left-Center coalition government still headed by the Christian Democrats. This drastic alteration in the Italian political spectrum has created new possibilities for Italy's political development. It has already permitted the long-awaited "opening to the Left"—as a basic alternative to governments dependent on the Center-Right—under which Italy will be ruled by a coalition of Christian Democrats, Republicans, and Social Democrats, with the PSI offering its support in Parliament in exchange for a bold program of economic planning and social reform. But some Socialists see a further possibility: the so-called "Socialist alternative." They hope for the possible development of the PSI into a second major party in a two-party system which would absorb the great bulk of the Italian electorate, with the exception of minor extremist fringes to the right and left.<sup>1</sup> To be sure, the success of the "opening to the Left" and the eventual emergence of a "Socialist alternative" both depend on the continued supremacy of the more progressive factions within the ranks of the Christian Democratic Party.

The decade-long process of change in the Socialist position results from influences both external and internal to the party. Such factors as Italy's close alignment with the West, and its entry into NATO and the Common Market; the

rapid economic growth and relative prosperity of the country; the evident danger that Socialist intransigence might provoke the Christian Democratic Party (which lacks an absolute majority in Parliament) into forming an alliance with Rightist parties; the changes in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin; and growing disillusionment engendered among Italian Socialists by the Hungarian intervention and by the subservience of the Italian Communist Party to the dictates of its Soviet senior partner—these and other considerations have had their impact on Socialist ideology and strategy. And within the PSI, a three-way factional split has gradually developed. Pietro Nenni, leader of the PSI throughout most of the postwar period, heads the dominant faction which has steered the party's course away from the original alliance with the Communists to the current *entente* with the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. But his freedom of action has been narrowed by the persisting influence of two left-wing factions that have steadily held out for maintaining the Communist link.

The strength of these intra-party Socialist factions varies considerably in the several geographic regions of Italy and is noticeably affected by the historical traditions, demographic and economic characteristics, and political coloration of each region. The party's strategy, in consequence, reflects these variations: for instance, the Communist tie may be affirmed in some areas, rejected in others.

Since Socialist parties the world over have been undergoing an agonizing reappraisal of their beliefs and roles in the postwar scheme of things, and since American political scientists have become increasingly concerned with the dynamics of intra-party politics, more than a parochial interest attaches to a study of the intricacies of the Socialist evolution in recent Italian politics. That evolution is traced in the pages that follow. It is a case study with two major themes: the movement away from the Communist alliance and the interplay of factional conflict within the Italian Socialist Party. But we are also concerned with using our data on PSI factions as a point of departure for investigating some more general questions regarding the dynamics of intra-party factional conflict, and for formulating hypotheses which may be tested in other contexts.

\* This study was made possible by a Summer Research Fellowship from the University of Nebraska in 1960 and by a Fulbright lectureship in Florence, Italy, during the academic year 1960-61.

<sup>1</sup> For a brief discussion of the two doctrines of "opening to the Left" and "Socialist alternative," see Tristano Codignola, "Il PSI davanti al Paese," *Il Ponte*, Vol. 13 (January, 1957), p. 27; Angelo Macchi, "Il XXXIII Congresso del PSI," *Aggiornamenti Sociali*, Vol. 10 (March, 1959), pp. 162-170; and "Editoriale," *Nord e Sud*, Vol. 6 (February, 1959), pp. 3-9.

## I. THE PSI ON THE ROAD TO AUTONOMY

The PSI—the larger of the two Socialist parties in Italy today—emerged from the secession of Palazzo Barberini in 1947, when Giuseppe Saragat and his Social Democratic followers deserted the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) in protest against the pro-Communist tendencies of some of its leaders and against the allegedly authoritarian methods being employed by the dominant Nenni group.<sup>2</sup> Saragat founded the Italian Socialist Workers' Party (PSLI), the forerunner of the present Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI). The rump of the PSIUP, remaining under the control of the Nenni leadership, adopted the briefer—and more accurate—title of Italian Socialist Party (PSI), which it retains to this day.<sup>3</sup>

After the Saragat secession, the PSI came under the domination of its Left-wing faction. The party secretary from 1947 to mid-1948 was Lelio Basso—a brilliant political theorist and exponent of a rather esoteric type of Marxism with Trotskyite and Titoist overtones. In Basso's opinion, a well organized and vigorous PSI would have nothing to fear from an alliance with the Communists but would, on the contrary, be able to seize the leadership in such an alliance. He therefore continued to maintain close unity of action with the Communist Party, and created an "apparatus"—a salaried

party bureaucracy—with a view to augmenting the bargaining power of the PSI in this risky partnership. Under pressure from extreme pro-Communists ("fusionists") in the PSI and under the influence of his own ideological preconceptions, Basso was induced to advocate the formation of a People's Democratic Front for the general elections of 1948. The Front was essentially an electoral bloc in which Communists, Socialists, and assorted splinter movements formed combined lists of candidates in each of Italy's 30 electoral circumscriptions. The result of this venture was catastrophic. Not only did the FDP go down to defeat in 1948, but also the hapless Socialist candidates on the FDP lists suffered especially heavy casualties as a result of the tendency of the more numerous and more disciplined Communist voters to concentrate their preference votes on a few names designated by their party leaders. Thus, the PSI, whose voters tended to scatter their preference votes among numerous candidates, failed to receive its proportionate share of FDP seats in Parliament. The FDP had, in effect, served as a device for cutting down the number of Socialist deputies within the Leftist bloc.

On the heels of the electoral defeat of 1948, it became evident that the Social Democratic secession of 1947 had by no means drawn all moderate elements out of the PSI. The failure of the People's Front policy resulted in a rank-and-file revolt against Basso's leadership. This insurrection was led by two leaders of a self-styled Centrist faction—Alberto Jacometti and Riccardo Lombardi—and by Giuseppe Romita, who headed a small group of Autonomists. Romita and his followers were interested primarily in achieving a *rapprochement* with Saragat and a reunification of the two Socialist parties, whereas the Centrists of *Riscossa Socialista* (Socialist Rally) were skeptical as to the prospects for reunification but insisted on a policy of greater autonomy for the PSI *vis-à-vis* its powerful Communist ally. These two factions, pooling their respective strength and taking advantage of grass-roots disillusionment, won control of the PSI at the Genoa Congress in June, 1948. Basso resigned as party secretary and was succeeded by Jacometti, whose faction dominated both the Party Directorate (a sort of party cabinet with from 15 to 21 members) and the larger Central Committee.

But the triumph of the moderates was short-lived. While Saragat's collaboration in a predominantly Christian Democratic Cabinet seemed to discredit the Social Democrats and to weaken the case for Socialist reunification, the impact of the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations on traditionally neutralist Socialist

<sup>2</sup> On the Saragat secession and the internal conflicts in the PSI between 1947 and 1951, see Raphael Zariski, "Problems and Prospects of Democratic Socialism in France and Italy," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (May, 1956), pp. 256-257 and 269-270; Raphael Zariski, "Socialism in Postwar Italy," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1952; Francesco D'Arcais, "Lineamenti Storici del socialismo italiano," *Civitas*, Vol. 8 (August-September, 1957), pp. 52-104, but especially pp. 80-91; Giuseppe Pera, "L'alternativa socialista del PSI," *Il Ponte*, Vol. 9, (May, 1953), pp. 579-598; Angelo Macchi, "Il XXXIV Congresso del PSI," *Aggiornamenti Sociali*, Vol. 12 (May, 1961), pp. 295-297; Giorgio Galli, *La Sinistra Italiana nel dopoguerra* (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1958), chs. 1 and 5; and Paolo Emiliani, *Dieci anni perduti* (Pisa, Nistri-Lischi, 1953).

<sup>3</sup> The PSI is about three times as strong as the PSDI in terms of electoral strength. In the general elections of 1958, it polled 4,206,777 votes, as against 1,345,334 received by the PSDI. Voting figures are drawn from the general elections to the Chamber of Deputies; see Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Elezioni della Camera dei Deputati, 25 Maggio 1958*, Vol. 1 (Roma, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1960), pp. 50-51.

opinion seemed to lend an aura of justification to the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists and thus strengthened the Leftist faction in the PSI. This faction was now led by a triumvirate composed of Pietro Nenni (leader of the PSIUP from 1945 to 1947 and the idol of the Socialist masses), Lelio Basso, and Rodolfo Morandi. Morandi, an able organizer and intransigent Leftist, used the superior financial resources of the Leftist faction to obtain control of the party "apparatus," which the vacillating Centrists had failed to purge. With the aid of a network of provincial secretaries who took their orders from Morandi rather than from the Directorate, the Leftist faction won a striking victory at the Florence Congress of 1949.<sup>4</sup> Failure to agree on a truly autonomous policy, and fear of offending the Communists, had prevented the Centrists from offering effective resistance to the Leftist counter-attack. After the Florence Congress, Nenni was elected party secretary and a majority of seats in the Directorate and Central Committee were assigned to his faction. The Centrists bowed to the majority decision, but Romita led his group out of the PSI in a new secession.

After the Leftist victory in 1949, the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists, never repudiated even by the Centrists, was stoutly reaffirmed. Morandi was now in charge of the party organization, and was regarded as second only to Nenni in the party hierarchy. In this capacity, he went so far as to declare the PSI's adherence to Leninist doctrine.<sup>5</sup> And in order to enforce the new Leftist line, he streamlined and expanded the "apparatus." The party machine, as we shall see, was never the all-powerful instrument that so many observers viewed with alarm in the 1950's. But it *did* enable the central party leadership to mobilize rapidly against isolated local rebellions. In a party characterized by widespread apathy among the bulk of its dues-paying members, a few hundred trained officials on regular salary could wield considerable influence.

So effective were Nenni and Morandi (Basso, for personal and doctrinal reasons, had been dropped from the Directorate and Central Committee at Morandi's behest) in suppressing autonomist tendencies that the Congress of Bologna in 1951 was marked by the absence of any organized opposition to the Leftist Directorate. The atmosphere, in fact, was one of near-unanimity. Firmly aligned with the

Communist Party on both internal and foreign policy, the PSI seemed to have become little more than a Communist-front organization.

Yet the PSI has recovered from the nadir of the Bologna Congress and has moved toward ever greater autonomy since 1953. This gradual but steady progression toward the democratic camp was encouraged by several factors: the respectable showing made by the PSI in the 1953 elections; the more independent line adopted by Saragat toward the Christian Democratic regime thereafter; the easing of East-West tension after Stalin's death; and above all, the drop in Communist prestige resulting from both the exposure of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Paradoxically enough, Morandi's "apparatus" played an unwitting role: by increasing the PSI's organizational strength and efficiency, it rendered an autonomous posture toward the Communists pragmatically feasible.<sup>6</sup> The heavy losses of the CGIL (the Communist-dominated labor confederation, which enjoyed PSI support) in various trade-union elections, and the corresponding gains by the democratic trade unions, also played an influential part, especially after 1955.<sup>7</sup> Italy's remarkable economic progress and increasingly close integration into a prosperous Western European economic community was causing many Socialists to question their long-established patterns of action, and to cast about for a more imaginative set of policies, geared to the realities of the mid-50's. And finally, there was still a strong minority of autonomists in the PSI—men who had supported the ill-starred Jacometti Directorate of 1948-49. These former Centrists had accepted

<sup>4</sup> For comments on the role of the "apparatus" in strengthening the PSI, see Pera, *ibid.*, p. 591, and Umberto Segre, "La stagione dei congressi," *Il Ponte*, Vol. 14 (November, 1958), pp. 1373-1374.

<sup>7</sup> On losses by the CGIL in various grievance committee elections, see Murray Edelman, "Causes of Fluctuations in Popular Support for the Italian Communist Party since 1946," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 20 (August, 1958), pp. 542-544; Antonio Toldo, "Situazione Sindacale Italiana," *Aggiornamenti Sociali*, Vol. 8 (February, 1957), pp. 113-122; Maurice F. Neufeld, "Appunti sul funzionamento delle commissioni interne," *Il Diritto del Lavoro* (Roma, Edizioni del Diritto del Lavoro, 1956), no. 6, pp. 1-8; and Joseph LaPalombara, *The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects* (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 110-118.

<sup>4</sup> The pre-Congress campaign of 1949 is ably described by Pera, *loc. cit.*, and by Emiliani, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-123.

<sup>5</sup> See Pera, *ibid.*, p. 590.

the unfavorable verdict of the Florence Congress of 1949 but were finding it increasingly difficult to repress their feelings of dissatisfaction with the outspokenly pro-Communist policies proclaimed by the leaders of the Leftist faction. By 1953, this autonomist minority had found an unexpected ally and leader in Pietro Nenni, who began to modify his political strategy in the direction of greater autonomy and a more democratic orientation for the PSI.

At the pre-election Socialist Congress of Milan in January, 1953, Nenni launched the slogan of "a Socialist alternative."<sup>8</sup> This minor ideological shift—at the time it seemed to be little more than a temporary electoral expedient—was accompanied by the PSI's presentation of separate slates of candidates in the general elections of 1953 and marked the first stage in Nenni's cautious campaign for a reappraisal of the PSI's objectives, methods, and alliances.

After the 1953 elections, Nenni began to take further steps along an autonomist course.<sup>9</sup> At the PSI Congress of Turin in April, 1955, he demanded—even while reconfirming the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists—a "dialogue" with the Christian Democratic Left with a view to forming an alliance between the Socialist and Catholic masses. This thesis encountered a cool reception from the delegates; and consequently Nenni did not press for a vote on his new doctrine but consented to the usual unanimous resolution acceptable to the Leftist faction. It is significant to note, however, that Nenni's prestige as party leader, and his popularity with both the rank-and-file members and the Socialist electorate, protected him from any open repudiation of his leadership by the Congress.

After the shattering revelations which leaked out of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February, 1956, the sequence of events began to accelerate.<sup>10</sup> Nenni reacted to the destruction of the Stalin myth by rejecting the Stalinist concepts of the vanguard party (the CPSU) and the vanguard nation (the Soviet Union), and by insisting on the "democratic road" to Socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat, he asserted, was not a suitable concept for a

Western European context, and the democratic way of life had to be regarded as an irreplaceable fundamental value, not a mere way-station on the road to Socialism. In a similarly heretical vein, the PSI daily *Avanti!* urged Communist defectors to join the PSI. After the municipal and provincial elections of 1956, which resulted in noticeable Socialist gains at the expense of the Communists, there were increasingly frequent references, by Nenni and others, to the possibility of a *rapprochement* and possible reunification with the Social Democrats. Contacts between these two parties at the local level began to develop and multiply. And finally, in a dramatic and seemingly portentous breakthrough, Nenni and Saragat held their famous summit meeting in August, 1956, at Pralognan in the French Alps. During this conference the two leaders agreed to press for the reunification of their two parties on a platform of democratic Socialism.

Pralognan was regarded by most observers as constituting a turning point in the troubled history of postwar Italian Socialism, and as paving the way for that "great, united, democratic Socialist movement" which has a virtually chiliastic appeal for Italian progressives. But the obstacles to PSI autonomy and Socialist reunification soon became manifest. Togliatti, the Communist leader, issued sharp warnings against undermining working-class unity, and actually threatened to provoke a split in the PSI if Nenni should prove too willing to capitulate to Social Democratic demands.<sup>11</sup> The PSI rank-and-file had been insufficiently prepared for the new approach Nenni was initiating. And the Social Democrats were demanding a complete break between the PSI and the Communist Party, and acceptance by the PSI of the North Atlantic Treaty, as prerequisites to Socialist reunification. Nenni, for his part, was willing to jettison the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists and to accept the North Atlantic Treaty in a strictly defensive sense. But he was still deeply influenced by traditional Socialist values of pacifism and working-class unity, and was also acutely aware of the dangers of a party split which might be precipitated by excessive concessions to the Social Democrats. Therefore, he advocated that Italy play a mediating role between East and West, suggested that close contacts be established with the uncommitted countries, and insisted that collaboration with the Communists in the CGIL and in hundreds of local governments could not be abandoned too precipitously.

In view of the traditional attitudes of many

<sup>8</sup> On the Milan Congress, see D'Arcais, *loc. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

<sup>9</sup> On the movement of the PSI in an autonomist direction from 1953 to 1956, see D'Arcais, *ibid.*, pp. 91-103, and U. Alfassio Grimaldi, "Nuovo capitolo," *Il Mondo*, February 12, 1957, pp. 1-2.

<sup>10</sup> On developments between the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the PSI Venice Congress, see D'Arcais, *ibid.*, pp. 95-103, and Grimaldi, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>11</sup> *La Nuova Stampa*, January 22, 1957.

PSI members—attitudes shaped by the Maximalist tradition of the early 20th Century, with its largely verbal revolutionary fervor, its intransigence toward bourgeois parties, its intense pacifism, its proletarian bias, and its rejection of gradualism<sup>12</sup>—Nenni's negotiations with Saragat and his increasing coolness toward the Communists were bound to provoke rebellion. Several opposition groups began to form behind the illusory façade of party unity which had been maintained with considerable success since 1951.<sup>13</sup> One faction was led by Lelio Basso, who had returned to a position of prominence after the death of his rival Morandi, and who hoped to replace Nenni as party secretary. Another group was made up of avowed pro-Communists who went so far as to defend the Soviet intervention in Hungary: these were the so-called *carristi* or "armored troops." In a curious juxtaposition, this faction included not only orthodox Stalinists but also some former autonomists and Resistance heroes—notably Sandro Pertini and Emilio Lussu—men who, for sentimental reasons, could not bear the thought of ending the longstanding friendship with the Communist Party. And finally, there was the party bureaucracy, the Morandian "apparatus," led by such young disciples of the late Rodolfo Morandi as Dario Valori and Vincenzo Gatto.

By combining their efforts, these three factions, which controlled a majority of the seats on the Directorate and the Central Committee, were able to place effective checks on Nenni's power to implement the policy goals he had formulated. And at the Venice Congress in February, 1957, Nenni's efforts to reverse this situation proved to be unavailing. To be sure, the Secretary's report was accepted unanimously and all but the *carristi* joined in criticizing the earlier policy of close cooperation with the Communists. Totalitarian methods were

denounced by virtually all speakers. But in the secret balloting for the 81-member Central Committee, Nenni and his Autonomists obtained only 27 seats, while 10 seats went to the *carristi*, 14 to Basso, and 30 to the Morandian bureaucrats. The Central Committee in turn elected a 21-member Directorate, composed of 10 Nenni supporters and 11 members of the three Leftist factions, and a 5-member Secretariat in which Nenni had a 3-2 majority. Thus, Nenni (who was reconfirmed as party secretary) retained control over day-to-day policy-making in the Secretariat, but could be curbed on broader policy questions by Leftist majorities in the Directorate and the Central Committee.<sup>14</sup>

Nenni's defeat was unexpected but probably inevitable in view of the tactics he had employed. He had been so uncertain regarding his actual strength within the party that he had not dared to force a showdown at the provincial congresses where delegates to the Venice Congress were chosen.<sup>15</sup> In order to secure as high a degree of party harmony as possible, Nenni's supporters at many of these Congresses agreed to the passage of ambiguously worded, strongly qualified resolutions in favor of Socialist reunification—resolutions to which the Basso faction and the Morandians were willing to subscribe. At many provincial congresses, there were two competing slates of delegates to be voted on: one presented by a makeshift Nenni-Basso-Morandian coalition and the other by the outnumbered and isolated *carristi*. In exchange for their willingness to refrain from open opposition, the Basso and Morandian factions were rewarded with a quota of delegates on the winning slate. Thus, many a provincial federation whose membership was mostly of moderate sympathies found itself sending Leftist delegates to the National Congress. Fear of a clamorous defeat, or of a bruising and highly publicized intra-party conflict, prevented Nenni from conducting an all-out offensive against the opposition and helped bring about a serious setback for the cause of democratic Socialism. Socialist reunification was postponed indefinitely.

<sup>12</sup> On the attitude of the revolutionaries (later known as Maximalists) in the PSI in the early 20th Century see Roberto Michels, *Storia critica del movimento socialista italiano* (Firenze, La Voce, 1926), Part V, ch. 2, and Wayland Hilton-Young, *The Italian Left* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1949), *passim*. For accounts of factional struggle at pre-1922 Socialist congresses, see Franco Pedone, *Partito Socialista Italiano nei suoi Congressi*, Vol. II (Milano, Edizioni Avanti, 1961); and Spartaco Cannarsa, *Il Socialismo e i XXVIII Congressi del Partito Socialista Italiano* (Milano, Edizioni Avanti, 1950), pp. 104-244.

<sup>13</sup> On the various contending factions in the PSI at the Venice Congress, see *Corriere d'Informazione*, February 5-6, 1957.

<sup>14</sup> On the Venice Congress and its outcome, see Umberto Segre, "Luci e ombre di un Congresso," *Il Ponte*, Vol. 13 (February 1957), pp. 185-192. See also *La Nuova Stampa*, February 7-10, 12 and 13, 1957, and *La Giustizia*, February 12, 13, 1957.

<sup>15</sup> On the intra-party contest at the provincial level just prior to the Venice Congress, see *La Nuova Stampa*, January 29, 1957, and F. Paolo Glorioso, "Nenni 60%," *L'Espresso*, January 11, 1959, p. 8.

After the Venice Congress, the most effective remaining weapon at Nenni's command was his immense popularity with the ordinary members and voters of the PSI. By threatening to resign as party secretary, Nenni was able to obtain some significant concessions—a majority on the Secretariat, appointment of a Nenni supporter to supervise the party organization—and to achieve a delicately balanced stalemate in place of the unconditional surrender the balloting at Venice had seemed to foreshadow.<sup>16</sup>

Thanks to his prestige as party leader, Nenni was able to press for more PSI autonomy even after the Venice debacle. The three Leftist factions failed to coordinate their efforts adequately, and in fact Basso sometimes threw his support to Nenni on certain policy issues.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, the PSI was able to abrogate the Unity of Action Pact and withdraw from several Communist-led mass organizations.<sup>18</sup> Only in the CGIL and in local government did cooperation with the Communists continue: Nenni himself opposed any basic departures from earlier commitments in these two sectors.

Another token of autonomy was the PSI's decision to welcome secessionists from the Communist Party into its ranks. This policy came up for a vote in the PSI Parliamentary Group in 1957 when Antonio Giolitti, an ex-Communist Deputy from Cuneo, applied for admission. On this matter, Nenni obtained the support of Basso and the Morandians, with only the *carristi* remaining in opposition.<sup>19</sup> The admission of the popular Deputy from Cuneo was followed by the entry of other ex-Communists into the PSI, where they usually joined the ranks of Nenni's Autonomists.

Moreover, Nenni also used the threat of resignation to induce his party to vote in favor of the European Atomic Agreements and to abstain from voting on the European Common Market when these two issues arose in Parlia-

ment.<sup>20</sup> On these two points, the intransigent *carristi* stood alone in defying Nenni. And, it should be added, on both these issues the Communists voted nay. The PSI, then, was diverging abruptly from the Communist line. The prospect of finding broader European outlets for Italian products and surplus manpower was far too tempting to be ignored for the sake of timeworn Maximalist shibboleths.

Shortly before the 1958 elections, the Popular Unity Party, a splinter group led by Florentine and Milanese intellectuals, merged with the PSI. These new recruits were mostly former members of the defunct Action Party, favored a synthesis of liberalism and socialism, and tended to support the Autonomist faction in the PSI.<sup>21</sup>

In the 1958 elections, the PSI temporarily submerged its internal differences and presented a reasonably united front to the electorate. In a few electoral circumscriptions, to be sure, provincial party federations removed the names of some prominent members of minority factions from the lists of candidates. A handful of incumbent Deputies—both Autonomists and members of the Left faction—were denied renomination by their provincial organizations.<sup>22</sup> But in most instances, the PSI lists included the names of both Leftists and Autonomists. One case in point was the Autonomist stronghold of Milan-Pavia where several incumbents hostile to Nenni's policies were renominated, and two (Basso and Malagugini) were re-elected.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Stampa-Sera*, July 20–21, 1957.

<sup>21</sup> Two of the former top leaders of the Popular Unity Party, Codignola and Vittorelli, were among the members of the Nenni faction elected to the Central Committee at the Naples Congress of January, 1959. See *Corriere d'Informazione*, January 20, 1959.

<sup>22</sup> This was the case with the Autonomist Deputies Sampietro of Vercelli and Lopardi of L'Aquila, dropped from the PSI slates in Torino-Novara-Vercelli and L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo respectively. Similarly, the Forlì Federation refused to approve the renomination of a prominent Leftist Deputy (Lami) in Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forlì, and the Venice Federation attempted unsuccessfully to remove the name of Tonetti (another Leftist) from the PSI list in Venice-Treviso. See *La Nuova Stampa*, March 27, April 3, May 18, 1958; *Il Messaggero*, May 10, 1958; *Il Corriere della Sera*, May 16, 1958; and *Il Resto del Carlino*, May 10, 18, 1958.

<sup>23</sup> Albizzati and Malagugini are identified as Leftists by Roberto Serpieri, "Nella misura in cui. . .", *Critica Sociale*, Vol. 50 (October 5, 1958),

<sup>16</sup> See *La Nuova Stampa*, February 13–15, 1957.

<sup>17</sup> For example, Basso supported Nenni in his refusal to admit the two leaders of the *carristi*, Lussu and Pertini, to the Directorate. *La Nuova Stampa*, November 12, 1957.

<sup>18</sup> For example, the PSI withdrew from the organization of Peace Partisans. See *La Nuova Stampa*, May 24, 1957. And a prominent Nenni lieutenant, Francesco De Martino, withdrew from his hitherto active role in the Communist-sponsored Movement for the Rebirth of the South. See Giovanni Cervigni e Giuseppe Galasso, "Il Mezzogiorno e il Partito Socialista," *Nord e Sud*, Vol. 4 (May, 1957), pp. 24–25, 37–38.

<sup>19</sup> *La Nuova Stampa*, October 4, 1957.

The PSI emerged from the 1958 elections in a considerably strengthened posture. It had gained some 750,000 votes since 1953 and risen from 12.7 per cent to 14.2 per cent of the total vote. When all the returns were in, the PSI had increased its number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 75 to 84, as compared to a loss of 3 seats for the Communist Party.<sup>24</sup>

In the struggle for preference votes among the various factions, Nenni and his Autonomists had fared quite well. According to one observer—and later evidence tended to confirm this estimate—slightly more than half of the 84 Deputies were Autonomists.<sup>25</sup> While this outcome could hardly be described as a conclusive mandate for Nenni's policies, it represented a moral victory for a leader who had so little control over his own party machinery.

With the elections safely concluded, Nenni opened a major offensive against his opponents in the PSI. This time, the errors committed before the Venice Congress were avoided.<sup>26</sup> At every provincial congress, Nenni's followers presented an unequivocally Autonomist motion, which the Leftist factions could not underwrite without betraying their avowed principles. Consequently, an open pre-congress campaign ensued between three major factions: Nenni and his Autonomists, Basso and his followers, and the Left faction, formed as the result of a merger between *carristi* and Morandians, and led by Tullio Vecchiotti. For the first time since 1949, the rank and file was presented with clear alternatives embodied in three separate motions and three distinct slates of delegates.

Efforts by the Left and Basso to discredit Nenni by accusing him of opportunism only served to advance the Autonomist cause. In fact, some provincial congresses were aroused

against the Left by such personal slurs, for Nenni had been leader of the PSI almost uninterruptedly since the Liberation and to attack him was to attack the party. Seizing the advantage presented him by his opponents, Nenni made his own leadership the central issue. After a contest marked by regrettable but apparently customary non-participation by a majority of dues-paying members,<sup>27</sup> Nenni prevailed at the Congress of Naples in January, 1959. The Autonomist motion received 58.3 per cent of the votes, with 32.6 per cent going to the Left motion, and a mere 8.7 per cent to the Basso motion. The Autonomists won an absolute majority on the Central Committee, and an all-Autonomist Directorate was chosen.<sup>28</sup>

But the Autonomist victory had been slightly diluted in the course of the Naples Congress. In his speech to the delegates, Nenni had ruled out PSI support for a Christian Democratic Cabinet or a Left-Center coalition Cabinet ("the opening to the Left") and had declared that Socialist reunification could only be achieved within the PSI. He had then proceeded to base his autonomist line on "the Socialist alternative": the hope of building a Socialist Party strong enough to take full responsibility for governing Italy, or at any rate strong enough to precipitate a crisis in the ranks of Christian Democracy.<sup>29</sup> By taking this tack, Nenni effectively defended himself against the Leftist charge of opportunism and stole the issues his opponents had raised. The Congress, then, had certain face-saving features for the minority factions, and Nenni's astute tactics may well have prevented a party split.

p. 456. Both were renominated and Malagugini was re-elected. For the election results in Milan-Pavia, and the preference votes pooled by the various candidates, see *I Deputati e Senatori del Terzo Parlamento Repubblicano* (Roma, La Navicella, 1960), pp. 629-634.

<sup>24</sup> Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51. See also *I Deputati e Senatori del Terzo Parlamento Repubblicano*, *op. cit.*, p. XL for number of seats captured by PSI in 1958, and p. LXVII for comparison with 1953. The PSI Group in the Chamber was, soon after the elections, reinforced by 4 secessionist Deputies from the PSDI and totalled 88 members by 1959.

<sup>25</sup> See Paolo Pavolini, "I sette socialismi," *Il Mondo* (August 26, 1958), p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> On the pre-Congress campaign of 1958-59, see Glorioso, *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> At the Naples Congress of 1959, Basso charged that there had been widespread absenteeism at pre-Congress sectional assemblies. See Alessandro Pizzorno, "The Italian Socialist Party and Political Participation," *Prod.*, Vol. 3 (December, 1959), pp. 25-31. Pizzorno confirms the validity of this charge as applied to Milan, and ventures the assumption that Basso was substantially correct with regard to other parts of Italy as well. Babbini estimates that attendance at sectional assemblies averaged 30-35 per cent of total membership. See Paolo Babbini, "Anatomia del PSI," *Il Mulino*, Vol. 10 (March, 1961), p. 128.

<sup>28</sup> For the final results of the Naples Congress, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *33° Congresso Nazionale* (Milano-Roma, Edizioni Avanti!, 1959), pp. 422-428.

<sup>29</sup> For Nenni's speeches at the Naples Congress, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *ibid.*, pp. 10-41, and 395-403. His opening speech is commented on in *La Stampa*, January 16, 1959.



Since the Naples Congress, Nenni has moved more boldly along the road to collaboration with other democratic forces, thus revealing the purely tactical nature of his isolationist stand at Naples. By September, 1959, he had modified his "Socialist alternative" doctrine and had indicated his willingness to support a Left-Center Cabinet on an *ad hoc* basis (*i.e.*, support for those government measures which would promote social and technical progress and aid the development of a democratic life for the masses).<sup>30</sup> At a Central Committee meeting in May, 1960, he went so far as to declare that the Soviet Union shared the responsibility for the failure of the Summit Conference. More significantly, he announced that the PSI, no longer content with mere autonomy, was about to enter a new phase of open competition with the Communists.<sup>31</sup> Another sharp break with precedent came in August, 1960 on the vote of confidence for the Fanfani Cabinet: the PSI abstained from voting and thus in effect helped Fanfani win his required majority of those voting on the issue of confidence.<sup>32</sup> And finally, in the Spring of 1961, the PSI agreed to participate in Left-Center juntas (composed of Christian Democrats, Republicans, Social Democrats, and Socialists) in numerous communal and provincial governments—Milan, Florence, and Genoa were among the Italian cities which witnessed this re-entry of the PSI into the democratic camp locally.<sup>33</sup> In many other communal and provincial governments, to be sure, the PSI continued to participate in Communist-led juntas.

The PSI had come a long way from the days of the People's Democratic Front, but the internal struggle was by no means over.

<sup>30</sup> *La Stampa*, September 8, 1959.

<sup>31</sup> *La Stampa*, May 31, 1960.

<sup>32</sup> *Il Corriere della Sera*, August 4, 6, 1960. The Communists had voted against Fanfani on this occasion. For the first time in over a decade, the PSI was abandoning its policy of all-out opposition.

<sup>33</sup> The PSI entered Left-Center municipal juntas in the following provincial capitals: Milan, Genoa, Florence, Piacenza, Pavia, La Spezia, Forlì, Rieti. Similar Left-Center experiments were initiated in 25 other communes and in four provinces: Pavia, La Spezia, Avellino, Rieti. See Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale* (Milano, Edizioni Avanti!, 1961), p. 34 (Nenni's report). More recently, the PSI has entered the Sicilian regional government in collaboration with the Christian Democrats, and has agreed to support a Left-Center cabinet in the national government.

Defeated at Naples, the PSI Left and the Basso faction still posed an active threat to the aspirations of the PSI's present leaders. Open manifestations of rebellion have not been lacking. After the Central Committee meeting of May, 1960, for instance, 28 PSI Deputies and 16 PSI Senators belonging to the Left faction signed an open letter, printed in the official Communist daily *Unità*, protesting against the attitude of Nenni and his Directorate in regard to the failure of the Summit Conference.<sup>34</sup> Fifteen Basso Senators and Deputies were reported as sympathizing with the 44 signatories. The second gesture of rebellion took place when the PSI abstained on the vote of confidence in Fanfani. This decision, taken by the PSI Directorate, was so bitterly criticized by so many members of the PSI Parliamentary Group that Nenni refused to call for a vote by the Group on the issue, but simply insisted that the Group must conform to the decisions of the party executive organ.<sup>35</sup> In protest against this decision, which entailed indirect PSI collaboration with the Center parties, 41 PSI Deputies belonging to both the Basso and Left factions signed an open letter to the official party daily *Avanti!*, indicating their dissent and asserting that they were submitting to the authority of the Directorate only out of regard for party discipline.<sup>36</sup> It was evident, at this time, that Nenni's control over his own Parliamentary Group verged on the precarious.

The clearest and most disturbing evidence of the continued strength of the opposition factions was furnished by the Milan Congress of March, 1961.<sup>37</sup> Despite the fact that Nenni had enjoyed full control of the central party organs since 1959, the followers of Vecchietti and Basso were able to hold their ground, and even gain slightly, at the provincial level. At the Milan Congress, the Autonomists received 55.1 per cent of the total votes (a drop of 3.2 percentage points since 1959), while Basso obtained 6.9 per cent (a drop of 1.8 points), and the Left showed some improvement with 35.1 per cent (a rise of 2.5 points). A minor Leftist motion sponsored by Sandro Pertini received about 1.1 per cent of the votes. Disillusionment over the results of the local and provincial elections of November, 1960, resentment against a

<sup>34</sup> *Unità*, May 31, 1960.

<sup>35</sup> *Il Corriere della Sera*, August 3, 1960.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, August 7, 1960. Their names appear in *Avanti!*, August 6, 1960.

<sup>37</sup> See Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.* Results of the Congress are summarized on pp. 264-270. See also *La Nazione*, March 21, 1961.

Christian Democratic Party which seemed to be unable to come to a firm decision regarding a future alliance with the PSI, and a deterioration of the international climate since the failure of the Summit Conference—these factors tended to bolster the opposition. The unity of the Autonomists was somewhat weakened (though the unity of the party may have been furthered) by the crystallization of an Autonomist sub-faction headed by Riccardo Lombardi.<sup>38</sup> Lombardi seemed to take a milder, more conciliatory approach to the Leftist opposition and insisted on representation of the minority factions in the Directorate. In the Directorate which emerged from the Milan Congress, all factions were represented. The Autonomists had a majority, but many conservative reporters held that Lombardi's sub-faction (whose objectives and consistency are not quite clear at this point) could, at any time, combine with the Left and Basso to deprive Nenni of his majority.<sup>39</sup> The outcome of the intra-party power struggle in the PSI still remained a bit uncertain.

Finally, it should be observed that the PSI is still associated with the Communist Party in the trade-union movement and in many local and provincial governments. Partly because of the need to prevent a party split, partly because Socialist withdrawal from the CGIL and from Communist-led local juntas would cost the PSI many thousands of jobs and some lucrative sources of financial support, partly because he does not want coalitions with Centrist parties in areas where the Left is traditionally dominant, Nenni has thus far been reluctant to take the final decisive steps toward repudiating all ties with the Communists.

Thus, as we have seen, the march toward autonomy has been a long and difficult one, and has entailed the resurgence of intense factional conflict. The factions which have emerged

from this period of strife are organized almost like miniature parties. Each has its own periodical (*Mondo Operaio* for the Autonomist Directorate, *Problemi del Socialismo* for the Basso group, and *Mondo Nuovo* for the Left), and the Left faction has its own press agency in Rome. Whenever a faction does not control the official party organization in a given province, it will often create its own machine, paralleling and—to some degree—competing with the provincial party organs. Also, some provincial federations openly flout national directives; and factions, on their own authority and with the use of their own funds, will sometimes transfer party bureaucrats from one province to another in an effort to promote factional interest.<sup>40</sup> Finally, we should take note of the high degree of cohesion and continuity displayed within PSI factions: in the period from 1959 to 1961, although the Autonomist faction monopolized the national executive organs of the party, the control of only 10 out of 102 federations changed hands.<sup>41</sup>

The preceding account of the PSI's arduous return to an autonomous status reveals the importance of a great national leader, who can personify the movement and appear indispensable to the great mass of party members. Most party members are apathetic, immune to ideological appeals, unable to understand the subtle dialectics of the party congresses. For many of these soldiers in the ranks, the party is little more than a symbol, a traditional object of loyalty. A national party leader who can obtain the affection and reverence of the masses, and who can become, in the public mind, the living embodiment of the party, has an enormous advantage over his less prominent associates, no matter how deeply entrenched the latter may be in the various executive and administrative organs of the party.<sup>42</sup> The threat to resign, mentioned by Michels,<sup>43</sup> is an especially potent weapon when wielded by a venerated leader like Nenni—though it might

<sup>38</sup> Many commentators, of diverse political shadings, speculated about the Lombardi sub-group. See *La Nazione* (an independent conservative paper), March 21, 31, 1961; *Il Corriere della Sera* (independent conservative), March 19, 1961; *Il Paese* (independent pro-Communist), March 31, 1961; and Antonio Gambino, "Hanno ricominciato a discutere tra loro," *L'Espresso* (independent Radical and anti-clerical), March 26, 1961, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> The Autonomists had 14 seats on the Directorate, while 6 were allotted to the Left and 1 to Basso. But according to *La Nazione*, March 31, 1961, 6 of the 14 Autonomists are supporters of Lombardi.

<sup>40</sup> See article by Giacomo Mancini in *Avanti!*, February 12, 1961. See also Babbini, *loc. cit.*, pp. 12-13. These generalizations apply primarily to the two largest factions.

<sup>41</sup> See Partito Socialista Italiano, *33° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, pp. 542-545, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-448, for provincial breakdowns of factional strength.

<sup>42</sup> For an account of the influence of the Nenni myth on local discussion and decisions, see the article by Cesare Bassi in *Avanti!*, January 10, 1959.

<sup>43</sup> See Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York, Dover Publications, 1959), pp. 45-48.

prove quite inadequate in the hands of his successor, who would not personify the heroic period of the anti-Fascist struggle as Nenni does. Possessing an influence which borders on the charismatic, a revered party leader can prevail over a hostile party "apparatus," especially when the "apparatus" cannot remain united. In fact, one might go so far as to suggest that, in a democratic mass party, a party bureaucracy, united only by common function, can never successfully resist the mystical appeal of the recognized party leader who has either founded the party or has led it during one of the crucial periods of its history. As we shall see, a party bureaucracy, under such circumstances, is unlikely to maintain its cohesion.

## II. FACTIONS IN THE PSI—SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS

Closer investigation of the three major PSI factions permits us to formulate certain general statements which may be tested for their relevance in other political environments. We may begin by noting the astounding fluidity of intra-party politics even in a branch-type party like the PSI, where factions possess a relatively high degree of cohesion and continuity and have their own highly articulated organizational structures. For each faction is merely a temporary coalition among various more or less cohesive sub-groups. The Left faction, for instance, included the *carristi*, open supporters of a permanent alliance with the Communist Party; veteran Maximalists of pre-Fascist vintage, who were animated primarily by the traditional Maximalist fear of the contaminating effects of collaboration with bourgeois parties; the young intellectuals of *Mondo Operaio*, who professed Leninist ideals but insisted on a thoroughgoing revision of Stalinist doctrines and methods; and the Morandians—young party bureaucrats who had risen to power in the party "apparatus" during the period of close collaboration with the Communist Party and who were seeking to protect their acquired positions in the PSI bureaucracy and their habitual routines of close partnership with their Communist allies. The Autonomist faction presented an even more heterogeneous appearance: former members of the Action Party, including the aforementioned Riccardo Lombardi; ex-Communists, who had seceded from the Communist Party after the Hungarian Revolution; an assortment of young intellectuals of miscellaneous origins, including contributors to *Il Ponte* and *Critica Sociale*; a large nucleus of party bureaucrats and former followers of Morandi—men similar in background and function to the Morandians who

backed the Left; and a motley collection of local "clientele" leaders (especially numerous in Central and Southern Italy), whose standing in the PSI depended on their vote-getting talents.<sup>44</sup>

Given the heterogeneity of each of the major intra-party factions, victory on the part of a single faction only opens a new phase of the intra-party process—for the component sub-groups are promptly subjected to a powerful centrifugal force: the divisions which decision-making responsibility must inevitably entail. And this same centrifugal force, offset somewhat by the common goal of overthrowing the faction in power, affects the minority factions as well.

Illustrations of this centrifugal tendency come readily to mind. If we go back to the early 20th Century, we may observe how the Reformist faction, victorious in the 1910 Congress by a wide margin, split in 1911 over the issue of the Libyan War, and lost control of the PSI in 1912.<sup>45</sup> And in 1961, the sudden and perhaps short-lived emergence of a new Lombardian sub-group within the Autonomist faction—a sub-group whose goals appeared to be the maintenance of party unity, the conciliation of the Left faction, and the adoption of preventive measures against a possible opportunistic degeneration of the autonomist policy—constituted another example.<sup>46</sup> Behind the relative stability of inter-party power relations in a multi-party system, there exists a more volatile situation of intra-party struggle, in which sub-groups are continuously clustering around parent factions and breaking off to form new factions or to join a new parent body.

We may also observe the limited utility of certain traditional categories in analyzing intra-party factional conflict. The party

<sup>44</sup> On the sub-groups in the PSI, see Pavolini *loc. cit.*, pp. 3-4; Umberto Segre, "Un partito moderno?", *Comunità*, Vol. 13 (February, 1959), pp. 3-7; and Gambino, *loc. cit.*, p. 3. A forthcoming article by Antonio Landolfi, to be published soon in *Tempi Moderni*, should provide us with a more extensive treatment of this subject. It should be noted in passing that, since *Mondo Operaio* is presently controlled by the Autonomist faction, its former collaborators now contribute articles to the Left organ, *Mondo Nuovo*.

<sup>45</sup> See Pedone, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-214.

<sup>46</sup> On Lombardi and his views, see Segre, "Un partito moderno?", *loc. cit.*, p. 6; Gambino, *loc. cit.*; and Lombardi's speech at the Milan Congress, Partito Socialista Italiano, 34° Congresso Nazionale, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-168.

bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, the trade-union officials, the old guard, the new generation of leaders, are all examples of the type of functional or occupational explanation which can prove particularly beguiling for an observer who is attempting to interpret factional conflicts. Michels' discussion of intra-party politics is a case in point.<sup>47</sup> But if we descend from the lofty vantage point of the national stage and begin to investigate and compare regional and local situations, and to subject our factions to closer scrutiny, we find that it is not quite so easy to force our data into these convenient pigeon-holes. There were, for instance, sizeable nuclei of young intellectuals in each of the three major PSI factions in 1961.<sup>48</sup> And a recent study of Parliamentary personnel reveals that Autonomist PSI Deputies and Left PSI Deputies yielded approximately similar percentages of university graduates. Nor did the two groups of Deputies differ to any very significant degree in the percentage of career party officials they contained: 25.9 per cent of the Left Deputies were classed as political activists as against 19.6 per cent of the Autonomists.<sup>49</sup> Morandian *apparatchiks* like Dario Valori and Vincenzo Gatto supported the Left faction, but other Morandians like Venerio Cattani and Luciano Paolicchi backed Nenni's Autonomists.<sup>50</sup> Even the party bureaucracy, then, with its alleged *esprit de corps*, fails us.

It would be interesting to determine what factors were responsible for the varying choices made by provincial party bureaucrats who—in a party characterized by a large measure of provincial autonomy—did not usually need to fear retaliation on the part of the central party leadership. Studies of the attitudes and behavior of local political elites would seem to promise richer harvests than the more familiar

voting behavior studies; in this connection, the work of Cervigni and Galasso on the PSI in Southern Italy represents an invaluable pioneering venture which has dispelled many illusions regarding the alleged character of the PSI as a "party of the masses."<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately, their investigation was completed in 1956, when factional conflict in the PSI was just beginning to come into the open.

An investigation of the *raison d'être* of the three major factions in the PSI reveals a multiplicity of overlapping motivations which serve to promote the division of a national party into warring factions. Shared values (the issue of individual liberty, the old Maximalist-Reformist schism) played a role. And yet, by 1961, there were very few avowed anti-libertarians in the Leftist group. Moreover, all factions appeared to attract men of widely diverse ideological pedigrees, as well as many Southern "clientele" leaders who seemed to be primarily concerned with winning elections.

Strategic considerations also served to differentiate the major factions. Such questions as the alliance with the Communists, the possibility of reunification with the Social Democrats, and the desirability of early collaboration with the Christian Democrats all served to differentiate Nenni on the one hand from Basso and the Left on the other. Basso, who shared the Left's distrust of the Center parties and its nostalgia for the old Communist alliance, seemed to be trying to achieve a synthesis between the two largest contending factions, avoiding the excesses of each (Social Democratic opportunism or slavish pro-Communism), and thus safeguard party unity and mitigate factional strife.<sup>52</sup>

The factor of affinity based on common interests, origins, or functions appears to be rather difficult to isolate. As we have already observed, the "apparatus" did not maintain a united front. Experience in the Resistance was a dominant motif for some sentimental pro-Communist *carristi*, but many other ex-members of the anti-Fascist underground did not allow sentiment and ancient memories to

<sup>47</sup> See Michels, *Political Parties*, *op. cit.*, especially Part Two, ch. 6, and Part Four, chs. 2-6. Michels was, however, aware of the possibility that conflicts may arise for ideological or personal reasons. See *ibid.*, pp. 167-168.

<sup>48</sup> See Pavolini, *loc. cit.*

<sup>49</sup> Giovanni Sartori has completed an exhaustive and penetrating comparative survey of Italian Deputies and their educational, social, and professional backgrounds. This analysis has been published in the Winter, 1961, issue of the *International Social Science Journal*. My computations are based on the raw data which Professor Sartori was kind enough to let me consult.

<sup>50</sup> See Pavolini, *loc. cit.* On Cattani, see Umberto Segre, "Il duello dei prossimi due anni," *L'Illustrazione Italiana*, Vol. 86 (February, 1959), p. 19.

<sup>51</sup> See Giovanni Cervigni and Giuseppe Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *Nord e Sud*, Vol. 3 (March, 1956); the entire issue is devoted to a study of the PSI.

<sup>52</sup> On positions taken by the various PSI factions, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, *passim*, but especially pp. 32-44, 64-66, 69-73, 107-109, 116-122, 220-221, 244-245. Basso's statement of his purposes is best summarized on pp. 220-221.

affect their vision of the political situation. Former members of the Action Party (which had itself been a rather motley organization with a plethora of internal currents) were active in roughly equal proportions in all factions. But we do note that, among Autonomist Deputies, there was a much higher percentage of former members of other parties (47.8 per cent) than was the case with the Left (32.2 per cent).<sup>53</sup>

Intimate ties with the Communists in Communist-dominated agricultural cooperatives have occasionally been pointed out as constituting a possible explanation for the Leftist tendencies of the PSI in the Emilian provinces of Reggio Emilia and Ravenna.<sup>54</sup> But this hypothesis appears less plausible when we observe the strongly autonomist character of the PSI in the Emilian provinces of Bologna and Ferrara, where Communist-led cooperatives were also numerous and economically potent.<sup>55</sup> Nor did the CGIL as an interest group present a façade of factional unity. Many of its leaders backed Basso in 1957, but some of these (Santi and Brodolini) defected to Nenni at the Naples Congress of 1959, while others (Foà) joined the Left, and still others (Avolio) remained faithful to their leader.<sup>56</sup> It would appear, then, that affinity based on common interests, origins, or functions played a relatively secondary role in determining factional alignments in the PSI; or, in any event, while material and functional motivations undoubtedly existed, they did not crystallize into readily identifiable patterns.

The survival of local cliques in a branch-type party like the PSI was especially marked in the agricultural areas of Central and Southern Italy. The leaders of many of these clientele backed Nenni because his faction seemed likely to prevail and because he enjoyed the support of the party electorate. Such Deputies as Andò, Mayor of Giarre (Catania Province), seemed to be primarily concerned with retaining the support of the town, province, or interest group to whose preference votes they owed their election.<sup>57</sup> And yet some clientele

leaders did not run true to form: Deputy Paolucci of Chieti—described by Cervigni and Galasso as being a clientele leader with autonomist leanings—later signed the aforementioned open letter of protest against Nenni's failure to take a clear anti-Western stand with regard to the collapse of the Summit Conference.<sup>58</sup> Here again, the motivation of local elites stands out as a fundamental problem whose exploration might open many doors.

As we can see, then, shared values, shared strategic conceptions, affinity based on common interests or functions, the instinct for survival of purely personal local cliques, and the charismatic appeal of a great national leader were all instrumental in dividing the PSI. But any assignment of relative weight to these various factors would seem to be a virtually hopeless task at the national level. On the regional or local level, on the other hand, a study of factional motivations may yield interesting insights into the effect of environment on the formation of intra-party groupings. In any heterogeneous society, with a variety of political traditions and contexts, an understanding of intra-party politics cannot be achieved except by plunging into the complex diversity of provincial and local political situations.

In an earlier article, we inquired whether any relationship existed between the political coloration, economic character, or social structure of a given area, and the relative strength of different factions within a party in that area.<sup>59</sup> For instance, we asked, does the intransigent (or the moderate) wing of a Socialist party tend to flourish most successfully in a certain specific type of political environment? Empirical research has yielded some suggestive indications of this sort—indications which must be qualified by citing ubiquitous exceptions—but no water-tight conclusions.

It has been noted, for example, that the Autonomists were stronger in the larger, wealthier, more powerful PSI provincial federations boasting the most numerous membership.<sup>60</sup> Thus, the seven biggest federations

<sup>53</sup> Computations are based on raw data collected by Professor Sartori for his article, *loc. cit.*

<sup>54</sup> See *La Nuova Stampa*, May 3, 1958, and *Il Corriere della Sera*, April 29, May 3, 1958. For data on factional coloration of the several provinces, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, pp. 443–448.

<sup>55</sup> See *Il Messaggero*, May 17, 1958, and *Il Corriere della Sera*, April 29, 1958.

<sup>56</sup> See "Speciale," *L'Espresso*, January 11, 1959, p. 2.

<sup>57</sup> On Southern and Central Italian clienteles, see Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali,"

*loc. cit.*, *passim*, but especially pp. 6–12, 33–39, 102, 147–152; and Pera, *loc. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>58</sup> See above, note 34, and Cervigni and Galasso, *ibid.*, pp. 26–27.

<sup>59</sup> See Raphael Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4 (February 1960), pp. 46–51.

<sup>60</sup> Pavolini, *loc. cit.* See also Sigfrido Ciccotti, "Nenni's Party at the Crossroads," *New Leader*, Vol. 41 (December 1, 1958), pp. 9–10.

(Milan, Mantua, Bologna, Ferrara, Florence, Rome, and Naples)—each having over 10,000 PSI members—were all under Autonomist control. One observer has attributed this phenomenon to the alleged fact that small and medium-sized federations were more likely to need outside assistance, in the form of activists and financial subsidies, and were therefore (in 1958–59) more likely to be amenable to guidance on the part of the “apparatus” and of the Communists.<sup>61</sup> This suggestion, which implies a close connection between organizational strength and political moderation in a provincial subdivision of a Socialist party, probably contains a kernel of truth and deserves further exploration. But there is some strong negative evidence which we cannot afford to overlook: the very large number of small Autonomist federations, of which 15 had less than 2500 members.

Some link also appears to exist between the strength of political Catholicism in a given area and the predominance of opposition factions in the PSI. Thus, while the anti-Nenni elements in the PSI controlled only 39 of the 92 provinces of Italy, they held a majority in 10 of the 19 provinces in which the Christian Democrats had succeeded in obtaining an absolute majority of the popular vote in 1958.<sup>62</sup> And if we confine our analysis to Northern and Central Italy, omitting five Southern provinces where DC strength had been swelled by an influx of Rightist votes and where political Catholicism had not made much progress before the advent of Fascism,<sup>63</sup> we are left with 14 provinces of which 8 were governed by opposition factions. These eight provinces were all concentrated in the Veneto and in North Lombardy, the two “white” regions *par*

*excellence*, whose devout masses had boycotted Italian general elections in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries in obedience to the Papal doctrine of *non expedit*.<sup>64</sup> Catholicism here tended to be conservative but paternalistic, quick to respond to social grievances but insistent on obedience to clerical directives. The strong vein of popular support for the clergy was further strengthened in the early 20th Century by the creation of a dense network of Catholic unions, peasant leagues, and cooperatives. In this type of environment, the Marxist parties had always been at a disadvantage.<sup>65</sup> Extremism and intransigence in the PSI could well be a reaction against PSI weakness, against the party's inability to challenge clerical hegemony. Another possible explanation, but one which lacks any empirical confirmation, might be the absorption into the “white” organizations of many local cadres who, in a less Catholic context, would have swelled the ranks of the Reformist faction in the PSI.

There appear, then, to be some indications of a connection between intransigence in a working-class movement and electoral weakness *vis-à-vis* a traditionally dominant Catholic party. Here again we must emphasize the existence of notable exceptions to the tendency we have just described: Bergamo, one of the classic “white” provinces of Northern Italy, is in the Autonomist camp, as is Trento, the home province of the late Alcide DeGasperi. In a situation characterized by a multiplicity of social and economic environments and by sharply divergent historical experiences (the Veneto and Lombardy had once been under Austrian rule), we must learn to live with multiple causality and forgo premature insistence on precise evaluation of the significance of various factors. The common strand which Key was able to employ to unravel the tangled reality of Southern politics eludes us here.

Socialist unwillingness to break away from an alliance with the Communists is sometimes attributed to an inferiority complex resulting from the superior strength of the Communist Party and the consequent Socialist fear of losing contact with the bulk of the working class. Yet when we examine the 30 provinces in which the Communist Party outpolled the PSI by

<sup>61</sup> See Pavolini, *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> For voting percentages, province by province, for the 1958 elections, see “Italia. Elezioni 1956–58–60: confronti percentuali per provincie,” *Tempi Moderni*, Vol. 4 (January–March, 1961), pp. 127–134.

<sup>63</sup> See Francesco Compagna and Vittorio De Caprariis, *Studi di geografia elettorale (1946–1958)*, (Napoli, Centro Studi “Nord e Sud,” 1959), p. 25 and Tables VII and VIII. I am using Braga's sociological classification of Italian provinces. He includes several Central Italian provinces (Lucca, Massa, Ferrara, Parma, Piacenza) in Northwest Italy on socio-economic grounds, and also includes two Southern Italian provinces (Pescara, Teramo) in Central Italy, and three Central Italian provinces (Roma, Latina, Frosinone) in Southern Italy. See Giorgio Braga, *Il Comunismo fra gli italiani* (Milano, Comunità, 1956), ch. 3.

<sup>64</sup> See Roberto Michels, *Il Proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano* (Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1908), pp. 217–218.

<sup>65</sup> See *Il Messaggero*, May 8, 1958. See also Luigi Preti, *Le lotte agrarie nella Valle Padana* (Torino, Einaudi, 1955), pp. 92, 120, 141, 223–224, 226–227, 240, 323–324, 356–358.

more than a 2-1 margin, we find that the Left faction controlled the PSI in only 14 of those provinces—46.7% of the 30 provinces, as compared to 42.3% of all Italian provinces in the hands of the Left. And, again, if we observe the 16 provinces in which the PSI outpolled the Communists in 1958, and in which by rearranging our hypothesis we would expect to find a sturdily independent variety of Socialism, we note that 8 of those 16 provinces were also controlled by the Left faction in 1961. To be sure, these eight Left provinces were all located in the "white" regions of the Veneto and North Lombardy, where an outnumbered PSI might regard a still weaker Communist Party not as a dangerous competitor, but as an indispensable ally against a Catholic mass party with deep roots in the countryside.

Thus far, our investigation fails to yield significant results. But if we break up our sample into component regions, discarding the South with its personal clienteles, we are left with 12 provinces in Central Italy—the vast sharecropping region which includes Northern Abruzzi, Northern Latium, Tuscany, Umbria, the Marches, and most of Emilia—in which the Communists outpolled the PSI by a margin of over 2-1.<sup>65</sup> And here we observe that, while the Left faction controlled the PSI in only half of the provinces of Central Italy, it managed to dominate three-fourths of those 12 Central Italian provinces where the power relationship between the Communist Party and the PSI was particularly unbalanced in favor of the former. Also, there were only five provinces (all in Central Italy) in which the Communists polled over 40 per cent of the votes—and the PSI in all but one of these was controlled by the Left faction.

Also in this instance, then, a position of weakness apparently favored the intransigent wing. In Central Italy, where a major proportion of the municipal and provincial governments were run by Communist-Socialist coalitions, support of Nenni's policies in provinces where the PSI was heavily outnumbered might lead to a unilateral rupture of the Communist-Socialist alliance, ouster of the Socialists from the local government, and loss of much patronage. Socialists were perhaps more likely to affect an independent stance in provinces where they commanded more than one-third of the Leftist votes and could regard themselves as equal partners, rather than as tolerated guests, in the local and provincial administrations. In the South, where the Socialists and Com-

munist together were nowhere near an absolute majority of the total vote, the relative strength of the two Leftist parties was less relevant. And even in Central Italy, the tendency we have just traced was by no means universal.

In Southern Italy, where Christian Democracy is prone to ally itself with the extreme Right,<sup>67</sup> there appears to be a significant relationship between the total strength of the Left-of-Center parties in a given province and the ability of the Autonomist faction to dominate the PSI in that province. Thus, in 12 Southern provinces, the four Left-of-Center parties combined (Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans) received less than 35 per cent of the vote in 1958. The PSI in no less than seven of these provinces was dominated by the Left in 1961. In short, Left opposition factions, which controlled the PSI in only about 40 per cent of the provinces in Southern Italy, held the upper hand in nearly 60 per cent of those provinces where the Left-of-Center parties were especially weak. And conversely, of those nine provinces where the Left-of-Center parties had polled over 40 per cent of the votes in 1958, only one had a Left-dominated PSI in 1961. The frustration experienced by Socialists in provinces firmly controlled by clerical and authoritarian clienteles may well have strengthened the forces of intransigence, whereas more moderate elements may have been encouraged by the more competitive situation in another group of Southern provinces.

In Northwest Italy, we may note that the Autonomists tended to prevail in provinces where the Socialist peasant leagues had been particularly strong and well organized before World War I. Of the eight provinces in Northwest Italy where rural Socialism had gained a firm foothold before 1914, by organizing the *braccianti* (farm laborers hired on a day-by-day basis),<sup>68</sup> all but one were held by the Autonomists in 1961. In Central Italy, the Left faction was more successful in controlling provinces with long Socialist traditions; but here, as we have seen, the predominance of the Communists was especially marked. Where Socialism has been long established, has created a network of economic and social organizations, has not been completely overshadowed by a dominant Communist Party,

<sup>67</sup> See Giovanni Cervigni, "La frana meridionale," *Il Mondo*, February 16, 1960, p. 1.

<sup>68</sup> These provinces (Ferrara, Parma, Piacenza, Pavia, Novara, Vercelli, Mantova, Cremona) are referred to by Preti in *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>66</sup> Again, I am using Braga's sociological classification. See note 63 above.



and has trained a generation of local and provincial cadres accustomed to exercising power at the local level, there is more likelihood that moderation and compromise will prevail in Socialist ranks. Contrariwise, where the Socialist movement has been established relatively recently, and has not yet had the time or the means to permeate the local power structure (as, for example, in Sardinia and parts of the Veneto), intransigence is likely to be the product of impotence and inexperience.

We must not, of course, jump to the conclusion that there is always an unbroken line of continuity between pre-Fascist Reformist Socialism and present-day Autonomism. Provinces like Parma and Ferrara—both Autonomist in 1961—were ruled by the extremist Syndicalist faction before World War I, while the Left won out in 1961 in the province of Reggio Emilia, once the Reformist fief of Camillo Prampolini and his cooperative movement.<sup>69</sup> We are isolating possibly influential factors, not stating invariable relationships.

Metropolitan areas, where the most powerful Socialist federations were often located, also tended to be especially Autonomist in their leanings. Of 12 provinces containing cities with populations in excess of 250,000, the PSI was under Autonomist rule in 10 in 1961—Turin and Palermo being the two exceptions. Thus, moderate Socialism also seemed to flourish in great metropolitan centers where the rising importance of the tertiary (service) sector of the economy tended to blur the distinction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and masses of white-collar workers had to be reckoned with by the various political parties.

Does industrialization have a moderating effect on Socialism, as some Italian observers suggest? It has been asserted, in this connection, that the great industrial centers (with the exception of Turin, where the CGIL has been thrown on the defensive by its own internal divisions and by unusually ruthless discriminatory policies on the part of the FIAT management), were virtually all in Autonomist hands.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 136–138, 294–298, 425.

<sup>70</sup> On Turin see "Problemi della Società Italiana—I Socialisti a Torino," *Il Mulino*, Vol. 8 (August, 1959), pp. 104–107, and Eugenio Scalfari, "La sconfitta degli operai," *L'Espresso*, July 2, 1961, pp. 8–9. During an interview with a close student of PSI affairs, I was informed that the PSI in Turin had lost contact with the working class, as a result of its refusal to allow PSI union leaders in the FIAT works to secede from the CGIL without facing expulsion from their party.

And in fact, of 9 provinces in Northwest Italy which had over 30 per cent of the labor force employed in manufacturing industries, 7 were under Autonomist control: the other exception, Como, was located in "white" North Lombardy.<sup>71</sup> In the rest of Italy only three provinces had over 30 per cent of their labor force engaged in manufacturing: two (Vicenza and Gorizia) were located in the "white" Venetian zone and were both characterized by Leftist domination of the PSI provincial organization; the other (Florence) was solidly Autonomist. Our evidence is only suggestive, to be sure; but there does appear to be some relationship between degree of industrialization (and, as a corollary, extent of labor organization)<sup>72</sup> and moderation in a Socialist movement.

It should be added, however, as a healthy antidote to the heavy dose of environmental determinism implicit in the analysis thus far, that in many cases the prestige and influence of a provincial or regional leader would set the tone for the federation and would overcome traditional attitudes and other historical or social factors. Although the party "apparatus" was ineffective and incohesive as a national force, its members could be very influential in their respective bailiwicks. For example in Calabria, Cosenza Province had an essentially Maximalist tradition, whereas pre-1922 Socialism in Reggio Calabria Province had been Reformist in orientation. But the unquestioned leader of the PSI in Cosenza after World War II was Giacomo Mancini, whose father had founded the Socialist Party in that province. Mancini, strongly pro-Communist during the immediate postwar period, gradually became converted to an Autonomist viewpoint, and he led his provincial federation into the Nenni fold. On the other hand, Reggio Calabria, despite its Reformist background,

<sup>71</sup> Statistics on percentage of industrial workers were computed from data compiled in Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Annuario di Statistiche Provinciali, 1959* (Roma, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1959), pp. 24–25, 28–29. The provinces in question were Milan, Turin, Genoa, Como, Varese, Novara, Vercelli, Bergamo, Pavia.

<sup>72</sup> Another interesting datum in this connection is provided by a study of trade-union elections in plants employing over 1,000 workers. Of the 14 provinces in which the CGIL polled its highest percentages, 11 were provinces in which the PSI was autonomist in character. See "Le Commissioni interne in Italia nelle 310 aziende con più di 1,000 dipendenti: risultati elettorali dal 1956 al 1959," *Tempi Moderni*, Vol. 3 (October–December, 1960), p. 13.



There may be numerous reasons for the prevalence of multifactionalism in the PSI. Italian political attitudes, which view secessionists with indulgence and consequently increase the ever-present danger of a party split, may help to explain the Integralist-Basso phenomenon. Then, too, given the traditional autonomy enjoyed by PSI provincial federations, dissident leaders may fortify themselves at the grass roots without feeling compelled to join forces for mutual self-protection against the majority faction. And finally, the great prevalence of intellectuals and university graduates in the directive organs and party congresses of the PSI tends to encourage continuous differentiation of conceptual schemes and strategic approaches.<sup>80</sup> To be sure, the multi-party system increases the number of alternatives and, by so doing, creates an added potential for multi-factionalism. But it appears to be less the multi-party system itself than the political culture in which that system thrives, which tends to encourage multi-factionalism. For instance, a certain disdain for "vulgar" empiricism is, among many Italian intellectuals, a subconscious by-product of Croceian idealism and may militate against the process of bargaining and mutual accommodation which is indispensable for a reconciliation of conflicting factional stands. In any event, it is fairly obvious that no single factor, such as the triple set of alternatives posed by the question of alliances, should be given undue weight.

The study of the PSI throws some additional light on questions connected with party structure. For instance, it becomes apparent from our examination of intra-party processes that in many parts of Italy the PSI failed to live up to Duverger's model of a branch-type party.<sup>81</sup> It had, to be sure, a highly articulated structure, complete with local sections and shop nuclei, provincial federations, national representative, executive and disciplinary organs, a party bureaucracy, and a party statute which spelled out disciplinary procedures and defined

the relationship between the various organs. It had about 500,000 dues-paying members.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, it published two daily newspapers and several periodicals, maintained auxiliary feminine and youth organizations, and purported to require the participation of all members in party affairs.<sup>83</sup> It appeared in these respects, then, to correspond to Duverger's definition of a branch-type party, which seeks not only to win elections but also to attract and educate a mass membership.

But the PSI also possessed some characteristics reminiscent of a caucus-type party. The dominant role played by local notables was quite striking: doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, shopkeepers, and union officials often dominated party affairs at the local level on the basis of personal popularity.<sup>84</sup> Many party functions and organs existed largely on paper. And the party rank-and-file revealed an amazing lack of interest in party affairs. Before the crucial Naples Congress of 1959, at a time when sharp factional conflict added an element of drama to party business, less than 35 per cent of the party membership took part in the election of delegates to the provincial congresses.<sup>85</sup> Nor was this apathy confined to the backward rural South; in the large Milan Federation, only 7,500 out of approximately 30,000 registered members showed any active interest in the most important and hotly contested pre-Congress campaign the PSI had faced in a decade.<sup>86</sup> To be sure, there was a higher degree of participation in the pre-convention campaign which led to the Milan Congress of 1961. But our point is, that classifications based on formal party structure may, in the absence of continual observation and analysis of intra-party processes, produce serious distortions in our view of empirical reality.

The vaunted party "apparatus" is another case in point. The term itself conjures up visions of ruthless monolithic power. Yet, when Italian observers finally subjected the PSI bureaucracy to closer examination, it turned out to be little more than a bare skeleton composed of 500 salaried officials. Many of its

<sup>80</sup> For the pre-1910 period, see Michels, *Il Proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano*, op. cit., pp. 88-114. My assessment of the current situation is based on Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," loc. cit., pp. 14-17, and on my talks with Antonio Landolfi, whose forthcoming article in *Tempi Moderni* will presumably touch on this point.

<sup>81</sup> For his discussion of caucus-type and branch-type parties, see Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 1954), pp. 1-3, 17-27, 120, 152-154.

<sup>82</sup> See Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, op. cit., p. 264.

<sup>83</sup> The PSI Statute requires active participation in party affairs as a duty of every party member. See Article 2 of the PSI Statute reproduced in Mario D'Antonio and Guglielmo Negri, *Raccolta degli Statuti dei partiti politici in Italia* (Milano, Giuffrè, 1958), pp. 152-153.

<sup>84</sup> Pavolini, loc. cit., and Pera, loc. cit., passim.

<sup>85</sup> Babbini, loc. cit., p. 128.

<sup>86</sup> See Pizzorno, loc. cit., pp. 25-26.

came under the control of a group of young Leftists after the 1948 electoral defeat of the PSI. The leader of this coterie, a lawyer named Rocco Minasi, was able to oust what remained of the Reformist Old Guard and turn Reggio Calabria into a stronghold of the Leftist faction.<sup>73</sup>

Similar cases occurred elsewhere in Italy. The Naples Federation was strongly Leftist until its leader, Francesco De Martino, was won over to the Autonomist cause by Nenni early in 1957. The same was true of Brindisi and its leader, Marino Guadalupi, whose shift to an Autonomist stand was barely under way in 1956.<sup>74</sup> Nor was this phenomenon of personal initiative limited to Southern Italy, habitat of the local clique. In politically mature Emilia, in North Central Italy, Bologna and Ferrara had been two of the most strongly pro-Communist provinces in the PSI organization during the 1951 Congress and for some years thereafter. Yet when their respective provincial secretaries, Armaroli and Cattani, finally swung their support to Nenni, these two provinces became overwhelmingly Autonomist. And similar examples could be cited in Tuscany.<sup>75</sup>

We might also inquire into the hypothesis, posed in an earlier study, that a multiparty system may *per se* encourage multifactionalism within a party, since the party is usually faced with three strategic choices: to choose its allies on the Left, or on the Right, or to renounce all alliances.<sup>76</sup> The PSI certainly had to confront these alternatives after World War II; but before the Communist secession of 1921, there was no party to the Left of the PSI on

the political spectrum—and yet, at most party congresses, there were at least three PSI factions.<sup>77</sup> Besides, even after World War II, factions in the PSI did not always correspond to these three alternatives. In fact, at both the 1959 and the 1961 party congresses, the Left and Basso factions were in substantial accord on the need for maintaining a permanent system of cooperation with the Communist Party, while Nenni advocated strict neutrality in 1959, and an eventual alliance with Christian Democracy—based on ironclad agreements regarding a reform program—in 1961.

While Italian Socialists have on occasion divided neatly into three factions on the issue of the choice of allies (this was certainly the case in 1921 and in 1948–49), a more typical tri-factional situation has been based on a Maximalist-Reformist split with an intermediate faction attempting to create a synthesis in the name of party unity. In this pattern Nenni's Autonomists would correspond to the Reformists of the pre-Fascist era; the Left faction is a direct descendant of the Syndicalists of 1906 (though many of these later joined the Fascist movement), the Revolutionaries of 1908–1914, and the Maximalists of 1919–1922; and finally, the Basso faction plays the same role as the Integralists of 1906–1908, the Dissident Reformists of 1910, and the Intermediate motion of 1912.<sup>78</sup>

The primary issue in most cases has been between compromise, accommodation, and gradualism on the one hand, and intransigence on the other. The question of alliances, while present at times, has been of secondary importance as compared to the basic cause of Maximalist-Reformist tension. And the intermediate faction, before 1914 and from 1959 to 1961, has attempted to play the role of *tertium gaudens*, seeking its supporters on the Right at one Congress and on the Left at the next. The major source of Maximalist-Reformist discord, to be sure, could have existed also under a two-party system, where the question of alliances would not arise. And other causes of factional division in the PSI—the Libyan War which split the Reformist faction in 1911, the anti-Mason issue of 1914<sup>79</sup>—have borne little or no relationship to the question of alliances, and have not been peculiar to a multi-party system.

<sup>77</sup> See Pavone, *op. cit.*, and Cannarsa, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>78</sup> See Pavone, *ibid.*, pp. 40–249, Cannarsa, *ibid.*, pp. 205–252.

<sup>79</sup> See Pavone, *ibid.*, pp. 169–179, 194–206, 227–234.

<sup>73</sup> See Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *loc. cit.*, pp. 79–86, 90–95, and Cervigni and Galasso, "Il Mezzogiorno e il Partito Socialista," *loc. cit.*, p. 33. See also Glorioso, *loc. cit.*

<sup>74</sup> See Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *loc. cit.*, pp. 42, 68–73, and Cervigni and Galasso, "Il Mezzogiorno e il Partito Socialista," *loc. cit.*, pp. 31–32. See also Glorioso, *ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> On Emilia, see Segre, "Il duello dei prossimi due anni," *loc. cit.*, pp. 19–20. On Emilia and Tuscany, see Pera, *loc. cit.*; party officials and students of PSI problems whom I interviewed all concurred in stressing the role of the provincial apparatus in determining the outcome of the intra-party struggle in the various Tuscan provinces.

<sup>76</sup> Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations," *loc. cit.*, pp. 41–43.

alleged functions—international relations, legislative reference, research—were apparently being performed in a remarkably sporadic and haphazard fashion, or in some instances were not being performed at all.<sup>87</sup> The "apparatus" had been able to defeat the Centrists in 1948–49, when local Autonomist forces lacked imaginative leadership at the national level and when the international and domestic situations tended to favor extremist elements. But in 1959, confronted with the personal opposition of the party's traditional leader, heading a coalition of local and provincial notables allied with ex-Action Party intellectuals, the "apparatus" proved incapable of maintaining its own cohesion, let alone blocking Nenni. One wonders whether the party "apparatus" is ever as cohesive a body as the term might imply.

The development of general structural categories for the study of intra-party politics has been an extremely desirable contribution to comparative politics, particularly because it has presented us with suggestive models for the comparison and evaluation of empirical data. But Duverger's categories must be employed as he intended them to be used: as testing devices, not as restrictive channel markers or substitutes for further empirical findings. It would be very unfortunate if reactions against "mere data-gathering" should lead us to remain too close to the summit and to theorize about politics at the national level without giving adequate attention to regional, local, and interest-group situations which may complicate our conceptual schemes. Further progress in the field of comparative politics will depend, in part, on our ability to break down national political systems and national parties into suitable component elements for closer investigation and more meaningful comparison.

We conclude our study with the following hypotheses, which may be applied, modified, or invalidated by further empirical research.

(1) In general, Socialist weakness appears to be associated with Left-wing intransigence within a Socialist party. More specifically, the following factors will encourage, but not necessarily insure, the prevalence of intransigent

tendencies within a Socialist Party in a given area:

- (a) The existence, in that area, of a dominant Communist Party, which exceeds the Socialist Party in electoral strength by a margin of over two-to-one.
- (b) The existence, in that area, of a dominant Catholic Party supported by a long Catholic tradition, by a dense network of Catholic social and economic organizations, and by widespread popular acceptance of paternalism and clerical influence.
- (c) The existence, in that area, of a dominant alliance of clerical, conservative, and reactionary parties—an alliance which includes Right-wing extremist parties and which greatly outnumbers the Left-of-Center bloc.

(2) The following factors will encourage, but not necessarily insure, the prevalence of moderate, gradualist tendencies within a Socialist Party in a given area:

- (a) The existence there of a strong party organization, backed by a numerous membership and by sufficient financial resources to obviate the need for outside assistance.
- (b) The existence there of a highly competitive electoral situation between Left-wing and Right-wing parties.
- (c) The existence there of a Socialist tradition of long standing, reinforced by a dense network of Socialist labor organizations and peasant leagues; but this factor can be vitiated if there is a dominant Communist Party in the area in question.
- (d) The existence there of a high degree of industrialization (with over 35 per cent of the labor force engaged in manufacturing) and a strong non-Catholic trade union movement.
- (e) The existence in the area of a great urban center with a population of over 250,000.

(3) Local or provincial party leaders often can play a decisive role in inter-factional struggles, even in a branch-type Socialist Party. This influence frequently appears to outweigh the pressure of the environmental factors cited in (1) and (2).

(4) In a branch-type party, a charismatic leader, who has either founded the party or has led it through a crucial period of its history, will usually prevail in any struggle with the party bureaucracy. In any such conflict, the party

<sup>87</sup> See Segre, "Un Partito moderno?", *loc. cit.*, p. 5. See also Piero Ardentl, "L'organizzazione del PSI da Napoli ad oggi," *Problemi del Socialismo*, Vol. 4 (January, 1961), pp. 15–26, but esp. pp. 15–18. Ardentl claims the "apparatus" never formed a united faction, and that the real problem is not to dethrone the "apparatus" but to provide the PSI with a more efficient organization.

bureaucracy will, in all likelihood, be unable to maintain its cohesion: a large proportion of its members will support the charismatic leader.

(5) Large intra-party factions are usually clusters of various subgroups animated by a variety of motives, and these clusters are subject to powerful centrifugal forces.

(6) In a multi-party system, a multi-factional situation within a given party may be the result of one or more of the following factors:

(a) The existence, for the party in question, of more than two choices regarding the acceptance or rejection of alliances with neighboring parties on the political spectrum.

(b) A historical background of multi-factionalism going back to the formative decades of the party.

(c) A strong intra-party tradition (usually embodied in formal statutory provisions) of autonomy for local and provincial party organizations.

(d) Domination of the party organization, and of all major factions, by intellectuals—trained in a tradition of disputation regarding the logical and philosophical validity of ideal categories—in a non-empirical tradition, that is.

(7) Branch-type political parties often possess many characteristics of caucus-type parties, especially in their formal intra-party processes at the local level.

(8) There is no clear evidence that affinity of function alone (as in the case of the party "apparatus") can ever produce a cohesive party faction with a high degree of continuity.

## THE SOURCES OF PROTEST IN JAPAN

HERBERT PASSIN  
*University of Washington*

The massive demonstrations of May and June 1960, which forced the resignation of the Kishi Cabinet and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Japan, alarmed Americans as much as they elated the Chinese Communists. The complacent American view of Japan as a sturdy conservative force loyally allied to the United States through a wise and benevolent Occupation and generous economic aid was rudely shattered. Coming at a time when student unrest precipitated the overthrow of governments in South Korea and Turkey—also allies—it was natural that many Americans saw communist plots and a Japan in the grip of a "revolutionary situation." But if they were wrong—and it has taken a great deal of soul-searching for informed opinion to understand fully what happened<sup>1</sup>—they were no less wrong than the Chinese Communists, who read the situation in much the same way. After a two-week trip to Japan in August 1960, Liu Ning-i, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, reported jubilantly that the revolutionary situation in Japan was well advanced. "The Japanese people's future is full of brightness and hope," he wrote.

But even if we discount the over-pessimism of naive American opinion and the over-optimism of the Chinese Communists, it is apparent that there are powerful and disturbing forces on the loose in Japan. To say this, however, is far from saying that Japan is on the verge of a revolution. The existence of revolutionary sentiment alone is not sufficient to bring about a revolution. This depends very much on the ability of the sentiment to crystallize itself in appropriate organizational form and around appropriate issues and on the extent to which moderate and conservative forces are able to maintain their own self-confidence and vigor. In Japan, the revolutionary forces are still far from having won over or neutralized the majority of public sentiment, and the conservative forces

still show every sign of vitality, ability, determination, and confidence. But the incidents surrounding the May-June events have revealed several important things. First, that disaffection and alienation with the *status quo* are widespread, particularly among students, the labor movement, and intellectuals. Second, that the fabric of consensus is seriously torn, that politics is sharply polarized. Third, that American policy is deeply implicated in internal political issues, and that this deep involvement intensifies Japan's susceptibility to the polarization of the cold war.

### I

The external signs of the "radicalization" of Japan are quite clear. Since the end of the war there has been a steady increase in the "progressive" vote. Moreover, within the "progressive" vote, the balance has shifted steadily towards the left. In 1952 and 1953, the right socialists within the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) were able to command a bare majority of the total socialist vote.<sup>2</sup> But in the elections of autumn 1960, the Japan Socialist Party, which is predominantly "left" today,<sup>3</sup> alone won 27 percent of the national vote, while the right

<sup>2</sup> In 1952, of the total socialist vote, which tallied 21.3 percent of the national vote, the Right accounted for 11.5 percent, and the Left for 9.8 percent; with this proportion, the Right won 57 seats in the Diet to the Left's 54. In 1953, the total socialist vote rose to 26 percent, the Right accounting for about 14 percent and the Left for about 13; however, in 1960 the Left, with a slightly smaller vote, won 72 seats to the Right's 66.

<sup>3</sup> The Party has undergone two major right-left splits since the end of the war. The 1952 split was finally repaired in 1955, in time for the national elections of that year, but another split took place in late 1959. This one, however, has divided the right wing: the Nishio faction left the Party to form the Democratic Socialist Party and the Kawakami faction remained within the Party, with Mr. Kawakami himself, in an evident effort to prevent his followers from joining the Nishio exodus, elected Party Chairman. A good account of these developments will be found in David C. S. Sissons: "Recent Developments in Japan's Socialist Movement," (in two parts), *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 29 (March and June 1960).

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., E. O. Reischauer: "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1960; Reischauer: "Some Thoughts on Japanese Democracy," *Japan Quarterly*, January-March 1961; "Japanese Intellectuals Discuss American-Japanese Relations" (Introduction by Robert Scalapino), special issue of *Far Eastern Survey*, October 1960; "Japan Today" (Introduction by Ivan Morris), *New Leader*, Section II, November 28, 1960.

socialists, who split from the JSP in late 1959 to form their own Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), received only 8.7 percent.<sup>4</sup> At the present time, the total "progressive" vote (including the communists, socialists, and democratic socialists) tallies about 39 percent.

The composition of the vote seems to point in the same direction. The progressives base themselves primarily on the urban youth, the educated classes, and the organized working class. Public opinion polls and voting surveys show a consistently higher "progressive" vote: in urban areas than in the countryside (and also in the larger cities than in the small cities and towns); in lower age groups than in higher age groups; in higher educational levels than in lower; and among workers than among non-workers (and also among organized workers than among unorganized workers, and among big-city workers than among small city and town workers). The conservative vote is characteristically strongest in the countryside, among older age groups, and among farmers and small business elements.

Many qualifications need to be placed on the significance of this vote. Certainly not all of it, even for the left socialists, is "revolutionary" in character. Much of it is more correctly a "protest" vote that reflects support for the socialists on particular issues—especially of foreign policy—and distrust of the professional conservative politicians. But it certainly shows that the arena of discontent, within which revolutionary ideas have their play, has been growing.

If these trends continue in a straight line for the next decade or so, it is clear that at some point in the foreseeable future, the progressive vote, now almost 40 percent, should pass the 50 percent mark, and so bring the socialists to

power. Projections of the inner trends lead to similar conclusions. The rural population is declining rapidly, the urban population rising. The level of education continues to rise year by year. The majority of youth entering the voting ranks for the first time vote left; as they move up the age scale, and as the older age groups retire from the scene, there should be an increasingly "radicalization" of each age group.

The question, then, is whether these trends will in fact continue to their apparent conclusion, or whether there might not be other forces or new developments in the making that would cut them short. It has often happened that a protest movement waxes at the very moment the conditions that brought it into being disappear. This, I suspect, may very well be what is happening in Japan today. In a more general way, the question is: how much revolutionary discontent can a modern industrial society accommodate, under what conditions? In early 1946, a Cabinet Minister, scheduled to be purged within a few days offered me the following prediction: "We will become, I think, a country like France or Italy. Our left will go to one-fourth or even one-third of the population. As long as it remains at that level, I think we shall be able to live with it, just as France and Italy can." "And if it goes beyond?" I asked. "That," he said "is what I don't know." Fifteen years later, Japan has reached the Minister's peril point, the so-called "one-third barrier," as the socialists themselves characterize it. Whether we judge it to have penetrated significantly beyond depends upon how we evaluate the right socialist vote of 13.2 percent, made up of the 8.7 percent who voted for the Democratic Socialist Party as well as the 4.5 percent who voted for the right-wing Kawakami faction of the JSP.<sup>5</sup> The suspicion

<sup>4</sup> Since the Kawakami faction of the JSP shares approximately the same ideological position as the newly formed DSP, a more accurate picture of the "right socialist" vote in the country would include the votes cast for the Kawakami faction, which come to approximately 4.5 percent of the national vote (about 17 percent of the JSP vote). This would suggest a little over 13 percent of the electorate voting a right socialist position, and about 22.5 percent voting left socialist (the total JSP vote minus the Kawakami votes).

At the time of the Party split late in 1959 the distribution of Diet seats was as follows: JSP, 128 (of which the Kawakami faction held 35) and DSP, 37. After the 1960 elections the distribution was: JSP, 145 (of which the Kawakami faction held 28) and DSP, 17.

<sup>5</sup> In the 1960 elections, the "progressive vote," which tallies 38.8 percent, was distributed as follows:

<i>Party (and Faction)</i>	<i>% of national vote</i>
Japan Socialist Party	27.2
Left factions*	22.7
Kawakami faction	4.5
Democratic Socialist Party	8.7
Japan Communist Party	2.9
Total	38.8

\* Including the Suzuki, Nomizo, Wada, Rono, and Matsumoto factions, plus a small number of uncommitted Diet members.

If the DSP vote is considered firmly part of the progressive vote, then the progressives have in-

that the "one-third barrier" may be a natural limit has haunted the socialists for some time, and it underlies the debates between right and left over whether the Party is to be a "class party" or a "mass" or "people's" party, capable of appealing to elements outside the working class. In the perennial debates over this issue, the experiences of European socialist parties, such as the British Labour Party and the German Social-Democratic Party, weigh heavily in the minds of the moderates. The most recent version of this dispute revolves around the concept, most strongly identified with the new General Secretary, Mr. Eda Saburo, the successor to the assassinated Mr. Asanuma, of the "structural revolution." Although the term has been taken from some debates within the Italian Communist Party—which makes it more palatable to the extreme left—it seems to represent a search for a pragmatic, subtle and yet responsible opposition to replace the negative politics of all-out opposition. It is a politics of "continuing the dialogue." The party may not be able to hold to this policy, under pressure from its own left, but it is a significant experiment.

## II

Whatever the ultimate fate of this experiment, Japanese politics today remains sharply polarized. The gap between right and left is deep and principled, and the area of consensus is extremely limited. As in any country where politics is so ideological, compromise is difficult, and all issues tend to take on a total character. Unions strike for higher wages with the slogans of "Down With the Government," "Yankees Go Home," "Protect the Constitution," "Recognize Communist China," "Hands Off Cuba," and "Reject the Japanese-American Security Treaty." Whatever the starting point of the protest—higher prices or the encroach-

ment of American bases on farmland or the building of experimental rocket bases—it quickly trips off the same range of issues, as if they formed a seamless web. No issue stands alone, to be dealt with piecemeal and *ad hoc*, but as part of a matrix of issues, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Each "struggle," then, as the Japanese progressives term it, quickly becomes generalized into a major confrontation of very much the same elements: intellectuals, students, and unionists on the one side, and whatever combination of *status quo* forces happens to emerge on the other side. Peasant demonstrations against, say, the extension of American airbase runways or the installation of Japanese rocket testing bases, are often joined by students—not always to the peasants' liking, it may be added. Striking workers find themselves joined by student pickets, or even by other "progressive" elements, such as intellectuals, "defenders of peace," and "defenders of the Constitution," offering physical, financial, and moral support. Similarly, the May-June 1960 demonstrations began with the students, but were soon joined by unionists and intellectuals.

This quality of all-out, uncompromising struggle is the most disturbing feature of the political climate of Japan today. "If you think the dialogue between Japan and America is in danger," one of Japan's leading public figures recently said to me, "let me tell you that the dialogue between left and right here in Japan is in even more danger. It is becoming harder every day to bring them into the same room, much less to have a real discussion." Therefore, although the normal procedures of parliamentary government prevail in the great bulk of ordinary matters, they are increasingly abandoned when the great issues, over which public opinion divides sharply, come up. The tactics of "struggle," of "direct action," and extra-parliamentary pressure begin to replace those of negotiation, compromise, and discussion. Not only is the work of the Diet seriously impeded, but the refusal to accept its authority and the resort to mass pressure and violent parliamentary filibustering bring the institution of parliamentary democracy itself into disrepute.

No doubt many Japanese people, worried by this growing polarization of national politics, would favor a politics of the center. But their continuing failure is itself a mark of the profundity of the polarization. The main attempt, the Socialist-Democratic coalition governments of 1947-48, first under Socialist Katayama and then under conservative Democrat Ashida, collapsed so ignominiously as to bring the very notion of a centralist government into dis-

deed gone well beyond one-third. However, if the DSP vote is considered largely a "centrist" vote, then the "progressive" vote falls to 30.1 percent. If, in addition, we consider the 4.5 percent of the votes cast for Kawakami-faction candidates as, by and large, also "centrist," then the hard-core "progressive" votes—of left socialists and communists—falls to 25.6 percent, and the "right socialist" vote (for the DSP and the Kawakami faction) rises to 13.2 percent. This figure shows a remarkable stability for the right socialist sentiment in the country: in 1952, it was about 12 percent; in 1953 and 1955, about 14 percent. The big growth in the socialist vote has been on the left, from 10 percent in 1952 to about 23 percent in 1960.

repute. In the very next elections in 1949, the Communists went from their previous 3 percent to 10 percent of the national vote and 35 seats in the Diet.<sup>6</sup> Since then there has been, particularly on the left, a steady weakening of the moderate forces, if not absolutely then at least relatively. In five years, the organized right socialists have declined from a high point of about 14 percent of the national vote (a slight majority of the combined socialist vote of 27 percent) and 66 members of the Diet in 1955, to under 9 percent of the national vote (as against over 27 percent<sup>7</sup> for the left socialists) and only 17 seats in 1960. On the conservative side, the factions favorable to a politics of the center have so far been constrained by the requirements of party unity.

What we find, therefore, is that the mainstream of Japan is divided sharply into two social-political combinations: the progressives, based largely on organized workers, intellectuals,<sup>8</sup> and students; and the conservatives, based largely on business, the middle classes, and the peasantry.

Many observers would add a third, the ultra-right; but I myself, for the time being, prefer to see it on the periphery, rather than in the center. The traditional sources of right-wing strength—the military and peasant discontent, especially as it was refracted through the Army—no longer exist. And the virulent ultra-nationalism which fed it has been too thoroughly discredited as a comprehensive ideology; the patriotic component, even in its extreme form, has been to a large extent absorbed by the neo-nationalism of the progressives. In the light of Japanese history it would be foolhardy to argue that the ultra-right presents no menace at all, but this is still on the margins of society. The crackpots and toughs of the ultra-right can create trouble through direct action and terrorism, and they can help create a mood of general willingness to resort to violence and extra-parliamentary methods.

<sup>6</sup> But in the following elections in 1952, the Communist vote plummeted once again to 2.7 percent and no seats in the Diet. It is clear that a great part of the left socialist vote, discontented with the politics of coalition, had gone to the Communists in 1949 and returned "home" when the danger of coalition was over.

<sup>7</sup> But see the qualification of this figure, above, note 5.

<sup>8</sup> By this term, I would include—following a recent suggestion by Prof. T. Takahashi of Tokyo University—the "minor intellectuals"—school teachers, higher technicians, higher civil servants, and white-collar workers.

The unleashing of terrorism on the right can also stimulate a reactive terrorism and violence on the left, a cycle already visible during the May-June riots. So far, however, a large moderate public, which remembers the terrorism of the late 1930s all too well, has reacted so strongly against violence, whether of the left or of the right, that this cycle has not yet been able to to run a full course.<sup>9</sup> What is much more serious at this stage is that the presence of an ultra-right, however insignificant, stirs historical memories, still very much alive, which may very well interfere with the normalization of Japanese politics. A left that sees ultra-rightism behind every conservative move is much less inclined to compromise and accept the adjustive mechanisms of parliamentary democracy than one that takes conservative measures at face value and opposes them on their inherent merits. Under certain conditions a genuine revival of an ultra-right, although certainly not of the massive proportions of the prewar period, is no doubt conceivable; but this is not Japan's immediate problem.

The social-political combinations I have suggested also require certain qualifications as well as perhaps a more dynamic estimate of the potential of each group. Not all workers, nor even all organized workers, support the progressive side. Moreover, although the peasantry, transformed by the American land reforms and buoyed up both by a continuing high level of prosperity and a stable improvement of its economic and political position in relation to the urban sector, is certainly in no revolutionary mood, one can conceive of many conditions in which this might change. For the moment, however, the peasantry gives its main support to the conservatives, and the government and the conservatives, in their turn, cultivate it carefully by devoted attention to its problems.

### III

The modern forms of protest and alienation in Japan appear to derive from four principal strata of national experience. The first of these is the "reactive nationalism"—to use Rostow's useful term—that lay at the heart of much of the Meiji Restoration movement. The need to "prove" herself to and against the West, the struggle for recognition and equality, the

<sup>9</sup> The sharp decline of the communist vote in 1952 resulted, at least in part, from strong public revulsion against the Party's "fire-bottle" tactics in the early part of the year. Since that time the Party has carried on a systematic campaign to transform itself into a "peaceful" and "lovable" Party.



constant tension of tradition and modernity, the search for a stable identity capable of synthesizing the conflicting elements, are problems essentially similar to those of the new states today. The second is the class-conflict stage of modern industrial society, classically described by Engels in his *Conditions of the Working Classes in England in 1844*. With the maturing industrialization of Japan and the formation of a modern working class, the same kinds of revolutionary protest developed as in Western Europe and the United States, of say, the 1930s. The third element derives from the humiliation of Japan's defeat and the complete destruction of the authority of the old order. The consequence has been a deep secular movement, strongly reminiscent of the tensions of the Meiji Era, to restore national self-respect and the sense of national self-direction—what a colleague and I have elsewhere called “the search for identity.”<sup>10</sup> Therefore, although Japan was herself a powerful and ruthless empire, it has been possible for many Japanese to indulge themselves in an orgy of self-pity as victims of imperialism, as a colonial or “semi-colonial” dependent people struggling for independence and liberation. The fourth layer is the typical modern discontent with the mass society, the protest against aimlessness, rootlessness, vulgarity, commercialism, declining standards, and boredom.

One would expect that such diverse layers would normally have their own different styles and directions. Before the war, for example, the class-struggle sentiment was strongly anti-nationalist, and the nationalist sentiment normally went to the support of the militarists. Today, however, we find all these roots strongly intertwined and reinforcing each other. The postwar socialist movement has fallen heir to a nationalist resurgence with which it cannot always be entirely at ease, particularly in the case of the prewar leaders. The rationalization is offered, to be sure, that nationalism is “progressive” and “revolutionary” in the period of struggle for national independence, but a Suzuki Mosaburo cannot intone the slogans of “racial” or “national” unity with the same conviction as an old-style fire-eating nationalist of prewar days. The intellectual's contempt for the “mambo-boy,” which he may formulate in terms of “American influence” or of “capitalist decadence,” echoes the prewar ultra-nationalist's complaints and the late Meiji “Japanist's” laments that Japan

is “losing her soul.” And we can surely detect the echo of the *samurai* contempt for the merchant classes and private egotism in the intellectual's anti-capitalism and anti-commercialism.

Two things bring the different elements together: first, the complete destruction of the prestige and moral authority of the old order—of the military, the war leaders, the weak and corrupt politicians, the compliant businessmen, the police, and the official ideologists; second, the continuing presence of the United States, which provides a convenient focus for the polarization of all discontent.

The modern protest in Japan consequently has a dual character: in part it is similar to types of protest well known in the Western advanced countries—anti-capitalism, the workers' struggle, anti-traditionalism, liberalism, etc., from an earlier phase, and the tensions of the mass society at a later stage; in part it has the tone of an under-developed country—assertive nationalism and occasionally even racialism, the feeling of a struggle for “true” national independence, and great hyper-sensitivity.

#### IV

Before we examine the historical stratigraphy of protest in Japan, let us look at the problem from a slightly different angle. Every protest movement, whether it develops into a full revolutionary movement or not, is a protest against a particular *status quo*. This *status quo* includes the dominant social consensus, the ruling political coalition, and the dominant ideology. In a country like Japan, we would also have to add: the prevailing balance of modernity and tradition. Each combination—each formula, as it were—includes some forces and excludes others; represents some and excludes others; satisfies some and arouses protest in others. It will be useful to identify in a general way just what combination a particular form of protest, rebelliousness, or revolutionary mood is directed against.

Meiji Japan's first coalition of triumphant junior *samurai* and court nobles started out in the 1870s and 1880s with several enormous advantages: the *élan* of revolutionary victory and powerful support of the legitimacy conferred upon it by the Imperial Throne. Yet it quickly evoked a protest from two sides. The conservative *samurai* protest, symbolized by Saigō Takamori, against over-Westernization and insufficient nationalism, was finally subdued only by large-scale military action. On the other hand, the excluded *samurai* and the small rural industrialists and landlords, who had no share

<sup>10</sup> J. W. Bennett, H. Passin, and R. McKnight: *In Search of Identity* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958).

in the new government, mounted a protest movement around the slogans of "people's rights" (*minken*) and "representative government" that eventually forced a reluctant regime to adopt a constitution and to establish a representative assembly. It was, to be sure, a strictly controlled system, and the autocratic oligarchy still held the power cards, but it was nevertheless the entering wedge for a line of development not anticipated by the Meiji leaders.

The new power balance of the oligarchy, at the center of power, and the military, a potential competitor, in the wings, still gave only minimal concessions to the upper-class rural and urban elements represented by the political parties, and certainly none at all to the mass of the peasantry and to the just-emerging working classes. Yet firm and forehanded as the oligarchy tried to be, it had not fully reckoned with the power of the new forces it had itself created by modernization and education. The new middle class—businessmen, and educated classes brought up in the new schools and exposed to a strong dose of Western ideas—were not content to be permanently excluded from a share in government. Expressing themselves mainly through the political parties, they pushed constantly for an enlargement of the franchise and greater power for the representative as against the autocratic element in the state. Their ultimate goal, if clearly formulated, would have been a fully responsible system of cabinet government, *i.e.*, a cabinet formed by the majority party of the elected assembly and responsible to it. Lower-class protest was, of course, firmly repressed.

The end of the First World War found a vastly changed Japan with a new central coalition. For the first time, business was accepted as a full partner with the political parties and the bureaucracy, the heir of the oligarchy of 40 years before. But enlarged as this coalition was, it still aroused the bitter and violent protest both of the new progressive element—the working class, which was enfranchised only in 1925, the Westernized liberals, the students, and the intellectuals—and of the conservative traditionalists, now represented primarily by the armed forces. In the struggle, which was a bitter one indeed, the party-business-bureaucracy regime was able to restrain the progressive forces; but with the incidents of May 15, 1932 and February 26, 1936, it fell before the forces of militant nationalism. From this time on a new power coalition dominated the Japanese scene, with the military as its center and the support of a fully compliant bureaucracy and a

now chastened business class. Only defeat in the war finally destroyed it.

*Reactive Nationalism.* It is sometimes forgotten, now that Japan is such an old "new state," that she too began her modern career under the strong fear of Western domination. The earliest Western treaties with Japan imposed humiliating conditions, such as extraterritoriality and tariff control, that were completely thrown off only after Japan had proved that she was "worthy" of equal treatment by defeating China and Russia in war. Therefore, although Japan was never a colony, she shared the same feeling of inferiority toward the West as the colonial countries. A sensitive Japanese could not but feel the disparity between Western power and Japanese weakness. However he might regard his own traditional values and institutions as superior, this meant, in an effective sense, inferiority, at least in those matters that enter into the balance-sheet of national strength. What was necessary was to overcome this inferiority as quickly as possible and to draw level with the West.

The leading elements of the anti-Tokugawa coalition, the younger *samurai* of the western and southern fiefs, were motivated therefore not so much by abstract ideological considerations as by the practical need for Japan to strengthen herself against Western pressure. This entailed above all two things: the creation of a strong, efficient, centralized modern state apparatus, and the building of industrial-military power. All the reforms flowed from these two requirements: the ending of feudalism and its class system, industrialization and modern economic methods, a modern conscript army, and a modern educational system. In developing its new institutions, Japan looked to the West for suitable models. In other words, she had to Westernize herself in order to resist the West.

But this created a dilemma, which still remains to plague the Japanese, perhaps even as much today, now that Japan has gone through another "colonial" period of Occupation by a foreign power, as ever before: how to be Western and yet remain Japanese. The problem was already adumbrated as early as the late 18th and early 19th century by the so-called "Dutch scholars" (the students of Western learning through the medium of the Dutch language). Laboriously piecing out their picture of Western power, they arrived at the formula "Western science, but Eastern morals." With suitable modifications for geography, this formula has continued to echo down through the years as each new nation enters the orbit of

modernization—in the form of the Indian spirit, or of pan-Arabism, or of the African personality. The extreme alternatives were: to retain the traditional structure intact, but simply to beef it up with Western arms and power—if it could have been conceived in the late 19th century, perhaps to give every *samurai* an atom bomb; or to replace the traditional system completely by some version of a generic Western society, even to the replacement of the Japanese language by English and the introduction of Christianity. No conceivable balance therefore was capable of satisfying all internal opinion. Even the minimal adjustments of the central Meiji leadership brought the conservative *samurai*, as early as the 1870s, into violent protest and finally into the climactic revolt of Saigō Takamori, which required the full military weight of the new regime to put down.

How fragile any consequent balance was may be seen in the rapid alternations of Westernization and reaction. Since 1868, Japan has gone through three such cycles. The early "Western fever" of the 1860s and 1870s was followed by the conservative reaction of the late 1880s which continued right down to the First World War. This period saw the formulation of the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor's Rescript on Education, the development of the Emperor myth, and the rise of "Japanism." The new wave of Westernism and liberalism after the First World War was followed in its turn by the victory of ultra-nationalist militarism. And the latest Western fever, or perhaps more accurately the "American fever," of the early Occupation period has been followed by a strong nationalist reaction, this time under the leadership of the left and the "progressive" forces.

*The Working Class<sup>11</sup> and Modern Industrial Society:* (1) *The Left.* The rapid industrialization of Japan created both a working class and its typical discontents. It also created a powerful tradition of working-class alienation from "the system." In spite of certain unique elements arising from special historical conditions and Japan's cultural background, the essential features in the picture are familiar to us from the experience of the working classes in the West. The Japanese working class, torn from

the sustaining warmth of the organic peasant communities of the countryside, was severely exploited by a particularly arrogant and narrow-minded management, well aware of the trade advantages of a low-paid labor force in a modern industrial economy. From their very first appearance on the scene, the workers were kept under strict control, either by paternalism or outright repression.

Moreover, the working class was politically disfranchised for the first 60 years of the New Japan. Its acceptance into full citizenship in political society has been a grudging process. The liberal Kato-Shidehara Cabinet enacted full manhood suffrage, free of tax qualifications, in 1925. Characteristically it balanced this liberal measure by immediately passing a strengthened Peace Preservation Law to prevent the "overthrow of the Emperor system" and of the system of private property.

The workers' movements therefore found themselves, from the very start, ranged against the *status quo*, and anti-*status quo* ideologies, from anarchism to socialism and even Christian socialism, made their appearance as early as the beginning of the 20th century.<sup>12</sup> When the labor movement began to reveal its modern shape after the First World War, neither of the two central power coalitions of the 1920s and 1930s—neither the businessman-bureaucrat-politician combination of the early period nor the military-bureaucrat combination of the end of the period—could accommodate it. The working-class movement, therefore, particularly after the First World War, could not help but be anti-*status quo* and revolutionary. The Peace Preservation Law, thought control, and the growing suppression of radicalism, liberalism, and nonconformism drove it further to the left. Although the repression was largely effective while it lasted, and particularly in the late 1930s, once it was lifted after the war by the American Occupation, the power of this tradition became immediately apparent. The postwar leadership and ideologies brought to the fore were those most strongly opposed to the prewar regime—i.e., leftists, socialists, and Marxists. From that time on a vastly expanded labor movement has maintained this strong leftist and class-struggle bias, with its corollary orientation towards political, rather than purely economic, action.

To some extent the rigors of control and repression were moderated by the projection of

<sup>11</sup> For a good account of the labor movement see the writings of Solomon Levine, particularly his *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1958); of James Abegglen, particularly his *The Japanese Factory* (Glencoe, 1958); and of Benjamin Martin.

<sup>12</sup> See Cecil Uehara: *Leftwing Social Movements in Japan: An Annotated Bibliography* (Tokyo, Tuttle, 1959).

traditional paternalistic concepts into modern industry.<sup>13</sup> But this has always been a two-edged sword. Insofar as this paternalism gave genuine benefits, particularly to workers of limited horizons fresh from rural backgrounds, working in small enterprises, it did create a version of the happy family working harmoniously for the common interest. But once these three essential conditions no longer obtain, the system of paternalism simply becomes irksome to the workers, a further restraint on their full development. As the benefits, such as sick care, job guarantees, unemployment insurance, pensions, etc., become increasingly available through the impersonal mechanisms of the state, the need for the traditional system declines. The personal relation of employer and worker in a small enterprise is replaced by the impersonal imperatives of modern large-scale enterprise. At the same time, the increase in educational level, growing individuation, and the "demonstration effect" of the way of life of the upper classes, have altered the workers' willingness to continue in the position of a dependent and filial child of a benevolent father-boss.<sup>14</sup>

The high class-consciousness, which characterizes much of the organized labor movement, is no new thing in Japan. It was, to be sure, stimulated by the course of the struggle and by the ideological outlook of the leadership. But it was already present in ample measure throughout society as a whole. Although Japan had left feudalism behind, it carried over the strong class bias of Tokugawa society, the disposition to see people in terms of class, and the sense of strong hierarchical bar-

riers between superiors and inferiors. This class consciousness, along with the sense of alienation from the *status quo*, particularly among the leftist-dominated organized workers, has led to what I should like to call the "institutionalization" of the trade-union movement as a part of working class life. The workers have never been particularly responsive to the "proletarian literature" of the 1920s and 1930s, nor to their far less numerous postwar counterparts; but the unions have succeeded since the war in creating, to some extent, an area of "working-class culture." A wide range of social and cultural activities of organized workers are channelled through the union movement, in parallel, as it were, to similar activities in the non-trade-union world. The enormous variety of sports associations, singing clubs, women's auxiliaries, outings, and educational activities can take up much of the worker's leisure time. An interesting example is the Workers' Musical League (*Ro-on*), which provides music at low cost to workers. Through its large-scale booking of concert halls, musical organizations, and musicians, it has by now become an important factor in concert management and in musical life. The alliance of left intellectuals with organized workers, already in evidence in the 1920s, is similarly strengthened by union educational activities, which provide an outlet—as well as sometimes a source of income—to many professors, writers, and journalists. And, since "power goes with money" even in proletarian organizations, the dependence of the Japan Socialist Party on the financial support of the unions makes it more responsive to political pressures from the leftist unions than *vice versa*.

Apart from ideology and politics, one structural feature of the labor movement strongly reinforces its political orientation: its large proportion of government workers. The Japan Teachers' Union, with about 600,000 members, is both the largest union in Japan and one of the most political. In *Sohyo* (General Council of Trade Unions), the largest and most left of Japan's labor bodies (claimed membership about 3,400,000), approximately two-thirds of the members are government workers, either "public employees" or employees of government corporations, such as the national railways and communications. This means that in an important sense their "class enemy" is government itself, rather than private individuals or corporations, so that labor-management issues can only be negotiated with the political authority. Their interest in the composition of government, the orientation of the Cabinet, and the allocation of priorities in the national budget makes them very political.

<sup>13</sup> A good account of the institutions of paternalism may be found in several articles by Iwao Ishino and John Bennett as well as in Levine, *op. cit.*, and Abegglen, *op. cit.* and particularly in Bennett and Ishino: *The Social Anthropology of Paternalism in Japan* (forthcoming—Minneapolis, University of Wisconsin Press).

<sup>14</sup> Benjamin Martin, "Japanese Mining Labor: The Miike Strike," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 30 (February 1961), p. 27, gives an extremely interesting example: "In the years immediately following the war the newly established Miike union was relatively docile and made little trouble for the management. The changing times did not seem to have outwardly affected labor-management relations but the customary arrogance of the mine executives, previously never challenged by the semi-literate miners of the old days, created an increasing sense of irritation among workers who were often as well educated as their superiors."

If I have emphasized the forces making for organized dissent in the working class, I do not wish to leave the impression that this is the whole picture. Certainly the organized working class is largely dominated by a leftist anti-*status quo* leadership and ideology. But the organized labor movement, numbering some 6.5 to 7 million members, is only about 25 percent of the total non-agricultural labor force of over 26 millions. Moreover, the most leftist of the unions, *Sohyo*, constitutes slightly less than half of the total union membership, and not all of this can be counted upon as absolutely obedient to the initiatives of the leadership. The leadership of the rival federation, the *Zenro*, along with the smaller associated *Sodomei*, is much more moderate.<sup>14a</sup>

(2) *The Right*. But there was in the interwar years a powerful rightist dissent from the liberal capitalist version of industrial society as well. For the fanatic partisans of the "Showa Restoration," intent on a new version of "Western science and Eastern morals," the balance of tradition and modernity was tilted the wrong way. The true national polity (*koku-tai*) they wished to see established was not conceivable in the corruption, divisiveness, and egotism of the existing order. Their targets therefore became the corrupt political parties, with their unseemly squabbling, partisan spirit, bribery, and indifference to the national interest; the selfish capitalists, who had already earned their undying hatred by a greater concern for profits and low taxes than for the needs of the military; liberalism; Western influence; and internationalism. The military contempt for capitalism was reinforced by an important structural feature of the Japanese army. The majority of recruits were from the peasantry, and many of the junior officers were themselves of peasant or small landowner stock. The normal conservative peasant distrust of the corrupt Westernized cities was exacerbated by the agrarian depression; and since the peasants had virtually no other channels of protest, it was the junior officers, extremely sensitive to the problems of the countryside and the worries of their troops, who undertook to express them.

Lt. Col. Aizawa Saburo, for example, on trial for the murder in 1935 of Gen. Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, explained his motive as follows: "When I thought of these things [the sad state of the country, the im-

poverishment of the peasants, the official scandals, and the weakness of foreign policy], I could not merely pass the time giving military training to my regiment." In like manner, the junior officer Goto Akinori explained his part in the May 15, 1932, incident in similar terms:

... The impoverishment of the agricultural villages is the cause of grave concern for thoughtful persons. It is extremely dangerous that while soldiers from the villages expose themselves to death at the front they should have to worry about their starving families. . . . In utter disregard of the poverty-stricken farmers the fabulously rich continue their pursuit of private gain. Meanwhile the children of the farmers are so poor that they must go to school in the morning without breakfast. . . . To let a day go by without doing something is to endanger the army one day longer, was my thought.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, while the working class and liberal protest was coming increasingly under Marxist, socialist, and liberal influence, the rightist anti-capitalist protest was finding its ideologists in Kita Ikki,<sup>16</sup> Gondo Seikyo, and Okawa Shumei with their notions of "socialism under the Emperor," "agrarian socialism," and "revolutionary imperial socialism." It is therefore not surprising that the militarist and ultra-nationalist terrorists of the 1930s invariably numbered the representatives of the "plutocracy" among their victims, along with the politicians and the other "evil advisers" who were "misleading the Emperor."

*Defeat and Occupation*. Japan's crushing defeat in the war has been as traumatic an experience as the intrusion of the West in the late 19th century, and it has reopened many of the same dilemmas, however modern their dress. The difference is that now the balance of forces has changed. The authority and legitimacy of the old order were destroyed, and the hitherto suppressed progressive forces were released into the mainstream of national life.

The collapse of the old order implicated not only the military and the ultra-nationalists, but everything that appeared to be associated with it: the older generation, the compliant politicians and businessmen, the family system, and "Japanese tradition" itself.<sup>17</sup> The result

<sup>15</sup> Translated from materials made available by Mr. Tokuyama Jiro.

<sup>16</sup> See in particular his *Nihon Kaizō Hōan Taikō* (Outline Plan for the Reconstruction of Japan), his most important work.

<sup>17</sup> Indicative of this outlook is the title of a study by one of Japan's leading sociologists,

<sup>14a</sup> On April 26, 1962, these two unions plus several other independents joined together in a new federation called the General Council of Japan Labor Organizations (*Domei Kaigi*) with a claimed membership of 1.4 millions.

was, in the words of Takeyama Michio, that "the Japanese jumped to the conclusion that historic Japan in its entirety was wrong, and there followed a period of bitter self-rejection and self-indictment."<sup>18</sup> Moreover, bad as the old system may have been, it had given meaning and purpose to life, a way of seeing the world, and an opportunity for service and sacrifice to a larger cause. The search for a new ideology and a new synthesis inevitably brought many people to Marxism, which had already been a powerful force among the progressives of the '20s and the '30s, since it was the only fully elaborated system of thought that was both comprehensive and also not discredited by the past. It appealed to the purely intellectual need for systematic understanding, and it appealed to the need for purpose and self-sacrifice. Western liberalism was too tepid, neither comprehensive nor demanding enough; and later, as we shall see, it was compromised by its association with "capitalism" and with the United States. For many people searching for something pure, uncontaminated by the war and the hated past, the communists had a special appeal; as the principal victims and opponents of the militarists, they were virtually the only uncompromised political force, if only for the reason that all of their leaders were either in jail or in exile. Tsurumi Shunsuke, a leading young intellectual, himself American-educated, has explained this very brilliantly in a fascinating account of why he supports the Japan Communist Party even though he is not a Marxist. The recent revival of religious sects, which have mushroomed all over Japan, undoubtedly represents another form of search for synthesis. Significantly the religious resurgence has not gone into the traditional channels of Shintoism, Buddhism, or even Christianity, but into deviant and newly established messianic religions.

At the same time that the discredited conservative forces were being held back by purges and the disfavor of the Occupation, the progressive forces were being given their head. A tremendous outburst of "democratic" energies, along with the continuing American reforms, touched almost every sector of Japanese life. In the first period of the Occupation, this force was strongly identified with the United States, and the ensuing Americanization of Japan began to take on epidemic proportions. But the early enthusiasm, particularly of the intellec-

tuals, soon gave way to an inevitable reaction. Unfortunately this wholly expectable nationalist reaction coincided with an apparently new direction in American policy, to some extent a result of the cold war. The liberals felt deeply betrayed; America's reactionary "reverse course," as they termed it, was forcing them to defend the American reforms not only against the conservatives, but against the Americans themselves.

Another important development has been the emergence of a powerful streak of nihilism, particularly among the youth. The rapid changes, the confusions, the "transvaluation of values," and the discrediting of the old authority without its replacement by a new, have created what the Japanese themselves refer to as a "spiritual void." Nor is this entirely new. Nihilism has long had a deep appeal to modern Japanese, as we can see in the undiminished popularity of Dostoevsky,<sup>19</sup> for example, or in such important Japanese novelists as Akutagawa Ryunosuke and Dazai Osamu. Characteristically it has been non-political and anti-traditional, asserting the priority of individual judgment over social convention and judgment. Therefore eroticism, both as pure, primary experience and as a form of Sade's criticism of civil society, plays an important role. The "ero-gro" (erotic and grotesque) literature of the 1920s has been succeeded by the postwar eroticism and hedonism of Tamura Taijiro, whose *Nikutai no Mon* (*The Gates of the Flesh*) opened the movement, and Ishihara Shinichiro, its greatest hero. Ishihara's *Taiyozoku* (*Tribe of the Sun*), which rapidly became a runaway best-seller, gave the movement its form and even its name. Japan's *taiyozoku* now take their place as the counterpart of the angry young men, the *stilyagi*, and the beatniks of other countries.

But although it considers itself non-political, its anti-conventional hedonism cannot fail to be implicitly political. As an all-out rejection of "the system," it implies its own politics of dissent against tradition, custom, authority, political leadership, and the *status quo*. Nor should this be too surprising when we reflect that England's angry young men are probably well represented in the unilateralist movement and

<sup>19</sup> Russian literature has had, in some ways, a greater appeal to modern Japanese intellectuals than that of any other country. Already in the early and middle Meiji period, the great Russians of the 19th century were well known, and the nihilism of Vera Zasulich, Bakunin and Dostoevsky were as popular as the idealistic anarchism of Kropotkin and Tolstoy.

Prof. Kawashima Takeyoshi, *The Family System as Ideology*.

<sup>18</sup> Takeyama Michio, "Tradition and Japanese Youth," *Japan Quarterly*, July-September 1960.

that America's beatniks seemed for a while to find in Fidel Castro their own "existentialist hero." The nihilism will therefore lead either to an unresolved despair, which will continuously corrode authority, or to the search for a resolution, which under present conditions is most likely to mean the acceptance of a "revolutionary"—that is, an anti-*status quo*—authority. This streak is found among the leaders of the student Zengakuren, particularly among those who are so revolutionary that they cannot even accept the authority of the Japanese Communist Party and must regard the Soviet Union and Communist China as already too reactionary for them.<sup>20</sup>

The complicating element in the postwar situation is the position of the United States. The United States has managed, by its massive presence, to become bound up with the profoundest divisions within the country on both internal and external questions. It is identified with the anti-progressive side on virtually all the important and symbolic issues in the country: rearmament, the revival of the power of the military, the restoration of the police power, the revision of the Constitution, the strengthening of the conservative elements, the reversal of the Occupation reforms, and the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Communist China. Its presence is a continuing affront to a reviving nationalist sentiment. If we were to formulate the standard view of the Japanese progressives, it would run somewhat as follows: "fascist and imperialist United States, the home of monopoly capitalism, is supporting Japan's conservatives, backed by Japan's own monopoly capitalists, in power in order to keep the country in a state of economic and political dependence so that she can continue to use the military bases as a springboard for aggression." The maintenance of American bases, the Japanese-American Security Treaty, and continued economic dependence upon the United States reinstate deep memories of the "unequal treaties" of Meiji times. In the words of Asanuma Inejiro, the recently assassinated General Secretary of the Japan Socialist Party:

... we must struggle for peace and independence, and carry on the struggle for the return of Okinawa to Japan, the struggle for restoration of normal relations with Communist China and the struggle against nuclear bombs. We must combine all these struggles into one struggle for revision of the unequal Security Pact and connect

this struggle with the struggle for the people's welfare.<sup>21</sup>

The *status quo*, then, against which Japanese discontent directs itself, is, symbolically, the Japanese-American alliance. This may, I think, explain something about the intensity of the May-June demonstrations against the Security Treaty as well as about the peculiar intensity of Japanese feelings on the recognition of Communist China, now one of the central issues in Japanese politics. For many, China has become the symbol of "true national independence" and of Japan's right to self-direction. Since America has been the principal obstacle to the restoration of normal relations, the assertion of friendship to China offers the added thrill of thumbing one's nose at America. That successive conservative governments, regularly re-elected by almost two-thirds of the voters, continue a policy of non-recognition is put down to mere supine obedience to America. The result is that the "China Boom," which swept the country from 1953 onwards, has taken on the character of an emotional crusade, and Japanese visitors to the mainland now outnumber those of any other nationality. Not all, even among the progressives, would be prepared to agree with the extreme proposition, frequently formulated by Japanese visitors to China in joint statements with their Chinese hosts, that "the United States is the common enemy of the Chinese and the Japanese people," but the logic of it is hard to resist.

In the new version of the old game of "how can I be both Japanese and Western," the cards are cut in a different way. Before the war, to be anti-traditional meant to be somehow "un-Japanese." But today, thanks to the United States and to the contempt for the old order, one can be both anti-traditional and 100-per cent Japanese. It is the conservatives, America's allies, who have to prove that they are not the "catpaw of foreign imperialism"—even if only "objectively." Raymond Aron has somewhere commented on the "Americanized Japanese who detest their American teachers."

The "*Mass Society*." Let us now return to the question, whether the political trend will continue long enough to bring the progressives into office. Sixteen years after the end of the war, the kind of internal situation assumed by this extrapolation can probably no longer be accepted. Japan's spectacular and sustained

<sup>20</sup> See the extremely illuminating article by Lewis Feuer, "A Talk With Zengakuren," *The New Leader*, May 1, 1961.

<sup>21</sup> Preface to "Decisions at the Regular Convention of the Japan Socialist Party, 1957," quoted in Nakamura Kikuo, "Party Politics," *New*



rate of economic growth,<sup>22</sup> perhaps the highest in the world, has brought her a long way into the era of mass abundance, mass society, and mass culture. It is true that the Japanese economy still remains extremely vulnerable, but so far the continuing prosperity has brought about far-reaching changes. The standard of living has been rising continuously, the surplus rural population is being absorbed so rapidly that a farm and small-town labor shortage is beginning to make its appearance, agricultural production has been increasing despite the predictions of experts that this was impossible, the wage gap between large and small enterprise has been narrowing, and—*mirabile dictu*—even mechanization has been growing on the tiny farms the experts adjudged too small for mechanization.<sup>23</sup> The outward consequences of these changes are all too evident. My own personal impression on visiting Japan early in 1960 after an absence of some two-and-a-half years was that everybody I knew had gained one inch in girth. The rate of ownership of the standard attractions of the mass consumption society—television, radio, washing machines, refrigerators, transistor radios, cameras, modern kitchen equipment—now compares favorably with that of Western Europe. Automobile ownership has already reached the middle classes solidly, and there seems no reason to doubt that within a measurable period it will be as common among the working classes as in Western Europe. In short, Japan is now beginning to savor the mixed blessings of advanced industrial society in its high-consumption phase: economic abundance and the insoluble traffic jams of Ginza and Marunouchi; universal literacy along with soap operas and comic books; air-conditioning and suburbia. It is still too early to assess all of the consequences of these structural changes: the

*embourgeoisement* of the working classes, particularly of the organized workers; the growth of the “*sarariman*” (salaryman), Japan’s version of the middle class salaried and white-collar element; the absolute decline of the labor force in the primary production sectors (farming, fishery, and forestry), along with stability in the secondary sectors (manufacturing) and a vast increase in the tertiary sectors; a general narrowing of the gap in outlook and standards among the classes; the terrible overcrowding of the cities; a growing shift in agriculture to mechanization and capital-intensive production (dairying, poultry, meat, and specialty crops).

There are still other changes in the offing whose effects we are not yet in a position to estimate. Educated unemployment, for example, has been an endemic feature of Japanese life since the 1920s. Although the supply-demand situation has fluctuated, Japanese university graduates retain a sharp memory of the fear of joblessness. The Occupation-sponsored reform of the educational system, which raised the university population almost 10 times to its present high of over 700,000 students, only intensified the insecurity, coming as it did in the midst of the postwar economic confusion. But the last few years have seen a radical change; in some categories, available jobs now far exceed the number of candidates. What will happen to student radicalism after several years without fear of unemployment? And what happens to the radical student, even today, we might ask, once he has found a job with a steady future and with some scope for advancement? In some cases there is a rapid subsidence of radical feelings, perhaps even a growing identification with the “establishment”; in others, a new form of dissatisfaction, not unknown in the West, a groping for meaning, adventure, and purpose. The generation of students educated entirely in the schools reformed by the American Occupation is just beginning to enter the universities. They come with a completely different background and outlook from the “*après-guerre*” students who have until now dominated the scene. With no personal experience of the war, free of the traditional ethics of subservience and self-effacement, encouraged to express their individuality, they are bound to be different from the embittered, disillusioned postwar students who could still their self-doubts, self-hatred, and insecurity only with radicalism and Marxism. Many of them may still see in Marxism the synthesis of their needs for meaning, purpose, and self-definition; others may start out on new paths in their new, affluent society.

*Leader*, Section II (Supplement entitled “Japan Today”), November 28, 1960.

<sup>22</sup> Between 1947 and 1952 the average annual GNP growth rate was 11.5 per cent; between 1953 and 1959, 8.3 per cent. From April 1959 to March 1960, the growth rate reached the extraordinary figure of 17 per cent, while mining and manufacturing production increased 29 per cent over fiscal year 1958.

<sup>23</sup> To cite two examples: between 1933 and 1958, the number of hand tractors in use went up from 1,000 to 337,800; threshing machines from 67,000 to 2,343,400. The current figures would undoubtedly show another important increase. See Fukushima Yoichi: “Agricultural Technology,” *Japan Quarterly*, July–September 1960.



Suffice it to say, in some respects recent Western experience will be a better guide to what is happening than the immediate Japanese past.

The observer cannot fail to be struck by the enormous gap between these new developments—the “objective situation,” as the socialists would call it—and the awareness of it, particularly on the left. The leftist slogans, which seem much more appropriate to the depressed 1930s, or even, in certain ways, to the extreme nationalist phase of some colonial movement, strike one as strangely out of tune with the developing reality. Many leftists have had the greatest difficulty in accepting the evidence of growth before their very eyes. As late as six years ago, a leading academic economist offered the challenging thesis that Japan needed a crash program to achieve a sustained growth of 4 per cent; that very year, the actual growth rate was over 8 per cent. Japan's most distinguished and senior agricultural economist recently acknowledged to me that even in his

wildest moments he could not have anticipated the changes. “In fact,” he said, “I can still hardly believe them. If anybody tells you that five years ago he could have predicted this, then he is lying.” The implications of the new situation are just beginning to percolate into the consciousness of Japanese intellectual life. Increasingly we find discussions of the “new middle class,” or even of the “new intellectuals”; and the problem of “*rei-ja*” (the Japanese pronunciation of the English “leisure”—a new and very popular word in the Japanese vocabulary) has become a major issue in the mass media, eliciting much the same range of comments on mass society and mass culture that we are so familiar with in Europe and America. In a sense, what we are seeing is a race between the trend line, based upon an earlier set of conditions, and the new situation: which will arrive first, the projection of the trend to 50 per cent plus one, or a full awareness of the new situation?

## THE LIMITS OF SELF-DETERMINATION: THE CASE OF THE KATANGA SECESSION

RENÉ LEMARCHAND

Université Libre de Bruxelles

Not the least paradoxical aspect of the United Nations mandate in the Congo, as described in the three-power resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 24, 1961, is that it was designed to prevent the exercise of a right which is explicitly recognized by the Charter. In effect, by "completely rejecting the claim of the Katanga as a sovereign independent Nation" and "recognizing the government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo," the authors of the resolution clearly denied the provincial authorities of the Katanga the right to self-determination.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the support given by the United States government to the resolution, reaffirmed in several official statements, seems hardly compatible with our long-standing moral commitment to the Wilsonian principle that "the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity that the great and powerful states expect and insist upon."<sup>2</sup> Actually, what may at first sight appear to be a sign of inconsistency is rather a reflection of the fundamental ambiguity in the concept of self-determination.

It is generally admitted that the principle of self-determination refers to the right of a people to determine their own political destiny; but beyond this very broad definition, no legal criteria determine which groups may legitimately claim this right in particular cases. No universally accepted standards mark the measure of freedom a group of people must presumably enjoy before they can exercise it. Nothing approaching a consensus of opinion exists regarding the feasibility of the principle itself. As a concept it cannot be stated in terms applicable to any given context. As a result, it

has been both a factor of cohesion and a source of disunity depending on the circumstances in which the question has arisen.<sup>3</sup>

The record of civil wars and partitions that have blocked the formation of larger territories, or caused the collapse of an original consensus, shows how self-determination has frequently been invoked to justify secession. In the second half of the last century, the American Civil War, and the Sonderbund in Switzerland, nearly destroyed two of today's most successful federal experiments. During the post-World War II period, under the pressure of anti-colonial sentiment, and as a result of the polarization of international power politics, the process of territorial fragmentation initiated in the heyday of the Wilsonian era reached its peak. In Germany, Korea and Viet-Nam, fundamental differences of opinion over the way in which self-determination ought to be carried out have divided these states along lines which demarcate the spheres of influence of the two major blocs; in each case ideological and power barriers cut across otherwise homogeneous communities. On the other hand, where one finds plural societies, as in many countries of Asia and Africa, the elimination of colonial rule has decisively encouraged demands for secession on the part of ethnically or religiously distinct communities. In India, for example, the tensions between Moslem and Hindu eventually provoked a three-way split between India proper, West Pakistan, speaking Urdu and Punjabi, and East Pakistan, speaking Bengali. Similarly, in many of the emergent states of Africa, and in the Congo more than in

<sup>1</sup> See UN document S/5002 (S/4985/Rev. 1, as amended); cf. UN Charter, Articles 1 and 55.

<sup>2</sup> Cited by former Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy in "The Principle of Self-Determination in International Relations," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 33, No. 857 (November 28, 1955), p. 889. The official viewpoint of the administration on the Katanga secession was clearly stated in the address delivered in Los Angeles on December 19, 1961, by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, reproduced in *Africa Report* (January 1962), p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> As one authority remarked, "[self-determination] might mean incorporation into a state, or some measure of autonomy within a state, or a somewhat larger degree of freedom in a federation or commonwealth or union, or it might mean complete independence," Clyde Eagleton, "The Excesses of Self-Determination," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 14 (July 1953), p. 594. For an interesting discussion of the problems raised in its application, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), esp. chs. 16 and 17. See also Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (London, New York, Toronto, 1945), and Benjamin Rivlin, *Self-Determination and Dependent Areas*, *International Conciliation*, No. 501 (January 1955).

any other territory, the fear of domination of one ethnic or tribal group by another has tended to accelerate the trend toward the "balkanization" of the continent. In practice therefore, and despite the efforts of the participants in the San Francisco Conference to rule out the possibility of secession, self-determination has either legitimized or encouraged territorial divisions.<sup>4</sup>

The purpose of this paper is not to present a case "for" or "against" the secession of the Katanga, although the reader will not be left in doubt about the author's stand on this issue. Nor is it to relate in any detailed fashion the sequence of events leading to it. The main concern is to examine the factors underlying the secession of the Katanga as they bear upon the more general problems posed by the "excesses of self-determination." More specifically, the analysis focuses on those factors which seem particularly relevant to an understanding of two central issues raised by partition: when does partition become inevitable? When does it become desirable?

#### I. PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Among the background elements of the Katanga secession, special attention must be paid to at least two underlying factors of disunity: (1) regional differences in the scale of economic development, and (2) areal disparities in the numerical importance and economic status of the settler population. These have been the major determinants of the recurrent conflicts between the Katanga provincial authorities and the central government on the one hand, and among the provincial leaders on the other. This section examines the way in which economic factors have influenced the political options of the Katanga leaders.

With a population of 1,709,659—approximately 13 per cent of the total population of the country—the Katanga was in 1960 one of the most sparsely populated of all the Congo provinces. Thanks to the diversity and sheer abundance of its subsoil resources it underwent a rapid and spectacular development in post-war years. Between 1950 and 1957 the total

value of its mineral output increased by 57 per cent, jumping from 5,569.3 to 8,764.5 million Belgian francs; this was estimated to be approximately 80 per cent of the total value of the minerals extracted in the Congo in 1957. Its main source of revenue came from the exploitation of its copper deposits, so vast and easy of access that they have been called a "geological scandal." Moreover some 60 per cent of the world's cobalt and an appreciable, though undisclosed, percentage of its uranium came from the Katanga. It also held a virtual monopoly in the Congo's production of tin, silver, platinum, lead, palladium and zinc.<sup>5</sup>

This wealth is sometimes identified with one of the Congo's largest operating companies, the *Union Minière du Haut Katanga* (UMHK), founded in 1906 to prospect the mineral resources of an area some 20,000 square kilometers in extent.<sup>6</sup> UMHK ranked as one of the free world's first producers of cobalt and uranium, and the world's third producer of copper; this is a rough indicator of its part in developing the economic potential of the province. In 1955 the company had gross profits of 125 million dollars, of which 54 million were distributed in dividends after taxes and other prior changes. Furthermore, it produced for its own consumption or for sale a variety of industrial by-products, and held a substantial share of the *Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga* (*Beceka*). Ultimate control over the UMHK, however, was exercised by the *Société Générale de Belgique*, unquestionably the most powerful of the five corporate groups which, until recently, dominated the Congo economy.

This overwhelming concentration of economic resources within the boundaries of the Katanga, and of capital in the hands of a single expatriate enterprise, has obvious political implications. For one thing, the dependence of the Katanga on Belgian technicians and investments tends to suggest that the chances of success of a secession depended, to a considerable extent, on the external support of Belgian interests. But this limitation on its feasibility

<sup>5</sup> See *Bulletin de la Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*, No. 12 (December 1958), p. 462 ff.; and *La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi en 1957*, Ministère des Colonies (Bruxelles, 1958), p. 49.

<sup>6</sup> For a global appraisal of the economic activities of the UMHK see Pierre Joye, *Les Trusts en Belgique* (Bruxelles, 1960), p. 121 ff. and Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin, *Les Trusts au Congo* (Bruxelles, 1961). Cf. "The Colonial Big Five," *Fortune* (November 1952), p. 113 ff.

<sup>4</sup> The delegates to the San Francisco Conference were not unaware of these divisive implications. One Committee Report for example emphasized that "the principle [of self-determination] conformed to the Charter insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession," *UN Conference on International Organization* (New York, 1945) Vol. 6, p. 226, cited in Benjamin Rivlin, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

did not make secession less desirable in the minds of the provincial authorities. In fact, as already noted, the position of the Katanga in relation to the other provinces has always been the source of profound economic grievances on the part of its resident population. Like the Ivory Coast in relation to the other states of French West Africa, the Katanga was viewed in some quarters as "the cow that the other territories never tired of milking." This feeling, however, was not uniformly shared by the African population, nor was it sufficiently strong to supersede all tensions among ethnic groups.

The persistence of ethnic particularisms has been reinforced by two salient features of the Katanga. One is the heavy concentration of industrial activities in the southern part of the province—in the Lualaba and Haut Katanga districts, particularly, where the three major mining centers of Elizabethville, Jadotville and Kolwezi are located. This unevenness of industrial development, also reflected in areal differences in the distribution of social overhead capital—commercial centers, communication facilities, schools, hospitals, etc.—has meant in effect that an important segment of the population of the northern region, the Baluba, has remained largely insulated from the unsettling influences generated by the spread of urbanization.

Secondly, given the paucity of the Katangan labor resources and the exigencies of its various industrial activities, the UMHK has tended to recruit a substantial part of its labor force from the populations of the Kasai Province. In 1956, for example, it was estimated that 35 per cent of the population of the *centre extra-coutumier* of Elizabethville, and 53 per cent of the workers employed by the UMHK at the Lubumbashi mine originated from the Kasai.<sup>7</sup> The presence of "alien" elements whose language, customs and traditions differed considerably from those of the resident tribes has made them all the more conscious of their mutual differences. The Baluba of the Kasai, for example, who constitute the bulk of the workers employed by the UMHK, although ethnically related to the Baluba of the Katanga, nevertheless form a distinct cultural group. Important cultural, linguistic and historical factors have also

marked them off from the Lunda, the Bayeke, the Tshokwe and other tribes of the Haut Katanga. Moreover, the fact that they were physically removed from their customary areas and permanently exposed to an industrial environment probably accounts for their greater receptivity to "national" symbols.

Qualifications must therefore be attached to the proposition that the Katanga represents, in terms of its economic development, a distinct geographical entity. In point of fact, the impact of urbanization and industrialization has largely been confined to the southern districts. And insofar as it has affected specific tribes to the exclusion of others, it has not only produced striking contrasts in the ecology of the province but profound social and political tensions among its native populations.

## II. ORGANIZATION, GOALS AND TACTICS OF SETTLER INTERESTS

If, as noted earlier, the Katanga is the most thinly populated area of the Congo, with a density of 3.44 per square kilometers, it was nevertheless in 1958 the province where European settlers were the most numerous. With a non-African population of 34,047 the Katanga claimed in 1956 about 31 per cent of the total European population of the Congo and a ratio of Europeans to Africans approximating 20.8 per thousand, as against 10.3 for the Leopoldville Province.<sup>9</sup>

The influx of European elements into the Katanga is a relatively recent phenomenon, motivated by the sudden opening of apparently unlimited economic opportunities. The province counted 4,824 Europeans in 1924 and 11,341 in 1947.<sup>10</sup> By 1958 some 31,847 Europeans lived in the Katanga, yet only 2,310 of these could be regarded as *bona fide* settlers, the rest consisting of temporarily employed or assigned civil servants, industrialists, technicians and missionaries. Moreover, only 52 per cent of Katangese settlers could claim Belgian nationality. Finally, the occupational distribution of the settler population, though indicating a heavy proportion of merchants and industrialists as well as a generous sprinkling of professional jobs, remained highly diversified.

The absence of a numerous, homogeneous and permanently settled non-African population, which was in a large measure the result of

<sup>7</sup> See Elliot J. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (June 1960), pp. 391-405.

<sup>8</sup> See E. Toussaint, "L'Avenir de la Population Bantoue du Haut Katanga Industriel," *Congrès Scientifique d'Elizabethville*, Vol. 6 (Elizabethville, 1956), p. 45.

<sup>9</sup> *La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi en 1958*, Ministère des Colonies (Bruxelles, 1959), p. 22.

<sup>10</sup> *Rapport Annuel sur la Colonie du Congo Belge en 1924*, p. 83; *ibid*, 1947, p. 258.

a conscious attempt on the part of the Belgian government to retain unfettered control over the affairs of its former colony,<sup>11</sup> admittedly weakened the prospects of European dominance in the Katanga. Similarly, the recency of European settlement as well as the lack of a strong cultural cohesion among the *colons* has probably limited the latter's capacity to identify their future with that of the province. Yet, despite these potential handicaps, the European population of the Katanga has been at the forefront of pro-settler activities.

One of the earliest settler organizations to appear on the Congolese scene was the *Union pour la Colonisation (Ucol)*, founded in May 1944 for the purpose of "deploying all efforts to obtain for the white population of the Congo the liberties granted by the Belgian Constitution to its nationals, and to promote by all available means the growth of European colonization."<sup>12</sup> The organization had representatives in each of the provinces and in Ruanda-Urundi, but its seat was in Elizabethville and most of its 400 dues-paying members registered in 1947 were drawn from the Katanga. An effort was made to reach a measure of social cohesion through periodic meetings and the diffusion of an official organ, the monthly *Ucol*, but there was in fact little or no coordination among its several branches.

The awareness of increasing threats to their respective interests induced the *colons* to close their ranks behind a new organization, the *Fédération des Associations de Colons du Congo Congo et du Ruandu-Urundi*, in short the

*Fedacol*. This roof-organization, set up in 1950, constituted the settlers' response to the introduction of a draft-decree on the "assimilation and immatriculation of civilized natives," on the floor of the *Conseil de Gouvernement*.<sup>13</sup> Its explicit aims were "the defense of the *colonat* and colonization" and "a rapid and harmonious development of European settlement in the Congo."<sup>14</sup> While the chairmanship of the organization was assigned, on a rotating basis, to a different provincial delegate every year, the organizational structure of the *Fedacol* made allowance for a Permanent Executive Committee and a delegate in Brussels. The appointment of representatives to metropolitan agencies, such as the *Société du Crédit au Colonat et à l'Industrie*, and the organization of lobbying activities designed to enlist the support of Belgian deputies, contributed to transform the *colonat* into a powerful pressure group.<sup>15</sup> Its spokesmen also availed themselves of the communications net offered by the colonial press to make their voices heard. Moreover, its representatives in the *Conseil de Gouvernement* were fully conscious of their "pressure-group" functions, as evidenced by the number of settler-sponsored *vœux* introduced at its yearly sessions.

Yet, for all its efforts to achieve some measure of solidarity among the *colons*, the *Fedacol* only earned the effective support of a small fraction of the settler population of the Congo. The figures in Table I indicate that only one-fourth of the *bona fide* settler population of the colony belonged to the *Fedacol* in 1959. But the

<sup>11</sup> Drawing a distinction between the *colonie de peuplement* where "immigrants bring along with themselves their own laws and institutions, exercise political rights and control over the local institutions," and the *colonie d'encadrement* "where the metropole has established its sovereignty over a numerous native population and [where] local government merely exercises delegated powers," the late Professor Marzorati unambiguously identified the former Belgian Congo with the latter type of dependency. See M. A. Marzorati, "L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Congo," *Compte Rendu des Journées Universitaires d'Etudes Coloniales* (Bruxelles, 1952), p. 8.

This distinction reinforced the Belgian government's determination to withhold political rights from both Africans and Europeans. It also provided a rationale for allowing admission into the colony only to those elements that seemed sufficiently capable or resourceful not to become "public burdens" or embittered agitators.

<sup>12</sup> Article 2 of the statutes of the *Ucol*; *Ucol* (Elizabethville), February 1947.

<sup>13</sup> Their reaction was expressed by the Chairman of the *Fedacol* in the following terms: "The European community is too much aware of the excellency of Western civilization to let it run the slightest risk of being submerged under the flood of a hybrid combination of civilization and barbarity," *L'Opinion Publique devant l'Assimilation des Indigènes* (Bruxelles, 1951), p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> See "La Fédération des Classes Moyennes," CRISP, *Courrier Africain*, No. 25 (July 1959), p. 19 ff.

<sup>15</sup> The record suggests that the Belgian Liberal Party (PLB) displayed the most emphatic support for the views and aspirations of the *colonat*. See in particular the declarations made before the Chamber of Representatives by the Liberal deputy Lahaye, *Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants*, April 21, 1959, p. 13 ff. Similarly, the conservative daily *La Libre Belgique*, whose views tend to reflect the opinions of the Social Christian Party (PSC), has at times expressed an overt sympathy towards settler interests.

TABLE I. PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE  
FEDACOL MEMBERSHIP, 1959

Province	Non-African Population	Settler Population	Membership Fedacol	
			Affiliated Members	Per Cent of Settler Pop.
Leopoldville	32,143	1,966	148	7.5
Equateur	6,501	599	110	18.3
Orientale	15,473	1,850	607	32.8
Kivu	12,788	1,397	470	29.4
Katanga	33,918	3,065	975	31.8
Kasai	8,634	544	174	31.9
Total	109,457	9,621	2,484	25.8

Source: "La Fédération des Classes Moyennes," *CRISP, Courrier Africain*, No. 25 (July 1959), p. 3.

Katanga, significantly enough, made the heaviest contribution. Furthermore, and this is symptomatic of regional disparities in settler solidarity, only 7.5 per cent of the total settler population of the Leopoldville Province was affiliated to the *Fedacol*, as against 31.8 per cent in the Katanga.

In their quest for a *modus vivendi* the *colons* relentlessly emphasized their wish to obtain a meaningful share of authority in the conduct of colonial affairs. This aim, viewed as a corollary of the social and economic transformation of the colony, and as a prerequisite for the establishment of mutually satisfactory relations between the African and the European communities, had already found expression in the statutes of the *Ucol*. It was upheld in several statements made by the spokesmen of the *colonat* before the *Commission du Colonat* and the *Conseil Colonial National*, as well as in a number of motions presented to the advisory organs of the colony.<sup>16</sup> In fact, it had earlier

<sup>16</sup> As early as 1925 the *Association des Colons Belges* introduced a motion to the *Comité Régional du Katanga* in which they urged the "competent authorities" "to examine the way in which they could facilitate the exercise of their political rights"; *Comité Régional, Katanga*, 1926, p. 159. In 1946, speaking on behalf of the *Ucol* before the *Commission du Colonat*, a prominent spokesman of the *colonat* stated: "The Belgian *colon* does not want to be regarded as a foreigner in a country which is now his. The Congo must therefore remain a Belgian entity, perhaps in the form of a British dominion"; *Commission du Colonat, Procès Verbaux* (Bruxelles, 1946), p. 30. And in 1953, the delegate of the *Ucol* to the *Conseil Colonial National* declared that "the establishment of legislative, executive and judicial author-

provided a basis for the draft proposal of administrative reorganization presented to the Belgian government in 1920 on behalf of the European population of the Katanga by Monseigneur de Hemptinne, former bishop of the Katanga, M. de Meulemeester, president of the Court of Appeals of Elizabethville, General Wangermée, former Vice Governor General of the Katanga who was at the time representing the UMHK, and several other prominent personalities.<sup>17</sup>

By 1956 it had become obvious to all but the settlers that the Durham formula did not hold much attraction for the Belgian government as a solution to the dilemmas posed by the first manifestations of nationalist assertions. Indeed, in the Katanga and elsewhere in the colony it appeared unlikely that the establishment of settler-controlled institutions would ever become a reality. Yet, in spite of the seemingly indifferent attitude of metropolitan authorities, the *colons* of the Katanga became increasingly committed to the idea of dominion status for the Province. Thus, in an article entitled "Pour un Statut de Dominion au Katanga," an anonymous defender of settler interests wrote in the issue of October 26, 1956 of *L'Essor du Congo*:

The Katanga should form immediately a distinct political entity administered by a Vice Governor General appointed by the King and assisted in his functions by a council whose members would be chosen among the personalities proposed by the various economic corporations which partake in the economic activities of the country.

This, however, was envisaged as the first step towards "the accession of the Katanga to dominion status."

Far from reflecting an isolated or eccentric viewpoint, this conception of the future character of the Katangese polity was typical of the opinions shared by the vast majority of settlers. The propinquity of the Rhodesias and South Africa has of course helped to accelerate to movement for dominion status under white domination in the years preceding independence.<sup>18</sup> But there are also important historical

ities in the the Congo" was "the immediate objective of the settler population"; *Congrès Colonial National, 9ème session* (Bruxelles, 1953), p. 140.

<sup>17</sup> See *Le Gouvernement du Congo Belge: Projet de Réorganisation Administrative* (Elizabethville, 1920); cf. Jean Sépulchre, *Propos sur le Congo Politique de Demain: Autonomie et Fédéralisme* (Elizabethville, 1958), p. 48.

<sup>18</sup> The influence exerted by the Union of South

reasons for this parochial outlook.

It must be remembered, first of all, that settlement processes in the Katanga were initiated and carried out under the auspices of a quasi-independent agency, the *Comité Spécial du Katanga* (CSK). It was responsible not only for the granting of freehold property and mining concessions but also for the administration of a Colonization Department whose principal function was to promote, in every possible way, the development of an agricultural *colonat*. To serve this purpose, a *Syndicat Foncier du Katanga* had been set up in 1920, thanks to the financial backing of the UMHK, the *Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie* (CCCI) and several other large-scale capitalist enterprises. It proved to be a valuable source of financial assistance for prospective settlers, and performed as well an important aggregative function insofar as it served as a connecting link between industrial and agricultural settler interests.<sup>19</sup>

Secondly, one must bear in mind that from 1910 to 1933 the province enjoyed a special administrative status. Partly because of the lack of adequate communications between the capital (then in Boma) and the interior of the colony, and also because the industrial development of the province necessitated a large measure of decentralization,<sup>20</sup> the administration of

the Katanga was entrusted during that period to a Vice Governor General who enjoyed full executive powers. A decree of July 1914 extended this organization to each of the four provinces then in existence. But in 1933, under the governorship of General Tilkens, a new administrative set-up was introduced which eliminated the posts of Vice Governors and transferred their prerogatives to the Governor General. In spite of vehement protests by the European population of the Katanga against this measure, the administrative structure established in 1933 remained basically unchanged in subsequent years.<sup>21</sup>

Thirdly, the desire of the settlers to retain a separate and autonomous status was also prompted by the feelings of hostility they consistently harbored towards Leopoldville. This hostility became more intense with the economic growth of the province and stemmed from the fact that the proportion of public expenditures devoted to the Katanga appeared minute when compared with the over-all contribution of its taxpayers to colonial revenues. As a result they felt that they alone supported the debt charges of the other Provinces as well as the operating costs of the colonial bureaucracy of Kalina. These complaints deserve consideration not only because they have been a source of solidarity among settlers, but also because they throw a revealing light on the subsequent political options of organized settler interests.

Africa on the settler community of the Katanga is evidenced by the following statement, which appeared in the issue of November 17, 1911, of the *Etoile du Congo*, one of the first newspapers to be published in Elizabethville: "If Katanga is to become a credit to South Africa a very different state of affairs than at present exists must be inaugurated in the country. . . . If our new Governor is to be a success he will not consult any man holding an official position; he must put aside officialdom altogether and must call together real businessmen who understand the true inwardness of affairs." It is also reflected in the suggestion made by the *Comité Régional du Katanga* in 1924 that a system of native reserves, "similar to that which prevails in South Africa," be adopted in order to satisfy the demands of the *colons*; *Comité Régional, Katanga*, 1925, p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> See *Le Comité Spécial du Katanga, 1900-1925* (Bruxelles, 1927), esp. Annexe III, pp. 119-120.

<sup>20</sup> As M. Renkin, then Minister of Colonies, declared before the Chambers: "La mesure la plus importante prise au cours de l'exercice 1910 est la création du Vice Gouvernement Général du Katanga. C'est une mesure essentiellement décentralisatrice, dont le but est de favoriser le développement de la région en lui assurant le plus d'autonomie possible. Y aura-t-il d'autres Vice

Gouvernements Généraux comme celui du Katanga? C'est peu probable; l'organisation d'une administration autonome se justifiait au Katanga, district minier où l'industrie s'implanterait facilement. Elle ne se justifierait pas ailleurs pour le moment." *Annales Parlementaires*, 1 Feb. 1911, p. 9.

<sup>21</sup> The resentment caused by the administrative reorganization of 1933 found a graphic expression in an article entitled "Entreprise de Démolition," which appeared in *L'Essor du Congo*, July 3, 1933. Referring to "le dictateur Tilkens," the author of the article stated: "Le grand destructeur de Kalina, qui n'a lui à son actif qu'une incompétence notoire et une incompréhensible suffisance, n'a pas hésité à sacrifier ces remarquables serviteurs de l'oeuvre coloniale pour le seul motif que leur valeur le gênait. Un homme de petite taille n'aime pas s'entourer d'athlètes. Lorsqu'on examine ces fameuses mesures de réorganisation, l'on s'aperçoit en effet que le seul, le vrai but de ce renversement n'a été que d'écarter de l'entourage du Gouverneur Général les hommes de valeur qui le surplombaient"; cited in Jean Sépulchre, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

## III. POLITICAL PRESSURES AND CLEAVAGES

The catalytic agent behind the emergence of political parties in the Katanga, as elsewhere in the Congo, was the constitutional reform introduced in 1957 by the so-called *statut des villes*.<sup>22</sup> The communal elections of December 1957 brought to light and reinforced the solidarity of distinctive tribal groupings. In Elizabethville, for example, three *bourgmestre* posts out of four fell into the hands of Baluba from the Kasai. Electoral processes, on the other hand, stimulated the growth of competing parties also organized on the basis of ethnic or regional criteria.

As noted earlier, this tendency to identify ethnic loyalties with political choices is due in part to the inter-group tensions generated by the uneven impact of economic and social forces. It was also aggravated by two characteristic features of the Katangese scene: (1) the presence of a politically conscious settler community, and (2) the relatively high concentration of Kasaiian immigrants in the industrial areas of the Katanga. Quite obviously, these communities affected the balance of political forces in different ways and through different means. But their respective roles cannot be fully understood independently of each other, for the presence of "alien" tribes provided the *raison d'être* of the alliance of European vested interests with those natives of the Katanga who claimed to be "genuine" Katangese.

In late 1957, shortly before the polling date, a Belgian lawyer, Antoine Rubbens, had taken the initiative in organizing the *Union Congolaise*, a party in which, according to its progenitor's own terms, "Congolese nationalism and Christian Social doctrines were intermingled with Socialist ideas."<sup>23</sup> But this program, despite or because of its novelty, held little attraction for the native tribes of the Katanga; their efforts were primarily aimed at checking the control of Kasaiian immigrants over the municipal institutions of Elizabethville. So, in

<sup>22</sup> The decree of March 23, 1957, provided for the election of municipal councillors in the European and African communes of those urban centers which had been officially recognized as *villes*, namely Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Jadotville. Similar elections were held in December 1958 in Stanleyville, Bukavu, Coquilhatville and Luluabourg. The text of the decree will be found in P. Piron and J. Devos, *Codes et Lois du Congo Belge*, Tome D, 1957 (Bruxelles, 1958), pp. 39-53.

<sup>23</sup> "Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo," *Civilisations*, Vol. X, No. 1 (1960), p. 66.

order to resist the inroads of "alien" tribes, the leaders of several tribal associations of the Katanga decided in November 1958 to form a coalition behind the *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga*, better known as the *Conakat*.<sup>24</sup> It included in its membership a host of minor tribal groupings, but derived most of its active support from the principal ethnic group of the Haut Katanga, the Lunda. In September of the same year, the Baluba of the Kasai who were previously affiliated to the *Fédération des Baluba Centraux du Katanga* (*Fegebaceka*) founded, under the leadership of Isaac Kalondji, the *Fédération Kasaienne* (*Fedeka*).

In the meantime, a group of white settlers had set up the *Union Katangaise*, a multi-racial party which, as the name suggests, aimed at the construction of a "genuine Katangese community."<sup>25</sup> It was in fact the political expression of the Katangese section of the *Fedacol*, the *Ucol-Katanga*. It will be recalled at this point that the Belgian government's declaration of January 1959 had made it quite plain that Belgium recognized the claims of the Congo to self-government. Equally plain was the assumption that the entire Congo was destined to remain a distinct geographical and political unit. Thus, promptly realizing the potential advantage that would result from an alliance with "genuine" Katangese, the *Union Katangaise* decided in the early part of 1959 to join forces with the *Conakat*.

<sup>24</sup> The *Conakat* incorporated in its membership the *Groupe des Associations Mutuelles de l'Empire Lunda*, the *Association des Baluba du Katanga*, the *Fédération des Tribus du Haut Katanga*, the *Association des Basonge*, the *Association des Bena Marunga*, the *Association des Ressortissants Bahemba*, the *Association des Minungu*, and several other tribal associations. The most important of these numerically was the *Association des Baluba*, founded in 1957 by Jason Sendwe for the avowed purpose of "promoting the unity of the Baluba." It agreed to join the *Conakat* on February 5, 1959, on the condition that it would retain a large measure of autonomy. As specified by Sendwe in a letter sent to the *Conakat* leaders, "la Balubakat se réserve formellement le droit de garder son autonomie de direction et de gestion." The writer wishes to acknowledge his debt to the Department of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Interior of the Katanga for permission to consult some of its files.

<sup>25</sup> The program of the *Union Katangaise* will be found in *L'Essor du Congo*, May 28, 1958; cf. *Ucol: Doctrine Politique* (Elizabethville, n.d.). mimeographed document.



This move added to the ambitions and gave increased confidence to the aspirations of its leaders. In February 1959, Mr. Godefroid Munongo, then President of the *Conakat*, openly criticized the provincial Governor for allowing the Kasaian tribes to reside in the Katanga.<sup>26</sup> In May of the same year the leaders of the *Conakat* publicly announced the need to transform the Katanga into "an autonomous and federated state" with political control vested in the hands of "authentic Katangese."<sup>27</sup> Shortly thereafter, Moïse Tshombe expressed his commitment to "a federal system uniting the Congolese Provinces and Belgium in the framework of a Belgo-Congolese Community with each of the constituent units preserving its internal autonomy."<sup>28</sup> Finally, on the inauguration of a *Conakat* section in Kolwezi, an eminent personality of the party, after paying lip service to the "legitimate rights of the inhabitants of this Province" went on to declare that all non-Katangese would be automatically excluded from the political and administrative posts of the province.<sup>29</sup> In fact, the parochial outlook of the *Conakat* developed into an increasingly xenophobic attitude.<sup>30</sup>

Partly as a result of the inflammatory state-

<sup>26</sup> On February 13, 1959, Mr. Munongo wrote a letter to the provincial Governor which stated, among other things: "Les Katangais d'origine se demandent avec raison si les autorités ne font pas exprès en accordant le séjour définitif aux gens du Kasai dans nos centres pour que les ressortissants de cette Province puissent, grâce à leur nombre toujours croissant, écraser ceux du pays. Ce fait pourrait faire déclencher dans un avenir plus ou moins proche des bagarres entre les habitants des deux Provinces. . . . Nous nous permettons de porter à votre connaissance que très nombreux sont les Katangais d'origine qui aimeraient travailler dans les grands centres de leur Province; impitoyablement on leur répond qu'il y a un arrêté interdisant l'accès vers ces centres. Et pourtant ce sont eux qui devraient avoir priorité."

<sup>27</sup> *L'Essor du Congo*, May 26, 1959.

<sup>28</sup> *L'Essor du Congo*, July 29, 1959.

<sup>29</sup> *Le Phare du Katanga*, June 3, 1959.

<sup>30</sup> As one competent observer noted: "Immigrants and their descendants would be thrown out of the Katanga; jobs made scarce by the recession would be left to the natives of the Province; in any case, the foreign labor which the industries might need would not be part of the community and would not participate in polls—these would be reserved exclusively to genuine Katangese and their civilizers"; A. Rubbens, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

ments made by party propagandists, and partly because of external pressures, the *Conakat* underwent serious internal stresses when, in November 1959, one of its most important constituent units, the *Association des Baluba du Katanga* (*Balubakat*), decided to bolt the party. The secession carried with it important consequences, for the *Balubakat*, led by Jason Sendwe, attracted the overwhelming support of the Baluba of the Katanga. Sendwe's move was of course symptomatic of personal rivalries in the leadership of the *Conakat*. But it is also indicative of the ethnic solidarity prevailing among the Baluba: if, as noted earlier, substantial cultural differences exist between the Kasaian tribes and those of the Katanga, they are at any rate not so fundamental as to leave each indifferent to the other's fate.<sup>31</sup> Another contributory factor lies in the alliance of settler interests with the *Conakat*.<sup>32</sup> In any event, the formation of the *Cartel Katangais*—which included, besides the *Fedeka* and the *Balubakat*, the *Association des Tshokwe du Congo, de l'Angola et de la Rhodesie* (*Atcar*)—drastically altered the previous lines of cleavage. No longer were divisions drawn between "genuine" Katangese and "immigrants," but between Baluba and Tshokwe on the one hand, and the remaining tribes on the other.

In assessing the relationships between European interests and political groups, one should stress at the outset that Europeans did not stand as a monolithic or undifferentiated bloc. In fact, the fusion of the short-lived *Union Katangaise* with the *Conakat* provoked the

<sup>31</sup> The alliance concluded by the *Balubakat* and the *Fedeka* on the eve of the Brussels Round Table Conference, in late 1959, also tends to confirm this fact. For further evidence see Mabika Kalanda, *Baluba et Lulua: Une Ethnie à la Recherche d'un Nouvel Equilibre* (Bruxelles, 1959); J. Vansina, "Migrations dans la Province du Kasai; Une Hypothèse," *Zaire* (January 1956), pp. 69–85; E. Verhulpen, *Baluba et Balubaisés du Katanga* (Antwerp, 1936).

<sup>32</sup> In a letter to Mr. Munongo, dated June 8, 1959, a group of Katangese *commerçants* of various tribal origins declared: "Votre position vous a été dictée par l'*Union Katangaise* de colons pour nous imposer le fédéralisme qui sera après considéré comme l'apartheid et l'autonomie. . . . Nous vous demandons Munongo de rentrer à l'Uganda dont vous êtes ressortissant, et laissez-nous Congolais seuls à réclamer notre droit à l'indépendance immédiate. . . . Nous sommes tous Kinois, Bukaviens, Kasaiens, Katangais, en un mot Congolais et Bantous."

emergence of new identifications between metropolitan or colonial interest groups and parties. While close organic ties existed between the *Conakat* and the white settlers through the *Ucol-Katanga*, the connections between the *Balubakat* and Belgian liberals—often associated with the Belgian Socialist Party—were initially due to the presence of isolated personalities upon whom the party had devolved advisory functions. Some were drawn from the provincial cadres of the colonial administration; others from the administrative personnel of the Université Officielle of Elizabethville; most of them, however, had been appointed to official positions under the Liberal Ministry of Auguste Buisseret, who held office from 1954 to 1958.

Secondly, the means of pressure available to the *Conakat* were far more effective than those at the disposal of its rivals. They could count on the active support of several local pressure groups, such as the *Ucol-Katanga*, the daily newspaper *L'Essor du Congo* and the Zionist Association of Elizabethville, as well as on the financial backing of powerful corporate interests, including the UMHK. As one might expect in view of the magnitude of the stake held by the *Société Générale* in the mineral resources of the Katanga, it was to the utmost advantage of Belgian banking interests that the *Conakat* should score a decisive victory at the polls. This point, however, needs qualification.<sup>33</sup>

In the first place, the Board of Directors of the *Société Générale* held different opinions concerning both the degree to which they should intervene in local politics, and the manner in which any intervention should be carried out. Even sharper differences of opinion divided the colonial personnel of the *Société Générale* from its metropolitan executives, the former being far more outspoken in their preference for a separate political status for the Katanga. Secondly, at least until the convening of the Brussels Round Table the contributions of campaign funds made by the *Société Générale* were mainly channelled through semi-independent agents, a fact which contributed in no small way to increase the fragmentation of the Congolese political scene.<sup>34</sup> Finally, when it

appeared that the balance of power was almost evenly shared between the *Conakat* and the *Balubakat*, the *Société Générale*, out of sheer opportunism, decided to dispense its financial aid to both of the two contenders, thus cancelling the potential advantage which it might have derived from a more discriminating disposition of its resources.

The net result of the involvement of European metropolitan interests in the politics of the Katanga is admittedly difficult to ascertain. But most informed observers would agree that the competition among parties served as an outlet for the expression of personal and ideological antagonisms between conservatives and liberals, or clericals and anticlericals. As a result, Katangese leaders have been led to adopt far more intransigent stands on concrete issues than might otherwise have been the case. One may also wonder if the secessionist efforts of the Katanga leaders could have succeeded unless they had been sustained, morally and financially, by Belgian interests.

#### IV. THE POLITICS OF SECESSION

The chain of events which led to the secession comprised two distinct major phases. One, which immediately followed the general elections of May 1960, ended with the neutralization of the forces opposed to the ambitions of Tshombe and the *Conakat*. The other, triggered off by the mutiny of the *Force Publique* in the early days of July 1960, relates more specifically to the circumstances which brought about the erection of an independent state in the Katanga.

It will be recalled that the *Loi Fondamentale*, enacted by the Belgian Parliament in March 1960, stipulated that the legislative powers of the province would be exercised by a single chamber composed of sixty elected members. Nine additional members were to be subsequently coopted by the provincial deputies from a list of "customary chiefs and notables." A provincial executive would then be elected by an absolute majority of at least two-thirds of the membership of the provincial assembly.<sup>35</sup>

The electoral campaign which began in April 1960 accelerated competition among groups and led to bloodshed on numerous occasions. But the battle for ballots was espe-

<sup>33</sup> The views contained in this paragraph and the next are based on oral and documentary evidence furnished by European and African personalities whose identity can not be disclosed.

<sup>34</sup> Commenting upon the financial aid extended to Katangese parties by Belgian "institutions with important moral and material stakes in the Katanga," Jules-Gérard Libois notes that "the

paradox lies in the fact that the Belgian source remained the same" and that "only the channels were different"; *Etudes Congolaises*, No. 1 (March 1961), p. 38.

<sup>35</sup> The text of the *Loi Fondamentale* will be found in *Documents Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants*, No. 489, pp. 1-44.

TABLE II. PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE KATANGAN PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY

Districts	Cona- kat	Baluba- kat	Cartel Baluba- kat- MNCL	Atcar	MNCL	MNCK	Union Congo- laise	Local In- terests	Total
Elizabethville	3	2				1			6
Jadotville	1		2						3
Tanganika	3	6	1		1		1	4	16
Lualaba	6	1		2				3	12
Haut-Lomami	3	9						1	13
Haut-Katanga	9							1	10
Total	25	18	3	2	1	1	1	9	60

Source: *Congo 1960*, Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (Bruxelles, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 243.

cially tight between the *Conakat* and the *Balubakat*, the two principal *dramatis personae*: of the 160 lists which competed for seats in either the provincial or the federal assemblies, 24 had been introduced by the *Conakat* and 16 by the *Balubakat*.<sup>36</sup> In the end, however, neither of the two major contestants could claim a decisive victory over its opponent. As shown by the figures in Table II, the Provincial Assembly was almost evenly split between the *Conakat* and the *Balubakat*, with the former controlling 25 seats out of a total of 60. Thanks to its alliance with the *Mouvement National Congolais* of Lumumba and the *Atcar*, the *Balubakat* could presumably count on 23 seats in the assembly.

This precarious equilibrium was eventually upset to the advantage of the *Conakat* by two unforeseen developments. On May 27, the dissident wing of the *Mouvement National Congolais*, led by Albert Kalondji, drew away the support of two Baluba elected on a *Cartel* ticket.<sup>37</sup> Almost simultaneously, several depu-

ties who had been elected on lists of "local interests" joined the *Conakat*. Thus, on June 1st, when the assembly held its inaugural session, the *Conakat* controlled 32 seats and the *Cartel* 22.

The electoral procedure adopted by the Belgian government also had important consequences on the outcome of the party struggle. As stipulated by the *loi electorale*, the elections to the provincial and federal assemblies were held concurrently; but the candidates were selected from different lists and in different constituencies.<sup>38</sup> Consequently, those parties which favored a unitary formula, such as the *Balubakat* and its coalition partners, tended to reserve their "safest" candidates for federal offices, while separatist parties, on the contrary, tended to orient their strategy along the opposite lines. This, in turn, considerably enhanced the position of the *Conakat* in the Provincial Assembly. Secondly, the odd results produced by the *scrutin de liste à un tour*, directly borrowed from the Belgian electoral system, led the members of the opposition to believe that the elections had been systematically "rigged" by the administration.<sup>39</sup> Whether

cial guarantees. See *Congo 1960*, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

<sup>38</sup> See "Loi relative aux elections legislatives," *Moniteur Congolais*, No. 13, March 28, 1960, p. 863 ff.

<sup>39</sup> In the Elizabethville constituency for example, where the *Conakat* polled 8,617 votes—exactly 7 more than the *Balubakat*—3 seats went to the *Conakat*, 2 to the *Balubakat* and one to the MNC-Kalondji. In Dilolo the *Balubakat* received only as many seats as the *Conakat*, in spite of the fact that it obtained 2,947 more votes than its opponent; see *Congo 1960*, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

<sup>36</sup> See *Congo 1960*, Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, (Bruxelles, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 240. This work contains the most abundant source of documentation available to this date on the recent political evolution of the Congo.

<sup>37</sup> Gérard-Libois reports that this sudden defection was in part the result of a *quid pro quo* between Tshombe and Kalondji. The latter, anxious to obtain the support of the federal deputies of the *Conakat* for his candidacy for the post of federal Prime Minister, had apparently promised the leader of the *Conakat* to lend him the support of his own party in the provincial assembly on the condition that the Kasaiian minority be given spe-

there was any conclusive evidence of this is difficult to say. The crucial point here is that the members of the opposition were unanimously convinced that they were the victims of electoral fraud. Although 21 complaints seeking the quashing of the elections had been introduced by the *Cartel* in the period following the publication of the electoral returns, none were acknowledged. Thus on June 1 as a sign of protest against "the way in which electoral processes had been conducted," the members of the *Cartel* walked out of the Provincial Assembly.

Realizing that a prolonged boycott of the Assembly would prevent the formation of a provisional government unless the two-thirds quorum prescribed by the *Loi Fondamentale* was reduced to a simple majority, the Provincial Governor, Mr. A. Schoeller, appealed to the Minister of the Congo in Brussels and urged him to promulgate an amendment to that effect.<sup>40</sup> At the same time Schoeller informed the leaders of the *Balubakat* that the amendment of the *Loi Fondamentale* would still allow them to get an "equitable share" of ministerial posts. Indifferent to the Governor's placatory statements, the leader of the *Balubakat*, Jason Sendwe, immediately cabled the Governor General and the King and prophetically warned them against the "promulgation of a law [which] would inevitably lead to civil war after June 30."<sup>41</sup> On June 15 the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, by a vote of 98 to 5, with 66 abstentions, and the Senate, by 66 votes with 33 abstentions, enacted the amendment; and the following day the provincial assembly elected a government in which all ministerial chairs but one were occupied by members of the *Conakat*.<sup>42</sup>

In yielding to the joint pressures of the *colonat* and "genuine" Katangese, the Belgian government had not only relieved the *Conakat* from the compromises on offices that would have been necessary if the two-thirds requirement had been retained; it had in effect deliberately played into the hands of the "separatists." If indeed ruthless repression was the only means available to the *Conakat* leaders to come to terms with the demands of the *Cartel* once the latter walked out of the parliamentary arena, secession became their only solution to escape the control of the central government.

On June 23, barely a week before independence and after a series of protracted negotia-

tions, the Congolese Chambers had finally given their reluctant approval to Lumumba's cabinet. As could be expected, Tshombe received the news with a mixture of astonishment and indignation. In a statement to the Belga news agency, the President of the provincial government of the Katanga gave the following hint of his ultimate intentions:

It is with astonishment that I have heard on the radio the final composition of the central government. I note that the Ministry of National Defense has been attributed to Mr. Lumumba and the Interior to a member of the MNC, although it had been decided that National Defense, in order to . . . avoid the control of a single party, would be administered by a college of all the ministers, with the Secretaryship of National Defense to a member of the *Conakat*. It had also been agreed that another key ministry, Interior, would be assigned to the *Abako* which shares the federalist ideas of the Katangese. The post of Head of the State had been formally promised to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and the Vice Presidency to Mr. Bolikango. It is only on these conditions that the *Conakat* accepted to lend its support to the government formed by Mr. Lumumba.<sup>43</sup>

That Tshombe intended to proclaim the independence of the Katanga on June 26, or shortly thereafter, is now a well established fact.<sup>44</sup> But the Belgian government was by this time too much aware of its responsibilities toward the central government, and of the consequences that would have resulted from its failure to meet them, to allow the secession to occur at this particular juncture. Belgian financial interests, moreover, were not unreservedly committed to Tshombe's views. Indeed, a Belgian writer who cannot be suspected of sympathies towards Belgian capitalist enterprises recognized that the UMHK favored other methods than secession. This possibility, according to him, was viewed rather as "a means of blackmail" or "an alternative linked to an eventual catastrophe."<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>44</sup> On June 25 Tshombe and Munongo secretly appointed a former Belgian functionary, Franz Scheerlinck, to the rank of "special ambassador" and provided him with all necessary credentials, including an airplane ticket for New York, via Brussels. But the news leaked and the authorities of Leopoldville euchred Tshombe out of his "coup" by arresting his "special ambassador" before he had any chance to acquit himself of his mission. *Ibid.*, pp. 254-256.

<sup>45</sup> Ernest Glinne, "Le Pourquoi de l'Affaire Katangaise," *Presence Africaine* (June-September 1960), p. 56 ff.

<sup>40</sup> An instructive account of this intervention will be found in Jules Chome, *La Crise Congolaise* (Bruxelles, 1960).

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>42</sup> *Congo 1960, op. cit.*, p. 253.

The catastrophe occurred on July 5 with the mutiny of the Congolese National Army. Difficult though it may be, even at this time, to separate fact from rumor in recording the developments and implications of the mutiny, it is nevertheless beyond question that the revolt which exploded at the Camp Massart on July 9, threatened the entire province with violence and confusion. Order was finally restored after the intervention of the Belgian paratroopers stationed in Kamina and on July 11 the President of the provincial government officially proclaimed the independence of the Katanga. Shortly thereafter, the Belgian government, now regarding itself as freed of its obligations toward the central government of the Republic of the Congo, delegated d'Aspremont Lynden to the Katanga as "Chief of the Belgian Technical Mission." While the Belgian government refused to extend official recognition to the newly born Katangese Republic, it nevertheless "acknowledged" the independence of the province and the King paid a public homage to the "tribes which have conserved their amity with Belgium and ask her to help them remain independent."<sup>46</sup>

#### V. CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion tends to suggest, the secession of the Katanga was not made inevitable, although it may have been precipitated, by any single set of factors. The fact that Belgium shares a heavy responsibility in the secession does not make her alone responsible for it. Indeed, one could possibly argue that the reason why it did not take place before June 30, 1960 was precisely because the Belgian government was willing to recognize and honor its legal obligations toward the central government. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the amendment to the *Loi Fondamentale*, which made it legally possible for the leaders of the *Conakat* to set up a government unhampered by the forces of the opposition, and their conviction that Belgian interests would then support their claims, did encourage the Katanga authorities to proclaim the independence of the province after June 30. But neither of these factors is sufficient to explain the existence of strong separatist sentiments in the Katanga. Nor do they provide a basis for predicting the occurrence of similar situations in a colonial context.

Among the several factors which predisposed the Katanga leaders to claim self-determination, at least three deserve emphasis. One is the sense of economic grievance which permeates the attitude of the so-called "gen-

uine" Katangese towards the inhabitants of the other provinces. As already noted, regional differences in the distribution of economic resources operated to aggravate latent tensions among ethnic groups, so that economic stratification tended to coincide with tribal divisions. In a sense, therefore, tribal antagonisms must be viewed as symptoms of economic grievances. The fact that the *Conakat* succeeded in rallying the support of otherwise unrelated tribal entities (Bayeke, Lunda, Batabwa, etc.) suggests indeed that these grievances were an important source of solidarity among its members. A second determinative factor was the part played by the white settlers in making the idea of secession both economically attractive and politically meaningful. The alliance between settler interests and "genuine" Katangese, prompted by the decision of the Belgian government to grant the Congo its independence, did not imply a fundamental change in their objectives. On the contrary, the tactics employed by the *colonat* consisted in communicating its political conceptions to the *Conakat* without in any way attempting to exercise a rigorous control over the activities of the party. By a process like osmosis the *Conakat* identified itself with the ideas and attitudes which gave the settler community of the Katanga its distinctive outlook. A third explanatory factor lies in the outside support accorded by Belgian metropolitan interests to the advocates of the secession. This by itself did not provoke the emergence of separatist claims. But it provided the external stimulus which made the prospects of a secession increasingly attractive. And in the event, this is what made it feasible.

Conceding that the combination of these factors rendered the secession of the Katanga virtually inevitable at a certain point, it does not necessarily follow that it was desirable.

Before a claim to self-determination can be recognized as legitimate, let alone desirable, certain minimum requirements must be met. Among those, "the freedom of the people of the territory to choose the form of government which they desire," and "freedom from interference by another government as to internal affairs" are essential.<sup>47</sup> Quite obviously, the Katanga authorities fail to measure up to either one of these standards. The minimum degree of internal freedom which would entitle them to speak for the whole province is

<sup>47</sup> These requirements were specifically mentioned, among several others, by the Committee on Factors established by the General Assembly in 1952 to report on the qualifications for self-government; see Clyde Eagleton, *op. cit.*, p. 599.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

completely lacking. As the United States Representative to the United Nations declared before the Security Council on November 16, 1961, "the Katanga Parliament is a rump organization formed of not more than 25 of the 60 legal members of the original assembly, and the ethnic groupings which support the present regime constitute . . . less than half of the province's inhabitants."<sup>48</sup> There is on the other hand sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges brought by the "Casablanca Powers" against the "clientele-sovereignty" of Tshombe's regime. The relation of dependence which, these "radicals" assert has been established by the metropolitan power "with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client state and controlling it effectively by means other than political,"<sup>49</sup> has been clearly evidenced in the more recent history of the Katanga.

The next question arising at this point is—even if we assume that the Katanga authorities could legitimize their claims to speak for the entire province—would this justify the United Nations in recognizing its independence? In this connection, two other factors deserve consideration. One relates to the general welfare of the community from which the group claiming self-determination seeks to secede. When the economic deprivations entailed by the secession become so harsh that they threaten the very survival of this community, there is clearly no justification for such claims. Or else the practical implications of a secession might well force upon the United Nations a financial burden out of all propor-

tion to its own available resources.

The second factor concerns the political consequences which may result from a full-scale application of the right of a people to self-determination. In this case the threat to international peace represented by the possible intervention of third parties largely accounts for the decision of the United Nations to condemn the secession. From the standpoint of the internal political situation in the Congo, the secession would have played directly into the hands of the Gizengists and perhaps have invited a much firmer "commitment" on their part than presently exists, thereby making the prospects of national unification all the more distant. For this reason it also ran counter to the long-range objectives of the United States in Africa. As Adlai Stevenson declared before the Security Council: "If Tshombe's unwillingness thus far to meet with the central government authorities has prevented the achievement of political unity, how much more dangerous are the defiant actions and declarations of the authorities of the Orientale Province."<sup>50</sup> True, in the minds of African "radicals" the danger of Soviet penetration was virtually nonexistent as long as the Congo remained partially controlled by "neo-colonialist" forces. The secession of the Katanga was viewed, rather, as the ultimate phase of the struggle of nationalist forces against the remnants of colonial rule. The crucial point here, however, is that in each case the decision to prevent the exercise of self-determination was based on political considerations. That there are important economic and political limitations to the right of self-determination, and that these will necessarily depend on the context and circumstances in which the question arises, is perhaps the most significant lesson to be learned from the secession of the Katanga.

<sup>48</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 45, No. 1174 (December 25, 1961), p. 1062.

<sup>49</sup> The words are those of Ghana's President, Kwame Nkrumah; see Robert C. Good, "Four African Views of the Congo Crisis," *Africa Report* (June 1961), p. 3.

<sup>50</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, *op. cit.*, p. 1063.

## POLITICAL SCIENCE AS A DISCIPLINE

### A STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF INSTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Political science is a basic discipline in the social sciences. Although it must necessarily maintain close scholarly association with the disciplines of history, economics, sociology, anthropology, geography, and social psychology, political science cannot be considered a part of any of these other social sciences. Political science has its own area of human experience to analyze, its own body of descriptive and factual data to gather, its own conceptual schemes to formulate and test for truth.

#### I

For many years in many American colleges and universities history and political science were united as disciplines. In an earlier time there may have been some justification for this relationship. Today, this particular combination of scholarship serves no useful academic purpose.

When history meant primarily political history, and when political science relied heavily upon historical analysis, the two disciplines might well be linked for reasons of administrative convenience and scholarly association. In the present time when historiography embraces economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological events as well as the political concerns of man, history no longer can be properly so tied to political science. And on the other hand, with history as an important but no longer the exclusive analytical technique of political inquiry, political science cannot properly be subsumed under the discipline of history.

Indeed, political science at the present time has developed its own internal specializations, even as most other disciplines. Less and less is a political scientist today a generalist in politics. He should have a broad background, it is true, in the general understanding of political power as a phenomenon of society, as a social institution, and as a structural and behavioral process. Yet the political scientist increasingly finds the body of political knowledge so great, and the tools of study so exacting, that he must specialize if he is to master and to communicate his subject matter.

In general, political science as a discipline is ordinarily divided into four broad areas of study. These are political theory, American political institutions and processes, comparative political institutions and processes, and international relations, organization and law.

In practice, these four major subdivisions of attention constitute great categories of political knowledge. Within each subdivision there are further specializations. The scholar in political theory may specialize in the thought of particular historical periods: ancient, medieval, renaissance, contemporary; or he may specialize in types of political doctrine such as aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian, or Marxian. The scholar of American government may specialize in constitutional law, political institutions including public administration, or political structure and behavior. The scholar in comparative government may concentrate upon the political systems of certain areas of the world: Western Europe, Latin America, the Far East, Africa, the Communist bloc; or he may of necessity devote his attention to specific nations: the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, French Equatorial Africa. The scholar of international relations and law may give primary attention to diplomatic or legal relations among nations, to the relations among two or more particular nations, or to particular subjects of international negotiation such as the promotion of trade, the pursuit of collective security, the control of arms.

Some universities have on occasion sought other arrangements than the one just outlined in the development of specialized categories of political knowledge. One system of specialization as against another is not our concern here. The fact of specialization within the body of knowledge labelled political science is of primary importance. There is also a growing specialization of methodology. In this respect the history of our discipline is similar to that of other disciplines.

Only in a large and wealthy university can a department of political science hope to bring together a company of scholars conversant with all or even most of these fields of specialized knowledge. Within many of our graduate schools there is a tendency to develop particular specialties, leaving other specialties to political science departments in other universities. For the most part agreements among political science departments to cooperate in the distribution of specializations are informal. Foundations by their grant programs have done much to encourage a distribution of specialization. There is a need for exploration of further desirable forms of inter-university cooperation in developing specialized fields of

political science. As in many other areas of scholarship and human endeavor, however, political science must be aware of a tendency toward monopoly.

Today, as never before, a knowledge of political science is an essential part of the intellectual equipment of every educated person. At the same time, specialized competence in political science is indispensable for the further intellectual growth of man, and for the guidance of decision-making in a beleaguered world.

## II

We are very much concerned about the implications of a recent survey of political science departments in four-year colleges and universities. This survey was undertaken by the headquarters staff of the American Political Science Association. The results of the survey give us reason for grave disquiet about the quality of the study of political science in American higher education today.

We appreciate the fact that our colleges and universities in the United States are proud of their variety and diversity. We realize that these institutions have somewhat different educational objectives, may serve somewhat different student interests and abilities, and may adopt somewhat different instructional procedures. We cannot accept the proposition, however, that political science as a discipline can be offered as a course of study in accredited colleges and universities without a definite concern for the quality and scope of such instruction.

In some circumstances the size of enrollment may be a restricting factor in curriculum offerings and instructional staffing. We are aware that some 615 private liberal arts colleges in the United States and some 67 state colleges had each an enrollment of under 1,000 students in 1960. In these circumstances we believe that political science should not be provided as a discipline unless the college has the resources to meet minimum acceptable standards of quality.

In our survey of degree granting colleges and universities, we have found 786 institutions offering courses under the heading of political science. We have found that only 466 of these institutions had a separate department of political science. In 162 instances political science was part of a joint department with history. In 129 instances political science was part of a department of social studies. In another 29 cases political science was joined with some other discipline, such as economics or sociology.

Of these 786 colleges and universities, we

have found that in 564 instances, or 72 per cent of the total, political science was being offered by three or fewer persons. Indeed, we have found 15 departments offering the master's degree with only two or three instructors, and have even found two departments offering the Ph.D. degree, one with two instructors and the other with three instructors!

With staff resources of this limited number, we are appalled to discover that these departments are offering up to as many as 30 different courses. The average number of political science courses offered by a one-man department is 11, the average for a two-man department is 13, and the average for a three-man department is 15. Here is fragmentation run riot without adequate staff resources for such specialization. We have even found one instance where one man taught 20 different courses, five each semester over a four-semester cycle.

The data on educational preparation for instruction in political science are also not reassuring. In the 297 separate departments of political science having three or fewer instructors, the total number of persons teaching is 412. Of these, 236 held the Ph.D. degree and 138 held the master's degree. The proportion of individuals with the doctorate was 57 per cent. Quite a large number of persons are teaching political science who have not had any educational preparation in political science. Their background has been in law, history, economics, sociology, and philosophy.

In general, teaching loads appear to be quite heavy, especially in these small departments. We have found instances of individuals who teach as many as 21 to 25 hours a week; 18 hours is not uncommon. It must be remembered that all of the institutions we have referred to are four-year, degree granting colleges and universities, and all are regionally accredited.

We believe the small college has an educational contribution to make in our society, although this contribution in our judgment is often exaggerated. The small college is misguided in its efforts when it seeks to imitate a university in the scope and number of its course offerings.

We think that a wide variety and a large number of courses offered by a one- or two-man political science department endanger a desirable quality of instruction. We think that ordinarily a college providing a major in political science with fewer than three competent instructors is risking poor quality of instruction. We think that a college with a large department in one of the social science disciplines which adds on one or two political scientists for "balance" has not carefully con-



considered the standards of instruction it desires to achieve. The variety of special instruction now required in political science of the scholarly political scientist must be properly prepared for his profession, or instruction in those areas of his individual competence, and must have time and opportunity for continued professional development and association.

We think these factors must be continually examined in every college and university providing instruction in political science.

### III

Quality of instruction in political science in terms of organizational arrangements, load, educational preparation, scope of offerings, and scholarly association are not our only concerns. Adequate library materials are of equal importance.

It is hardly necessary to argue that library resources have a vital role in the teaching of political science. In a small college in particular, books can supplement limited resources in teachers. Yet the political scientist who is a specialist in American political institutions may often find himself at a loss to determine the most desirable library holdings in comparative government or international relations and law. Such a specialist in American political institutions may feel even more incompetent in deciding the desirable acquisitions in various sub-specialties, such as Russian government, arms control, or Sino-American relations.

We are confident that a minimum working undergraduate library in political science would involve at least 2,500 to 3,000 different volumes. We believe it would be desirable for the American Political Science Association to arrange the preparation of a list of volumes which would constitute such a minimum working undergraduate library.

### IV

It seems unlikely that political scientists would necessarily agree that there is one best possible kind of undergraduate curriculum for the study of political science. We believe there would be a high degree of consensus, however, about the basic construction of such a curriculum.

First of all, there must be a general introductory course. For many students in a college or university this will be their only exposure to political science as a discipline. This course

will usually satisfy such general education requirements in government or the social sciences as a college or university may prescribe. At the same time, this course must satisfy the need for a foundation to later and further study of political science by students with a particular interest in the field.

The introductory course may approach the study of political science in terms of political theory, of comparative government, or of American political institutions. Some admixture of all three may well be undertaken, as well as a consideration of American foreign policy.

It seems particularly desirable that the introductory course should avoid a mere repetition of descriptive and factual data about American government which the college student should have acquired in high school.

Secondly, beyond the introductory course there should be a desirable array of core courses in political science. Ordinarily, there should be at least four of these: one each in American political institutions, comparative government, international relations, and political theory. Such core courses must be carefully articulated with the introductory course to avoid repetition of content.

In the third place, there will be some specialized course offerings within the framework of the core courses. In general, we believe that such specialized courses should be kept within reasonable limits at the undergraduate level, and that the undergraduate major should be encouraged instead to study comparable core areas in related social science disciplines such as history, economics, and sociology.

There is a good deal of discussion about the extent of concentration to be required of the undergraduate political science major. This can only be resolved in terms of the undergraduate educational goals and procedures of an individual college or university as a whole. Education in depth and breadth are the equal objectives of undergraduate instruction in the United States.

### V

We are also concerned about graduate instruction in political science. According to Berelson's recent study, about half of the political scientists on graduate faculties in American universities are dissatisfied with the state of graduate education in our discipline. This may reflect no more than a continuing restless discontent, a healthy state of affairs for our profession.

Many issues are involved. Perhaps they can all be summarized in the language of a colleague who remarked several years ago that we seek a concept of the doctorate which will provide a

"valid indication of technical competence." Should research training or teaching ability be the primary goal of graduate education? Is breadth of knowledge about political science or a high degree of specialization desirable? What kinds of educational endeavor and experience will best realize our goals? How long a period of time should graduate education require?

These are all familiar issues, and they are not peculiar to political science. All of these problems require continuing attention.

The curriculum for graduate education will necessarily reflect the instructional philosophy of a graduate department of political science. At a minimum a graduate department will desire to carry the specialization of undergraduate study to a more intensive level of competence. We recognize that undergraduate and graduate education tend to overlap, but some arrangements should be possible to avoid duplicating course requirements for the individual student.

We believe it is necessary for all graduate students to have some specialized study in the field of political theory. If the graduate student has not had some introduction to the other major areas of political science, this also seems necessary. Beyond this, we think that the graduate student should be expected to develop a particular competence within one general area and within some subdivision of another general area.

When should a university contemplate offering a Ph.D. in political science? The answer must be general but emphatic. The department must have the necessary resources in number and quality of personnel, in library and research materials, and in instructional and research facilities to offer courses and student supervision in at least three of the broad areas of political science and in considerable depth of specialization within each of these areas.

Good graduate education requires good students as well. Standards of admission determine in large part the standards of graduate instruction. Moreover, the graduate student should be expected to have acquired a general background in political science and the liberal arts as an undergraduate student.

The extent to which the graduate student should be expected to master foreign languages, statistical techniques, or other special research methodology may perhaps be best resolved in each particular subject-matter area. Certainly some understanding of research methodology in general should be an integral part of all graduate instruction in political science.

In recent years there has been some discussion of requirements for higher education as something about the acquire some experience teaching. We believe that this to discuss without formal course work, but we learn all graduate departments of political science give some attention to this matter.

There is no doubt in our minds about the need for a major piece of research as the capstone of the doctorate. A dissertation, however, need not be regarded in the strictest possible sense as a contribution to knowledge. Perhaps the best standard would be to insist that the dissertation evidence a capacity to do original, if not creative, work.

The future of political science instruction in the United States will depend in large measure upon the future graduate preparation of instructors in our discipline.

## VI

In political science, as in other scholarly disciplines, there is tension between undergraduate and graduate instruction in our large universities. Prestige, status, and salary remuneration tend to be greater for the graduate professor than for the undergraduate teacher. The scholar at the graduate level is expected to be engaged actively in research, and hence is often given a reduced teaching load in comparison with his undergraduate colleagues.

Some scholars may prefer graduate instruction to undergraduate teaching because the quality and interest of their students are superior. Perhaps it is fair to say that graduate teaching may even be easier, since less effort may be expended in arousing the latent interest of students and in stimulating them to their own education. Moreover, the graduate teacher is often able to confine instruction to his own special interest; he may not conduct classes in the broader areas of knowledge about government.

In some of the larger universities it is said that lower division classes fall entirely into the hands of graduate assistants. We do not see this practice as necessarily unfortunate. The assistant nearing completion of his doctorate work will often bring a freshness of point of view and an enthusiasm to his instructional duties which others may lack. In some instances leading scholars of a political science department may lecture to large sections of undergraduate students. Here again there is nothing to criticize in this arrangement as such. Everything depends upon how well the lecturing is done, and upon the supplementary opportunities for discussion.

Universities have tried many organizational arrangements in order to lessen conflict between undergraduate and graduate instruction. Sometimes two separate departments have been created. Sometimes separate standards for academic rank have been established. Sometimes special efforts to increase the remuneration of those primarily engaged in undergraduate instruction have been made. In general, we feel that to divide a department of political science into exclusively graduate or exclusively undergraduate parts is unfortunate. While some faculty members should not teach graduate work, there should not be any faculty members who teach nothing else but graduate work. Both levels of effort present challenges to effective instruction which demand careful consideration by all members of a department.

There are also certain complexities in developing working relations between the discipline of political science and such professional fields of instruction as law, business administration, public administration, school administration, social work, and foreign affairs. The desirable relationship between the discipline and related professional fields deserves continuing attention. The discipline of political science has a major contribution to make in many different fields of professional education, and individuals with recognized scholarship in the discipline should be encouraged to participate in professional education.

## VII

We have given some thought to establishing a procedure for the accreditation of departments of political science along the lines of that established by the American Chemical Society for departments of chemistry. After considerable discussion we are agreed that this type of action at this time would be premature.

The accreditation function for American colleges and universities is performed in general by six regional accrediting associations, supplemented by national accrediting agencies in fields of study preparing for different professions. Substantial effort is being expended to reduce rather than further to proliferate specialized accrediting bodies. This goal is certainly worthwhile. But it is acceptable only if regional accrediting associations perform their function with greater care and with more attention to the interests of various scholarly disciplines than has often been evidenced in the past.

We believe that needed standards of instruction will not be obtained just by a simple declaration of desirable principles. Some definite additional steps are required.

First, some effort at cooperation with the

regional accrediting associations should be made to help ensure appropriate consideration of the factor of competence in political science. Copies of this statement should be provided the officers and members of the commissions responsible for accreditation of colleges and universities in each regional association. Our own regional political science groups should take action to make assistance available to accrediting bodies in evaluating present instructional resources and practice in political science at colleges and universities.

Secondly, the regional accrediting associations should be urged to establish review procedures which make full use of the disciplines. A committee of political scientists should be established in each accrediting region to participate in visits to colleges and universities offering instruction in political science. We believe that review and inspection groups of regional accrediting associations might include a member of such a committee.

Thirdly, the regional seminars sponsored by the American Political Science Association should give attention to this report and should consider additional desirable steps to advance the quality of instruction in political science.

In the fourth place, in those states where a state agency is authorized by law to evaluate instructional quality of colleges and universities, and where such authority is exercised in practice, we believe that these agencies should have the assistance of political scientists in performing their task. The political science departments in our leading universities might well offer their services in this activity.

Finally, we believe it is desirable for the American Political Science Association periodically to review the problems outlined herein, and in particular to re-examine such action as may have been taken by regional accrediting associations and others. If there is not some evidence of definite improvement in the next three or four years, additional steps must be given consideration.

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

*Yale University*

ERIC C. BELLQUIST

*University of California (Berkeley)*

JOSEPH M. RAY

*Texas Western College*

JOHN P. ROCHE

*Brandeis University*

IRVIN STEWART

*West Virginia University*

RICHARD W. VAN WAGENEN

*The American University*

JOHN D. MILLETT *Chairman*

*Miami University*

September, 1961

## COMMUNICATIONS

### ERRATA

#### TO THE EDITOR:

Through the advice of a friend who had read a mimeographed draft of the article, I have discovered computational errors involving two of the three rank correlation coefficients reported in Table VI of my article on the 1960 Term of the Supreme Court, in the March issue of this REVIEW. These errors do not affect the substantive findings or interpretation or analysis, but they are wrong, and I shall be very grateful for their correction, as follows:

- p. 105, Table VI: tau for E should be .817, and  $p < .0012$ ; and tau for F should be .783, and  $p < .0029$
- p. 105, col. 2, 2nd para., line 3: tau should be .78
- p. 106, col. 1, 2nd para., lines 15-16 should read:  $< .0^94$ , or less than one chance in a hundred million.

GLENDON SCHUBERT

#### TO THE EDITOR:

My contributors and I are compelled to respond briefly to Alan Altshuler's review of our *Cases in State and Local Government*, in the March issue, p. 178. The book is a supplementary text, only a text, and nothing but a text.

The flyer from the publisher says that the book "can help you, the professor, by supplementing your standard class text." It was conceived and produced with this limited need in mind. We felt that rather short, straight-forward descriptions of illustrative situations in the state and local area would be useful to teachers in that field. Those with even a few years experience in the state and local field have usually felt that the sector could use a little humanizing, and that the long and complicated cases found as small parts of other volumes were not always an answer to our troubles.

We certainly wished that each case could meet every professional standard by being "accurate, applicable, profound, perceptive, significant, vivid, colorful, persuasive, provocative, etc.," the criteria which appear in the review. Altshuler is right when he notes that "space limitation has precluded the development of relationships in detail." But long cases, wonderfully accomplished, such as Ylvisaker's "Battle of Blue Earth County" or Kaufman's "Gotham in the Air Age," both in the Stein case-book, do not have exactly the same teaching goals that most of ours do. We think that the specific, worthwhile need we had in mind was met better than the reviewer allowed.

RICHARD T. FROST

Reed College

## BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### REVIEWS OF BOOKS

<i>Biderman and Zimmer, Ed.</i> , The Manipulation of Human Behavior. ARNOLD A. ROGOW .....	424
<i>Bechhoefer</i> , Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control; <i>Bull</i> , The Control of the Arms Race; <i>Warburg</i> , Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties. JOHN GANGE .....	425
<i>Kurland, Ed.</i> , The Supreme Court Review. HAROLD W. CHASE .....	427
<i>Blau and Scott</i> , Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. HAROLD GUETZKOW .....	428
<i>Wallerstein</i> , Africa: the Politics of Independence. WILLIAM HANNA .....	429
<i>Rosenau, Ed.</i> , International Politics and Foreign Policy. E. RAYMOND PLATIG ...	431
<i>Syrett, Ed. and Cooke, Assoc. Ed.</i> , The Papers of Alexander Hamilton. Vol. I, 1768- 1778. Vol. II, 1779-1781. PATRICIA BARRETT .....	432
<i>Humes and Martin</i> , The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World. FRED G. BURKE .....	434
<i>Fleming</i> , The Cold War and Its Origins. THEODORE P. WRIGHT, JR. ....	435

### BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY .....	438
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS .....	459
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT .....	479
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION .....	496
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED .....	514

## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Manipulation of Human Behavior.* EDITED BY ALBERT D. BIDERMAN AND HERBERT ZIMMER. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961. Pp. 323. \$7.95.)

When the first reports reached the United States of gross misconduct among American prisoners-of-war in Korea, they occasioned a good deal of shock and indignation in both civilian and military circles. The reports indicated that of the 7,190 American soldiers captured by the Communists, only a mere handful, or approximately 5 per cent, consistently refused to cooperate with the Chinese. Some 15 per cent collaborated extensively with the enemy, while 80 per cent, according to an authoritative report on the subject, "collaborated occasionally and mildly and can be thought of as having maintained an essentially neutral position."<sup>1</sup> It also appeared that of the 3,000 soldiers who died or were murdered in the POW camps, a significant number perished as the direct result of the low morale prevailing in the ranks of the officers and enlisted men. In a large number of cases, of course, deaths could be attributed to starvation, extreme cold, and illness. But in other cases—no one will ever know exactly how many—the cause of death was referred to by repatriated POWs as "give-up-itis," or, in more formal terms, the loss of the will to live. "Give-up-itis," one returned prisoner later reported, often took the initial form of not caring about one's physical well-being: "Some men got so lazy and so negligent . . . that they wouldn't even kill their own lice. There were men with dysentery who, when they soiled their own clothes . . . they wouldn't even clean their own clothes out. They would just sit in their own waste."<sup>2</sup> In the final stages, a man suffering from "give-up-itis" would stop eating, but not all at once. "His appetite lagged, he began to give portions of his food away, within the next few days he became more and more withdrawn, would speak to his friends less, within the next day or so he would have his blanket or coat or whatever was available for his covering pulled up over his head, and would then sort of go into a cocoon and assume the foetal position, and in another twenty-four hours he'd be dead. This

<sup>1</sup> Edgar H. Schein (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), "Social Disorganization, Belief Change, and Collaboration." Professor Schein's report was based on research sponsored by the Army and undertaken by him when he was a Captain on the staff of Walter Reed Hospital.

whole period of time was predictable—it took about ten days."<sup>2</sup>

In the years since the end of the Korean War the behavior of our soldiers in the prison camp has been systematically investigated by a number of public and private agencies. Unfortunately, these explorations, while they have resulted in or inspired a considerable literature, have raised many more questions than answers, and the answers that have been suggested reflect a wide range of opinion. On one point, however, all of the investigators appear to be in agreement: the Communists did not produce collaborators and informers by the technique popularly known as "brain-washing." Instead, they used a variety of methods other than forced indoctrination, all of which had as their purpose the destruction of group cohesion and the undermining of individual morale. Natural leaders among the prisoners for example, were isolated or otherwise cut off from the rank-and-file. No organized activity which the Chinese did not sponsor was permitted. Informers and active collaborators were rewarded with extra rations, cigarettes, and warm clothing—rewards of no little significance for survival in the starved and frozen atmosphere of the camps. Leading atomized existences, broken in body and frequently in mind as well, many of the POWs were inclined to take, in the context of the situation, one or more of the easier ways out: for some, death via "give-up-itis"; for others, collaboration for most, a passive and docile attitude toward their captors, and willing attendance at the propaganda lectures that were a regular feature of camp life.

The book under review does not deal directly with the Korean War POW experience, but it is doubtful that it would have been written had that experience not shocked the sensibilities of professional and lay publics in the United States. Indeed, in their introduction the editors refer to the broader questions posed by the Korean affair, and the essays that follow are addressed to these questions. In essence, the editors insist, the "central question of fact" raised by Korea, apart from moral, philosophical, and I should add, political and cultural issues, is:

whether all individuals, regardless of how strongly

<sup>2</sup> Quoted from interviews with repatriated POW's broadcast over the CBS Radio Network, June 9, 1958. The program, "P.O.W.—A Study in Survival," was narrated by Edward R. Murrow.

motivated to resist, could be made to comply with demands for information, "confessions," or other collaboration by methods employed by the Communists, provided that the intensity, duration, and quality of the pressures were sufficiently great.

Or in other words, ask the editors, is it true that "every man has his breaking point"? Noting that this proposition has served as a premise in policy formulation, the editors query whether any situation encountered by American POWs in Korea "approached those extremes of 'stress' that no individual could be expected to resist."

Since I am reviewing a 'what-dunnit' rather than a 'who-dunnit,' I don't think it is unfair to the editors and contributors to reveal that their book does not provide, and was not intended to provide, a reliable answer to this question—and perhaps none can be provided except by those who were themselves POWs in Korea. What we do learn from the seven essays that constitute the book is the extent to which human behavior can be changed, altered, or radically transformed by a variety of techniques including drugs, hypnosis, reduced environmental stimulation, and the manipulation of interpersonal relations. As may be expected, the essays draw much of their evidence from controlled experiments carried on under laboratory conditions. But that does not make their conclusions, in my view, any less impressive, or any less relevant to the everyday world. To be sure, the data cited frequently point in opposite directions; it is sometimes a case of 'on the one hand, this, and on the other hand, that.' Nevertheless, the book is an invaluable—I am tempted to say indispensable—summary of what is definitely or approximately known about the control of human behavior.

I want to emphasize, however, that neither the editors nor the contributors are particularly concerned with the moral and ethical questions involved in the experimental findings they report. Although most of the essays deal in part with techniques of counter-manipulation, only one, concerned with malingering, has counter-manipulation as its primary subject. None of the essays discusses the extent to which political, social, and cultural behavior in the United States is increasingly subject to manipulation.

These remarks are not intended as criticism of the book but as a pointer to areas of research that are going begging, so far as political science is concerned. Let me be bold, brash, and vulgar: I suggest that we either confer a Ph.D. degree on Vance Packard or do a better job

than he is doing. And unless we do a better job than he has done the day is not far off when none of us will know, with or without a Ph.D., who is manipulating whom, how, and for what. The book I have been reviewing reveals that the manipulation of behavior is gradually moving from art to science, and from uncertainty to certainty. It seems reasonable to suggest that until research begins to focus on the moral and ethical problems involved, and devise counter-offensive strategies and techniques, those of us who are optimists, democrats, and believers in free will, must resign ourselves to whistling in the dark.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW

*Stanford University*

*Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control.* BY BERNHARD G. BECHHOEFER. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961. Pp. xiv, 641. \$8.75.)

*The Control of the Arms Race.* BY HEDLEY BULL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. xiv, 215. \$3.95.)

*Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties.* BY JAMES P. WARBURG. (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1961. Pp. 288, \$4.50.)

When Dean Rusk was president of the Rockefeller Foundation, he once referred to his earlier days in the Department of State as being "a part of a rather artificial and sometimes dangerous game being played on the roof of a mansion in which the people of the world were very busy getting the job of the human race done." Perhaps no other segment of our post-war diplomatic history reads so much like an "artificial and sometimes dangerous game" as does the story of the hide-and-seek on international disarmament and arms control.

The story of efforts to find, or to block, a viable road to effective disarmament and arms control is well reviewed in each of these three books although the approach differs in each. Many children's games come to mind as one re-observes the primary participants in this perpetually improvised minuet of changing poses and positions called disarmament conferences and negotiations. Viewed from the perspective of some other planet this dreary story of the past sixteen years would perhaps seem comical, but for us who are still bound to this planet it is far from funny.

Mr. Warburg devotes about one hundred pages of his book to the review of post-war arguments over disarmament and some other relevant international issues which strongly influenced the arms talks. He includes, in seven-

teen appendices, a well-chosen assortment of documents on the arms controversy for the period from May 1956 to October 1960. These documents tend to repeat his earlier resume of arms negotiations but they are useful for their official quality. There is no bibliography (nor many footnote references), and there is no index.

Warburg ranges rather widely at times in his discussion, including the final chapter of the book in which he argues the imperative need for multinational aid to the disadvantaged peoples of the world. He believes that the United States should henceforth follow the path of multilateral foreign aid with new boldness and new generosity. This discussion on aid concludes a three-chapter analysis of the abatement of tensions, the economic feasibility of disarmament for America, and the "creation of conditions of life that the majority of mankind will find tolerable and reasonably just." Perhaps it is the ever-widening scope of Warburg's book which leaves a reader at the end feeling titillated with many problems and ideas but unsatisfied as to the evidence, logic, or persuasion of the author's answers to the "imperatives" he postulates.

Mr. Bechhoefer has drawn upon twelve years of responsible participation in armaments control negotiations in making his review of our peregrinations on what he calls the "highway without signs" in search of agreement on arms control. Bechhoefer devotes 550 pages of his book to a review of the important international disarmament discussions from 1943 (with some references to even earlier periods) to the breakup of the Ten-Power Conference at Geneva in the early summer of 1960. His review is quite detailed, and heavily documented with references to official sources. He makes many effective references to over-all U. S. foreign policy and also to the general international context of the arms negotiations.

Bechhoefer is often candid and blunt in his criticisms of United States policy and action in disarmament issues. He is most critical of those instances when U. S. policy failed to be militarily and technically sound and also politically attractive. He also makes some fully justified criticisms of the frequent United States practice of changing our official negotiator and policy formulators only a few months before major, and often crucial, international meetings.

In a concluding lengthy "appraisal" Bechhoefer gives considerable attention to the critical question of acceptable "first-stage" measures for any comprehensive disarmament and arms control program. He suggests five

areas where negotiations for an acceptable first-stage plan might be achieved. All of these are certain to be discussed in the March 1962 conference and in subsequent meetings. His long historical review, therefore, ends on a note of preview of the continuing agenda for arms control.

Despite the lack of tangible success in arms control, Bechhoefer believes that the arms control negotiations may have been—and may continue to be—"a road toward peace and security." Twelves years of frustration seem not to have dimmed Bechhoefer's basic optimism that "arms control negotiations may be one of the roads, or even the main road, leading to East-West accords."

The book includes a useful ten-page bibliographical guide and a very good index.

The shortest of the three books here reviewed seemed to this reviewer the most satisfying treatment of the arms race. Mr. Bull had the cooperation and assistance of a very distinguished group of specialists meeting with him at Oxford. The Institute for Strategic Studies sponsored the book and also organized the study group. Two members of the study group, Mr. Richard Goold-Adams (chairman) and the Right Honorable John Strachey, M.P., take directly opposed views regarding Bull's book, Mr. Strachey's disagreement with many of Bull's observations being included as the last three pages of the book, offsetting Goold-Adams' warm endorsement of Bull's study.

Bull's approach to the long record of disarmament discussions is more by categories of problems than as a single chronological narrative. This approach involves some repetition of key meetings but it has the great advantage of concentrating successively on the major issues one at a time. Bull divides his analysis into four parts: "The Objectives and Conditions of Arms Control," "Arms Control Through Disarmament," "Arms Control Without Disarmament," and "The Problem of Continuous Innovation."

In the course of his very lucid, and unemotional review of the many problems and proposed solutions for international arms control, Bull does not seek ideal solutions but rather the more realistic measures which might provide some stability in an extremely dynamic and fluid arena of international politics and technology. He also gives more attention than Warburg and Bechhoefer to developments in the field of chemical, biological and radiological warfare.

Mr. Bull concludes his book with a stimulating and provocative chapter on "the problem of continuous innovation"; a problem which re-



peatedly undermines the shaky foundations of international arms control accords. As he puts it: "The uncertainty [especially technologically] of the future is a factor which strongly influences the present." He sees little prospect of an end being put upon military innovation and in this position he has most of human history on his side. He does see another alternative, however, in "basing arms control systems themselves on an innovating technology," and he argues persuasively that "arms control starts on the drawing boards" of new weapons.

Mr. Bull concludes his book with a plea for the serious study of modern military technology and arms control. Our hope for the future he believes lies in "the constant application of palliatives" rather than the "taking of a single dramatic step of sweeping present difficulties aside" by trying to create a whole new international political structure and order.

The leap-frog game of innovation and counter-innovation, controls and evasion of controls, is as predictable a course for the human future now as in the days when Ecclesiastes declaimed the theme of "a time for war, and a time for peace." It is equally predictable and politically necessary that the issue of disarmament will continue to be a major feature of international politics. As Secretary Rusk said in a radio interview on January 7, 1962, "... we must keep gnawing at it [the issue of disarmament], working at it, trying our best to find a practical and safe means [to] . . . reduced arms and to some limitation on the arms race."

The student who wants to join in the "gnawing at" and "working at" this problem will find a good ground for practice in any of these three books, especially the Bechhoefer and Bull studies.

JOHN GANGE

*University of Oregon*

*The Supreme Court Review*. EDITED BY PHILIP B. KURLAND. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp. 332. \$6.50.)

This book is not as one might suspect from the title and the publisher's advertising a panoramic view of the Supreme Court's work in the 1960-61 Term. It is not in the genre of the annual survey featured in some of the law journals and so ably done for the *Review* by David Fellman. Rather, it is a collection of eight superb essays, six of which deal with selected important cases decided in the Term. The other two essays provide a delicious frosting to a cake which in and of itself would tickle the palates of even the gourmets in the Public Law and American Government fields. So much for generalities.

In the first of the essays, Professor Francis A. Allen deals with *Mapp v. Ohio*, the case in which the Court held that evidence obtained by state officers through an unreasonable search and seizure was inadmissible in state courts. Allen furnishes a succinct and lively account of previous pertinent decisions and an interesting discussion of the pros and cons of the exclusionary rule as well as an analysis of the issues and decision in *Mapp*. While doing so, Allen develops the interesting theme that the decision was a surprise. Some of his conclusions are especially provocative, consequently well worth scrutiny. He suggests, for example, that the *Mapp* decision: (1) leaves important questions unresolved; (2) "intrudes farther into areas of local policy and self-determination than earlier decisions of the Court affecting state criminal procedures"; (3) may not in the last analysis afford much protection to individual rights.

Against the backdrop of *Machinists v. Street*, the case in which the Supreme Court decided that the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act denies a union the power to use funds exacted from an employee to support political causes which he opposes and where he objects, Professor Harry H. Wellington treats with great skill and insight the arguments for and against the avoidance of constitutional issues by the Supreme Court. Later, with forceful argument and language, Wellington castigates the Court for avoiding the constitutional issue in this particular case. He concludes that "the Court had no legitimate alternative to constitutional decision," that a proper decision would have rejected "the contention that the validity of a union shop contract is to be tested by the requirements of the First Amendment" and that such a decision "would have spared us a slick but shallow performance in the delicate art of avoiding questions through statutory interpretation." Even those who, like the reviewer, disagree with these conclusions, will profit from and enjoy this hard-hitting essay.

Using as a jumping off point the covey of cases which bore heavily on the subject, David Fellman with characteristic thoroughness and skill explores the important aspects of the constitutional rights of association. He concludes that the "importance of the rights of association demands that the law should regard with great suspicions any attempt to denigrate them" that "doubts should be resolved in their favor, never against them." He goes on to add, however, that "there are vital public interests in the maintenance of law and order and in restraining criminal conspiracies, and where such interests exist the rights of association must yield." He then commiserates with the Court

which in our system must draw the line, by writing that the Court "has a job of obviously formidable proportions on their hands." Those of us who look to guidance from Professor Fellman can only wish that he had spelled out precisely what his conclusions mean in terms of the cases dealing with Communists. On which side of the ledger do the Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Subversive Activities Control Act and the membership clause of the Smith Act go, David?

The fact that only brief mention is made of the other three essays dealing with specific cases is due to lack of space rather than any lack of merit. For law professors, Jo Lucas, Walter Blum and Derek Bok provide first-rate analyses of and interesting insights on the issues in *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, *Knetsch v. United States*, and *Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Co.* respectively.

The frosting on the cake alluded to at the beginning of this review is the splendid pair of essays by Walter Murphy and Alexander Meiklejohn. Murphy describes how William Howard Taft as Chief Justice attempted with some success to influence the choice of appointments to the Supreme Court. His findings suggest that sitting justices of the Supreme Court may have had more to do with appointments to the bench than has previously been suspected.

One might well wonder what Alexander Meiklejohn can write about First Amendment freedoms which he had not written before. But even those familiar with his previous explications will find much worthwhile in his essay. Particularly interesting are his observations on Professor Leonard Levy's authoritative study which presented strong evidence that the Framers of the Constitution were not as absolute about protecting First Amendment freedoms as their language suggests.

In conclusion, kudos must go to the editor, Professor Philip B. Kurland. Surely, the high quality of scholarship and the literary craftsmanship manifested in the book reflect, at the very least, unusual skill in recruiting and marshalling extraordinary talent.

HAROLD W. CHASE

University of Minnesota

*Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach.* BY PETER M. BLAU AND RICHARD W. SCOTT. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. x, 312. \$5.25.)

Blau and Scott make a remarkable integration of the literature of organizational behavior, in its informal as well as its formal aspects. Working as sociologists, they have developed

a vivid array of partial theories about stable collective social entities which have been "deliberately established for specific ends." Their nine orderly chapters present typologies and propositions about the entire gamut of such organizations, from "business concerns" and "service organizations" (as hospitals and social-work agencies) to "mutual-benefit organizations" (as political parties and professional associations) and "commonweal organizations" through which local, state, and national governments function. The book makes careful articulation of the organization *per se* with its internal structure, as such exists in its informal work groups and its supervisory and managerial practices, and with its external social context, as the organization relates to its publics and to other organizations in its environment.

Students of bureaucracy will be aided by the careful conceptual development which Blau and Scott make of the nature of authority, with their clear delineation of the way in which informal processes reinforce the legitimacy of compliance stemming from cultural roots. The authors have significantly extended and clarified Weber's pioneering over-simplifications. Scholars also will appreciate their theoretical contribution in constructing a partial theory of organizational development, viewing tendencies toward bureaucratization and debureaucratization as processes of change and conflict. In this work they have gone beyond the original but loose formulations of Eisenstadt.

Students of public administration will be helped by the insightful ways in which Blau and Scott have transformed traditional problems of the executive branch, such as specialization and coordination, into quite fruitful inquiries about processes of communication and planning, especially those involving "impersonal control" mechanisms. Scholars will value their clarification of how an organization's formal structure is influenced by the characteristics of its leadership and informal group processes, and *vice versa*. Their most ground-breaking work is their delineation of how competing and cooperating counterpart organizations influence an organization's internal functioning.

Those who desire that our study of politics become more rigorous will admire the modesty and soundness with which Blau and Scott apply the scientific method. They use negative instances and contrasting findings to serve as springboards in the development of theories more closely related to empirical realities. These scholarly skills are exhibited well in their brilliant chapter on "Processes of Communication," in which they mesh the findings of ex-

perimental and field work into a theory of how formal hierarchical characteristics of an organization interact with informal social support processes in the facilitation and hindrance of problem-solving and coordination outputs of the organization.

In this reviewer's opinion, the clarity of the book as an amalgam of empirical studies completed through 1960 is blurred by the inclusion of overly detailed expositions of two unpublished studies of a city and a county welfare agency conducted by the two authors. Some readers may find in these interruptions refreshing contacts with raw data, which are difficult to maintain in a book primarily constructed from the findings of others. When dealing with their own more recent findings, however, the authors lose the cautious perspective which they demonstrated in handling the research findings of the field as a whole. Their own more recent data entice them into unwarranted speculation.

Now teachers of public administration have a pair of complementary books for the renovation of their teaching of advanced courses on organizational behavior. In March and Simon's *Organizations*, directors of seminars have a book which exhibits the structure of propositions about social psychological processes involved in decision-making in government. In Blau and Scott's *Formal Organizations*, they have a book of equal quality and creative penetration into group processes involved in the functioning of governmental units. Because both are based on extant empirical researches, master and doctoral candidates may become inspired to abandon the descriptive, single case and proceed without further delay to the building of a social science of administration. In the five years ahead, the findings displayed so advantageously in the Blau and Scott volume should have much impact on the revision and development of our many undergraduate texts in public administration.

At times the conceptual and resource difficulties that scholars face in developing politics as a social science rather than as polemic seem overwhelming. But this work by Blau and Scott will embolden all of us. Just as important strides have been taken in developing empirically grounded theory for party politics and voting behavior, so now we have significant achievement in our comprehension of organizational and executive activity. Within the next decade or so, our understanding of the legislative and judicial aspects of government may be underpinned more adequately with data. More and more tightly constructed political theories may result. Then finally we can bid farewell to

the contentious autism which has been our heritage. Blau and Scott speed us on our way.

HAROLD GUETZKOW

*Northwestern University*

*Africa: The Politics of Independence.* By IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN. (New York: Vintage Books, 1961. Pp. vi, 174. \$1.25.)

Most intellectually stimulating studies of African politics are limited in scope to a small number of geographical areas, e.g., Apter's *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*, or to a small number of analytical dimensions, e.g., Hodgkin's *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*. The few with broad scope have usually appeared in forms not suitable for mass distribution either among the laity or among students as a classroom text, e.g., Coleman's section in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. The book under review is intellectually stimulating, has broad scope, and is available in paperback. It therefore fills an important gap in the literature.

That broad scope is the aim, the author makes clear on the first page of his introduction. He describes the book as "an interpretative essay that seeks to place within an overall perspective the whole range of modern political developments on the African continent." The geographical and analytical scope of a prospective study is a problem which must be confronted by all comparative social analysts. Should we focus upon the political system or a part of it? Should we limit ourselves to peoples who have had relatively similar experiences or expand to include peoples with relatively dissimilar experiences? In what ways should our data collection, analysis, and presentation vary with scope?

The geographical scope decision most Africanists have made is to focus either upon North or sub-Saharan Africa (at most), on the grounds that within each of these areas the indigenous cultures, external contacts, and contemporary developments have been relatively similar and therefore amenable to generalization at lower levels of abstraction.

The continent of Africa as a whole contains considerably more variety in culture, contact, and development, necessitating higher levels of abstraction, more elaboration, or generalizations where deviant cases are often not considered. Wallerstein writes that many of the statements in his book are "generalizations, true of the large majority [of African territories]. Where there are important exceptions to the rule, they are usually indicated." He is reasonably successful at indicating "important" exceptions, but the task of covering African politics at a lower level of abstraction

in less than two hundred small pages is enormous.

A new era of African history began when Europeans—motivated by “the lure of adventure, the search for personal freedom, the sense of mission . . . greed and vanity and lust for power”—imposed their rule upon the continent. The era is, in Wallerstein’s well chosen words, “a story of how Africans reacted to their conquest by seeking to learn the secret of their weaknesses in order to reestablish the autonomous control of their own destiny.”

This story can be viewed as two social processes, and these are the two main foci of the book: (1) the ways in which colonial administrations “generate within themselves social conflict, and under what conditions this social conflict results in a revolution which overthrows [the administrations],” and (2) the ways in which independent African states “hold themselves together, acquire the loyalty of their subjects in a complex economy where the interests of the citizens vary widely.”

The social changes which led to revolution were, according to the author, largely by-products of European acts of self-interest. *Order* assured Europeans freedom of action, but it also provided the African with safe travel and the African deviant with an escape. “The dissenter, the misfit, the rebel could now defy the chief simply by moving out from under his control.” *Education* supplied trained workers for the Europeans, but it also socialized Africans to western perspectives. *Transportation and communication* facilitated European administrative and economic goals, but it also increased the diversity of African contacts. *Commercialization* contributed to European wealth, but because of the need for African manpower, cash crops, and a money economy, it also interrupted traditional patterns. *Urbanization* created centers for the new infrastructure, but it also was the agent of modernity. *Bureaucratization of traditional authorities* facilitated European administration, but it also weakened the position of these authorities in the traditional society.

The most consequential effect of social change was the emergence of westernized Africans as a potential counter-elite. As vehicles to power they first organized voluntary associations and later mass nationalist movements. Finally, power in the form of territorial independence was gained.

Before turning to the independence period, I shall offer a proposition suggested by Wallerstein’s materials. Many of the Europeans who came to Africa were deviants in the metropole

society seeking deference. Similarly, many of the Africans who came into contact with the Europeans were deviants in the traditional society seeking deference. I believe that the selective recruitment of these two groups heightened the intensity of conflict between them.

The second focus of Wallerstein’s book is the development of stability and integration in the new African states. Instability often, and disintegration sometimes, accompanies the transfer of power because of underdeveloped civility and frail authority. African political elites use a variety of strategies in order to develop the needed stability and integration. Among those mentioned by Wallerstein are (1) legitimation of the state through revival and glorification of the indigenous culture, (2) development of intra-territorial functional interdependence, (3) creation and dissemination of the national image, (4) emphasis upon the supportive “we” rather than the oppositional “they,” (5) socialization to the new political symbols, and (6) creation of new political goals, *e.g.*, African unity and eradication of neo-colonialism to replace the goal of independence.

The two major instruments for attaining stability and integration, according to Wallerstein, are the nationalist party and the national hero. The party “is the emanation of the people . . . holds their loyalty and ties them to the state.” The hero “legitimizes the state by ordaining obedience to its norms out of loyalty to his person.” Thus “there is a correlation between the strength of party and hero and the degree of national integration and stability.”

Wallerstein implies that the correlation bespeaks a causal relationship, *i.e.*, that stronger parties and heroes develop greater national integration and stability. Alternative possibilities should at least be considered, *viz.*, (1) greater national integration and stability develop stronger parties and heroes, and (2) other factors, *e.g.*, indigenous culture, are causal conditions for both parties-heroes and integration-stability.

The modal African political system, in the author’s view, contains many non-democratic and democratic elements. Among the former are the single party, the national hero, party-dominated voluntary associations, manipulative electoral laws, preventive detention acts, and the non-independent judiciary. In general, several forms of opposition are not tolerated out of fear that the state is in jeopardy, a fear “not wholly without foundation.”

The modal system also contains democratic elements. The single party is a broad coalition

with mass membership in which interests are constantly being negotiated. The national hero is rigidly constrained by the party. Political participation and debate are encouraged so long as they are "kept within the framework of the party structure." Perhaps of greatest importance, a democratic atmosphere is supported by many of the indigenous political systems and by "the continued turmoil and movement of the African political scene." In sum, the modal political system represents a workable solution given the character of contemporary African society; the widespread civility and firm authority necessary for a mature democracy have not yet evolved.

In a chapter entitled "Africa and the World" Wallerstein adds to the domestic problems of the new African states those of the international arena. "Having emerged from colonial rule," he writes, "Africa is determined to be subject to no one but itself." This calls for a policy of neutralism, defined as "the determination to judge other countries by how they help solve African problems, the determination to be tied too closely to no one, and somewhat to everyone."

Domestic problems and international problems—but with determination, outside help, and a little bit of luck, Africa will succeed. "Africa has greatness in her past as well as her present. And probably her future too."

WILLIAM HANNA

*Michigan State University*

*International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory.* EDITED BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. xiv, 511. \$8.50.)

The editor of this volume has brought together 55 readings (7 not previously published), under 5 headings, and has contributed about 14 pages of introductory and connecting comment. The editor's central thesis is that there is "a large and persistent gap" between the research "frontiersman" and the "classroom practitioner." The frontier is "alive with activity" that challenges the "traditional concepts" of the classroom. The primary purpose of his book is to "narrow" this gap.

There are indications that Mr. Rosenau is concerned primarily, though not exclusively, with the undergraduate "college classroom." It is unlikely that many undergraduates will be attracted to a book that crams about 1,200 words on each double-column page. It will be an even more rare undergraduate student who stays with the book any length of time, for the

editor's avowed "eclecticism" results not in a dialogue between frontiersmen and classroom practitioners but rather in a cacophony on the frontier.

The fact that many of his "research frontiersmen" are also classroom teachers has implications for the "gap" which Mr. Rosenau seems to overlook. One wonders too whether it is good pedagogy to try to narrow the remaining gap in any other than the advanced graduate seminar room. The function of the undergraduate and beginning graduate classroom is to provide the student with a "map" of the terrain to help him find his way in the real political world as it manifests itself in history and current affairs. Once the student masters the map symbols and then seeks to find his way in the analysis of the real world, he will become acutely aware of the deficiencies of the map. It is then that he may profit from a knowledge that there are other symbols and other maps. But to immerse him initially in a mass of undifferentiated symbols, maps, and map fragments is to invite him to flee in utter confusion, especially if author and teacher refuse to share their own judgments as to which are most useful. Yet this is precisely what Mr. Rosenau does, claiming that since "present knowledge of international politics and foreign policy is too scanty to permit reliable estimates of the potential usefulness of any of the theories which have been developed," the student should "choose for himself the approach (or approaches) that seems most suitable."

Leaving aside matters of pedagogy, what does the book tell us about the state of theory and research in International Relations and Foreign Policy? For one thing it demonstrates quite adequately that there has been a lot of writing done. But there are strange gaps in the coverage provided by the volume. It offers no treatment of diplomacy, propaganda, alliances, subversion, economic or military action. The editor labels these "forms of state action" and eliminates them on the grounds that they "do not pose major theoretical or methodological problems." Both the label and the reasoning seem questionable. In the light of the great emphasis that the volume places upon the difference and the "linkage" (read "nexus") between international politics and foreign policy, it would appear to be a theoretical problem of some significance to consider whether diplomacy, alliances, war, etc., are better treated as modes or patterns of state interaction rather than as forms of state action. Certainly there is theoretically rich and methodologically suggestive recent literature dealing with typologies of alli-

ances and of foreign aid, to say nothing of the conceptual gems that might be sifted out of the theoretical dust kicked up by the arms controllers.

There is another major omission that is related to a general fault that can be found with many of the readings in this volume. The general fault is a tendency to attack old concepts or embrace new ones without demonstrating either the inadequacy of the old or the superiority of the new. (It is impossible in this connection to avoid calling attention to Urban Whitaker's "Coarse-Screen Macro-Theory," which phrase, it turns out, can be freely but accurately translated as a general theory with large holes in it.) One suspects that newness is valued either for its own sake or, worse, because it confers upon its author a mark which identifies him as a pioneer. Thus supposedly responsible scholars construct straw men by distorting the concepts and formulations of their colleagues and then seek to build a reputation by tearing down the results of their own misinterpretation.

This general fault manifests itself in an interesting way in the eagerness with which the editor embraces the concept of system: "Of all the advances that have occurred in the study of international phenomena, perhaps none is more important than the ever-growing tendency to regard the world as *the international system*." He goes on to extol the "systems perspective" since "a system is considered to exist in an environment and to be composed of parts which through interaction are in relation to each other." What he fails to acknowledge is that one of the "traditional concepts" of international relations is "the modern state *system*." Indeed, it is a concept used in the article by John Herz which follows immediately on the heels of the editor's remarks. Furthermore, the editor never makes clear whether by international system he refers (broadly) to the international *social* system, or (narrowly) to the international *political* system. If the former, one would expect some consideration of international law, ethics, organization, and economics as component systems, along with international politics, of the international system. If the latter, one would expect those matters to be treated as important parts of the "environment" of the international (political) system. But the book offers neither a specific treatment of these matters nor an explanation of their omission. If these concepts are so traditional as to be pronounced dead they ought at least to have a decent burial.

This is not to say that the collection is without value: there are occasional flashes of in-

sight, imaginative constructs, and feats of logical analysis. But in this reviewer's opinion the most valuable readings are those that set themselves the modest task of refining and building upon the "traditional concepts" rather than those that seek to wipe the slate clean and start anew. On the whole, one comes away from this volume somewhat dismayed by the state of theory and research, hopeful that it is in better shape than here demonstrated, and fearful that he has been more victimized by scholarly pretensions than enlightened by scholarly discourse.

E. RAYMOND PLATIG

*Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

*The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*. Vol. I., 1768-1778. Vol. II., 1779-1781. EDITED BY HAROLD C. SYRETT; JACOB E. COOKE, Associate Editor. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. 1337. Single vols. \$12.50.)

Whether by chance or by contrivance, Alexander Hamilton managed to be present at the center of events which launched the American republic into the orbit of history. With the lengthening shadow of experience hard upon us, we have recently been spurred to explore more thoroughly the dimensions of world history and to probe more deeply the reaches of our own tradition for the relevance it may bear to contemporary issues. In an age of revolutionary upheaval which has spawned new nations at an unprecedented rate, it is sobering and instructive to review the searing adventures and sage observations of this neophyte statesman-in-the-making. What kind of a man was Hamilton? How did he come by the ideas that he expressed so incisively and the arguments he marshalled so persuasively in support of sundry causes? What native qualities of mind and heart did he bring to the demanding tasks which confronted him at one of the turning points of time? Answers to such questions begin to take shape as one ponders the fascinating account from Hamilton's own pen so attractively presented in this impressive product of American scholarship at its best.

The present two volumes are the first fruits of an imaginative project of collecting, editing and publishing the papers of Alexander Hamilton which may number as many as twenty volumes when completed. Grateful tribute should be paid to the vision and industry of Dr. John A. Krout, Vice President of Columbia University, Mr. Charles G. Proffitt, Director of the Columbia University Press and editors Harold C. Syrett and Jacob

E. Cooke and their associates. The documents include: 1) letters written by Hamilton or to him as well as those he wrote for someone else, notably George Washington; 2) certain published articles such as "The Continentalist," and the "Publius Letters;" 3) a number of poems; 4) financial and legal records. The notes and editorial comments are skillfully arranged and extremely helpful to the amateur reader and professional scholar.

The figure that emerges from these pages is a remarkably talented and many-sided young man, especially when one remembers that the record stops at his twenty-sixth year, in 1781. Intense, restless, ambitious, with a genius for the existential, Hamilton was never content to wait for the *event* to know what measure to take, but devised the requisite measures to produce the *event*. The basic pattern of his political thought was set early, in the familiar tradition of the eighteenth century which, in turn, grew out of the ancient heritage of Greece, Rome and the Middle Ages. Thus he espoused a natural rights philosophy, the free contract origin of the state, the dependence of civil enactment on the God-ordained natural law. He accepted the constitutional theory of the American revolution, alleging that "the pretensions of Parliament are contradictory to the law of nature, subversive of the British constitution, and destructive of the faith of the most solemn compacts."<sup>1</sup> To justify this opinion as prompted by sober reason and not prejudice, he admitted having once defended the opposite side, but insisted that his change of sentiment "proceeded from the superior force of the arguments, in favour of the American claims."<sup>2</sup>

His views on government were expressed cautiously in a pair of letters to Gouverneur Morris in 1777, with a comment on the New York State Constitution, which he found lacking in a vigorous executive. He pursued the same thing with a keen, incisive analysis of the shortcomings of the Confederation in a letter to James Duane, a New York member of Congress, written from Liberty Pole, New Jersey, in September, 1780.<sup>3</sup> The major defects, he pointed out, sprang from a want of power in Congress, and this for three reasons: "an excess of the spirit of liberty" which made the

states jealous of their own power; "a want of sufficient means" at the disposal of Congress to answer the public exigencies, and "of vigor to draw forth those means;" an over-dependence on the states to fulfil their military commitments. The only feasible and adequate remedy, as he saw it, would be to summon a convention of the states with the aim of establishing "a solid, coercive union." Congress should have "complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance, and to the management of foreign affairs." There should be an integrated administrative structure for the whole country, a permanent army, a rational financial system pivoted on a national bank, and a measure of central economic planning.

Essentially the same charges and recommendations appeared again during July and August, 1781 and April and July, 1782 after Hamilton's departure from Washington's official family. This time, his ideas were disseminated in a series of papers entitled, "The Continentalist," and published in *The New York Packet and the American Advertiser*. Characteristically, he pushed hard for effective power in the central organs of government, which he considered indispensable to the maintenance of independence in the face of fragmenting tendencies from within the nation and threatening force from without. The natural reluctance to bestow power, attendant upon popular revolutions, must yield, he contended, to the exigencies of political stability and economic viability.

It is interesting to speculate where Hamilton would stand if he could look in on the eighty-seventh Congress as it debates controversial questions of increased governmental influence in economic, educational and social welfare fields. The tenor of his thought contained in the writings herein presented, suggests that he would probably go along with the prevailing trend to center more responsibility in the federal government. A protagonist of order and authority, though never a foe of freedom, he did not find in the philosophy of *laissez-faire* an adequate safeguard for their proper exercise. It is not likely that he would feel at home with the modern conservative, least of all with the radical fringe.

In a letter to Elizabeth Schuyler, who was soon to become his wife, Hamilton described himself as a "philosopher and a soldier."<sup>4</sup> It is precisely the virile, decisive qualities of

<sup>1</sup> "A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress, from the Calumnies of their Enemies," etc., New York, Dec. 15, 1774, Vol. I, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> "The Farmer Refuted, etc.," New York, Feb. 23, 1775, Vol. I, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> "To James Duane," Liberty Pole, New Jersey, Sept. 3, 1780, Vol. II, pp. 400-418.

<sup>4</sup> "To Elizabeth Schuyler," Preakness, New Jersey, Oct. 13, 1780, Vol. II, p. 474.



the military man, complementing those of the intellectual, which give further testimony to the extraordinary range of his talents.

The letters penned during the bleak and depressing months at Valley Forge and afterward, reveal the writer as a man of courage, ambition and vigor, a keen judge of character, a realist in appraising the strength and weakness of the British enemy as well as the French ally. Two circumstances indicate the strange combination of relentless persistence, on the one hand, and sensitive impetuosity, on the other, which seriously undermined Hamilton's powers of perseverance and sustained fidelity. The first is evident in the protracted correspondence which he carried on with Colonel John Brooke, Francis Dana and Reverend William Gordon. At issue was a statement falsely attributed to Hamilton, in which he was supposed to have urged "the people to rise, join General Washington, and turn Congress out of doors."<sup>5</sup> So disturbed was Hamilton at this odious charge, that he spared no effort to uncover the culprit and bring him to a reckoning on the field of honor. The tone of these letters inclines one to endorse the writer's own assessment of the affair which was contained in a final word to Washington: "I hope Your Excellency will excuse the asperity of my expressions, which my respect for you would induce me to suppress, did I not owe it to my sensibility, wounded by the most barbarous attack upon my reputation and principles, to speak without reserve."<sup>6</sup>

Paradoxically, this same hyper-sensitivity sometimes precipitated Hamilton into modes of conduct which betrayed an emotional immaturity and want of self-discipline. Examples are the impulsive break with the Commander-in-Chief in 1781, over a trivial incident, and the acknowledged lapses from marital fidelity later on.

The ensemble of material in these volumes enhances the biographical work of Louis M. Hacker, Broadus Mitchell, Nathan Schachner and others who have labored to promote a better understanding and greater appreciation of the *whole* Hamilton. Perhaps the main thing that stands out in retrospect is the amazing diversity of the gifts, intellectual, practical, diplomatic, literary, which he devoted with rare skill to the master purpose of his short life—the building of a politically stable, eco-

nomically prosperous and industrially strong United States of America.

PATRICIA BARRETT

*Maryville College*

*The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World.* BY SAMUEL HUMES AND EILEEN M. MARTIN. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. Pp. 449. Guilders 36.)

Local government as an academic discipline has had a unique history. Unlike other fields of political science, it has failed, at least in recent decades, to develop a corresponding methodology and theory. The bulk of the journal articles—in fact the journals themselves—that treat the subject of local government are predominantly written or edited by practitioners, administrators, or professional research associates and staff members. This is not to say that the contributions of local government associations and practitioners have not been of value, for they certainly have added considerably to the empirical documentation of an area of study that understandably resembles its subject matter in variation, complexity and immensity.

Much is said today of the analytical utility of a multidisciplinary approach to the subject matter of the social sciences. Seldom-read articles of the 1930s and 1940s in journals of anthropology, sociology, and psychology are being combed and recombined by the current generation of political scientists as they seek decision-making or functional insights into international politics, comparative government, voting behavior, etc. Despite the work done in the other disciplines in the area of small group behavior, community analysis and locality culture, the political scientist has consistently shied away from a "multi-disciplinary," "cross-cultural" approach to the ancient and honorable field of local government. Is it any wonder that the latter has tended to become preempted by municipal research bureaus and local government associations?

Two somewhat contradictory major trends in the style of human political organization apparent in our time would seem to encourage a more academic and theoretical concern with local governance than has in fact occurred. On the one hand the realm of the supranational and regional association is growing. On the other hand, the attention of political scientists, as never before, is being drawn to those regions of the world (*e.g.*, Southeast Asia, Africa, Oceania), where the significance of non-nation-state political forms has long been ap-

<sup>5</sup> "From Lieutenant Colonel John Brooks," West Point, July 4, 1779, Vol. II, p. 91.

<sup>6</sup> "To George Washington," Morris Town, New Jersey, May 2, 1780, Vol. II, p. 316.



parent to the anthropologist if not to the political scientist.

Possibly the renaissance of local government, with its supporting column of theoretical and methodological sophistication, and hopefully also a revival of its contribution to the general realm of political philosophy and theory, must await the development of the field of comparative local government. This may be more than idle speculation, for not only will the relative importance of locality and local political organization in the newly developing states of Asia and Africa attract the systematic attention of more political science scholarship, but the internationalization of all political science in recent years is bringing to American scholars an awareness of the relative importance of the study of local government in the more developed states as well.

Therefore, the contribution of the International Union of Local Authorities generally, and of Samuel Humes and Eileen Martin specifically, is of particular import in this critical juncture in the study of local government. *The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World* is the culmination of a massive data collection effort undertaken by the IULA at the request of UNESCO. Detailed questionnaires, seeking legal and structural data of a descriptive nature, were obtained from forty-two of the seventy-four countries approached.

In the first half of the volume, Samuel Humes has sought to examine the data from the contributing countries and systematically to contrast the more important structural features. The comparative method employed contributes little to raising the low level of generalization that has so long characterized this subject area. However, this is in part attributable, as Humes himself notes, to the manner in which the data were gathered.

Although Humes, in contrast to Montague Harris (*Local Governments Around the World*) has developed a typology of local government structures, the presentation and comparative scheme is noticeably lacking in precision and rigorous definition.

In a world in which local governments are being created and designed to contribute to modernization and nation building, the orthodox statements of local government ventured by the John Stuart Mill school nearly a century ago are hardly appropriate. The most fascinating area of local government development and experimentation today is not in the Western nations, (whose structural descriptions make

up the greater part of this work), but in the new countries of Asia and Africa. There John Stuart Mill is being stood on his head and local governments are deliberately being created to lessen local separatism and to further national development and conformity. The new purposes to which local government and other local political institutions are being put in the nation building process, in much of Africa and Asia, provide the most exciting field for a sophisticated scholarly study of this subject area that in turn might offer theoretical insights dealing with the general functions of local political organizations in addition to static descriptions of statutory local government institutions. The trouble with the legalistic, descriptive approach which characterizes this work, is that it approaches local government from the direction of the nation-state and thereby precludes a return to the richness of local politics and governance as an area of observation and analysis that can contribute in its own right to more general political understanding and theory.

Miss Martin has contributed a straightforward country-by-country description of local government as contrasted to Humes' presentation of comparative structures. The forty-two countries surveyed are treated in nine geographical groups. The nine area categories selected reflect the predominantly traditional and Western focus of not only the survey material, but of the nature of the analysis as well. Six of the nine geographical areas, for example, refer to one part or another of Europe or of the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Having said this, however, it must be added that this volume not only brings together for us much previously scattered data, but also contains a vast amount of empirical data invaluable to those who would pursue further the study of local government as either the "most local" aspect of the nation-state or as the "most fundamental" aspect of human political behavior and organization.

FRED G. BURKE

*Syracuse University*

*The Cold War and Its Origins: The Eloquent and Indelible Record of The Great Conflict of Our Time.* BY D. F. FLEMING. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1961. Two volumes. Pp. xx, 540, Vol. I. Pp. 615, Vol. II. \$15.00.)

At last someone has attempted a comprehensive survey of the Cold War. The two weighty volumes under review are not properly a work of political science. As the subtitle

implies, Professor Fleming has devoted himself to piecing together the chronological narrative of Soviet-Western relations since 1917 in order to demonstrate causal relationships. Like the revisionist historians of World War I, he proposes to assign responsibility for war by establishing who took the initiative in the diplomatic exchanges which led to hostilities. By showing that we of the West are as much to blame as the Soviets, if not more so, he hopes to halt the vicious spiral of recriminations and the arms race which point to a third World War.

His choice of an essentially historical approach lays him open to the historians' disdainful charge that political science is a mere journalistic recital of current events pending their own more scholarly, balanced judgment when the complete sources become available. Both Fleming and the historians are vulnerable to the criticism that their searches for first causes lead to an infinite regression.

The nearest the author comes to employing methods of analysis now associated with political science is a summary list of events, from which one might get a better sense of the interplay of policies than from the massively detailed text if the list were organized into synchronous columns, Soviet and Western. The rest of the work is at the historians' usual low level of generalization interspersed with apocalyptic moral judgments. There is no attempt to tie this potentially valuable mine of material in to a more general body of theory about international relations.

More controversial than Fleming's methods are his main themes: "The Cold War arose because the leaders of American public opinion could not accept the chief consequences of World War II . . . Communist control of East Europe and China." Most impartial scholars would probably now agree that Hitler could not have been stopped after Munich without Soviet military participation, the price for which was a Soviet sphere of influence in those areas she conquered from Germany. He is also undoubtedly correct that the American goal of free elections in Eastern Europe was incompatible with the legitimate Soviet demand for friendly governments in the power vacuum between Russia and Germany. It is harder for some people to accept after fifteen years of Cold War that the price was worth it because Nazism was intrinsically worse than Communism.

Most debatable of all is Fleming's further thesis that "the Russians' . . . first driving and continuing motive was, and is, security." Un-

like Hitler, Stalin and his successors are pictured as cautious, conservative defenders of the *status quo*, interested only in recovering the lost border territories of the Czars as buffers against future German aggression plus the perennial Russian objective of warm water ports through the Straits, the Persian Gulf and Manchuria. These goals, Fleming asserts, did not arise out of Marxian dogma which he largely discounts as a determinant of day-to-day Soviet foreign policy.

From these postulates flow his policy conclusions: that American "containment" and "encircling" bases are wrong because provocative; that the support of unpopular governments just because they are anti-Communist is unnecessary; and that we should have shared our atomic secrets with the Russians from the beginning and should accept their conditions for disarmament now and take up their challenge to "peaceful coexistence," a race for improving living conditions everywhere.

Before we can endorse Fleming's postulates and conclusions, we must examine his evidence. Real Soviet motives are difficult to ascertain because of the secrecy and concentration of decision-making in totalitarian government and because of the self-admitted gap between the shifting, expedient public propaganda "line" and the actual intentions of the party leadership in the Communist system. Fleming shows no awareness of these problems but takes all Soviet public statements at face value. For instance, his principal source for Soviet policy in the 1934-38 period is Litvinov's speeches before the League of Nations. Throughout the two volumes he limits himself largely to Western sources and practically ignores the whole body of literature which has appeared in the last fifteen years which essays an analysis of Soviet motives and operating rules with the help of refugees, defectors and ex-Communists, interviews, captured Soviet documents and Lenin's and Stalin's own writings. For instance, the author cites Nathan Leites' pathbreaking *Study of Bolshevism* only to confirm the principle of caution in Soviet behavior. Nowhere does he refer to the works of Raymond Garthoff on Soviet military strategy. No doubt he would argue that the output of our Soviet area experts is itself a part of the Cold War, biased by the disillusioning experiences, prejudices and present employments of the writers, but that does not relieve him of the obligation to refute their hypotheses and prove his own with comparable inside evidence. Instead, he resorts frequently to authors whose prejudices in the

opposite direction are at least equally notorious: Zilliacus, Coates, Rosinger, Snow, Strong, Smedley, Jaffe, Stone, Panikkar, Wechsler and Williams. In addition the author cites some of our more sensational columnists—Drew Pearson and the Alsops—without sufficient assessment of the reliability of their reporting. His method of quoting newspaper editorials about each development in the Cold War lengthens the narrative unnecessarily.

Fleming's own biases are strong and much in evidence. His personal heroes are Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt; he views the political influence of the Catholic church and its laymen with much suspicion, and the "feudal, reactionary, fascist, militarist, collaborationist landlords" of every country with undisguised hatred which may reflect a nineteenth century American agrarian radicalism more than any Socialist leanings. Governments on our side in the Cold War are invariably "corrupt, repressive and inefficient." The supreme sin of appeasement is always committed by the West and its allies, never by the U.S.S.R. as in 1939-41. On the positive side, Fleming has a romantic predilection for social revolution as both inevitable and just. One wonders if the beneficiaries of the *status quo* have no human rights and if the bloodshed and destruction involved in dispossessing them always produce greater net wealth, happiness and justice. Land reform is his panacea for the backward agrarian countries and it is always associated with Communist rule, but he glosses over the subsequent collectivization of agriculture which in effect

deprives the peasant of his newly acquired acres.

The foregoing criticisms to the contrary notwithstanding, this is a book that needed to be written. Professor Fleming is to be congratulated for his courage in going against the tide and for his years of patient research. So much of journalism, popular writing and even scholarly research on American foreign policy is in justification of or pursuit of the Cold War that a certain amount of exaggeration, indignation and selectivity are pardonable and possibly necessary to put across the unpopular viewpoint. It is salutary to be reminded of analogies between the significance of the Straits, Suez and Panama to Russia, Britain and the United States respectively; to be confronted with the contradiction between the American revolutionary tradition and the Truman Doctrine; to recognize that we earned and enjoyed no more influence in the occupation of Eastern Europe than the Russians did in Japan; to perceive the logical inconsistency of defending South Korea and then invading North Korea; to admit that if Red China can't "shoot her way into the United Nations" then none of the original members are entitled to membership; and to smile at the reversal from American defense of neutral rights before World War I to Dulles' condemnation of neutrality as immoral. All these insights Professor Fleming offers the reader who is prepared to detach himself for awhile from the heat of battle.

THEODORE P. WRIGHT, JR.

Bates College

## BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

*Justice and Social Policy.* EDITED BY FREDERICK A. OLAFSON, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961, Pp. viii, 150. \$1.95, paper.)

Dean Pound was perhaps right when he said that the mansion of legal philosophy is a large one with room enough for all. The winds that have swept in and out of political science have not excluded jurisprudence. The contributions of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence are but two parts of a movement—perhaps a “revolution” in thought—that has swept through the entire mansion of legal thought. The rejection—at times total—of “metaphysical” conceptions of law, of broad formal conceptual schemes, has now begun to come full circle, and Professor Olafson’s very useful volume is one index of a growing return to the discussion of legal ideals, including natural law.

This compact volume should not be confused with the veritable spate of readings books that cross a professor’s desk nearly every week. It is in no sense a collection of amorphous materials, but is a calculated attempt to carefully and critically examine the concept of justice through the use of two portions of a book published by Henry Sidgwick (*The Methods of Ethics*, 1893 ed.) and five recent essays that Olafson regards as “fairly typical of the state of philosophical opinion at the present time.” While this might sound rather vague and much too large a subject for critical analysis, the starting point is the utilitarian theory of justice, represented by Sidgwick’s work. Sidgwick was chosen, rather than Bentham, because he seemed closer to current philosophical inquiry, particularly his respect for other points of view. Essays by J. D. Mabbott, Jonathan Harrison, and John Rawls are rather distinctive attempts at reformulation of the utilitarian thesis, although it might be questioned how much of the utilitarian thesis they still retain. Mabbott’s essay on “Punishment” is a particularized attempt to isolate a part of the general problem of justice for microscopic scrutiny, a type of analysis that is all too rare and none too easy. It is obvious from the Mabbott essay, as well as the other two, that the rather sharp epistemological quarrels within contemporary jurisprudence over the meaning of words, the kinds of questions that can be raised, and the methods of inquiry that are germane to these questions, have borne fruit. Once again, philosophical speculation in the area of legal ideas is “respectable,” and while we may still throw brickbats at the protagonists, at least the enterprise is very much alive again.

The final two essays by Richard Wollheim and Sir Isaiah Berlin on the concept of equality at first glance seem to be out of place, but they serve to emphasize the very important relation between justice and other social ideals. This collection of well written essays will offer a rich source of discussion in a variety of academic situations, including courses in modern political thought, jurisprudence, problems of democracy, and even in those philosophically-oriented areas of public administration.

The deaths of Morris R. Cohen and Felix S. Cohen left an enormous gap in American jurisprudence, but men on both sides of the Atlantic still maintain a lively interest in the history of legal ideas and the critical assessment of these ideas. The veritable axe of American legal realism has been tempered, and even natural law theory now merits a journal of its own (the *Natural Law Forum*), and writers like Hart, Wollheim, Williams, and Lloyd in England and Cahn, Bodenheimer, Cowan, Hall, Fuller and others in America are giving new life to the study of legal philosophy. The realist stress on *facts* and the sociological school’s stress on *process* were certainly necessary in their own right. Perhaps Buckland was right in saying that Austin (and the command theory) could be regarded as a disease, in much the same sense that legal realism and sociological jurisprudence have been viewed by their opponents. But Pound’s admonition was cogent. There is plenty of room for combat, and plenty of time for redefinition and reformulation. The empirical, pragmatic winds are still blowing strong—and their contributions legion—but we have learned the lesson that in order to have a legal system function within what A. D. Lindsay called “operative ideals,” we must be able to define with some degree of precision and clarity the ideas that undergird that system. Facts and values may be miles apart, and a love tryst out of the question, but at least the effort can be made.

—JULIUS PAUL, *Wayne State University.*

*Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends.* BY OTTO KIRCHHEIMER. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 452. \$8.50.)

This is an impressive work, almost encyclopedic in analytical framework, yet rich with illustration and judgment concerning the problems and effectiveness involved in the use of the agencies of criminal and civil justice for political ends. Nevertheless, Professor Kirchheimer’s open-

ing judgment is moot in view of the substance of his effort. In his preface he questions whether the application of the term "Political Justice" by European writers "to the most dubious segment of the administration of justice, that segment which uses the devices of justice to bolster or create new power positions" is "gross linguistic abuse and utter cynicism" in view of its usual sense, the Greek idea of a "search for an ideal order in which all members will communicate and interact with the body politic to assure its highest perfection." He answers "no," arguing that, "The Greek ideal grows sharper in profile precisely because justice in political matters is more tenuous than in any other field of jurisprudence, because it can so easily become a mere farce."

This answer is curious, since although he may have intended that his impartial language and power approach should indicate how farcical political justice is in view of the Greek ideal, they do not themselves explicate or defend the latter; a reader must already understand and accept the Greek view to see the farce.

True, at the end of the work he concludes that the process of political justice therein described is grotesque and not even very effective relative to its own ends except for creating an image, but he also thinks it is necessary and beneficial in making the power struggle less disorderly and tenacious. Such conclusions add little to the classical concept, nor do they further its acceptance, and the author ignores the argument that it is dubious and unverified that political order ever rests on the mental states of individuals, an assumption implied in the kind of political justice he describes.

Perhaps it is not without significance, therefore, that although Professor Kirchheimer appears generally to assume the positivist definition of law and remains faithful to his descriptive approach, delineating the material in terms of the assumptions, motives, techniques, and actions of practitioners of power, he now and then expresses judgments in "ideal" terms. For example, in discussing "The Sanction of the Legal Order," as a plea which defendants such as those in the Nuremberg trials used, he states, "Not every piece of legislation enacted by a government in conformity with its own rules acquires, by the mere fact of enactment, the quality of binding the lower echelons," e.g., an enactment which "shows on its face the character of inhumanity, as did the decree concerning the administration of penal justice against Poles and Jews in the incorporated Eastern territories, . . ." Here, "the value of legal certainty is not strong enough against the principle that intentional violation of minimum standards deprives an enactment of the claim to legal validity." These are strange judgments for positivism to make. Who except the community

elite, the power-holders of the state, may so conclude—assuming one adheres faithfully to this position? Is it not accepting "ideal" criteria to say (and this reviewer approves) that a state rule like the above "is the negation of the purpose of law, which even in the form of the shoddiest enactment must still offer a password: the ordering of human relations?"

However, such seeming contradictions do not significantly detract from this real contribution to jurisprudence. Thus, in Part One, Kirchheimer calls attention to changes in the practice of using legal technique for political ends from the Roman period to the present. Our era, he thinks, is a strange one of "transition as difficult for those in search of new durable attachments as for those charged with upholding fading traditional ones." Nevertheless, he concludes, "Whatever the state's pattern, its protective armor thickens and stiffens," and this he demonstrates during an incisive discussion of the political trial as differentiated from the purely criminal procedure, with illustrations drawn from homicide trials, trials for treason, and the show trials beyond usual constitutional protection. It is also indicated as he discusses the legal repression of political organizations and the forms of treatment applied by an established regime to hostile groups, such as repression by minority fiat in South Africa, or repression by majority rule in West Germany and the United States, in which case he analyzes the criteria used: the anticipation of remote consequences, the weight of specific acts, etc., concluding with a discussion of variation in attitudes toward an opposition of principle.

Part Two is a close analytical study of the work and effect of the judge, the defendant, and the latter's lawyer, under western constitutional regimes and also in East Germany or previously under the Nazis. This part likewise includes an excellent analysis of the trial by fiat of a successor regime, giving extensive attention to the Nuremberg trials.

The final part of the book, "Political Justice Modified," discusses asylum and clemency. The extensive footnotes not only enrich the book but indicate the wealth of materials used, many not available in English.—JOHN PAUL DUNCAN, *University of Oklahoma*.

*Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel; with a translation of his essay on The Decomposition of Marxism.* By IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 264. \$6.00.)

Georges Sorel, treated in this book as the symbol of pragmatic (irrational) socialism in "*fin de siècle* France," has not customarily been regarded

by English-writing students of political philosophy as a thinker of the first or even second rank. Whether or not this assessment of Sorel has been accurate is, of course, a moot point, and may undergo revision as time carries researchers and analysts further from 1922, the year of the Frenchman's death. At any rate, Professor Horowitz, who is Chairman of the Department of Anthropology and Sociology of Hobart and William Smith Colleges, apparently thinks that it is time to take another look at Sorel.

In taking his psycho-sociological (or socio-psychological) glance into the past, Horowitz sees, and relates, the roles played by many men who affected the Sorelian perspective: Charles Péguy, Fernand Pelloutier, Gustave Le Bon, Henri Bergson, William James, and numerous others. Early in the book it becomes, and, throughout, remains obvious that myriad names can, in some fashion, be referred to Sorel's thought. On substantive grounds, the reader may object that the profusion of names often dims and sometimes eclipses the light which the author is trying to shed on an already obscure subject. A similar result occasionally is produced by faulty organization and presentation of the material, and by vague or ineffective terminology. In view of the undoubtedly great effort which Horowitz put into researching his subject, it is unfortunate that seemingly unnecessary obstacles to clear communication exist.

At his best when criticizing the illogical position of Sorel, Horowitz strikes several telling blows, one example being sufficient here. Having noted Sorel's vacillation concerning whether violent action or anarchistic socialism were the prime value, the author shows that Sorel could not have it both ways: "... If action were central, then the goals achieved by socialism were necessarily transitory and of secondary value. If socialism were the focal point, then action was simply an instrument for reaching the goal, intrinsically no more valuable than other means..." and more perilous than other techniques.

On the other hand, there are a few instances, usually relating to the concept of democracy, where Horowitz's arguments may leave the political philosopher unsatisfied. For example, there will be difficulty in agreeing that "the principles of economic and political democracy" must receive constant redefinition or die, unless one adopts the attitude of pragmatism and is prepared to have "democracy" mean anything which anyone desires, thereby depriving the term of communicative worth. Furthermore, the value of a concept which has general application may be lost because of provincialism: "Judicial review, constitutional amendment, parliamentary statute, executive veto and the like, are... activities of

democracy...". In this case, a partial list of standards, which are empirically verifiable, is indicated, but the roster seems to have been constructed almost exclusively from the American political experience, thus giving rise to the peril of a parochial definition—an outcome which Horowitz would probably want to avoid. Moreover, the chore of classifying states with respect to democracy remains about as difficult as it had been.

Sorel's lack of precision, his pragmatic irresolution, and mystical attitude in general have probably caused much of the criticism which his intellectual posture properly deserves. Political and other philosophers who criticize Sorel on these grounds would do well to remember that the same criteria may be used to judge their works.

This reviewer would be remiss in his responsibility if he did not call attention to the existence of many grammatical and related errors in the book. Some, perhaps many, of the mistakes may be typographical (spelling, the absence of quotation marks, missing apostrophes, etc.), but there are, unfortunately, errors in agreement between subject and verb and in sentence structure. Before an instructor puts this book in the hands of his students, if he does, he would doubtless want to be aware of the presence of such errors.—WILLIAM D. S. WITTE, *Bradley University*.

*Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance.* EDITED BY DWAIN MARVICK. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Pp. 347. \$7.50.)

This volume is the second of the *International Yearbooks of Political Behavior Research* put out by the Free Press. Such volumes serve a useful purpose in bringing together representative current writings in significant fields of political behavior. The first volume was on community political systems, and we are told that others are to follow on civil-military relations, comparative party systems, and political ideologies.

In the present volume, edited by Dwaine Marvick, the papers, including two review articles, are of generally high interest and quality. Read together, they illustrate the richness and diversity of the possible approaches to the study of political elites—and political behavior in general.

There is, in the first place, a great variety in the methods used. Two of the studies—that by Marvick and Nixon on campaign workers in Los Angeles and that by Eulau and his associates on state legislators in four states—utilize systematic surveys. But these surveys differ from each other, and in turn both differ from most surveys, in the population studied. Neither study uses a cross-section sample. The Eulau study is of almost all

(91% to 100%) of the members of the four state legislatures, while Marvick and Nixon interviewed a sample of campaign activists weighted so as to secure a larger representation of those at the center of campaign activities. Such studies of significant political sub-groups represent an important application of the survey technique. Dogan, in his study of French deputies from 1870 to 1958, uses standard biographical data for an ingenious statistical analysis of the social origins and career patterns of the French legislative elite, while Guttsman bases his first-rate study of changes in British Labour Party leadership on similar material supplemented by memoir literature and Labour Party documents. Renate Mayntz spent eight months of intensive participant observation in a local district CDU organization in Berlin, observing the decisional process, repeatedly interviewing key participants, and studying the records of the organization. In addition a questionnaire was circulated to all members of the largest local of the district. And Edward Shils bases his essay on Indian intellectuals on long field experience in India and a large number of intensive discussions with Indian elites, as well as deep knowledge of the literature by and about Indians.

This catalogue of methods is presented here because it illustrates quite clearly how many approaches to political behavior are open to the scholar. The methods differ, but each has advantages and each appears quite appropriate for the particular subject matter. The statistical analysis of biographical data by Dogan and Guttsman tell us little directly of the attitudes and opinions of the political elites compared with the studies based on interviews. Yet unlike the survey studies by Eulau and his associates and by Marvick and Nixon that are conducted at one point of time, the use of biographical data allows the analysis of changes and trends. On the other hand, the use of standardized statistical techniques with either biographical or interview material would not have allowed the analysis Shils presents of the complex and rich intellectual tradition in India and its impact on political life. Nor does it seem likely that the decision-making process in an organization can be understood without some participant observation of the sort carried on by Mayntz in the CDU local district. Anyone who believes that the systematic study of political behavior involves a commitment to a particular method or technique will be disabused and enlightened by this volume. Such systematic study does, however, involve commitment to more general standards of evidence, inference, and analysis. Such standards are exhibited in this volume.

The substance of the volume is as diversified as the techniques of study and more difficult to sum-

marize. The subjects include the social origins of decision-makers, their career perspectives, changes in outlook and style of political decision-makers, the effects of organizational structure on political careers, and the motivations of campaign activists. The subjects range from an analysis of the complex, deeply felt, and highly articulate belief systems of the intellectuals in the new states to the non-ideological, relatively professional career perspectives of American states legislators. Such diversity in subject-matter—the tendency to study one problem in one context and another problem in another—is perhaps not as fortunate as the diversity in method. It makes graphic the need for explicitly comparative studies in different political contexts. There are no such studies in this volume, but the book serves a purpose along these lines in bringing together in one place studies from a variety of political systems and allowing at least implicit comparisons. That one deals with ideologies when one studies Indian political elites and with career perspectives when one studies American legislative elites suggests a point of great comparative importance. Furthermore, the essay by Lasswell on an "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites" provides a number of perspectives from which such comparative study might begin.—SIDNEY VERBA, *Princeton University*.

*Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.* BY JAMES N. ROSENDAU. (New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. 118. Paper-bound, \$1.35.)

This study by Professor Rosenau of Rutgers is a useful and well-written one, even though the title is much too broad. A more exact title would be: *The Opinion-Transmission Network of the Present-Day U.S.A.* Convinced by his reading of recent literature that it is scientifically "premature to chart the flow of influence in behavioral terms" without first re-conceptualizing the opinion process as a whole, Rosenau proposes to deal in this book with a small and relatively manageable part of this process. He charts, in effect, the circulating system within which transmission of opinions (including non-influential as well as influential opinions) takes place.

The better to focus upon the succession of steps in the circulation of opinions from given participants in the polity to other participants, he has deliberately excluded all statements about the motivational systems of the individual and collective actors who use the system, as well as about the symbolic or ideological or value contents of their communications. To use a bit of the more or less standard jargon of communication analysts (a language that Dr. Rosenau appears to avoid for some reason), what he presents is essentially a classification of components of the net-

work of "channels," "gatekeepers," and "relay points" through which communicators occupying various roles transmit opinions to various "audiences" (publics) in the present-day United States.

He considers the United States as if it existed in a vacuum. The impacts of communications to the United States from other countries, the effects of the existence of other sorts of circulating systems abroad, and the varying "states of the world opinion-field" in which American opinion plays itself out—all these essential components of a generalized explanatory or predictive theory are left out of the discussion.

Such an analytic procedure is like making an anatomist's diagram of a cardiovascular system *per se*. The arteries and arterioles, veins and ventricles are named and their respective locations are shown, but we are told nothing about the effects of the system's contents (blood, drugs, toxins), or the effects of impinging systems, upon the organism's functioning.

Within this delimited area, Rosenau's line of argument is marshalled extremely well. When he must introduce new terminology, he makes a knowing case for it, and uses common sense and plain words. Thus, the generalized roles of participants in his system are those of "opinion-holders" (nearly all of us); "opinion-makers" (those who introduce opinions into the relatively "impersonal" communication channels); "local opinion leaders" (here he follows the usage of Lazarsfeld and Katz: these are persons who transmit opinions locally in face-to-face situations); and "opinion-submitters" (those who convey opinions to "decision-makers"). Each of these rôle-concepts is defined and sub-classified in precise and orderly terms. As he points out, each rôle-incumbent, of course, may be on occasion either a communicator or a communicatee or both. The media, likewise, are catalogued exhaustively.

Here, tantalizingly, the book ends. Just what has all this definition-chopping accomplished? I think Rosenau has added a number of useful specifications and caveats for the benefit of users of the communication models set up by Almond (*The American People and Foreign Policy*), Lazarsfeld and Katz (*Personal Influence*) and related writers who furnished Rosenau's points of take-off. We can see the rôles of the specified participants, and their points of interaction, more clearly now. But we are still left with the important theoretical problem of how to classify the communicators' values and motives and the contents of their transmitted opinions, and how to demonstrate the effects of the latter. The reviewer hopes that Professor Rosenau will next apply his passion and real talent for conceptualizing to some

of these more elusive variables in the communication process.

As the behavioral sciences become more rigorous in dealing explicitly with such abstractions as "systems," "models" and "processes," it becomes increasingly useful to have these constructs lucidly diagrammed—as the physical sciences have already shown. In step with the times, Dr. Rosenau undertakes to draw a flow-chart of "the opinion-policy relation." The intent is commendable and the associated text reads well. At first glance, the diagram itself bears a reassuring resemblance to the economist's familiar charts of "flow of money in an economy." However, on second glance it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a drunken driver's apperception of a cloverleaf intersection on an eight-lane highway. Perhaps this is proof of the model's "empirical fit" to the facts of the American Way of arriving at opinions on foreign policy. However, it is just possible that the cartographer could benefit by taking one more lesson from such a master diagrammer as Kurt Lewin.—BRUCE LANNES SMITH, *Michigan State University*.

*Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*. By ROBERT C. TUCKER. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961. Pp. 263. Cloth \$5.50. Paper \$1.75.)

A spectre is haunting Marxist scholarship—the spectre of Alienation. Some scholars, notably those of an existentialist or religious persuasion, have tried to show that a notion of "self-alienation" is pervasive and abiding in Marx's thought throughout; others, like Sidney Hook, have sought to exorcise the spectre by arguing that the notion of human alienation is actually foreign to Marx's conception of man. Professor Tucker's book is an important contribution to the literature which stems especially from the comparatively recent publication of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844. It is meant, in his own words, "to carry forward the still unfinished work of reinterpretation and basic critical analysis of the thought of Karl Marx." There need be no quarrel with many features of his interpretation, but his central thesis is open to challenge.

Tucker distinguishes the "original Marxism" of the 1844 manuscripts from "mature Marxism" as found in all the works after 1845. The "Philosophy" in what purported to be positive social science was chiefly Hegel's, but Tucker enriches this familiar insight by tracing carefully Marx's philosophical transposition of Hegelian terms into economics. In 1844, he argues, Marx suddenly had a colossal insight: Hegelianism is fundamentally about economics. Whereas Feuerbach had taken Hegelianism to be esoteric anthropology, Marx treated it as esoteric economics. The "Myth" in Marxism is, according to Tucker,



Marx's vision of an inner moral drama of the self as something taking place in the outer world. The controlling concern of his thought was the structure of selfhood, and this applies not merely to the early writings which are explicitly dominated by the notion of "alienation," but also to the seemingly sociological thought of "mature Marxism." "Marx was not a social scientist whose theory was rendered obsolete by the further march of history, but a philosopher become myth-maker, who, having inverted Hegel, represented a subjective process as the social universe."

One could agree with Tucker that Marx was moralistic, utopian, and quasi-religious (as Max Eastman contended long ago), in the mature as well as in the early writings. One might wish to insist upon ambivalent tendencies in Marx. Moralism is mixed up with anti-moralistic doctrine. Marx's view of the communist future contains utopian elements but this is not to gainsay the force of his own critique of utopianism. And it is not really sound to talk of the religious "essence" of Marxism, as Tucker does. It is true that Marxism exhibits aspects of a secular religion which are superficially obscured by Marx's rejection of the traditional religions, but one might reject the notion of "essences" here as elsewhere: Marxism is not "essentially" a religion even though it has affinities with religious movements. Nevertheless, despite differences on matters of emphasis, one could accept many of Tucker's general arguments and specific points of detail as acute and illuminating.

A really questionable argument is Tucker's main thesis, expressed in a number of different ways, of which the following passage is a sample: "A system concerned with the generic human self in its hostile relations with itself turns into one that seems to have nothing to do with a dualized self and everything to do with a dualized society" (p. 176). Tucker's view about the nature of the shift between early and mature Marxism is thus opposed to all those interpretations which see a change from a psychological to a predominantly sociological position. Like any "interpretation," Tucker's reinterpretation involves an attempt to say what Marx "really" meant. As against G. D. H. Cole, for instance, Tucker says "it is not that Marx views social classes rather than individuals as possessing ultimate reality, but that his image of society is an image of a collective dual personality." This compels Tucker to lay a good deal of weight on such purely literary devices in *Capital* as "My Lord Capital" and the "Collective Worker." And it forces him to lay too little weight on the *Communist Manifesto's* attack on the German "true socialists." In a passage which Tucker quotes, Marx explicitly scoffs at the way in which these "true" socialists think not

in terms of the interests of a social class, the proletariat, but "the interests of human nature, of man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, and subsists only in the misty realms of philosophical fantasy." It is true that Marx approached the subject of social class as a metaphysician and not as an empirical sociologist, and it seems clear that no coherent theory of social class can be extracted from Marx's writings. But the concept of social class has at least potential objectivity and empirical reference in a way that such obscure subjective categories as "the structure of selfhood" or "an image of a collective dual personality" do not have.

Tucker makes out an exceedingly plausible case by using the distinction between manifest and latent functions. In the structural history of Marx's ideas, the notion of the "division of labour" came to play a role that "self-alienation" had played in the early work. Obviously a man may think he has escaped early assumptions (as Marx thought himself more emancipated from Hegel than he "really" was), and yet they may continue to play a role in later work. But Tucker shows no more than that Marx's earlier concern with "the structure of selfhood" plays an occasional underlying role in later writings, as a "lapse" into earlier psychological modes of thought. He does not show that conceptions like "self" and "alienation" play a *systematic* role in mature Marxism. In any case these indefinite notions refer chiefly to the future communist society as a new "state of self" rather than to the attempted historical and sociological discussion of the capitalist present. The myth and melodrama in Marxism derive from the dialectical mumbo-jumbo rather than from a thoroughly spectral notion like the "self."

Professor Tucker's book is nonetheless a most valuable contribution to scholarly analysis and criticism of Marxism.—DOUGLAS MCCALLUM, *University of Sydney*.

*Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855.* BY MARTIN MALIA. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. pp. 486. \$10.00.)

Marxism, Lenin once said, has three components: German philosophy, French socialism, and English political economy. It is notable that the first two of these ingredients had been mixed into the Russian radical mind long before the advent of Marxism. The resultant blend—inspired by a conviction that Russia followed her own laws of development and could by-pass the capitalist stage of history—was Populism, *narodnichestvo* or Russian socialism, which dominated the scene in Russia before the appearance of Marxism in the mid-1880s. Populism was the work of many

minds, but no thinker contributed more than Alexander Herzen (1812-1870); and Professor Malia has performed a considerable service for the historian of political philosophy in this masterful account of the younger Herzen and his thought.

The dates in the title are misleading, for the book is concerned principally with the period from 1832 or 1833, when Herzen first became acquainted with Saint-Simon, to 1847, when he left Russia never to return. Most previous studies of Herzen have attached great importance to his first shocked reaction to Europe in 1847 and 1848, and to his bitter disillusionment with the failure of the February revolution. But if Malia's conclusion is correct—and he has gathered impressive evidence to support it—the main outline of Herzen's thought had already taken shape before he left Russia. This is true even of Herzen's characteristic "rejection of the West," which was really a rejection of bourgeois Europe, and his conviction (an article of faith with the later Populists) that the younger and more vigorous Russia was destined to lead the way to socialism. The one new element in Herzen's writings after 1847, his faith in the Russian peasant commune as the embryo of a socialist society, was not of course an original idea but borrowed much from the thinking of the Slavophiles.

Thus the main contribution of the book is to explain why the young Herzen became a socialist, and perhaps more important, to examine what "socialism" must have meant to a Russian radical of the 1840s. Certainly for Herzen socialism did not mean reconstruction of the economic system, but rather total negation of the existing order in the name of a higher ideal of justice—without any specific reference to economic goals. Malia argues that socialism began not as a protest against industrial capitalism but as a protest against the old regime and a demand for political democracy against authoritarian government; Herzen's "socialism" was simply the most extreme and uncompromising form of a movement of protest which had seized the intelligentsia of the Forties. On this point Malia is profoundly right just as in his own way Stalin was right when he formulated the theory of the "weakest link": socialism is a phenomenon of under-development, a protest movement driven to revolutionary extremism by the failure of democratic (or "bourgeois") reform.

But although Malia has provided us with a penetrating account of Herzen's own thought, to which no brief review can do justice, he has been less successful in describing this general political movement of the Forties. He has tried to analyze the politics of the period exclusively according to the western spectrum of political ideas. The major tendencies of the time, Official Nationalism,

Slavophilism, and Westernism are graded in the over-simplified and misleading terminology of "left" and "right." This is particularly unfortunate for the Slavophiles, who become the Right Center, "something like a Russian version of enlightened Tories" and "a rather typical aristocratic opposition to absolutism." The Slavophiles are hard to classify on any political scale, for the essence of their teaching was a flight from politics, a total rejection of government, and an insistence, to quote Konstantin Aksakov, that "the state, as a state, is a lie." Yet the Slavophiles were not anarchists, for they were willing to leave the evil and corrupting power of the state in the hands of the tsar-autocrat so long as he, in turn, left substantial autonomy to the nation. But if Russia did develop a typical aristocratic opposition to absolutism, then this designation belongs to the Westerners, and especially to such intellectuals from the lower nobility as Konstantin Kavelin and Timofei Granovskii, who were not as "rootless" as Malia suggests.

This criticism should not, however, detract from the overall value of the book, which is certain to be a standard work in the library of every student of the history of socialist thought.—DARRELL P. HAMMER, *Indiana University*.

*Politics of Cultural Despair.* By FRITZ STERN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. 367. \$8.00.)

This book invokes the memory of three German ideologists who, from the days of the Wilhelminian Empire to the germinal period of Nazism, could boast of a strategic influence over the minds of considerable segments of the German middle class, including the members of the academic community. None of the "Germanic Ideologists" as the author of this absorbing and painstaking study has dubbed Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck (respectively authors of *Deutsche Schriften*, *Rembrandt als Erzieher* and *Das Dritte Reich*) had the power of analysis and the breadth of vision of the intellectual titan of their period, Friedrich Nietzsche. They stood out in their times because they articulated most penetratingly a mood of "cultural despair." Reacting as they did against the environment of their days they cried out their hatred of the combined features of authoritarianism, liberalism and materialism. They came to reject modernism, the sum total of Western values, in favor of the reestablishment of a spiritually united community of the German people. The detailed inquiry of the author brings out quite clearly the share which a warped personality structure had in the anti-modernist reaction by all three of them—the first, a philologist of repute, the second,

an eternal bohemian, and only the third a direct participant in the rightist opinion-forming process of the early nineteen twenties. In theory, at least, their program was tied to the revitalization of a truly conservative heritage. But where would this projection of a conservatism which was a construct of their crisis-ridden minds rather than the evocation of a living past, lead them to?

Though belonging to different generations and concentrating on different, if overlapping, facets of communal deficiencies—Lagarde as critic of the staleness of 19th century Christianity and herald of a new national religion, Langbehn as rhapsodist of an irrationalism recreating true artistic feeling, and Moeller smashing outdated modes of political thinking and manufacturing a universally binding, community centered political style—they all were partners in an ambiguity which vitiated their thought processes: the failure to elucidate the relations between symbols and reality. To what extent does the ambivalence between symbols for a more meaningful life pattern and ever present concern for extremist political action only connote an expression of incapacity to arrive at a more all-embracing societal analysis and to what extent does it contain also an attempt at conscious manipulation? With all due safeguards against historical simplifications and *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* constructs, there are the syndrome of cultural antisemitism (in two of the three authors), the ostentatious lack of interest in analyzing the social basis of the society in which they were living, the facile effacement of class distinctions in the urge for national unity, the thoroughly imperialist program of expansionist action.

The significance of the men studied here, as intellectual progenitors of National Socialism, emerges clearly. Nazi ideology was not an *ad hoc* invention of Hitler, Rosenberg and their cohorts. Almost every specific Nazi tenet was circulated widely decades before Versailles. One of the merits of this book is that it demonstrates this fact exhaustively. Many National Socialist notions, concepts and slogans were part of that "pervasive mood" created by Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller among the German educated and middle classes. This ideology "was one of the traditions that the German elite and the National Socialists shared." "Without this pervasive mood [they] would not have been able to succeed," for they would have lacked that rapport with the middle and upper echelons of German society which to a considerable degree explains the National Socialist victory. What the latter contributed was to transform the Germanic ideology and its mood of cultural despair into a dynamic political force. In this, to be sure, they were aided by economic

and political conditions different from those in which the two older men, Lagarde and Langbehn, lived. Nevertheless, because the "Germanic ideologists" transmitted both their rejections and their vistas to broad strata—noticeably, as the author justifiably remarks, to the world of the teachers—their predictions, though they rested on an "intellectually threadbare analysis," acquired many of the elements of a self-fulfilling prophesy.—OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University*.

*Montesquieu: a Critical Biography.* By ROBERT SHACKLETON. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xv, 432. 45/-.)

Montesquieu has been undeservedly neglected by biographers and we are indebted to Mr. Shackleton, who had complete access to all the relevant manuscripts and family archives, for having filled this gap. He has produced a careful, balanced, and highly informative biography, based upon thorough research. With Montesquieu, the reader shuttles back and forth between Paris and his home territory of Guyenne, catching glimpses of him, too, on his travels in Italy and England. One gets enough of the flavor and texture of life in Paris and in the environs of Bordeaux to understand the *milieu* in which Montesquieu moved. The picture that emerges from these pages is that of a man who played a rather prominent role in the life of the Academy of Bordeaux and, for some years, as a "President" judge of the local Parlement, who was elected to the French Academy at the age of thirty-eight, who was intimate with Parisian society at various extended periods of his life, who was welcomed into and delighted by the Parisian intellectual salons from 1733 to the time of his death, and yet who remained intellectually somewhat aloof. Few people were aware of the fact that he was writing *The Persian Letters* until they were published; and the composition of *The Spirit of the Laws*, to which he devoted nearly twenty years, was surrounded by almost equal secrecy.

In Shackleton's pages, we follow Montesquieu's intellectual growth and changing ideas throughout all his writings, published and unpublished. We note the development of his regard for liberty, for which in his early years he had a rather low opinion. We can even trace, step by step, the changes in his essay on the English constitution, between the time when he wrote it, in 1733 after his return from England, and the date of its eventual publication, fifteen years later, as chapter 6 of Book XI of *The Spirit of the Laws*.

The account of Montesquieu's method of working on his *magnum opus* is interesting and impressive. The notion that he was an elegant dil-

letante gains no support here. From the start he envisaged the project as one that would require him to put aside preconceptions and search for the broadest possible factual basis regarding all aspects of every known civilization. Beginning at the ripe age of forty-five, he labored assiduously for sixteen years, reading widely and prodigiously, and making careful abstracts of the books he read. Throughout his adult life he kept journals in which he noted and developed his ideas, sometimes elaborating them at considerable length. From these sourcebooks, as well as from the abstracts, he drew heavily in composing *The Spirit of the Laws*. If, by modern standards of scholarship, his evidence appears inadequate and even capriciously selected, one must remember the character of the available materials—often such unreliable sources as letters of missionaries and accounts of returned travellers.

On the actual composition he exerted the greatest care. The finished product, says Shackleton, "was the result of continued and deliberate transference of sentences from one place to another, of intentional polishing, of conscious pursuit of the epigram and the paradox, of the constant suppression of the redundant and of the intermediate link between two ideas, of the rearranging of a sequence of ideas so that the consequence precedes the cause."

A large part of the book is devoted to chapters on various aspects of his published works, especially *The Spirit of the Laws*. They deal, for instance, with "Montesquieu's Conception of Law," "The Theory of Governments," "The System of Liberty," "Climate and Causes," and "The History of Laws." The critical exposition set forth in these chapters is generally sound, although there are points to which one may take exception. Montesquieu's theory of natural law is made to seem less torn between rationalism and empiricism than in fact it is. Contrary to Shackleton's implication, Montesquieu was not the first to link a doctrine of the separation of powers with the theory of liberty, nor was Locke. Hence the evidence that Montesquieu had developed his theory before he had read Locke with care does not necessarily support the author's conclusion that Montesquieu's theory was based on his own observation.

The author concludes his study with the final sentence of Lord Chesterfield's published comment at the time of Montesquieu's death: "His work will illustrate his name, and survive him as long as right reason, moral obligation, and the true spirit of laws, shall be understood, respected and maintained." This reviewer puts down the volume with a feeling of greatly increased appreciation for the validity of Chester-

field's appraisal.—J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*.

*Sociology: The Progress of a Decade.* BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND NEIL J. SMELSER. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp xi, 635. \$7.50.)

This is a collection of articles from the pages of the learned journals in the field of sociology, reflecting what the authors consider to be major trends in the literature during the decade of the 1950s. As such, it contains some that will be of little interest to many political scientists. But there are some sections that should prove to be valuable and enlightening to those who are attempting to relate political science to the other social sciences.

The first section, which deals with the discipline of sociology itself, provides a means for comparison between the two fields. A number of the problems are identical, a few are analogous and perhaps none completely irrelevant. The authors have not tried to comment on the major works in this area except as such works have become the basis for discussion in the journals. So those unfamiliar with such major contributions as those of Parsons and Shils, for example, may sometimes wonder what all the to-do is about. But if he reads the whole section, he may get some insights about these major works that will give him light on their shortcomings or induce him to read and see whether or not he agrees with the critics. What he will discover in any case is that there is emerging some systematic theory in sociology which is directly apropos to the findings of political scientists and may, in fact, serve well to throw light on some of their empirical findings. Gouldner's article on the Theory of Bureaucracy is a particular case in point.

The methods employed by sociologists and political scientists are at some points identical and at others it looks as if criticisms of research in one field are equally applicable to the other. At any event, it may be easier to see the validity of criticism when it is directed at workers in another field than one's own, and so, by reference, discover something of one's shortcomings.

Those political scientists who are concerned with the ecological and demographic aspects of political phenomena will find much of immediate interest in the section dealing with physical and biological boundaries of systems. The complaint that these factors have been neglected by the behaviorists is aired and rebutted, and some contributions to an understanding of political phenomena that might be made, using knowledge about these parameters, is indicated.

In another section dealing with the production

and allocation of wealth, power, and prestige, the fields of sociology and political science are pretty well merged. It is interesting to note that two of the articles cited here are by authors primarily identified as political scientists. The articles by David Easton and Robert Dahl show something of what can be done when social phenomena and political phenomena are considered as one.

Of growing significance in political science, is knowledge about the class and status system of a state. The articles on these subjects deal with the primary controversies among students concentrating in this area. Some of the methods are such as might be directly used in political science, and the findings contribute to the substantive knowledge required for political analysis.

The sections on social change and social control will be of more peripheral interest but those interested particularly in urban government may find that the pathology of the city, as revealed by sociological analysis is the source of most of the political problems confronted by local governments.

The quality of the articles is, as is always the case in a collection, varied, but, in general, they represent a pretty good cross section of the work that was done in the '50s, and this volume provides the political scientist with an easy access to a field in which there is increasing interest.—FRED COTTRELL, *Miami University*.

*Free Minds: A Venture in the Philosophy of Democracy.* BY RALPH W. NELSON. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. xv, 291. \$4.50.)

In this impressively entitled book, Dr. Ralph Waldo Nelson exhorts his fellow "grass-blade home folks" of the world to unite with him in rescuing democracy from the clutches of autocratic politicians, priests and professors "who have traditionally smothered the freedom of our minds by their paternalistic eagerness to do our thinking for us." To succeed in this venture the plain people need only to begin to think for themselves, seriously, deeply and hard. Then, freed by this "headwork" from the dictatorship of capitol, cathedral and campus, the home folks can proceed to apply to the solution of world problems that pragmatic philosophy of life they already employ for solving their personal problems. The author, a philosopher, credits John Dewey with formulating this method which operates, briefly, in the following manner: The ordinary citizen solves a small scale problem by (1) sensing it accurately, (2) locating and defining it clearly, (3) creatively seeking a possible solution, (4) reasoning soundly "as to what results or fruits to expect in the laboratory of life—when (5) he dares freely to

seek truth in laboratory application of the best wisdom of his day to the continuing tasks of citizenship in the kingdom of God." The author's pioneering achievement, he frequently reminds the reader, is his discovery that this method, "already rooted and strongly growing in the sturdy hearts and clear heads of our plainest people," holds the key to the world's salvation.

Several times in what he calls his "adventurous book," Nelson criticizes the methods of social and political scientists. He advises them to abandon their outmoded approaches to their subject matter and adopt instead his "conception of human life as itself our scientific laboratory of supreme value [that] will provide philosophical ground essential to the techniques that will ultimately lift their sciences from the status of 'descriptive' to that of true laboratory sciences." The author's analysis of how he thinks the Founding Fathers solved their political problem by writing the Constitution illustrates both how Americans executed step four of the problem-solving process (the United States has been engaged in step five since 1787), and the marvelous insights to be gained by adopting his suggested technique.

"What happened at Philadelphia . . . was that each individual thinker received stimuli from his fellows to which he responded as an individual thinker; and when he expressed his responding idea in language, this idea served as a further stimulus to all his fellows who understood it. So on, back and forth and round about, each response stimulating other responses until the gradually ripening reactions of individuals evolved into the united and composite, formulated response of the whole convention . . . the Constitution."

This passage illustrates not a new methodology for the social sciences but rather an unintended parody on a behavioral study of groups. It springs from the author's total unfamiliarity with the goals and methods of social scientists.

Not only does Nelson reveal no understanding of our methodology, but he fails to develop one of his own and apply it to this book. The result is a work that rambles in a pseudo-scholarly manner through "historical evidence" selected to buttress what are no more than the author's personal predilections. He constantly reasserts his primary proposition without demonstrating how that pioneering discovery can be put into action. In short, he never brings off steps one through four himself.—F. DONALD ZUCKER, *Ursinus College*.

*Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages.* BY WALTER ULLMANN. (New York: Barnes and Noble. 1961. Pp. 320. \$6.00.)

Dr. Ullmann has written a very important book in the tradition of Gierke and McIlwain, one in spirit closer to the former. For this very definitely is a work of concepts and principles;

italicized nouns and phrases such as *gratia*, *publica utilitas*, *ordo rationis*, and *principatus* abound, and in effect the volume represents an attempt to order the political thought of some 1500 years in the light of several great themes. The non-specialist reader will be overwhelmed by an elaborate scheme which, in terms of beautifully clear and precise statements of the relationship of law and institutions to Christian theology or Aristotelian philosophy, explains why men of politics thought and acted the way they did before the Reformation. Beyond this, the specialist—and here one must include not only the historian of political ideas but also historians of the church and the several national monarchies—will find Ullmann's views on a multitude of issues over which there is learned debate. For example, he adds to the literature on *Magna Carta*, the English coronation oath of 1308, and the prohibition of Roman Law study in France. Nor is any authority safe: Stephan Kuttner's views on this last issue are characterized as "naive."

The book is divided into three sections, The Pope, The King, and The People, the three being preceded by an introduction which describes the ascending and descending themes of government that contested throughout the period, and that constitute the basic analytical conception of the study. In the descending conception of government and law, authority flows from God "in the shape of a pyramid," while in the opposing theory "law-creating power may be ascribed to the community or the *populus*." Those familiar with the author's two books on the medieval papacy will find here another brilliant statement of the development of the papal institution. The Bible, writings of the early popes, vocabulary and theories borrowed from the majesty of Roman Law, all these had contributed to the papal doctrine of the *principatus* by the fifth century. The pope, a fundamental distinction being made between the office and the person, was to direct all Christians in the affairs of this world. Within the Church, broadly conceived as the community of all Christians, ruled the temporal power. Given the theory of descending government, secular

authority was transmitted by the pope to the ruler as an act of grace, *gratia*. Characteristically Dr. Ullmann here gives both a religious and juristic interpretation of the foundation of secular rule.

Having examined the dependent relationship between monarchy and the papal office, the author analyzes monarchy. Initially the theocratic kingship stood exalted: "there was no juristic line of communication running from the people to the king." Now the king too had *gratia*; like the pope he was an estate apart. But, if the theocratic king was above man's law he remained under God's law, and therefore under the interpreter of that law, the pope. At this point in his argument the author investigates the restraints that legal and institutional feudalism placed upon the theocratic king. He discusses both English and French constitutional history and shows how the king who stood unchallenged as theocratic monarch could be challenged as feudal lord. He emphasizes that responsibility to feudal law and custom was already a step in the direction of popular control. Finally we are treated to a discussion of medieval populism conceived in the broadest theoretical and institutional sense. Dr. Ullmann ranges from guilds and heretical groups as expressions of popular needs or discontents to careful analysis of Aristotelian naturalistic politics. He analyzes Marsilius of Padua and Bartolus' theory of popular sovereignty. Thus, having begun with the early papacy, he ends with the Renaissance. Having begun with God as the source of all authority, he ends with a theory of popular sovereignty worked out by theorists and legists in relation to the functioning institutions of their own day.

This brief summary omits the passion, scholarship, ingenuity, and vision that pervade Dr. Ullmann's book. One may argue against many of the author's strongly held views, or one may wish that he had not strained a given point of interpretation—and many will do both. But no one will close the book feeling uninformed or unchallenged.—PETER RIESENBERG, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON POLITICAL THEORY

CECELIA M. KENYON  
Smith College

Adorno, Theodor W. Meinung Whan Gesellschaft. *Der Monat*. December 1961.

Agazzi, Emilio. Il marxismo di Antonio Labriola. *Il Pensiero Critico*. April–September, 1961.

Alexander, Robert J. Nationalism, Latin Amer-

ica's Predominant Ideology. *Journal of International Affairs*. 2/XV/1961.

Amann, Peter. Revolution: A Redefinition. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Apter, D. E. Some Reflections on the Role of a

Political Opposition in New Nations. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. January, 1962.

Aranda, Luis Rodriguez. El racionalismo en el pensamiento político español. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1961.

Bestor, Arthur. State Sovereignty and Slavery—a Reinterpretation of Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860. *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*. Summer, 1961.

Bluhm, William T. Causal Theory in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*. *Political Studies*. February, 1962.

Bomholt, Julius. Dichtung und Gemeinschaft. *Schweizer Monatshefte*. February, 1962.

Casaubon, Juan A. Los orígenes hegelianos y la esencia del marxismo. *Sapientia*. April-June, 1961, and July-September, 1961.

Clarac, Pierre. La politique dans l'oeuvre de Chateaubriand. *Revue politique et Parlementaire*. March, 1962.

Debré, Michel. La teoría y la práctica de la política. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. November-December, 1961.

Debré, Michel. Science politique et action politique. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. December, 1961.

Dunne, Gerald T. Joseph Story: The Germinal Years. *Harvard Law Review*. February, 1962.

Fay, Charles. Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic Ethics. *International Philosophical Quarterly*. February, 1962.

Fernani, Franco. Il "brifrontismo" di Hegel e la sinistra hegeliana. *Il Pensiero Critico*. April-September, 1961.

Furtado, João Rodrigo Narciso. Contribuição para o estudo do pensamento político de Álvaro Pais. *Filosofia*. 4/VIII/1961.

Gabel, Joseph. The Idea of Alienation and the Sociology of Mannheim. *The Review*. 1/IV/1962.

Gaeta, Sergio Bertelli-Franco. Noterelle Machiavelliane. *Revista Storica Italiana*. III/LXXIII/1961.

Golding, M. P. Causation in the Law. *The Journal of Philosophy*. February 15, 1962.

Goldstein, Leon J. The Meaning of 'State' in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. *The Philosophical Quarterly*. January, 1962.

Goodman, Elliot R. Die apokalyptische Vision des staatenlosen Weltkommunismus. *Ost Europa*. November-December, 1961.

Goodman, Elliot. East vs. West in Communist Ideology. *Journal of International Affairs*. 2/XV/1961.

Hamburger, Joseph. James Mill on Universal Suffrage and the Middle Class. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1962.

Hanak, Tibor. Kommunistische Diskussionen um Georg Lukács. *Ost Europa*. July-August, 1961.

Haykal, Mouhammad Hassanein. Le communisme et nous. *Orient*. 3/V/1961.

Ibrahim, Zakariya. Le communisme et l'avenir. *Orient*. 3/V/1961.

Kenyon, Cecelia M. Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation. *William and Mary Quarterly*. April, 1962.

Kirchheimer, Otto. Gnade in der politischen Strafverfolgung. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. December, 1961.

Knox, George. Apocalypse and Sour Utopias. *Western Humanities Review*. Winter, 1962.

Laeuen, Harold. Polens Verhältnis zur Ideologie. *Ost Europa*. July-August, 1961.

Le Lannou, Maurice. La géographie est-elle une science politique? *Revue Française de Science Politique*. December, 1961.

Lübbe, Hermann. Verteidigung Der Freiheit Als Kampf gegen Den Liberalismus. *Zeitschrift für Politik*. 4/8/1961.

Ludz, Peter Christian. Offene Fragen in der Totalitarismus-Forschung. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. December, 1961.

Maravall, J. A. The Origins of the Modern State. *Journal of World History*. 4/VI/1961.

Naville, Pierre. Alienation and the Analysis of the Modern World. *The Review*. 1/IV/1962.

Neal, Fred Warner. Titoist Theory and Titoist Practice. *Journal of International Affairs*. 2/XV/1961.

Newmyer, R. Kent. A Note on the Whig Politics of Justice Joseph Story. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. December, 1961.

Nulle, Stebelton H. The Anomaly of Revolution. *Western Humanities Review*. Winter, 1961.

Orfei, R. Un confronto tra Gramsci e Marx: il nesso teoria-pratica. *Revista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*. November-December, 1961.

Paechter, Heinz. Radikalismus in den U.S.A. *Der Monat*. February, 1962.

Peck, Arthur L. Plato versus Parmenides. *The Philosophical Review*. April, 1962.

Peperzak, A. De jonge Hegel en de oorsprong van het denken. *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*. December, 1961.

Powell, J. H. John Dickinson as President of Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania History*. July, 1961.

Prata, Francisco X. Pina Martins. O nível de radicalidade da Filosofia de Jose Ortega y Gasset. *Filosofia*. 4/VIII/1961.

Prawer, J. Etude sur le droit des Assises de Jérusalem: Droit de confiscation et droit d'exhérédation. *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger*. October-December, 1961.

Prybyla, Jan S. Das Eigentum in der kommunistischen Gesellschaftsordnung. *Ost Europa*. November-December, 1961.

Romero, Francisco. La historia de la filosofía

según Hegel, N. Hartmann y G. Kafka. *Cuadernos Americanos*. March-April, 1962.

Ruiz-Gimenez, Joaquín. Balmes y el sentido de la libertad. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. November-December, 1961.

Rupprecht, F. Über den Charakter der Kommunistischen Ideale. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 11/IX/1961.

Scheler, H. Das Problem der nationalen Souveränität in der modernen imperialistischen Kriegsideologie. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 11/IX/1961.

Schmidt, F. Hegels Philosophie der Sprache. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*.

Shaltout, Mahmoud. Le Socialisme et L'Islam. *Orient*. 4/V/1961.

al-Sib'í, Mustafa. A propos du socialisme de l'Islam. *Orient*. 4/V/1961.

Stoljarow, V. Kommunismus und Wissen-

schaft. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 12/IX/1961.

Streisand, Joachim. Progressive Traditionen und reaktionäre Anachronismen in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft. *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*. 8/IX/1961.

Tindemans, L. C. Formation et diffusion de la Propriété dans une perspective sociale chrétienne. *La Revue Politique*. December, 1961.

de la Torre, Angel Sanchez. La Socialización en la Doctrina Social Católica. *Revista de Política Social*. October-December, 1961.

Uscatescu, George. Tres Meditaciones Sobre el Comunismo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. September-October, 1961.

Klaus, G., und Wittich, D. Zu einigen Fragen des Verhältnisses von Praxis und Erkenntnis. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 11/IX/1961.

#### SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

### METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

JULIAN FELDMAN

*University of California, Berkeley*

#### Philosophy of Social Science

Meltzer, L. The need for a dual orientation in social psychology. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 43, October.

Swanson, G. E. Mead and Freud: their relevance for social psychology. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 319, December.

Tisdale, J. R. Psychological value theory and research: 1930-1960. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.

#### Research Methods

Ancombe, F. J. Estimating a mixed-exponential response law. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 493, September.

Bechtoldt, H. P. An empirical study of the factor analysis stability hypothesis. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 405, December.

Berger, A. On comparing intensities of association between two binary characteristics in two different populations. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 889, December.

Blalock, H. M., Jr. Evaluating the relative importance of variables. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 866, December.

Blankenship, A. B. Creativity in consumer research. *Journal of Marketing*, 1961, 25, 34, October.

Borgatta, E. F. Toward a methodological codi-

fication: the shotgun and the saltshaker. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 432, December.

Capon, J. A note on the asymptotic normality of the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon statistic. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 687, September.

Carroll, J. B. The nature of the data, or how to choose a correlation coefficient. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 347, December.

Davies, M. Multiple linear regression analysis with adjustment for class differences. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 729, September.

de Groot, A. D. Via clinical to statistical prediction. *Acta Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 274.

Deutsch, K. W., and Isard, W. A note on a generalized concept of effective distance. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 308, October.

Dill, W. R. What management games do best. *Business Horizons*, 1961, 4, 55, Fall.

Edgington, E. S. A statistical test of cyclical trends, with application to Weber's law. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 630, December.

El-badry, M. A. Failure of enumerators to make entries of zero: errors in-recording childless cases in population censuses. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 909, December.

Feldt, L. S. The use of extreme groups to test for the presence of a relationship. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 307, September.



- Fruchter, B., and Anderson, H. E., Jr. Geometrical representation of two methods of linear least squares multiple correlation. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 433, December.
- Goldberger, A. S. Stepwise least squares: residual analysis and specification error. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 998, December.
- Gross, C. F. Intrajudge consistency in ratings of heterogeneous persons. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 605, May.
- Halperin, M. Fitting of straight lines and prediction when both variables are subject to error. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 657, September.
- Hart, H. Laboratory sociology as a social innovation. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 781, October.
- Hennessy, B. C., and Hennessy, E. R. The prediction of close elections: comments on some 1960 polls. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 405, Fall.
- Herbst, P. G. A theory of simple behaviour systems. I. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 71, February.
- Herbst, P. G. A theory of simple behaviour systems. II. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 193, August.
- Hirshleifer, J. The Bayesian approach to statistical decision: an exposition. *Journal of Business*, 1961, 34, 471, October.
- Hogg, R. V. On the resolution of statistical hypotheses. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 978, December.
- Kimball, A. E. Increasing the rate of return in mail surveys. *Journal of Marketing*, 1961, 25, 63, October.
- Lachman, S. J. Level of aspiration: a classroom demonstration of phenomena and principles. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 357, October.
- Lees, R. W., and Lord, F. M. A nomograph for computing partial correlation coefficients. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 995, December.
- Lubin, A. The interpretation of significant interaction. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1961, 21, 807, Winter.
- Lumsden, J. A common error with chi-square. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 13, 55, June.
- McElwain, D. W., and Keats, J. A. Multidimensional unfolding: some geometrical solutions. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 325, September.
- Mandel, J. Non-additivity in two-way analysis of variance. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 878, December.
- Marks, M. R., Christal, R. E., and Bottenberg, R. A. Simple formula aids for understanding the joint action of two predictors. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 285, October.
- Morrill, C. S. Teaching machines: a review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 363, September.
- Neyman, J., and Scott, E. L. Further comments on the "Final report of the advisory committee on weather control." *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 580, September.
- Peach, P. Bias in pseudo-random numbers. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 610, September.
- Pearlin, L. I. The appeals of anonymity in questionnaire response. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 640, Winter.
- Rapoport A., and Horvath, W. J. A study of a large sociogram. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 279, October.
- Saunders, D. R. The rationale for an "oblimax" method of transformation in factor analysis. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 317, September.
- Shephard, R. W. An appraisal of some of the problems of measurement in operational research. *Operational Research Quarterly*, 1961, 12, 161, September.
- Stekler, H. O. Forecasting industrial production. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 869, December.
- Theil, H., and Nagar, A. L. Testing the independence of regression disturbances. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 793, December.
- Thompson, J. W. Meteorological models in social dynamics. I: concepts in meteorology. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 43, February.
- Thompson, J. W. Meteorological models in social dynamics. II: the extension of meteorological concepts to sociology. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 51, February.
- Weinberger, M. Does the " sleeper effect " apply to advertising? *Journal of Marketing*, 1961, 25, 65, October.
- Weinwurm, E. H. Limits of the scientific method. *The Engineering Economist*, 1961, 7, 27, Fall.

#### Motivation and Personality

- Barber, T. X. Physiological effects of "hypnosis." *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 390, September.
- Binder, A., and Salop, P. Reinforcement and personality factors in verbal conditioning. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 379, October.
- Block, J. Ego identity, role variability, and adjustment. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1961, 25, 392, October.
- Carlson, E. R. Motivation and set in acquiring information about persons. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 285, September.

- Champion, R. A. Motivational effects in approach-avoidance conflict. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 354, September.
- Croner, M. D., and Willis, R. H. Perceived differences in task competence and asymmetry of dyadic influence. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 705, May.
- Deutsch, M. Courage as a concept in social psychology. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 49, October.
- Garmezy, N., Clarke, A. R., and Stockner, C. Child rearing attitudes of mothers and fathers as reported by schizophrenic and normal patients. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 176, July.
- Gerard, H. B., and Rabbie, J. M. Fear and social comparison. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 586, May.
- Gumpert, P., Thibaut, J. W., and Shuford, E. H. Effect of personality and status experience upon the valuation of unobtained statuses. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 47, July.
- Harned, L. Authoritarian attitudes and party activity. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 393, Fall.
- Heilbrun, A. B., Jr. Maternal authoritarianism, social class, and filial schizophrenia. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 235, October.
- Hokanson, J. E. The effects of frustration and anxiety on overt aggression. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 346, March.
- Irwin, F. W. On desire, aversion, and the affective zero. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 293, September.
- King, F. J., Bowman, B. H., and Moreland, H. J. Some intellectual correlates of biochemical variability. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 297, October.
- Kleiner, R. J., and Tuckman, J. Multiple group membership and schizophrenia. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 292, October.
- Kregarman, J. J., and Worchel, P. Arbitrariness of frustration and aggression. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 183, July.
- Lowe, A. Individual differences in reaction to failure: mode of coping with anxiety and interference proneness. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 303, March.
- Maslow, A. R. Some relationships between social conformity and self perception. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.
- Milgram, N. A. Microgenetic analysis of word associations in schizophrenic and brain damaged patients. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 364, March.
- Painting, D. H. The performance of psychopathic individuals under conditions of positive and negative partial reinforcement. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 352, March.
- Pikas, A. Children's attitudes toward rational versus inhibiting parental authority. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 315, March.
- Pine, F. Incidental versus focal presentation of drive related stimuli. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 482, May.
- Podell, J. E. A comparison of generalization and adaptation-level as theories of connotation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 593, May.
- Reimanis, G., and Davol, S. H. Correlates and prediction of anomie in a VA domiciliary. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 237, December.
- Sanua, V. D. Sociocultural factors in families of schizophrenics. *Psychiatry*, 1961, 24, 246, August.
- Sarnoff, I., and Zimbardo, P. G. Anxiety, fear, and social affiliation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 356, March.
- Schachter, S., Willerman, B., Festinger, L., and Hyman, R. Emotional disruption and industrial productivity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 201, August.
- Tucker, W. T., and Painter, J. J. Personality and product use. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 325, October.
- Van Buskirk, C. Performance on complex reasoning tasks as a function of anxiety. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 201, March.
- Weiner, H., and McGinnies, E. Authoritarianism, conformity, and confidence in a perceptual judgment situation. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 77, October.
- Witkin, H. A. Cognitive development and the growth of personality. *Acta Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 245.
- Zagona, S. V., and MacKinnon W. J. Open-mindedness and hypotheses of interdependence between libertarian and equalitarian processes. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 347, October.

#### Opinions and Attitudes

- Bauer, R. A. Risk handling in drug adoption: the role of company preference. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 546, Winter.
- Beloff, J., and Beloff, H. The influence of valence on distance judgments of human faces. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 720, May.
- Belson, W. A. The effects of television on the reading and the buying of newspapers and magazines. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 366, Fall.
- Blake, R. R., and Mouton, J. S. Perceived characteristics of elected representatives. *Journal*

of *Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 693, May.

Breed, W., and Ktsanes, T. Pluralistic ignorance in the process of opinion formation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 382, Fall.

Burke, R. L., and Bennis, W. G. Changes in perception of self and others during human relations training. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 165, February.

Byrne, D. Interpersonal attraction and attitude similarity. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 713, May.

Cohn, T. S., Fisher, A., and Brown, V. Leadership and predicting attitudes of others. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 199, December.

Cohn, T. S., Yee, W., and Brown, V. Attitude change and interpersonal attraction. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 207, December.

Cole, D. L. The perception of Lincoln: a psychological approach to the public's conception of historical figures. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 23, October.

Gerard, H. B., and Rotter, G. S. Time perspective, consistency of attitude, and social influence. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 565, May.

Gleitman, H., and Greenbaum, J. J. Attitudes and personality patterns of Hungarian refugees. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 351, Fall.

Greenstein, F. I. More on children's images of the President. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 648, Winter.

Jung, A. F. Attitudes toward customers at financial institutions. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 414, Fall.

Lavidge, R. J., and Steiner, G. A. A model for predictive measurements of advertising effectiveness. *Journal of Marketing*, 1961, 25, 59, October.

Maccoby, N., and Maccoby, E. E. Homeostatic theory in attitude change. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 538, Winter.

Maccoby, E. E., Maccoby, N., Romney, A. K., and Adams, J. S. Social reinforcement in attitude change. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 109, July.

Manis, M. The interpretation of opinion statements as a function of message ambiguity and recipient attitude. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 76, July.

Manis, M. The interpretation of opinion statements as a function of recipient attitude and source prestige. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 82, July.

Quay, L. C., Bartlett, C. J., Wrightsman, L. S., Jr., and Catron, D. Attitude change in attendant employees. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 27, October.

Radloff, R. Opinion evaluation and affiliation.

*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 578, May.

Seeman, M., and Evans, J. W., Apprenticeship and attitude change. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 365, January.

Smock, C. D., and Kanfer, F. H. Response bias and perception. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 158, August.

Stempel, G. H. III Selectivity in readership of political news. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 400, Fall.

Swank, T. E. An analysis of the social diffusion of an audio-visual message through a church congregation. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.

Taylor, J. B. What do attitude scales measure: the problem of social desirability. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 386, March.

Weiss, W. An examination of attitude toward negroes. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 3, October.

Wurster, C. R., Bass, B. M., and Alcock, W. A test of the proposition: we want to be esteemed most by those we esteem most highly. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 650, November.

Zeisel, H. The opinion game and the danger of stereotypes. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 655, Winter.

#### Cognitive Processes and Individual Decision Making

Anderson, N. H. Two learning models for responses measured on a continuous scale. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 391, December.

Atkinson, R. C. A generalization of stimulus sampling theory. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 281, September.

Ausubel, D. P., and Fitzgerald, D. The role of discriminability in meaningful verbal learning and retention. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 266, October.

Beach, L., and Wertheimer, M. A free response approach to the study of person cognition. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 367, March.

Behrend, E. R., and Bitterman, M. E. Probability-matching in the fish. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 542, December.

Bower, G. H. Application of a model to paired-associate learning. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 255, September.

Bruner, J. S., and Tajfel, H. Cognitive risk and environmental change. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 231, March.

Cunningham, R. M. Customer loyalty to store and brand. *Harvard Business Review*, 1961, 39, 127 November-December.

- Edwards, W. Probability learning in 1000 trials. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 385, October.
- Elkind, D. The development of the additive composition of classes in the child: Piaget Replication Study III. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1961, 99, 51, September.
- Ellsberg, D. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1961, 75, 643, November.
- Epstein, W., and Ebenholtz, S. M. Evidence for incremental processes in associative learning. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1961, 65, 319, October.
- Erlick, D. E. Judgments of the relative frequency of a sequential series of two events. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 105, August.
- Ervin, S. M. Changes with age in the verbal determinants of word-association. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 361, September.
- Feldman, J., and Newell, A. A note on a class of probability matching models. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 333, September.
- Fellner, W. Distortion of subjective probabilities as a reaction to uncertainty. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1961, 75, 670, November.
- Fisher, S. Achievement themes and directionality of autokinetic movement. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 64, July.
- Gagné, R. M., and Brown, L. T. Some factors in the programming of conceptual learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 313, October.
- Gonzalez, R. C., Eskin, R. M., and Bitterman, M. E. Alternating and random partial reinforcement in the fish, with some observations on asymptotic resistance to extinction. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 561, December.
- Gutman, H. The biological roots of creativity. *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1961, 64, 417, November.
- Haines, G. H., Jr. The rote marketer. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 357, October.
- Herman, S. N. Explorations in the social psychology of language choice. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 149, February.
- Hickson, R. H. Response probability in a two-choice learning situation with varying probability of reinforcement. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 138, August.
- Hoffman, L. R. Conditions for creative problem solving. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 429, October.
- Hollander, E. P. Some effects of perceived status on responses to innovative behavior. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 247, September.
- Jensen, A. R. An empirical theory of the serial-position effect. *Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, 127, January.
- Jones, J. E. Deviations from matching behavior in probability learning. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 335, October.
- Klein, M. W. Ambiguity and response conflict: a conceptual and experimental analysis. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.
- Koehler, J., Jr. Role of instructions in two-choice verbal conditioning with contingent partial reinforcement. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 122, August.
- Kraeling, D. Analysis of amount of reward as a variable in learning. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 560, October.
- Lanzetta, J. T., and Kanareff, V. T. The effects of congruent and conflicting social and task feedback on the acquisition of an imitative response. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 322, October.
- Leslie, G. R., and Richardson, A. H. Life-cycle, career pattern, and the decision to move. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 894, December.
- Lockhead, G. R. A re-evaluation of evidence of one-trial associative learning. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 590, December.
- Losen, S. M. The differential effects of censure on the problem-solving behavior of schizophrenic and normal subjects. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 258, September.
- Luchins, A. S., and Luchins, E. H. Einstellung effect in social learning. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 59, October.
- MacKay, D. M. Operational aspects of some fundamental concepts of human communication. *Journal of Communication*, 1961, 11, 183, December.
- McDaniel, E. D., Halter, A. N., and Hartford, D. L. Grade utility: a new noncognitive factor in academic prediction. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1961, 21, 621, Autumn.
- McGuire, W. J. A multiprocess model for paired-associate learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 335, October.
- McReynolds, P., and Collins, B. Concept-forming behavior in schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic subjects. *Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 52, 369, October.
- Michels, K. M., Pustek, J. J., Jr., and Johnson, J. I., Jr. Solution of patterned-strings problems by raccoons. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 439, August.
- Morris, C. Values, problematic and unproblematic, and science. *Journal of Communication*, 1961, 11, 205, December.
- Murphy, G. Toward a field theory of communication. *Journal of Communication*, 1961, 11, 196, December.
- Muth, J. F. Rational expectations and the

- theory of price movements. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 315, July.
- Myers, J. L., Reilly, R. E., and Taub, H. A., Differential cost, gain, and relative frequency of reward in a sequential choice situation. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 357, October.
- Nelson, R. R. Uncertainty, learning, and the economics of parallel research and development efforts. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 1961, 43, 351, November.
- Northrop, F. S. C. The human communicants in communication engineering. *Journal of Communication*, 1961, 11, 202, December.
- Overall, J. E., and Brown, W. L. A factor analysis of several measures of choice behavior from a probability learning situation. *Journal of General Psychology*, 1962, 66, 115, January.
- Penney, R. K., and Lupton, A. A. Children's discrimination learning as a function of reward and punishment. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 449, August.
- Piaget, J. The genetic approach to the psychology of thought. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1961, 52, 275, December.
- Pruitt, D. G. Informational requirements in making decisions. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 433, September.
- Pulos, L., and Spilka, B. Perceptual selectivity, memory, and antisemitism. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 690, May.
- Restle, F. Statistical methods for a theory of cue learning. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 291, September.
- Rivoire, J. L. The development of reference systems in children. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, September.
- Rosen, S. Postdecision affinity for incompatible information. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 188, July.
- Rosenzweig, M. R. Comparisons among word-association responses in English, French, German, and Italian. *American Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 74, 347, September.
- Rubinstein, I. Supplementary report: the influence of one stimulus on the prediction of the alternative stimulus in two-choice problems. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 311, September.
- Schusterman, R. J. The use of strategies in the decision-behavior of children, chimpanzees and monkeys. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.
- Sebeok, T. A., and Zeps, V. J. Computer research in psycholinguistics: toward an analysis of poetic language. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 365, October.
- Singer, R. D. Verbal conditioning and generalization of prodemocratic responses. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 43, July.
- Sinnott, E. W. The biological basis of communication. *Journal of Communication*, 1961, 11, 190, December.
- Smelser, W. T. Dominance as a factor in achievement and perception in cooperative problem solving interactions. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 535, May.
- Suppes, P. Behavioristic foundations of utility. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 186, April.
- Suppes, P., and Zinnes, J. L. Stochastic learning theories for a response continuum with non-determinate reinforcement. *Psychometrika*, 1961, 26, 373, December.
- Swets, J. A., Tanner, W. P., Jr., and Birdsall, T. G. Decision processes in perception. *Psychological Review*, 1961, 68, 301, September.
- Toch, H., Allen, T., and Lazer, W. The public image of cancer etiology. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 411, Fall.
- Wesley, F. The number concept: a phylogenetic review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1961, 58, 420, September.
- Wrightman, L. S., Jr., and Baumeister, A. A. A comparison of actual and paper-and-pencil versions of the water jar test of rigidity. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 191, July.
- Yamaguchi, S., and Warren, J. M. Single versus double alternation learning by cats. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1961, 54, 533, October.
- Zajonc, R. B., and Burnstein, E. The resolution of cognitive conflict under uncertainty. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 113, February.
- Zimmerman, D. W. The effect of deprivation and satiation on secondary reinforcement developed by two methods. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1961, 99, 139, September.
- Pfeiffer, J., Problems, too, have problems. *Fortune*, 1961, 144, October.

#### Interpersonal Influence

- Birney, R. C., and Houston, J. P. The effects of creativity, norm distance, and instructions on social influence. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 294, September.
- Byrne, D., Terrill, J., and McReynolds, P. Incongruity as a predictor of response to humor. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 435, March.
- Cervin, V. B., Joyner, R. C., Spence, J. M., and Heinzl, R. Relationship of persuasive interaction to change of opinion in dyadic groups when the original opinions of participants are expressed privately and publicly. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 431, March.
- Davis, J. A. Compositional effects, role sys-

tems, and the survival of small discussion groups. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 574, Winter.

Gerard, H. B. Disagreement with others, their credibility, and experienced stress. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 559, May.

Janowitz, M. Mass persuasion and international relations. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 560, Winter.

Julian, J. W., and Steiner, I. D. Perceived acceptance as a determinant of conformity behavior. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 191, December.

Lana, R. E. Familiarity and the order of presentation of persuasive communications. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 573, May.

Levin, M. L. Social climates and political socialization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 596, Winter.

Lewan, P. C., and Stotland, E. The effects of prior information on susceptibility to an emotional appeal. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 450, March.

McGuire, W. J. Resistance to persuasion conferred by active and passive prior refutation of the same and alternative counterarguments. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 326, September.

Michael, J. A. High school climates and plans for entering college. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 585, Winter.

Papageorgis, D., and McGuire, W. J. The generality of immunity to persuasion produced by pre-exposure to weakened counter-arguments. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 475, May.

Shaw, M. E. Some correlates of social acquiescence. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 133, October.

Smith, E. E. The power of dissonance techniques to change attitudes. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 626, Winter.

Vidulich, R. N., and Kaiman, I. P. The effects of information source status and dogmatism upon conformity behavior. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 639, November.

Zajonc, R. B., and Wahi, N. K. Conformity and need-achievement under cross-cultural norm conflict. *Human relations*, 1961, 14, 241, August.

#### Group Behavior

Anderson, N. H. Group performance in an anagram task. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 67, October.

Berkowitz, L., and Macaulay, J. R. Some effects of differences in status level and status stability. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 135, February.

Bjerstedt, A. Preparation, process, and product in small group interaction. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 183, February.

Borgatta, M. L. Power structure and coalitions in three person groups. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 287, December.

Byrne, D. Interpersonal attraction as a function of affiliation need and attitude similarity. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 283, August.

Cassel, R. N. A construct validity study on a leadership and a social insight tests for 200 college freshman students. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1961, 99, 165, September.

Cohen, A. M. Changing small group communication networks. *Journal of Communication*, 1961, 11, 116, September.

Cohen, A. M., and Bennis, W. G. Continuity of leadership in communication networks. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 351, November.

Cohen, A. M., Bennis, W. G., and Wolkon, G. H. The effects of continued practice on the behaviors of problem-solving groups. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 416, December.

Crook, R. B. Communication and group structure. *Journal of Communication*, 1961, 11, 136, September.

Deutsch, M. The interpretation of praise and criticism as a function of their social context. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 391, March.

Haines, G., Heider, F., and Remington, D. The computer as a small-group member. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 360, December.

Hoffman, L. R., and Maier, N. R. F. Quality and acceptance of problem solutions by members of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 401, March.

Kelley, H. H., and Ring, K. Some effects of "suspicious" versus "trusting" training schedules. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 294, September.

Krislov, S. Groping in group theory. *Public Administration Review*, 1961, 21, 157, Summer.

Lindzey, G., Lykken, D. T., and Winston, H. D. Confusion, conviction, and control groups. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 221, July.

Lott, A. J., and Lott, B. E. Group cohesiveness, communication level and conformity. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, March.

Lott, B. E. Group cohesiveness: a learning phenomenon. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 275, December.

Lyle, Jack. Communication, group atmosphere, productivity, and morale in small task groups. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 369, November.

- Mann, R. D. Dimensions of individual performance in small groups under task and social-emotional conditions. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 674, May.
- Nokes, P. Feedback as an explanatory device in the study of certain interpersonal and institutional processes. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 281, November.
- Rosen, J. Dominance behavior of the adult rat as a function of early social experience. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1961, 99, 145, September.
- Rosenblum, L. A. The development of social behavior in the rhesus monkey. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, September.
- Schultz, W. C. On group composition. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 62, 275, March.
- Singer, J. D. Primary groups and the political system: simulation and reality. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 336, October.
- Stotland, E., and Cottrell, N. B. Self-esteem, group interaction, and group influence on performance. *Journal of Personality*, 1961, 29, 273, September.
- Stradtbeck, F. L., and Hook, L. H. The social dimensions of a twelve-man jury table. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 397, December.
- Thomas, E. J., and Fink, C. F. Models of group problem solving. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 53, July.
- Tiedemann, J. G. An investigation of the influence of group standards and deviate member behavior on the exhibited racial prejudice of an individual. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.
- Wallace, S. E. Patterns of interaction: the significance of numbers on togetherness. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.
- Whitmyre, J. W., Diggory, J. C., and Cohen, D. The effects of personal liking, perceived ability, and value of prize on choice of partners for a competition. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961, 63, 198, July.
- Winick, C. The diffusion of an innovation among physicians in a large city. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 384, December.
- Wolfe, D. M. Social influence toward unanimous group decision in various group authority structures. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.
- Ziller, R. C., and Behringer, R. D. A longitudinal study of the assimilation of the new child in the group. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 121, February.
- Burlingame, J. F. Information technology and decentralization. *Harvard Business Review*, 1961, 39, 121, November-December.
- Burns, T. Micropolitics: mechanisms of institutional change. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 257, December.
- Campbell, D. T., and Damarin, F. L. Measuring leadership attitudes through an information test. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 159, December.
- Cooper, W. W. Some implications of the newer analytic approaches to management. *California Management Review*, 1961, 4, 51, Fall.
- Daniel, D. R. Management information crisis. *Harvard Business Review*, 1961, 39, 111, September-October.
- Derber, M., Chalmers, W. E., and Edelman, M. T. Union participation in plant decision-making. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 1961, 15, 83, October.
- Donaldson, C. Soviet management. *Manager*, 1961, 29, 771, October.
- Evan, W. M., and Zelditch, M., Jr. A laboratory experiment on bureaucratic authority. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 883, December.
- Fisch, G. G. Line-staff is obsolete. *Harvard Business Review*, 1961, 39, 67, September-October.
- Forehand, G. A., and Guetzkow, H. The administrative judgment test as related to descriptions of executive judgment behaviors. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 257, August.
- Goodman, E. H. Effects of computers on personnel. *Data Processing*, 1961, 3, 9, November.
- Grusky, O. Corporate size, bureaucratization, and managerial succession. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 261, November.
- Hearle, E. F. R. How useful are "scientific" tools of management? *Public Administration Review*, 1961, 21, 206, Autumn.
- Hund, J. M. Decentralization in a wider context. *California Management Review*, 1961, 4, 65, Fall.
- Kilbridge, M. D. Turnover, absence, and transfer rates as indicators of employee dissatisfaction with repetitive work. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 1961, 15, 21, October.
- Landsberger, H. A. The horizontal dimension in bureaucracy. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 299, December.
- McGuire, J. W. The concept of the firm. *California Management Review*, 1961, 3, 64, Summer.
- Maier, N. R. F., and Hoffman, L. R. Organization and creative problem solving. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1961, 45, 277, August.
- Nadler, E. B. Psychological analysis of organizational ideology. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1961, 55, 223, December.

#### Organizational Behavior

Argyris, C. Explorations in consulting-client relationships. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 121, Fall.

- O'Donnell, C. Ground rules for using committees. *Management Review*, 1961, 50, 63, October.
- Perrow, C. The analysis of goals in complex organizations. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 854, December.
- Perrucci, R. The significance of intra-occupational mobility: some methodological and theoretical notes, together with a case study of engineers. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 874, December.
- Prentice, W. C. H. Understanding leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, 1961, 39, 143, September-October.
- Rogers, D., and Berg, I. E., Jr. Occupation and ideology: the case of the small businessman. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 103, Fall.
- Udy, S. H., Jr. Technical and institutional factors in production organization: a preliminary model. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 247, November.
- Wilson, C. Z. Organization theory: a survey of three views. *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*, 1961, 1, 53, August.
- family in sociological theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 312, November.
- Gross, E. Social integration and the control of competition. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 270, November.
- Jahoda, M. A social-psychological approach to the study of culture. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 23, February.
- Katz, E., and Zloczower, A. Ethnic continuity in an Israeli town: I. relations with parents. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 293, November.
- Katz, E., and Zloczower, A. Ethnic continuity in an Israeli town: II. relations with peers. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 309, November.
- Klietsch, R. G. Decision-making in dairy farming: a sociological analysis. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.
- Lazerwitz, B. A comparison of major United States religious groups. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 568, September.
- Maccoby, E. E. The choice of variables in the study of socialization. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 357, December.
- Macpherson, C. B. Market concepts in political theory. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 1961, 27, 490, November.
- Nahirny, V. C. Some observations on ideological groups. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 397, January.
- Preston, L. E., and Bell, E. J. The statistical analysis of industry structure: an application to food industries. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 925, December.
- Putney, S., and Middleton, R. Ethical relativism and anomia. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 430, January.
- Schelling, T. C. The future of arms control. *Operations Research*, 1961, 9, 722, September-October.
- Schnore, L. F. Municipal annexations and the growth of metropolitan suburbs, 1950-60. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 406, January.
- Sewell, W. H., Social class and childhood personality. *Sociometry*, 1961, 24, 340, December.
- Singer, J. D. The relevance of the behavioral sciences to the study of international relations. *Behavioral Science*, 1961, 6, 324, October.
- Taeuber, K. E., Haenszel, W., and Sirken, M. G. Residence histories and exposure residences for the United States population. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 824, December.
- Thomlinson, R. A model for migration analysis. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 675, September.
- Tilly, C. Occupational rank and grade of residence in a metropolis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 67, 323, November.
- Vogel, E. The go-between in a developing soci-

#### Voting Behavior

- Campbell, A., and Valen, H. Party identification in Norway and the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 505, Winter.
- Greer, S. Catholic voters and the democratic party. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 611, Winter.

#### Culture and Institutions

- Constas, H. The U.S.S.R.—from charismatic sect to bureaucratic society. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 282, December.
- Deutsch, M. The face of bargaining. *Operations Research*, 1961, 9, 886, November-December.
- Duncan, B., Sabagh, G., and Van Arsdol, M. D., Jr. Patterns of city growth. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 418, January.
- Duncan, O. D. Occupational components of educational differences in income. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1961, 56, 783, December.
- Easterlin, R. A. The American baby boom in historical perspective. *American Economic Review*, 1961, 51, 869, December.
- Ehrlich, H. J. The reputational approach to the study of community power. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 926, December.
- Fallding, H. The family and the idea of a cardinal role: a sociological study. *Human Relations*, 1961, 14, 329, November.
- Gamson, W. A. The fluoridation dialogue: is it an ideological conflict? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1961, 25, 526, Winter.
- Greenfield, S. M. Industrialization and the



ety: the case of the Japanese marriage arranger. *Human Organization*, 1961, 20, 112, Fall.

Ward, W. Continuities and discontinuities in denominational loyalty: a Lehigh Valley study of residential movement and church membership. *Dissertation Abstracts*, 1961, 22, October.

Warriner, C. K. Public opinion and collective

action: formation of a watershed district. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1961, 6, 333, December.

Wood, A. L. A socio-structural analysis of murder, suicide, and economic crime in Ceylon. *American Sociological Review*, 1961, 26, 744, October.

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961*. EDITED BY PAUL T. DAVID. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961. Pp. ix, 353. \$3.75.)

This book is a useful addition to the series of studies of the electoral process that the Brookings Institution has published in recent years. The Institution is making a valuable contribution in devoting continuing attention to this particular field. Periodic studies afford a depth and a comparative dimension that in itself is the surest antidote to and safeguard against impressionistic interpretation in an area where that has been all too common.

In this volume particular attention is given to changes and trends in the apparatus, procedures and emphases of campaigning, the function of the convention, the process of platform construction. Although the format is not the same, the central concern of the first half of this book is not unlike the pioneer studies, *The 1928 Campaign* and *The 1932 Campaign* produced by Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly thirty years ago. In the intervening years the literature on voting causation, techniques of polling and election analysis has undergone marked change. Political vocabularies have been colored by the statistical and behavioral disciplines. The basic problems have not changed, however, and it is useful as well as interesting to note how little new there was in the 1960 campaign.

Since the present work also covers much the same ground as Theodore White's book, comparisons are inevitable. Both books have their particular assets: White's extensive reportorial man-on-the-spot access plus his "insider's" view versus Brookings' "team" resources. Both have the advantage of advance planning—the recording of politics in action, rather than the *post hoc* methods of recapturing already completed action. The White book comes off better as a literary product. It is better journalism and more dynamic political science, but the David volume is a worthy contribution.

Actually, the symposium (twelve chapters contributed by ten writers) comprises two monographs, one treating the 1960 campaign, the other the transition and transfer of the presidency in

1960-1961. The conception of the book emphasizes the interrelated character of our political processes—the continuity of all phases of the presidency. Yet, for all its recognition of the inseparability of election and administration, the present work has not gone all the way. It presents within a single volume the campaign and the transition—in tandem; it does not incorporate them into a single panoramic treatment of the period under scrutiny. Nor, indeed, does it treat them as interstitial parts of a single structure. The first six chapters, comprising approximately half the book, deal with various aspects of the 1960 campaign. The final six chapters are concerned primarily with the transition from one administration to its successor. There is little cross reference from one subject to the other. The inherent unity of the subject matter is not organically recognized in the execution of the work.

Nevertheless, the book will find a ready market because it fulfills a real need. What it may lack because of attempting to cover too much ground within a single volume is at least partially offset by its utility in making readily available in highly readable form a number of factual, authoritative and in some instances penetrating essays upon pertinent aspects of significant recent events.

It is impossible to treat individually all of the essays. Each has its own particular merits. Among the chapters relating to the election, it seems likely that the one on finance by Herbert E. Alexander and V. O. Key's interpretation of the election results will be most useful. The former is systematic, comprehensive, well documented yet highly compressed; it will be a standard source for some time to come. Key's sophisticated interpretation of the statistical data yielded by improved techniques of recording election results should give pause to analysts tempted to indulge in sweeping generalizations concerning voting causation.

The chapters on transition and transfer are chiefly narrative; they provide a compact yet adequately detailed review of the many-sided problem of changing the guard. Party and congressional interpretations are contributed by Senators Eugene McCarthy and Thruston Morton. John M. Hightower's essay on the impact of the campaign on foreign relations com-

mands particular attention. For one thing, it is unique because it brings into a book about our election processes the external ramifications of what we have traditionally regarded as the most domestic—almost private—aspect of our political life.

Among the essays some repetition occurs but not enough to be objectionable; more serious is the range in thoroughness of treatment—from meticulous analysis to off-the-cuff commentary. Perhaps this is unavoidable in a symposium of this type.

One wishes for more detail at a number of places. In the campaign chapters: special uses of the vice-presidential candidates, changing organizational situations at the state and local levels, relationships with other party leaders. In the transition section, Eisenhower-Kennedy contrasts as they affected the transition adjustments are touched upon but only enough to tantalize, not to illuminate. Obviously, space limitations are to blame for these minor shortcomings.—LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN, *Columbia University*.

*Freedom and Protection: The Bill of Rights.* By ANDREW D. WEINBERGER. (San Francisco: The Chandler Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. xix, 180. Paper \$1.75, cloth \$3.50.)

*Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action.* By JOHN P. ROCHE. (New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. xiii, 117. \$1.35.)

*Freedom and Protection* is essentially a book for nonspecialists on the Bill of Rights broadly defined. The bulk of the book is consumed by 14 chapters, each of which begins with a short introductory note citing the significant historical and political developments for the particular freedom or right being discussed. This is followed in each case by short excerpts from one to three relevant Supreme Court opinions. The opinions seem to have been chosen primarily to give the flavor or tone of Supreme Court attitudes rather than to state the holding or rule of the particular case.

Although 13 justices of the court are represented, approximately one-half of the contributions are from Frankfurter (5), Black (4), and Warren (3). On balance Weinberger's notes are dispassionate and seemingly unexceptionable, though an occasional imprecision in expression occurs. For example, the case of *Shelley v. Kraemer*, as Weinberger asserts, stands for the proposition that racial land covenants cannot be enforced. But to describe such covenants today as "entirely meaningless" is, at the least, a misleading emphasis.

John P. Roche has also written a short paper-back in the Random House series—"Studies in Political Science." The book deals, as the author says, with the struggle for justice in the United

States and the role of the judiciary in that struggle. Specifically, the volume treats such topics as the rule of law, the judicial process, and the rights of citizens. In a final chapter on the judiciary and the democratic process, the author adopts the view of Learned Hand that "the current policy power of the federal judiciary is an anomaly in our democratic system." This conclusion, however, comes as somewhat of a surprise since there is little in the preceding pages to suggest that the author is concerned about such matters.

*Courts and Rights* is written in a felicitous and readable style which some may find entertaining. Yet certain deficiencies may be mentioned. Viewed as a book for the specialist, there is nothing new here—fact or interpretation. Indeed, the initiated will probably be irritated by the oversimplifications, the clichés, and the "cute" asides which mar this work. Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, even in 1866, are not best described as "rebels and traitors" who "were fortunate to escape with their heads intact." The President and the Congress did not unite "to lock 75,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry in concentration camps for possessing enemy chromosomes." Professor Roche's penchant for clever and immoderate comment only serves to dilute the informative and thought-provoking functions that a work such as this might have.

Viewed as supplementary or textual material for undergraduate students, the book may be compared to previous studies in this series dealing with the same or similar subject matter. *Courts and Rights* is a cut below Victor Rosenblum's *Law as a Political Instrument* and Jack Peltason's *Federal Courts in the Political Process* in carefulness of statement, systematic coverage of relevant subject matter, and organization. Professor Roche's loose use of language has been noted. Since he does not identify his frame of reference or tell us why he has written his book, it is not clear why some materials are included and others left out; nor why some topics are discussed in depth and others ignored or given cursory consideration.

The author's treatment of the topics he chooses to discuss is not always adequate. In discussing "clear and present danger" Professor Roche is seemingly oblivious to the extent to which that concept has been undermined in recent years. His tendency to downgrade the libertarian heritage of the common law runs counter to the posture taken by J. A. C. Grant in *Our Common Law Constitution*—a book Professor Roche does not cite. The intentions behind the federal Bill of Rights, often a subject of controversy, present no problem for the author of *Courts and Rights*. Since civil liberties in the colonies meant noninterference in the American *status quo*, the Bill of

Rights merely reflected concern "for the federal principle and not any abstract American dedication to freedom of the press, a fair trial, or humane and usual punishment." The major contributors to the development of constitutional liberty in the United States, according to the author were not the founders of the republic but the abolitionists. The extent to which state constitutions paralleled the wording of the federal Bill of Rights, however, would seem to testify to a different concern. And the alien and sedition acts were, after all, of little consequence after 1801.

In sum, *Courts and Rights* is a nonsystematic and narrow treatment of an important subject matter area.—S. SYDNEY ULMER, *Michigan State University*.

*The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.* By DAVID N. FARNSWORTH. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. Pp. vi, 189. \$4.00, cloth. \$3.00, paper.)

*The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations* is a useful study of an interesting and important element in foreign policy decision-making. Based on what appears to be a rather thorough review of the Committee's published hearings from the 80th through the 84th Congresses, 1947-1956, and using for background the standard works on Congress and foreign policy, Farnsworth's book has the merits of being adequately researched, carefully organized, and clearly written. The author himself is well aware of the limitations of published hearings as a source of research material. Such readers as have had direct contacts with members of the Committee and its staff may note omissions and small factual errors, but the book was well worth writing and publishing. It will contribute to further public understanding of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. If it will not be considered the definitive book on the Committee, it still deserves serious attention. So far as I know, there is no other current book on this topic, and an up-to-date analysis of the Committee was long over-due.

After a brief introduction, justifying the importance to decision-making of Congressional committees in general and the Foreign Relations Committee in particular, the author sets the limits of his study. A chapter on Committee membership, procedure, and staff serves primarily as background for a chapter-by-chapter analysis of the major types of hearings conducted: nominations; treaties; foreign aid; and investigations, debates, and the St. Lawrence Seaway. Some attention is given to the anti-internationalist—internationalist voting records of Committee members in the Senate, to whether the Committee is "representative" of the Senate on foreign policy questions, and to the impact of fluctuating de-

grees of bipartisanship upon the Committee's influence in the Senate. A final chapter, which draws general conclusions, is brief, somewhat provocative, but may offer useful insights.

Farnsworth notes a "unity of purpose among administrative witnesses" before the Committee and believes that during hearings "witnesses from the administration have a shared interest with the Committee." He is not alone in drawing the conclusion from a reading of the public hearings that such hearings are often held to justify the Committee's own position and that of the executive branch, that the procedures of the hearings minimize the effectiveness of any opposition. As he says, "... if an interest is to be effective, i.e., affect the basic objectives of the legislation, access to the Committee must be established before public hearings are held, not during the hearings."

Farnsworth implies that such hearings are rarely a critical decision-making procedure, but are more often declaratory of decisions already taken. Thus, their importance and purpose is largely to attract and justify support from the Senate as a whole and from the House (and in lesser degree from the attentive and mass publics), to identify the degree of opposition so that steps may be taken to overcome it, and to serve as an escape valve to release opposition tensions.

If this thesis is correct, and some knowledgeable sources will deny that it is, the elite publics have already been consulted or ignored by the executive branch and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee long before the Committee holds public hearings. It has been charged in years past that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sometimes paid little attention to his own planners and policy-makers in the Department of State. It has been observed by others that President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave low priority to consultation with members of the academic community. True, at the present time, the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State is in a stage of energetic revival, and policy-oriented research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research poses alternatives to present policies and even to policies recommended by task forces; but, this has not always been so. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognized this fact when it took steps in 1958 which led to the series of 13 contract studies on *United States Foreign Policy* by private research groups during 1959. At best, this was a stop-gap measure, with research sometimes hastily done.

In the State Department's Office of Personnel, a small, reflective Personnel Policy Council, set somewhat apart from daily operations, gives promise of providing sustained long range con-

sideration to emerging personnel problems confronting State and other foreign affairs agencies. It gathers ideas from a wide variety of sources. In a rapidly changing world environment, is it not imperative that other such devices for ensuring regular executive and/or legislative consultation with Gabriel Almond's so-called elite publics be built-in to the overall government machinery of policy-making?

President John F. Kennedy has stimulated government consultation with the elite publics. He has energized the machinery of policy-making, eliminating the National Security Council Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board, in a sense elevating the role of the Department of State, while mobilizing on an *ad hoc* basis a veritable mushroom patch of groups, working groups, inter-agency committees, and task forces, utilizing both governmental and non-governmental personnel. But, is it not now time to regularize the emerging behavioral patterns of the Kennedy Administration? In the complex and competitive arena of policy-making for national security, where domestic and foreign policy issues are hopelessly intertwined, a creative restoration of order will assure proper coordination of efforts by the President and his chief advisers—not the least of which is the Secretary of State.—ROBERT E. ELDER, *Colgate University*.

*Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime.*

By NATHAN D. GRUNDSTEIN. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1961. Pp. 106. \$1.60 paper.)

Professor Nathan D. Grundstein, of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Pittsburgh, has rendered a service to the profession by reprinting his monograph, *Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime*. These three essays first appeared in the *George Washington Law Review* in 1947 and 1948. The first covers the experience during World War I, and the other two are devoted to World War II.

Professor Grundstein utilizes a common pattern to discuss the comparative experiences of both wars, under the headings "The President's Power to Subdelegate," "Form and Precision of the Sub-delegation," "Presidential Control of the Hierarchy," "Sub-Subdelegation of Administrative Authority" (both the horizontal and vertical distribution of power), and "Top Administrative Co-ordination." The end of the essay dealing with World War II also includes a discussion of "The Power of an Officer to Redelagate His Authority to the Officers of Another Agency."

The major lesson to be drawn from this descriptive analysis is that the President, during wartime, will delegate authority to agencies and

subordinates whenever it is convenient for him to do so in order successfully to prosecute the war. Congress, if it takes action at all on this question, will authorize such a delegation, oftentimes retroactively. When an administrative order or regulation is challenged in the courts, alleging an improper delegation of presidential authority, the plaintiff will lose his case.

In both wars, "wartime administration revolved about the President and it exhibited the triple characteristics of a maximum of executive discretion with respect to administration, legislative concentration of administrative authority in the Chief Executive, and Presidential subdelegation of administrative authority to a multitude of subordinate officials and agencies. . . . Essentially the differences in administration in the two wars spring from the practically unfettered choice of means possessed by the President in wartime," although some differences can be attributed to other factors, such as "the partnership between the executive and legislature" in World War II, the "amazing growth of the profession of public administration and the pervasive influence of the trained administrator," and the precedents left by President Wilson. Two fundamental problems during World War II, both unresolved at the end of the war, were (a) "the need for clarifying principles regarding the locus of determinative administrative power and discretion, both as between agencies and within an agency," and (b) "systematizing the exercise of administrative power, especially by subordinate officials."

While it is useful to have these essays available in this convenient form, and while the reprinting of them is a tribute to Professor Grundstein, it is unfortunate that no attempt was made to bring the discussion up to date. Two areas where this might have been done are the experiences during the Korean War and, with respect to national defense, the precedents for and the practices of the current neither-war-nor-peace situation. This reviewer would have liked to have seen Professor Grundstein extend his study to an examination of the delegation of Presidential authority during peace that grew out of the precedents established during war—but this may well be another book in itself. It would have been most helpful to have added both a general conclusion and an index, in the light of the scores of statutes, executive orders, court decisions, and personalities covered in the text.—FELIX RACKOW, *Western Reserve University*.

*Outlawing The Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement 1865-1883.* By ARN HOOGENBOOM. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 306. \$6.50.)

In the post-Civil War decades civil service re-

form was a decisive factor in American politics. It shaped party strategy, won and lost elections, made and broke presidents. It claimed the social and intellectual leaders of the time, men like Henry Adams, Carl Schurz, George William Curtis, E. L. Godkin, and Henry Villard. And the final success of the movement created major problems of political organization and administrative responsibility which remain unsolved.

Professor Hoogenboom has made a detailed, carefully documented, study of the civil service reform movement from 1865 to 1883. Beginning with the first proposals of Sumner and Jenckes, he traces the reform movement through the Grant and Hayes administrations, the formation of the National Civil Service Reform League, the assassination of Garfield, and the passage of the Pendleton Act. In so doing he casts new light on such complex and difficult questions as the relations of civil service reform to Radical Reconstruction, the failure of reform during the Grant administration, the virtual collapse of the reform movement after the election of 1872, the Hayes-Conkling fight for control of the New York Customhouse, and the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Pendleton Act.

Professor Hoogenboom also seeks to develop a "theory of reform." He sees the civil service reform movement primarily as a struggle of the "outs" against the "ins." Most of the reformers were professional men, editors and businessmen with commercial and financial interests. The typical reformer came from a well established New England family. He inherited wealth and deplored the materialism of the new industrial rich whose prominence, based on still greater wealth, surpassed his own. He was typically an Episcopalian or a Unitarian and a Harvard graduate.

These reformers were the "best people" of America and many of them had joined the Republican party during the antislavery crusade and held positions of power and authority in the Lincoln administration. During the post-Civil War years they were forced out of public life; they saw their political aspirations frustrated first by Johnson and then by Grant. "Blaming the professional politician for their political impotence, reformers struck at his source of strength, the spoils system. As a weapon they used civil service reform, which would convert the public service from partisanship to political neutrality."

Hoogenboom's "outs" versus "ins" theory is a provocative one, but it raises certain questions. For one thing it does not very well explain why the civil service reform movement began when it did and ended when it did. The "best people" had after all been "outs" since the time of Jackson and were still "outs" when the reform movement declined. Then too, it may be that Hoogenboom

in his emphasis on "outs" and "ins" minimizes the importance of ethical considerations. It is doubtless true that the reformers were motivated at least in part by political self interest. But it is also true, as others have argued, that the reformers were outraged by the gross corruption of the spoils system and sought on moral grounds to purify the body politic. One final comment of a different order. Hoogenboom assumes the validity and desirability of civil service reform; yet, while many criticisms of reform were obviously based on partisan considerations, some of them were nonetheless valid. Civil service reform and the merit system have created serious problems of political organization and administrative responsibility and these problems were clearly anticipated in the early debates. But these brief comments aside, we are indebted to Professor Hoogenboom for extending our understanding of the civil service reform movement and its relation to the political, social, and intellectual events of the time.—ROBERT J. MCNEILL, *Purdue University*.

*United States Fiscal Policy 1945-1959.* By A. E. HOLMANS. (New York. Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv, 342. \$6.40.)

At the close of World War II, there was general concern over the ability of the United States to avoid serious economic depression. The Employment Act of 1946 was enacted to provide a policy to avert such a catastrophe. Dr. A. E. Holmans of the University of Glasgow in *United States Fiscal Policy, 1945-1959* assesses the effectiveness of U. S. fiscal policy as a stabilizing device. His conclusions are mixed, that the United States has "lucked out" of each post-war recession, but with the help of capable management, that countercyclical fiscal policy has in fact become a part of the American consensus by 1960.

His analysis makes clear that fiscal policy is formulated in the context of broader political ideologies. For example, in the first post-war congresses, tax policy was heavily influenced by the fact that a primary objective of conservatives was to return to a *status quo ante* Roosevelt, rather than to pursue goals of economic stability. Republicans and conservatives generally shy away from the use of compensatory fiscal policy because of their preferences for private rather than public solutions. Even today the conventional wisdom of the balanced budget is important in fiscal policy formulation.

Dr. Holmans raises well stated reasons for mild pessimism about the willingness and ability to use compensatory public finance effectively. However, by focusing on fiscal policy he tends to understate the importance of the weapons in the credit and monetary fields. The study and experience has been with minor recessions and moderate

war-caused inflation, while the more serious concern is over a major depression. It is not clear that the institutional and ideological barriers to the subtle uses of fiscal policy in minor disturbances would also hold in the case of a depression. The additional strictures placed upon economic policy makers by the United States' international trade balances and the gold flow became prominent after this study was made and have received little discussion in it.

Throughout United States history economic policy has been a vehicle for fundamental political controversies. This book is a study of economic policy in terms of its political context. Moreover, the author raises, but does not explore, political and institutional problems arising in the use of compensatory fiscal policy. He points to difficulties of the separation of powers and the organization of Congress which make prompt action in compensatory fiscal policy difficult. He describes, for example, the failure of the device of an omnibus appropriation bill. On another subject, it is noted that state and local governments, which account for over one third of government spending, are largely beyond the reach of a federal fiscal policy.

The accounts of debate on tax bills and budgets make clear that there is much claptrap about economics in Congress. Some of the quotations must seem embarrassing in retrospect to Republicans and Democrats alike. There is a great deal of detail in the author's discussion of revenue and appropriations bills which seem to move by in unending succession. Perhaps the emphasis on detail is in part due to the origin of this study in a dissertation. As a European, Dr. Holmans provides considerable insight into United States economic policy and politics with a minimum of the difficulty that an outsider might expect to have over nuances of meaning.—ORVILLE F. POLAND, *University of California* (Berkeley).

*Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail.* By JAMES C. N. PAUL AND MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. 368. \$7.50.)

In the *Areopagitica* Milton warns of censorship which will bring about the suppression of "a flowery crop of knowledge" and consequent famine of the mind. The noxiousness of the crop and the permissible content of the literary diet of Americans has received the attention of many zealous citizens and not a few governmental officials. Until the publication of this study by Professors Paul and Schwartz, however, a systematic study of the powers of the Federal government in this area of civil liberties was lacking. The authors trace the growth of one aspect of civil guardian-

ship over popular taste and morality, the suppression of "obscene" publications by postal and customs interdiction. The authors conclude that the amount of pornographic material distributed in this country is rapidly increasing; furthermore, because of this pressure and changing standards, the law of obscenity, both as administered by the Federal government and promulgated by the courts, is in a state of flux. For these reasons alone, the publication of this excellent survey is timely.

The major emphasis of the study concerns current practices of the Post Office and Customs Bureau and recent decisions of the Supreme Court (including *Roth*, *Buller*, *Alberts*) and significant lower court decisions. There is a detailed analysis of Federal legislation, the rise and fall of "the most obscene man" test of *Queen v. Hicklin* together with a deservedly acid indictment of the legislative and administrative history of the Comstock Act and adequate illustrations of the misuse of discretion by the Federal executive. While the authors give ample evidence of the literary ignorance of the censors they do not fail to recognize the need for some official net to catch the commercial purveyors of pornography. Their willingness to face up to this difficult task constructively is as convincing as their indictment of the superficiality of the "community conscience" test of *Roth v. United States*.

The preferences for changes in the law, and the administration of the law evolve from the wealth of data the authors have gathered. Their arguments are adequately supported by the facts. Having assumed that blatant pornography does not deserve the protection of society, they appear to favor evolution toward the test foreshadowed in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in the *Roth* case, that is, that "the conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture." Irresponsible commercial exploitation of certain materials is taken to be a form of anti-social conduct and must be proscribed. In other words, where obscenity, not a book, is sold, the government should be authorized to step in. Ultimately, the authors favor an end to censorship by the Federal administrative branch. Short of this utopian reform, however, they propose the modification of the government's power to revoke the second class mailing privilege, and an end to the arbitrary use of the mail-block sanction. Above all, they emphasize that criminal and civil procedures in a court of law should supersede the unchecked imposition of bureaucratic literary taste. The standards of administrative censorship, in sum, should conform to judicial standards. The Post Office may be permitted the power to investigate and screen materials but it should be enabled to apply further sanctions only when it has proved its case in court.

This volume more than adequately fills a need for a comprehensive study of a complex problem. It is readable, well documented, and the result of careful evaluation of written sources and interview material. There is an exhaustive and definitive bibliography. It is to be hoped that postal and customs officials will be able to include it in their scheduled list of readings.—RICHARD P. LONGAKER, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

*The Structure of American Federalism.* By M. J. C. VILE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 206. \$4.00.)

This book examines the working of American federalism. "Structure" in the title is used to mean the interrelation of parts as dominated by the character of the whole. A re-appraisal is justified on the grounds that no current study is available which sets out to present the American federal structure as a single system of government, combining both constitutional and political elements. Vile's aim is to produce an integrated picture; he is dissatisfied with the textbook practice of treating separately the federal and state systems. Finding other definitions of federalism too restrictive, the author comes up with his own. A new definition is required in order to cover both the early period of dual federalism and the modern era of co-operative federalism. Although he writes almost entirely on the American experience, Vile proclaims a universal definition of federalism. It is a 150-word definition, so loose that even the author admits it cannot serve as an infallible test to differentiate federal and unitary states!

At best we may say that Vile has traversed well-trod territory and synthesized a great amount of material. The book is obviously designed for British or other non-American readers who are not too familiar with U. S. government and politics. Political scientists in the United States will not find much that is new.

Vile's presentation portrays the combination of independence and interdependence as the hallmark of the federal state; mutual respect, compromise, and co-operation characterize American federalism. Early in the book he claims to have a thesis: namely, conflicts between and among the Supreme Court, Congress, and the States rarely become serious because political integration and the mechanisms within the system quickly operate to resolve such conflicts, and, further, that on the very rare occasions when such conflicts do become serious the system operates to provide delay and discussion at the end of which a compromise solution emerges. This is a good workaday generalization. However, it overlooks the Civil War and will not be acceptable to those Americans who have deep feelings of urgency, seriousness, or principle on persistent public

problems.—DAVID G. FARRELLY, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

*The Government of Kansas.* By JAMES W. DRURY AND ASSOCIATES. (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 1961. Pp. 393. \$7.50.)

The title of this book is to be taken literally: this is almost exclusively a study of the *government* of Kansas and not of its politics. For this reason it should prove most useful to those in the state who are interested mainly in the formal and institutional aspects of Kansas government. There is a short introductory chapter on the state and its people and another on the state constitution. Only two of the twenty-six chapters are devoted specifically to local government, but another deals with intergovernmental relations and many of the rest treat various other problems confronted by the cities, townships, and counties. At the state level two chapters are devoted to the legislature, another to the governor, and a fourth to the court system. Most of the rest are concerned with various aspects of public administration—administrative organization, financial administration, the revenue system, personnel administration, law enforcement and correction, highways and the regulation of motor vehicles, and the regulation and protection of labor, business, and the licensed professions. Public education, health, and welfare are taken up in separate chapters, and so are agriculture, conservation of natural resources, and state planning. In the thoroughness with which it deals with each of these subjects, the book could hardly be improved upon. It is also notable for the candor with which it discusses the defects as well as the virtues of Kansas government. There is practically none of the puff and boosterism which sometimes characterize studies of this kind particularly when they are undertaken, as in this case, by an agency of the state.

For all of its merits as a textbook and reference tool, the book is not as useful to those interested in the study of comparative state government as its authors had intended. Institutionally, the whole of Kansas government is laid out, carefully and judiciously, for the reader to examine, but unless he is already familiar with state and local government generally, he is not likely to appreciate how typical or atypical the government of Kansas may be. Of the three coordinate branches, only the court system is related to that in other states: it is characterized as following a "pattern familiar to many American states"—"a hierarchy of tribunals, a proliferation of local courts established to make justice widely available, and the popular election of judges." No attempt was made to compare Kansas with other states as to the size and composition of the legislature, the extent to which the governor must share control over the

administrative branch with other independently elected officials, and the vigor (or rather the lack thereof) of the two-party competition. For the most part it is only when some feature is unique to Kansas government—or nearly so—that reference is made to the practice in other states. It is pointed out, for example, that the state printer is popularly elected in only one other state (Nevada), that the governor must seek the advice of a “legislatively oriented” Finance Council in the preparation of the “executive” budget, and that the State Board of Agriculture which administers the laws regulating and assisting the farmer is “elected by and responsible to various private farm organizations in the state rather than to the governor or the general electorate.” But this, perhaps, is to criticize the authors for a book they did not write. For the first-rate study which they did write, James W. Drury and his colleagues have placed the people of Kansas greatly in their debt.—ROBERT B. DISHMAN, *University of New Hampshire*.

*Texas: Its Government and Politics.* BY WILBOURN E. BENTON. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp. ix, 662. \$5.95.)

Texans apparently not only like to think “big” but also tend to think “double.” Texas has a dual system of nominations for public office since it uses not only a system of nominating conventions but also a primary system. In addition, it has a dual budget system using both an executive budget and a legislative budget. This duality extends also to the highest court of Texas where we find a Supreme Court which handles only civil cases and the Court of Criminal Appeals which is the highest appellate court for criminal cases. These points, and others of equal interest, are presented in *Texas: Its Government and Politics* by Wilbourn E. Benton who is an Associate Professor of Government at Texas A. and M. College.

Professor Benton’s book is somewhat hard to assess as a scholarly contribution since neither the preface nor the jacket material gives the reader any clue as to the purpose of the book. Consequently, the reviewer must set his own frame of reference. Apparently, the book is designed as a college level text. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legislature has provided that a study of the state’s government is compulsory in Texas colleges and it may be assumed that the book is designed primarily for this market.

Judged as a text the book has considerable merit although it does not quite live up to its subtitle. While there is a thorough description and considerable analysis of Texas “government,” there are some significant gaps in the analysis of what many students would consider Texas “politics.” For example, there is no discussion of

Texas presidential politics, no analysis of gubernatorial politics nor any comment on the significant developments in the last several years in congressional politics in the Lone Star State.

On the other hand, there is a very good section on “The Politics of Legislation.” In addition, this aspect of Texas politics is implicit in the discussion of the many substantive problems of government such as management-labor relations or the control of oil production. The study does not fall heir to the criticism most often made of textbooks that the work is “entirely descriptive.” On the whole, the writer must be commended for a thorough presentation that shows evidence of a broad understanding of the Texas governmental machinery and major state programs.—COLEMAN B. RANSOME, JR., *University of Alabama*.

*Decisions in Syracuse.* BY ROSCOE C. MARTIN, FRANK J. MUNGER AND OTHERS. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi, 368. \$6.95.)

Not too many years ago one critic deplored “the lost world of local government.” That world has been “rediscovered” with a vengeance since then as political scientists, sociologists and economists have increasingly directed research on the community. Analyses of community power structures, community decision-making patterns, and the social, economic and governmental problems of metropolitan growth have tended to replace the purely institutional and legal studies that once claimed scholarly attention. The growing literature flowing from local and community research has taken several forms. There have been fairly discrete case studies of local decisions. Community power structures and community leadership have increasingly drawn research interest. Intergovernmental cooperation and conflict have provided the raw materials for numerous studies, particularly within the conceptual scheme of metropolitan as distinguished from purely municipal action. Local and regional economic development has found growing favor as the object of inquiry. Seldom, however, have these closely related themes been woven into a single study. This is what Professors Martin and Munger and their collaborators have successfully attempted in *Decisions in Syracuse*.

Much of the research directed at defining, understanding and explaining the processes of community power and decision-making has left the impression of decisive, purposeful, if not monolithic action. The twenty-two case studies contained in this volume, however, constitute a persuasive rebuttal, at least so far as the Syracuse-Onondaga County area of New York State is concerned. The issues examined in these cases affected, at one time or another, most of the



people often suspected of possessing and exercising final authority in community decisions. Seldom, however, did such people appear to wield that power.

What does emerge from these studies is a complex mosaic of decision-making. The industrial, economic and professional leadership of the area rarely initiated action calling for decision and when it did, the one cohesive agent that could, on occasion, carry through was the dominant Republican political organization and not the "hidden men of power" behind the scenes. Throughout these cases, only two men were able to make or force major governmental decisions for the area; each was chairman of the county Republican organization. In many instances the prime instigators of events leading to decisions were either agents external to the area—state government and irresistible social and economic trends—or professional government officials responding to such external pressures. In other cases, decisions were the product not of purposeful human inspiration but rather of "inadvertence" or the natural sequence of earlier decisions.

In general, it is more accurate to refer to clusters of power wielders who were activated to influence decisions that affected them but who remained largely inert when their interests were not directly at issue. The cases support the conclusion that there perhaps are "as many decision centers as there are important decision areas." Further, the authors conclude that community power is not a personal possession but a process. It is more appropriate to consider power as a process having "value and substance only as it is used for something. . . . Community power is a network of action, not a locus of residence."

Equally arresting about these studies is the light shed upon metropolitan action and intergovernmental relations. Despite the growing urbanization of the study area, conflict between the central city of Syracuse and its periphery tended to become more intense. In part this followed the relative disintegration of cohesion within the Republican county organization, although even today major area-wide decisions are reached, postponed or neglected through the agency of the party structure. Ironically, while it has become increasingly difficult to obtain agreement between Syracuse and the rest of the county on regional programs and services, the county has emerged as the most likely center of metropolitan action. The County Board of Supervisors, responsive to the towns rather than to the city, highly sensitive to non-urban values in a highly urban setting, views with growing suspicion efforts aimed at formal intergovernmental cooperation and governmental reform at the county level.

It is impossible to distill the rich detail, the

lucid analysis and insight that flow through this tightly organized, well-written volume. It is much more than a "casebook" in community power or metropolitan decision-making. Its cases, ranging from attempts to provide area-wide sewage and water services to the development of the Syracuse Industrial Park, and the excellent analytical chapters, are directed at the central theme of understanding "the structure and exercise of community power in a metropolitan context." This is the first in a series of Metropolitan Action Studies; we can look forward hopefully to its companion works and suggest that other research efforts consider seriously the direction taken by this series.—WILLIAM R. MONAT, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

*The Man in the Middle—The Inside Story of the Hot and Cold Wars Between Labor and Management.* BY NATHAN W. SHEFFERMAN, WITH DALE KRAMER. (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961. Pp. xi, 292. \$4.50.)

In this volume, the author purports to bring "the whole conflict between labor and management into focus." While inevitably a portion of the American labor relations scene is brought into some sort of focus here, the resulting picture is neither complete nor clear. But failing this overly ambitious, self-assigned goal, the book does serve other purposes.

Nathan W. Shefferman is an experienced and knowledgeable, but less than objective, observer. For, though he was in the midst of labor-management strife for several decades, seldom was he, as the book title would suggest, in the middle between management and labor. Always (save for a stint with the National Labor Board in 1934-35) he was working with or for management: as efficiency expert, personnel consultant, employee relations specialist, and, finally, as director of one of the largest labor relations firms in the Nation. At the time the McClellan ("Senate Labor-Management Rackets") Committee was established, Shefferman's organization, Labor Relations Associates, was doing a million-dollar-a-year business with hundreds of employers, large and small.

After seven months of investigations and hearings by the McClellan Committee in 1957, Shefferman was a TV "bad guy," his business was ruined, and his reputation and health seriously damaged. "Shefferman tactics" became a new term in the American lexicon, referring to such operations by management labor relations consultants as union countering activities, covert side deals with labor leaders, "soft" working agreements selling out the rank and file workers, and questionable gratuitous services. In *The Enemy Within*, Robert Kennedy credits Shefferman's testimony with unlocking for the Committee

Dave Beck's "empire of crookedness," and in Kennedy's book references to Shefferman's activities rival those of Beck or Hoffa.

Considering these disastrous personal developments for Shefferman, a surprisingly small amount of space in the present volume (pp. 205-221) is spent by him in discussing his relations with the Committee. But this brief statement raises serious questions concerning procedures of that Committee. If remedial legislation were to result from the series of Committee hearings on management consultants, then it can be argued that less than a broad sample was taken when the investigation was restricted to Shefferman and his firm, while thousands of labor-management consultants and other thousands of specialized labor-relations lawyers serving employers in similar fashion existed unexplored. The leaking and printing in full of a list of Shefferman's clients, past and present, resulted in extensive "guilt-by-association" repercussions. Robert Kennedy's assertion that any Committee witness was permitted to make a detailed statement answering charges made against him is countered by Shefferman's assertion that rarely was such a statement read in open hearing, but instead usually went to the inert files. Moreover, civil libertarians should be (and, historically, were) offended by the telecasting and broadcasting, coast to coast, of the grand-jury-like testimony of unproved charges without opportunity for reply or cross-examination.

Although Shefferman was usually in the pay of employers, by far the greater proportion of his book deals with labor leaders, unions, and union activities. In a personal, breezy style that reads easily, he traces the history of the Teamsters Union from Daniel Tobin through Dave Beck to James Hoffa. Shefferman tells how unions are organized and (with more enthusiasm and first-hand knowledge) how unions are disorganized. He gives a running glossary of union slang and reviews a rogues gallery of minor labor hoodlums bearing hilarious nicknames. He presents a brief history of organized labor in America from 1827 to date, complete with a thumbnail biography of Gompers, Lewis, Green, Tobin, Woll, Hutcheson, Murray, Hillman, Dubinsky, Meany, and Reuther. The concluding chapters include decided, but less than novel or profound, observations concerning the Landrum-Griffin Act, automation, and the unionizing of white-collar and Negro workers.—C. EDWIN GILMOUR, *Grinnell College*.

*Religion, Government, and Education*. EDITED BY WILLIAM W. BRICKMAN AND STANLEY LEHRER. (New York: Society for the Advancement of Education, 1961. Pp. 292. \$5.25.)

Whenever a political issue pokes its way into public attention, there follows inevitably the

symposium designed to enlighten the general debate. Such is the intent of *Religion, Government, and Education*, edited by William W. Brickman and Stanley Lehrer, both editors of the magazine, *School and Society*. The book contains ten original essays by nine different authors, all of them primarily educators, except for one political scientist. The diversity in the format is somewhat misleading since more than sixty percent of the book is written by Mr. Brickman.

Despite the comprehensive title, the focal point of the book is the current debate over public support of religious schools. The essays, which represent, in a vague way, "mainline" Protestant, Lutheran, Catholic, Jewish and humanistic thought on the issue, are very uneven in their contributions. One of the essays "Public Function of the Lutheran School" by William Kramer, Secretary of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, unwittingly gives a false impression of that denomination's position. Lutherans have flatly rejected the public service argument or any other argument for public support of their schools. The only case study in the book is a description by William W. Boyer of inter-faith tension over a baccalaureate ceremony in a rural Wisconsin high school. The study is a striking vignette of a religious minority (Catholic) perceiving and using the symbols of a separation of church and state in order to preserve its independence. In similar circumstances in New England, these same rhetorical defenses are being used against a Catholic majority. Although the essays add some new facts and interpretative materials, the major positions on the issue are best stated in reprints of official statements of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and Civil Liberties organizations in the appendix. A chronological outline of American church and state relations in education also in the appendix is helpful.

The major defect in the book is that some of the educators, particularly Mr. Brickman, attempt to deal with the complex legal and political questions of the school issue in a superficial way. This factor together with the tendency toward polemicism of many who write on this religious issue make for some bizarre interpretations of law and history. For example, Brickman, an ardent supporter of public aid for parochial schools, finds that parochial schools are an establishment of religion (apparently in the way that a business is called an establishment) and that the First Amendment prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of religion" should be read as barring the states from requiring parochial schools to obey fire regulations and curriculum requirements. Brickman thinks that if the state has the right to make these minimum regulations it is then legally obligated to support parochial schools. Arguments like this do little to clarify the

complex legal problems surrounding the issue.

In the second half of the book, Brickman takes the reader on a world tour of church-state educational relations. Potentially a valuable undertaking, this section suffers from the same defects mentioned above. The author is so determined to prove "that governmental bodies should give support to religious schools" that his use of resources is selectively one-sided. Although the new educational law of May 1959 aiding religious education in Belgium caused weeks of rioting and still is a divisive issue, Brickman finds that the Belgian situation "is illustrative of how a consensus may alleviate a serious question in a country devoted to the doctrines of democracy." Passing over the generations of strife in French politics over the church-state educational question, Brickman concludes, "It is possible to observe that the French people as a whole do not take a doctrinaire, rigid and one-sided view of private (parochial) education. . . ." Since the Netherlands decided to support sectarian schools in 1921, public schools have decreased from 56% of the total to 32%. The only Dutch opinion Brickman quotes is that of an educator who regards this system as "a consequence of democracy." In a country considered to be one of the most religiously divided in Europe, with one Catholic and two Protestant parties, there are surely some who would disagree with that evaluation. There is much to be gained by looking at the compromises on church schools worked out by other countries, and Brickman's study contains many useful references and facts. However, without examining the political costs involved, uncritical acceptance of endorsements of church-state relations by members of the standing order is a dangerous method of policy formation. The American tradition on church and state and our diverse religious population are almost unique in the world.

Most political scientists, unless they have special interest in church-state educational problems, will find little to interest them in *Religion, Government and Education*. The significant work in case studies or in comparative law and administration on church and state questions has only just begun.—GEORGE R. LANOUE, *Yale University*.

*Conscience in Politics: Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1950's*. By STUART GERRY BROWN. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961. Pp. xi, 313. \$4.50.)

This book is considerably more than a partisan tract friendly to Adlai Stevenson, although it is much less than the full treatment of the Eisenhower administration and its critics which our times call for.

Mr. Brown has chosen to deal less with the events of the period from 1952 to 1960 than with

the statements which Stevenson and President Eisenhower made about them at the time. The form is that of a debate, an exciting dialogue which deals in turn with issues ranging from McCarthyism to desegregation to a whole range of foreign affairs problems from Korea to Quemoy and the U-2 incident.

The method itself is somewhat unfair to Eisenhower; an old and cruel Democratic jest was that he would never have won a television debate with Stevenson because of "the language barrier." The effect of parallel quotations from the two men, which is heightened by Brown's low-key presentation, is rather devastating to the General. A comparison of this book with, for example, Sherman Adams' recent memoirs indicates that if Eisenhower is to be judged favorably by history it will have to be on the basis of his actions, not his public statements.

Certainly the record of President Eisenhower's statements about Senator McCarthy, especially in regard to the latter's attacks on General Marshall, is hardly flattering; Adams would suggest that the President should be judged rather on the soundness of his efforts to blur over a major ideological conflict in American life rather than to sharpen it. Similarly, one's opinion of the Eisenhower civil rights record will have to be based on whether one feels that his degree of caution in both word and deed was wiser during those years than the position of strong moral and political intervention which Stevenson urged.

Brown's book, granted its limitations as a "debate" between a man who loved the written and spoken word and another who preferred to move in quite different ways to achieve his ends, is nevertheless a fascinating history of the period. It may be of special value in meeting that perennial need of the political science teacher—background information for undergraduates who were only seven or eight years old in 1952.

The book has certain other limitations. Brown appears to assume too easily, it seems to this writer, the degree of Stevenson's actual influence in affecting a good many policy changes in the nineteen-fifties. It is doubtful, for example—in the light of available electoral data and polling returns, which Brown does not make use of—whether Stevenson "led his party back to power" in Congress in 1954 as a result of his stands on McCarthyism or other issues. It might also be questioned how much his personal influence affected the 1957 civil rights bill or some of the debates over foreign policy of the period. In the realm of ideas, however, Brown makes a strong case that Stevenson's views, even in the short run of those eight years, were closer by far than Eisenhower's to the direction that the United States would take.

Brown does not deal very extensively with the

long-debated question of whether Adlai E. Stevenson was a "viable" politician in rough-and-tumble democratic politics. But he makes a most persuasive argument that Stevenson did indeed represent conscience in politics, an authentic personal vision in the complacency of the fifties, and that he left a permanent mark on the Democratic Party and the American people.—JOHN P. MALLAN, *Smith College*.

*The Robe and the Sword: The Methodist Church and the Rise of American Imperialism.* By KENNETH M. MACKENZIE. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. v, 128. \$3.25.)

A piece of ancient wisdom teaches that a book never should be judged by its cover. A gloss might be added to the effect that neither should it be judged by its foreword. The reader is promised, in the foreword, a study that is characterized by "a facile style of writing" and "a penetrating, critical power of analysis." The anticipations thereby raised, however, are not satisfied in the text. The handling of the subject is mechanical rather than "penetrating" and there are more accurate words than "facile" for writing that needs a stern editorial hand to enforce greater respect for the ordinary rules of grammar, sentence structure and syntax.

The essence of *The Cross and the Sword* can be distilled into a few sentences. Between 1865 and 1900 the interest of Methodists in foreign missions grew. This interest flowed into a larger concern about American imperialistic ventures in Asia, Oceania, and the Caribbean which the Methodist leadership generally supported and helped to make palatable to its constituency. These conclusions are not likely to provoke a quarrel since they are almost as commonplace as the way in which they are reached. Literal summaries of the opinions of Methodist spokesmen are strung together to produce conclusions about a particular denomination that correspond to those already held to be valid for the larger company of Protestants.

There are questions about imperialism, missions and American churches, however, which the book does not answer. In fact, it does not even ask them. Nowhere are Methodist thought and action examined in the context of the tensions and stresses in American society. To have fitted the jingoism of the church into its nineteenth century social setting would have suggested some tantalizing lines of investigation. Did the enthusiasm for missions and imperialism bear any relation to the erosion of Protestant orthodoxy, the growth of Catholicism, the advance of urbanization and the rise of new forms of association which competed with the church for the loyalties of Americans? Was foreign missionary activity a kind of compensation for the church's losses of influence and prestige at home? Did the championship of

imperialism enable the church to find support which it could no longer attract through its conventional message? Were the returns from mission work an antidote to a gnawing suspicion that what the church had to say was not relevant to the interests and needs of late 19th century America? Admittedly, these are not problems that are easily solved but they are very important ones. One puts down this book with the feeling that it ends where it should have begun. The subject of organized religion and foreign policy is a worthy one. It deserves, in any of its phases, more thorough study than it has received here.—RALPH E. MORROW, *Washington University (St. Louis)*.

*Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961. Pp. 1853. \$11.75.)

There are now some fifteen editions of the comprehensive biographical directory of the United States Congress, beginning with that of Charles Lanman in 1859. The present one prepared by Clifford P. Reynolds of the staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing follows closely the pattern set in the one of 1927 by Ansel Wold, long-time clerk of the Joint Committee, and continued in the one of 1949 prepared by James L. Harrison of the staff of the Joint Committee. The 10,400 odd biographies vary in length from the exceptional one of two lines to about two-thirds of a column of the large two-column pages. Emphasis is almost exclusively placed on the details of Congressional service, political and public career, and even includes wherever possible for those not still living, such a detail as the place of interment. The idiosyncrasy of the late Arkansas senator T. H. Caraway in limiting biographical details in the current *Official Congressional directory* to the laconic statement "Democrat, Jonesboro" has given way to a paragraph of 18 lines. For the details, according to the pattern which is nowhere explained, ceaseless effort seems to have been made to secure a reasonable minimum, even pursuing an early member to the Wabash country without being able to determine when and where he had died.

Family relationships are given only when linked to others in the work. No effort has been made to cover literary and other activity or to indicate special legislative or other Congressional service for which the member may have become known such as the Volstead Act and Cannon's *Precedents of the House of Representatives*. The *Biographical Directory* does include many who are not treated elsewhere in standard biographical sources, or whose Congressional service and political activity are not too clearly pinpointed in such sources.

In no other country of the world has there ap-

parently been such continuing effort to establish a minimum biographical record of the members of the national legislative body from the beginning. For those members of the American Congress for whom the minimum information desired has not been procurable, the venerable Senator Carl Hayden, chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing, states that "The Committee will be especially indebted to those sufficiently interested in furnishing additional information which would add to the value of future editions."—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress*.

*Select list of publications issued by Senate and House committees. Committee prints, staff studies, reports, and documents, 80th-86th Congresses (1947-60, inclusive). PREPARED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961. Pp. 427.)

Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the authorization for professional staff assistants to Congressional committees has inevitably been accompanied by the appearance of many reports, committee prints, staff studies, etc., of value to the various committees, but usually much too little known and often much too little circulated outside the committees. An effort has been made in the *Select list* (issued as a committee print) to indicate under the committees so far as possible, both Senate and House, the principal topics on which hearings have been held and on which staff studies, committee prints and other

reports have been made during the intervening 14 year period. Bibliographical record of such in the *Monthly catalog of United States government publications* tends to become obscured in the multitude of month by month listings. Some studies of interest issued in rather small printings seem to escape recording in the *Monthly catalog*. Not only does the *Select list* pinpoint areas of investigation, but helps in the location of special studies and in avoiding duplication of staff work. Although reference to the number of pages, parts, or volumes in each item is not indicated, the overall picture seems to be helpful for students of legislative work. Even the Bureau of the Budget has furnished a very useful nine-page list of selected reports and studies from the Executive Branch during the same period. There is a detailed index to the whole *Select list*.

The appearance of the volume reminds us of the inadequacy of such materials prior to the 80th Congress and of the need to rectify the situation. The nine-part *Checklist of hearings before congressional committees through the Sixty-seventh Congress*, by Harold O. Thomen, completed in 1958 and issued by the Library of Congress, made a very substantial contribution that should be followed up and amplified as a service to effective national legislation as well as to effective scholarship. The *Select list* points to the fact that both the legislator and the scholar need to keep in mind the requirement for an absolute minimum of bibliographical control over materials very difficult to keep under such control.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress*.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE  
*University of Maryland*

### ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

#### National Government

Clark, Joseph S. The Hesitant Senate. *Atlantic*. March, 1962.

Fiellen, Alan. The Functions of Informal Groups in Legislative Institutions. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1962.

Robertson, P. L. Cleveland's Constructive Use of the Pension Vetoes. *Mid-America*. January, 1962.

Steinbach, H. Burr. Scientists and Public Policy. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. March, 1962.

Williamson, Willard F., S. J. House Rules Committee: An Appraisal. *Social Order*. February, 1962.

#### State Government

Carley, David. Legal and Extra-Legal Powers of Wisconsin Governors in Legislative Relations—Part I. *Wisconsin Law Review*. January, 1962.

Constitutional Earmarking of State Tax Revenues. Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 1962.

David, Paul T., and Ralph Eisenberg. Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote: A Statistical Investigation of Long-Term Trends in State Legislative Representation. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia. 1961.

Davis, Claude J. West Virginia's State-Wide [Property] Reappraisal Program. Bureau for

Government Research, West Virginia University, and West Virginia Association of County Officials. December, 1961.

Derge, David R. The Lawyer in the Indiana General Assembly. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. February, 1962.

Faust, Martin L. Constitutional Convention in Missouri? *Business and Government Review, University of Missouri*. March-April, 1962.

Fisher, Glenn W. Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis. *National Tax Journal*. December, 1961.

Gardner, Wayland D. The Usefulness of Comparative Studies of State Tax Systems. *Ibid.*

Mann, Dean E. The Legislative Committee System in Arizona. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.

McAllister, Harry E. The Border Tax Problem in Washington. *National Tax Journal*. December, 1961.

Retail Sales and Individual Income Taxes in State Tax Structures. Tax Foundation. 1962.

Ross, William R. House of Delegates Apportionment in West Virginia. Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University. December, 1961.

Stevenson, William E. The Place of Purchasing in State Government. *State Government*. Winter, 1962.

#### Local Government

The American County Platform. *County Officer*. January, 1962.

Arbena, Joseph F. The 1962 Census of Governments. *Public Management*. March, 1962.

Burkhead, Jesse. Uniformity in Governmental Expenditures and Resources in a Metropolitan Area: Cuyahoga County. *National Tax Journal*. December, 1961.

California Land Use Controls. [Symposium.] *Hastings Law Journal*. February, 1962.

Carson, Robert J. Reclassification, Variances, and Special Exceptions in Maryland. *Maryland Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

Corson, John J. Better Personnel in Local Government. *Public Management*. February, 1962.

Crouch, Winston W. The California Way [in Metropolitan Government]. *National Civic Review*. March, 1962.

Current Problems in Municipal Law. [Symposium.] *University of Illinois Law Forum*. Fall, 1961.

Duggar, George S., ed. The New Renewal. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1961.

Esser, George H., Jr. Next Steps in Improving Local Government. *Public Management*. January, 1962.

Frye, Robert J., and John A. Dyer. The City Manager System in Alabama. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama. 1961.

Heikoff, Joseph M. The XYZ's of Community Planning. *Public Management*. March, 1962.

Kammerer, Gladys M. Is the Manager a Political Leader?—Yes. *Ibid.* February, 1962.

McDonald, James T. Municipal Finance in Kansas, 1948-1959. Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas. 1961.

Municipal Revenue Planning. [Symposium.] *Municipal Finance*. February, 1962.

Nolting, Orin F. A Code of Ethics for Municipal Government. *Public Management*. March, 1962.

Pope, H. G. Is the Manager a Political Leader?—No. *Ibid.* February, 1962.

Reed, Thomas H. A Call for Plain Talk [about Metropolitan Government]. *National Civic Review*. March, 1962.

Schmandt, Henry J. The Municipal Incorporation Trend, 1950-1960. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. November, 1961.

Shapiro, Harvey. Measuring Local Government Output: A Comment. *National Tax Journal*. December, 1961.

Texas Council-Manager Charters. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1961.

Urban Renewal Symposium. *Federal Bar Journal*. Summer, 1961.

Waldron, Ellis. Municipal Facilities and Services in Montana. Bureau of Government Research, University of Montana. 1961.

What Certified Public Accountants Can Contribute to County Government. *County Officer*. March, 1962.

Williams, Percy R. Pittsburgh's Pioneering in Scientific Taxation. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. January, 1962.

Wood, Robert C. There Are Many Roads [to Metropolitan Reform]. *National Civic Review*. March, 1962.

#### Intergovernmental Relations

Bane, Frank. Recommendations for Improving Intergovernmental Relations. *Public Management*. January, 1962.

Cook, James M. National-State Cooperation in Securities Regulation. *State Government*. Winter, 1962.

Developments in the Law—Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business. *Harvard Law Review*. March, 1962.

Federal-Aid Guide for Local Governments. *County Officer*. February, 1962.

Fier, Louis. A Note on Federal-State Fiscal Coordination. *National Tax Journal*. December, 1961.

Kneier, Charles M. City-State Conflict in the

Use of Municipal Police Power. *Kentucky Law Journal*. Winter, 1961-62.

Krasnowiecki, Jan Z., and James C. N. Paul. The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. December, 1961.

Manvel, Allen D. The States' Concern [with Metropolitan Area Problems]. *National Civic Review*. February, 1962.

Maxwell, James A. A New Proposal for Coordination of Death Taxation. *National Tax Journal*. December, 1961.

McNayr, Irving G. All Pulling Together [in Dade County, Florida]. *National Civic Review*. March, 1962.

Starner, Frances L. General Obligation Bond Financing by Local Governments: A Survey of State Controls. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1961.

#### Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Beth, Loren P. The Supreme Court and State Civil Liberties. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Bonfield, Arthur E. The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude. *Minnesota Law Review*. January, 1962.

The Distinction between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect on Judicial Assignment. *Columbia Law Review*. January, 1962.

Fitzgerald, David F., Patrick W. Lee, and Jay E. Ricks. The Sovereign's Immunity and Private Property: A Due Process Problem. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Winter, 1961.

French, John D. Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis. *Ibid.*

Goostree, Robert E. The Power of the President to Impound Appropriated Funds: With Special Reference to Grants-in-Aid to Segregated Activities. *American University Law Review*. January, 1962.

Gould, William B. The Right to Travel and National Security. *Washington University Law Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Gummere, Richard M. The Classical Ancestry of the United States Constitution. *American Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Kent, Robert B. Compulsory Disclosure and the First Amendment—The Scope of Judicial Review. *Boston University Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

Kranz, Harry. A 20th Century Emancipation Proclamation: Presidential Power Permits Withholding of Federal Funds from Segregated Institutions. *American University Law Review*. January, 1962.

Mendelson, Wallace. Jefferson on Judicial Re-

view: Consistency through Change. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Mr. Justice Brennan. [Symposium.] *Catholic University of America Law Review*. January, 1962.

Murphy, William P. State Sovereignty and the Ratification of the Constitution—I. *Mississippi Law Journal*. December, 1961.

Newman, Frank C. Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights. *University of California, Los Angeles, Law Review*. July, 1961.

Nutting, Charles B. Is the First Amendment Obsolete? *George Washington Law Review*. December, 1961.

Private Economic Coercion and the Civil Rights Act of 1957. *Yale Law Journal*. January, 1962.

Radabaugh, John. Spencer Roane and the Genesis of Virginia Judicial Review. *American Journal of Legal History*. January, 1962.

Retroactivity and First Amendment Rights. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. January, 1962.

Roberts, Richard J., S.J. Fair Housing Laws: A Tool for Racial Equality. *Social Order*. January, 1962.

Saye, Albert B. Civil Rights. *Georgia Review*. Spring, 1962.

Shapiro, Martin. Judicial Modesty, Political Reality, and Preferred Position. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Winter, 1962.

Smith, John Malcolm. Mr. Justice Horace Gray of the United States Supreme Court. *South Dakota Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

Somerville, John. Law, Logic and Revolution: The Smith Act Decisions. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Spaeth, Harold J. Judicial Power as a Variable Motivating Supreme Court Behavior. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. February, 1962.

Threat of Enforcement—Prerequisite of a Justiciable Controversy. *Columbia Law Review*. January, 1962.

Wickersham, Cornelius W. Presidential Inability: Procrastination, Apathy and the Constitution. *Villanova Law Review*. Winter, 1961-62.

#### Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

Barzun, Jacques. In Favor of Capital Punishment. *American Scholar*. Spring, 1962.

Bruno, John P. The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development and Application. *Southern California Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

Carnes, Robert M., and John W. Ryan. Police Training for Delinquency Prevention and Control—An Appraisal. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1961.

Clark, Charles E. Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights; to a More Perfect Union. *Texas Law Review*. December, 1961.

- DeMott, Benjamin. The Great Narcotics Muddle. *Harper's Magazine*. March, 1962.
- Friedrich, C. J. Law and History. *Vanderbilt Law Review*. October, 1961.
- Goldstein, Sidney. Economic Evidence in Right-of-Way Litigation. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Winter, 1961.
- Holtzoff, Alexander. Federal Pretrial Procedure. *American University Law Review*. January, 1962.
- Kadish, Sanford H. Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes. *Harvard Law Review*. March, 1962.
- LaFave, Wayne R. The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law—Part I. *Wisconsin Law Review*. January, 1962.
- Lasky, Moses. Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench. *California Law Review*. December, 1961.
- Luhman, Stanley. The Unrecognized Government in American Courts: *Upright v. Mercury Business Machines*. *Columbia Law Review*. February, 1962.
- Macy, John W., Jr. "New Era" in Employee-Management Relations. *Civil Service Journal*. January-March, 1962.
- Marcus, Philip. The Big Antitrust Case in the Trial Courts. *Indiana Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.
- Nagel, Stuart S. Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Propensities. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1962.
- Newland, Chester A. Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks. *Oregon Law Review*. June, 1961.
- Newman, Donald J. The Effect of Accommodations in Justice Administration on Criminal Statistics. *Sociology and Social Research*. January, 1962.
- Orfield, Lester B. Indictment and Information in Federal Criminal Prosecution—Part II. *Syracuse Law Review*. Winter, 1961.
- . Trial by Jury in Federal Criminal Procedure. *Duke Law Journal*. Winter, 1962.
- Pittman, David J., and William F. Handy. Uniform Crime Reporting: Suggested Improvements. *Sociology and Social Research*. January, 1962.
- Schwartz, Louis B., ed. Crime and the American Penal System. *Annals*. January, 1962.
- Speed, Oscar, Jr. A Report of an Administrative Analysis of a Police Car Reporting System. School of Public Administration, University of Southern California. 1961.
- Symposium on Intoxication. *Cleveland-Marshall Law Review*. January, 1962.
- Tramontine, John O. Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court. *Intramural Law Review, New York University*. March, 1962.
- Ulmer, S. Sidney. Public Office in the Social Background of Supreme Court Justices. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. January, 1962.
- Use of Mandamus to Nullify an Arbitrary Acquittal in a Criminal Prosecution. *Columbia Law Review*. February, 1962.
- Wilson, Paul E. Basic Rules of Arrest, Search and Seizure. Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas. 1961.
- Public Administration and Administrative Law
- Baird, Duncan H. Judicial Review of Administrative Procedures in Minnesota. *Minnesota Law Review*. January, 1962.
- Bragdon, Kerlin J. Administrative Resolution of Delay Claims in Government Contracts. *Administrative Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Cavers, David F. Administrative Decision-making in Nuclear Facilities Licensing. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. January, 1962.
- Cooper, Frank E. Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents. *Michigan Law Review*. December, 1961.
- Corson, John J. Comparable Pay for Comparable Work? *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1961.
- Davis, Kenneth Culp. Nuclear Facilities Licensing: Another View. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. January, 1962.
- Friendly, Henry J. The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards. *Harvard Law Review*. March, 1962.
- Gellhorn, Walter. Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial. *American Bar Association Journal*. March, 1962.
- Guetzkow, H., G. A. Forehand, and B. J. James. An Evaluation of Educational Influence on Administrative Judgment. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.
- Hearle, Edward F. R. How Useful Are "Scientific" Tools of Management? *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1961.
- Jennes, Ernest. Judicial Review and the FCC: A Legislative History. *Administrative Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Litwak, Eugene, and Lydia F. Hylton. Inter-organizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Coordinating Agencies. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.
- McCulloch, Frank W. The NLRB and Techniques for Expediting the Administrative Process. *Administrative Law Review*. Fall, 1961.
- Monat, William R., ed. Public Administration in an Era of Change. Pennsylvania Economy League, Philadelphia. December, 1961.
- Newman, Frank C. Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness. *Michigan Law Review*. December, 1961.
- Nigro, Felix A. Public Personnel: Agenda for the Sixties. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1961.



Peabody, Robert L. Perceptions of Organizational Authority: A Comparative Analysis. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Personnel Panorama—1961. [Symposium.] *Public Personnel Review*. January, 1962.

Redford, Emmette S. Perspectives for the Study of Government Regulation. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. February, 1962.

Rights of Federal Government Personnel under the Copyright Act. *Indiana Law Journal*. Fall, 1961.

Stone, Donald C., and Robert L. Brown. Careers in the Rebuilding and Management of Cities. Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. 1962.

University Bureau Research in Government: An Inventory of Current Projects. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1961.

Wildavsky, Aaron. Political Implications of Budgetary Reform. *Public Administration Review*. Autumn, 1961.

#### Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Bartholomew, Paul C. A Voting Machine That Leads Two Lives. *County Officer*. February, 1962.

Bender, Charles W. A Report on Politics in Seattle. Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. 1961.

Billington, Monroe. Senator Thomas P. Gore: Southern Isolationist. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Bogardus, Emory S. Sociology of Presidential TV Press Conferences. *Sociology and Social Research*. January, 1962.

Campbell, Angus, and Henry Valen. Party Identification in Norway and the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1961.

Collinge, F. B. A Projective Technique for Political Behavior. *American Behavioral Scientist*. March, 1962.

Cornelius, William G. The County Unit System of Georgia: Facts and Prospects. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Drinker, Sophie H. Votes for Women in 18th-Century New Jersey. *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society*. January, 1962.

Erlandson, Erling H. Press Cards U.S.A. *Journalism Quarterly*. Winter, 1962.

Galbraith, John Kenneth. Dissent in a Free Society. *Atlantic*. February, 1962.

Gamson, William A. The Fluoridation Dialogue: Is It an Ideological Conflict? *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1961.

Gold, David. Lawyers in Politics: An Empirical Exploration of Biographical Data on State Legislators. *Pacific Sociological Review*. Fall, 1961.

Gusfield, Joseph R. Mass Society and Extremist

Politics. *American Sociological Review*. February, 1962.

Hershkovitz, Leo. The Native American Democratic Association in New York City, 1835-1836. *New York Historical Society Quarterly*. January, 1962.

Huefner, Dixie S. A Report on Politics in Salt Lake City. Joint Center for Urban Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. 1961.

Lustig, Norman I. The Relationships between Demographic Characteristics and Pro-Integration Vote of White Precincts in a Metropolitan Southern County. *Social Forces*. March, 1962.

Maccoby, Nathan, and Eleanor E. Maccoby. Homeostatic Theory in Attitude Change. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1961.

Margulies, Herbert F. Anti-Catholicism in Wisconsin Politics, 1914-1920. *Mid-America*. January, 1962.

Markham, James W. Press Treatment of the 1958 State Elections in Pennsylvania. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Middleton, Russell. The Civil Rights Issue and Presidential Voting among Southern Negroes and Whites. *Social Forces*. March, 1962.

Oklahoma Voter's Guide. Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma. November, 1961.

Olmsted, Donald W. Social Groups, Roles, and Leadership: An Introduction to the Concepts. Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University. 1961.

Robinson, Jack W. Revision of Federal Law on Campaign Finances. *George Washington Law Review*. December, 1961.

Rose, Henry. A Critical Look at the Hatch Act. *Harvard Law Review*. January, 1962.

Shannon, David A. Was McCarthy a Political Heir of La Follette? *Wisconsin Magazine of History*. Autumn, 1961.

Warriner, Charles K. Public Opinion and Collective Action: Formation of a Watershed District. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Weeks, O. Douglas. Texas in the 1960 Presidential Election. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1961.

Williams, Donald E. Dawes and the 1924 Republican Vice Presidential Nomination. *Mid-America*. January, 1962.

#### Economic and Social Functions

##### National Economy

Burnham, John Chynoweth. The Gasoline Tax and the Automobile Revolution. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. December, 1961.

Fiscal and Monetary Policy for High Employment. Committee for Economic Development. [1962.]

Lukaczer, Moses. Reflections on the Problem of Depressed Areas—1962. *Labor Law Journal*. January, 1962.

Perlman, Jacob. Intersectorial Flow of Funds for Research and Development in the United States and Some Implications for Public Policy. *Social Science*. January, 1962.

Ritter, Lawrence S. Official Central Banking Theory in the United States, 1939–61. *Journal of Political Economy*. February, 1962.

Seligman, Ben B. Tariffs, the Kennedy Administration, and American Politics. *Commentary*. March, 1962.

Smithies, Arthur. The Commission on Money and Credit. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. November, 1961.

#### *Natural Resources*

Brewer, Michael F. Public Pricing of Natural Resources. *Journal of Farm Economics*. February, 1962.

Gatewood, Willard P. Conservation and Politics in the South, 1899–1906. *Georgia Review*. Spring, 1962.

Hess, W. N. New Horizons in Resource Development: The Role of Nuclear Explosions. *Geographical Review*. January, 1962.

#### *Agriculture*

Harris, Curtis C., Jr. Parity Income Prices. *Journal of Farm Economics*. February, 1962.

The "New" Agricultural Program—For Better or for Worse? [Symposium.] *Ibid.* December, 1961.

Ryan, John W. Public Administration in Agricultural Development, 1961. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1962.

Woodman, Harold D. Chicago Businessmen and the "Granger" Laws. *Agricultural History*. January, 1962.

#### *Business and Labor*

Antitrust and Small Business Symposium. *University of Detroit Law Journal*. December, 1961.

Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws: Competition Frustrated. *Yale Law Journal*. January, 1962.

Barber, Richard J. Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience. *George Washington Law Review*. December, 1961.

Browne, Harry L. The Missile Sites Labor Commission and the Derogation of the Taft-Hartley Act. *American Bar Association Journal*. February, 1962.

Cohen, George H. Self-Determination Elections among Previously Unrepresented Employees in Fringe Groups: A Reexamination. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Winter, 1961.

Daykin, Walter L. Legal Meaning of "Supervisor" under Taft-Hartley. *Labor Law Journal*. February, 1962.

Drucker, Peter F. Big Business and the National Purpose. *Harvard Business Review*. March–April, 1962.

The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement. *Columbia Law Review*. February, 1962.

Eisenberg, Meyer, and Richard M. Phillips. Mutual Fund Litigation—New Frontiers for the Investment Company Act. *Ibid.* January, 1962.

Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers: The Opposing Views of the Federal Banking Agencies and the Department of Justice. *Harvard Law Review*. February, 1962.

Forkosch, Morris D. The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its Modern Application to Labor. *Texas Law Review*. February, 1962.

FPC Regulation of Independent Producers of Natural Gas. *Harvard Law Review*. January, 1962.

Gellhorn, Walter, and Louis Lauer. Administration of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law (Part 1). *New York University Law Review*. January, 1962.

Givens, Richard A. The Validity of Delayed Awards under Section 301, Taft-Hartley Act. *Arbitration Journal*. Vol. 16, No. 4. 1961.

Hally, John R. The Meeting Competition Defense in Robinson-Patman: FTC v. the Courts. *Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Higgins, John P. The Legality of FPC Regulation of Independent Gas Producers by Area Price Fixing. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Winter, 1961.

Kearns, Lawrence M. Injunctions against Mass Picketing—A Gap in the Pre-emption Doctrine. *Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Kroner, Jack L. Minor Disputes under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Appraisal. *New York University Law Review*. January, 1962.

Lazar, Joseph. Concurrent Jurisdiction of Federal and State Mediation Agencies. *Labor Law Journal*. March, 1962.

Leiter, Robert D. Coverage Confusion under the Fair Labor Standards Act. *Ibid.* February, 1962.

Lewis, Willard A. The Law of Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes. *Ibid.*

Malisoff, Harry. The Insurance Character of Unemployment Insurance. W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Mich. December, 1961.

Mayer, Henry. Labor Relations, 1961: The Steelworkers Cases Re-examined. *Labor Law Journal*. March, 1962.

McDonald, Stephen L. Percentage Depletion

and the Allocation of Resources: The Case of Oil and Gas. *National Tax Journal*. December, 1961.

Norton, Hugh S. The President and Transportation Policy 1930-1960. *I. C. C. Practitioners' Journal*. March, 1962.

Patent Use Restrictions. *Harvard Law Review*. January, 1962.

The Publisher's Monetary Liability for Copyright Infringement. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Rohman, Murray M. National Emergency Disputes and Seizure. *Labor Law Journal*. January, 1962.

Shils, Edward B. The "Flag of Necessity" Fleet and the American Economy. *Ibid.* February, 1962.

Soter, William J. Taxation of Oil and Gas Financing Arrangements. *University of Cincinnati Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Spradlin, T. Richard. The Mexican Farm Labor Importation Program—Review and Reform (Part II). *George Washington Law Review*. December, 1961.

Steele, Charles J. A Decade of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act. *Vanderbilt Law Review*. October, 1961.

Timberlake, E. Compton. The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions under the Antitrust Laws. *George Washington Law Review*. December, 1961.

Travers, Arthur H., Jr., and Thomas D. Wright. Restricted Channels of Distribution under the Sherman Act. *Harvard Law Review*. February, 1962.

Turner, Donald F. The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal. *Ibid.*

Van Cise, Jerrold G. The Federal Antitrust Laws. American Enterprise Association. 1962.

Weber, Arnold R. Railroad Industry: Public Policy and the Scope of Collective Bargaining. *Labor Law Journal*. January, 1962.

Weiss, Leo. Labor Arbitration in the Federal Courts. *George Washington Law Review*. December, 1961.

Wetter, J. Gillis. Diplomatic Assistance to Private Investment. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Whiting, Richard A. Antitrust and the Corporate Executive II. *Virginia Law Review*. January, 1962.

#### *Health, Education, and Welfare*

Chasanow, Howard S. Civil and Criminal Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Maryland. *Maryland Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

Costanzo, Joseph F. Ribicoff on Federal Aid to Education. *Thought*. Winter, 1961.

Department of Health, Education, and Wel-

fare. Memorandum on the Impact of the First Amendment to the Constitution upon Federal Aid to Education. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Winter, 1961.

Dybwad, Gunnar. Administrative and Legislative Problems in the Care of the Adult and Aged Mental Retardate. *American Journal of Mental Deficiency*. March, 1962.

Franklin, Marc A. Medical Mass Screening Programs: A Legal Appraisal. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Winter, 1962.

Humphrey, Hubert H. A Magna Carta for the Social and Behavioral Sciences. *American Behavioral Scientist*. February, 1962.

The Investigation into Administered Prices in Nation's Drug Industry. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest*. February, 1962.

Legal Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference. The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Winter, 1961.

LoGatto, Anthony F. Privileged Communication and the Social Worker. *Catholic Lawyer*. Winter, 1962.

Mencher, Samuel. Newburgh: The Recurrent Crisis of Public Assistance. *Social Work*. January, 1962.

Meyer, Louis S. Federal Aid to Education: Its Impact on Arizona. Bureau of Government Research, Arizona State University. 1962.

Mulvihill, Roger. Problems in the Management of Public Housing. *Temple Law Quarterly*. Winter, 1962.

Northrop, Robert M. Organizing for Public Health: Recommendations for New Jersey. Bureau of Government Research, Rutgers—the State University. 1962.

Philp, John R. Government Programs on Alcoholism. *State Government*. Winter, 1962.

Rosenberg, Herbert H. Research and the Financing of Higher Education. *Higher Education*. October–November, 1961.

Zapp, John A., Jr. The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act. *Food-Drug-Cosmetic Law Journal*. February, 1962.

#### *Military Affairs and National Security*

Alley, Wayne E. The Litigious Aftermath of Martial Law. *Oklahoma Law Review*. February, 1962.

Dickinson, William B., Jr. Military Manpower Policies. *Editorial Research Reports*. February 14, 1962.

Huntington, Samuel P. Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in American Military Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Larrabee, Eric. The Politics of Strategy. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. March, 1962.

Waskow, Arthur I. *The Limits of Defense.* *Atlantic.* February, 1962.

#### Government Documents

##### Congress

House. Committee on Agriculture. Food and Agriculture Act of 1962. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Mexican Farm Labor Program. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Rice Acreage Allotments. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Use and Administration of National Forests. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Education and Labor. Economic Conditions in the Performing Arts. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Equal Employment Opportunity. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. Also House Report No. 1370. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Equal Opportunity in Apprenticeship Programs. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961, 1962.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong. 1962.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Investigation and Study of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1962: To Create a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on House Administration. History of the United States House of Representatives. By George B. Galloway. House Doc. No. 246. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Antarctica Legislation—1961. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Communications Act Amendments. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Communications Satellites. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. To Establish a National Accident Prevention Center. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Gambling Devices. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Natural Gas for Resale for Industrial Use. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Training of Physicians, Dentists, and Professional Public Health Personnel. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Consular Affairs and Security Administration in the Department of State. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Establishing Rules of Interpretation Governing Questions of the Effect of Acts of Congress on State Laws. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Functional Discounts. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. State Income Taxation of Mercantile and Manufacturing Corporations. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Miscellaneous Fish and Wildlife Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Miscellaneous Merchant Marine Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Mid-Decade Census. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Ways and Means. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. Also House Report No. 1414. 1962.

———. Revenue Act of 1962. House Report No. 1447. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Select Committee on Export Control. Investigation and Study of the Administration, Operation, and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Small Business Problems Created by Petroleum Imports. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

House and Senate. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. AEC Raw Materials Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Nuclear Energy for Space Propulsion and Auxiliary Power. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.

———. Joint Economic Committee. Employment and Unemployment. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.

———. Employment and Unemployment. Report of Subcommittee. Joint Committee Print. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

- . The Federal Budget as an Economic Document. Joint Committee Print. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Foreign Economic Policy. Hearings before Subcommittee. Dec. 4-14, 1961. 1962.
- . January 1962 Economic Report of the President. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Variability of Private Investment in Plant and Equipment. Joint Committee Print. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Orbital Flight of John H. Glenn, Jr. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Food and Agriculture Act of 1962. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . 1962 Dairy Price Supports. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Commerce. Deactivation of Military Installations. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- . Decline of Regulated Common Carriage. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- . Freedom of Communications. Kennedy, Nixon Speeches; Newscasts; Hearings. Senate Report No. 994, 6 parts. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961, 1962.
- . Freight Car Shortage. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- . Regulation of Supplemental Air Carriers. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Reorganization of Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Trade Commission, and Federal Maritime Board. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.
- . Committee on Government Operations. Establish a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on the Judiciary. Administrative Procedure Act Amendments. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- . Export of Strategic Materials to the U.S.S.R. and Other Soviet Bloc Countries. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.
- . Legislation to Strengthen Penalties under the Antitrust Laws. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- . Relationship between Teamsters Union and Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Rules and Administration. Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1789 to 1960. Compiled by Richard D. Hupman. Senate Doc. No. 71. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Select Committee on Small Business. Lease Guarantees—1961. Hearings. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- . Special Committee on Aging. Housing Problems of the Elderly. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.
- . Problems of the Aging. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961.
- Other Federal*
- Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governments Division. City Employment in 1961. 1962.
- Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors. Historical Chart Book, 1961. [1962.]
- Judicial Conference of the United States. Rules of Evidence. [Preliminary Report on Uniform Rules for U. S. District Courts.] 1962.

## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*Parliamentary Reform 1933-1960.* By THE HANSARD SOCIETY. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 193. \$4.00.)

In contrast to the nineteenth century, the reforms discussed here will not move men to demonstrate in the streets of Manchester or Bristol. Darby jail will not be sacked nor will Nottingham castle burn. Rather these reforms represent the tinkering with a well-established and complex machinery. Where the reforms of the nineteenth century were shot through with passion, those of the middle-twentieth are technical, professional, and, by and large, non-ideological. And yet, the

years under review were marked by the most profound economic, social, and political changes. It is in the context of these changes that the question as to the adequacy of the current arrangements and methods by which the British Parliament conducts its business is raised. Though in fact the book never clearly answers the questions of adequacy, since it is more of a compilation of proposals for reform, it does present to the student of British and comparative politics a small silvermine of information and potential insights. Parliamentary reform is something of a misnomer here. The book deals essentially with suggested

reforms in the House of Commons. Those in the House of Lords are briefly treated in an appendix.

Proposals for reform are concerned with those areas of the body politic in which irritation and conflict are most acutely felt. This survey of parliamentary reform proposals then becomes an important guide to potential trouble-spots. Thus, although questions of electoral reform have been with us for a long time, the increasing role and power of constituency associations on the one hand and of the party in Parliament, on the other, place an altogether new emphasis on these reforms. Similarly, there is the widespread demand that the House of Commons ought to set up specialized Committees of Members who would link the House with individual Departments of State. A great number of proposals toward the formation of Departmental Committees have been put forward in the last few years, though here too some areas are felt to be more sensitive than others. Thus in 1957 a motion was put down on the House of Commons Order Paper saying that Parliament lacked control over external affairs (shades of Suez); demands have also been made for Committees on Colonial Affairs, on Defense, on nationalized industries, and on finance.

An increasing area for conflict, if recent reform proposals are any indication, is in the relationship between the M.P. and his party. In answer to the question of how "honest political dissent" can be encouraged, it has been suggested that M.Ps. should be guaranteed a reasonable income for life. J. Grimond has advocated greater latitude in free voting, and a whole host of proposals have been advanced to give back-benchers some *raison d'être*. Other important areas of suggested reform pertain to the relationship of Parliament and the Executive, with particular reference to the Cabinet's collective responsibility and efficiency, delegated legislation, and parliamentary control over nationalized industries. Here the scope of Parliamentary Questions and the proposal of a Parliamentary arbiter, along the lines of the Danish Ombudsman, are particularly relevant.

Finally, both public opinion and the amenities of Parliamentary life play an important role in shaping the day-to-day business of Westminster. As for the latter, W. J. Brown, a former Independent Member, remarked that "when it is said of the House of Commons that 'it is the best club in the world,' this must be taken as referring to the company, and not the comfort, of the club." The inadequacies of research facilities and of secretarial help are felt acutely. As for public opinion, the compilers of this survey feel that "the prestige of Parliament has probably never been higher." This rosy outlook is not borne out by the observations of Bernard Crick or Christopher Hollis, nor is it consistent with recent public reactions to cases

involving parliamentary privilege. The survey, then, tells us a good deal about where the shoe pinches, and, additionally, whose shoe is being pinched, for it depends whether one has Conservative, Labour, or Liberal feet.

Other possible insights which may be gained relate to political trends. Thus, the creation of a Select Committee on nationalized industries may presage the development of some form of departmental committee. At the same time there is a visible trend towards smaller Committees. There seems to be an increasing demand for constituency television coverage especially if a network of local television stations can be developed. At the same time, whatever changes occur will take place only exceedingly slowly and gradually. As Sir Kenneth Pickthorn has said, "Procedure is all the constitution the poor Briton has."

Broadly speaking, parliamentary reforms have been proposed by two groups: the theoreticians and the practitioners, although in as literate a country as Britain, the two tend to overlap. The theoreticians are represented by such men as Jennings, Laski, and Ross; the practitioners by Churchill, Grimond, and Morrison, in addition to several former Clerks of the House and a host of M.Ps. Conspicuous by their absence are, however, such writers as S. E. Finer, J. D. Stewart, Harry Eckstein and Allen Potter. While their work is empirically oriented, and thus has relatively little reformative content, it does seem significant that so few reforms regarding pressure groups seem to have been proposed in Parliament. —LUCIAN C. MARQUIS, *University of Oregon*.

*The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960.* BY THOMAS L. KARNES. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 277. \$6.00.)

In recent years Central American and foreign observers have turned attention again to the subject of federation or some type of union of the five states of the region. The subject has been of recurrent interest and discussion during the near century and a quarter since collapse of the *Confederación Centroamericana*. Professor Karnes has produced a timely and valuable work which sheds much light on the record of past attempts at union and on the prospects for future accomplishment of what many consider an ideal solution to political, economic, and social problems of the area. The book serves a real need in view of the paucity of works on Central America in the English language and the frequent lack of objectivity in the voluminous writing in Spanish. Political scientists and historians will find it useful both for general history and for understanding of the political question.

The author's approach is historical-analytical

and, while it may not be "refreshingly new" as the dust jacket proclaims, the author has done a thorough, conscientious treatment. He has successfully avoided the errors of emotional involvement and too-easy assumptions which often vitiate writing on the subject. In this respect, the work is refreshing, as well as for the fact that the title very aptly labels the contents.

Professor Karnes has made a contribution that is threefold. In the first place, he analyzes two premises that often lead to the assumption that union of the Central American republics should be accomplished with ease: the supposed similarities among them and the supposed cohesiveness of the area as a political unit of the Spanish Empire. It is shown that neither of these premises is absolutely true. Despite obvious similarities, which may be superficial, there are important differences and a lack of uniformity with respect to size (both in area and population), ethnic composition, language, social structure, and religion. Furthermore, there was not a single, unified drive in the Spanish conquest of the area and a number of factors contributed to political and religious decentralization which allowed the provinces under the *Audiencia* of Guatemala considerable autonomy.

Secondly, the largest part of the book is devoted to surveying the numerous efforts and attempts to bring about federation and to analyzing the reasons for failure of all attempts after the brief period of union following separation from Mexico. This is a concise but thorough treatment which shows evidence of painstaking care in research, analysis, and writing. Comprehensive coverage and objective appraisal in tracing the story of repeated failure make this section a major contribution to the literature.

The third aspect of the contribution is found in the brief concluding chapter. Herein the author reveals his pessimism about prospects for future union, founding this view not merely on the record of numerous failures in the past. The reasons why individual attempts did not succeed might have been superficial, but there are several fundamental obstacles which have, and do, stand in the way. Foremost among them are: (1) political adolescence of the republics—the failure of all but Costa Rica to achieve representative government; (2) exaggerated nationalism and jealousies among them; and (3) Costa Rican isolationism.

The more optimistic proponents of federation may be disappointed with the brevity of Professor Karnes' treatment of ODECA. He relates the story of the founding of the organization in 1951 and refers to some of the subsequent political and economic activities, judging that accomplishments in the latter field have been more significant. It is not clear whether the author is fully aware of all of the activities currently being

carried on under the auspices of the organization, including much cultural interchange and groundwork supposedly for future integration of educational systems, but at any rate he is wise in stating that ODECA is too young to be judged fairly.—CARL C. MOSES, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute*.

*Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders.* BY ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. Pp. viii, 322. \$4.95.)

Until recently, United States and European interest in the revolution which has overturned institutions in much of the world was focused on its more spectacular forms in Asia and Africa. However, events of the last few years—Vice President Nixon's confrontation with violence in South America, the implantation of a Communist system in Cuba, and the enunciation of the Alliance for Progress—dramatically pushed Latin America into the foreground of United States interest and concern. Interestingly enough, the revolutionary process in this hemisphere, which we were so slow to acknowledge, is one with antecedents and a sustained development considerably predating most of the Asian and African experiments. Perhaps it is the case of being too close to our noses to see it. At any rate, the publication of this excellent study of the "prophets" of the Latin American revolution is most timely.

Quite rightly, the author's concept of revolution, like that of the Latin American, is far broader and more basic than the chronic revolts and uprisings which much of the press would fit under this label. Furthermore, it is a concept which is thoroughly respectable to a preponderance of Latin Americans inasmuch as it connotes "fundamental alteration of the political, social, and economic life" of one's country and is manifested in the ascendancy of urban working class and middle sectors and, in an incipient way, the peasantry to the councils of political decision-making.

As a consequence, the dozen leaders considered in this book are deemed heroes by these emerging classes. Much of their appeal derives from policies and enactments which substantially ripped their societies out of nineteenth century feudalism and launched them on the road of twentieth century values and aspirations. Not surprisingly, they are men of considerable diversity and complexity. Sequentially, they begin with the revered Uruguayan democrat, José Batlle y Ordóñez, and move along to Cuba's Fidel Castro, modern exponent of totalitarian revolution. In between lie a variety of types—Lázaro Cárdenas (Mexico), Arturo Alessandri (Chile), Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (Peru), Rómulo Betancourt (Venezuela), José Figueres (Costa Rica), Luis Muñoz Marín

(Puerto Rico), Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles (Bolivia), Getulio Vargas (Brazil), and Juan Perón (Argentina). Despite their differences, all have been men of action, steeped in politics, possessing enormous leadership abilities, and prime movers in their countries' development.

The author approaches each of these men with meticulous care and a strong appreciation of the vital roles they played. Each of the "prophets" is set against an effectively sketched panorama of events, ideas, and forces of the times—all interacting in the fascinating unfoldment of revolution.

Professor Alexander is one of a small number of scholars with a background adequate to the demands inherent in this kind of writing. For more than two decades he has studied at first hand many of the currents of Latin America's revolution and, in the process, he has come to know most of its leaders. Only such close contacts could have produced this lively and authoritative work.

Questions need be raised on only a few minor points. The statement that Calles never returned to Mexico from exile counters this reviewer's impression that he was one of several ex-presidents who gathered together in September, 1942 to demonstrate solidarity in the war effort. In the section on Alessandri, the reference to "several attempted revolutions between 1833 and 1924" is somewhat debatable. Perhaps "revolts" would have been more precise.

But these are insignificant relative to the great merits of this book—certainly a worthy addition to Professor Alexander's list of distinguished contributions to the study of Latin America.—  
BEN G. BURNETT, *Whittier College*.

*The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America.* BY KALMAN H. SILVERT. (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1961. Pp. xi, 280. \$7.50.)

Present and former members of the American Universities Field Staff recently have presented a freshet of books which are in reality selections of their report letters to the subscribers of the admirable service. Dr. Silvert's volume is of this group. Twelve of its sixteen chapters are slightly revised reprintings of papers written over a five-year period; one chapter is the substance of a convention paper, and another was written as a contribution to a book. On the whole, the volume is a *pasticcio* of efforts sandwiched between short opening and closing statements, and cemented into several sections by very brief explanatory remarks preceding each part. The result can be interpreted in several ways.

The intent at one level is to follow the AUFS plan of depiction in depth of selected national societies; Silvert's field experiences in Guatemala,

Chile and Argentina establish general limits to the detailed papers. At another level, the four substantive sections concern, in order, the levels at which these national societies can be studied, some symbolic social and political situations, the positions of intellectuals and the Universities, and idiosyncracies which suggest reasons for some Latin reactions to common and uncommon situations. At yet another level, Silvert seeks, by means of the interspersed explanations and the foreword, as well as by the mixture of non-systematic elements, to offer the bases for several forcefully stated propositions concerning social development. Implicitly, guidelines for United States policies toward Latin America are also offered.

An unfortunate aspect of the book is its failure really to add up to an analysis or even to an argument. Aside from mild objection to the phrasing of the modest opening conceptualization, this reviewer cannot challenge its application to subsequent content; none really is undertaken. Further, Silvert makes no claim that he is more than intimating categories of analysis; this indeed is the case in comparison with the painstaking work of many other authors. The projection of broad terminal propositions, however generally acceptable they might be to the specialized students of the underdeveloped areas, comes rather abruptly; the most recently written AUFS letter employed, drawn from the challenge of Castro, is the sole groundbreaker.

A book properly should be greater than the mere sum of its parts. The offering of political taxonomies and of deviant disparities does not necessarily accomplish the job, despite the offering of undoubted literary competence. The cogency with which Silvert is fully capable of infusing his work is missing in this volume.

The end product therefore is kaleidoscopic. In book form these useful papers will reach many who are not reached by the AUFS reports. The anecdotes will give an air of authority to teachers impressed into Latin American courses by mounting departmental curricular demands and the tactics of Fidel Castro. The work will suggest the possibilities inherent in research and absorption of *ambiente* by a discerning reporter trained in one academic discipline but alert to the possibilities of others.—PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR., *The Johns Hopkins University* (Washington, D. C.).

*Social and Economic Frontiers in Latin America.* BY HARRY STARK. (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, Company, 1961. Pp. xx, 421. \$7.25.)

This book has some attractive features. Its maps, charts, and tables give us in easily assimilable form much useful data about Latin America's societies and their environments. Those parts of it



that are narrowly economic in focus are interesting, sometimes insightful, and frequently provocative. The presentation is couched in terms that should be comprehensible to almost anyone, however limited his preparation. But really the book is very bad.

Lacking a discernible thesis and structural unity, the book draws indiscriminately upon the author's random impressions and his reading of an ill-sorted range of materials. (Although one finds a footnote citation of Tennyson's "Locksley Hall," one searches vainly for a specific reference to any material written in Spanish or Portuguese.) Its analyses of complex phenomena are quite unsophisticated, and woefully incomplete. It is poorly edited and produced. It is, to use a word favored by Professor Stark, "uniquivocably" a bad book.

If this were just another general introduction to Latin America, an updated Gunther, it would cause little concern. But the author of this book is a professor of Latin American Affairs at the University of Miami, and he has put it forward as a textbook designed to acquaint beginning students with Latin America's "social and economic frontiers." As a textbook it does a major disservice to the cause of serious Latin American scholarship; it greatly underestimates the intelligence and capacities of North American students who might be exposed to it; it perpetuates a distorted and stereotyped approach to Latin America that will do little to improve our understanding of the region and its peoples; and it is grossly unfair to the Latin Americans themselves.

Consider, for example, the parallel columns of "social and cultural traits" with which Chapter 3 begins. Here Professor Stark contrasts Latin Americans and North Americans in terms of twenty-eight "traits," of which the following are representative:

<i>Latin American</i>	<i>North American</i>
Follows heart	Follows head
Closer to species	More evolved
Gallery player	Team player
Lawless	Law-abiding
Ego	Social conscience
Cuts Gordian knot	Unravels Gordian knot
Procratinating (sic)	Gets things done

Aware that not all Latin Americans are properly to be classified as "lawless animals" (see the second and fourth items in the abbreviated list above,) Professor Stark qualifies what he has done: "Were it possible to fuse all Latin Americans and all North Americans into two individuals that we could call the 'average' Latin American and the 'average' North American, these two individuals would possess essentially the character-

istics shown in the foregoing lists." A further qualification, not altogether compatible with the previous one, follows: "The traits I have listed as typically Latin American are those that would be possessed by an average individual taken from the numerically small but politically and economically predominant class."

In what the publishers describe as a "discerning analysis based on the author's personal and career background in this controversial country," Professor Stark undertakes a survey of contemporary Cuba. After all, as he says, "a book on Latin America appearing after 1961 . . . that did not contain some reference to the Fidel Castro revolution in Cuba would sound rather queer." The "discerning analysis," which takes up eleven pages of the book's four hundred, moves at this level of perceptiveness and profundity:

"Castro's early actions in cutting rentals in half and in announcing that large landholdings would be broken up and distributed to the landless peasant were the first inklings of things to come. The economic unsoundness of these measures gave birth to the suspicion that this bearded revolutionary might turn out to be an irresponsible demagog. . . . The seizure of property without equitable compensation goes sharply against American concepts of what is right."

That a book of this caliber could find a publisher and may find a market in our schools and universities is discouraging.—JOHN N. PLANK, *Harvard University*.

*Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism.* By STANLEY G. PAYNE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 316. \$6.00.)

1961 was a productive year for books on Spain. This excellent study is the latest addition to a number of significant works—those by Burnett Bolloten, Hugh Thomas and Arthur P. Whitaker—and is a valuable contribution. Its preparation was assisted by a Social Science Research Council fellowship and, according to the jacket, the author spent a year of personal investigation in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. He is an instructor in history at the University of Minnesota.

The author examines the genesis and evolution of the Spanish version of fascism from the formation of the *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista* (JONS) to the *Falange Española* becoming the state party through the party's demise at the hands of General Franco. The first half of the book is devoted to the short career and life (1903–1936) of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange. He enters the political arena in 1930 as Vice Secretary-General of the conservative *Unión Monárquica*; during the general election of 1933 his movement becomes the *Falange Española* (FE); the FE and the JONS unite; and in late

1934 he is acclaimed *Jefe Nacional* by the party's National Council. Now the FE is José Antonio's own instrument. The entire slate of FE candidates, including the *Jefe* himself, is defeated in the 1936 election and the victorious Popular Front government outlaws the FE and incarcerates its leader. Late that year José Antonio is executed.

The increasing political polarization between Left and Right precipitates a military insurrection—FE “intransigence” serves as a “secondary catalyst”—which expands into a civil war on account of German and Italian intervention on behalf of the rebels. General Franco assumes command of the rebel forces and Ramón Serrano Súñer, his brother-in-law, becomes his civilian counterpart. General Franco thus achieves a “military-civilian synthesis” and begins his transformation of the FE into the party of the Spanish state.

The author examines Franco's tactics: the “born politician” balancing one group against another, capitalizing upon each faction's hates and internal dissensions, and using the FE as a buffer against all threats to his power. Serrano proves to be an astute manipulator and is essential to Franco's gaining control of all facets of the political spectrum; but he is no match for Franco—and later, neither is Hitler's *Real-politik*. Thus General Franco emerges as the master pupil of Machiavelli. In the words of the author: “His formula was a conservative syndicalism, bounded by all sorts of state economic controls, spiritually tied to Catholicism, ready for any kind of practical compromise, and always backed up by the Army.”

Since the end of the Spanish civil war on the eve of World War II, General Franco has continued his policies of “divide-and-rule” and interlocking directorates. Their success is attested to by the longevity of his regime, now in its twenty-sixth year. The postwar “silent treatment” of Franco by the Western powers failed to weaken his position; it only strengthened it. Today the Falange is a corpse. It has been bled to death—with frequent transfusions along the way—by General Franco.

This significant book is indispensable to understanding contemporary Spanish politics. It is an example of good scholarship; it is extensively documented and much is from original sources, mainly in Spanish.—LARMAN C. WILSON, *University of Maryland*.

*The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961.* By GEORGE BENNETT AND CARL ROSBERG. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 230. \$4.80.)

In February 1961 Kenya's first general election on a common roll basis was held. It was the cul-

mination of a train of events that led from the Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House in early 1960. In the background of these events were the long-standing belief of many Kenya settlers that much of the best of Kenya's land was “white man's country,” the not-long past horror of Mau Mau, and the new disorders in the Congo. Out of this election emerged an African-oriented government and the outlines of a party system of Africans in Kenya.

George Bennett of Oxford University and Carl G. Rosberg of the University of California at Berkeley have given an account of these events that is much more than a simple narrative of a swiftly moving bit of history. The events in themselves were important. In a large sense this was the period in which the final turn away from settler domination in Kenya was made. It was the time in which the fundamental problems of an African-ruled nation began to emerge, and a time of crucial testing for the new political leaders. Nevertheless, the value of this book lies in its broad picture of the great complexity of politics in even a moderate-sized new African country.

Before the campaign leading to the 1961 election, Kenya politics largely consisted of a struggle over multi-racialism. In the years following the easing of the Mau Mau emergency in the middle nineteen-fifties, the surface of Kenya politics was a troubled pattern of contests between different settler groups. One, which became the New Kenya Party led by Michael Blundell, sought some means of accommodating the rising demands of the great African majority of the colony. The other, ultimately organized by Group-Captain Briggs as the United Party, sought to preserve a way of life based upon settler pre-eminence in political affairs. In these contests, despite much sympathy from overseas, the New Kenya Party lost. The heritage of the Emergency was deep bitterness among the settlers and Blundell himself had to endure great vilification from his white opponents. At the same time, the idea of multi-racialism was not accepted by most Africans. The dominant settler group, however, did not win. A complex electoral system had been contrived with much ingenuity. Although it stopped far short of satisfying African leaders, it was openly a plan of transition to a government in which Africans would have the largest voice.

Almost abruptly, then, the major arena of Kenya politics became the African parties. The Kenya African National Union sought to become a counterpart for the Tanganyika party (TANU) which was its near namesake. For this endeavor KANU seemed to have great advantages, a strong base in the two largest tribes in Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo, and most of the well known

African leaders in the country, among whom it was increasingly evident that Jomo Kenyatta would soon be included. These advantages, however, carried correlative disadvantages. The alliance of the two largest tribes seemed to pose a threat to the numerous small tribes in Kenya. The conspicuous character of KANU's leaders laid the party open to intra-party rivalry and disunity. And in time Kenyatta proved less of an asset than he appeared while he remained in confinement.

A rival party, the Kenya African Democratic Union, appeared and it made itself spokesman for the small tribes and in general became more rural in orientation. The contest between KANU and KADU was lively but uneven. KANU was a heavy winner of popular votes. Nevertheless, this advantage was offset in part by the design of the election and by the greater cohesiveness of KADU. Through a combination of circumstances and KANU miscalculation, KADU became the party to assume the role of government to the degree possible at this stage of evolution toward independence.

The "Kenyatta election," then, was considerably more important than the title of the book suggests. Kenyatta was an issue and a lively one. Nevertheless, already in early 1962 there are signs that his charisma is wearing thin. And in any event the basic development of a system of two African parties was the fact of large significance. This book is essential to an understanding of this and of the politics of the nation that is to be.—GRANT MCCONNELL, *University of Chicago*.

*I Speak of Freedom*. By KWAME NKRUMAH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1961. Pp. xiv, 291. \$4.95; paper, \$1.95.)

The slogan "Freedom and Unity" is increasingly heard in the new African states, and this book is Dr. Nkrumah's attempt to bring these two concepts before an American audience. This is, according to its subtitle, "a statement of African ideology," but it is not a disciplined formulation of political thought. Here is a selection of Nkrumah's speeches for the period 1947 to 1960, interspersed with his own commentary and summary of further speeches. The book begins with his return to the Gold Coast from England, and ends with a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960.

The first ten chapters cover the time dealt with in his earlier work, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, but there is considerable variance in the two accounts of his activities, a matter of differing selection and emphasis. The first book dealt principally with political developments in the Gold Coast and the work of the Convention Peoples' Party; the second one emphasizes far

more continental and international aspects of the same events. There is no account here of Nkrumah's imprisonment, the development of party technique, or the Motion of Destiny speech in 1953 on coming independence. Instead there are comments on the African personality, positive action in international affairs, the Congo, and Ghanaian membership in the commonwealth. There is mention of international crises and the Berlin blockade. Nkrumah's thesis is perhaps most clearly stated in his preface: "The greatest contribution that Africa can make to the peace of the world is to avoid all the dangers inherent in disunity, by creating a political union which will also by its success, stand as an example to a divided world. A union of African states will project more effectively the African personality. It will command respect from a world that has regard only for size and influence."

Nkrumah does not concentrate entirely on international affairs; he discusses some Ghanaian political developments, but they do not occupy him as fully as they once did. Unfortunately in becoming more international he has become less interesting. While there is evidence of absorption and dedication to the enormous tasks faced by Ghana and all of Africa today, there is much absorption also with Kwame Nkrumah. This book does not bear out recent accusations of megalomania, but every other paragraph does begin with the word "I." There is little reflection of other personalities, or the description of local background and attitudes which contributed to the earlier book. There is an African background in terms of many of the issues considered, but otherwise this might be any prime minister, writing anywhere. The prose style is reminiscent of Lord Attlee's.

Since Nkrumah is writing on African freedom and pan-Africanism, there are some curious omissions. Except for a brief mention of the Sani-quellie conference, there is no discussion of the Ghana-Guinea union, or any account of relations with Togo. Nigeria is mentioned once, and most of French-speaking Africa not at all. The Accra conference of independent African states and Nkrumah's travel to Liberia, India and the United States are considered in some detail. Since the book ends with 1960, there is no discussion of policy toward Gizenga in the Congo, or any recent political developments. Neutralism is mentioned, and carefully called non-alignment.

It would seem that Nkrumah has aimed this book at the general public rather than the specialist. Only a few speeches are reproduced in full, most of them having been excerpted in that particularly irritating fashion which gives the reader no clue as to how much of the speech he is actually

reading. Nor are we given any really new information. This book might be recommended as a study in African psychology, but it is otherwise disappointing. Someday it is to be hoped that Nkrumah will give us, perhaps in his memoirs, a more systematic and informative account of his years as prime minister. In the meantime his first book stands as a far better introduction to African affairs.—MARGARET L. BATES, *Goddard College*.

*The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa.*

By VIRGINIA THOMPSON AND EARL ADLOFF.  
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960.  
Pp. xii, 595. \$8.75.)

The Adloffs have performed a valuable service in providing what is in fact the first balanced and truly comprehensive survey in the English language dealing with an area of former French Equatorial Africa. The AEF has been long neglected by English-speaking scholars; with the exception of mention in the works of Buell, Lord Hailey, and Hodgkin, and with occasional articles in periodical literature, most of the material available on the area has been of an official nature and in the characteristically lifeless style adopted by French colonial administrators. Moreover, the latter volumes tended to be compendia of economic statistics coupled with highly detailed descriptions of structures on the various levels of administration. Such works usually lacked any discussion of political matters—particularly after 1944—and one got the impression from them that apart from the aseptic consultative organisms created by the Administration from time to time, the area experienced little or no political change.

Happily, the Adloffs have devoted considerable portions of their volume to discussions on the nature of political activity in each of the four states treated (Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, and the Congo (Brazzaville) Republic). In addition, there is a useful historical introduction and a short but excellent statement on the growth of political organizations in the AEF after 1944.

Further, the volume examines the current economic and social problems of the area as a whole and of each of the new states in turn. This approach enables the reader to compare the economic development of the AEF in its former status as an administrative federation with the social and economic problems faced by the new states in their attempts to strike out on their own. At the time this book was being written (1959) the states of the old AEF had decided on tentative steps toward a loose union (the union des Republiques d'Afrique Centrale). Even though the Union itself did not get much beyond the discussion stage, it is interesting to observe how heavily the four states' former interdependence weighed in the planning for the Union and in their subse-

quent (1961) decision to enter the broader functional union of the Union of Africa and Malagasy States. The Adloffs' work provides a most useful basis for assessing the four states' contributions to the larger Union, and indeed, for a realistic appraisal of the possible future integration of the whole area, including the Cameroon and former Belgian Congo.

The book is not without its defects. It is somewhat unfortunate, considering the wealth of information and insight presented by the authors, that they chose to adopt the encyclopedic format of their earlier volume on French West Africa. This format recalls the older French presentations, and undoubtedly accounts for the dryness of some of the discussions (particularly those dealing with administrative and economic matters) and for the somewhat perfunctory manner in which the accounts of political activity are handled. These drawbacks, though limiting the usefulness of the book, do not detract from its overall excellence.

The story of the AEF, less politically and economically favored than the area of the former French West Africa, makes fascinating reading not only for those interested in African affairs, but for all concerned with problems of political and economic modernization. The Adloffs' contribution deserves to be widely read, and will undoubtedly find a preferred place among the increasingly large number of valuable works on Africa.—VICTOR T. LE VINE, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

*African Affairs: Number One. St. Antony's Papers: Number 10.* EDITED BY KENNETH KIRKWOOD. (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961. Pp. 164. \$3.75.)

Like the inevitable double-feature movie, one a piperoo and the other a stinkeroo, this octet on Africa is of uneven quality. There is a notable essay on the differing connotations of political words like "politician" and "freedom" in Western Europe and in Africa south of the Sahara. Following this logically is an excellent analysis of the roots and shoots of nascent nationalism in the one-time colonial territories, by Thomas Hodgkin, who published a book on the subject five years ago. Other essays are on Islam in Nigeria (which essay gets lost en route from Nigerian savannah to jungle, examining individual bushes and trees); on demographic surveys in the Central African Federation (which surveys show awesome ingenuity and some important economic data); on urbanized Africans in the Union of South Africa (after a legalistic beginning, a sensitive and sensible discussion); on academic research on Africa in the Soviet Union; on the prospects for non-holocaust in South Africa (by a distinguished scholar and former Senator from Natal who re-

uses to despair). An essay on federation in French West Africa demonstrates that it is not only Africans but Western Europeans who use the same words differently. What French colonial administrators called federation is more like what is elsewhere called democratic centralism, and yet the author artlessly describes the breakup after de-colonization of what never existed before and which, on a truly voluntary basis, has been tried with little success since, in French-speaking Africa.

Altogether a motley lot of essays, but in various ways each provides information and within its stated competence is competent. It is well to know how provincial were Soviet scholars about Africa until after the 1955 Bandung Conference and even better to know how quickly they are now earning the realities. And it makes sense to relate the growth of Marxist parties in French-speaking Africa to the strength of the Communist party in France, in contrast to the situation in the English-speaking areas. But would it not be more relevant to consider more deeply why Marxism has become so intensely attractive to so many Africans, Chinese, Indonesians, Malaysians, and Indians regardless of language, and whether Islam is in practice any more hostile to Communism in Africa than Christianity proved to be in the Soviet Union?

To understand the various reactions of Africans to tribalism, colonialism, urbanization, and Westernization, and to ascertain their future expectations, we have to know more than the institutional and legal soil out of which burst new growths that are supplanting tribalism and colonialism—growths that not even Africans in the midst of things can adequately describe. This collection of institutional analyses is nevertheless useful.—JAMES C. DAVIES, *California Institute of Technology*.

*South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid*. By F. P. SPOONER. (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960. Pp. 288, \$5.00.)

There are those who say that economic pressures will finally bring *apartheid* to the ground or, at very least, alter it sufficiently to avoid a violent explosion in the Republic of South Africa. This argument (simplified) runs as follows: the demand for labor will force South African industry and mining to upgrade the skills and jobs of the Bantu worker. His continued presence, working and living in the European sector of the economy will be necessary. His population increase and lack of land will force him there as well. His increasing purchasing power will create increasing markets for goods, as well as demands for higher standards of living and political and social rights.

Since white and black will become so totally dependent upon each other, neither can tolerate nor pay for the extremes of total separate development or segregation, let alone a violent African nationalism. Some form of social and political compromise will thus be forced.

This book, in spite of its subtitle, does not address itself fully to the economics of *apartheid*. Rather, it devotes well over half its pages to a thin résumé of the physical features of the country, its historical background and the growth of the conflict between Boer and Englishman. As a matter of fact, the book is almost quaint in its pleading for a return to the days when mutual understanding and cooperation between the two European groups was hoped for by so many Englishmen. The author, a businessman of English and Afrikaner lineage, complains that the Vortrekkers have been glorified, that the Englishman's contributions have been minimized and that the politics of the country have been rigged in favor of the Boer. The faith and trust placed in the Boer community in 1910 by the United Kingdom has not been answered with corresponding fair play. The book is wistful, vague and naive in its analyses of politics. A Victorian didacticism pervades its pages.

The problem of the author is that he cannot apply the spirit of the liberal English political tradition to contemporary South Africa. He is accurate when he states that the Afrikaner's isolation caused him to miss a century and to develop a narrow and self-righteous community. But one cannot move from this type of criticism onto a useful economic or political platform by claiming that the United Party is the party of 'reason,' that White superiority over the Bantu is patent, that it is 'unthinkable' to give the Bantu the franchise or that western democratic concepts lack relevance in South Africa because they do not teach discipline.

The author ends with a plea for the vision of Rhodes, a great multi-racial federation in South Africa. Economic development would be applied evenly throughout the land and not compartmentalized into white and black 'stans.' Domination supported by race alone would be ended in favor of the guided advance of the African by the more able European. The book is a good statement, perhaps unintended, of the Englishman's dilemma in South Africa.—CHANNING B. RICHARDSON, *Hamilton College*.

*The Edge of Freedom*. By JOHN B. OAKES. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. xiv, 129. \$3.50.)

This book, subtitled "A report on neutralism and new forces in Subsaharan Africa and Eastern Europe," is a rapid and informed survey by a

leading journalist of a key problem in contemporary politics, the meaning of "neutralism." It is a plea for "sympathy without condescension" towards the proponents of this doctrine.

The basic thesis is that the neutralism of the new African nations "is not a moral judgment, but a political one, a judgment that it is in their interest to stay away from the great power struggle." This view is sustained by brief snapshot analyses of recent political developments in Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, "French Africa," Congo, Rhodesia, and Kenya-Tanganyika. Mr. Oakes combines with this African overview some equally brief statements on the evolution of new forces in some Communist states, the USSR, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in the direction of "liberalization."

Having explained that the African neutrals are often lined up with the Soviet bloc on colonial issues—or rather, as Mr. Oakes says, that the Soviet bloc is lined up with them—the book outlines the major problems facing the new African nations: national integration (against tribalism), the scarcity of national leaders, the difficulties of economic survival. These problems are the central focus of contemporary African politics. The attempts to deal with them explain the particular paths the new African nations have taken far better than any kinds of conspiracy theories (external influence of world communism, the international network of capitalist firms, the political penchants of small groups of African elites). What has become clear in the last few years is that, whatever the political leanings of various African states, they have all been pushed towards similar solutions for similar problems. The creation of one-party states in Africa has been a way of countering tribalism and promoting national integration. It has been a means of utilizing the scarce numbers of skilled personnel to the optimum instead of "wasting" a certain number in opposition politics. It has been essential to economic survival not only by protecting the national budget against excessive demands of small but effective interest-groups (salaried employees organized as trade-unions, cash-crop farmers organized in syndicates) but also by ensuring the strongest possible stance towards the external world, increasing maneuverability in obtaining external economic aid. Mr. Oakes draws from these facts a very simple conclusion:

"The new African states can succeed—and if given a chance they will—not as satellites of East and West, not necessarily as free-enterprise parliamentary democracies, but as independent entities growing along African lines out of the African soil. American policy toward them is, or ought to be, to help them stand on their own feet, help them sustain their independence, help them to achieve real freedom of choice in determining their own governmental systems. We must not be deterred from this goal because some of these countries are neutralist, many are

socialist and most are, at least for the present, semiauthoritarian. None of these characteristics is in accordance with the American way; but in subsaharan Africa we are going to have to live with them."

Mr. Oakes performs a further useful service by placing before us in the same context the new forces of Eastern Europe. Here what he has to say is more familiar. He says it with the same tone of judicious patience and guarded hopefulness that he uses for his analysis of African neutralism. As we must "live with" the latter, so he suggests we must seek to "keep open the channels of communication" with Eastern Europe in the hope of hastening and intensifying the "process of dilution" of Communism that has long since been begun.

This does not pretend to be a work of scholarship, though it points to important problems to which scholars must address themselves. It is rather an attempt to cut through the daily newspaper reports with a clear viewpoint, and thus enable the reader to make more sober and more sophisticated judgments on some current happenings.—IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *Columbia University*.

*The Changing Patterns of the Middle East.* By PIERRE RONDOT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. 221. \$5.00.)

This book is a skillful introductory survey of modern Middle East political forces and patterns. The "changing patterns" alluded to in the title will disappoint the student who expects to find a new key to new trends in the region, for the term refers to the fluidity associated with the entry of the Middle East into the modern world against the background of centuries of stagnation. It is perhaps the foremost merit of the book that it adroitly blends historical analysis with contemporary observation. The instructor in Middle East politics faces no more exacting problem than that of conveying old history and pointing up its relevance to students accustomed to investigating behavior by analyzing last week's events, in the apparent conviction that history was correctly defined by the late Ford. Modern social science often permits the illusion, at least, that such a procedure is possible. In the study of the Middle East even the illusion evaporates, given the different scale on which time in that region is measured, and the extent to which political behavior there consciously accrues from ancient dilemmas and myths.

A second significant merit of the book is the sure touch with which the author analytically interlocks the forces at play within each Arab country with those operating in inter-Arab relations, and in turn ties these to the relations of the Arab world within the broader international

arena and the cold war. This too is a problem sharply felt by the instructor whose students may tend unduly to separate domestic politics from regional and international politics. Again, while in the west such a procedure is tentatively possible, permitting considerable quantities of data to be arranged in plausible models, it does not meet the test of the Middle East. This is so not only because of the colonial history which colors the attitudes of its people to the international arena, but the more so because of the economic and strategic significance customarily attributed to the region by external actors.

The broad historical perspective of the author enables him to select and state with unusual lucidity three basic stages in the political development of the modern Middle East. These are the "period of Arab nationalism" from 1919-1936, the "period of Arab-Israeli tension" from 1936-1955, and the "period of Soviet intervention" which began in 1955. While this selection of stages assists in the detection of patterns, it does not greatly enhance the accretion of conclusions. If the analysis permits any conclusion, it may only be that no change need be anticipated in the characteristic political patterns of the region.

One generalization which the author is at great pains to elaborate seems open to serious challenge: the prime importance of Zionism and the establishment of Israel as fundamental determinants of Arab political modes and reactions. This aberration possibly affords an instance of how the political scientist can usefully caution the political historian. There can be little doubt that the Zionist incursion accelerated the Arab revolution. However, it is patently unlikely that Israel was necessary to revolutionary Arab nationalism or significantly shaped it. Israel is but an incident in the ubiquitous clash between Islamic "tradition" and western "progress" which works itself out within the various economic and social strata of the population, within the various states, among those states, and through the avenues of the cold war. The author clarifies these forces with distinction, and on his own terms it would appear redundant to lean upon Israel for the explanation of Arab movements and diplomacy. Were Israel to be struck from the modern map of the Middle East, or indeed had it never been allowed to decorate that map in the first place, Nasser would still be Nasser and the cold war would surely rock the cradle of civilization.—NOAH LUCATZ, *Southern Illinois University*, (East St. Louis Center).

*Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism.* By FERENC A. VÁLI. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xvii, 590. \$9.75.)

Professor Váli's monumental study of recent Hungarian politics was published almost exactly on the fifth anniversary of the October 1956 revolt in Budapest. Following in the footsteps of the first excited accounts breathlessly detailing the sensational events of the revolt, this historically objective and scholarly book with its panoramic view of pre- and post-revolutionary Hungary will immensely enrich our understanding of the intricate maze of recent Eastern European politics. The diligent author has performed an admirable job in a relatively brief time-span. Indeed not only has he offered us a meticulous analytical survey of the events immediately preceding the climactic few days of the popular explosion itself, but he has also been able to investigate and present the manifold "means of coercion and control" as well as of "satellite synchronization" so shrewdly and ruthlessly practiced by the Kádár government ever since November 1956. In a lucid chronological and logical sequence the causes of the "rift" lead first to the effect—the "revolt"—and ultimately to the after-effect itself: to the tortuous road travelled and the manifold ups-and-downs staged by the present regime in Budapest.

Váli's book is divided into five major phases. The author first examines the "Hotbed of Conflicts: The Stalinist Dictatorship" (1949-1953), then the period of "Dual Leadership—Conflicting Policies" (1953-1955), followed by the era of "Single Leadership—Divided Party" (1955-1956), "The Revolution" (1956) and finally by the fifth phase: "Aftermath of a Revolution" (1957-1961). The recurring *Leitmotiv* throughout is the inevitable and explosive conflict of nationalism and communism which has produced not only violent popular revolts in Eastern Europe, but has also been responsible for the Polish, the Yugoslav (and more recently even the Albanian) "roads to socialism." It is the author's fervent conviction that this endemic and infectious pattern of violent nationalism will oppose Soviet-imposed forms of Communism everywhere throughout the once-monolithic bloc and will eventually denote the total "bankruptcy of Soviet-satellite relations."

This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees with Professor Váli's principal conclusions concerning the Revolution itself—namely that it was negativist (an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist outburst triggered off by massive popular resentment against Soviet rule), spontaneous, largely unplanned and overwhelmingly leaderless. The author disagrees with those of our fellow-professionals who portray the Hungarian revolt either as essentially a "test case of national Communism," or as primarily socialist in orientation, or again as a struggle in the search for self-

determination for all of Eastern Europe. Actually, Váli has offered us such an eminently thorough and careful reading of Hungarian history—ranging from published sources in several languages to personal interviews of numerous refugees and to the full use of the Columbia University Hungarian research project—that his “Nationalism Versus Communism” theme looms as by far the most valid psychological-political interpretation of Hungary’s post-World War II evolution.

In this context, evolution is probably not the most felicitous phrase. Postwar Hungary looms more like a case study in galloping and involuntary political satellitism in which the principle of greatly reduced sovereignty and dependence on the dominant power remains qualitatively constant, while the degree of dependence and the means and techniques of control seem to fluctuate quantitatively according to the changing dictates of Soviet and world politics. The picture painted in this scholarly study is a far cry from the expected monolithic unity; on the contrary, even the dull ideological facade of today’s Kádár government hides fascinating and multiple political deviations both to the left and the right. The story of the post-revolutionary repressions is almost equally complex and not simply a stereotyped sequence of horrors presented to the indignant reader with television-patented breathlessness. Dr. Váli’s first-rate discussion of gradualism and selectivity in Kádár’s repression process is one of the most noteworthy aspects of his work.

A related facet of prime significance to the political scientist is an analysis of the essential duality of Hungary’s post-revolutionary government. At first political power was exercised *literally* on simultaneous levels by the revolutionary institutions on the one hand and the so-called “legal” institutions on the other. It then took the Kádár regime several months to liquidate, by a police process of continuous erosion, the remnants of such important revolutionary organs as the workers’ councils and finally establish the monopoly of its own, widely publicized and allegedly “legal” institutions. Indeed, there seems to be an element of creeping duality in all phases and all types of satellite government. Soviet-inspired Communism inevitably pits party-rule against government-rule, semi-popular rule against rule by a small and antagonistic clique (e.g., the perennial Rákosi-Nagy struggle for power), military against civilian, or native Communists embroiled in factional controversies with Moscow-oriented and Comintern-trained Stalinists. In Váli’s scholarly account most of these patterns of duality emerge with force and clarity despite the incredible murkiness and elu-

sive “Now you see me, now you don’t” aspect of Hungarian domestic politics.

The Harvard University Press performed an outstanding publishing job which further enhances the professional value of the excellent bibliography, charts, maps and index of *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*. This reviewer emphatically agrees with the *London Times* which highlighted its summary of the book (in its issue of January 18, 1962) with the trenchant comment: “Mr. Váli has used his voluminous sources with skill. His narrative marches purposefully forward and his analyses are always illuminating. *This is contemporary history at its best.*”—ANDREW GEORGY, *Boston University*.

*Our Fundamental Rights: Their Nature and Extent (As Judicially Determined).* By D. N. BANERJEE. (Calcutta: 1960. Pp. ix, 483. 37s. 6d.)

Professor Banerjee’s monograph is a detailed examination of the impact of judicial review, as exercised by the Indian Supreme Court, on the application and extension of the Bill of Rights section of the present, republican constitution of India. The author is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Calcutta.

Indian scholarship, since the new constitution went into force on January 26th, 1950, has been rich in studies of various aspects of its judicial interpretation; but the interpretive writing on political and civil Rights under the constitution has largely been undertaken by foreigners—for example, by Alan Gledhill and C. H. Alexandrowicz—and the definitive study by an Indian author has still to appear. Part of the trouble may be that Indian writers, after more than a decade of working judicial interpretation of the constitution, are still too deferential in their approach to the judicial process as a whole and disinclined to take strong positions in regard to individual judicial opinions or even individual judges personally. There is, to be sure, very often a fine line to be drawn between fair comment and criticism that is purely intemperate or pejorative; but, as Jeremy Bentham points out, “the law is not made by judge alone, but by judge and company.” Certainly the detailed and continuing appraisal and criticism of judicial opinions—both as to their reasoning and also as to their end results—in the law reviews and commentaries in the United States, has been, over the years, a major factor in the effectuation of legal change and growth.

Professor Banerjee, in common with other Indian commentators, relies far too heavily on lengthy quotations from assorted judicial opin-



ions, from both majority and minority judges, incorporated directly into the main text, the footnotes being formal and cursory. This makes for a somewhat discursive presentation and lessens the impact of Mr. Banerjee's evaluations, when he chooses to make them. When he does so, he writes with power and eloquence. Thus, after reviewing the case law on the "Fundamental Right to Property" under the constitution, and the ensuing constitutional amendments which the federal government had enacted to overcome judicial decisions hostile to its land expropriation and related measures, Professor Banerjee concludes that the right to property has "become, legally speaking, whatever might be the sociopolitical justification of the changes, almost, unlike our other Fundamental Rights, a myth." One can only regret that he has not further developed these and similar appraisals of the actual working operation of the constitutional Bill of Rights, for this would give this careful and detailed review of the case law the light and shade effects that it needs to shape and determine judicial responses in future cases.—EDWARD McWHINNEY, *University of Toronto*.

*Parliaments and Electoral Systems: A World Handbook*. Pp. 128. 15s. (London: The Institute of Electoral Research, Ltd. 1962.)

The latest publication of the Institute's series on elections and electoral systems is a thumbnail description of the formal governmental structure, the system of electing the national legislature, and the suffrage provision (usually age) in 118 countries, exclusive of unions. It is scarcely a substitute for the *Statesman's Yearbook* or the Council on Foreign Relations' *Political Handbook of the World*, but it may be a quicker reference for the items mentioned above. There is an interesting description and classification of terms, in which such devices as the block vote, the cumulative vote, the limited vote, and the single non-transferable vote are grouped together in a sub-category of "majority" systems called the *simple recurring majority* type. There is no index, but the countries are listed alphabetically. The date as of which the data are valid is not specified, but it must be early in 1961, because Syria is still classified under the United Arab Republic.—AVERY LEISERSON, *Vanderbilt University*.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

HIRAM M. STOUT

*Washington, D. C.*

### *General*

Bryan, Carter R. Security and News in Liberal Countries. *Journalism Quarterly*, Autumn 1961.

Laqueur, Walter Z. The Emergence of Polycentrism. *New Leader*, January 8, 1961.

Peffer, Nathaniel. Colonialism: New Problems for Old. *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Winter, 1961.

### *United Kingdom and Commonwealth*

Amory, Rt. Hon. Viscount. Preparing the Budget. *Parliamentary Affairs*, Autumn, 1961.

Berndt, Frank. A Free Press and a Fair Trial: England v. the United States. *Western Reserve Law Review*, December, 1961.

Berrington, Hugh. The Conservative Party: Revolts and Pressures—1955–1961. *The Political Quarterly*, October–December, 1961.

Biffen, W. J. Party Conference and Party Policy. *The Political Quarterly*, July–September, 1961.

Britain's Defence Services. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (R. 5064).

Bromhead, Peter. Mr. Wedgwood Benn, the Peerage, and the Constitution. *Parliamentary Affairs*, Autumn, 1961.

Buck, Philip W. M. P.s in Ministerial Office, 1918–55 and 1955–9. *Political Studies*, October, 1961.

Cassstevens, Thomas W. Party Theories and British Parties. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, November, 1961.

Constitutional Development in the Commonwealth. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (RF. P 5047).

Critchley, Julian. The Intellectuals. *The Political Quarterly*, July–September, 1961.

Fairlie, Henry. The Exclusive Ones. *Encounter*, December, 1961.

Gaster, Vivian I. Planning in Cambridge. *Contemporary Review*, November, 1961.

Heasman, D. J. British Political Attitudes. *Dalhousie Review*, Autumn, 1961.

Hennessy, David. The Communication of Conservative Policy 1957–59. *The Political Quarterly*, July–September, 1961.

Hollis, Christopher. The Conservative Party in

- History. *The Political Quarterly*. July–September, 1961.
- Hornby, Richard. Conservative Principles. *The Political Quarterly*. July–September, 1961.
- Jeger, Lena M. The Politics of Family Planning. *Political Quarterly*. January–March, 1962.
- Land Use in an Urban Environment; a General View of Town and Country Planning. *Town Planning Review*. October, 1961–January, 1962.
- Layton, Christopher. Labour and Europe. *Political Quarterly*. January–March, 1962.
- London Government: Government Proposals for Reorganization. London, H. M. S. O., 1961. (Cmd. 1562).
- Marquand, David. Passion and Politics. *Encounter*. December, 1961.
- Mawer, R. Knox. Juries and Assessors in Criminal Trials in Some Commonwealth Countries: A Preliminary Survey. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1961.
- Mohan, Jitendra. The Commonwealth Without South Africa: An Asian View. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1961. (Behind the Headlines, v. 21, no. 4).
- Negley, Glenn R. The British Administrative Staff College-Training for Executive Responsibility. *Personnel Administration*. January–February, 1962.
- Noel-Baker, Francis. "The Gray Zone." The Problem of the Business Affiliations of Members of Parliament. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Winter, 1961–62.
- Parry, Clive. The Foreign Office Archives. *International Relations*. October, 1961.
- Pickles, William. The Decline of Parliament. *Statist*. January 5, 1962.
- Platt, D. C. M. The Commercial and Industrial Interests of Ministers of the Crown. *Political Studies*. October, 1961.
- Political Development in the United Kingdom Dependencies. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (I. D. 1286 rev.)
- Public Finance in Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (No. R. 5129).
- Rose, Richard. Tensions in Conservative Philosophy. *The Political Quarterly*. July–September, 1961.
- Rose, Richard. The Bow Group's Role in British Politics. *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.
- Sanderson, J. B. The National Smoke Abatement Society and the Clean Air Act (1956). *Political Studies*. October, 1961.
- Schneider, Fred D. The Study of Parliamentary Government in the Commonwealth. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Autumn, 1961.
- The Central Government of Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (R. F. P. 5149).
- Walker, Patrick Gordon. Federalism in the Commonwealth. *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*. October, 1961.

#### Western Europe

- Alisky, Marvin. Spain's Press and Broadcasting: Conformity and Censorship. *Journalism Quarterly*. Winter, 1962.
- Anthem, Thomas. The Greek Elections. *Contemporary Review*. December, 1961.
- Berlia, Georges. Essai sur la Cinquième République. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. November–December, 1961.
- Campbell, Angus, and Valen, Henry. Party Identification in Norway and the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1961.
- Constitution. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany; Amendments as of December 31, 1962. New York, German Information Center, 1962.
- Coty, René. Portrait d'un Republicain: Marcel Plaisant. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. January, 1962.
- De Marchi, Ernest. Trends in Italy: an "Opening to the Left?" *Orbis*. Winter, 1962.
- Grandchamp, René. Allemagne 62: Continuité de la Politique Interieure et Exterieur. *Revue Militaire d'Information*, January, 1962.
- Hamon, Leo and Emeri, Claude. Vie et Droit Parliementaires. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. November–December, 1961.
- Hirsch, Felix E. Europe Today; a Bibliography. 3d rev. ed., with supplement. Trenton, N. J., Roscoe L. West Library, Trenton State College, 1961.
- Ireland: A New Chapter. *Round Table*. December, 1961.
- Italian Communist Party Debate, 5–7 October, 1961. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1961. (JPRS: 11575).
- Lutz, Hans. Kirche und Sozial-demokratie. *Zeitschrift für Politik*. No. 4, 1961.
- Maranini, Giuseppe. Rapports entre le Pouvoir Exécutif et le Pouvoir Législatif en Italie. *Synthèses*. October, 1961.
- Marette, Jacques. L'U. N. R. et l'Election Législative Partielle du 9e Arrondissement (4–11 Juin 1961). *Revue Française de Science Politique*. December, 1961.
- Middleton, W. L. Gaullist Prospects. *Contemporary Review*. December, 1961.
- Nenni, Pietro. Where the Italian Socialists Stand. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.
- Rougier, Louis. La Tradition Insurrectionnelle de la France. *Review des Deux Mondes*. December 1, 1961.

The Atlantic Report on Bonn. *Atlantic Monthly*. January, 1962.

Triesch, Gunter. Struktur eines Parlaments. *Politische Meinung*. November, 1961.

Waline, Jean. Les Groupes Parlementaires en France. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. November-December, 1961.

Williams, J. Emlyn. Federal Elections in West Germany. *World Today*. December, 1961.

Williams, Philip. The French Army. *Encounter*. December, 1961.

Zeidler, Karl. Gedanken zum Fernseh-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts*. January, 1962.

#### *Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

Adams, Arthur E. Khrushchev's Motivations. *New Leader*. January 8, 1962.

Akhminov, Herman. The "Permanent Purge" in the New Party Program. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. October, 1961.

Avtorkhanov, A. The Political Significance of the Twenty-Second Party Congress. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. November, 1961.

Biddleford, James. Conflicting Orientations in Soviet Leadership. *SAIS Review*. Winter, 1961.

Bromke, Adam. The "Znak" Group in Poland. *East Europe*. January and February, 1962.

Brown, J. F. Albania, Mirror of Conflict. *Survey*. January, 1962.

Cabanne, Claude. Le XXIIe Congrès du Parti Communiste de l'U.R.S.S.: Retour aux Sources, Assouplissement du Régime? *Revue Militaire d'Information*. December, 1961.

Conquest, Robert. The Three Funerals of Joseph Stalin. *Problems of Communism*. January-February, 1962.

Constas, Helen. The U. S. S. R.—from Charismatic Sect to Bureaucratic Society. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Croan, Melvin. Ulbricht: Will He Last? *East Europe*. December, 1961.

Crossman, R. H. S. Reading Khrushchev's Mind. *Commentary*. December, 1961.

Degras, Jane. Communists in Congress; the 22nd Meeting in Moscow. *World Today*. December, 1961.

Destalinizing Eastern Europe. *East Europe*. January, 1962.

Dilo, Jani I. The Communist Party Leadership in Albania. Washington, Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University, 1961.

Fainsod, Merle. The 22nd Party Congress. *Problems of Communism*. Special Supplement. November-December, 1961.

Galay, Nikolai. The Soviet Armed Forces and the Twenty-second Party Congress. *Bulletin of*

*the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. January, 1962.

Ginsburgs, George. Objective Truth and the Judicial Process in Post-Stalinist Jurisprudence. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*. Winter-Spring, 1961.

Greenslade, Rush, V. Forward to Communism? *Problems of Communism*. January-February, 1962.

Handlin, Oscar. The Failure of Communism—and What it Portends. *Atlantic Monthly*. December, 1961.

Hoy, Gerald E. The Abolition of Income Tax in the USSR. *Canadian Tax Journal*. November-December, 1961.

Hulicka, Karel. The Welfare State: Soviet Ideology and Practice. *Midwest Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Karavaev, A. The Sick Dictatorship. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. December, 1961.

Katona, P. and Jotischky, L. Hungary: Five Years after the Revolution. *British Survey*. November, 1961. (Main series no. 152).

Kubat, Daniel. Communist Use of the Czechoslovak Parliament since World War II. *Slavic Review*. December, 1961.

Landy, Paul. Reforms in Yugoslavia. *Problems of Communism*. November-December, 1961.

Lawyers in the "New Society." *East Europe*. December, 1961.

Leading Positions and Personalities in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. November, 1961. Supplement.

Lowenthal, Richard. Schism among the Faithful. *Problems of Communism*. January-February, 1962.

Markham, James W. Effects of "the Thaw" on the Soviet Press. *Journalism Quarterly*. Autumn, 1961.

Moll, W. The Catalog as a Political Weapon. *Library Journal*. February 15, 1962.

Mosely, Philip E. Khrushchev's Party Congress. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

Neal, Fred Warner. Titoist Theory and Titoist Practice. *Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2, 1961.

Oppenheimer, Max, Jr. Some Linguistic Aspects of Mind Conditioning by the Soviet Press. *Journal of Human Relations*. Autumn, 1961.

Pierre, André. Le XXIIe Congrès du Parti Communiste de l'U. R. S. S., *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. December, 1961.

Prittie, Terence. East Germany: Record of Failure. *Problems of Communism*. November-December, 1961.

Reports and Articles Follow Up the Party

Congress. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. December 27, 1961.

Roucek, Joseph S. Albania in Geopolitics. *Contemporary Review*. January, 1962.

Rush, Myron. The Khrushchev Succession Problem. *World Politics*. January, 1962.

Shinn, William T., Jr. The Law of the Russian Peasant Household. *Slavic Review*. December, 1961.

Skilling, H. Gordon. Gottwald and the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. *Slavic Review*. December, 1961.

Taylor, Lord. Deep Analysis of the Russian Mind. *The New York Times Magazine*. January 7, 1962.

Vakar, Nicholas P. Creeds and Communism. *East Europe*. December, 1961.

Yurchenko, A. The State and the New Party Program. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. December, 1961.

Zinner, Paul E. The Vacancy in the Mausoleum. *East Europe*. January, 1962.

#### *Middle East and Arab North Africa*

Agwani, M. S. The Ba'th: A Study in Contemporary Arab Politics. *International Studies* (New Delhi). July, 1961.

Ashford, Douglas E. Elections in Morocco: Progress or Confusion? *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1961.

Bayne, E. A. No Magic in Israel. American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Southwest Asia series, v. 10, no. 9 (Israel). September, 1961.

Grandchamp, René. Elections Capitales en Turquie et en Grèce. *Revue Militaire d'Information*. December, 1961.

Heymann, Egon. Zerbrochene Einheit: Syrien geht seinen eigenen Weg. *Politische Meinung*. November, 1961.

Kapani, Munci. Outlines of the New Turkish Constitution. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Winter, 1961-62.

Rondot, Pierre. Le Nassérisme après la sécession de la Syrie. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. January, 1962.

Sablier, Edouard. D'Ataturk à la IIe République Turque. *Revue de Paris*. November, 1961.

Salpeter, Eliahu. Israel Knesset Elections. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. November, 1961.

Seymour, I. Destins de l'Iran. *Revue des Deux Mondes*. December 1, 1961.

Syrian Break from the United Arab Republic. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. November, 1961.

The Atlantic Report on Syria. *Atlantic Monthly*. January, 1962.

Young, T. Cuyler. Iran in Continuing Crisis. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

#### *Africa*

Austin, Dennis. The Political Scene in Ghana. *Political Quarterly*. January-March, 1962.

Brown, Peter. The Liberal Party of South Africa. *Contemporary Review*. November, 1961.

Bullard, W. E. Guinean Diary: Life in Africa's First Marxist State. *Harper's Magazine*. December, 1961.

Cannon, R. W. Law, Bench and Bar in the Protectorate of Uganda. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Communism in Africa. Moscow's First Steps by David L. Morison. The West African Scene by Walter Kolarz. *Problems of Communism*. November-December, 1961.

Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic and Chad. British Information Services. London, 1961 (R. 4982).

D., G. V. South Africa Faces the Future. *World Today*. December, 1961.

Dalton, John H. The Predicaments of African Developments. *Social Science*. October, 1961.

Davies, Chief H. O. The New African Profile. *Foreign Affairs*. January, 1962.

Debrah, E. M. Understanding Ghana. *Social Science*. October, 1961.

Gareau, Frederick J. Bloc Politics in West Africa. *Orbis*. Winter, 1962.

Ghana's First Five Years. *West African Review*. January, 1962.

Hopkinson, Tom. The Congo's Challenge. *Optima*. December, 1961.

Huxley, Elspeth. Some Observations on the African Personality. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Winter, 1962.

Incorporation of the Northern Cameroons into the Federation of Nigeria; exchange of letters between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation of Nigeria. London, H.M.S.O., 1961. (Cmd. 1567).

La Crise du Congo (ex-belge); Chronologie (Juin 1960-Aout 1961). Paris, Documentation Française, 1961. (Notes et études documentaires, no. 2834).

LeVine, Victor T. The New Cameroon Federation. *Africa Report*. December, 1961.

Lowenkopf, Martin. Uganda: Prelude to Independence. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Winter, 1961-62.

Mittlebeeler, Emmet V. European Colonialism in Africa. Washington, Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University, 1961.

Nigeria's First Year. *Round Table*. December, 1961.

The Kenya Coastal Strip; Report of the Commissioner. London, H.M.S.O., 1961. (Cmd. 1585).

Uganda; Report of the Uganda Constitutional Conference 1961, and Text of the Agreed Draft

of a New Buganda Agreement Initialled in London on the 9th of October, 1961. London, H.M.S.O., 1961 (Cmd. 1523).

Vermont, René. La Fusion des Cameroun; un Événement en Afrique Noire. *Revue Militaire d'Information*. November, 1961.

Worley, Parker, comp. *Africa Today*. rev. Trenton, N. J., Roscoe L. West Library, Trenton State College, 1961.

#### *South and Southeast Asia*

Ahmed, G. Changes in the Administrative Organization of the Government of Pakistan since 1953. *Public Administration*. Winter, 1961.

Arora, R. S. Rise of the Public Corporation in India: Some Constitutional Aspects. *Public Law*. Winter, 1961.

Fall, Bernard B. Reappraisal in Laos. *Current History*. January, 1962.

Federation of Malaysia: Joint Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom of the Federation of Malaya. London, H.M.S.O., 1961. (Cmd. 1563).

Friedman, Harry J. Notes on Pakistan's Basic Democracies. *Asian Survey*. December, 1961.

House, E. Malcolm. India under the Impact of Western Political Ideas and Institutions. *The Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Jensen, J. V. Burma's Experiment in a State Religion. *Commonweal*. December 15, 1961.

Linebarger, Genevieve Collins. Leadership in Southeast Asia. *SAIS Review*. Winter, 1962.

Nathanson, Nathaniel L. Indian Constitutional Law in American Perspective. *Northwestern University Law Review*. May-June, 1961.

Pakistan. A special survey. *The Economist*. December 2, 1961.

Sadka, Emma. Singapore and the Federation: Problems of Merger. *Asian Survey*. January, 1962.

Sharma, B. A. V. and Valecha, N. M. The Indian President. *Political Quarterly*. January-March, 1962.

The Military Legal Systems of Southeast Asia. *Military Law Review*, October 1, 1961.

Turner, Ralph E. Southeast Asiatic Cultures; Special Significance for Planning and Administering American Aid. Foreword by Dewey Anderson. Washington, Public Affairs Institute, 1962.

Van der Kroef, Justus M. Recent Developments in West New Guinea. *Pacific Affairs*. Fall, 1961.

Woodward, Calvin A. The Trotskyite Movement in Ceylon. *World Politics*. January, 1962.

#### *Far East*

Bradner, Stephen. Korea: Experiment and Instability. *Japan Quarterly*. October-December, 1961.

Chassin, L. M. De Fourier à Mao Tse-tung ou du Phalanstère à la Commune du Peuple. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. February, 1962.

Cohen, Arthur A. How Original is "Maoism?" *Problems of Communism*. November-December, 1961.

Eckersley, T. W. The Imperial Institution in Japan. *India Quarterly*. April-June, 1961.

Hinton, Harold C. Tiger at the Gate. *Commonweal*. January 19, 1962.

Langdon, Frank C. Organized Interests in Japan and their Influence on Political Parties. *Pacific Affairs*. Fall, 1961.

Milne, R. S. The Party System and Democracy in the Philippines. *Political Science*. September, 1961.

Milne, R. S. The Role of Government Corporations in the Philippines. *Pacific Affairs*. Fall, 1961.

Statute on Elections to Hural of People's Deputies in Aymaks, Cities, Somons, and Urban Districts of the Mongolian People's Republic. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1962. (JPRS: 12135).

Worley, Parker, comp. *Asia Today; a Bibliography*. rev. Trenton, N. J., Roscoe L. West Library, Trenton State College, 1960.

#### *Australia and New Zealand*

Bibliography of Research in the Social Sciences in Australia 1957-1960. Social Science Research Council of Australia. Canberra, 1961.

Burns, A. L. Problems of Australian Foreign Policy; January-June 1961. *Australian Journal of Politics and History*. November, 1961.

Holgate, Katherine. Liberal Party Problems in N. S. W. State Politics. *The Australian Quarterly*. December, 1961.

#### *Latin America and West Indies*

The Center of Latin American Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, began in January the publication of *Latin America in Periodical Literature*. The new monthly publication is designed "to present in summary form the material relating to Latin America included in a large number of periodicals of widely varying subject matter, published in this and other countries." The subscription price is \$4.00 annually, and orders may be addressed to the Center (Los Angeles 24, California).

Alexander, Robert J. Nationalism, Latin America's Predominant Ideology. *Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2, 1961.

Anderson, Charles W. Politics and Development Policy in Central America. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* November 1961.

- Beatty, Donald W. Middle Class Government in Chile. *Current History*. February, 1962.
- British Honduras. rev. British Information Services. Reference Division. New York, 1961.
- Brodowski, Joyce H., comp. Latin America Today; a Bibliography. Trenton, N. J., Roscoe L. West Library, Trenton State College, 1961.
- Carpentier, M. La Politique Étrangère du Brésil. *Revue Militaire Générale*. December, 1961.
- Deutschmann, Paul J., et al. Mass Media Use by Sub-elites in 11 Latin American Countries. *Journalism Quarterly*. Autumn, 1961.
- Grandchamp, René. Rôle et Avenir du Mexique. *Revue Militaire d'Information*. November, 1961.
- Holt, Pat M. Political Ferment in Columbia. *New Leader*. January 8, 1962.
- Johnson, John J. Politics and Economics in Brazil. *Current History*. February, 1962.
- Knowles, A. J. An Appraisal of the Cuban Revolution. *Queen's Quarterly*. Spring, 1961.
- Potash, Robert A. Argentina's Quest for Stability. *Current History*. February, 1962.
- Singer, Leonardo. Brazil's Parliamentarism in Crisis. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. December, 1961.
- Stolte, Stefan C. Latin America in the Danger Zone. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. November, 1961.
- Szule, Tad. This is Castro—Three Years After. *New York Times Magazine*. December 31, 1961.
- Tennenbaum, Frank. The Mexican Revolution—50 Years Later. *Challenge*. December, 1961.
- Worsnop, Richard L. Brazil in Ferment. Washington, Editorial Research Reports, 1962.

#### Canada

- Hull, W. H. N. The Public Control of Broadcasting: The Canadian and Australian Experiences. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. February, 1962.
- Jewett, Pauline. Voting in the 1960 Federal By-Elections at Peterborough and Niagara Falls: Who Voted New Party and Why? *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. February, 1962.
- Scarrow, Howard A. Pattern of Voter Turnout in Canada. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. November, 1961.
- Smiley, D. V. The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy, and Post-War Canadian Federalism. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. February, 1962.
- The Role of the Deputy Minister: I by J. H. Bieler; II by R. M. Burns; III by A. W. Johnson. *Canadian Public Administration*. December, 1961.

## INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

*America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity.* BY LIONEL GELBER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 356. \$5.00.)

This is a provocative and absorbing study in recent Anglo-American relations. It is an interpretive essay, not a documented and exhaustive monograph, and it profits from the virtues and suffers from the defects of the genre. The book has many brilliant insights but these are rarely developed in full and upon occasion their impact upon the major thesis of the work is not fully realized.

The author is a Canadian, a former Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and lecturer at the University of Toronto. What makes the work of peculiar interest, however, are not these academic qualifications but the fact that Mr. Gelber is Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Canada and puts forward a view of Anglo-American relations which many persons of authority in the Commonwealth undoubtedly share. His thesis can be put thus: Peace is preserved by an East-West balance of power and Anglo-American solidarity is the chief support of this equilibrium. This unique friendship makes feasible the coalition strategy

of the West. Their special relationship is not only based upon a common law, language and literature but upon the fact that through their free institutions they have been schooled to cooperate. Their relations exhibit a dialectical process in which the English-speaking people diverge and then, on a new plane, reconcile clashing interests for the sake of a still higher common good. This higher common interest is the continuance of a free world order. It is this latter fact which enabled the transfer of primacy in the leadership of the West to occur with so little friction and jealousy. Differences did arise—there were wartime fears in Washington that Britain was trying to form an Anglo-American bloc against the Soviet Union, for example—but, given the magnitude of the problems faced and the difficult nature of the decisions taken, these differences were amazingly few. The most signal failure in cooperation involved, of course, post-war policies on atomic weapons and Mr. Gelber makes clear the tragic waste of resources which this entailed.

Although relying too heavily on the Eden memoirs, the chapter on the Suez crisis is worthy of the close scrutiny of American students. It makes clear that the chief failure of Dulles's

policy lay in his inability to inspire confidence in the minds of British leaders, and that on the British side there was an inadequate grasp of the extent to which American policy was controlled by global rather than regional considerations.

The divergences at the time of Suez and the failure to continue the wartime cooperation on atomic energy suggest that, as it stands, Gelber's thesis is inadequate to explain all the facts concerning the Anglo-American relationship. A. E. Campbell has suggested (*The Listener*, October 4, 1961) that the idea of a special relationship between the United States and Britain is a myth which served the function of permitting Britain to withdraw gracefully from clashes with the United States. This may put the matter a trifle too baldly but it does emphasize an important point, namely that the relationship in question arose only in the last decade of the nineteenth century when the United States achieved great power. During this early period Britain did in fact give way whenever serious clashes occurred—in Venezuela, Panama and Alaska. In two world wars America intervened only when forced to do so. Certainly the thesis that a special relationship existed was always more strongly felt in Britain than in America and is reflected in the author's perfunctory treatment of the dilemmas presented by the emergence of the Common Market. He fails to grasp the significance for his thesis of the fact that, while the British consistently dragged their collective feet, the Americans could see no basic reason why Britain should oppose closer relations with Europe.

The parts of the book dealing with the impact of the new weapons upon coalition strategy are particularly fine. The complex variables involved are analyzed with acuteness and rare subtlety. In sum, this is a work of considerable penetration, clearly written and forcefully argued. If the major thesis is pressed too hard at times and cannot bear the full weight demanded of it by the author, it nevertheless serves as an organizing hypothesis for a good deal of recent international politics.—C. B. JOYNT, *Lehigh University*.

*Around the Edge of War.* BY JOHN FORTH AMORY.  
(New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc. Pp. 185. \$4.50.)

This book joins the barrage of criticism of American foreign policy which has become more intense with each passing year. The author adds a cryptic overtone to his study by writing under a pen name and depicting himself as "a strategically placed Washington expert."

The book correctly points out that a major failure of post-war American foreign policy has been the inability of the United States to under-

stand and support the rising underprivileged majorities in the underdeveloped countries of the non-Western world. The author labels these emerging revolutionary forces as "people power." Instead of assisting the evolution of these groups the United States is supporting small reactionary elites in these countries who are suppressing the inevitable forces of progress and are primarily concerned with maintaining their dominant position.

The present nuclear stalemate between the Western and Communist blocs, the author claims, has encouraged the Soviet Union to pursue its aggressive aims by exploiting these massive discontented groups and utilizing them for its own ulterior ends. The Communists have achieved this important goal by stressing political, economic, and social reforms to needy and receptive people. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in directing this revolutionary tide, and if the United States fails to halt this trend and win the support of these rising forces, the world balance of power will shift decisively and irrevocably in favor of the Communists.

One solution to this dilemma as proposed by the author is appropriate and timely. He encourages the United States to place greater stress on non-military aid programs in the underdeveloped countries. He urges an emphasis on American ideology upholding the rights of the individual—a "Jeffersonian weapon"—to capture the thinking and aspirations of these people. This policy would create a "nuclear shield" by steering the uncommitted nations away from the Communist bloc and shifting the balance of power in favor of the United States.

Yet in spite of some sound analysis and good proposals this book has several serious shortcomings. With gross oversimplification of an exceedingly complex process the author places the blame for the failures of American foreign policy on a single group: the American overseas investors. In no way does he document what he believes to be the dominant power wielded by this group over the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. He merely assumes it exists.

The author fails to explain that the process of making foreign policy in the United States is extremely complicated and fluid. And the influence of American overseas investors on foreign policy in many regions of the world is a minor one. Dollar diplomacy has steadily declined since the 1920s. Since World War II the American military establishment has played a much greater role than American overseas investors in the conduct of foreign policy. This is especially true in Asia and the Middle East. And in many countries

American business interests are assisting, not opposing, the emerging progressive forces which are demanding a new and better life.

Another weakness in this study is the author's uninformed condemnation of the Central Intelligence Agency for many of the failures of American foreign policy. CIA is blamed for giving the top-level policy makers a distorted image of the world. Allen Dulles is depicted as a tool of "overseas business interests." While CIA has many deficiencies, its acquisition and evaluation of intelligence is probably the most noteworthy contribution it has made to the formulation of foreign policy in the post-war era.

Finally, when the author states that Latin America is the most vital region in the world to the national interest of the United States he reveals the narrow and parochial approach which distorts his assessment of the foreign policy process. He has posited certain premises regarding American objectives in one specific region and applied them to the entire world. Without adequate knowledge of the conditions in other regions of the world this is a dangerous and questionable practice.

In an era of continual tension and growing responsibility the American people need more enlightenment on the conduct of foreign affairs. They need a better understanding of the many diverse forces inside and outside the United States which actually influence their foreign policy. While this book offers some good suggestions on long-range American objectives it does nothing to shed light on the process of making American foreign policy. Let us hope it is soon superseded by a better book on this timely and vital subject.—FRANK C. DARLING, *University of Colorado*.

*When Nations Disagree: A Handbook on Peace through Law.* BY ARTHUR LARSON. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 251. \$3.95.)

In recent years an increasing number of lawyers and public servants have been urging the development of a "world rule of law" as our best hope of survival in the atomic age. Rarely, however, do they make explicit the basic assumptions and components on which a "world rule of law" should be based. *When Nations Disagree* is an attempt by Dr. Arthur Larson, Director of the World Rule of Law Center at Duke University, to set forth the underlying premises of the "world rule of law" idea and to present a concrete description of the steps needed to strengthen the rule of law in international relations.

Unlike others who often unrealistically advocate the substitution of law for politics in world affairs, Dr. Larson views "world law" as only one approach toward the creation of a more peace-

ful world, arguing that "... if a concept of 'world law' is given too diffuse a scope, it loses its distinctive power to set a clear line of practical action." While acknowledging the desirability of such ancillary actions as the strengthening of the United Nations and the encouragement of political, economic, and cultural moves, his main purpose is "... to see how the resources of law can be directly brought to bear on the problem of preventing conflict and building peace."

In view of the increasing number of books and articles dealing with nuclear deterrence and the possibility if not the probability of war, it is refreshing to find a book that seeks to exploit and project the capacity of states to attain internal order rather than pessimistically accepting the contemporary condition of international disorder.

Written in non-technical terms to reach a wide audience of civil servants, lawyers, businessmen, and teachers, *When Nations Disagree* attempts to enlist the support of the informed public for the "world rule of law" idea. As will be apparent subsequently, however, efforts to illuminate what is inherently a complex and controversial subject by discussion essentially popular in tone may result in oversimplification.

Following in the tradition of C. Wilfred Jenks' *The Common Law of Mankind*, Dr. Larson argues that international law needs to be expanded into a genuine world law which would differ from its predecessor not only by virtue of an expanded range of general principles drawn from the legal systems of non-Western as well as Western nations but also in its emphasis on an expanded scope of areas subject to regulation by law. He urges but does not elaborate upon the extension of the rule of law to such matters as outer space, international propaganda, and atomic energy.

But the existence of a body of law that is accessible, up to date, and suffused with principles drawn from the world's principal legal systems is only one component of an effective system of peace through law. The author devotes a considerable part of the book to an examination of three other basic prerequisites: improved machinery for the application of world law; acceptance of the "world rule of law" idea by all nations; and effective compliance with decisions rendered by an improved system of judicial machinery.

While space does not permit a detailed analysis of these suggestions, there is one major premise of central importance to the entire concept of world law. Explicit throughout is the author's assumption that most of the critical international disputes are justiciable in whole or in part, and Dr. Larson does a skilful job of delineating the legal aspects of the Berlin problem, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Egyptian blockade of



the Suez Canal to Israeli ships. It is doubtless valid that there are legal elements susceptible to adjudication in each of these examples, but it is submitted that the author never adequately faces up to the intrinsic limitations of law as a means of solving fundamentally political disputes which involve not the clarification of existing legal rights but aggressive demands for a change in the *status quo*. How can it be "... pointless to try to calculate the relative gravity of those controversies threatening the peace that are capable of final settlement through the judicial process"?

Any realistic assessment of the future prospects for the judicial settlement of international disputes must in part depend upon the character of previous decisions by the International Court of Justice and its predecessor. The experience of these institutions, however, demonstrates that the cases successfully adjudicated did not involve disputes that gravely threatened peace and security. While the major contemporary disputes involve legal elements, the unwillingness of one or both disputants to accept judicial settlement renders them non-justiciable. Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that voluntary submission would result in final settlement. A very recent illustration is provided by the Indian dispute with Portugal over Goa that was adjudicated by the International Court of Justice in 1960. The decision rendered obviously did not deter India from using force to bring about a spurious kind of justice to a dispute which Dr. Larson over-optimistically predicted nearer to solution at the time the book went to press.

Only a few of the interesting aspects of *When Nations Disagree* have been touched on in this review. While Dr. Larson deserves credit for developing a systematic and concrete program for the realization of a "world rule of law" in contrast to the more usual banalities that accompany this concept, a more realistic appreciation of the limitations of the role of law in relation to politics in a system of nation-states still dominated by the centrifugal forces of sovereignty and nationalism would have increased the value of the book.—RONALD J. YALEM, *Norfolk College of William and Mary*.

*Legal Problems of the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association.* WITH A FOREWORD BY SIR KENNETH DIPLOCK. Published under the Auspices of The British Institute of International and Comparative Law. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 110 \$3.95.)

The dream of saints, savants, and statesmen, from St. Isidore of Seville to Rousseau to Briand, of a politically united Europe may yet come to pass. It may be on the way, but it will certainly

not come through mere verbalized transfers of aspects of sovereignty to improvised parliamentary institutions. As John Jay so sagely pointed out in one of his Federalist Papers, union in form was ripe for the American states because already there was union in fact. The precedent essential sense of community for Europe is being developed at the center by the Inner Six with their European Economic Community and peripherally by the Outer Seven with their European Fair Trade Association. Already the centripetal forces engendered by solid success along pragmatic lines within the Common Market of the EEC have forced the Inner Six to extend their system to the hitherto omitted agricultural area of their community, have caused the United Kingdom to seek some kind of participation in the EEC, and have confronted the United States with the necessity—and opportunity—of making sweeping changes in its trade and tariff policies toward this new Europe and the larger Atlantic Community.

The present slender volume contains nine papers read at a conference held in London in September 1960 under the auspices of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and of the Federal Trust and Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. They deal entirely with legal problems involved in the economic, not political, relationships of the Community and the Association. They are the first of a series of supplementary publications brought out by the British Institute. Other publications, in the same series, planned for 1961, deal respectively with "Restrictive Trade Practices" and "Comparative Aspects of Legal Aid." Six of the nine papers are by officers of the EEC, including one on the Court of Justice by the President of the Court, Professor A. M. Donner. The other three are by non-officers similarly expert in EEC and Association affairs.

All of the papers assume a considerable knowledge of the structure and operations of the three European Communities: the Common Market or EEC, the Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom, as well as the two institutions common to the three communities, namely, the Court of Justice and the Parliamentary Assembly. Fortunately, seven of the discussions in the present work are confined to the EEC, the remaining two dealing with the European Free Trade Association and some of its relations to the EEC.

Of the seven papers centered on the EEC, two deal, respectively, with the objectives and constitutional structure of the EEC and with its legal framework; four deal, respectively, with (1) the establishment of companies, the spread of investment, and the problem of taxation, (2) the need for more uniformity in the law relating to the international sale of goods in Europe, (3) the

law relating to industrial property (patents, trade marks, and licenses) within the community, and (4) rules of competition and restrictive trade practices. Each of these papers, as well as the two on the Outer Seven Free Trade Association, discuss highly technical legal problems of greatest value to the expert in the respective fields. They reveal considerable invention of techniques, devices, formulae, and harmonizations necessitated by this mutation of relationships to a developing community. In many ways the problems encountered and in process of solution in EEC are reminiscent of those encountered within the national market of the United States, criss-crossed by the confederation and federation of the states since 1776, but not yet enjoying the salutary ordering of affairs by a central power with authority to lay down increasingly the law of the land. In due course, if union in fact in Europe continues, central formal authority may emerge.

The paper on the Court of Justice of the European Communities by its President should have special interest for students of American constitutional law. The Court is very much *sui generis*. Its jurisdiction in terms of law and parties, its procedure in four languages, its non-use of dissenting opinions, its use of advocates-general as substitutes for the clarifying processes of lower courts, and other unusual features make fascinating reading. Its contribution to a reign of law among the European states concerned, even if confined thus far to matters of economic significance, is most heartening. Though the Court appears to operate closely within its European matrix, "it would be surprising," as Paul Freund observed in his "Forum" lecture on the Supreme Court of the United States, if the European Court were not to find "much of value . . . in the experience of the Supreme Court during a century and a half in striking a working balance between the needs of the individual states and the freedom of the common market."—HENRY REIFF, *St. Lawrence University*.

*The United States and the United Nations*. Ed. by FRANCIS O. WILCOX and H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Pp. x, 188. \$4.50.)

Now that the United States stake in the United Nations is under close scrutiny, this slender volume which grew out of a mid-1961 conference held under the joint auspices of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Brookings Institution is of particular value. It is a symposium dealing with seven major subjects through seven essays. Each offers some timely observations and insights.

Joseph E. Johnson, in "Helping to Build New States" maintains that most new states should not

be expected to develop Western canons of political behavior and suggests that the greatest contribution of the United Nations might ultimately be the smoothing of *Western* adjustment to the fact of the new nations. In the second essay, "The Six Imperatives of Economic and Social Progress," Paul G. Hoffman presents a succinct analysis of the United Nations Special Fund and proposes that a greater proportion of international public assistance—in pre-investment and investment fields—be channeled through the United Nations. Lincoln P. Bloomfield's careful observations on the "new arithmetic" of voting alignments in the General Assembly form the most perceptive part of a thoughtful essay on "The New Diplomacy in the United Nations." Ernest A. Gross, in "Shifting Institutional Patterns of the United Nations" focusses on the most significant structural developments in the world organization. Inis L. Claude's essay "The Containment and Resolution of Disputes" is probably the most valuable contribution. His comparative analysis of United States and Soviet responses to United Nations "sealing-off" activities in the "no man's land" of the cold war is truly excellent. In his essay on "The Capacities of the United Nations" Harlan Cleveland sets forth three capacities as the most crucial: to act, to befriend, and to create. A balanced assessment of United States policy in the United Nations by Francis O. Wilcox concludes the volume.

The book as a whole highlights two general problems of great importance: first, the increasing interdependence of the two great conflicts of our time—the struggle over the expansion or containment of Communism and the struggle over the liquidation of Western colonialism—and the increasing complexity of the United States position in the United Nations as a result. The Soviet exploitation of the colonial struggle and the anti-colonial exploitation of the East-West struggle are confronting United States policy makers with more and more agonizing dilemmas in all organs of the world organization. Second, and perhaps most important, the book points up the necessity for clarifying United States policy toward the United Nations. Should we regard the world body as another version of NATO, that is, as a vehicle for the furtherance of Western interests? Or should we view it as genuinely neutral ground in the East-West struggle? Inis L. Claude's thoughts on this point are well worth pondering:

"We should concentrate less on equipping the organization to override Soviet opposition than on enabling it to gain Soviet acquiescence in, or support for, its playing an essentially neutralist role—one which contributes not to the winning of the Cold War by one side or the other, but to the limitation of the scope and intensity of that struggle. . . ."

—JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College*.

*The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities.* BY BENJAMIN V. COHEN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 106. \$2.75.)

The three all too short chapters which comprise this book were delivered as the Holmes Lectures at Harvard in the Spring of 1961. They represent the distilled wisdom of a long and fruitful association with the United Nations extending back to the author's participation as a White House adviser in the Department of State deliberations which gave birth to the American draft of the Charter of the United Nations. The author's association with this work was a fruitful one as he is what in current parlance is called an "innovator." At any moment of deadlock or stalled action he could be counted on for a fresh idea or a new approach.

Mr. Cohen's basic thesis is that the Charter of the United Nations has within it all the possibilities and potentialities for growth to deal with today's formidable problems. The trouble lies not in the Charter but in the willingness of the Members to use it and to support action under it. The lack is one of will and of consensus. It is not the Charter which impedes the expansion of United Nations activities, Mr. Cohen rightly declares, but a lack of working consensus among the Member States. The Charter, he adds, has created an organism capable of life and growth, but that life and growth depend not only on the words of the Charter but on the way the Member States meet their responsibilities and exercise their rights and privileges under the Charter.

For Mr. Cohen the basic law of the Charter is to be found in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2—(1) that all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security are not endangered; and (2) that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. If these obligations are accepted in good faith by the Members of the United Nations, all other matters are manageable within the four corners of the Charter. The principles of the Charter are broad and comprehensive and made flexible enough, like our Constitution, to be adapted to exigencies which in the words of Justice Holmes, "could not have been completely foreseen by the most gifted of its begetters."

The first lecture is devoted to the elaboration of key examples of the Charter's demonstrated capacity for growth. These include the interpretation that an abstention by a permanent member of the Security Council, *is not* treated as equivalent

to a negative vote under Article 27, par. 3; that the question whether a matter is a substantive vote shall be decided by a procedural vote (the potential double veto); that the General Assembly may make recommendations for collective measures in cases of threats to or acts of aggression, when the Security Council is unable to act; that Article 2, paragraph 7 on domestic jurisdiction "was not intended to take away powers granted to the United Nations by the Charter, but to provide a guide for their construction"; and that the competence and powers of United Nations organs may derive not only from the Charter but from treaties and *ad hoc* agreements. The significant conclusion is that "generally speaking Charter interpretations that would seriously retard the organic growth and development of the Charter have not prevailed."

The second lecture is devoted to an examination of the exercise of their responsibilities by the Member States. "If the United Nations is to live and grow, Member States must not only observe their obligations under the Charter, but exercise their rights and privileges under the Charter wisely and prudently." While almost a truism, this proposition is far from being taken as a serious guide for their conduct by many Members in the organization's significant business. A large part of the lecture is devoted to an appraisal of the narrow limits of self defense within which Members may legally resort to the unilateral use of force under the limitations imposed by Article 2, par. 4.

The author is less persuasive in his projections in lecture three entitled "What to do"—given a workable organization, but Members who have been unwilling to exploit its resources. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the nearly insoluble dilemma presented by the absence of a community of purpose between the two principal power groups in the United Nations. It is at this point that Mr. Cohen tackles the problem with proposals which are wise but would seem to have little chance of prospering as long as the Communists persist in objectives diametrically opposed to the basic purposes and principles of the organization. His basic proposition is that ways must be found to strengthen the consensus among all nations, and among the Great Powers in particular, that force must not be used as an arbiter of international differences. It is characteristic of the author and a tribute to his faith that he insists that, no matter how hopeless the effort may seem, we must continue to rely upon an appeal to reason and common interest. We must not let Communist scorn for bourgeois thinking cause us to lose "faith in the power of right reason." The more difficult the tasks of the United Nations may be, the greater the need for pressing for a con-

sensus of thinking that will make active cooperation possible and meaningful. "In this quest for consensus there is no role for dogmatism and self righteousness. I would close no doors. In the United Nations, as 'in my Father's house,' there 'are many mansions.' "—DURWARD V. SANDIFER, *American University*.

*International Immunities.* By C. WILFRED JENKS. (London: Stevens & Sons Limited; New York: Oceana Publications, 1961. Pp. xxxviii, 178. \$6.00.)

Simultaneously, and perhaps paradoxically, with the increase in the tasks and scope for which international organisations are expected to provide solutions, there have grown in recent decades also the importance and power of the sovereign nation-state. In addition to the recent quantitative increase in their number, the authority of the sovereign states expanded also qualitatively. The newly independent nations display a passionate desire for independence from and equality with the older nations. Both are reluctant to concede to international bodies even small concessions or privileges as long as these might appear as infractions of their sovereignty.

In the municipal sphere the functions of national governments have increased not only in the totalitarian or authoritarian states but also in states with truly democratic institutions. Public controls and responsibilities are today larger than ever before. This is a natural consequence of the fact that in modern societies more and more tasks are entrusted to public authorities. In performing many of these tasks, international organisations can help individual states. Yet it is essential that international organisations carry out their activities independent of the control of the individual state in order to achieve their international goals. They are ultimately controlled by and responsible to the multi-national community of the member states. At the same time the maintenance of the municipal legal order cannot be simply brushed aside. A proper coordination between the two is imperative. International immunities are essentially a body of rules regulating the relationships between individual states and various international institutions insofar as the latter require special consideration and status within the municipal legal order. They are "an essential device for the purpose of bridling unilateral and sometimes irresponsible control by particular governments of the activities of international organisations."

With the advent of international organisations in the twentieth century it seemed at first quite natural to accord to the new international institutions and their functionaries the diplomatic immunities and privileges. This was done, for example, in the Covenant of the League of Nations

[Art. 7(4)] and in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice [Art. 19]. With the gradual growth in size and number of international organisations it soon became obvious that a wholesale application of diplomatic immunities is impossible and that even analogy to them in the process of formation of new rules concerning international immunities can suffer from serious defects.

Wilfred Jenks, long an official of the International Labor Organization, considers that of the three theories employed to justify diplomatic immunities, namely the 'extraterritoriality' theory, the 'representative character' theory and the 'functional necessity' theory, only the last one can be usefully applied to the field of international immunities. Both types of immunities correspond to certain basic functional needs of international intercourse. Since these are not identical, though sometimes comparable, different solutions and regulations will probably evolve in the field of international immunities from the already recognised ones in the diplomatic field. There exist major differences between diplomatic practices and the activities of international organisations and their functionaries. Diplomatic representatives are chosen from amongst nationals of the sending state in agreement with the authorities of the receiving state. Substantial diplomatic exemptions from the jurisdiction of the receiving state do not exempt the agent from the jurisdiction of his own sending state. The diplomatic immunities are well sanctioned by the principle of reciprocity and the possibility of effective retaliation for any violation or infraction of the diplomatic code. Hence their predominantly customary character with but a few conventional additions. International immunities, on the other hand, cannot be sanctioned by the same method and require to a much greater extent precise conventional guarantees. An international organisation will usually employ, especially at its official headquarters, a substantially larger number of multi-national personnel than an average embassy. The duration of an individual employee's service period will very often be quite extended. At its headquarters at least, an international organisation will also require extensive facilities, office buildings and premises, and it will be often involved in substantial monetary and other material transactions. All of these factors increase the potential points of friction with the local jurisdiction for which satisfactory solutions must be found in advance, at least in principle.

The author finds the conception of international immunities based on the 'functional necessity' theory confirmed in the general acceptance of certain basic principles by recent state practice. "The thinking underlying these principles is

essentially institutional in character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members." Jenks identifies two main historical sources from which the principles of functional international immunities were gradually derived, namely, the already mentioned diplomatic immunities, on the one hand, and "the writings and decisions of the great federalists, and notably of Hamilton and Marshall, on the arrangements necessary to give reasonable independence and authority to newly created federal instrumentalities," on the other.

With the use of this conceptual framework the author then carefully examines various aspects of international immunities. In the first, general, part he deals briefly with the basic theory of immunities, the legal process of determining the extent of granted immunities, and some special problems connected with international immunities such as the neutrality of a member state, subversive activities of functionaries and the relationship to third, non-member states. Parts two and three represent the core of the work. Here he deals comprehensively with immunities of international organisations as such and the immunities of persons connected with international institutions. In the last part the author discusses the future of international immunities, dealing specifically with problem areas that seem most likely to develop substantially in the future while their present regulation is still in a fluid stage. One is the pronounced trend toward uniformity of regulations that can be seen in recent practices concerning international immunities. The author weighs carefully the advantages of such uniformity as against the need to preserve the adaptability to new functions and problems arising from growth in size, scope and locality of the operations. The other special problem area is that of judicial redress against international decisions. The need to provide proper safeguards against arbitrariness on the side of international organisations in relation to their own officials and within the sphere of their immunities is weighed against the requirement for reasonable freedom of action unhampered by excessive and cumbersome legal procedures. The concluding chapter is on the central problem area, namely, the protection of international independence against national sovereignty.

The volume as such is a most comprehensive and up to date reference work on international immunities. One can only hope that the author will soon be able to fulfill his promise of a volume on *The Corporate Personality for International*

*Purposes* of which the present book was originally intended to be a part.—PETER P. REMEC, *Fordham University*.

*The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War.* BY BURNETT BOLLOTEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 350. \$6.50.)

"Although the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July, 1936, was followed by a far-reaching social revolution in the anti-Franco camp . . . people outside Spain were kept in ignorance, not only of its depth and range, but even of its existence, by virtue of a policy of duplicity and dissimulation of which there is no parallel in history." With this statement, Burnett Bolloten sets out to correct this situation, and a most formidable one at that, by presenting some years after the event, a thoroughly and well documented account of the techniques employed by a small group of Marxist-Leninists seeking to achieve their goal.

The author does admirably well in the task of tracing and pin-pointing the Communist intrigues in the anti-Franco government and, in particular, the efforts of Francisco Largo Caballero who, as Prime Minister, struggled to remain the master of a government beset by an externally Axis-supplied enemy and an internal enemy bent on the subversion of the existing government.

In Mr. Bolloten's account, we witness the manner in which the Communists skillfully secured pivotal positions by proselytism, defamation and infiltration in the reorganization of the police forces which, by October, 1936, were little more than an arm of the Soviet Secret Police. Once the Communists had achieved this goal, the Leftists were able to focus their attention on the left-wing opponents of Soviet policy and, as the author documents it, this became a decisive force in determining the course of events in the government of that era inasmuch as the Ministry of Justice had no control over the police forces nor their activities. The analysis of the Communist subversion of the police forces is followed by the detailed account of the creation of the Fifth Regiment, the balancing off of one class against another, control of the War Ministry, the successful infiltration of the Armed Forces, youth groups and other institutions in the society until Prime Minister Caballero, having lost his support in the coalition Cabinet, was forced out of the government and the Communists emerged the victors.

This is a masterful, highly informative work which effectively marshalls the intricacies of Communist strategy in the Spanish Civil War. In a sense, it is an "anatomy of a revolution" and provides a clear insight on the Communist tactics

in a national revolution, it is timely in view of the recent events in Cuba and Laos.

In conclusion, the author writes with a high degree of skill acquired as an eye-witness to the events he speaks of plus many additional years of painstaking research on the subject. The reader is left with a detailed map of the Communist strategy in Spain. This reviewer found that Mr. Bolloten is without question justified in closing his study with a very apt quotation: "The Communist parties (of the world) are strong in proportion as the other parties and trade union organizations are weak and vacillating and play their game. That was the lesson of Spain and that, today, is the lesson of Europe and the world."—THOMAS W. NAGLE, *U. S. Naval Postgraduate School*.

*The Backward Society*. By RAYMOND FROST. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1961. Pp. 246. \$5.00.)

Generalizing simply but astutely is a formidable task for the specialist, but Raymond Frost can claim top honors. His book is an ABC of the problems and possibilities of economic development in the less industrialized areas of the world. Even though such an approach necessarily loses something for the reader interested in focusing upon a particular nation or region, it nevertheless offers a good deal to all those who wish to concentrate on the larger, more general aspects of building sound economies in the developing countries.

The author, working within the context of Western values (thereby precluding forced savings), outlines three means of "breaking out of the closed circles of inadequate savings and inadequate exports": generous grants of foreign aid, the discovery of scarce mineral deposits, and the opportunity offered by a boom in commodity export prices. He discounts the first two measures as unreliable but places considerable faith in the third. Little attention is paid to such incentive factors as changes in the tax laws or land reform, and the general effects of inflation are not elaborated upon. When commodity export prices boom, he emphasizes, the developing countries must capitalize fully upon their opportunity: they must avoid the temptations of increased consumption, and the resultant savings must be invested with the utmost care.

How are savings to be utilized most productively? To start with, Frost would rely ideally on the operations of the market mechanism. He is well aware of the social forces pressing the bureaucracy to perform a wider and wider range of functions in the developing countries, but he urges that government officials undertake only responsibilities which are general and basic. Some planning is obviously required, however, and the author de-

votes considerable attention to setting up appropriate guidelines.

If planners are to combine land, labor and capital in order to achieve the author's goal of balanced economic growth, they must devote greater energies to technical details as well as to overall purposes. Frost takes great pains to show that a poor combination will retard development. Thus power projects and highways are useful if productive—and to the extent to which they are productive; they involve a poor allocation of resources, however, if their yield is low. Investments in education and improvement of land are preferred to impressive construction projects where the costs of the latter are high relative to returns. Poverty and population pressure, he feels, make it imperative to invest in projects yielding rapid returns. "When investment produces quick returns its beneficent effect becomes rapidly cumulative. But if there is a long delay before the first additional dollars come in, then the cumulative effect of investment is postponed." For Frost, then, extensive sacrifice at this time may cause increasing misery both in the present and the future; no doubt this approach will be less exacting than one directed toward TVA-like projects, but one wonders if it is best designed to meet the challenge of rising expectations over the long pull.

The above thesis on the need for rapid returns from investments directly affects the nature of planning for foreign trade. Exports must be increased in order to finance the importation of additional capital goods. What kinds of exports can the less technically advanced lands produce most competitively? Frost urges these lands to export consumer goods. Not only does he feel that the adoption of a simple line of consumer goods will avoid the problem of complex and expensive imported equipment, but that it will also establish a good base for progress toward more complex and more expensive projects.

It is when Frost deals with non-economic questions—many of which turn out to be impediments to sound economic growth—that he seems least inclined to consider all factors. The pressures to spread governmental power among a number of constituent authorities and to invest in display projects may retard economic progress to some extent, but if these schemes give satisfaction, they must be weighed at every stage against the more purely economic goals. To do otherwise is to oversimplify the planners' task. It is not enough to indicate that national disunity is costly in economic terms without also indicating that minority ethnic group fears are costly in human terms. It is not enough to scoff at vast expenditures on the establishment of airlines or television stations without also understanding that people gain

satisfaction from such prestige projects. Planners, in short, must not operate *in vacuo* but must allocate expenditures according to the principle of greatest satisfaction, for both the present and the future. Judged by this yardstick, a few grandiose schemes may seem prudent.

Certainly Frost does the public a major service by grappling resolutely with some of the most vital questions of our time. *The Backward Society* is a concise, well written study which deserves serious scrutiny.—DONALD S. ROTHCHILD, *Colby College*.

*The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea*  
By HENRY REIFF. (University of Minnesota Press, 1959. Pp. 451. \$8.00.)

This volume can be highly recommended on two counts, its assembly of relevant facts and its approach to the problems of the sea. First, it provides a comprehensive survey of the extraordinary number of treaties which the United States has entered into, bilaterally and multilaterally, with nations of the world to deal with the many problems of transportation, conservation, and jurisdiction which have arisen and will continue to arise. The extensive documentation will assist the reader to appreciate the vast amount of literature on the subject. The author rightly acknowledges his indebtedness to the late Judge Manley Hudson who first drew attention to the growing significance of treaty law in his authoritative nine-volume work, *International Legislation*, and convincingly shows the growing importance of multi-national conferences and especially of the increasing number of international agencies, such as the United Nations, its specialized agencies and regional international bodies which frequently work in association with national governments and private national and international associations.

The number of treaties rose greatly between World War I and World War II. Reiff suggests that rather than deal with this growth in terms of institutions and programs undertaken by the League, the United Nations, and other bodies, it is more profitable to concentrate upon the sea itself and to see national and international action in relation to it.

After World War II the nations were confronted with the older problems which had challenged mankind, plus new problems and opportunities which arose from the extraordinary range of scientific and technological developments. The treaties dealing with these new areas of activity—Antarctica, missile testing, conservation, disposal of waste, scientific cooperation, etc.—became more complex and more numerous, and required the services of the most highly-trained experts in many fields of endeavor.

The inter-relation between the United Nations, its specialized agencies, regional bodies, national bodies and private associations increased to an extraordinary degree. The formation of the International Law Commission by the United Nations bears witness to the need of constant study of legal aspects, as do the great conferences on the law of the sea.

The second major contribution of the volume lies in its theoretical and philosophical implications. The voluminous treaty law arises *out of necessity*, being conditioned by the very nature of the sea itself and man's dependence upon it. Certain "compulsions" arise out of the sea which imposes "a degree of unification of effort and organization" and results in a growing inter-relation of the regimes. "The sea inspires profound respect for the facts. . . . To be durable, solutions of the very practical problems arising out of man's use of the sea must perforce rest firmly upon a realistic appraisal of the material facts." The theme that legislation must reflect the realities imposed upon us by the sea is extensively sound. The author describes the many uses and abuses of the sea and emphasizes mankind must approach nature with respect or even reverence if it is to utilize it to advantage and not to suffer from the catastrophe which follows the abuse and depletion of resources, whether on sea or land. Reiff sees beneath the political problems narrowly construed, and with van Wageningen and others speaks of the "community of the sea"; he stresses the need of a social science of the sea, for individuals, groups, and nation-states are now experiencing what appears to be a historic trend toward increased dependence upon the ocean.

Focused on the sea, such a social science would assess the relation of men, groups, nation-states, and international agencies to the central phenomena and seek to discover what the interaction portends for a more secure, orderly, and cooperative world.

The community of the sea preceded the nation-state and "will most probably survive the transmutation of the state system into something else."

The sea which was once regarded as *res nullius* will increasingly become *res communis*. The implications of this approach cannot be dealt with in this review which must content itself with underlining the vital importance of constantly keeping in mind the necessity of basing human laws and institutions upon life itself. It is for this fundamental reason, among others, that changes in national and international organization must continuously take place and result in an ever increasing amount of what the present reviewer in his *Foundations of Modern World Society* (which appeared in 1941) called "transnational law." I perhaps may be permitted to recall that the ap-

proach which I made a generation ago paralleled that of Professor Reiff in his present work. Professor Reiff, however, has written a volume marked by a greater concentration of analysis upon the sea, a more extensive and imposing bibliography, and a greater degree of expertness in the field of international law. And one is happy to note the fluency and clarity of his prose, a contrast to some of the material now appearing in the field of the social sciences.—LINDEN A. MANDER, *University of Washington* (Seattle).

*Food, Land, and Manpower in Western Europe.*

By P. LAMARTINE YATES. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 294. \$7.00.)

This volume is one of four monographs which together constitute a major study of the economic resources and requirements of Western Europe. The main volume in the series, *Europe's Needs and Resources*, has also been published. The study has been sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund under the general direction of J. Frederic Dewhurst.

Yates' volume is primarily concerned with the changes which are taking place in both the consumption and production of agricultural commodities in Europe. With increasing affluence, Europeans are consuming rather more vegetables, fruit, sugar and eggs, while wheat and potatoes play an ever smaller role in diets. Aside from an excess consumption of sugar, Yates notes, the inter-war problem of lower-class malnutrition has disappeared. Or rather, it has been transformed; today the division is between nations rather than between social classes. The dividing line is roughly that between northern and Mediterranean Europe with France standing somewhere in between.

The pattern of production is characterized by the same geographic division. With the exception of Spain, Portugal, Greece, and parts of Italy, per capita production is rising rapidly. For Europe the Malthusian fear of population excess is no longer a real one. On the other hand, many countries do face the problem of surplus production and rural unemployment. Further, Southern Europe especially is still characterized by excess fragmentation of holdings, a lack of effective cooperation, a lack of effective government agricultural policies, and the continued use of primitive techniques.

Attempts to solve these problems are hampered by traditional attitudes and political pressures. Peasants are still loath to leave the land or to use the newer machinery. Further, a national tradition which glorifies the soil supports the efforts of marginal producers to obtain subsidies, and "requirements of security" result in artificial support for a highly inefficient agriculture.

Yates offers a number of policy suggestions, in-

cluding an increase in technical training, consolidation of fragmented holdings, and a general attempt to develop well-run family farms of from 15 to 30 hectares. Considering European conditions, he sees no need for the larger units characteristic of the Soviet Union and much of the United States. He argues for the reduction of subsidies, and an effort to attract surplus farm labor from the land. Most of the current migration to the city is taking place from areas adjacent to large metropolitan centers. The real problem of rural overpopulation, however, lies in the more remote sections of the various countries. Yates suggests a two-pronged attack involving first attracting industry to these areas and then retraining the rural populations.

Given a modicum of intelligent attention to agricultural problems, Europe, by 1970, should be producing some 30 percent more food with some 20 percent less manpower. The effects of this transformation are likely to be substantial. Not only will it involve increasing affluence, but it will also bring about the disappearance of the most traditional-minded elements in European society. Even those who remain in agriculture are no longer the peasants of even 50 years ago. Given the rapid growth of transportation and communication networks, and the spread of universal education, the isolated peasant is disappearing, and is increasingly being replaced by farmers whose outlook does not differ overly from their urban brethren. The continuing revolution in agriculture, then, is contributing to the continuing revolution in the whole pattern of European politics.—STANLEY ROTHMAN, *Smith College*.

*Soviet Policy towards International Control of Atomic Energy.* By JOSEPH L. NOGEE. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. xiv, 306. \$6.50.)

Although the seemingly endless search for the means to control nuclear weapons continues, the author of this volume contends that the attempt to place atomic energy under direct international control and ownership has become a closed subject. Since the Soviet Union played the key role in creating this lamentable state of affairs, the subject provides a very neat and significant case study in Soviet "diplomacy" and foreign policy.

Professor Joseph Noguee of the University of Houston has traced in great detail the record of the Soviet Union's response to the fact of nuclear energy and to the challenge presented by the Acheson-Lilienthal Report which advocated international ownership of atomic energy installations. His account is confined primarily to the public negotiations and debates of the 1945-1953 period and is based on readily accessible, if burdensome, sources such as the record of proceedings



in the United Nations bodies which have dealt with the problem. The author has painstakingly extracted all the significant statements from this prolix record and has examined all other relevant Soviet statements. Thus three-quarters of this study is devoted to the record of fruitless negotiations which reads like the depressing chronicle of an unending journey through a morass.

The monotony with which the Soviet delegates repeated certain propaganda themes in what were to have been "negotiations" has not prevented Professor Nogee from identifying the various nuances in Soviet policy. Initially Moscow was cautious and taciturn regarding atomic weapons and minimized their significance. When confronted with the United States plan for an International Atomic Development Authority, as presented by Bernard Baruch, the Soviet Union charged that this organization would be controlled by "American monopolists" who desired to dominate the Soviet economy. The Soviet purpose was to propagate the notion of an atomic weapons ban unrelated to any effective system of international control and based exclusively upon Soviet protestations of good faith. When Soviet concessions appeared to have been made they were usually quickly nullified by reversion to the basic Soviet line.

After charting the various phases of the search for an international control system—or more correctly, its rejection—Professor Nogee devotes the two final chapters of his study to an analysis of the sources of Soviet opposition to an international control agency and the techniques of "gamesmanship" employed in eight years of negotiation. Soviet opposition was based on the conception of national sovereignty as expressed in the United Nations Charter and its veto provision. Thus an international agency exercising control over Soviet atomic energy installations and foreign penetration of the Soviet economy were regarded as a less desirable prospect than the perpetuation of the *status quo* in the form of an arms race. To the Soviet Union international ownership of atomic energy facilities meant "capitalist ownership" in view of Western insistence that the veto be abolished in this vital area.

Professor Nogee's trenchant analysis of Soviet gamesmanship demonstrates that the Soviet Union's participation in protracted public negotiations prior to 1954 was designed to achieve certain objectives. Foremost among these was the effort to influence world opinion as well as American public opinion in an attempt to compel the United States Government to renounce use of the bomb. At the same time the negotiations were employed to depict the policies of the Western democracies as "aggressive" and to stall

for time during which the Soviet Union could rush its own atomic weapons development program to completion and in this way render the United Nations majority (Baruch) plan obsolete. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 led to a campaign designed to stress Soviet use of atomic energy for "peaceful" purposes. While Soviet spokesmen did not appear to reject Western proposals outright they did so in fact by demanding that the West agree to conditions which would nullify international controls. The Soviet delegates, by compelling the West to reject a number of unacceptable Soviet proposals, were able to displace some of the onus of negativism entailed in their rejection of Western proposals. The author has examined in detail the various techniques of stalling employed to prolong the debates over the years.

In a separate chapter devoted to the test ban problem Professor Nogee contends, very convincingly, that the Soviet Union acted on the basis of a careful calculation in unilaterally ceasing bomb tests in March 1958 and in embarking upon test ban negotiations. Although his treatment of this particular subject does not extend much beyond 1959, it clearly underlines the dilemma persistently confronting American policy-makers.

This is a very important volume for anyone interested in the record of the Soviet approach to the problems of arms reduction. The facts of this record and Professor Nogee's accompanying analysis are indispensable for an understanding of the policy and tactics of Soviet gamesmanship in disarmament and test ban negotiations.—JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR., *University of Washington* (Seattle).

*Strategy for the 60's*, EDITED BY JAY H. CERF AND WALTER POZEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Pp. 155. \$4.00, cloth, \$1.50, paper).

This volume provides a twenty-eight page analysis and an outline summary of thirteen studies on United States foreign policy prepared, with one exception, by private research organizations for the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. The editors are the Director and Associate Director of the Foreign Policy Clearing House, a "nonpartisan, nonprofit, private organization devoted to communicating to U. S. foreign policy-makers the consensuses of major foreign policy research centers of the United States."

These thirteen reports are of interest not only because of the policy proposals that they advance but also because they represent a creative adaptation by the Foreign Relations Committee to the new challenges being thrust upon it. Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Committee, succinctly describes the predicament of the Com-

mittee in an introduction to this volume. In order to operate effectively, says Senator Fulbright, "the Committee needs ideas, background, and information originating from sources outside the government." In domestic policy fields congressional committees "have available to them the wealth of ideas and information generated by the domestic press, by domestic organizations, and by constituents generally." In the field of foreign policy, however, the Senator states:

... it is the executive branch which has a near monopoly on information and ideas. This is attributable in part to the fact that the Department of State has some 20,000 employees in daily contact with countries and individuals throughout the world.

It is clear that Congress cannot long play its traditional role in our political system if it finds itself incompetent to make an independent judgment on the ever-increasing foreign relations elements of national policy.

The reports analyzed and summarized in this volume were financed by a Senate appropriation of \$300,000 and printed on 1421 pages of fine print by the Senate between August 1959 and February 1960. Five of the thirteen reports discuss United States foreign policy for geographical areas: (1) Western Europe, (2) Africa, (3) Asia, (4) the Middle East, and (5) the USSR. Latin America is omitted because the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs separately contracted for seven studies. (It is unfortunate that the editors did not include these studies.) Five studies deal with the impact on United States foreign policy of (6) world-wide and domestic economic problems, (7) nonmilitary scientific developments, (8) developments in military technology, (9) principal ideological conflicts, and (10) economic, social, and political change in underdeveloped countries. The other three discuss (11) the formulation and administration, (12) operational aspects, and (13) basic aims of United States foreign policy.

It is impossible in a short review to give much consideration to the varied content of the reports. (The reader may find useful the critiques of Morton Halperin and James A. Robinson in volume four of *The American Behavioral Scientist*.) The reviewer was impressed with the number of stimulating innovations which, although not all entirely new, the reports bring to the attention of the Senate—e.g., a United Nations university for advancement of science and humanities with branches throughout the world (proposed by Stanford Research Institute); development of an international career service for technical assistance personnel (Northwestern University); negotiation of an Indian aid agreement by India, U. S., USSR, and perhaps Japan, West Germany and others (Conlon Associates); a number of proposals for the further development of multilateral

institutions for economic development programs (Council on Foreign Relations, Harvard, and Syracuse); and suggestions for working with the "next government" in foreign countries rather than just with the current regime (Syracuse).

Also worthy of particular attention are the proposals for further research. One recommends that consideration be given to the establishment of a foreign policy research organization similar to the Air Force-supported RAND Corporation (Brookings). Another recommends the development of a "conscious policy to promote foreign policy aims through a systematic stimulation of desirable nonmilitary scientific developments" (Stanford Research Institute). Many would agree with Senator Fulbright that additional sources of ideas and information on foreign policy problems are vitally needed—by the executive branch as well as by Congress! Hopefully, he and his colleagues will, with the stimulus provided by such ideas as these, devise means for satisfying these needs on a more continuing basis.—CHADWICK F. ALGER, *Northwestern University*.

*National Character in Action.* By WASHINGTON PLATT. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961. Pp. xix, 250. \$6.00.)

General Platt has essayed a highly important but much controverted task: his purpose is to make relevant for strategic intelligence contemporary investigations of national character. He writes: "In all aspects of international relations and especially in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, an intimate understanding of the character of other nations must always be one of the vital factors in the situation. . . ." And so, indeed, it must. But the path of application of this fugitive and evanescent material to practical diplomacy is beset with hazard and difficulty. It does no particular discredit to General Platt's book to note that he has not solved all the problems or been able to sidestep the difficulties. Unfortunately but understandably, they are as present on the last pages of his work as on the first. If vain, the attempt is nonetheless courageous, and in the process of tackling a formidable subject, General Platt has shed no little light upon it. He has, I believe, shown, largely through the works of others, that the notion of national character is a viable concept.<sup>1</sup> One does not have to adopt the tattered stereotypes of German stolidity and romanticism, French ardor and logicity, or British pragmatism and lack of humor to acknowledge that certain nations behave differently from others. This is something we all know as social scientists; we only recoil from

<sup>1</sup> In *People of Plenty* David Potter writes, for example: "After all its vicissitudes, national character is still with us. The fact is inescapable."

our natural and correct observations when it is suggested that they be codified into concepts of national character. Since national character can be no more and no less than the sum of influences which make a Frenchman French or an Englishman English, it must comprise *inter alia* "geographic location, climate, a common history . . . , common economic interests . . . " political traditions, institutions and practices, and a certain cultural or linguistic identity. It may involve a distinct practical philosophy as well. General Platt makes a useful distinction between national character conceived as the sum of individual behavior and as the characteristic posture of a nation in foreign relations. He notes that the first must be dependent upon a prior analysis of personal and group character, and that the second cannot diverge limitlessly from the characteristic behavior of individuals.

It is in the area of application of conceptions of national character to strategic intelligence production that General Platt most often goes awry. He affects to believe that it is feasible to make simple numerical rankings of aspects of national character. Thus, fighting qualities could be expressed by "2, 3, 4, and so on up to 10 as the 'do or die.' " "Similarly, when considering natural resources *industry* would be expressed by positive integers. Laziness by fractions." "An unusually aggressive spirit on the one hand or a defeatist spirit on the other hand may multiply the capability which would ordinarily be expected from a given situation by ten or one tenth respectively." Once these traits have been assimilated into national character for the purposes of a given intelligence estimate, it is then alleged that HF (Hard Facts)—NC (National Character) × Sit (Situation) can produce the required intelligence information. The disclaimers General Platt issues to this highly oversimple numerical analysis are not convincing. He says that such calculations should be regarded as a "useful *guide to our judgement*" rather than as a "final answer." If such computations are to influence our judgment, they will mislead us: if they are not to influence it, they should be discarded.

The author falters as well in his hints for

derivations of national character. How are we to go about grasping it? Since he admits that national character shifts over time, often in the relatively short run, he cannot give a satisfactory account of how we definitively come to grips with such fleeting traits. We are told, for instance, that the national character of Americans shifted between 1916 and 1917 from peace-loving to martial and bellicose. Assuming the validity of the change (and this reviewer would not do so), we are left with no clues that would make such a sea-change in character comprehensible to an intelligence analyst. The assessments of 1916 would be false in 1917. The answer is not mechanical computations of "optimism, enthusiasm, . . . progressive spirit, . . . and the will-to-win." Indeed, General Platt's conceptions of national character hark back to the national stereotypes which proved the greatest obstacle to acceptance of notions of national character in the past.

In the final analysis, the greatest aid to strategic intelligence production is informed work on individual countries. General Platt recognizes this need, and in an apparently path-breaking appendix, he provides a brief bibliography of works informative for national character studies of specific countries. This list is probably the most useful feature of the book for intelligence officers. But the list itself is rudimentary and uneven. On the United States, David Potter, Louis Hartz, Clinton Rossiter, Daniel Boorstin, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. are notable in their absence. The section on Latin America contains no works by George Blanksten. The British section omits the pioneering works of Sir Louis Namier, and does not mention Samuel Beer, Leslie Lipson, or Harry Eckstein. The section on France does not include Herbert Luethy, Nicholas Wahl, or Stanley Hoffman, and that on Russia egregiously neglects Merle Fainsod and Barrington Moore. In East and West Asia there is no mention of the works of George Kahin, Leonard Binder, David Wilson, and Myron Weiner. National character may be a viable notion, but General Platt has scarcely shown us how it might be employed.—R. N. ROSECRANCE, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

# SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

*The Catholic University of America*

## ARTICLES

### *International Politics and National Policies*

#### *General*

Ashford, D. E. How Non-Western Are the New Nations? *World Politics*. January, 1962.

———. Patterns of Consensus in Developing Countries. *American Behavioral Scientist*. April, 1961.

Bell, H. H. Modern Analytical Techniques *Foreign Service Journal*. October, 1961.

Benveniste, G. Technological Change and Foreign Policy-Making: Some Political Effects of Scientific Progress. Pasadena, Institute of World Affairs. *Proceedings*, 1960.

Boulding, K. E. The Prevention of World War III. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Winter, 1962.

Bouscaren, A. T. The Nature of the War We Are In. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. October, 1961.

Burns, A. L. Prospects for a General Theory of International Relations. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

Della Porta, G. Problemi e Prospettive di Coesistenza fra Oriente ed Occidente. *La Comunità Internazionale*. July, 1961.

Fagen, R. R. Some Assessments and Uses of Public Opinion in Diplomacy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Fall, 1960.

Guttenberg, K. T. F. Aussenpolitik Ohne Illusion; Nachgiebigkeit des Westens Führt zur Katastrophe. *Politische Meinung*. November, 1961.

James, A. M. Neutral Men and Neutral Action. *International Relations*. October, 1961.

Janowitz, M. Mass Persuasion and International Relations. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Winter, 1961.

Kaplan, M. A. Problems of Theory Building and Theory Confirmation in International Politics. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

Kolarz, W. Coexistence and Nationalism. *Listener*. February 1, 1962.

Le Vine, R. A. The Internationalization of Political Values in Stateless Societies. *Human Organization*. N. 2, 1960.

Marcy, C. Interparliamentary Union Conference. *World Affairs*. Winter, 1961.

Mayo, L. H. The New Technology and National Goals: Some Implications for Legal-Policy Decision Making. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. No. 1, 1961.

McClelland, C. A. The Acute International Crisis. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

Quandt, R. E. On the Use of Game Models in Theories of International Relations. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

Rose, E. J. B. The Press and International Tensions. *International Affairs* (London). January, 1962.

Rosenau, J. N. Consensus, Leadership and Foreign Policy. *SAIS Review*. Winter, 1962.

Rubin, B. Propaganda and Ideological Conflicts, 1917-1945; the Need for Psychological Peacefare—I. *Contemporary Review*. December, 1961.

Schelling, T. C. Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

Sereno, R. Diplomacy for Our Times. *SAIS Review*. Winter, 1962.

Singer, J. D. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

———. The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations. *Behavioral Science*. October, 1961.

Trager, F. N. Exporting and Training Experts. *Review of Politics*. January, 1962.

Verba, S. Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System. *World Politics*. October, 1961.

Younger, K. Is World Government Possible? *Listener*. January 11, 1962.

Zampaglione, G. Iniziative Pacifiste nel Ventennio tra le Due Guerre Mondiali. *La Comunità Internazionale*. July, 1961.

### *Military and Functional Questions*

Atom Tests and Radiation Hazards; Test Ban Efforts; UN; Cold War Conferences; Chronology. New York, International Review Service, 1961.

Aurand, H. S., Jr. The Delicate Balance of Terror. Pasadena, Institute of World Affairs. *Proceedings*, 1960.

Blassel, P. Données Scientifiques et Techniques des Problèmes que Pose la Réglementation de l'Utilisation de l'Espace. *Politique Étrangère*. No. 4, 1961.

Bowie, R. R. Basic Requirements of Arms Control. *Daedalus*. Fall, 1960.

Civis, P. Le Désarmement, Désarmerait-Il la Méfiance? *Politique Étrangère*. No. 4, 1961.

Gauvenet, A. Quelques Problèmes Liés au

Désarmement Nucléaire. *Politique Étrangère*. No. 4, 1961.

Glennan, T. K. International Aspects of Space Programs. Pasadena, Institute of World Affairs. *Proceedings*, 1960.

Halperin, M. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. June, 1961.

Nickerson, H. What of Limited War? *Ordnance*. January, 1962.

Read, T. A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Weapons. Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1960.

Singer, J. D. From Deterrence to Disarmament: the Problem of Transition. *International Journal*. No. 4, 1961.

———. Weapons Technology and International Stability. *The Centennial Review*. Fall, 1961.

Stenzl, O. Das Ringen um die Abrüstung: ein Rückblick auf Fünfzehn Jahre. *Politische Meinung*. November, 1961.

Stewart, C. T., Jr. Nuclear Stalemate and Simulated War. *Military Review*. January, 1962.

Talensky, N. Disarmament and its Enemies. *International Affairs* (Moscow). December, 1961.

Vizzard, W. R., Jr. Disarmament—Blunted Shovel? *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. February, 1961.

#### United States

Bell, C. American Leadership of the Western World. *India Quarterly*. April, 1961.

Kintner, W. R. The Role of Military Assistance. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*. March, 1961.

Lincoln, G. A. Planning United States Security in a Changing World. Pasadena, Institute of World Affairs. *Proceedings*, 1960.

Lyons, E. M. The Politics of the Military Budget. *Revue Française de Sociologie*. April, 1961.

Mathews, E. G. The FSO and High Policy. *Foreign Service Journal*. October, 1961.

A New American Mood: Living with the Cold War. *Round Table*. December, 1961.

Schatz, S. P. The American Approach to Foreign Aid and the Thesis of Low Absorptive Capacity—(Illustrated by Reference to Nigeria). *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*. November, 1961.

Schwarz, U. US Political and Military Strategy—a Progress Report. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. December, 1961.

#### Canada

Keenleyside, H. L. The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940–1945. *International Journal*. Winter, 1960–61.

#### Latin America

Alliance for Progress; Official Documents Emanating from the Special Meeting held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, from August 5 to 17, 1961. Washington, Pan American Union, 1961.

Bellegarde, D. La Quatrième Réunion Consultative des Ministres des Relations Extérieures d'Amérique. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. January, 1962.

Smith, R. F. The United States and Latin-American Revolutions. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. January, 1962.

Teichert, P. C. M. Latin America and the Socio-Economic Impact of the Cuban Revolution. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. January, 1962.

Thorning, J. F. The "Alliance for Progress"—Opportunity and Problems. *World Affairs*. Winter, 1961.

Whitaker, A. P. Yankeeophobia: the United States and Latin America. *Current History*. January, 1962.

#### United Kingdom

L'Assistance Technique du Royaume-Uni aux Pays d'Outre-Mer. Paris, Documentation Française, 1961.

Watt, D. C. United States Documentary Resources for the Study of British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. *International Affairs* (London). January, 1962.

#### Western Europe

Lauesen, M. La Défense de la Région Danoise. *Revue Militaire Générale*. December, 1961.

Lavaud, G. La Délégation Ministérielle pour l'Armement—Organisation et Fonctionnement. *Revue Militaire Générale*. December, 1961.

Snapper, F. The Dutch Republic and the NATO. *Revue Militaire Générale*. December, 1961.

#### Central Europe

Anthon, C. G. The Berlin Crisis and Atlantic Unity. *Current History*. January, 1962.

Berlin Air Access Sovereignty Claimed by East Germany. Washington, U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1962.

Cornides, W. Les Problèmes et les Perspectives de Politique Étrangère en République Fédérale après le 13 Aout 1961. *Politique Étrangère*. No. 4, 1961.

Galay, N. Berlin: On the Eve of the Dénouement. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. October, 1961.

#### Southern Europe and Mediterranean

Cassimatis, G. P. What Greece Expects from

the Atlantic Alliance. *NATO Letter*. February, 1962.

#### *Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

Burg, D. The "People's Friendship University." *Problems of Communism*. November, 1961.

Goodman, E. R. East vs. West in Communist Ideology. *Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2, 1961.

Grant, N. Communist Psychological Offensive: Distortions in the Translations of Official Documents. Washington, Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1961.

Guedon, M. Perspectives Militaires Soviétiques. *Revue Défense Nationale*. February, 1962.

Harben, W. H. Soviet Attitudes and Practices Concerning Maritime Waters. *JAG Journal*. October, 1961.

Kashin, A. Reactions to the Twenty-Second Congress in the Communist Camp. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. January, 1962.

———. Schism in the Communist Camp. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. December, 1961.

Keep, J. Soviet Foreign Policy: Doctrine and Reality. *Survey*. January, 1962.

La Rue, P. A. de. Le Neutralisme Yougoslave. *Politique Étrangère*. No. 4, 1961.

Meissner, B. Das Neue Parteiprogramm der KPdSU. *Europa Archiv*. September 25, 1961.

Methvin, E. H. Mob Violence and Communist Strategy. *Orbis*. July, 1961.

Rosser, R. F. Soviet Opposition to Racial Discrimination in the United Nations. *Russian Review*. January, 1962.

Schapiro, L. The Party's New Rules. *Problems of Communism*. January, 1962.

Seton-Watson, H. Soviet Foreign Policy in 1961. *International Relations*. October, 1961.

Shulman, M. D. Some implications of Changes in Soviet Policy Toward the West: 1949-1952. *Slavic Review*. December, 1961.

Towster, J. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.: Challenge and Response. *Current History*. January, 1962.

Translations on East European Foreign Trade. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1962.

Wraga, R. Integral Communism: A Program for Action. Washington, Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1961.

#### *Middle East and Africa*

Bustani, E. Arab-European Relations. *Middle East Forum*. October, 1961.

The Central Treaty Organization—Why It Was Established, How It Functions and a Few Samples of Achievement During Its Sixth Year. Ankara, Central Treaty Organization, 1961.

Gidney, J. B. The King-Crane Commission, an American Policy for the Middle East. *Middle East Forum*. October, 1961.

Logan, R. W. Discrimination: Weakness of Our African Policy. *Current History*. January, 1962.

Marchat, H. Mauritanie, Nations Unies . . . et Marchandages Planétaires. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. January, 1962.

Mason, P. Prospects and Progress in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. *African Affairs*. January, 1962.

Parker, J. S. F. The United Arab Republic. *International Affairs* (London). January, 1962.

Rondot, P. Égypte et Syrie dans l'Orient Instable. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. February, 1962.

S., R. L'Échiquier Africain. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. January, 1962.

Schwarzenbach, E. C. In Kenya Today. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. January, 1962.

West Africa: Now, Freedom. *Economist*. January 20, 1962.

#### *South and Southeast Asia*

Blumenfeld, F. Y. India's Election and Political Progress. Washington, Editorial Research Reports, 1962.

DeRussett, A. On Understanding Indian Foreign Policy; Continuation of a Discussion. *International Relations*. October, 1961.

Enright, D. J. The White Man's Burden; Thoughts from Asia. *Encounter*. January, 1962.

Mozingo, D. The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty. *Asian Survey*. December, 1961.

Nguyen-Cao-Hach. Western Economic Policies and Asian Trade Development. *Asian Survey*. December, 1961.

Vergheze, B. G. A Reassessment of Indian Policy in Asia. *India Quarterly*. April, 1961.

#### *Far East and Pacific*

Boorman, H. L. Peking in World Politics. *Pacific Affairs*. Fall, 1961.

Graebner, N. A. China: Unanswered Challenge. *Current History*. January, 1962.

Husemann, H. Defense of the British Commonwealth in Asia and the Pacific. *Military Review*. January, 1962.

#### *International Economic Policy and Relations*

Altman, O. L. Foreign Markets for Dollars, Sterling, and Other Countries. *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*. December, 1961.

Barkin, S. "Full Productive and Freely Chosen Employment"—the ILO Program. *Labor Law Journal*. December, 1961.

Bega, S. T. International Trade and Economic

Expansion. *American Economic Review*. March, 1961.

Botting, D. C. New Concepts in Economic Assistance for Underdeveloped Countries. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1961.

Heller, C. A. Oil at the United Nations. *World Petroleum*. January, 1962.

Hoffman, P. G. Bootstrap Statesmanship. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. December, 1961.

#### International Law

The Annual Naval War College International Law Study. *JAG Journal*. October, 1961.

Baldwin, R. W. An Alternative to the Connelly Amendment as a Practical and Realistic Step Toward World Peace Through Law. *South Carolina Law Quarterly*. Summer, 1961.

Bärmann, J. Pacta Sunt Servanda. Considérations sur l'Histoire du Contrat Consensuel. *Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé*. January, 1961.

Calon, J. P. La Société Internationale-Eléments d'Une Théorie Générale. *Journal du Droit International (Clunet)*. July, 1961.

Coerper, M. G. The Act of State Doctrine in the Light of the *Sabbatino* Case. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1962.

Connell, H. P. United States Protection of Private Foreign Investment Through Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*. September, 1961.

Delaume, G. R. The Proper Law of Loans Concluded by International Persons: A Restatement and a Forecast. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1962.

De Nova, R. Prospettive Giuridiche della Guerra Cosmica. *Diritto Internazionale*. April, 1961.

Dietze, G. The Disregard for Property in International Law. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March, 1961.

Evans, A. E. Observations on the Practice of Territorial Asylum in the United States. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1962.

Gross, L. Some Observations on the International Court of Justice. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1962.

Hardy, M. J. L. International Protection Against Nuclear Risks. *International Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Harris, C. W. International Relations and the Disposition of Alien Enemy Property Seized by the United States during World War II: A Case Study on German Properties. *Journal of Politics*. November, 1961.

Herzog, R. Das Grundrecht auf Freiheit in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention. *Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts*. September, 1961.

Holcombe, A. N. The Improvement of the

International Law-Making Process. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. No. 1, 1961.

Lawford, H. J. Treaties and Rights of Transit on the St. Lawrence. *Canadian Bar Review*. December, 1961.

Lemaire, W. L. G. Questioni di Diritto Interpersonale. *Diritto Internazionale*. April, 1961.

Lissitzyn, O. J. Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1962.

Metzger, S. D. Extending the Rule of Law by Traditional International Agreements. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. No. 1, 1961.

Rosenne, S. La Cour Internationale de Justice en 1960. *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*. July, 1961.

Schachter, O. Dag Hammarskjöld and the Relation of Law to Politics. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1962.

Schick, F. B. Space Law and Space Politics. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Thompson, D. The Project for a Commercial Company of European Type. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. October, 1961.

Timberg, S. Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March, 1961.

Vali, F. A. Soviet Satellite Status and International Law. *JAG Journal*. October, 1961.

Wright, O. Domestic Jurisdiction as a Limit on National and Supra-National Action. *Northwestern University Law Review*. March, 1961.

#### International Organizations

##### United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Assembly's Efforts to Overcome Serious Financial Difficulties. *United Nations Review*. January, 1962.

Berkes, R. N. The New Frontier in the United Nations. *Current History*. January, 1962.

Clinton, E. J. The United Nations and the Congo. *American Bar Association Journal*. October, 1961.

Cohen, R. The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. June, 1961.

Goodwin, G. L. The Political Role of the United Nations: Some British Views. *International Organization*. Autumn, 1961.

Nicholas, H. G. The Growth of World Institutions. *Listener*. December 14, 1961.

Padelford, N. J. Politics and the Future of ECOSOC. *International Organization*. Autumn, 1961.

Stein, E. Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Charter Law and the Future Role of the United Nations

Secretary General. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1962.

U Thant of Burma Appointed Acting Secretary-General. *United Nations Review*. December, 1961.

West, R. L. The United Nations and the Congo Financial Crisis: Lessons of the First Year. *International Organization*. Autumn, 1961.

#### *Regional and Collective Security Organizations*

Australia and E. E. C.—a Critical View of the Common Market. *Round Table*. December, 1961.

Buchan, A. The Atlantic Dilemma. *Listener*. December 14, 1961.

Catalano, N. La Communauté Économique

Européenne et l'Unification, le Rapprochement et l'Harmonisation des Droits des États Membres. *Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé*. January, 1961.

Kaplan, L. S. NATO and Adenauer's Germany: Uneasy Partnership. *International Organization*. Autumn, 1961.

Lombardo, I. M. What's Wrong with NATO? The Lack of Unity in Foreign Policy. *British Survey*. December, 1961.

Münch, F. Prolégomènes a Une Théorie Constitutionnelle des Communautés Européennes. *Rivista di Diritto Europeo*. April, 1961.

Ruffner, C. L. NATO—Force for Peace. *World Affairs*. Winter, 1961.

### OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

ALBERTSON, MAURICE L., RICE, ANDREW E. AND BIRKY, PAULINE E., *New Frontiers for American Youth: Perspective on the Peace Corps*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. vi, 212. \$4.50.)

ALLEN, JAMES JAY, *The European Common Market and the G. A. T. T.* (Washington: The University Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 244. \$6.00.)

AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, *Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. ix, 203. Cloth, \$3.95. Paper, \$1.95.)

ANDERSON, BENEDICT R. O'G., *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation, 1944-1945*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. 1961. Pp. ix, 126. \$3.00.)

BARCK, OSCAR THEODORE, JR. (Ed.), *America in the World: Twentieth Century History in Documents*. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company. 1962. Pp. 494. \$1.95, paper.)

BARKER, SIR ERNEST (Ed. and Trans.), *The Politics of Aristotle*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. lxxvi, 411. \$1.95, paper.)

BARKER, SIR ERNEST (Ed.), *Social Contract: Locke, Hume, Rousseau*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. xlv, 307. \$1.65, paper.)

BARNARD, ALAN, *Visions and Profits: Studies in the Business Career of T. S. Mort*. (Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press. 1961. Pp. xvii, 234. \$8.50.)

BASS, HERBERT J., *I am a Democrat: Career of David B. Hill*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 315. \$5.50.)

BEARD, CHARLES A., *The Supreme Court and the Constitution*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,

Inc. 1962. Pp. viii, 149. \$1.95, paper. \$3.95, cloth.)

BERGSTRASSER, ARNOLD, *Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung*. (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach. 1961. Pp. 291.)

BETTS, RAYMOND F., *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 224. \$5.00.)

BIRKE, Wolfgang, *European Elections by Direct Suffrage*. (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff. 1961. Pp. 124.)

BISHOP, WILLIAM W., JR., *International Law* (Second Edition) (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1962. Pp. xlv, 964. \$13.00.)

BLACK, ALGERNON D., *The Young Citizens: The Story of the Encampment for Citizenship*. (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. xiv, 416. \$6.00.)

BONNEFOUS, MARC, *Europe et Tiers Monde*. (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff. 1961. 7d fl 9,75.)

BRIGHT, JAMES R. (Ed.), *Technological Planning on the Corporate Level*. (Boston: Harvard Business School. 1962. Pp. vii, 253. \$3.50, paper.)

BROWDER, R. P., KERENSKY, A. A. (Eds.), *The Russian Provisional Government, 1917 Documents*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961. Pp. Volume I. xxx, 477. Volume II. xxvi, 477-1193. Volume III. xix, 1193-1875. \$30.00, 3 Volumes.)

BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1961. Pp. xxii, 543. \$2.75, paper.)

CALLAN, EDWARD, *Albert John Luthuli and the South African Race Conflict*. (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University Press. 1962. Pp. 75. \$1.00, paper.)



- CARNELL, FRANCIS, *The Politics of the New States (Bibliography)*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. xvi, 171. \$2.00, paper.)
- CARPENTER, WALTER H., JR. AND HANDLER, EDWARD, *Small Business and Pattern Bargaining*. (Babson Park: Babson Institute Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 243. \$3.00, paper.)
- CARY, JOHN, *Joseph Warren: Physician, Politician, Patriot*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 260. \$5.00.)
- CENTER OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1961*. (Los Angeles: University of California. 1961. Pp. x, 56. \$2.50, paper.)
- CHAI, CH'U, AND CHAI, WINBERG, *The Changing Society of China*. (New York: The New American Library. 1962. Pp. 253. \$.75, paper.)
- CHEIT, EARL F., *Injury and Recovery in the Course of Employment*. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1961. Pp. xviii, 377.)
- CHRISTENSON, C. L., *Economic Redevelopment in Bituminous Coal*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1962. Pp. xxi, 312. \$7.50.)
- CLARK, JOHN MAURICE, *Competition as a Dynamic Process*. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1961. Pp. xvii, 501. \$7.50.)
- COLLOTTI, ENZO (Ed.), *The Communist Party of Germany, 1918-33* (Bibliography, Biblio. Essay). (Milan: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1961. Pp. 217. 1,006 lire.)
- COOK, JAMES M., *Texas Corporation Courts*. (Austin: University of Texas. 1961. Pp. 141. \$2.50, paper.)
- DESTLER, CHESTER MCARTHUR, *Joshua Coit, American Federalist, 1758-1798*. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press. 1962. Pp. xiii, 191. \$5.75.)
- DOHERTY, HERBERT J., *Richard Keith Call, Southern Unionist*. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1961. Pp. vii, 195. \$5.50.)
- DOOB, LEONARD W., *Communication in Africa: A Search for Boundaries*. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1961. Pp. xvi, 406. \$7.50.)
- DORNBERG, JOHN, *Schizophrenic Germany*. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1961. Pp. ix, 302. \$6.50.)
- DUNNE, GEORGE H., S. J., *Generation of Giants: The Story of the Jesuits in China in the Last Decades of the Ming Dynasty*. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1962. Pp. 389. \$5.75.)
- ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Volume 13, Number 1. (New York: United Nations. 1961. Pp. 55. \$.75, paper.)
- ELDER, ROBERT E., *The Foreign Leader Program: Operations in the U. S.* (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1961. Pp. xii, 115. \$2.00, paper.)
- FLETCHER, C. SCOTT (Ed.), *Education: The Challenge Ahead*. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc. 1962. Pp. 232. \$4.50.)
- FOOTMAN, DAVID (Ed.), *Soviet Affairs: Number Three (St. Anthony's Papers Number 12)*. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1962. Pp. 141. \$3.75.)
- FOSS, PHILIP O., *The Battle of Soldier Creek*. (University: University of Alabama Press. Pp. 15. \$.35, paper.)
- FRYE, ROBERT J. AND DYER, JOHN A., *The City Manager System in Alabama*. (University: University of Alabama Bureau of Public Administration. 1961. Pp. 45.)
- GERBER, ROSALIE B., *The Responsibilities of Man*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1962. Pp. vi, 147. \$3.25.)
- GERSHOY, LEO, *Barere, Bertrand: A Reluctant Terrorist*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. xi, 459. \$8.50.)
- GOETHALS, PETER R., *Aspects of Local Government in a Sumbawan Village (Eastern Indonesia)*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. 1961. Pp. vii, 143. \$3.00, paper.)
- GHOSH, STANLEY, *Embers in Cathay*. (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1961. Pp. 236. \$4.50.)
- GORDON, LINCOLN AND GROMMERS, ENGLEBERT L., *United States Manufacturing Investment in Brazil*. (Boston: Harvard Business School. 1962. Pp. xvii, 177. \$2.50, paper.)
- GRANT, DOUGLAS AND MILLAR, MACLURE (Ed.), *The Far East: China and Japan*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. \$2.50.)
- GRINELL-MILNE, DUNCAN, *The Triumph of Integrity: A Portrait of Charles de Gaulle*. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1962. Pp. 334. \$5.00.)
- GRUBER, RUTH, *Science and the New Nations*. (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1961. Pp. 314. \$6.50.)
- HALECKI, OSCAR, *The Limits and Divisions of European History*. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1962. Pp. xiii, 242. \$1.95.)
- HANCOCK, W. K., *Rome: Caput Mundi and Italian Capital*. (Canberra: Australian National University. 1961. Pp. 15. 5s., paper.)
- HARDT, JOHN P. WITH STOLZENBACH, C. DARWIN AND KOHN, MARTIN J., *The Cold War Economic Gap*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiv, 114. \$4.00.)
- HATCH, JOHN, *Africa Today—and Tomorrow* (New Edition). (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. viii, 343. \$5.00.)
- HAUSER, PHILIP M., *On the Impact of Population and Community Changes on Local Government*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, Institute of Local Government. 1961. Pp. 28. \$2.00, paper.)

- HAYES, C. J. H., *Nationalism: A Religion*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. Pp. xi, 187. \$5.00.)
- HENNING, THEODORE F., *Buritis in Paradise*. (New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1961. Pp. 252. \$3.00.)
- HEXTER, J. H., *Reappraisals in History*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961. Pp. xxi, 214.)
- VON DER HEYDTE, Friedrich August, Freiherr, *Volkerrecht; Ein Lehrbuch II*. (Berlin: Verlag Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1960. Pp. 445.)
- HODGKIN, THOMAS AND SCHACHTER, RUTH, *French-Speaking West Africa in Transition*. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1961. Pp. 375-436. \$35, paper.)
- HUGHES, JOHN, *The New Face of Africa South of the Sahara*. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Inc. 1961. Pp. 296. \$5.00.)
- INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, *Texas Council-Manager Charters*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. Pp. 71. \$2.00, paper.)
- INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, *African Conference on the Rule of Law: Lagos, Nigeria January 3-7, 1961*. (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1961.)
- INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, *The Parliamentary Profession*. (Paris: Unesco, 1961. \$2.10, paper.)
- JACKSON, PERCIVAL E., (Selected and arranged by), *The Wisdom of the Supreme Court*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962. Pp. xvi, 524. \$8.95.)
- JACOBS, DAN N. (Ed.), *The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents*. (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co. Pp. 218. \$1.90.)
- JELLISON, CHARLES A., *Fessenden of Maine: Civil War Senator*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962. Pp. vi, 294. \$5.50.)
- JOHNSON, FRANK J., *No Substitute for Victory*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1962. Pp. xi, 230. \$5.00.)
- JONES, W. T., *The Romantic Syndrome*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. Pp. xv, 255. 23.75 guilders.)
- JOYCE, JAMES AVERY, *Capital Punishment*. (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1961. Pp. 288. \$5.00.)
- JOYNER, CONRAD, *Holman vs. Hughes: Extension of Australian Commonwealth Powers*. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1961. Pp. 70. \$2.00, paper.)
- KECSKEMETI, PAUL, *The Unexpected Revolution—Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. vi, 178. \$4.75.)
- KELLEN, KONRAD, *Khrushchev, A Political Portrait*. (New York: Frederick Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 271. \$5.00.)
- KING, GILLIAN (Ed.), *Documents on International Affairs*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xviii, 605. \$13.45.)
- KING, WUNSZ, *China at the Peace Conference in 1919*. (Jamaica, New York: St. John's University Press, 1961. Pp. 39. \$1.00, paper.)
- KISSINGER, HENRY A., *The Necessity of Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy*. (New York: Doubleday and Co. 1962. Pp. xii, 387. \$1.45, paper.)
- KOENTJARANINGRAT, Dr., *Some Social-Anthropological Observations on Golog Rojong Practices in Two Villages of Central Java*. (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961. \$2.50, paper.)
- KROPOTKIN, PETER, (Rogers, James Allen-Ed.), *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*. (New York: Doubleday and Co. 1962. Pp. xviii, 338. \$1.45, paper.)
- KUHN, HANS WOLFGANG, *Der Apokalyptiker und die Politik*. (Friburg: Rombach and Co. Pp. 255. 19.10.61.)
- KUZNETS, SIMON, *Capital in the American Economy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xxix, 664. \$12.00.)
- LAMPMAN, ROBERT J., *The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 1922-1956*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xxvii, 286. \$6.50.)
- LANGROD, GEORGES, *Some Current Problems of Administration in France Today*. (San Juan: University of Puerto Rico, School of Public Administration, 1961. Pp. vii, 152.)
- LA PIERRE, JEAN-WILLIAM AND NOIZET, GEORGES, *Une Recherche sur le Civismisme des Jeunes*. (Aix-en-Provence: Annales de la Faculté des Lettres, 1961. Pp. iv, 176. 17 NF.)
- LEAKEY, L. S. B., *The Progress and Evolution of Man in Africa*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 50. \$2.25.)
- LEDERMANN, LASZLO, *Considerations Epistémologiques Sur L'Étude des Relations Internationales*. (Athens: A Klissiounis, 1961. Pp. 21.)
- LEFEBVRE, GEORGES, *The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. xviii. \$6.00.)
- LEPRINCE-RINQUET, LOUIS, *Atoms and Men*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 118. \$3.00.)
- LERNER, ABBA, *Everybody's Business*. (East Lansing: The Michigan State University Press, 1962. Pp. 134. \$3.75.)
- LIANG, C. T., *The Chinese Revolution of 1911*. (Jamaica, New York: St. John's University Press, 1962. Pp. 59. \$1.00, paper.)
- LIEUWEN, EDWIN, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*. (Revised Edition) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. xii, 335. \$5.00, cloth. \$1.85, paper.)
- MACRIDIS, ROY C. (Ed.), *Foreign Policy in World*

- Politics*. (Second Edition) (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. x, 374. \$5.25, paper.)
- MAKI, JOHN M., *Conflict and Tension in the Far East—Key Documents—1894–60*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 245. \$5.00.)
- MALLORY, WALTER H. (Ed.), *35th Political Handbook of the World*. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1962. Pp. 246. \$4.95.)
- MASON, FRANCES NORTON, *My dearest Polly: Letters of Chief Justice John Marshall to his Wife, 1779–1831*. (Richmond: Garrett & Massie, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiv, 386. \$5.00.)
- MCGEE, REECE, *Social Disorganization in America*. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. xiv, 176. \$1.95, paper.)
- MENDEL, ARTHUR P., *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1961. Pp. 310. \$7.00.)
- MERRIFIELD, CHARLES W. (ed.), *Leadership in Voluntary Enterprise*. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1961. Pp. 232. \$3.95, cloth, \$1.75, paper.)
- MEYER, A. J. WITH VASSILION, SIMON, *The Economy of Cyprus*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 94. \$3.50.)
- MILLER, NATHAN, *The Enterprise of a Free People: Aspects of Economic Development in New York State during the Canal Period 1792–1838*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1962. Pp. xv, 293. \$6.00.)
- MITCHELL, GLENFORD E. AND PEACE, WILLIAM H., III, *The Angry Black South: Southern Negroes Tell Their Own Story*. (New York: The Citadel Press. 1962. Pp. 159. \$1.25, paper.)
- MOUNT ALLISON SUMMER INSTITUTE, *French Canada Today*. (Sackville, N.B.: Mount Allison University. 1962. Pp. 115. \$2.00, paper.)
- MURTY, K. SATCHIDANANDA, AND BOUQUET, A. C., *Studies in the Problems of Peace*. (New York: Asia Publishing House. 1960. Pp. vi, 375. \$6.75.)
- NEALE, ALAN D., *The Flow of Resources from Rich to Poor*. (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard. 1961. Pp. 83. \$1.00, paper.)
- NEF, JOHN U., *A Search for Civilization*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1962. Pp. xii, 210. \$4.00.)
- NELSON, WILLIAM H., *The American Tory*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. vi, 194. \$4.80.)
- NEWMAN, RALPH A., *Equity and Law: A Comparative Study*. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1961. Pp. 280. \$7.50.)
- OFFICE OF RESEARCH IN MILITARY HISTORY, *Operationsgebiet Östliche Ostsee und der Finnisch—Baltische Raum 1944*. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags—Anstalt. 1961.)
- OLIVESI, ANTOINE AND RONCAYOLO MARCEL, *Geographie Electorale des Bouches-du-Rhone Sous la IVe Republique*. (Paris: Armand Colin. 1961. Pp. 278. paper.)
- OLIVER, MICHAEL (ed.), *Social Purpose for Canada*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. xii, 472. \$7.95, cloth \$4.95, paper.)
- OPPERMANN, THOMAS, *Britisches Unterhauswahlrecht und Zweiparteinsystem*. (Karlsruhe: C. F. Muller. 1961. Pp. xiii, 151. DM 15.)
- PADELFORD, NORMAN J. AND LINCOLN, GEORGE A., *The Dynamics of International Politics*. 1962. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1962. Pp. xvi, 634. \$7.50.)
- PADGETT, L. V. (ed.), *Community Development in the Western Hemisphere*. (San Diego: San Diego State College. 1961. Pp. 88, \$1.00, paper.)
- PARÉ, PETER AND SHY, JOHN W., *Guerrillas in the 1960's*. (Princeton Studies in World Politics No. 1) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. 82. \$3.50.)
- PERKINS, DEXTER AND SNELL, JOHN L., *The Education of Historians in the United States*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1962. Pp. xiii, 244. \$4.95.)
- PETERSON, MERRILL D., *The Jefferson Image in the American Mind*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 548. \$2.65, paper.)
- PIKE, DOUGLAS., *Australia: The Quiet Continent*. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 242. \$3.95.)
- PRICE, DON K., *Government and Science*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. ix, 203. \$1.65, paper.)
- PROUDFOOT, MERRILL, *Diary of a Sit-in*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1962. Pp. xiv, 204.)
- RICKELS, MILTON, *Thomas Bangs Thorpe: Humorist of the Old Southwest*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1962. Pp. x, 275. \$5.00.)
- ROBERTSON, A. H., *The Law of International Institutions in Europe*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1961. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. Pp. ix, 140. \$4.00.)
- ROBINSON, ALAN D., *Dutch Organised Agriculture in International Politics 1945–1960*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1961. Pp. 192.)
- ROGERS, CYRIL A. AND FRANTZ, C., *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia*. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1962. Pp. xviii, 427. \$6.75.)
- ROY, JULES., *The War in Algeria*. (New York: Grove Press. 1961. Pp. 128. \$7.50.)
- RUDWICK, ELLIOTT M., *W. E. B. Du Bois: A Study in Minority Group Leadership*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1961. Pp. 382. \$6.00.)

- RUSSELL, BERTRAND., *Has Man a Future?* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc. 1962. Pp. 128. \$.85, paper.)
- SALISBURY, HARRISON E., *Moscow Journal*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1961. Pp. 499. \$.65.)
- SALVADORI, MASSIMO., *Cavour and the Unification of Italy*. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. An Anvil Original. 1961. Pp. 191. \$1.25.)
- SAYE, POUND, AND ALLUMS, *Principles of American Government*. (4th ed.) (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. x, 469. \$.55.)
- SCIGLIANO, ROBERT., *The Courts: A Reader in the Judicial Process*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1962. Pp. viii, 503. Paper.)
- SEGAL, RONALD, *Political Africa: A Who's Who of Personalities and Parties*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 475. \$12.50.)
- SIEVERS, ALLEN M., *Revolution, Evolution, and the Economic Order*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. vii, 173. \$.35, cloth. \$1.95, paper.)
- SLADE, RUTH, *The Belgian Congo*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. 82. \$1.00.)
- SOCIÉTÉ D'ETUDES ET DE PUBLICATIONS ORIENT, *Orient-Revue Trimestrielle*. (Paris: Société d'Etudes et de Publications Orient. 1961. Pp. 231.)
- SOSIN, JACK M., *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 307. \$.65.)
- STOESSINGER, JOHN G., *Financing the United Nations*. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. 72, \$.35, paper.)
- STURZO, LUIGI, *Church and State*. Vol. I and Vol. II. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1962. Pp. Vol. I, xix, 272. Vol. II, 273-584. \$.45, paper.)
- SWADOS, HARVEY, *A Radical's America*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1962. Pp. xvii, 347. \$.50.)
- SWIFT, RICHARD N. (ed.) *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1960-61*. (New York: Oceana Publications. 1961. Pp. xvi, 207. \$.60.)
- SZAPIRO, JERZY, *The Newspaperman's United Nations*. (New York: Columbia University Press, with UNESCO. 1962. Pp. 190. \$.25.)
- TALMON, J. L., *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 607. \$.85.)
- TANG, PETER S. H., *Communist China Today*. Vol. I. (2nd edition) (Washington: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. 1961. Pp. xviii, 745. \$10.00.)
- TAYLOR, LILY ROSS, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 255. \$1.95, paper.)
- THOMPSON, JOSEPH S., *Taxation's New Frontier*. (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation. 1961. Pp. 96. \$1.00, paper.)
- TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J., *A Study of History*. 3 Vols. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Vol. I, xiii, 484. Vol. II, ix, 452. Vol. III, viii, 551. Vol. I, \$.245, paper, Vol. 2, \$.235, paper, Vol. III, \$.275, paper.)
- TRISKA, JAN F. (ed.), *Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules*. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. x, 196. \$1.50, paper.)
- TUCHMAN, BARBARA W., *The Guns of August*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1962. Pp. xii, 511. \$.65.)
- TUSSMAN, JOSEPH, *The Supreme Court on Church and State*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. xxiv, 305. \$1.95, paper.)
- UNESCO: International Social Science Journal, *The Yugoslav Commune*. (Paris: UNESCO. \$.20, paper, quarterly.)
- UNITED NATIONS: REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, *Community Development in Urban Areas*. (New York: United Nations Publications. Pp. 44. \$.75, paper.)
- UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL OFFICE, *Commodity Trade Statistics Part II. Exports Jan.-Dec. 1960*. (New York: U.N. Pp. xv, 710, C53. \$.25, paper.)
- UNITED NATIONS, *Yearbook of the United Nations. 1960*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1962. Pp. x, 827. \$15.00.)
- U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment & Earnings for the U. S. 1909-60*. (Washington: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1961. Pp. x, 536. \$.30, paper.)
- UTLEY, FRANCIS LEE (ed.), *The Forward Movement of the Fourteenth Century*. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1962. \$.60.)
- VAN DERSAL, WILLIAM R., *The Successful Supervisor: in Government and Business*. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1962. Pp. 192. \$.95.)
- VANEK, JAROSLAV, *International Trade: Theory and Economic Policy*. (Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 426. \$.75.)
- VAN RENSBERG, PATRICK, *Guilty Land: The History of Apartheid*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962. Pp. 224. \$.45.)
- WALKER, EDWARD L. AND HEYNS, ROGER W., *An Anatomy for Conformity*. (Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. xiv, 103. \$.35, cloth. \$1.95, paper.)
- WARD, JOHN WILLIAM, *Andrew Jackson. Symbol for an Age*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 275. \$1.75, paper.)
- WEEKS, O. DOUGLAS, *Texas in the 1960 Presiden-*

- tial Election*. (Austin: The University of Texas. 1961. Pp. 80. \$2.00, paper.)
- WEINBERG, GERHARD L. (ed.), *Hillers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928*. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt. 1961. Pp. 228.)
- WESTOFF, CHARLES F., POTTER, ROBERT G., SAGI, PHILIP C., AND MISHLER, ELLIOT G., *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. xxii, 433. \$10.00.)
- WHEELER, GEOFFREY, *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. 67. \$1.75, paper.)
- WILLIAMS, CHANCELLOR, *The Rebirth of African Civilization*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. 328. \$6.00.)
- WOLFE, BERTRAM D., *Communist Totalitarianism. Keys to the Soviet System*. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1961. Pp. xx, 328. \$4.95.)
- WOOD, SUSAN, *Kenya: The Tensions of Progress*. (2nd ed.) (London: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. x, 135. Paper.)
- WOOD, JOHN SUMNER, *The Virginia Bishop: A Yankee Hero of the Confederacy*. (Richmond: Garrett & Massie, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 187. \$3.50.)
- YEARLEY, CLIFTON K., *Enterprise & Anthracite. Economics and Democracy in Schuylkill County 1820-75*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 254. \$5.00.)

## NEWS AND NOTES

### 1962 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1962-1963

The 1962 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5-8, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D. C. Professor Byrum E. Carter of Indiana University is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee (comprised of J. Roland Pennock, Chairman; Dayton D. McKean; Lucian W. Pye; Weldon Cooper; Stanley J. Parry; and Jack Peltason) will propose the following officers for 1962-1963: President-elect, C. Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago); Vice Presidents, Alexander Heard (University of North Carolina); John D. Lewis (Oberlin College); Wallace S. Sayre (Columbia University); Secretary, Ruth Lawson (Mt. Holyoke College); Treasurer, Max Kampelman (Washington, D. C.); Members of the Council for two years: Franklin L. Burdette (University of Maryland); Charles B. Hagan (University of Illinois); H. Field Haviland, Jr. (Brookings Institution); Robert E. Lane (Yale University); Joseph LaPalombara (Michigan State University); Ithiel de Sola Pool (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Harold H. Sprout (Princeton University); Sheldon S. Wolin (University of California)

### PROGRAM: 1963 ANNUAL MEETING

Early appointment of the Program Committee for the annual meeting of the Association, to be held in New York City in September 1963, makes it timely now to invite anyone having program suggestions for the occasion to convey them as soon as may be convenient, and prior to October, 1962, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Its members are: Karl W. Deutsch (Yale University) Chairman; David Easton (University of Chicago), Political Theory; Roy C. Macridis (Washington University), Comparative Politics; William N. Chambers (Washington University), National Government and Politics; Robert C. Wood (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), State and Local Government; Arnold A. Rogow (Stanford University), Political Behavior; James C. March (Carnegie Inst. of Technology), Public Administration; Harold W. Chase (Univ. of Minnesota), Public Law, National and International; Richard N. Rosecrance (University of California, Los Angeles), International Politics; Chairmen of Special Topics: Challenges to Constitutional Government, Charles M. Hardin (Rockefeller Foundation); Evolution of the Communist World, Zbigniew Brzezinski (Columbia University); The Developing Countries, Chairman to be appointed.

## PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Twelfth International Congress of Administrative Sciences will be held July 16 to 20, 1962, in the Hofburg at Vienna. Three subjects are on the program: (1) Technical Assistance in Public Administration—Lessons of experience and possible improvements; (2) Public Relations in Administration—I. Official publications; and

(3) Government Organization for Economic Development.

Special meetings for representatives of schools and institutes of public administration are also scheduled, to discuss (1) Teaching methods and materials, and (2) Cooperation among institutions. General reports to guide the debates have

been in preparation for two years, with the cooperation of national reporters in some thirty countries. These Congresses attract over 500 participants from more than fifty countries, including those of Asia and Africa—officials in the control organs of central governments, directors of national institutes of training and research and professors of administration and administrative law. Further details from Don L. Bowen, director, American Society for Public Administration, 6042 South Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois, or from P. A. Schillings, Director General, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 25 rue de la Charité, Brussels 4, Belgium.

The Southern California Political Science Association has held three meetings: (1) in July at Occidental College with Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago, speaking on "The Paradoxes of Democratic Government"; in November at Loyola University with William Ebenstein, Princeton, speaking on "Franco's Spain"; in January (1962) at Pomona College with Maurice Shock, University College, Oxford University, speaking on "How Europe Views the Cold War." Officers of the Association for the year 1961-62

are president, Raymond G. McKelvey, Occidental College; secretary-treasurer, William F. Fitzgerald, Loyola University; executive committee: Carl Q. Christol, University of Southern California; Jeniellen Ferguson, San Fernando Valley State College; Ivan H. Hinderaker, University of California, Los Angeles; Lester H. Phillips, University of Redlands; William S. Stokes, Claremont Men's College.

Section K—Social and Economic Sciences—of the American Association for the Advancement of Science will hold sessions for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. in Philadelphia, December 26-31, 1962. Association members interested in presenting a paper at these sessions should forward titles and abstracts not later than September 10 to the Secretary of A.A.A.S. Section K, Donald P. Ray, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington 4, D. C. Papers should be based on current or recently completed research. The American Political Science Association is an affiliate member of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the A.A.A.S.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

### 1962 FOREIGN SERVICE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION TO BE GIVEN IN SEPTEMBER

The Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service of the Department of State, after careful study and consultations with private and government authorities concerned, has decided to schedule the 1962 Foreign Service Officer written examination on September 8, 1962.

The September date should give students more free time to prepare for the examination without interrupting summer or academic work. Too, the Board of Examiners will be able to begin oral examinations in November thereby enabling the induction of successful candidates soon after the close of the school year.

Candidates are eligible to take the examination if they are between the ages of 21 and 31 and have been U. S. citizens for nine years as of July 1, 1962. Candidates who are 20 years of age may take the examination if they have completed their junior year.

Application forms for designation to take the examination may be obtained by writing to the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. The completed application form must be received by the Board by July 23, 1962.

The department of government at Indiana University will establish a faculty seminar on political and administrative development, stressing the conditions under which viable political institutions, capable of directing and controlling public bureaucracies, emerge. The role of various elites or leadership elements in these societies will be studied through selected case studies by participating faculty members, research associates and graduate students. Fred W. Riggs, professor of government, will serve as seminar director. Financing is provided by a three-year grant of \$105,000 from the Carnegie Corporation.

The Merston National Security Center awarded the prize of \$2,500 for the best book-length manuscript on national security submitted in 1961 to George Stambuk, department of government, Indiana University. The manuscript, *American Military Forces Abroad: A Postwar Pattern In International Relations*, will be published by the Ohio State University Press in 1962.

University Bureau Research in Government—An Inventory of Current Projects, published for the Conference of University Bureaus of Governmental Research, American Society for Public Administration, by the Bureau of Government, University Extension Division, University of

Wisconsin, Madison, 1961. 122 pp. Copies may be secured from the Wisconsin Bureau for \$1.

Dartmouth College has received a grant of \$100,000 from the Carnegie Corporation of New York for two related national security studies. Eugene Lyons will examine the command of international armed forces and Louis Morton will analyze command and other problems of World War II.

The Lilly Endowment of Indianapolis, Indiana has awarded Duke University \$75,000 as the continuation of its research program in Christianity and Politics. The Program was initiated by the Lilly Endowment in 1957. The program is administered by Dr. John H. Hallowell, professor of political science.

Under grants received from the Ford Foundation and the New York State Senate, Columbia University, Hunter College, and Syracuse University have established a graduate New York State Legislative Internship Program, comparable in scope and intent to the APSA Congressional Fellowship program. The three-year grant of \$75,000 from the Ford Foundation is supplemented by an annual grant of \$10,000 from the New York State Senate. Dr. Ruth Weintraub, professor of political science and director of the graduate program in Arts and Science at Hunter College, is director of the Internship Program. Professors David Truman of Columbia University, Frederick Zimmerman of Hunter College, and Frank Munger of Syracuse University, compose the executive committee, and Professor Donald G. Baker of Skidmore College is faculty supervisor of the program.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER of Rutgers will serve as visiting professor of government at Columbia during 1962-63 with primary assignment to the newly created institute of Latin American studies.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON of the University of Wisconsin has been awarded an SSRC foreign area research grant for Latin-American work in 1962-63.

DAVID W. BARKLEY, associate professor of political science, Northeastern University, attended the Wilton Park conference, Steyning, Sussex, England, December 1 to December 16, as a Ford Fellow. While there, he led one of the discussions on the topic: "The Control of the State in Modern Society: An American Point of View."

PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, is the recipient of a \$25,000 grant from a private, civic-minded donor for a study of the Third Indiana Congressional District.

RUTH BAUMANN, associate professor of political science, University Extension Division, University of Wisconsin, has been appointed an assistant to the dean of extension for the administration of the Wisconsin Urban Program which is supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, retaining part time her position in the bureau of government.

WALTER T. BOGART of Middlebury College has retired for reasons of ill health as chairman of the department of political science. DR. HARRIS E. THURBER has been named to succeed him as chairman. LEE A. LENDT, formerly at Columbia University, is now teaching in the department.

RONALD F. BUNN of the University of Texas will serve as visiting associate professor of government at Indiana University for the year 1962-63.

FRED G. BURKE, Syracuse University, begins a leave of absence for a year of continuing research in East Africa starting in July 1962.

WILLIAM N. CHAMBERS, professor of political science at Washington University (St. Louis) will be on leave of absence for the academic year 1962-63.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN of the University of Pittsburgh, delivered a series of lectures in Poland at the Uniwersitet Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, Lublin and at the Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczna, Krakow.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL, professor of international law and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Southern California has been appointed to the chair of International Law, Naval College, for 1962-63. TOTTEN J. ANDERSON will serve as chairman of the political science department at the University of Southern California during Dr. Christol's absence.

MORRIS H. COHEN, associate professor of government, Clark University, has been elected president of the Worcester Plan "E" Association, the Worcester civic improvement organization.

JOHN A. CRITTENDEN, formerly of the University of North Carolina and recently law and behavioral science research Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School, has accepted an appointment as visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California.

RALPH CROW, American University, Beirut, has been appointed visiting associate professor for 1962-63 at Indiana University.

HENRY W. EHRLMANN of Dartmouth College has been invited to deliver a lecture at the Free University of Berlin during an international



gathering of political scientists organized May 8-10 to celebrate the inauguration of the new building of the Otto-Suhr-Institute (Institute of Politics) of the Free University. During July Professor Ehrmann will serve as Fulbright lecturer and director of studies at the American Seminar in political science to be held in Nice, France. He will spend the fall term on research leave in Paris and will also lecture at the Universities of Paris and Bordeaux.

DAVID G. FARRELLY, UCLA, has been appointed by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to a 25-man committee which is charged with the study and review of the county charter. Professor Farrelly is chairman of a subcommittee on political activities of classified county employees.

PETER J. FLIESS, professor of government, Louisiana State University, delivered the Maurice Falk Lectures at Carnegie Tech on January 10 and 11, 1962. The general subject of the lectures was Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity.

MERRILL R. GOODALL on leave as professor of government in the Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, has been appointed by the United Nations as its public administration advisor to the Government of Nepal. His assignment in Kathmandu begins March, 1962.

BERTRAM GROSS, professor of administration, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, who is spending 1961-62 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, is serving as visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, during the spring semester, 1962.

ROBERT W. HATTERY, assistant professor of political science, has assumed the assistant directorship of the institute of world affairs education, Extension Political Science Department, University Extension Division, University of Wisconsin.

C. LEONARD HOAG has been Fulbright Lecturer in political science at Kyung-Pook University, Taegu, Korea during the academic year 1961-62, having been granted a leave of absence from Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont.

J. C. HUREWITZ of Columbia, who will be on leave during 1962-63, will spend the year at the center for advanced studies in the behavioral sciences.

ALDOUS HUXLEY is serving as the Ford Rotating research professor in governmental affairs in the department of political science, University of California, Berkeley, for the spring term, 1962.

THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University for the winter and spring terms of 1962. He had recently served from 1957-1961 as United States Ambassador to El Salvador.

MAGID KHADDURI of the school of advanced international studies, will be at Columbia as visiting professor of government in the academic year 1962-63.

PAUL KECSKEMETI of the RAND Corporation will serve as lecturer in government and senior fellow in the research program on communism at Columbia University, in 1962-63.

KWANG-HSUN TU has been teaching on a Fulbright Exchange professorship at the University of Washington and University of California at Santa Barbara.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, professor of political science at Michigan State University, who is spending 1961-62 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, is serving as visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, during the spring semester, 1962.

LOUIS E. LAMBERT has been appointed to the Governor's Advisory Committee on Traffic Safety for the State of Indiana.

WALTER H. C. LAVES has been appointed consultant to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare at Indiana University on its programs in international education.

REAM A. LAZARO has been named director of the institute of administrative management and lecturer in public administration at the University of Pittsburgh.

M. NELSON MCGEARY, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University is on leave of absence during the spring and summer terms of 1962. He will be working in Washington in the office of Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania.

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON lectured in March and April at the University of Buenos Aires, under an AID-supported cooperative arrangement between the Economics Faculty of that university and the Columbia Graduate School of Business; his subject was trends in research and teaching in public administration. In May and June he was engaged in staff work on "education and training" for the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, a study group set up in Washington by the Carnegie Endowment with the cooperation of the Department of State.

DOUGLAS H. MENDEL, formerly at UCLA, has received a grant from the contemporary China committee of the SSRC/ACLS to study Sino-Japanese relations. He will also spend September and October as guest lecturer at the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Melbourne, Australia.

NORMAN D. PALMER, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, who is in South Asia on an assignment for the Council on Foreign Relations, with the assistance of a Guggenheim Fellowship and a grant for research on Asia from the American Council of Learned Societies, delivered a series of lectures at universities in India, Nepal and Pakistan.

RICHARD L. PARK, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been appointed representative in India of the Asia Foundation.

J. WILLIAM ROBINSON, chairman, department of political science and international relations at Whittier College, has been appointed director of the 39th annual session of the institute of world affairs to be held December 2-5, 1962 in Pasadena. The Institute will again be sponsored by the University of Southern California in cooperation with the colleges and universities of the Pacific area.

OLE S. SMOLANSKY, UCLA, received a Rockefeller research grant to conduct a study of Arab politics.

FRANCES L. STARNER, assistant professor of political science, San Jose State College, is on leave, 1961-62, on her second Fulbright Award. She is engaged in research on far eastern agrarian politics and has her headquarters in Manila, P.I.

IRVIN STEWART, professor of political science, West Virginia University, is on leave of absence from March 1, 1962 to September, 1963, in order to undertake, at President Kennedy's request, the newly created position of Director of Telecommunications Management.

JOSEPH L. SUTTON, Indiana University, has been appointed as a member of the Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Fellowship Committee.

S. LAIRD SWAGERT, professor of political science, San Jose State College, is on leave, 1961-62, engaged in work for the Stanford Research Institute.

FRANK N. TRAGER, professor of international affairs, New York University, is on leave to serve on the faculty of the National War College for the academic year 1961-62. During the summer of 1962 he will participate in the 44th Conference on "The Defense of the West," at Wilton Park, Sussex, England. He will then return to the National War College for the academic year 1962-63.

SCHUYLER C. WALLACE has resigned as dean of the school of international affairs at Columbia and will be on leave from the University for the next two years, to serve as director of the Ford Foundation's Foreign Area Training Fellowship program.

QUINCY WRIGHT will spend 1962-63 as visiting professor of international relations at Columbia University.

HARMON ZEIGLER of the department of political science at Emory University has been appointed field supervisor (southern region) by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.

## APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

JOHN H. BALLARD of San Jose State College has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

ROBERT A. BARRETT, a doctoral candidate at the American University, has been appointed as lecturer in the school of government and public administration, the American University, effective February 5, 1962.

JEWEL L. BELLUSH has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of political science at Hunter College.

ELIOT S. BERKLEY has been appointed dean of the college of the Kansas City Art Institute.

PAUL BERNSTEIN has been appointed instructor

in the political science department, University of Pennsylvania.

JOHN D. BORN, JR. has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of history and political science, University of Nevada, Reno.

DON L. BOWEN was appointed executive director of the American Society for public administration by the Society's council meeting here. This appointment, effective as of January 1, 1962, was announced by Elmer B. Staats, the society's president and deputy director of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget.

DONALD BRANDON has been promoted from

assistant to associate professor of political science at the University of San Francisco.

DAVID BROOK recently received a doctorate from Columbia University and has been appointed an instructor of international relations and government at St. Johns University.

ARDATH W. BURKS has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Rutgers University effective February 1, 1962.

EDWARD McNALL BURNS, professor of political science at Rutgers University, is on leave of absence during the second semester of 1961-62. He will retire at the close of the current academic year after having served as chairman of the department over the past decade.

L. GERALD BURSEY has joined the department of political science, Northeastern University, with the rank of associate professor.

DONALD S. CARLISLE, has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin beginning in September, 1962.

HARRY M. CHASE, JR. has been promoted to associate professor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada, Reno.

HSIEN T'ING PETER CH'EN has been appointed instructor in the Far Eastern studies program at Brown University.

ANDREW W. CORDIER has become dean of the school of international affairs at Columbia University.

ROGER H. DAVIDSON has been appointed instructor at Dartmouth.

VINCENT DAVIS, JR. has been appointed assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

After seven years as head of the all-university department of government and international relations at New York University, MARSHALL E. DIMOCK will resign at the end of the current academic year to resume his writing in Bethel, Vermont.

JACK D. EDWARDS has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada, Reno.

MALBONE W. GRAHAM, professor of political science at UCLA since 1924, will retire at the end of the spring semester. On May 25, 1962, a seminar and dinner in his honor was held at which the featured participants were three

former students of Professor Graham: Malcolm Moos, of the Rockefeller Foundation, G. Homer Durham, president of Arizona State University, and Robert Walker of Oklahoma State University.

DUANE GRIMES has joined the department of political science, Northeastern University, with the rank of instructor.

ROBERT D. HAYTON has been promoted to associate professor in the department of political science at Hunter College.

HUEY BLAIR HOWERTON, a member of the faculty in political science at University of Mississippi since 1930 and chairman of the department from 1930-1958, retired in June after 32 years of service.

PETER H. JUVILER has been promoted to assistant professor at the department of political science at Hunter College.

JEROME G. KERWIN, director, honors division, University of Santa Clara, and professor emeritus of the University of Chicago, has accepted appointment as professor of political science at San Jose State College where he will be teaching one-quarter time. Dr. Kerwin's principal duties will remain at the University of Santa Clara.

MRS. JEAN KOPYTOFF has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science at Brown University.

DAVID KOVENOCK, has been appointed instructor at Dartmouth College.

FRED KRINSKY, formerly of Syracuse University, has joined the department of political science, University of Southern California, as an associate professor.

CHARLES H. KUNSMAN, JR. has joined the political science department at San Jose State College as an assistant professor, after a year at the University of Nevada.

AREND LIJPHART was appointed instructor of political science at Elmira College, beginning September, 1961.

C. PETER MAGRATH has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Brown University.

CHARLES McCALL, Yale, has been appointed instructor at Indiana University.

STEVEN MULLER has been promoted to associate professor of government and director of the center for international studies at Cornell University.

ROBERT T. NORMAN of Harvard University has been appointed assistant professor of political science and director of the bureau of municipal research, Kalamazoo Michigan.

ROY OLTON has been promoted to associate professor of government at Western Michigan University.

STANLEY A. PEARL has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada, Reno.

JAMES W. PRATT, formerly at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, is now assistant professor of political science at San Jose State College.

CHANNING B. RICHARDSON, associate professor of government, has been named the first occupant of the newly established Henry P. Bristol chair in international affairs at Hamilton College.

JOHN W. RYAN, associate professor of political science, University of Wisconsin's extension division, is now associated with that university's center for international studies and programs in addition to his position in the bureau of government.

EDWARD V. SCHTEN has joined the staff of the bureau of government at the University of Wisconsin as an assistant professor of political science and as an assistant director of the Bureau. He will be responsible for education and training activities of the Bureau and will be located on the

Milwaukee campus. Mr. Schten was formerly the director of research of the legislative research commission of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

KALMAN H. SILVERT, formerly of Tulane University, has been appointed professor of government at Dartmouth.

GEORGE STAMBUK has been appointed assistant professor of government at Indiana University.

RICHARD W. STAVELEY, assistant professor of political science, San Jose State College, is on leave for the year 1962, teaching at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

T. NOEL STERN, former president of West Chester State College in Pennsylvania has been appointed research associate in the bureau of government research at Indiana University.

JOHN C. STOESSINGER has been promoted to associate professor at the department of political science, Hunter College.

CLARENCE E. THURBER has been appointed associate professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University effective March 1, 1962.

JOSEPH B. TUCKER, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Ohio University.

FREDERIC A. WEED, head of the San Jose State College department of political science and public administration has been named a full professor.

## IN MEMORIAM

Professor AARON M. MARGALITH died suddenly in his home at 175 Pinehurst Avenue, Saturday, October 21, at the age of 59. Dr. Margalith, former chairman of the social science department, 1949-1955, was professor of political science.

A native of Jerusalem, Dr. Margalith spent his early years in the Holy City, and there attended elementary and secondary schools. During the First World War, Dr. Margalith, although under age, joined the Royal Fusiliers of the British Army. He fought on the Sinai Peninsula where he distinguished himself by receiving both the British Victory and War Medals.

In 1921 he came to America and studied at the City College of New York and Temple University. He received both his B.A. and Ph.D. degrees at the Johns Hopkins University, the latter in 1929.

A member of the college faculty for twenty eight years, Dr. Margalith became a full professor in 1951 and also served as University librarian and chairman of the social science department. He was currently serving as faculty representative to the alumni-faculty-student relations special committee.

Mr. Margalith, a scion of a family of scholars, was the author of "The International Mandate" and co-author with Dr. Cyrus Adler of "American Intercession on Behalf of Jews" and "With Firmness in the Right," a statement of diplomatic action affecting Jews during the century before its publication in 1946.

—Yeshiva College Commentator

Professor LANE W. LANCASTER died of a heart attack in Bruges, Belgium, on March 27, 1962.

Thus came to an end a long and distinguished career as a teacher and scholar in the field of political science.

He was born in Bellaire, Ohio, on December 9, 1892, took his first degree at Ohio Wesleyan University in 1915, his Master's degree from the University of Illinois in 1918, and his doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania in 1923. He was a private in the U. S. Army in 1918. After serving as an instructor at the University of Pennsylvania from 1920 to 1923, he taught at Wesleyan University, in Middletown, Connecticut, from 1923 to 1930. He came to the University of Nebraska as Professor in 1930, and remained there until his retirement in the spring of 1960. He served as chairman of his department from 1939 to 1953, and from 1955 to 1957, a fact to which he attached no significance at all. He had no desire for administrative power, and regarded the teacher's calling as fully satisfying. He was visiting professor in several institutions, Northwestern University during the year 1940-1941, Yale University, 1948-1949, and the University of California at Berkeley, 1949-1950. He was Vice-President of the American Political Science Association in 1951-1952. He was also a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

In 1924 Professor Lancaster published a study on *State Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness*. His well-known book, *Government in Rural America*, appeared in 1937, with a second edition in 1952. In 1959 he published Volume 3 of *Masters of Political Science: Hegel to Dewey*. Over the years he contributed generously to political science journals and to books on American government.

After his retirement he moved to Berkeley, California, and in the fall of 1961 accepted appointment as Fulbright Professor of Political Science at University College, Swansea, Wales. He was on a holiday trip to Italy when he passed away.

Lane Lancaster was an unusually gifted teacher. He combined a genuinely friendly manner with an effortless mastery of the Socratic method. To a vast store of learning in political science he added a tremendous knowledge of English literature and history. He wrote with

grace and charm, and was immensely popular with students without courting popularity. His many warm friends in the teaching profession join his widow and his two daughters in shedding a tear for a wise, decent and gallant man.—

DAVID FELLMAN

AUSTIN F. MACDONALD, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of California, died in his home in Berkeley, January 8, 1962. He had retired in August, 1961, because of failing health.

Born in Philadelphia, January 21, 1898, he was an honors graduate of the University of Pennsylvania in 1920. He took his M. A. there too the following year, was a Harrison Fellow, 1921-23, and received his doctorate on a thesis published in 1923, *Federal Subsidies to the States*, a subject which he developed further in his book on *Federal Aid*, 1928. He taught at his alma mater until invited to Berkeley as a full professor in 1930. Despite his youth, he had already published four books and a dozen articles.

At California Macdonald continued his work in municipal and state government and in the late 1930's returned to an interest he had developed while still a graduate student at Pennsylvania, namely, Latin America. Professionally he was probably best known for his *American City Government and Administration*, first published in 1929, and *American State Government and Administration*, both of which have appeared in six editions. His *Government of the Argentine Republic*, 1942, was well received, and his *Latin American Politics and Government* has been widely used.

Professor Macdonald had many interests and was a prodigious worker. He travelled extensively and was an accomplished musician. He was an able lecturer, noted for his keen wit, and attracted huge upper division classes while at the same time his graduate students came to know him well. He was in frequent demand as a public speaker. He was a man of integrity, thoughtfulness, sincerity of purpose, and lived a well organized life. He is survived by his widow, Frances W. Macdonald, to whom he was deeply devoted.—ERIC BELLQUIST

# OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

## *President*

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN  
Indiana University

## *President-Elect*

CARL J. FRIEDRICH  
Harvard University

## *Vice Presidents*

GABRIEL A. ALMOND  
Yale University

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT  
University of Chicago

DWIGHT WALDO  
University of California

## *Secretary*

MARIAN IRISH  
Florida State University

## *Treasurer*

MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
Washington, D. C.

## *Executive Director*

EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK  
1726 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.  
Washington 6, D. C.

## *Assistant Director*

JOHN G. STEWART

## *Managing Editor, APSR*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD  
The Ohio State University

# COUNCIL

## *Above-named Officers ex officio*

LAWRENCE DURISCH  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
WILLIAM O. FARBER  
University of South Dakota  
IVAN H. HINDERAKER  
University of California, Los Angeles  
JOHN T. HOLDEN  
University of New Hampshire  
GLADYS M. KAMMERER  
University of Florida  
RICHARD C. SNYDER  
Northwestern University  
KENNETH W. THOMPSON  
Rockefeller Foundation  
JOHN D. WILLIAMS  
University of Utah

ALFRED DEGRAZIA  
New York University  
JOHN HALLOWELL  
Duke University  
SIGMUND NEUMANN  
Wesleyan University  
LEO C. RIETHMAYER  
University of Colorado  
LESTER G. SELIGMAN  
University of Oregon  
VERNON VAN DYKE  
State University of Iowa  
ROBERT E. WARD  
University of Michigan  
BRYCE WOOD  
Social Science Research Council

# FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW  
ALBERT SHAW  
FREDERIC N. JUDSON  
JAMES BRYCE  
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL  
WOODROW WILSON  
SIMEON E. BALDWIN  
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART  
W. W. WILLOUGHBY  
JOHN BASSETT MOORE  
ERNST FREUND  
JESSE MACY  
MUNROE SMITH  
HENRY JONES FORD  
PAUL S. REINSCH  
LEO S. ROWE  
WILLIAM A. DUNNING  
HARRY A. GARFIELD  
JAMES W. GARNER

CHARLES E. MERRIAM  
CHARLES A. BEARD  
WILLIAM B. MUNRO  
JESSE S. REEVES  
JOHN A. FAIRLIE  
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH  
EDWARD S. CORWIN  
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY  
ISIDOR LOEB  
WALTER J. SHEPARD  
FRANCIS W. COKER  
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE  
THOMAS REED POWELL  
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA  
CHARLES GROVE HAINES  
ROBERT C. BROOKS  
FREDERIC A. OGG  
WILLIAM ANDERSON

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN  
LEONARD D. WHITE  
JOHN M. GAUS  
WALTER F. DODD  
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON  
HENRY R. SPENCER  
QUINCY WRIGHT  
JAMES POLLOCK  
PETER H. ODEGARD  
LUTHER H. GULICK  
PENDLETON HERRING  
RALPH J. BUNCHE  
CHARLES MCKINLEY  
HAROLD D. LASSWELL  
E. E. SCHATTSCHEIDER  
V. O. KEY, JR.  
R. TAYLOR COLE  
CARL B. SWISHER  
EMMETTE S. REDFORD

**APSA ANNUAL MEETING**  
**Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.**  
**September 3-8, 1962**

**Hotel Accommodations**

The Mayflower Hotel is the official hotel for the Annual Meeting. Flat rates for all rooms will be: \$9.00 single; \$14.00 double. The Statler-Hilton, located two blocks from the Mayflower, also has reserved a block of rooms at the same rate for overflow from the Mayflower. Reservations should be made at least two weeks prior to opening of the Annual Meeting.

**Monday and Tuesday, September 3 & 4**

Committee Meetings

**Registration—September 4-8**

A registration desk will be maintained in the Chinese Room of the Mayflower Hotel and will be open during the following hours:

Tuesday, September 4—1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.  
Wednesday, September 5—9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.  
Thursday, September 6—9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.  
Friday, September 7—9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.  
Saturday, September 8—9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.

*Persons arriving on Tuesday are urged to register promptly and thereby avoid the heavy registration periods later in the week.*

The registration fee will be \$3.00 for APSA members and \$5.00 for non-members. Social studies teachers attending only the Saturday joint APSA-NCSS meetings are not expected to register.

**Students**

Graduate and undergraduate students of political science are especially encouraged to attend the Washington meeting. Special panels on graduate research are being scheduled in conjunction with the regular panel sections. In addition, special sessions with Professor Harold Lasswell, Yale Law School, and Professor Arnold Brecht, New School for Social Research, have been scheduled for graduate students and young instructors.

**Location of Meetings**

Panel meetings, special meetings, and general sessions will be held in the Mayflower Hotel unless otherwise noted. The exact location of each meeting will be indicated in the Final Program distributed at registration.

**Program Committee**

Chairman: Byrum E. Carter, Department of Government, Indiana University. Committee Members:

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: Professor David Smith, Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: Professor James Prothro, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT: Professor Lucian Pye, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: Mr. Charles L. Clapp.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Professor Ethan Allen, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Professor James Robinson, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Professor Vincent Ostrom, Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: Professor Vernon Van Dyke, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.

SPECIAL GRADUATE SEMINARS: Professor Howard Penniman, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

# Professional Placement Service At 1962 Annual Meeting

(September 3-8, 1962)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Washington meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U.S. Employment Service for the District of Columbia, U.S. Department of Labor. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa. The service operated in St. Louis in 1961 in a most satisfactory fashion.

A staff of experienced Employment Service interviewers will be available at the Annual Meeting Placement Center to review employer's orders, interview applicants, and arrange for an interview between prospective employers and employees.

If you are planning to attend the 1962 Annual Meeting and wish to utilize the Placement Service, this is how to proceed:

**ADVANCE REGISTRATION:** Both prospective employers with personnel needs and employees seeking a position are urged to make application *before August 24* at the nearest local office of their State Employment Service and ask that the forms be forwarded to the District of Columbia Service. There are over 1800 local Employment Service offices throughout the country, including 119 urban professional placement centers. Personnel at these offices will have the appropriate forms and will assist employers and applicants to prepare them. Employers should take detailed job specifications and applicants should take a brief (preferably one page) vita when they visit the local office. The APSA National Office will send additional information on this service to department chairmen.

With the exception of instances in which a satisfactory placement has been effected before the Annual Meeting begins, the local Employment Service will forward all applications and orders directly to the Annual Meeting Placement Center after the registration deadline, August 24. The Center, located at the Mayflower Hotel, is manned by a staff of experienced professional placement interviewers who conduct the matching process of bringing together qualified personnel and interested employers.

The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants.

**ACTIVATING REGISTRATION AT THE CENTER:** Immediately upon arrival, the employer or applicant should check in at the Annual Meeting Placement Center so that earlier local registration can be activated.

**REGISTRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AT THE CENTER:** While initial registrations will be taken at the Center, you will get quicker service if you register in advance at the local Employment Service office.

**FOLLOW UP:** Orders and applications will be returned to the local Employment Service Office after the Annual Meeting. The office will determine if a satisfactory placement occurred and, if not, will make further recruitment or placement efforts.

All State Employment Service local offices accept orders and applications in the field of political science on a year-round basis as a regular part of their professional service.



## Three New, Noteworthy A-C-C Texts

**Ogg and Ray's**

### **INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 12th Edition**

by William H. Young, *University of Wisconsin*. The 12th edition of this well-known best seller includes rewritten and expanded chapters on civil rights, elections, foreign affairs, and national defense. A new chapter has been added on government in metropolitan areas. The book is completely up-to-date, including the major new programs, policies and events of 1961. Published in April. 957 pp., illus. \$8.00

Also available, the 12th edition of **INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, The National Government**. 748 pp., illus. \$7.50

### **THE REVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY**

by Neal Riemer, *The Pennsylvania State University*. In this original work of scholarship, the author analyzes the decline of democratic theory and presents a strong case for its revival. After giving the reasons for the decline, he lines out a scheme for American democracy and provides a framework within which it may operate. Throughout, the underlying definition of political theory is that of the critical study concerned with harmoniously relating the normative, empirical, and prudential components of political science. **Just published.**

190 pp., paper, \$1.95

### **FRENCH POLITICS AND ALGERIA**

by William G. Andrews, *Tufts University*. This book presents a comparative case study in the functioning of French governmental systems. From a wealth of documentary material and statistical data, the writer has woven a lucid account of policy in the making. His study demonstrates how the governmental and political institutions of the Fourth and Fifth French republics have functioned in dealing with the rebellion in Algeria from November 1954 to May 1962. The striking differences in approach to the same problem by two successive regimes are highlighted. **To be published this month.**

About 224 pp., paper, \$1.95 (tent.)



**APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS**

34 West 33rd Street, New York 1, N.Y.

Division of Meredith Publishing Company

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



# Public Opinion and American Democracy

by **V. O. KEY, JR.**, *Harvard University*

An excellent analysis of the implications for political theory of public opinion poll findings. A most penetrating study.—**HARWOOD L. CHILDS**, *Princeton University*

602 pp.; \$7.50 text

# Modern Organization

by **VICTOR A. THOMPSON**, *Illinois Institute of Technology*

Professor Thompson has written an unusually good presentation and integration of modern behavioral science findings with public administration and traditional organizational theory. Not only are there many insightful ideas which will supply researchers with many hypotheses but perhaps more important Professor Thompson is developing a theoretical framework that is of much promise.

—**CHRIS ARGYRIS**, *Yale University*

192 pp.; \$3.75 text

# Politics Among Nations

by **HANS J. MORGENTHAU**, *University of Chicago*

Without question, Professor Morgenthau's book is among the top five in the literature of the field today. It is indispensable to any course in international politics.—**JOE R. WILKINSON**, *University of Denver*.

660 pp.; \$7.50 text

**ALFRED A. KNOFF**, *Publisher*

College Department

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



# European Political Systems

*edited by* **TAYLOR COLE**, *Duke University*

This was an excellent text when it was first published. It is even better in the second edition which (is) thoroughly revised, reset and printed from new plates. The various changes made have improved and strengthened the book.—**ROGER H. WELLS**, *Bryn Mawr College*

876 pp.; \$7.50 *text*

# Introduction to Government

*by* **ROBERT RIENOW**, *State University of New York,  
College for Teachers, Albany*

An explicit and factual discussion of what governments are and how they work, with new material added throughout.

620 pp.; \$5.75 *text*

# Population and World Power

*by* **KATHERINE ORGANSKI and A. F. K. ORGANSKI**, *Brooklyn College*

An excellent study of population as a factor in world politics today—both internal and international.—**J. C. RUSSELL**, *University of Minnesota*

280 pp.; \$4.00 *text*

**ALFRED A. KNOFF**, *Publisher*

College Department

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## 5 SIGNIFICANT MCGRAW-HILL BOOKS

### VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda

Edited by REO M. CHRISTENSON, Miami University, Ohio; and ROBERT O. McWILLIAMS, Eastern Michigan University. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 585 pages, \$4.95.

This readable anthology on public opinion and propaganda is designed for nonspecialists and students planning further study. The book includes: a discussion of the nature of public opinion; the dynamics of its process; and its role in a democracy. This is followed by a consideration of factors which influence or determine opinion. Propaganda principles, techniques, and effects, plus types of propaganda are examined. Contributors include: Walter Lippmann, Bertrand Russell, Richard M. Nixon, James Bryce, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., George Gallup, Carl Sandburg, Alexis De Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Harold D. Lasswell.

### ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Fifth Edition

By JOHN H. FERGUSON, The Pennsylvania State University; and DEAN E. McHENRY, University of California, Los Angeles. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 512 pages, \$6.95.

Concise discusses national, state, and local government by introducing background and principles and their institutions and their operation in practice. The book contains new and updated information on: Alaska and Hawaii as new states; election of 1960 and its aftermath; reapportionment of 1961; the Kennedy Administration; recent Supreme Court decisions on contempt of Congress; federal finance; new drive for state constitutional modernization.

### LATIN AMERICA: An Interpretive History

By DONALD MARQUAND DOZER, University of California, Santa Barbara. 618 pages, \$7.95.

Offers an important step away from the traditional nation-by-nation treatment of Latin American history and offers an organized and integrated "interpretive history" of the area. The treatment is generally chronological and covers the entire span of Latin American history. The author avoids the encyclopedic detail that clutters much of the Latin American historiography, and, instead, stresses relationships, currents of development, and the most significant events.

### THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN HIGHER EDUCATION

By HOMER D. BABIDGE, Jr., Vice President of the American Council on Education; and ROBERT M. ROSENZWEIG, Assistant to U. S. Commissioner of Education, U. S. Office of Education. 224 pages, \$5.95.

Presents a realistic and authoritative discussion of the background and development of relations between the Federal Government and the higher education community. This book is designed to provoke more extensive and realistic debate about major issues of public policy. It is a candid assessment of limitations of colleges and universities in dealing with the Federal Government, and of the Federal Government in dealing with colleges and universities. Its treatment of delicate political issues, such as segregation and Church-State relations, make this book valuable to the well-informed citizen.

### AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

By C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, The University of Chicago. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. Available August.

A noteworthy casebook, including approximately 50 Supreme Court decisions, including *Baker v. Carr*—the recent Supreme Court decision on reapportionment. In general, the author has selected more recent cases which present constitutional issues with maximum impact for students and demonstrates how lively and current these constitutional controversies are. Material organized by issues . . . dissenting opinions fully treated . . . editing kept to a minimum . . . cases selected for interest to students.



**MCGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.**  
330 West 42nd Street  
New York 36, N.Y.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

### *Essays in Historical Perspective*

EDITED BY IVO J. LEDERER. This pioneer effort by leading American specialists is the first major attempt to deal with the interrelation of Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy. Individual essays interpret Russian national interests and objectives; Russian attitudes toward the West; the effect of internal politics on foreign policy; the role of personalities, the foreign ministry, and economics; and such instruments of diplomacy as the military apparatus, propaganda, international movements, and negotiation. These essays were originally presented at Yale University in April 1961, at a conference that included among its participants George F. Kennan, Cyril E. Black, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Hajo Holborn, and Henry L. Roberts. \$10.00

## POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND NATION BUILDING

### *Burma's Search for Identity*

BY LUCIAN W. PYE. This study of the search for personal and political identity in Burma brings to light some of the great difficulties which confront a transitional society in creating a modern state system. Mr. Pye examines Burma's political culture, exploring both the historical evolution of the society and the psychological reactions to change. He deals with problems such as the inhibitions thwarting modernization, the tendency toward ideological agitation, and the roles of colonialism and nationalism in the complex process of transformation. \$7.50

## RACIAL THEMES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

### *The Attitudes and Behavior of the White Population*

BY CYRIL A. ROGERS AND C. FRANTZ, WITH A FOREWORD BY SIR ROBERT C. TREDGOLD. From Algiers to Capetown, racial conflict threatens the peace of the entire African continent. Danger signals are especially clear in Southern Rhodesia, where the small white minority faces an increasingly restive African population. For the first time, in this book, a psychologist and an anthropologist have joined together to study the attitudes and behavior of the white Southern Rhodesians. The authors examine the historical background and then analyze specific categories of behavior toward Africans such as legal justice, political control, land use, educational opportunities, and sexual relations. \$6.75

Yale University Press



New Haven and London

Canadian orders:

McGill University Press, Montreal 25

# *from* RANDOM

.....

## *Patterns of Government*

THE MAJOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE  
Revised Edition

*by* SAMUEL BEER, ADAM B. ULAM, *and* NICHOLAS WAHL  
*all of Harvard University*

HERBERT J. SPIRO, *Amherst College*

HARRY ECKSTEIN, *Princeton University*

Since it first appeared in 1958, this authoritative text has challenged not only the undergraduate but the graduate student and professor as well.

Completely revised and updated, this book remains a distinguished analysis of the politics and governments of four major world powers—Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union. The authors, each an authority in his respective field, have under taken to present the politics of each of the four countries as a political system. Stressing scientific method, they work from a perspective that has won high regard in present-day political science.

*Summer 1962; about 700 pages; \$6.95 text*

.....

## *State and Local Government and Politics*

Revised Edition

*by* ROBERT S. BABCOCK, *University of Vermont*

This is a thoroughly updated and revised edition of a lucid, well organized and highly informative text. It is infused with the practical wisdom and sense of excitement derived from the author's own successful participation in grass roots politics and offers a stimulating and authoritative description and analysis of the problems of state and local governments.

*Summer 1962; 500 pages; paperbound; \$5.50 text*

.....

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



# HOUSE

.....

## *Power and International Relations*

by INIS L. CLAUDE, *University of Michigan*

*Autumn 1962; about 600 pages; \$5.95 text*

## *People, Power, and Politics*

AN INTRODUCTORY READER

by LYMAN J. GOULD, and E. WILLIAM STEELE,  
*both of the University of Vermont*

*1961; 725 pages; paperbound; \$3.95 text*

## *Courts, Judges, and Politics*

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

by WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*  
and C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, *University of Chicago*

*1961; 707 pages; \$6.75 text*

## *The Might of Nations*

WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME

by JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College*

*1961; 468 pages; \$6.25 text*

## *Send for a List*

*of Random House Studies in Political Science, a series of original works attractively bound in paper covers. The most recently published books in this series are: SMALL CITY GOVERNMENT by Warner E. Mills and Harry R. Davis, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURT by Robert S. Hirschfeld, and THE STATE LEGISLATURE by Malcolm E. Jewell. Priced from 95 cents.*

.....

RANDOM HOUSE • *The College Department* • 501 Madison Avenue • New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

---

Princeton

UNIVERSITY PRESS



---

## Men and Nations

By Louis J. Halle

For over half a century it has been commonplace to complain that the long tradition of political philosophy has at last come to an end, that the world today is without a valid and relevant political philosophy. *Men and Nations* represents an effort to repair this fault, to present a philosophy on which we can base the continued progress of our societies. That philosophical system is presented here as a proposed foundation for the understanding and teaching of politics. It is, however, a rounded system—a complete philosophy of life—so that its illumination is not limited to politics.

275 pages. \$4.50

---

## The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries

Edited by John J. Johnson

This volume examines the social and political role of the armed forces in the emergent countries of Latin America, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. The contributors include such distinguished historians and political scientists as Belmont Brice, James S. Coleman, and Lucian W. Pye. They offer here some searching observations on the political structure of the new states, on the relationship between the needs of internal order and those of external defense, and on the curious fact that military regimes, while they have promoted national development, social change, and free political practices in some countries, have hampered similar growth in others. *A RAND Corporation Research Study.*

428 pages. Tables. \$8.50

---

## The Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union

By G. Warren Nutter

The author's aim is to set the record straight for forty-odd years of Russian history in industrial growth from revolutionary to recent times, in its trends and fluctuations. He places developments in perspective by comparing them with those for Tsarist Russia and the United States, and estimates the volume of industrial production and labor productivity for the Soviet Union relative to the United States at benchmark dates. *Published for the National Bureau of Economic Research.*

734 pages. Tables, charts. \$15.00

---

Order from your bookstore, or  
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS  
Princeton, New Jersey

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



## **OXFORD BOOKS**

### **OF EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST**

---

#### **PEACE AND OPINION**

By EVAN LUARD. Mr. Luard shows that efforts to bring about international disarmament are directed at the symptoms rather than the causes of disorder—since it is not weapons which produce wars, but the habit of warlike conduct which creates the demand for weapons. His original and provocative argument, presented with force and clarity, is that public opinion as represented by the U.N. must grow in power so as to become a deterrent rather than a condemnation of acts of war. \$4.00

#### **THE ELIMINATION OF CORRUPT PRACTICES IN 19TH-CENTURY BRITISH ELECTIONS 1868-1911**

By CORNELIUS O'LEARY. In this volume Mr. O'Leary thoroughly explores a hitherto neglected aspect of British democracy in the nineteenth century: Britain's improvement in electoral morality from 1868, the year of the first real reform, to 1911. \$5.60

#### **THE AMERICAN TORY**

By WILLIAM H. NELSON. A general study, the first in more than half a century, of the Loyalists in the American Revolution. Mr. Nelson shows who they were, and why they suffered the most abject kind of political failure. \$4.80

#### **A HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE**

By CHRISTOPHER FYFE. The first comprehensive history of Sierra Leone, colonized from Britain in 1787 by settlers of African origin, and after 1807 the center for western African slaves captured and freed at sea by the Royal Navy. Mr. Fyfe's illuminating study lays particular emphasis upon these liberated Africans and their modern Creole descendants. \$13.45

*At all bookstores*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**New York 16**

# BOOKS THAT MATTER IN WORLD AFFAIRS from Praeger

## **RUSSIA UNDER KHRUSHCHEV**

**An Anthology from Problems of Communism**

Edited by Abraham Brumberg. Articles from a noteworthy periodical devoted to Soviet studies, documenting and analyzing the period of upheaval since Stalin's death.

660 pages, \$8.75 cloth, \$2.50 paper

## **THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS**

**An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives**

By Alexander Dallin. An assessment of the place of the United Nations in over-all Soviet world strategy by a foremost specialist on Soviet foreign policy.

256 pages, \$5.75 cloth, \$1.95 paper

## **CASTRO'S REVOLUTION**

**Myths and Realities**

By Theodore Draper. "The most lucid and intelligent bit of political analysis done by any American in a decade, perhaps in a couple of decades. It is not just an excellent book on a subject of interest and importance. It is a model of clarity, reason, intellectual decency, and good American English prose."—Richard H. Rovere, in *The American Scholar*

220 pages, \$4.50 cloth, \$1.75 paper

## **WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA**

**An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution**

By Gabriel Kolko. Challenging the popular theories of an affluent U.S. society, the author asserts that despite greatly increased taxation and economic innovations, wealth remains in essentially the same hands as in 1910.

190 pages, \$4.85

## **THE KREMLIN SINCE STALIN**

By Wolfgang Leonhard. A brilliant and thoroughly documented history—based almost exclusively on Soviet sources—of the internal politics and policies of the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin.

384 pages, \$7.75

## **REVISIONISM**

**Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas**

Edited by Leopold Labedz. The first book to deal comprehensively with the history of ideas associated with Marxist movements, providing a historical perspective for various reinterpretations of the original doctrine.

404 pages, \$7.95

## **UNITY AND CONTRADICTION**

**Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations**

Edited by Kurt L. London. Twenty Soviet-affairs specialists debate the issue of coexistence between the U.S.S.R. and China.

476 pages, \$7.50

## **LATIN AMERICA BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR**

By Salvador de Madariaga. The great European liberal, writer, and historian studies the causes of the current turmoil in Latin America—dealing with the local causes for unrest, the U.S.-Latin American relationship, and Latin America's relations with the Soviet Union and China.

200 pages, \$4.50

## **SOVIET MAN AND HIS WORLD**

By Klaus Mehnert. A full-dimensional portrait of life in the Soviet Union today by one of Europe's foremost experts on Soviet politics and literature.

320 pages, \$5.95

---

**FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publisher / 64 University Place, N. Y. 3, N. Y.**

---

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## **The Amateur Democrat**

CLUB POLITICS IN THREE CITIES

*By James Q. Wilson.* The growing challenge of local amateur activity in the Democratic party, as seen in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

\$6.95

## **Jurisprudence**

REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

*By Karl N. Llewellyn.* This collection of essays—many already known as classics—brings within easy reach the wide range of thought of one of the great American legal philosophers of our time.

\$8.95

## **The Small Group**

AN ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH CONCEPTS  
AND OPERATIONS

*By Robert T. Golembiewski.* A broad, yet thorough study of all that has been learned to date on small group analysis.

\$6.00

## **Render Unto Caesar**

THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY

*By David R. Manwaring.* A powerful treatment of the legal struggle of the Jehovah's Witnesses against the compulsory flag salute in public schools. Index

\$5.50

Through your bookseller or,

**UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**

Chicago 7, Illinois

IN CANADA: The University of Toronto Press

*To be published shortly*

**SYSTEMATIC POLITICS: Elementa Politica et Sociologica**

by George E. Gordon Catlin

This important work is the culmination of thirty years of leadership in the "scientific" study of politics by one of the world's foremost political scientists.

480 pages

6 x 9 inches

\$7.50

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

*Selected RONALD Books . . .*

**European Politics and Government**

*A Comparative Approach*

CLIFFORD A. L. RICH, *Oklahoma State University*; ROBERT O. GIBBON, *Wisconsin State College, Eau Claire*; LOWELL G. NOONAN, *San Fernando Valley State College*; HELMUT BADER, *El Camino College*; and KAREL HULICKA, *University of Buffalo*. Edited by CLIFFORD A. L. RICH

New. Designed for the first course in comparative government, this book presents a detailed, comprehensive, and balanced account of the politics and government of five major European powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S.S.R. Specialists on each country analyze the causal determinants of political action, providing

the student with a sound basis for drawing conclusions. The book systematically focuses attention on the governing process in order to impart a clear understanding of how the five major European systems compare with the United States. The final chapter summarizes the politics and institutions of European union. 1962. 780 pp., illus. \$8.00

**Public Administration**

JOHN M. PFIFFNER, *University of Southern California*; and ROBERT V. PRESTHUS, *Cornell University*

This standard textbook provides a comprehensive account of public administration today. It integrates the descriptive-institutional material of administrative science and the behavioral analyses of administration in action. The book analyzes the nature of public bureaucracy and the political en-

vironment with its attendant pressures on the public administrator; incorporates material on decision-making and data-processing in fact-finding and planning; reflects recent research in group behavior, individual motivation, leadership dynamics, etc. 4th Ed., 1960. 570 pp. \$7.50

**THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY**

15 East 26th Street, New York 10, New York

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## Economic Development in Perspective

By **John Kenneth Galbraith**. Knowing that new states and old states alike now recognize economic development as an imperative, Mr. Galbraith, United States Ambassador to India, delivered in late 1961 five public lectures on the essentials of the process.  
\$2.50

## Prices and Production of Machinery in the Soviet Union, 1928-1958

By **Richard Moorsteen**. This study provides the key quantitative indicators for 30 years of Soviet experience in developing machinery production. A RAND Corporation Study.  
\$15.00

## Communist China 1955-1959

### POLICY DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS

With a Foreword by **Robert R. Bowie** and **John K. Fairbank**. This volume presents a documented and interpretive record of Chinese domestic policy during a five-year period of intense revolutionary change.  
\$10.00

## The American Approach to Foreign Policy

### REVISED EDITION

By **Dexter Perkins**. In this thorough revision of a famous book, the author adds an analysis of the events of ten fateful years to his narrative. "... an extremely valuable contribution to the understanding of the distinctive character of American foreign policy."—H. J. Morgenthau  
\$4.95

## The Future of Federalism

By **Nelson Rockefeller**. The Governor of New York State here presents a strong case for the usefulness, indeed the necessity of federalism in the modern world. *The Godkin Lectures, 1962.*  
\$2.75

## Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959

By **Harold Swayze**. Mr. Swayze explores the elusive area where politics and literature meet—the junction of government directives and partisan emotions. His analysis of the Russian government's methods and mistakes illuminates not only the Soviet experience, but the basic relationship between art and society.  
\$5.95

**H**ARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

---

# **3 SIGNIFICANT VIEWS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN 20th-CENTURY AMERICA**

## **Democracy in Action**

Edited by THEODORE POWELL, Public Information Consultant for Connecticut's Department of Education and member of the Manchester, Connecticut, City Council.

By bringing together the pertinent writings of American men of government and politics, Dr. Powell has shown that today's process of government is the result of the continuing contest of personal views, interests, and ambitions within the evolving framework of law. Dramatically illustrating contrasting approaches to the issues which have contributed to the contemporary scene, the editor has chosen 83 selections from memoirs, public documents, periodicals, scholarly analyses, and novels.

834 pages, paper, \$3.25

---

## **A Bill Becomes A Law**

By DANIEL M. BERMAN, faculty member of the School of Government and Public Administration at The American University.

The background of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 provides a subject for careful study of the legislative process. Reflecting one of the most complex social issues of our time, this Act called into play almost every procedure designed for the purpose of passing or defeating legislation. This analysis follows its enactment step by step. 135 pages, paper, \$1.75

---

## **The Anatomy of A Constitutional Law Case**

By ALAN F. WESTIN, member of the District of Columbia Bar.

Documents relating to the Steel Seizure Decision of 1952, from its beginning as a wage dispute through its final hearing before the United States Supreme Court "successfully commingled the techniques of the reporter and the scholar in a dramatic presentation of a constitutional law case."—Stanley P. Stern, *Temple Law Quarterly*. 183 pages, \$1.95

---

*The Macmillan Company, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11*

---

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## Authoritative and Recommended

### REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY

*By Paul E. Zinner.* Based on interviews with Hungarian refugees in the summer of 1957, and drawn from numerous documentary sources, this book analyzes in detail the background of the ill-fated Hungarian Revolution. Discussed are the personality and role of Imré Nagy, the struggles for power within the Communist Party, and other little known facts about Hungary's internal politics.

*To be published August 13                      368 pages                      \$6.00*

### RUSSIAN CLASSICS IN SOVIET JACKETS

*By Maurice Friedberg.* Why does the Soviet government sponsor the publication of Tolstoy, Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Turgenev, Checkhov, or Gogol? Dr. Friedberg discusses the government's interest in the classics and illustrates the methods used in selection and editing of published materials.

*Just published                      248 pages                      \$4.75*

### YUGOSLAVIA IN CRISIS 1934-1941

*By J. B. Hoptner.* A documented account of Yugoslavia caught in an international world of great and self-centered powers and a domestic world of multinational population, pressured and manipulated from all sides. Included is an evaluation of Great Britain's role in the collapse of the regency.

*Just published                      326 pages                      \$6.50*

### EUROPE AT SIXES AND SEVENS: *The Common Market, the Free Trade Association, and the United States*

*By Emile Benoit.* "The issues in this crucial situation are admirably outlined in this analysis . . ." *Saturday Review Syndicate*

"An important book dealing with a subject vital to the relationship between the United States and what signs point to as the emerging United Europe." *Virginia Kirkus' Service*  
*275 pages                      \$6.00*



**Columbia University Press**  
*Publishers of the Columbia Encyclopedia*

## APSA PERSONNEL SERVICE

MEMBERSHIP—available to every member of the Association for \$5.00 yearly.

NEWSLETTER—issued every 4-6 weeks. Contains a listing of current teaching and research vacancies. Upon request, the Association forwards biographical information forms directly to employers.

PLACEMENT SERVICE AT ANNUAL MEETING—see page 530.

*For further information write:*

*Miss Cora Prifold, Director  
Personnel Service  
American Political Science Association  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.*

## The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy

**New York as a Test Case**

*By Lee Benson*

Jacksonian Democracy has become almost a commonplace in American history. But in this penetrating analysis of one state—its voting cycles, party makeup, and social, ethnic, and religious patterns—Lee Benson shows that the concept bears little or no relation to New York history during the Jacksonian period. Mr. Benson's examination suggests a new theory of American voting behavior and a reconsideration of other local studies during this period.

352 pages. \$6.00



*Order from your bookstore, or*  
**PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS**  
**Princeton, New Jersey**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



---

The Galleon Series in Economics, History, Philosophy and  
Political Science

---

*Just Out*

**CANADA VOTES: Howard A. Scarrow**

A handbook of Federal and Provincial Election data.

**\$12.00**  
LC 62-14822

**THE CONFLICT SOCIETY: Reaction and Revolution in  
Latin America**

By **KALMAN H. SILVERT, Tulane University**

*The Conflict Society* attempts to breathe order into the complex events  
of social change in today's Latin America.

**\$7.50**  
LC 61-12686

**THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS, A British View:**

**The Journal of Major C. R. FORREST**

Hugh F. Rankin, Editor

**\$2.00**  
LC 61-13685

*Recent Publications*

**EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA, By G. V. LA FOREST**

A comprehensive treatment of Canadian law and practice in interna-  
tional and inter-Commonwealth extradition.

**\$6.50**  
LC 61-7029

**THE CATHOLIC VOTE, By JOHN H. FENTON**

"This competent study is written without bias, and constitutes a reliable  
exposition of a problem of great topicality at the present time."

*The Book Exchange* (London)

**\$4.75**  
LC 60-12512

**U. S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND**

**INTERNATIONAL LAW, By ROBERT R. WILSON**

". . . an authoritative contribution to the literature on treaty law . . ."  
*American Political Science Review*

**\$6.50**  
LC 60-11021

**CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS, By CARL BECK**

"A masterful organization of material . . . essential for any law library  
with pretention to adequacy." *Law Library Journal*

**\$4.50**  
LC 59-15941

Wartime Origins of the East-West

**DILEMMA OVER GERMANY, By JOHN L. SNELL**

"His account of the development of United States policy is the fullest  
and most painstaking currently available." *Journal of Politics*

**\$7.00**  
LC 59-12404

**POLITICS IN THE BORDER STATES, By JOHN H. FENTON**

". . . excellent example of the combination of historical, statistical, and  
interviewing techniques in the study of state politics." *Public Admin-  
istration Review*

**\$5.50**  
LC 58-16327

*Once Again Available*

*A Distinguished Text*

**AN INTRODUCTION TO**

**PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY, By JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN**

**\$7.00**

**THE HAUSER PRESS**

720 POYDRAS ST.  
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

---

# THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN

by Edmond Cahn

"...is the kind of book that gains in value with the passing of months and years. The theme of the book is one with which every discussion group on democracy should concern itself. I know of no legal or political philosopher who combines in the same degree Cahn's command of the general and the particular."

—KENNETH W. THOMPSON, Vice President,  
The Rockefeller Foundation

"It is an important book. It radiates confidence in the free society as the hope of the world. One who puts down this volume realizes he has acquired new strength. There is the quality of Isaiah in the text. This is a book to read and re-read."

—JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS,  
The New York Times Book Review

"Among the teachers of law in America none is so sensitive and searching in relating the political and legal processes to the ethical concerns of the individual as Edmond Cahn."

—REINHOLD NIEBUHR




Photo of Professor Cahn  
by Arnold Newman

"This book expresses my idea of a true democratic philosophy."

—JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK

"Contributes significantly to our understanding of democratic man and the essential foundations upon which the democratic order stands."

—AMERICAN POLITICAL  
SCIENCE REVIEW

\$3.95

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N. Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## ***Ex-Communist Witnesses***

**FOUR STUDIES IN FACT FINDING**

*Herbert L. Packer.* A challenging examination of the testimony of four former Communists—Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz, and John Lautner—that tries to determine the effectiveness of present fact-finding processes. The author maintains that gaps and discrepancies exist in the witnesses' stories due to limitations in the fact-finding processes employed, and he discusses remedies and possible alternatives. \$4.95

## ***The Siege of Leningrad***

*Leon Goure. Foreword by Merle Fainsod.* Using memoirs, eyewitness accounts, and captured German documents, the author has told the dramatic story of the 900 day siege that saw almost one million people die of starvation, cold, and disease. How the Soviet authorities managed not only to maintain order and control but to mobilize the people into playing an important part in the city's defense is told for the first time. Illustrated. \$6.95

## ***The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties***

*Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser.* This is a systematic study of Soviet foreign policy from the point of view of Soviet international treaties, agreements, and conventions. It is based on an analysis of the more than 2,000 treaties entered into by the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1957, and also on the speeches, statements, and writings of Soviet scholars and foreign policy spokesmen. *A publication of the Hoover Institution.* \$10.00

## ***Kingship and Community in Early India***

*Charles Drekmeier.* This intellectual and cultural history of ancient India, from the Aryan invasions in the second millennium B.C. to the rise of Islam, places chief emphasis on political and social thought—the relation of social theory to religious belief, the values that replaced the heroic ideal of the Aryan warrior, the ways in which society was ordered and coercion justified. September. About \$7.00

*Order from your bookstore, please*

**STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## **New Political Science Texts . . .**

### **The Politics of American Democracy, 2nd Ed.**

by Marian D. Irish, Florida State University, and James W. Prothro,  
University of North Carolina

A realistic view of the American political scene, examining both sides of controversial subjects without bias or evasion. This text coordinates behavioral findings and interpretations of American politics with legal and constitutional matters.

1962

658 pp.

Text price: \$7.50

### **Functions and Policies of American Government, 2nd Edition**

by Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois, and James M. Burns,  
Williams College

A series of integrated essays on the policies and functions of American government and their history. Presents the history of our policy problems and analyzes alternate solutions. Covers problems in each area: welfare, labor, resources, fiscal, civil rights, foreign, and military.

1962

450 pp.

Text price: \$5.95

### **An Introduction to Political Analysis: Problems in American Government, 3rd Edition**

edited by Robert E. Lane, James D. Barber, and Fred I. Greenstein,  
all of Yale University

Stresses analysis and interpretation of concrete, lively case materials by the student, working within a framework of significant political science questions and policy alternatives. Incorporates recent research developments in political science.

1962

Approx. 384 pp.

paperbound

Text price: \$4.95

### **Case Studies in American Government**

edited by Edwin A. Bock, Staff Director, Inter-University Case Program,  
and Alan K. Campbell, Syracuse University and Chairman of the  
I.C.P. First-Year Course Committee

Published under the auspices of the Inter-University Case Program, this book features 9 cases, researched and written by teachers experienced in using the case method approach in teaching. It focuses on communicating the realities of government to students and combines and handles the structure and problems of government within the case method framework.

1962

Approx. 384 pp.

paperbound

Text price: \$3.95

For approval copies, write to: Box 903

**Prentice-Hall, Inc.**  
**Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey**

---

## THREE NEW TEXTS

### Coming in November:

In contrast to many volumes on conditions in Africa, here is the first comprehensive analysis of the nature and significance of Africa's rapidly multiplying contacts with Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Following an analysis of the combined internal and external pressures which precipitated the quick rise of Africa, the author devotes twenty chapters to major African issues in international relations. A major theme throughout the book is the striving of Africa's new leaders to develop foreign policies of their own, independent of either the Soviet or Western powers.

### Coming in January:

The Fifth Edition of the earlier work by William E. Mosher, J. Donald Kingsley, and O. Glenn Stahl. Synthesizing knowledge and experience of many scholars and practitioners, this text is now entirely up to date, is shorter than before, and gives more emphasis to principles and general practice. Several chapters have been completely reorganized and rewritten, and there is a new chapter on Personnel Research. "An excellent work . . . fills the most important void in the public personnel field," Professor Edwin A. Cottrell, Stanford University, said of the last edition. *(available for quantity sale to schools and colleges only.)*

Emphasizing basic facts and principles, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS deals successively with historical background of international relations; concepts reflected in the conduct of states (realism, idealism, neutralism, the principles of democracy and those of communism); the cold war (its background, methods, and issues); the conditions, forces, and movements that play so large a part in the conduct of nations (with special attention given to national power and to the balance of power); and the role of force and war and the efforts to eliminate or control it (with special reference to the United Nations).

49 EAST 33D STREET, NEW YORK 16, N.Y.

# THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

*Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association*

## EDITORIAL BOARD

- HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Managing Editor, Ohio State University*  
WALLACE S. SAYRE, *Associate Editor, Columbia University (on leave)* DWIGHT WALDO, *University of California, Berkeley*  
SAMUEL H. BEER, *Associate Editor, Harvard University* HAROLD STEIN, *Princeton University*  
ALEXANDER HEARD, *University of North Carolina*  
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University* JOHN D. LEWIS, *Oberlin College*

## EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

- VICTOR T. LE VINE, *Acting Book Review Editor, Washington University* JULIAN FELDMAN, *University of California (Berkeley)*  
RALPH A. STRAETZ, *News and Notes Editor, New York University* FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, *University of Maryland*  
CORINNE SILVERMAN, *Woodstock, Vt.* HIRAM M. STOUT, *George Washington University*  
CECELIA M. KENYON, *Smith College*

## EDITORIAL OFFICE

*Managing Editor, APSR*  
100 University Hall, Ohio State  
University, 216 N. Oval Dr.,  
Columbus 10, Ohio

## EXECUTIVE OFFICE

*Executive Director, APSA*  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

---

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are \$15.00 a year (\$6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of \$1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

*Current issues* are priced at \$3.75 per copy. Prices of other issues are furnished on request.

*Applications for membership*, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 5th day of the month of publication.

*Address correspondence about contributions* to the REVIEW to Harvey C. Mansfield, 100 University Hall, 216 N. Oval Dr., Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio; *books intended for review*, to Victor T. Le Vine, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.; *News and Notes items*, to Ralph A. Straetz, Department of Political Science, New York University, University Heights, New York 53, N.Y.; *advertising correspondence*, to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The *International Index to Periodicals* indexes current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

---

*Office of publication:* Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

*Foreign Agent:* P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1962, by The American Political Science Association.

**outstanding  
new and  
recent books**

## **THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY**

**Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, both of Western Michigan University**

Over 1100 political terms are defined and described in terms of their significance to the problems, practices, and institutions of American government in this unique dictionary—the only dictionary to feature a chapter-subject matter approach and to discuss the significance of each of its terms. To further assist the reader, each chapter concludes with a discussion of relevant Supreme Court cases, Federal statutes, and government agencies. Written in brisk, clear language, this book is an important aid to all American government courses.

*Aug. 1962, 400 pp., \$5.95 casebound, \$3.95 paper*



**Holt,  
Rinehart and  
Winston, Inc.**

**383 Madison Ave., N.Y.**

## **SOVIET UNION:**

### **Paradox and Change**

**Robert T. Holt, John E. Turner, both of the University of Minnesota; et al.**

This book neither condemns nor praises the Soviet Union, but rather tries to reveal the quality of life in that changing country. Seven areas—city growth, economic change, agricultural production, science and technology, education, youth, radio and television—are studied by the authors who journeyed through Russia together and are experts on Soviet affairs.

*Nov. 1962, 256 pp., \$4.50 cloth, \$2.50 paper (tentative)*

## **AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ANNUAL, 1962-63**

**Ivan Hinderaker (Ed.), University of California, Los Angeles**

A continuation of a distinguished series, this year's *Annual* includes: Communism, Socialism, and Democracy: Perspectives—*Thomas Landon Thorson*; The Supreme Court and Issues for the Sixties—*William M. Beaney*; Politics and Reform in American Cities—*James Q. Wilson*; The President and the Civil Rights of Negroes—*Richard P. Longaker*; Kennedy and the 87th Congress—*Louis W. Koenig*; American Foreign Policy: The First Year of the Kennedy Administration—*William P. Gerberding*.

*May 1962, 116 pp., \$1.95 paper*

FIRST PUBLICATIONS OF  
**ATHERTON PRESS**

NOMOS  
I-V

edited by Carl J. Friedrich, Harvard University, for The  
American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy

Just published

**NOMOS IV • Liberty** The topic of NOMOS IV was occasioned by the centenary of Mill's *On Liberty*, but it was expanded beyond the focus on Mill into a multifaceted examination of the problems and prospects of freedom. The results of these various approaches to the subject are represented in NOMOS IV in sixteen original essays—ranging politically from left to right and philosophically over widely disparate schools of thought—written for this collection by distinguished political scientists, philosophers, lawyers, historians, and other experts in political and legal philosophy. 333 pp., \$6.00

**NOMOS V • The Public Interest** This book is a stimulating interdisciplinary examination of many aspects of "the public and its problems." The topic has in recent years come to the forefront of popular concern as governments have increasingly intervened in conflicts between interest groups on behalf of "the public interest." The nineteen original essays written for this volume reflect the increasing concern with this topic. The essays vary widely in both conclusion and method, ranging from the reasoned conviction that the public interest is a central concern of political and legal philosophy to the pointedly argued rejection of it as merely a façade for special-interest groups and partisan position in the political battle. 256 pp., \$6.00

Also available

NOMOS I • Authority; NOMOS II • Community; NOMOS III • Responsibility  
\$6.00 each volume

November publication

THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT

edited by Malcolm E. Jewell, University of Kentucky

This timely and important book thoroughly analyzes the problems of both Congressional and legislative reapportionment. Fifteen key states have been selected for intensive study in seventeen original essays by political scientists who have been deeply involved in the problems of reapportionment. 350 pp., \$7.50

In production

AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY: The Issue of Foreign Trade

Raymond A. Bauer, Harvard University, and Ithiel deSola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Lewis A. Dexter

In this richly documented study of the participation of business in the making of foreign economic policy, the authors interviewed lobbyists, congressmen, "opinion leaders," and more than 900 corporation directors. The results of the survey are embodied in this historical study of pressure groups and legislative politics.

GOVERNMENT OF THE ATOM: The Integration of Powers

Harold P. Green, Attorney, Washington, D.C., and Alan Rosenthal, Hunter College

Forthcoming

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

edited by Richard Nolte, Director, Institute of Current World Affairs

All books may be ordered directly from

**ATHERTON PRESS**

70 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK 11, N.Y.  
A DIVISION OF PRENTICE-HALL, INCORPORATED



# The American Political Science Review



VOL. LVI

SEPTEMBER, 1962

NO. 3

## HOW CAN WE JUSTIFY DEMOCRACY?

H. B. MAYO

*University of Western Ontario*

One should say at the outset what one means by democracy. I shall keep close to historical usage by excluding the economic, social, cultural and other extended meanings, and stipulate that democracy is a type of political system. A political system in turn is composed of methods of making public policies, those policies embodied in laws, orders, agreements, understandings and "conventions," at varying levels of generality, related to government and binding upon all within the system.<sup>1</sup> The approach taken here is thus to classify political systems according to how public policies are made, the assumption being that different systems use different methods or, as we may say, operate on characteristic principles.

The theory of any political system consists, in the first instance, of the operating principles on which the system works. These make up what may be called the *explanatory* theory, which is of course based upon empirical data. Thus we have a political theory of communism, of democracy, and of many other systems. Each theory forms as it were a stripped model of the particular system and inevitably appears somewhat abstract, analogous perhaps to the simplified model of an economic system.

In the case of democracy the operating or institutionalized principles that are the heart of the explanatory theory, appear to me as set out

in what follows. They cannot, I think, be reduced in number, even by the most rigorous demands for theoretical parsimony, though they may certainly be increased by drawing out their practical implications. And they could no doubt be arranged in a different order, depending on which feature of democracy we wished to emphasize.

### I

(1) Public policies are made by representatives, on a majority rule. It is a waste of time today to consider direct democracies such as that of ancient Athens, or the New England town meeting or small face-to-face groups, if we want to understand representative democracy. Even worse, great confusion can be generated by mixing the classic premises of direct democracy with the quite different premises and conditions of representative democracy.

As to the majority rule, what is meant is simply the common practice in representative legislatures that when a vote is taken the decision of the majority prevails. We are all aware of the complications introduced by special majorities, bicameralism, federalism, the relation of the legislative to the popular majority, and the like; but we cannot expect an abstract model to describe the endless variations of particular real-life specimens. The point is that these *are* variations from what is generally regarded as a democratic principle.

(2) The representatives are elected periodically. A policy-maker or leader may of course "represent" without being elected—history is full of examples—but it can scarcely be denied today that popular election is what gives title to make policies in a democracy; it is the generally accepted type of authorization, by which policies in a democracy are accepted as rightfully made, and hence to be obeyed—if only for the time being. Even pseudo-democracies go

<sup>1</sup> This definition has the defect of evading an important question, namely that of the boundaries of the system. What, for instance, is to be the unit of democracy? Should we take the municipality? the state? the nation? the world? This is one of the most difficult and least explored questions in democratic theory, and because it is seldom even asked, many political controversies—*e.g.*, over local government or national sovereignty—are unnecessarily confused. (The international political system is clearly *sui generis*.)

through the ritual of elections, thereby testifying to the almost universal acceptance of this mode of legitimation.<sup>2</sup> The general principles of political theory will not tell us how often elections should be held nor, what is the same thing, the tenure of representatives. A period of tenure is arrived at by exercising judgment on a number of often conflicting practical considerations. In a similar way, not the elements of theory, but practical wisdom, determines such matters as the secrecy of the ballot, method of voting, etc.

(3) Political equality of voting prevails, with the universal franchise and the familiar rule of one person one vote. We recognize this principle whenever we criticize plural and weighted voting, gerrymandering, and any electoral system or practice that distorts the political equality. As with election periods, so questions of voting age and the like connected with the franchise, are settled by practical considerations arising from experience.

(4) Elections, policy-making, and politicking in general, take place in a framework of political liberties. These political liberties—notably of speech, press, assembly and organization—are necessary to ensure a free choice of representatives, and to ensure that policies have popular support. They constitute only a sector of the wider field of traditional civil liberties and rights which may include, for example, trial by jury or religious freedom, and some of the latter may or may not happen to prevail in any given democracy at any given time. That is to say, democracies may be wise or unwise, good or bad in many of the policies which they enact and approve. No one can foretell the full consequences of his acts, and public policies even though undertaken for the best of reasons will sometimes turn out to have been wrong or mistaken. Moreover, the public in a democracy may sometimes endorse harsh treatment of minorities. To make democracy, by definition, an ideal system with ideal policies, is to destroy all possibility of understanding politics, and gives no help at all with our problem of justifying (or even defining) democracy.

A political system which operates on these characteristic principles, we may then call democracy. If fewer than all of them are present, we should not call the system democratic.

<sup>2</sup> Bertrand de Jouvenel apparently believes that democratic legitimacy is so widely agreed that "Argument about attribution has now, however, passed into history; the transitional period is over, and all that matters now is the realistic study of the 'what.'" *Sovereignty* (Chicago, 1957), p. 6.

(It is the absence of number (4) above that is usually noted when we dismiss the claims of the Soviet Union to be a democracy in any ordinary sense; the existence of political liberties forms a litmus test for democracy.)

The system is one which institutionalizes popular control of policy-makers; and this popular control may be called the broadest, most general, the highest-level principle of democracy, underlying and unifying the separate principles. It is not only that policy-makers are *responsive* to the public—any clever autocrat makes concessions to public sentiment; or that political authority is *ultimately* derived from the public—even the Roman Empire paid lip service to popular sovereignty; but the point is that a democracy provides the institutional machinery of popular control. As with the classical democracy of Athens, the system is thought of as a form of government, and at the same time is identified by and rigorously connected with certain specific institutions.<sup>3</sup> We do not imply that every democracy must push each of the principles to full application before we call the system democratic; in practice, it is a question of degree, of a system being more or less democratic in its complex of characteristics—for instance in the extent of the franchise or of the political liberties.

The operating principles can be cast in *normative* as well as neutral explanatory form. We can, that is, take each of the separate principles as moral imperatives—*e.g.*, that popular control, political liberties and political equality *should* prevail—and in their normative form the principles provide a proximate justification for the system. There is more to justification than that, or this paper could stop here and now, but enough has been said to make the point that the theory of democracy is normative as well as explanatory. In this respect a comprehensive political theory is unlike a scientific theory; the former justifies as well as explains, whereas the scientific theory does not pass moral or esthetic judgment on the motion of atoms or the behaviour of bacteria.<sup>4</sup> A political theory may of course explain and *condemn*—as Marxists pass judgment on capitalist democracy, or as most of us would

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Richard Wollheim, "Democracy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 19 (1958), p. 226.

<sup>4</sup> By a "comprehensive" political theory I mean one which deals with a type of political system, in contrast to a "partial" theory, which may cover only a specific policy, or confine itself to empirical explanation alone, or to normative theory alone, or deal with the purposes that all political systems should pursue.

condemn the Soviet system—but condemnation is like justifying, in that it invariably has reference to moral discourse. The distinction between explanation and justification has frequently not been made in the history of thought; to explain has been thought to justify—as in teleological explanations, or in *laissez-faire* with its appeal to the assumed fact of natural harmony, or in those theories which purport to base themselves upon a scientific or rationalistic account of human nature.<sup>5</sup>

To call democracy a political system is also to say that it is a method of choosing leaders or rulers, and its full theory is thus both an explanation (by reference to institutionalized principles) of how the leaders are chosen, and a validation of that method of choice. This point of view has the advantage of giving us a ready method of classifying political systems, so that we can contrast democracy with other systems and their corresponding theories of leadership—for instance with hereditary aristocracy, or military rule, or that of Plato's *Republic*. It is not a system of registering and implementing the general or popular "will," which we might rather call Jacobinism and which could be done by a benevolent autocrat with the aid of a computing machine. There is plenty of room in the system outlined for the fact and art of leadership, the struggle for power, and the emergence of policy from the complex interplay of citizen and politician.

Everyone would subscribe to the view that the best should rule, but this gets us nowhere. The problem is how to find and agree on the credentials of the politically best, to identify such persons, to install them as rulers, to hold them accountable, to prevent their corruption by power. These are practical questions, thrust upon men by bitter experience, and are not primarily questions of philosophy or logic. Hence an important part of the justification of any political system consists of the answers it gives to the questions of leadership, questions somewhat neglected in traditional democratic theory.

## II

Since history and experience are among the tests applied to judge a system, democracy too must stand on its record as well as upon its rational and moral justification in theory. In this paper, however, the empirical justification by reference to the record of democracies will not be explored. Neither will the question of

empirical conditions for the success of democracy be discussed, though it too is relevant since theoretical superiority is not enough if we are to work the system and preach it to the world. (The only *caveat* one may enter is that democracy is certainly not immediately feasible all over the world. Neither for that matter is any alternative system. One should not be misunderstood on this—it has nothing to do with climatic, racial, or other determinism, but simply with conditions such as the requisite leadership, economic level, education, consensus, tradition, etc.) Neither do I propose to discuss the tendencies—whether logical or practical—for the principles and spirit of democracy to carry over from the political to other spheres, and so to become "social democracy"; nor the association of democracy with a capitalist or a socialist economy; nor questions of the psychological feasibility of democracy. These and other great questions must be put aside to concentrate upon the narrower, though surely central, questions of the logic of justification of democracy—*i.e.*, what does it mean to justify a political system and what *types* of justification can we use?

The formal, rather than the informal policy-making system will be dealt with, *i.e.*, the framework or model, not its detailed application to reality as the sociologist or group theorist, for instance, might reveal the actualities of day-to-day decision-making—the lines of power and influence; or as Marxists and others might speak of those behind the scenes making decisions or calling the tune. In judging the extent of democracy in a system we are, of course, perfectly entitled to ask how far the image corresponds to reality. Reform and opposition to reform of the system both presuppose such an inquiry. But that is not the same as constructing the model and justifying it.

Some people say that to desire explicit justification at all is a symptom of our declining belief in the "given" and of our "unhappy consciousness," and the famous flight of Minerva's owl at dusk is bound to be mentioned. Perhaps all this may be so. Certainly we do not feel impelled to justify our everyday habits and beliefs until doubts arise, and when put on the defensive we generally do seek to give reasons for our beliefs.<sup>6</sup> We do the same, however, when we take the offensive. A rising and confident democracy also justifies itself when challenging

<sup>5</sup> Explanatory theory could of course take other forms—*e.g.*, it could be historical, or by reference to causality.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (New York, 1957), p. 80: "All theology is the result of doubt and criticism, not of simple and childlike faith, which has at no time felt the need for it."

the *status quo*. One thinks of the democratic movement in the 19th century. I am not convinced that to want justification is a sign of decadence, or that beliefs wither when we can rationally justify them; whereas I do feel sure that to seek justification is a sign of intelligence, a perfectly proper and inevitable undertaking for man as he moves from myth to philosophy, from unexamined impulse to rational belief. Only if we take thought can we hope to take charge of our destiny.

One method of justifying political systems seems to me quite erroneous: that of justification by origin or source. This method has sometimes been used by political philosophers to account for the institution of political society in general, where it may be valid enough, as in Aristotle's remark that "the State *comes into being* for the sake of mere life." But social contract theorists have often been tempted to justify a particular form of government by the historical or hypothetical origins of government-in-general. To use this sort of justification is to fall into something close to the genetic fallacy, which Aristotle avoided by saying that "the State *exists* for the promotion of the good life" (*i.e.*, regardless of what its lowly origins may have been). Origins neither validate nor invalidate any current beliefs or systems, any more than etymology dictates current word meanings. The genetic argument must be put aside; we are concerned with the present merits and validity of a system, and attention to its sources or origins will add nothing to its justification (though it may have lessons to teach on the conditions for the successful working of democracy).<sup>7</sup>

A second error is to justify a system by reference to its "intrinsic" purposes or "essence," a method which has also been common in the history of political thought. The defect here is that it is so misleading to speak of intrinsic purposes. All governments, by definition, govern, *i.e.*, carry out the minimum function of maintaining order and security, but it is purpose beyond this of which we speak. It does not seem to make sense to say that a society, state, or political system as a whole, has an intrinsic or "natural" or "essential" purpose, other than those mundane and collective purposes which are given to it by the citizens and their rulers. In some social institutions the specific purposes are to the forefront—a joint stock company for instance, or a sports club or a traffic board—but there are others such as friendship, marriage, politics and government where purpose is too

limited and too rational an explanation, and where purposes (and functions) as well as procedures change from time to time.<sup>8</sup>

A related fallacy must also be avoided, namely, that the type of political system follows logically from a statement of the purposes it should pursue. Pick any of the great names in the history of political philosophy—Hobbes for instance—and you will find a logical gap between the purpose of government as he outlines it and the form of government which he purports to deduce. It is perhaps the commonest logical fallacy in the history of political thought. (Similar fallacies are perpetrated when we start with an intrinsic or postulated human nature and purport to deduce the political system.)

Nevertheless, when all this is said, the language of purpose (as well as of social function) must be used. We might, for instance, specify the goals that a good political system should pursue and then we could justify democracy on the instrumental ground that it can best attain these goals. This is a more modest claim than that of deducing the system from intrinsic or posited goals. And it is at first sight a very promising approach to the question of justification. For instance, justice, happiness (including liberty), and improvement, are said by one philosopher to be the three accepted goals of a good political system. Democracy is then justified by showing (not deducing) that it can more nearly reach these goals than other systems can.<sup>9</sup> There is no doubt that this type of argument is very common; it appeals to our deep and proper concern with the substance as well as the form; and it makes a powerful case for democracy if certain difficulties are noted and can be avoided.

The difficulties with it are: (a) All such goals—*e.g.*, happiness, peace, the good life, the common good, human dignity, the development of the personality, etc.—if they command universal agreement, are usually vague and at such high levels of generality that we can hardly say what they are until they are spelled out in intermediate and specific terms. They are so general that all can adopt them as desirable goals. It is extremely rare to find politicians or political philosophers disagreeing over their general aims. But when we get to the intermediate and more practical levels the agreement vanishes,

<sup>8</sup> Some human behavior is hardly purposive at all—*e.g.*, a quarrel or even a war, which may be "because of something, not for something." We may even speak of unconscious purposes.

<sup>9</sup> E. F. Garritt, *Ethical and Political Thinking* (Oxford, 1947).

<sup>7</sup> *E.g.*, how we come to hold our beliefs has wide implications for education in a democracy.

and we find ourselves in the familiar disputes over policy that are typical of democracies, disputes that are over competing conceptions of the good as well as over means and over self- and sectional-interest. (b) Different democracies can and often do pursue different purposes, or the same democracy may pursue different purposes at different times, if by purposes we mean something as specific as the objectives of particular policies. The only common elements in all democracies are those of the system itself, and the effects upon purposes and policies which the democratic principles and procedures will have.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, non-democracies may also pursue many if not all of the same purposes as any given democracy. That is why it seems useless to try to distinguish forms of government by the criterion of purpose, as in the line: "Kings seek their subjects' good, tyrants their own."

The meaning of democracy as stipulated above has no reference to purpose except indirectly: purposes pursued could not, except with inconsistency, conflict with the operating principles or values of the system; and of course procedures often affect the content of policies. The purposes, whether individual or common, are left to be worked out in the system itself, and that is what disputes over public policy are about: they are not simply over means to agreed ends, Maritain and others to the contrary. It is quite impossible to believe that all men are agreed, in any politically meaningful sense, on the ends or purposes they should pursue (except as noted above, in the most general and least useful sense). The democratic system gives scope for (almost) any purposes.

The assumption behind this is presumably that purposes (and results) will take care of themselves in a democracy, and this is a very large assumption indeed. Naturally there can never be a guarantee that they will do so, and a democracy may be unwise and fall, or be wicked and deserve to fall. Infallibility is not for human beings and their institutions. That the people or their representatives can do no wrong is a grotesque assumption that has no place in democratic theory, though it is often made the basis of sneering criticisms of democracy.

<sup>10</sup> A lesser objection to this end-means justification is that it tends to make a political system merely of instrumental or expedient value, whereas a good system is surely good for itself—though not of course unconditionally good. (Loyalty to a political system should not—probably cannot—be absolute, *i.e.*, *always* regardless of the content of policies.)

Several reasons account for the persistent tendency to define democracy in ideal terms: the ancient hankering that what we favour (democracy) will always be wise and right; the fact that democracy has in the course of history accumulated around it many of our best hopes for mankind, and been closely associated with many great popular reforms. Further, when we see an unpleasant reality we often define it out of sight as not "true" or "real," thereby insulating our faith and definition against shock and disillusion. But democracy does not answer all the questions of political philosophy, and certainly not the greatest of all—those concerned with "final" or "ultimate" ends.

In a very real sense the theory of democracy is not an ideology, like liberalism or socialism, say; not, that is, a body of doctrine in the grand manner dealing with the ends of government. Contemporary efforts to make democracy a kind of secular faith, an ideological substitute for religion, are I think mistaken and likely to fail. In a democracy many ideologies, many economic, social, religious and other outlooks may flourish (as indeed they do), and may do so without inconsistency so long as their principles and values are not antipathetic to the principles and values of democracy.<sup>11</sup> One may go deeper and say that in a sense all politics has of itself no content; it is an organizing principle, the principle of order and priorities and harmonizing; what it is *about*, what gives it content, is morality, economics, religion, education and so on.<sup>12</sup>

### III

We can now move closer to the heart of our subject. The operating principles which make up the explanatory theory of democracy, discussed above, will not be further dealt with. Their validity is, one supposes, established by empirical investigation: Do democratic systems operate as the principles assert? Or are Marxists and others right who say that the democratic principles are a facade for class or élite rule?

What I shall discuss instead are the normative principles of democracy and the broad theory of justification in general. We may justify a democratic system in several ways.

(1) First, we may take the normative principles—political equality, etc.—as ultimate moral imperatives, as good in themselves, in-

<sup>11</sup> Possibly Daniel Boorstin had this in mind when he wrote in *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1953), of the "un-American demand for a philosophy of democracy."

<sup>12</sup> Cf. E. Jordan, *Theory of Legislation* (Chicago, 1952), p. 73 and Ch. 7.

trinsically good. Or we could take as our ultimate (our most general, basic and unifying principle) that there ought to be popular control of policy-makers; and if we grant this we could then accept the separate principles which are listed, as instrumental to that end. These might not follow in strict deductive logic, but we should be practically committed to their incorporation in some such machinery.

Some may call this method of justification an appeal to self-evidence or intuition; it is fashionable nowadays to despise both, and with considerable reason. There is clearly such a thing as a climate of opinion, a way of thinking of an age, and hence the kind of belief that one age finds self-evident or obvious seems doubtful to another. Even when we give reasons in support of a principle, the reasons that one age or culture finds convincing leave another cold. Nothing is quite so dead as obvious or self-evident truths which have ceased to command belief.

Since self-evident principles and moral beliefs—except again when they are very general or “high order”—appear to vary so much from age to age and place to place, some people dismiss them altogether and say that one is as good as another. While self-evidence is not a guarantee of truth—but of usage—the conclusion that one belief is as good as another is not one that necessarily follows from the varieties of moral experience.

Very often no doubt, our final choices of belief or of action at the end of the longest possible deliberative process, are of values which we make intuitively or call self-evident. Somewhere choice, like philosophy, must have a stop. But this is not to say that our choices are quite arbitrary and capricious, still less that they are all trivial preferences which we can shrug off as a matter of taste. We all come sometime to the *hier stehe ich*, some things are just right or wrong, however powerful the case against us, however weak our own case.

One is aware that this may be a dangerous ground of argument, justifying even the whirling dervish in his fanatical error; but it is also rich and fertile ground, often giving rise to and justifying the best in our heritage, for instance, belief in the rights of man. It was this kind of argument which condemned racial inequality long before the biologists could show scientifically that there were no inherent human differences between men of different shapes and colours.

Still, there are those who will incline to distrust this method of argument (as I do myself because it tends to make democracy an absolute value), and who may simply reject the principles of democracy as ultimates. If they are

regarded as imperatives or “stop signs,” reasons are wanted why they are so regarded.

One immediate lesson follows, however, regardless of our opinion on self-evidence, namely, that to make a convincing case for a political system we have to put it in terms of the unexpressed assumptions of the age, the climate of opinion and belief to which we speak. No political case would go far today that did not take account of the scientific, urban, and industrial environment. Even cognition, though taking place inside the individual head, is social and affected by others. How much more so are our thinking and beliefs about politics. And this is highly relevant to any effective justification of democracy. In fact it makes our task easy, perhaps too easy. Being soaked in the attitudes and beliefs of democracy, the man on the street often believes in democracy for the most feeble of reasons. It is our job, as political philosophers, to see whether a case can be built which will stand critical analysis.

(2) The second method then is to make out a case for the separate and the underlying principles, giving arguments and reasons. The method here is to take the principles of popular control, political equality, majority policy-making, etc., and examine them in detail, weighing the pros and cons of each argument.<sup>13</sup> Such a proceeding has some resemblance to the cases which are heard daily in the law courts, where the evidence is not conclusive, but a decision has to be made that will satisfy the “reasonable man.” It resembles even more the usual debates over public policy, which involve judgments on not only facts and expectations, but also on moral principles. (Something more is said on this below.)

Behind the democratic system there clearly lies an assumption, perhaps many assumptions, about the nature of politics. Just as our criteria of reality help to determine what reality is, so our definition of politics inevitably forms part of our justification, and should therefore be made explicit. In ancient Athens, for instance, the assumption of the democrats was that politics was not an expert skill, like navigation, but something in which all were equally competent. (Plato’s view was the opposite, and so he argued that only a few were fit to rule.)<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> As in my *Introduction to Democratic Theory* (New York, 1960), Chs. 5 to 8.

<sup>14</sup> Just as we cannot call upon all the arguments for a direct democracy to support a representative system, so the latter is immune from some of the criticism aimed at the former—e.g., that of mob rule. Our problem is less that of the psychology of crowd behaviour than of mass manipulation.

Whatever the validity of this assumption for a direct democracy, we cannot use it in a representative democracy; and fortunately do not require it since deciding policies directly, and choosing the rulers, are two different—though some would call them related—skills.

There are many tricky problems here. One could still ask the question whether the common man can in fact judge his rulers wisely. When we put it that way we have at the back of our minds the old idea of the intelligent, informed, impartial voter deciding policy. We are then naturally driven back to consider some kind of test for “fitness” to vote, and we land in a bog of controversy about how we test the political wisdom of the voter. Voting is certainly not a scientific method of ascertaining political wisdom in the rulers, still less of finding wise policies; but there is *no* such scientific method open to man.

We must, I think, forget about tests of “fitness” to vote (or to rule), and fall back upon the nature of democratic politics; the parties, leadership and liberties which screen the candidates and find the political wisdom a system needs. Democracy then stands on the ground that periodic election and popular control of leaders (policy-makers) is likely to result in better rulers and policies than alternative methods. If we reject this, we are committed, like Plato, to some other method of identifying minority rulers and validating their rule.

In a direct democracy again, the argument of the democrat is that each citizen is the best judge of the public interest in making policy. Once again, in a representative system we do not require this assumption to the same extent, since the voters do not make policies. It will, however, be required to *some* extent, since presumably some policies (issues) will be judged by a proportion of voters on election day, and there will be some connection however indirect and complex between public opinion and policies. Being marked by popular control, and compelled to defer to the voters, democracy will have a tendency to bias government towards the popular interests. (Other tendencies work in other directions.) The notion of political feasibility reminds us that the democratic politician must carry the public with him. There is plenty of room in a democracy for political wisdom, and knowledge of the *summum bonum*, but it must be wedded to political persuasion.

Instead of assuming that the ordinary citizen is a competent judge of the public interest, the defender of a direct democracy could argue, for example, that the public good emerges almost automatically from the struggle over private

interests, and that each is the best judge of his own interests. I do not recall ever having seen this argument put forward on behalf of ancient Athens. Something very like it is, however, put forward by interest-group theories of politics today, which thus give us a kind of corporate political version of *laissez-faire*. All equilibrium theories of politics make use of the same argument, which may not be quite as foolish as it sounds; but in any case we do not need it. We must fall back again upon the nature of democratic leadership, upon the debate and discussion, the complicated interplay of politician and public. The result is never an automatic equilibrium, but one that is constantly worked out afresh by the conscious efforts of many participants.

A completely sceptical argument for democracy may also be constructed: since no one really knows where the “true” interests of the individual or community lie, everyone ought to have a chance to help choose the rulers, and policy can do no better than go by the majority, just because it is a majority and as likely to be right as a minority.<sup>15</sup> Again, one need not stake anything on this argument—though it might have its appeal, at certain times and places.

(3) The third method is to justify by reference to the social and individual values realized by the democratic system. To take this approach is to trace the logical or practical consequences of the system—the values actually realized in any working democracy, even though they may not have been the purposes for which democracy was set up or which it keeps always before it. Good results are, in some moral theories—*e.g.*, utilitarianism—the *only* moral justification, and while not going so far, nearly all would agree they are *some* justification. It would be an odd social or political theory that entirely ignored results. This type of justification (similar in its ends-means structure to that mentioned earlier) is very common, and certainly powerful; so much so that many people would regard it as quite sufficient.

Among the social values realized by democracy are: the peaceful adjustment of the disputes and conflicts that exist in any society (by treating conflict and the struggle for power as legitimate—even creative—and providing for its settlement); the closely related adaptability and peaceful social change (particularly necessary in a world of rapid technological and social change); and the peaceful and orderly succession of rulers. Many political philosophies have concerned themselves with prescribing ways to

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Wollheim, *op. cit.* This argument also was not used by the Athenians.



these high ends, and consequently in achieving them democracy, whatever its defects, may easily be regarded as superior to alternative systems. Judge Learned Hand put it thus: "For, abuse it as you will, it gives a bloodless measure of social forces—bloodless, have you thought of that?—a means of continuity, a principle of stability, a relief from the paralyzing terror of revolution."<sup>18</sup>

To these commonly accepted values we may add: it is the system—other than anarchy, which is hardly a live option—with the minimum of coercion (not so much because the majority is presumed to favour every policy, as that policy emerges from discussion and pressure in which all may share); the promotion of diversity (which like knowledge or self-control is not unconditionally good, but good so far as it goes); the self-correctibility in the attainment of justice (a political system cannot guarantee that injustice will not be committed—an impossible political ideal—but democracy provides the means of redress); the political freedoms and rights which tend to "grow" into non-political fields. Other values, such as the promotion of science, may also perhaps be added. One does not maintain that every democracy is always successful in real life in turning up these results, but that they are, so to speak, built into the logical structure of democracy, which also provides the institutional means to their realization.

One may also think of individual values, such as the promotion of rational methods of thought, or regard free participation in politics and governing as a kind of moral self-education for the citizen—an argument as old as Aristotle. (Because of the free participation there is incidentally a wider range of leaders to draw from.) The effect upon citizens will always be one test of a political system. In general our mode of justification here is to look at the image of human nature, the qualities or characteristics regarded as admirable—*e.g.*, independence, rationality, sympathy, tolerance, etc.—and to show that these are the qualities promoted and presupposed by democracy. A similar kind of justification is used by those—T. H. Green and others—who argue in terms of "maximum self-realization" and the like.

As with the separate principle, these systemic and resulting values may be taken as ultimates, and since some of them command nearly universal approval—*e.g.*, peaceful succession—this method of justification carries much weight. But it would not of course carry any weight

with one who rejected the values concerned.

(4) Again, as with the separate principles, we might go further and deeper and build a rational-empirical-moral case for the resulting values, and only then show that democracy best realizes them. Unlike the economist, the political philosopher cannot rest content with taking social and individual values as given, and confine himself to talking of "maximum net goal achievement." His view of rationality must be broader than the economists' means-ends definition; he must examine ends as well as means because they are always mixed together in politics.

Alternatively, the resulting values of democracy (peaceful change, diversity, means of redress, etc.) could be regarded as procedural or intermediate values, instrumental to more general values agreed upon alike by the democrat and his critic. If there is no such agreement, justification along this line is of course impossible.

(5) We may try to give the principles and values of the system support in philosophy. The mere mention of this raises at once the whole vexed question of the relationship of philosophy to political theory.

There are, to begin with, two conflicting and extreme views on the relationship. The *first* of those is that a close logical relationship invariably exists, so that we could by working out the implied ultimates in, say, metaphysics and epistemology, take our political theory back to a point of philosophic truth or falsehood; and conversely, from a philosophic position by a process of deduction we could arrive at the principles of a political theory. It follows, if this view is correct, that the theory of democracy might find support in a sound philosophy, and that unsound political theories could be exposed by showing their unsound philosophic basis.

The *second*, and conflicting view, is that philosophy has no necessary or close logical connections with a political theory, although admittedly the two may be associated in the same mind (that is, there may be psychological connections), or may go together in the same historical period (that is, the relation may be historical and more or less accidental). If the relationship is of this adventitious kind, it follows that democracy can find no support in philosophy.

Adherents of the first view argue that philosophic "absolutism" leads to autocracy; but strangely enough others argue that philosophic (or moral) "absolutism" is the necessary foundation of democracy. We are also given arguments that each of a rational philosophy,

<sup>18</sup> *The Spirit of Liberty*, ed. Irving Dillard (New York, 1959), p. 76.



an empiricist epistemology, relativism, scepticism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, positivism, dialectical materialism and perhaps other philosophies supports (or undermines) democracy. The mind reels in the conflict of charge and counter-charge, and linguistic analysis comes along with the *coup de grâce* that no philosophy can provide a foundation for any political system, because that is not the sort of job that philosophy is equipped to do.

Plainly we have here a good deal of confusion and arguing at cross purposes. The debate is so heated that at times one wonders whether anybody listens to his critics. The relationship is probably extremely complex, if it can generate so much disagreement by good and able men, most of them only too anxious to defend what they understand by democracy.

#### IV

How are we to disentangle the threads and and weave a valid answer? It is impossible to examine each case of alleged relationship in a short space, so I can only state my position with desperate brevity.

For one thing, the attempts to prove the logical relationship, by classifying philosophers and schools as, say, absolutist and relativist and noting the correlation of philosophic beliefs with authoritarian or democratic political beliefs, are a long way from being convincing. The lines are blurred because democracy has not been a live issue, or a real alternative, throughout most of history, and the best that can be done is to say that the emphasis in the thought of this or that philosopher lay in the general direction of what today would be called democratic ideas. Further, the citing of persons is not conclusive because people may be inconsistent: men are often better than their philosophy—perhaps fortunately so.

For another, if the arguments for a close logical relationship from philosophy to political theory (and *vice versa*) are examined closely, they turn out in fact not to be arguments for the deductive relationship at all. The first impression given, it is true, is of such a relationship; but in the actual arguments one invariably finds a “toning down” of the tight connection. Russell, to take a typical case, argues that it is the “temper of mind” of empiricism that favours democracy—a quite different statement, which may or may not be true. “Temper of mind” is not deduction or logical implication. Kelsen, too, backs away from a rigorous connection and uses the looser language of “tendency.”

The close deductive relationship between philosophy and political theory (and *vice versa*)

is extremely uncommon, if not non-existent. (One is aware that if a political ingredient is inserted into the premises, a political conclusion may be drawn, but this is already to re-define “philosophy,” and make it political). Political and everyday reasoning is rarely deduction from philosophical or general premises; chains of syllogistic reasoning, while they exist here and there, are short and disconnected.<sup>17</sup>

There is undoubtedly a tendency for bodies of thought to cluster or “hang together” so that philosophic, educational, economic, religious and other beliefs all as it were buttress each other. That is why, for instance, we study political activity in the context of other beliefs. It would make little sense to study the political thought and activity of the Puritans without noting their religious beliefs; though this admittedly is an extreme case. Moreover, we (*i.e.*, some people, sometimes) do consciously try to bring order and consistency to our varied beliefs, and are not content to weld them together by our tastes and personalities. (In a sense every philosophy tries to explain everything, by a kind of Parkinson’s Law of Ideologies.) But although we sometimes try to integrate our life with our metaphysics, and our different belief systems, the amount of logic or intellectual satisfaction demanded varies greatly among both philosophers and the unlearned.

If, like the Athenians, we treat government as a practical matter and defend democracy by listing its advantages, we do not come very close to philosophy. More precisely, perhaps, democracy may be combined with a variety of technical philosophical (*i.e.*, metaphysical and epistemological) views. Political theory and philosophy occupy different territory. Even though we read into nature or reality (or history or experience) a moral component, at the most we can draw a conclusion which is relevant to our political theory. But though relevant, moral principles alone do not determine policy and still less a political system.

We can draw satisfaction from the looser connection of philosophy with politics: the great advantage is that we can all be democrats

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Stephen E. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge, 1958). It seems to me that some “natural” law reasoning falls into the error of suggesting that reaching a moral decision is a matter of drawing a correct conclusion by a chain of deductive reasoning from a general moral principle; whereas we weigh evidence and arguments and then make a choice what to do. To make a decision or judgment is much more than deductive reasoning.

before we come to the end of the restless search for agreement on cosmic ultimates. As suggested earlier, even though we approach politics with a conception of the purpose or end that should be served, we still cannot deduce the political system, and can therefore accommodate our ultimates to a democracy that can be valued for instrumental reasons; as Acton agreed with Mill on liberty, though for quite different reasons. We may believe with Plato that Justice rules through every part of the cosmos and still stop short of his other belief that the political order can and should imitate it.

Why is it that the ethical relativist and the ethical absolutist may both be at home in a democracy? And if different moral philosophies can lie down together in one political system, then *a fortiori* general philosophies can do so. The reason is that politics is a practical art—its function is to arrange priorities and harmonize interests. Policies are usually if not always compromises, mixing many elements; seldom if ever ideal or a choice of good and evil; where they are moral then they are not *only* moral, and sometimes their connection with moral principles is slender or accidental. Political controversy is legitimate and normal even when we agree on moral principles. Policies are a matter of judging the components, not of applying a single standard like a yardstick. Short of abolishing politics, only relative justice is attainable, and hence political relativism does not imply moral relativism. Nor are public policies simply like private actions. Hence a knowledge of moral principles is not a guarantee of political wisdom—which explains why good men are often poor politicians, and personally bad men good politicians. Though politics “may indeed sometimes centre in a moral emphasis, political and moral argument are essentially different things.”<sup>18</sup>

The integration or inter-relatedness or “hanging together” of general and moral philosophy with political theory which we often find, is a loose kind of relationship, the

only strictly logical part being that of compatibility, the usefulness of which is very limited. We must, that is, not define logic or even intelligence too strictly when we look for connections between human beliefs. There are, then, relationships that are loosely logical and rational, and people go too far who assert that they are only psychological or historical. But because relationships are loose, we never settle our political problems by a resort to philosophy.

If all this is granted we can more easily avoid the “hedgehog error”—the belief that we can discover one great principle, one unifying thought or vision that will unlock the mysteries of the universe and from which we can deduce everything else. We can not, in the present state of our ignorance, make a purely logical synthesis of human knowledge that will stand the cutting edge of analysis.

Our elders were (and some of them still are) full of hopes and ambitions of achieving a ‘synthesis’ of knowledge; science, religion, art, the practice of personal and political life were to become an orderly pattern, dominated by an agreed philosophical outlook. But it looks as if we were becoming increasingly conscious of diversities and discontinuities in our worlds of thought and experience. . . . The real problem is that our diverse worlds of thought do not make sense as a coherent unity, and probably cannot and will not do so for some time to come.<sup>19</sup>

This being a frustrating state of affairs, men turn in many directions to find a forcible synthesis or unity, and others give up philosophy altogether for the analysis of language or for existentialism. As for me, my position is that the debate is still open—as it is on other great questions, such as the metaphysics of science and its relevance, if any, for human life. The very vexations of the unsettled debate over philosophy and political theory emphasize the importance of keeping the channels open for all contributions, and this forms in itself no small justification for democracy and its concomitant liberties and public discussion. (This would not be a justification however, for those who believe they already have Truth, but instead the political question would be—as it was for Plato—to trace out the obligations of their premises.)

## V

Finally, part of the defence of democracy will always rest upon the deficiencies of alternative systems. This will always be a cogent de-

<sup>18</sup> Aurel Kolnai, “The Moral Theme in Political Division,” *Philosophy*, Vol. 35 (July, 1960), p. 237. It is also true that a knowledge of moral principles is often not a sufficient guide to personal duty in concrete situations—indeed the whole subject of casuistry (in its original sense) takes its *raison d’être* from this very difficulty; hence too a partial reason why moral philosophers are often no better than anyone else: knowing the rules and knowing how to apply them (to say nothing of being motivated to apply them) are different things.

<sup>19</sup> Dorothy M. Emmet, *Function, Purpose and Powers* (London, 1958), p. 219.

fence, since intelligent action presupposes that we understand, compare, and appraise alternatives.<sup>20</sup> As a defence it gains strength too from the consideration that our choice is never between ideal systems: if we do have a choice it is between democracy and accepting the credentials of some type of self-appointed minority rulers.<sup>21</sup>

To paraphrase F. W. Maitland slightly, one could say that the most powerful argument for democracy is based on the necessary ignorance of our masters. This—like the arguments drawn from the historical record of democracy and of other systems—will always be persuasive, because most of the problems of politics are practical, not philosophic. Politics arise from life, not logic. Bryce once wrote, in *Modern Democracies*: "The facts and forces that have created Popular Government are partly of the Practical and partly of the Theoretic order." And the same is true of the total justification of democracy, or indeed of any other political system or public policy.

It is at this practical point that philosophers from Plato onwards have been weak, with their belief that the (politically) best could be found, their rule validated and accepted, and their character remain incorruptible by office; and after all it is this belief, sublime often, naive always, that alternative systems, without political liberties and periodic elections, ask us to approve. It is too tall a story for us, the disillusioned generations.

It is at this point too, that democracy is so strong: it implies and institutionalizes a distrust of those with power, by offering them competition and criticism, and by providing for their removal. That is why Niebuhr's defence will always be a good one: "man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." The same mixture of hope and pessimism, of idealism and realism, is found in James Madison and his view of human nature. It is an appropriate outlook for democrats, avoiding cynicism on one side and Utopianism on the other.

The total justification for democracy is thus a mixed case, combining the rational, the fac-

tual, the moral.<sup>22</sup> Being mixed, it compels all of us, if we want to defend democracy, to be both political scientists and political philosophers. To make such a case, to come down on the side of the weight of the evidence and the argument, involves much more than avoiding logical fallacies, or special pleading, or the rationalisation of personal preferences. There is both valid and invalid reasoning about political systems as in every type of discourse, and each has its appropriate criteria, and canons of evidence.<sup>23</sup>

Problems still remain, even when we have made the most comprehensive justification, and ranged over territory not explored in this paper.<sup>24</sup> For one thing, justification is not proof, not a conclusive demonstration, after which we can write Q.E.D. as after a theorem in Euclid, nor yet one that gives a measurable probability of truth as in much of science. It is not proof or statistical probability because it always depends upon values. The case does not compel belief but favors it. It is a matter of judgment—of weighing imponderables, of decision and choice—and there are no rules for this except in the routine case.

We may never know for certain that our political theory and system are the best, but we are better able to establish that others are worse. In this perhaps we are not very different from the natural scientists in many fields. Justification, like explanation or even description, is selective and always incomplete. In any event, however provisional our case for democracy, it must serve well enough to act upon.

For these reasons not everyone will be convinced; the democrat may not convince his adversaries but he may make disciples. Not

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Douglas N. Morgan, "On Justifying Political Action," *Ethics*, Vol. 71 (October, 1960), pp. 1-13.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Stephen Toulmin, *Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 67-101. Cf. also Florian Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (New York, 1940), p. 189, "... the choice between any given theories is (not) subjectively arbitrary. For there are objective standards by which inductive theories can be compared and their relative validity estimated. Of two theories, A and B, bearing on the same empirical field, if B solves all the problems A has solved and also other problems which A could not solve, B is superior to A in theoretic validity, both from the rational and from the empirical point of view."

<sup>24</sup> It will be observed that I have not attempted defences of democracy in terms of theology, religion, natural law, natural rights, psychology, economic progress, etc.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. F. H. Knight, *Intelligence and Democratic Action* (Harvard, 1960), p. 145.

<sup>21</sup> Possibly we could add as a further argument the impracticability of other systems: "... under modern conditions it is the only working possibility. No member of an emancipated industrial society will put up with political tutelage," Wollheim, *op. cit.*, p. 242. (The last remark is however excessively optimistic, even false.)

everyone will accept the values which the democrat holds, and some of those who do accept them might argue they are better realized in some other system. We may apply to democracy, perhaps, what Pascal said of the argument from design: Nature proves God only to those who already believe in Him on other grounds.

So we can say that acts of faith may be demanded. But again the same is true with respect to any political system, and as for me, democracy strains my credulity less than do the

alternatives. So, but not perhaps in a religious sense, we come in the end to a "justification by faith" or, as it is sometimes put, to those ultimate beliefs and ideals which we cannot wholly validate by rational means (though they are not thereby irrational). Machiavelli wrote wisely when he said in his *Discourses*: "There are in fact many useful truths of which a wise man will have knowledge without their having in themselves such clear reasons for their being so as to be able to convince others."

## VALUES AND INTERESTS\*

VERNON VAN DYKE  
*University of Iowa*

Most political scientists concern themselves in one way or another with *values* and *interests*. References to *values* are ubiquitous in the literature, and one need only cite such terms as interest groups, the public interest, the common interest, and the national interest to recall the frequent reference to *interests*.

The two words have already been discussed a great deal.<sup>1</sup> Even so, there is considerable confusion about their meaning and about the interrelationships of their meaning. Rather than serve as effective tools for incisive analyses, they frequently lead into intellectual traps; and rather than serve as clear symbols for communication, they frequently lead to misunderstanding. These difficulties have been especially great in the field of foreign affairs, where so much has been made of the concept the *national interest*.

My aim here is to search for greater conceptual clarity, and to identify the roles that scholars and others can properly play in relation to various sorts of values and interests; at the same time I hope to show that some of the conceptions that have been employed in discussing the national interest and interest groups have shortcomings both in terms of their clarity and in terms of the role that they permit scholars to play. I propose first to establish a perspective from which values and interests can be viewed—a perspective that makes the two words virtually synonymous and enables them to be discussed in terms of means and ends, or of causal or functional relationships. Next I propose to examine the epistemological bases for knowledge about values and interests, indicating how they can

be identified or calculated or clarified, whether for practical or for analytical purposes. And finally I will point out what seem to be weaknesses and difficulties in conceptions of *interest* advanced by Hans Morgenthau and the Bentleyans. A clearer and more useful meaning of the term, and a clearer and more useful role for scholars, will, I hope, emerge.

### I. SEQUENTIAL AND HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIPS

It is a common feature of the words *values* and *interests* that they apply to items in a series, like rungs on a ladder or links in a chain; more broadly, they apply to a sequence of stages or states. A value may be endorsed either for its own sake or because it contributes to a second value; the second may be endorsed either for its own sake or because it contributes to a third; and so on. One interest may be pursued because it is held to be inherently or intrinsically worth pursuing; or it may be pursued because it is thought to promote the achievement of another interest.

In many cases this is not an "either-or" proposition. A value or interest may be endorsed *both* because it is thought to be self-justifying *and* because its promotion may contribute to a second value or interest; the second may be endorsed for a similar mixture of reasons; and so on.

Thus health in a given city may contribute to health in the country, which may contribute to greater productivity, which may contribute to greater power, which may contribute to greater security, which may contribute to the survival and development of the social order, which may contribute to human dignity and liberty. Each item in the sequence might be judged good in itself or good because it contributes to the next item, or good for both reasons.

Various terms are used to describe this situation. Especially if the reference is to purposes or ends or objectives or interests, they are likely to be classified as "immediate," "intermediate," and "ultimate," or perhaps as "proximate" and "remote" or "ulterior." Dahl and Lindblom classify goals as "prime" and "instrumental";<sup>2</sup> if values and interests are

\* For comments on an earlier version of this article I wish to thank Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Charles B. Hagan, Duncan MacRae, Jr., and Glendon Schubert.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ethel M. Albert, Clyde Kluckhohn, et al., *A Selected Bibliography on Values, Ethics, and Esthetics in the Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, 1920-1958* (Glencoe, 1959); and Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest, A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept* (Glencoe, 1960). See also Philip E. Jacob and Jame J. Flink, "Values and Their Function in Decision-Making," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 5, Supplement (May, 1962), pp. 5-38; this thoughtful and stimulating study became available after I had completed the present article.

<sup>2</sup> Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1953), p. 26.

thought of as goals, they too can be classified as prime and instrumental. Harold Lasswell and others speak of "goal values," which suggests the term "instrumental values." Ralph Barton Perry classifies values and interests into categories labelled "independent" and "dependent."<sup>3</sup> His focus is on the "independent" value or interest, *i.e.*, on the far end of the series—on the goal value that is regarded as desirable for its own sake; presumably this value is freely chosen and therefore "independent." Given the "independent" value or interest, "dependent" values or interests remain to be selected, and they are selected at least in part on the basis of their utility or desirability as instruments. This use of the terms independent and dependent is implied in every day usage. For example, if the question is whether it is in the American interest to build up its armed power, the answer might be that *it depends* on the prospect that more armed power will promote greater security. If it will, then the enhancement of armed power may be a dependent interest.

Obviously, if a value is instrumental it can also be called a means or method. Similarly, an immediate end or objective may be pursued as a means of promoting the achievement of another end farther along in the series. A dependent interest is championed as a means of promoting an independent interest. In any series of these sorts everything leading up to the end can be thought of as means.

In place of means and ends, some prefer to speak of *conditions* and *consequences*. Under this usage conditions are analogous to means, and consequences are analogous to ends—or at least the consequences are farther along in the series and may be thought of as ends. In other words, instrumental values and goals, immediate ends, and dependent interests may all be thought of as analogous to *conditions* through which or on the basis of which *consequences* come about.

The idea of a series in all of the above usages suggests the idea of cause and effect. In so far as anything is instrumental, it is—or is analogous to—a cause. If the goal-value is American security, armaments of certain sorts have instrumental value and can be thought of as a condition or cause of security. If the prime goal of a person is to live, food becomes an instrumental goal and can be thought of as a condition or cause of survival. Achievement of a dependent interest in being elected Governor

may operate as a means or a condition or a cause in bringing about the achievement of the independent interest—election as President. In any process comprising a sequence of states, features of each state may be thought of as causing the development of the next succeeding state.

Instead of using any of the above sets of terms, some describe the factors that are relevant to any development as variables, and they are likely to classify variables as dependent or independent, just as Perry classifies interests. But in the two contexts the meanings of the words get reversed, an independent variable being analogous to a cause and a dependent variable being analogous to an effect. In truth, however, those who speak of variables commonly speak of functional rather than causal relationships, dependent variables being functions of independent variables.

Quite apart from their sequential relationships, values and interests also fall into hierarchical relationships. This implies the obvious point that values and interests do not all fit on the same means-ends chain. Rather, different sorts of values and interests belong on different chains, some of which are likely to intersect. Sometimes pursuit of values in one series may interfere with pursuit of values in another series; *e.g.*, a government that seeks both higher scales of living and greater military power may have to make a choice, at least of emphasis. It can perhaps keep the conflict at a minimum by finding measures that promote both values simultaneously or by identifying different areas of activity in each of which one of the values can be pursued without adverse effect on the other. But where conflict exists, a choice is likely to have to be made, effective for a shorter or a longer period.

There is a reference above to the possibility of considering values and interests as goals. Let this possibility now be stressed. When we use the language of means and ends, we say that means can themselves be ends and that ends can be means. Both means and ends can be goals. The goal of a student may be to get credit in a course as a means of achieving another goal or end—graduation from college. When we speak of conditions and consequences, we can also say that the creation of certain conditions is a goal, sought as a means of achieving another goal, *i.e.*, the consequence. When we speak of causal or functional relationships, similar statements are possible. A goal can be defined as an event that an actor plans or seeks to bring about or prevent, or a state of affairs that he plans or seeks to establish, maintain, or change.

<sup>3</sup> Ralph Barton Perry, *Realms of Value, A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 79.

## II. CRITERIA OF CLASSIFICATION

The fact that the words values and interests apply to items in a series or to links in a chain (or network of chains) suggests difficulty when it comes to classification. By definition, the final item in a series or the final link in the chain represents a "goal value" or "independent interest." But, as a normative matter, is there any objective or scientific way of determining which items or links—which goals—should be ultimate? As a descriptive matter, are there ways of determining which goals are in fact ultimate for given actors, or are treated as if they were? If so, on what basis and within what limits? Is there a reasonable basis on which the scholar can classify values or interests simply for analytical purposes, even if his classification cannot be validated or cannot be shown to reflect reality in any way?

Similar questions can be asked concerning the hierarchical relationships of values and interests. If a conflict exists between what are admittedly goal values or independent interests, is there an objective way of determining which is the more important?

The question whether there is an objective way of validating goal values has been debated especially. The issue is the old one concerning the relationship between fact and value, between the is and the ought. No one has yet succeeded, and it seems unlikely that any one will succeed, in developing a reliable method of determining what ought to be for its own sake—what is self-justifying. As Perry says,

There do not appear to be any interests that are inherently independent rather than dependent. The basic biological interests may play either role: one may live to eat and drink or eat and drink to live. Games may be played for themselves or for money. Even self-preservation may be a dependent interest; otherwise there would be no meaning in the question, What is it that makes life worth living?<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, a candidate for office may champion certain principles in order to win an election, or may seek to win in order to champion the principles. And self-preservation is no more a categorical imperative for a corporate entity (e.g., a nation-state) than it is for an individual human being. The simplest statement, and apparently a correct one, is that, consciously or not, actors assume or postulate the goal values or independent interests that guide their behavior—sometimes seeking to justify themselves by references to alleged natural law or to religious injunction. If they try to prove the

validity or rightness of goal value "A" (other than by an appeal to faith), they apparently can do it only on the assumption that it is a means of promoting goal value "B," and this automatically forces the consideration of "A" as an instrumental value.

The second question—whether as a descriptive matter there are ways of determining which goals are in fact ultimate for given actors—offers somewhat greater possibilities, but nevertheless here too there are difficulties. The fact is that people rarely proceed on the basis of a well considered and consciously entertained comprehensive conception of their values or interests. The point is implicit in a study of human motivation by A. H. Maslow.<sup>5</sup> He speaks of motivation in terms of needs, suggesting a number of categories: physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, the need for self-actualization, the need for the preconditions of need satisfaction (e.g., for freedom and justice), and the desire to know and understand. People have motives (goals, values, interests) in a number of such categories, but are rarely conscious of them all. When their physiological interests are threatened, concern for them is likely to be a controlling guide to behavior; temporarily, at least, they may become ultimate interests. When a reasonable degree of satisfaction for the physiological needs is assured, they are more or less taken for granted, and attention is directed to, e.g., safety needs. When satisfaction for these can also be taken for granted, they are more or less forgotten and attention shifts to another category. Maslow suggests that, in principle, there is an endless set of categories of motives or needs (goals, values, interests), new types emerging or developing as others come to be substantially satisfied. He pictures men shifting their attention back and forth among the various categories, depending on circumstances—now being guided by an "ultimate" interest (my term, not Maslow's) in knowledge or understanding, perhaps, only to shift suddenly to an "ultimate" interest, say, in physiological or safety needs if a threat to life develops. Preoccupation with one sort of interest may lead to a neglect of another sort; pursuit of peripheral interests may jeopardize those that are fundamental. The point has its parallel in politics. Time and again in the conduct of American foreign relations, for example, interests have been pursued in normal times that

<sup>5</sup> A. H. Maslow, "A Dynamic Theory of Human Motivation," in Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred F. DeMartino (eds.), *Understanding Human Motivation* (Cleveland: Howard Allen, 1958), pp. 28ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51

did not appear to be the ones that really mattered when a crisis occurred. Presidents and Secretaries of State tend to speak of those values or interests that are threatened or that seem to be in need of attention, and they tend to forget about values and interests that seem to be assured. Sometimes there has seemed to be complete unawareness of certain values and interests and complete insensitivity to developing dangers.

To a limited extent there are ways of checking statements by actors concerning their interests or values or goals. In every culture certain rules of behavior or patterns of activity come to be associated with the pursuit of specific goals; and when the statements and the activities of an actor all point in the same direction, goals (at least those pursued at the time) can be inferred with some degree of probability. Along the same line, certain criteria for identifying goals are suggestive. Under a common view goals are "recognized as the points at which prolonged patterns of activity cease with comparative suddenness."<sup>6</sup> Another statement, and a more useful one, is:

We call something a goal not because it is a natural terminating point of movements but because movements persist towards it and vary in accordance with the changes in it and with conditions that lead to it.<sup>7</sup>

The implication is that if we see where prolonged patterns of activity cease, or if we see that movements persist and vary as indicated, we will have identified a goal. But such criteria could be used to identify instrumental goals as well as prime goals. According to them, crossing the goal line in a football game is a goal, and so is winning the game itself. Further, the use of such criteria may or may not provide a very sure basis for identifying broad and general goals, such as the promotion of peace, security, justice and freedom. In complex situations the same movements or activities (*e.g.*, building up the military power of the country) might indicate the pursuit of either war or peace—or, for that matter, prosperity or victory in the next election.

The upshot is that though it may sometimes be possible to identify, from his behavior, the goals that an actor pursues and to determine which of them is (are?) ultimate, this cannot

always be done. In many cases it is plain that actors themselves have not clearly and consciously identified their ultimate goals.

Considerations of this sort commend the view that a goal is "an incentive that is chosen by the investigator as a reference point for describing observed behavior."<sup>8</sup> In other words, if we think of a series of desired events or states of affairs, the identification of the one to be picked out as the goal may be rather arbitrary, designed to suit the purposes of the investigator rather than to be a reflection of a factual situation. The investigator simply breaks into the means-ends chain at a point where he finds it useful to do so; and then for analytical purposes he treats the final link as ultimate, and all links leading toward it as instrumental.

### III. THE IDENTIFICATION OR CALCULATION OF INTERESTS

Implied in what has already been said is the fact that it is frequently difficult both to identify the interests that actors do pursue and to determine those that they should pursue. The problem is obviously of concern to scholars, especially to those who are policy-oriented and who seek to enhance capacities for rational action. I will discuss it first in relation to independent interests and then in relation to dependent interests.

If the issue concerns strictly the desirability of a goal value or independent interest, then (as indicated above) no reliable method—*i.e.*, no method that produces the same result for all qualified persons who use it—is available. That something should be desired for its own intrinsic goodness or because it is self-justifying is an argument that no one has been able to establish by evidence and logic sufficient to command the assent of all who look and listen. There is (and probably can be) no theory of ends or theory of interests if by this is meant verifiable thought about what ought to be for its own sake.

This means that methods other than scholarship are to be employed in selecting the goal values or independent interests that are to be pursued; *e.g.*, by governments. Perhaps they will be the methods prescribed in some constitutional or legal arrangement—or the methods of civil or international war. One of the assumptions on which democracy rests is that the preferences of the majority should prevail. Whatever the method of determining goal values, the likelihood is that attitudes reflecting them will be laden with affect. They

<sup>6</sup> Raymond B. Cattell, *Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement* (Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Co., 1957), p. 440.

<sup>7</sup> R. S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation* (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), p. 122; *cf.* pp. 5-6.

<sup>8</sup> Dalbir Bindra, *Motivation: A Systematic Re-interpretation* (New York, 1959), p. 54.



will be matters of principle, intrinsically desirable, sustained by emotion. At the extreme they will not be open to discussion.

Nevertheless various tasks are open to the scholar in connection with goal values or independent interests. One of them is conceptual analysis. The scholar can bring reason and logic to bear in analyzing statements of goal values or independent interests with a view to identifying and reducing vaguenesses and ambiguities. If it is said, for example, that the major goal values in conducting American foreign relations should be to provide for the survival of the nation and the integrity of its territory, institutions, and culture, the scholar can analyze the crucial terms to see whether they convey clear meaning and, if so, what it is. There are bound to be intellectual difficulties in connection with any such broad formulations, and there are opportunities for real service in identifying them and seeking to reduce them.

Further, the scholar can also ask about the practical implications of the endorsement of various goal values: what are the actual or potential risks and costs of pursuing each of them? Perhaps the pursuit of one will turn out to be incompatible with the pursuit of another, or extremely costly in terms of values in other realms. Again there is an opportunity for significant service in identifying implications, for when people are made to see what their value position entails, they may choose to shift to a different position.

To express approximately the same point in a different way, the scholar may seek to influence the choice of independent interests. He can do this not by asserting that he knows best what they ought to be but rather by stimulating and contributing to clarity of thought on the part of those who make the choice. The suggestion was made above that ordinarily individual and corporate actors (including governments and governmental agencies) do not act on the basis of an articulated, comprehensive and coherent conception of their independent and dependent interests. They do not fully know their own minds, if indeed the relevant questions have entered their minds at all. They tend to fasten on certain goals and endow them with affect without fully exploring the implications and the possible alternatives. The scholar thus has an opportunity to stimulate more or less detached thought, and he may lead an actor to re-examine his assumptions concerning his independent interests. As a result some interests may be removed from the category and others placed in it.

It is probably desirable for scholars to try to get the realm of goal values or independent

interests restricted to the narrowest possible confines. If it were foreordained that certain values were necessarily goal values—if a given list of interests were inherently and intrinsically independent—there would be no choice about the matter. But we have seen that this is not the case. It is difficult to imagine any value or interest that cannot be considered instrumental or dependent. Recall, for example, the alleged values or interests that should guide American foreign policies: the survival of the nation and the integrity of its territory, institutions, and culture. Whatever the phenomena or the qualities identified by these words, they are not necessarily goal values or independent interests. All of them can readily be considered as instrumental values or dependent interests. Territorial integrity is in fact very often regarded as instrumental to survival. The survival of the nation could quite plausibly be regarded as instrumental to the survival of other cherished institutions, or as instrumental to the survival of the culture. The culture might be thought worth preserving because it provides the fullest known opportunity for the development of the potentialities of individual human beings. As each interest or value is shifted into the instrumental category, two reciprocal advantages may be gained: the role of emotion in considering the interest is likely to be reduced, and the role of objective inquiry is likely to be increased.

If the present analysis is correct, those who seek to reduce the role of conflict in human affairs should be especially alert to the conception of independent interests that guides actors who are in contention. It seems highly probable that all kinds of actors have engaged in all kinds of struggle, including war, on the basis of a conception of independent interests that they would have rejected if they had thought more incisively and clearly. Certainly the states that have been primarily responsible for launching the major wars of this century have lost more than they gained, and in nuclear wars all belligerents might suffer net losses of truly catastrophic proportions. One way of reducing the likelihood of irrational war or other costly struggle is to keep asking one or both contending parties why they do what they do—to keep trying to force them farther out toward the ultimates on their means-ends chains. What was beyond discussion as a self-justifying end may then become discussable. Perhaps one party or the other may then decide that the probable consequences of its course of action are unacceptable. Conceivably the contending parties may find that their means-ends chains intersect, *i.e.*, that they have a common inter-

est; and in the light of the common interest (taken as independent) the courses of action leading to conflict can be reexamined in a search for common dependent interests.<sup>9</sup> This type of thing seems to be going on, for example, in Western Europe, where the question is, why seek jealously to maintain sovereign independence; and many of those who manage to transfer the principle of sovereign independence from the category of independent interest to the category of dependent interests are apparently concluding that the alleged dependent interest is not, after all, a very compelling one. A similar development seems to be occurring in interest groups that are in contention in the United States over the school segregation issue. If a man says that he wants segregation or integration simply because he wants it (that is, if he treats it as an independent interest), the opportunities for helpful objective inquiry are rather limited; but if he identifies a goal that will allegedly be served by segregation or integration, then it may be possible to determine whether his notion of the means-ends relationship is correct.

The statement is made above that a reduction of conflict can sometimes be sought by forcing the contending parties farther out on their means-ends chains. The reverse of this procedure also sometimes applies. When ultimate goals are in irrevocable conflict, the appropriate strategy for reducing conflict is presumably to draw attention away from them and to look for more immediate interests that, hopefully, may be shared.<sup>10</sup>

The foregoing is addressed to independent interests and to the role of the scholar in relationship to them. If, conversely, the problem is to identify or calculate interests of a strictly dependent sort, there are additional possibilities. The scholar, the actor himself, or any observer—all may feel qualified to take a stand. So far as the scholar is concerned, he has the same opportunities that he has in connection with independent values or interests; that is, he can seek to clarify the meanings and the logical and practical implications of propositions advanced. And he may also be able to do much more. As is pointed out above, if a precise goal value or independent interest is given (either in fact or hypothetically), the problem of identifying the dependent interest(s) is the

problem of identifying the means that will bring about the desired end, the conditions that will produce the desired consequence, the cause that will produce the desired effect, or the variables associated with the desired functional outcome. Obviously, this is an area in which objective inquiry is possible, perhaps leading to conclusive proof. Studies can be made on various sorts of relevant questions, *e.g.*, the costs of employing various alternative possible means, the degree of probability that the means will produce the desired result, the speed with which the result will be achieved, etc. On the basis of such studies it may be possible to say flatly whether a given dependent interest is a "true" interest, *e.g.*, whether it will in fact promote the independent interest more surely or more quickly or more economically or with fewer risks than the available alternatives.

What the scholar can properly do for analytical purposes, as described above, has naturally had some influence on thoughts about what he can do for practical purposes. Thus the suggestion has been made that more of the practical problems of politics and government should be turned over to experts of one sort or another. For example, the well known distinction has been made between "politics" and "administration," the suggestion being that politics is the realm of choice among values and that administration is (or should be made to be) the realm where technical expertise is relied upon to promote the values that have been politically selected. Suggestions have been made, too, that in other areas greater reliance should be placed on the professionals (*e.g.*, the career Foreign Service Officers) and less on the amateurs. At the extreme, the suggestion would be that virtually all governmental decisions should be the work of the expert: that he should simply be told what the goal value(s) or independent interest(s) is (are) and then be allowed to identify the appropriate instrumental values or dependent interests.

This line of thought has much to commend it; nevertheless, it cannot be pressed too far. The solution of public problems is not always a matter of specialized expertise. Clear cut situations of the sorts assumed above for analytical purposes do not always obtain in practice. In practical affairs more than one goal value is usually involved, with nothing to indicate clearly their relative importance or urgency. Means are usually not separated neatly from ends. Precisely the same thing may be both goal value and an instrumental value; an actor may want something because he considers it intrinsically desirable, and he may also want it because it will contribute to the achievement

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Gordon W. Allport, "Normative Compatibility in the Light of Social Science," in Abraham Maslow (ed.), *New Knowledge in Human Values* (New York, 1959), pp. 140-41.

<sup>10</sup> Charles Frankel, *The Case for Modern Man* (New York, 1955), pp. 78-84.

of something else that is also desirable. Further, where a number of persons are involved it is likely that what is an instrumental value for one will be a goal value for another. Moreover, though reliable methods may exist for selecting means in connection with rather narrow problems, the task is more difficult in relation to problems of a broad and general sort.<sup>11</sup> If the object is to maximize the firepower of the foot soldier, there will presumably be a fairly reliable means of choosing between two rifles; at least, the question is unlikely to be submitted to a vote, above all not to voters who have little or no relevant knowledge or experience. Even if the object is the broader one of reducing unemployment, the question whether to attempt it through a program of government spending or through cutting taxes so as to encourage private spending may be susceptible to answer on a fairly reliable scientific basis; but one need only mention the problem to make it obvious that this is a situation where goal values and instrumental values are likely to be inextricably intermixed in practice. If the problem is to maintain or create a world environment in which the American people will have a maximum opportunity to develop their way of life as they please, the scientific basis for a choice of means is still less reliable. The number of relevant variables is so large and the interrelationships among them are so obscure that reliable prediction could not be counted on even if goal and instrumental values could be kept neatly separated; and, of course, this neat separation could not be achieved. When judgment is to be exercised (*i.e.*, when a decision is to be made on the basis of inadequate knowledge of relevant relationships) there is a fair prospect that the greater knowledge of the specialist will enable him to judge more soundly. But if he seems to claim a prescience that he does not have he may discredit himself. Given the necessity of some guessing, he may wish to have affairs so arranged that those who will enjoy or suffer the consequences share in the process and the responsibility.

Much depends on the mix in connection with any given decision. Except perhaps for the purest of independent interests, the position is scarcely tenable that "the public interest, so far as the United States is concerned, is and can only be what the public, what mass opinion, says it is."<sup>12</sup> After all, a great many inter-

ests are of the dependent sort, subject to determination by more or less reliable methods. But conversely, except for the purest of dependent interests, the position is scarcely tenable that the interest of an actor is what the expert says it is. For analytical purposes the scholar can consider all interests dependent. But for the purpose of practical decision-making the value element must ordinarily be recognized. And the appropriate roles of the expert and the others are likely to vary depending on the relative emphasis on the two elements involved.

#### IV. *Interests* IN CURRENT USAGE

Those who dwell on values are usually alert to the problems discussed above, though there is a tendency to assume that all values are necessarily normative (*i.e.*, goal) and not instrumental. Problems more commonly arise where the emphasis is on the concept *interests*.

Let it be recalled that the actor himself (*e.g.*, a person, a group, a government), the scholar, or any observer may advance propositions concerning the actor's interests, and that the interests may be either independent or dependent. Independent interests are assumed or postulated or accepted on faith; and whatever will serve them is a dependent interest.

Let it be noted, also, that the word *interests* is commonly modified by various terms, *e.g.*, *national*, *public*, *common*, which create difficulties; and much of the discussion of interests has concerned the meaning of the adjectives rather than the meaning of the noun. We are not here concerned with the adjectives.

*Interest as a Guide to Foreign Policy.* Where *interest* is the subject of discussion in connection with foreign affairs—and particularly in the writing of Hans Morgenthau concerning the national interest—much of the trouble is definitional rather than epistemological; and the examination of such trouble is not central to the present purpose. Nevertheless, brief attention to the matter is called for, if only to identify the problem.

In developing what he calls a theory of international politics Morgenthau says that this is "inherently a world of opposing interests." "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."<sup>13</sup> Morgenthau repeatedly uses the formula, "interest defined in terms of power." But, so far as I have been able to discover, he does not himself advance a

<sup>11</sup> See Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19 (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88.

<sup>12</sup> Harwood L. Childs, as quoted by Schubert, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace* (3d ed., New York, 1960), pp. 4-5.

definition explicitly, whether or not in terms of power. In truth, he seems almost deliberately to accentuate the vagueness of the key terms. Thus he says,

The kind of interest [and here he does not say "defined in terms of power"] determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy [note that interests are apparently goals] can run the gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.<sup>14</sup>

It is not clear whether Morgenthau approves such an elastic interpretation of the term *interest*. It is clearer, however, that he approves a similarly elastic interpretation of the term *power*.

Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.<sup>15</sup>

Morgenthau does not say what kind of power he has in mind when he says that interest is to be defined in terms of power, nor does he identify the degree or level of power (of whatever kind) that the pursuit of interest requires. He identifies survival as the minimum interest of a political unit; and, in broader terms, he suggests that the concept *national interest* "encompasses the integrity of the nation's territory, of its political institutions, and of its culture."<sup>16</sup> But at the same time he makes it clear that persons or entities other than the nation have interests that will sometime supersede the national interest.

While the realist indeed believes that interest [but whose interest? and on the basis of whose calculation?] is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the national state is a product of history and is therefore bound to disappear.<sup>17</sup>

Sometimes Morgenthau speaks of the "true"

interest, which seems to imply that some interests are something other than "true," but he does not clearly describe the tests by which "true" interests are distinguished from others. Pretty obviously, such a treatment of interests leaves many questions unanswered. And Morgenthau adds to the uncertainties when, after seeming to identify interests with goals or objectives, he warns that "a realist theory of international politics [must] guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences."<sup>18</sup> But surely many interests in the sense of goals or objectives are closely associated both with motives and with ideological preferences. In short, Morgenthau's use of the term *interest* leads mainly to puzzlement. It is perhaps noteworthy that his most recent book, which is very perceptive and stimulating, focuses not on the concept *interest* but rather on the concept purpose—*The Purpose of American Politics*.

Robert E. Osgood likewise makes extensive use of the concept *interest* in discussing foreign policy problems, but he departs considerably from Morgenthau's extremely vague meaning.

National self-interest is understood to mean a state of affairs *valued* solely for its benefit to the nation. The *motive* of national egoism, which leads men to seek this *end*, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself solely with the welfare of one's own nation; it is self-love transferred to the national group.<sup>19</sup> [Italics supplied.]

Implicitly, Osgood grants that an interest might be altruistic, for he adopts a modifier for the word, speaking of self-interest. He does not define self-interest in terms of power, nor does he reject concern for motives; rather, to him an interest *is* an end or a motive. It is a *valued* state of affairs, and not a state of affairs that exists objectively—independently of human evaluations or appraisals. Though Osgood equates interests with ends, he might also identify them with means; for, as indicated above, a state of affairs might be valued either for its own sake or because of its contribution to the achievement of some other valued state of affairs, or both. In short, Osgood's definition leads to the question of the bases on which evaluations occur and to the question of the relationships between interests on the one hand and ends and means on the other.

The contention here is that the discussion of *interests* as a guide to foreign policy decisions is

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December 1952), p. 973.

<sup>17</sup> *Politics Among Nations*, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>19</sup> Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 4.

likely to be sounder and more cogent if a distinction is made between the independent and the dependent. Especially if an author is prescribing, it is important that he stipulate clearly the independent interests that he is postulating; given the independent interests, he then in principle has the opportunity to identify appropriate dependent interests—and he may be able to do this more soundly than any one else. Even if the author is describing, it is likely to be desirable to maintain the distinction between independent and dependent interests, or at least to place them accurately in their serial and hierarchical relationships.

*Interests and Interest Groups in Domestic Politics.* The tendency of those who dwell on the role of interests or interest groups in domestic policy is to think only in terms of interests as defined by the actor himself, leaving no room for the scholar or any detached observer to say that the actor goes against his own interests or that he *should* pursue an interest other than the one that he in fact pursues.

Arthur F. Bentley set the precedent for this: There is no group without its interest. An interest . . . is the equivalent of a group. . . . The group and the interest are not separate. There exists only one thing, that is, so many men bound together in or along the path of a certain activity. . . . The group is activity and the activity is only known to us through its . . . value in terms of other activities. . . . The interest is just this valuation of the activity, . . . the valued activity itself.<sup>20</sup>

In approximately the same manner, Jack Peltason says, "An interest consists of all kinds of activity of all kinds of people, some of whom may be public officials, in conflict with an opposed array of activities."<sup>21</sup> And Charles Hagan says, "The activity is the interest. The interest is a shorthand way of saying that there is a mass of activity operating in a given direction. . . . The present assignment of meaning to interest is to find the activity and call that an interest which the activity connotes."<sup>22</sup>

Definitions of this sort suggest two kinds of problems.

<sup>20</sup> Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), pp. 211, 213.

<sup>21</sup> Jack W. Peltason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process* (Garden City, 1955), p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in a Political Science," in Roland Young (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 45.

The first is whether the pursuit of interests or the activity of interest groups is to be considered in the general context of purposefulness and rationality. Probably so, though the quotations cited are not very clear on the point. Both Bentley and Hagan describe the activity as going along a path or operating in a given direction. This implies that the activity is not random, and it probably implies that it is directed or controlled so as to promote the achievement of a goal. If so, a discriminating intelligence is involved, and choices are made among possible alternatives. But in stressing activity rather than the criteria of choice that guide the activity, Peltason and Hagan do little to suggest concern for the purposes, the goals, and the rationality of the behavior. They might remedy the matter by including expressions of purpose and reason in the category that they label activity; but then they would make the category so broad that they would simply join the ranks of others who are concerned with identifying and appraising means and ends in politics. The role that Bentley himself assigned to discriminating intelligence—to reason and purpose in the activity of groups—is not very clear either, though he did refer to interest as the "valuation" of the activity.

The other problem to which the Bentleyan type of definition leads is that it apparently rejects the view that anyone other than the actor has a basis for identifying the actor's interests. Hagan makes this explicit in repudiating the practice under which "interest is often utilized to designate a kind of activity which follows as an inference from a premise."<sup>23</sup> He is adversely critical of those who say in certain circumstances that an interest group acted against its interests. As noted above, he is on sound ground if the reference is to independent interests, strictly defined; but given the independent interest to be served, it is quite possible that a scholar or other detached observer may identify the dependent interests of a group more accurately than do its members or leaders. Under the conception being advocated here, for example, an observer might find that it is against the interests of a candidate for office to insult the voters; or he might find that it is against the interests of children to skip school persistently. But if the activity is the interest, then insulting the voters and skipping school automatically become interests by the fact of their occurrence.

David Truman relates the word *interest* to attitudes rather than to activity.

As used here, "interest group" refers to any group

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes. . . . The shared attitudes constitute the interests.<sup>24</sup>

If interests are attitudes, an evaluation is implied; a person who has an attitude is for or against something. An attitude indicates a sense of direction if not a desired destination. This suggests again that the pursuit of an interest is the pursuit of a goal, and it again points to the question whether the goal is being pursued rationally. Obviously, a detached observer might conclude that an interest group is not acting rationally, and sooner or later some or all members of the interest group might agree. This means that the observer and the members would take the view that the activity of the interest group had not served its best interests. And it suggests that there are difficulties in a conception that identifies interests with the current attitudes of those pursuing them. Further, there is at least a certain incompleteness in the conception of "potential groups" that Truman advances. In his view a potential group consists of people with shared attitudes who have not yet become organized; but it might also be potential in the sense that the prospective members may develop certain attitudes when they become aware of their common dependent interests.<sup>25</sup> The interest group might be there potentially, regardless of both existing attitudes and existing organizational forms.

#### V. CONCLUSION

In sum, values and interests fall into sequences (some leading to others in the same sequence) and into hierarchies (some superseding others). In common usage the words *values*

and *interests* have approximately the same meaning, and each designates two sorts of thing—approximately the same two sorts. What are called interests divide into categories that can conveniently be labelled "independent" and "dependent." What are called values divide into categories that can conveniently be labelled "goal" and "instrumental." Independent interests are equivalent to goal values, and dependent interests are approximately equivalent to instrumental values, the difference being that the term dependent interest is not so likely to connote the notion of intrinsic desirability whereas the term instrumental value may do so. No value or interest belongs inherently in one category and not in the other; any value or interest might be in either category, depending on human preference. The scholar has no scientific way of determining what goal values or independent interests should be pursued, and since in practice most actors are not clear in identifying them, the scholar may not be able to determine which ones are in fact pursued. In any event, what is an independent interest for one actor may be a dependent interest for another, and *vice versa*. For items in each category, however, the scholar can seek to promote conceptual clarity and knowledge of logical and practical relationships. Moreover, he can simply assume one or more independent interests for analytical purposes and then identify and appraise relevant dependent interests. If he focuses on the concept *interest*, he is likely to do better if he avoids defining it in terms of power or activity or attitudes—though, to be sure, different meanings may be useful for different purposes. He is likely to find it advantageous to define an interest as a goal that an actor does or should pursue. His appraisal of dependent interests may lead him to make recommendations, which is intellectually justifiable if he keeps himself within the limits of logic and evidence and if he recognizes that the independent interests that he postulates may or may not be the ones that others accept.

<sup>24</sup> David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), pp. 33–34.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35, 510–15.

# COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

HERBERT J. SPIRO

Amherst College

This is a tentative outline of a systematic and comprehensive approach to the study of politics. Part I gives the method. Part II indicates some advantages of the approach. Part III anticipates likely objections to it. And Part IV suggests some applications. My purpose in presenting the paper in its present form is to encourage my colleagues to consider this approach and, if they find it potentially useful, to contribute to its refinement through criticism.<sup>1</sup> As David Easton said in his "Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"<sup>2</sup> I know "I run the definite risk that the meaning and implications of this point of view may be only superficially communicated; but it is a risk I shall have to undertake since I do not know how to avoid it sensibly."

## I

*Politics* is the process by which a community deals with its problems. A *community* exists among people who are aware of pursuing common goals.<sup>3</sup> *Problems* are obstacles perceived on the road toward goals. Problems must therefore be recognized in order to become politically relevant or alive. But recognition of a problem by itself does not lead to the generation of politics about it. When there is complete consensus in the community on the solution of a problem, after it has been recognized, no politics concerning the problem takes place. In this sense, a community whose members always agree on solutions to their problems is not a political system. Since there are few (if any) such communities, most communities are political systems. In almost all communities, disagreements occur. Disagreements present *issues*. A *political system*, therefore, is a community that is processing its issues. While the basic prerequisite for community is *consensus*, though minimally only on common goals (which may be negative, like prevention of the extermination of the community of mankind),

the basic prerequisite for a political system is *dissensus*. Politics arises out of disagreements within a network, wide or narrow, loose or tight, of agreement. (17-27)<sup>4</sup>

A problem enters politics once members of the community recognize it *and* disagree about it. A problem leaves politics when it has been "solved" *and* this solution has been recognized. Between the beginning and end of this process, the issue(s) generated by a problem passes through four *phases* of the "flow of policy": (1) formulation of the issue, (2) deliberation, (3) resolution, and (4) solution of the problem. Since problems are obstacles on the road to goals, disagreements may be about the *substance* of the goals or the *procedures* used to approach them. (363-372) In either case, the issue may be perceived as involving a long-term, *fundamental* matter or a short-term, *circumstantial* matter. (211-213)<sup>5</sup> A political system may be described, and two or more systems may be compared, by "plotting" the incidence of issues with reference to two intersecting axes. The vertical axis runs from the procedural to the substantive extreme, the horizontal from the fundamental to the circumstantial. (Figure 1)

In every political system, some issues arise under each of the four combinations. (I) Fundamental procedural issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *stability*, *i.e.*, by *constitutional* problems. (II) Procedural circumstantial issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *flexibility*, *i.e.*, typically by *economic* problems in modern or modernizing communities. (III) Circumstantial substantive issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *efficiency*, *i.e.*, by *power* problems. (IV) And substantive fundamental issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of *effectiveness*, *i.e.*, by *cultural* problems.

<sup>1</sup> I am already indebted for very helpful critiques to V. O. Key, Jr., Harvey C. Mansfield, Franklin L. Ford, Harry Eckstein, and especially Duncan MacRae, Jr.

<sup>2</sup> *World Politics*, Vol. 9 (April 1957).

<sup>3</sup> This does not imply a "progressive" as distinguished from a "conservative" bias, since the goals may include maintenance of the *status quo*.

<sup>4</sup> Numbers in parentheses refer to pages in my *Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy* (New York, 1959), where the concepts used in this paper were put to work in a less systematic fashion, and which contains many concrete illustrations that could not be included here.

<sup>5</sup> This distinction is not meant to suggest that issues about fundamentals are more important than those about circumstantials.




FIGURE 1. Diagram of system issues.

The relative *success* of political systems (or of one system at different times) can be gauged by the degree to which they manage to sustain a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals. (41-42) If problems are thought of as the input and solutions the output of the political system, *efficiency* measures the output-input ratio. If the system solves none of its problems, it will fail. But the problems it recognizes for processing, the process itself, and the solutions also have to be considered *effective*, or acceptable, by at least those members whose opposition could put an end to the system. At least some procedures used for the handling of problems have to remain *stable* over time, otherwise the system will lose its identity *vis-à-vis* itself and its basic goals.<sup>6</sup> But both procedures and even more the policies (or solutions) worked out within these procedures have to be sufficiently *flexible* to adjust to changes in the content of the community's problems; otherwise stagnation will set in.

<sup>6</sup> This should not be confused with substantive "boundary maintenance"; a political system may be stable even though its scope and membership fluctuate, that is, expand, contract, and overlap or merge with those of other systems preoccupied with the solution of similar or different problems. See also p. 595 below.

Stability and effectiveness are concerned with the long run; flexibility and efficiency with the short run. Each of these basic goals needs to be balanced by its temporal opposite. Stability and flexibility are concerned with the methods used for handling issues; effectiveness and efficiency with the content of problems and their solutions. Each procedural goal should be balanced by its substantive opposite.

None of the four basic goals by itself is sufficient for the success of a political system. Exclusive concern with stability is shown by legalistic attempts to foreorder the entire future by means of comprehensive, detailed, and consistent regulation. (211-236) This is designed to preclude the need for any future choices, to prevent changes in values or goals, and to keep efficiency at its current level, since no novel substantive problems will be allowed to come up. The final goal pursued here is a kind of regimented bureaucratism. Members of a more or less well balanced political system who are overly committed to bringing about stability only will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (I). Their *political style* is *legalistic*. The style of the subsystem of these members could be described graphically as in Figure 2.

Exclusive concern with flexibility is the temporal antithesis of legalism. (182, 189)






FIGURE 2. Subsystem distortion, I.

Here the desire is to keep opportunities for change permanently open. Constancy in goals would consequently become impossible, and policies would fail because of inability to sustain them long enough to solve the problems to which they were addressed. Even the procedures of politics would be altered in response to changes in the problems currently considered most pressing. Anarchy would be the logical end result. Members overly interested in flexibility will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (II). Their style is *pragmatic*. (Figure 3)

Exclusive concern with efficiency results from the desire to achieve nothing but the immediate solution of current problems. (179–180, 186–187) It manifests itself in technocratic focussing on the substance of problems, as these happen to be perceived at the moment, in order to bring available power and other resources to bear on them at once. What participants desire is quick solutions—regardless of the means used, of alternative policies that may have been suggested, or of the effectiveness of these solutions in terms of goals other than pure short-run efficiency. The end result of imposition of its rule by an efficiency-minded group would be a kind of technocratic totalitarianism. Such persons will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (III). Since they are concerned only with the application of power to the solution of problems, their political style in its extreme form is *violent*. (Figure 4)

Exclusive concern with effectiveness is the temporal opposite of violence. (194–210) It would seek to imprison the whole community in the rubrics of one ruling ideology. Ideological motivation would shape the recognition of




FIGURE 3. Subsystem distortion, II.




FIGURE 4. Subsystem distortion, III.

problems and the formulation of issues, regardless of “objective” needs. All policy is put in the service of the long-run substantive goals to which the ideology is committed, so that nothing that deviates from it can remain stable, nor can adjustments be made to changes within, or in the environment of, the system, unless the ideology itself dictates these changes. Theocracy or “hierocracy,” in which a fanatical intelligentsia, secular or spiritual, ruled would be the result of victory by a group committed to the exclusive pursuit of effectiveness. Members of a more or less balanced political system who have this kind of commitment will raise an inordinate number of issues under (IV). Their style is *ideological*. (Figure 5)

The style of a successful political system, in which tensions due to pursuit of the four basic goals bring about a dynamic equilibrium, could be described by Figure 6. It also relates the political process, *i.e.*, the four phases of the flow of policy, to basic goals and to types of issues and problems. A system is most successful when issues cluster around the intersection of the procedural-substantive and fundamental-circumstantial axes. This central clustering will happen, not because of the content of the problems dealt with, but because of the equilibrium described above. This in turn is related to the particular sequence in which each of the four phases of the political process proceeds from one to another of the basic goals.

A problem is recognized for issue *formulation* when fundamental substantive goals, *i.e.*, the effectiveness of the system and its policies, call for its solution. Cultural values, in the broad sense, lead to recognition of discrepancies between goals and current conditions. But the




FIGURE 5. Subsystem distortion, IV.




FIGURE 6. Diagram of system in dynamic equilibrium.

particular formulation that the issue receives is shaped by the fundamental procedures in use. If there is disagreement on recognition of the problem and/or its proper solution, this is due to differences in the fundamental substantive goals of members. But the form in which the resultant issue is stated—two or three alternative solutions, clear or vague differentiation, etc.—is shaped by the “constitution,” and the fact that it is so shaped gives, and is usually designed to give, stability to the system, regardless of the content of all the various issues that have to be dealt with. (164–177)

*Deliberation* consists of the consideration of alternative solutions to a problem. The alternatives, having already been formulated, are now examined in the light of the need to adjust to changes inside the system and in its environment. (239–257) Without realistic consideration of these changes, deliberation would be meaningless, and the solution would be unsatisfactory.

Deliberation normally leads to *resolution*, that is, the narrowing down of alternatives and the final selection of one policy. Resolution might be called “the big decision,” since the word *decide* means to cut off—in this case, to cut off deliberation. (258–269) But one should not identify resolution alone with decision,

because the whole political process consists of a sequence of decisions: what problems to recognize, how to formulate the issues, how to deliberate and resolve, what resources to use in solution, and many more decisions. While the formulation of the issue involves fundamentals, its resolution involves short-term considerations. Resolution is always addressed to the problem as it appears at the moment deliberation is cut off. It need therefore not be final, because changes can always be made during the phase of solution. In fact, resolution rarely is final, and only rigid adherents of the mechanical doctrine of the separation of powers believe that the legislature deliberates and resolves, and then the executive puts this resolution into effect. (12–13) Actually, “the executive,” and whoever else participates in the final phase of the political process, often introduces new, or re-introduces old, alternative solutions to the problem. In any case, the resolution of the deliberated issue directs flexibility toward efficiency. While constitutional and economic considerations normally play important roles in the course of deliberation, economic and power considerations do so during resolution. And while an excess of constitutional regulation may prevent an optimal weighing of alternatives, a lack of available power or other re-

sources may lead to inability to arrive at resolution of the issue.

The phase of *solution* deals with the substance of a problem, bringing to bear short-run power for the achievement of the community's long-run goals. Solution of a problem normally removes the goal on the road toward which the problem was an obstacle. Once an economy with millions of unemployed has achieved stable full employment, this achievement ceases to be a goal, though the maintenance of full employment may continue as a goal of lesser importance. In a successful system, solution links efficiency to effectiveness and thereby clears the channels of politics for the recognition and processing of new problems that are obstacles on the road to new goals.

Formulation, deliberation, resolution, and solution are called *phases* rather than stages or departments of the political process or, preferably, of the flow of policy, in order to emphasize that they usually overlap. In an emergency, for example, all four may be compressed into a matter of moments. (269-273) Moreover, political systems differ with respect to the relative importance of the four phases and the basic goals that are given strongest consideration in each phase. For example, a system with a very legalistic style might devote most of its politics to the concoction of "artificial" constitutional issues and their very abstract deliberation, without ever arriving at their resolution or the solution of its "real" problems. Or a system of very violent style might concentrate its politics on the quick resolution of conflicts between various armed organizations and the efficient solution of these problems, to the complete neglect of considering alternative solutions and formulating other issues about different problems. In the Fourth Republic, French politics was preoccupied with formulation and deliberation, to the neglect of resolution and solution. In the Fifth Republic, this emphasis has been reversed.

The style of a political system at any one time is rarely as one-sided as in the preceding examples of legalism and violence. Combinations with a double or triple emphasis are more




FIGURE 7. Combination styles, A.




FIGURE 8. Combination styles, B.

common; for example, legalistic pragmatism, as often displayed in American constitutional litigation (Figure 7); pragmatic violence, as among the criminal underworld (Figure 8); ideological legalism, as in Calvin's Geneva; or alternating pragmatic and ideological violence, as in the Soviet Union (Figure 9). A triple emphasis of this kind cannot describe the style of a system at one moment, because ideologism and pragmatism are true opposites, as are legalism and violence. Triple emphasis is therefore more likely to describe style over time, when radical oscillations occur, *e.g.*, from ideologically motivated to pragmatically motivated violence. However, simultaneous concern with stability and efficiency, or with flexibility and effectiveness, is possible when the issues of politics are clustered around the intersection of the two axes: for example, when the problem is jay-walking and the issue is means of enforcement, arguments about legality (not legalistic arguments) and the availability of traffic cops can be adduced simultaneously without calling for a description of style as violently legalistic. Or when the issue arises out of the problem of dowries in a modernizing community, arguments about cultural values and the distribution of income may be raised in the course of pushing this problem closer toward solution, without making the style ideologically pragmatic.

The greater the incidence of issues away from the central intersection, the weaker is consensus on those of the basic goals near which the issues cluster, and the more pathological is the




FIGURE 9. Combination styles, C.




FIGURE 10. Judicial and business firm systems.

style in that particular direction. For example, when the most important issues revolve around the constitutional document itself—constant proposals for its amendment, discussions of its internal consistency, of its effectiveness, of its adequacy to solve the problems different members consider most pressing—if indeed this preoccupation with the constitution leads to the formulation of artificial issues, then consensus is obviously weakest on the content of the goal of stability, and style is legalistic.

For most subsystems, this kind of preoccupation with only one or two of the four basic goals is normal. The judiciary, for example, and parts of the bureaucracy are subsystems more concerned with stability than with anything else. (276–297) Both the internal style of these subsystems and their contributions to the style of the system of which they are parts will tend more toward legalism than toward the other three styles. However, a detail of their square, Figure 6 (I), shows that their concern with stability also has aspects of flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness; and that, while the two phases of the central policy flow to which they mainly contribute—formulation and deliberation—deal typically with the constitutional aspects of problems, these constitutional aspects have to be looked at from the “purely” constitutional, the constitutional-economic, the constitutional-power, and the constitutional-cultural points of view. (Figure 10)

Similar details for the other squares would show major preoccupation with flexibility on

the part of, say, a business firm during a period of great economic growth, Figure 10 (II), with efficiency on the part of, say, the military in some Latin American country, Figure 6 (III), and with effectiveness on the part of, say, “ideologues,” propagandists, or public relations agents of a certain type, Figure 6 (IV).

Useful comparisons can be made by examining the internal political style of similar subsystems or groups of political personnel in different systems; *e.g.*, the governments of Paris and Stockholm, Coca Cola distributors in various countries, the general staff corps of France and Germany, or of Weimar and Federal Germany, different firms in the American electrical industry, or the top newspapers of several states. This kind of comparison would show, among other things, that the sources of authority of the personnel of these subsystems vary from one system to the next, and do so even more within any single political system. If *authority* is considered a kind of “additive” to central decisions, which leads those who are exposed to the consequences of these decisions to accept them, then the sources of authority can be classified in the same way as issues and consensus. (372–379) For instance, military heroes have authority among the military as a result of substantive circumstantial achievements, like a general’s victories. Some saints have authority among communicants of their religion as a result of more fundamental substantive claims, such as visions of the deity, performance of miracles, or stigmata. The

Supreme Court of the United States enjoys authority among the legal profession and other Americans because it is identified with the fundamental procedures of the legal profession and of the Constitution. (282-286) Medical researchers like Dr. Jonas Salk enjoy authority among the public because they have addressed their innovating methods to the successful solution of current medical problems. I am willing to take the prescriptions my general practitioner issues to me and I regard him as an authority on my ills, because he has solved my medical problems before and because I know him to have been certified by meeting a combination of procedural and substantive requirements.

These are examples of authority in various types of subsystems. Of greater interest are the sources of authority of contributors to the central flow of policy. In a successful system, these sources vary with the phase(s) of the political process in which particular contributors are chiefly involved. To illustrate this, we can take the American problem of the costs of medical care. In Figure 11, each of the four phases of the policy flow is further broken down into two sub-phases, one on either side of the axis passing through it. The recognized problem is brought to public attention and (1) formulated as a substantive issue by leaders of affected interest groups, that is, subcommunities whose members are aware (or are being made aware) of having special goals and problems in common. Among these are leaders of underprivileged minority groups, of labor unions, of the medical profession. The issue is then (2) formulated in such a form that it can be deliberated upon, given the constitution of the system, in this case the fundamental procedures of politics in the United States. In this phase, legal advisers to the groups involved make their contributions, and other lawyers and the courts may also participate, *e.g.*, if constitutional test cases are initiated. Some of the issues arising out of the general problem are

formulated by the political parties, *e.g.*, through inclusion of planks in their platforms, and by other national politicians through introduction of legislation, *e.g.*, to change social security laws. These issues are (3) deliberated upon in the Congress and, occasionally, by Congressional politicians, the President, and others outside the Congress, *e.g.*, in public debates and on television interviews. Next, (4) deliberation begins to be carried on by increasingly less "constitutional," more interest-oriented figures, like negotiating agents for the various groups involved, perhaps with the advice of economists and business consultants. The issue will come closer to (5) resolution, perhaps after further litigation, as a result of successful negotiation between the antagonists, or through Congressional action. In Switzerland, a referendum might bring resolution at this point. (6) Substantive resolution can also be accomplished through threats or the use of force, as in strikes or violent clashes between doctors' and patients' organizations and the police. Here men whose authority comes largely from substantive and circumstantial sources would be in charge. After resolution of the issue, (7) solution begins with participation of government and private administrators, like the Surgeon General, hospital administrators, Blue Cross officials, Social Security civil servants. Finally, (8) the original problem is solved and thereby removed close to the "low" or "grassroots" levels at which it was first recognized through the actions of doctors and patients and subordinate bureaucrats who operate the system that has been set up more or less in keeping with the resolution of the issue. The authority of these people is derived from their identification (which may be a new product of the earlier phases of the process) with the substantive fundamentals of the community.

In an unbalanced system, on the other hand, sources of authority will be out of keeping with the particular phase of the policy flow to which participants contribute. For example, in subphase 3 of deliberation, which calls for authority coming from identification with fundamental procedures, practicing physicians and "experienced patients" may be the main actors. Or in subphase 7 of solution, which calls for authority based on experience with administrative and medical organization, the bargaining agents of medical associations or labor unions may play the most important role. In either case, the success of the system in its handling of this problem would suffer. The mishap in subphase 3 might be an indication of ideological style. The malfunction in subphase 7 would




FIGURE 11. Sub phases in the policy flow.

*Handwritten signature or initials.*




FIGURE 12. Post-independence system.

suggest pragmatic style. If mob leaders or the police had to get involved in subphase 2 of formulation, this would be a manifestation of violent style. If constitutional lawyers opened new issues in the course of subphase 7 of solution, the system would be suffering from undue legalism.

Perfect equilibrium among the four basic goals is hard if not impossible to achieve and it would not be desirable to insure success except under very rare conditions. Members of any non-stagnant political system change their estimates of the most important problems it faces. If they start, for example, by considering solution of the problem of independence from outside rule most important, as colonial independence movements have, the initial style of the system may be more or less violently

ideological. Once independence is achieved, leaders identified with solution of the problem of colonialism will be regarded as most authoritative in all phases of the political process. If the independence movement develops successfully into a new political system, its style will add elements of pragmatism and legalism, as concern shifts to flexibility and stability, the original problem having been solved efficiently and effectively, *i.e.*, in an acceptable fashion. In this kind of development, the phase of deliberation would be last to receive the backing of a firm consensus. (Figure 12) Consensus would initially be strongest on solution to the poorly formulated, undeliberated, and therefore technically "non-resolved" independence problem. But this would be true only within the movement, since between it and the colonial power this would be precisely the area of greatest disagreement, leading to ideological and violence in the larger system and, eventually, to its breaking apart.

On the other hand, a subsystem that starts off with an exclusive pursuit of stability, perhaps out of opposition to an efficiency-oriented totalitarianism, (1) will have an initially legalistic style; (2) slowly pay greater attention to the twin needs of flexibility and effectiveness; and (3) finally perhaps reach a point where it is ready to use violence against the totalitarian regime to solve its own crucial problem. The German resistance to Hitler seems to have followed this pattern. (Figure 13) Its members began by discussing the legality of resistance to the tyrant (and drafted a new constitution for the *Reich*), then constructed an ideology of resistance on this foundation of constitutionality, considered how to adjust their tactical plans to Hitler's operating procedures, and finally—after several unsuccessful




FIGURE 13. Anti-Nazi resistance movement.




FIGURE 14. Nazi suppression of resistance.

attempts on his life—set off the bomb in his headquarters on July 20, 1944.

After failure of this plot, the Nazi regime's reactions followed the reverse order, though this development occurred much more quickly. The first reaction (1) was brutally violent. It then became somewhat more pragmatic in the sense that temporary concessions were made where this seemed expedient, *e.g.*, concerning executions. At the same time, (2) the existing anti-resistance ideology was quickly elaborated. Finally, (3) the surviving major conspirators were tried by a special people's court, so that their execution could be presented as "legal" to the public. A diagrammatic presentation would look like Figure 13, except that the movement starts in (III), not (I), and that final arrows from (III) to (I) would be much farther away from the central intersection. (Figure 14)

This comparison of the resistance to Hitler and its repression by the Nazis might suggest that the development patterns of these two or any political (sub)systems are considered of equal value or, indeed, that this method of comparison pretended to be *wertfrei*. It does not, for two related reasons. In the first place, the purpose of comparison is to evaluate the relative success of political systems, success having been defined as a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals. Success was not defined with reference to the achievement of the always necessarily transient substantive goals of political systems. However, this criterion of success may be considered unsatisfactory because, for example, we might at least conceive of an ideologically violent totalitarianism that manages to indoctrinate its population so thoroughly in its ideology that it retains sufficient stability and flexibility to remain effective. No totalitarianism has in fact so far "succeeded" in this sense. On the contrary, the more successful ones are precisely those that moved away from an exclusively substantive to an increasingly procedural emphasis in both consensus and sources of authority. This objection is, nevertheless, well taken, and the normative assumptions underlying this approach can be made explicit. (30-42)

In the first instance, or in the last instance, or in both, it is individual human beings who recognize the problems that make up the raw material of politics, because these human beings are working toward goals: in the first instance, when individuals deliberately come together, as in modern interest organizations; in the last, when collectivism is at least alleged to serve the end goal of greater individualism, as according to Marx ("the free development

of each . . ."). Human beings are distinguished from the rest of creation (or "existence") by their presumed capacity to work deliberately toward perceived goals. What distinguishes them even more is their capacity to invent new goals, *e.g.*, when old ones have been reached. In this respect, human beings, or our understanding of ourselves, resemble political systems (more than our understanding of political systems resembles our understanding of human beings, since the differentiated functioning of political systems is much more open to analysis than that of individual persons). (28-29)

The individual, as a personality system, also pursues the basic goals of stability, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness, in terms of his own built-in or acquired substantive values. He or she also has to maintain a dynamic balance in the pursuit of these basic goals. The development of the behavior style of infants or older persons could be described in the terms used here for political systems. (366-367) Because there is general agreement that human beings are capable of forging new goals for themselves and of working toward their goals, broad consensus might also be reached on the desirability of providing individuals with optimum opportunities for "realizing themselves" in this sense. The norm of individual responsibility could serve as the highest common normative denominator for the two antagonistic camps of the Cold War, and others, at least philosophically.<sup>7</sup> This norm demands that individuals should be given opportunities to contribute to those central decisions whose consequences will affect themselves; and that their capacity to contribute to such decisions should be proportionate to the extent of their exposure to the consequences. The balance between opportunity to contribute and exposure to consequences describes the individual's *situation of responsibility*. To be in a sound situation of responsibility, one should be provided by the political system with four ingredients: (1) *foreknowledge* of the probable consequences of one's decisions; (2) *choice* among alternative courses of action; (3) *resources* with which to realize the choice; and (4) *purpose* or commitment on the part of the system to the norm of responsibility itself.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See my "Responsibility and the Goal of Survival," *Responsibility: Nomos III* (New York, 1960), pp. 290-303.

<sup>8</sup> For an earlier application of the norm of responsibility, see my "Co-Determination in Germany," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 48 (December 1954), pp. 1114-1127. "Purpose" has been added as a fourth ingredient since then, for reasons that may be apparent.




FIGURE 15. Prerequisites of individual responsibility.

Without foreknowledge, one's situation in the political system would lack stability; without choice, it would lack flexibility. Without resources, the problems arising out of one's membership could not be dealt with efficiently; and without the system's commitment to the goal of responsibility, its pursuit by the individual would be thwarted even if the other three ingredients are provided. Knowledge and choice are matters of procedure; resources and purpose are matters of substance. Foreknowledge and purpose relate to fundamental goals, choice and resources to circumstantial problems. (Figure 15) The pathological systems described by Figures 2 to 5 and 7 to 9 would, each in a different way, unbalance their members' capacity to pursue self-realization, that is, to achieve a sound situation of responsibility, by putting one or more of its four ingredients beyond their reach. For this reason, disequilibrium and pathological style can also be criticized systematically from a normative standpoint.

## II

Table I shows relations between various dimensions of this approach. The approach makes possible systematic comparison by allowing the same aspects of any two or more political systems, empirical or normative, to be "plotted" in systematic comparison to one another. Issues are taken as the basic data of politics. Their incidence can be plotted comparatively with reference to the two coordinates, Substantive-Procedural and Fundamental-Circumstantial. These in turn are related to the basic goals of any system, balance between which serves as a criterion of success and, at the level of the individual, of normative judgment. Political style and sources of authority can each be described systematically and in relation to one another. Style and authority can also be related systematically to the political process and the personnel of politics. (276-297) The approach also offers a tool for the comparative study of political development of systems and subsystems, in relation to their problems, issues, consensus, sources of authority, types of personnel, and the political process. It also provides a descriptive pathology of politics. So far, systematic description is the main use of this approach. Without systematic description, comparison is difficult. Without sound comparisons, explanations are impossible.

While systematic comparison is its main advantage, the method may also have some other merits. Among these is avoidance of any artificial compartmentalization of one and the same system into "polity," "society," "economy," "culture," etc. To be sure, any system studied by political scientists has all these

TABLE I RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SYSTEM DIMENSIONS

Policy Flow Sub-Phase	Policy Flow Phase	Coordinates	Basic Goal	Problem	Style	Situation of Responsibility
8	Formulation	Subst-Fdtl	8	Effectiveness	Cultural	Ideological
1		Fdtl-Subst	1			
2		Fdtl-Proc	2			
3	Deliberation	Proc-Fdtl	3	Stability	Constitutional	Legalistic
4		Proc-Circ	4			
5	Resolution	Circ-Proc	5	Flexibility	Economic	Pragmatic
6		Circ-Subst	6			
7	Solution	Subst-Circ	7	Efficiency	Power	Violent
8		Subst-Fdtl	8			
1		Fdtl-Subst	1	Effectiveness	Cultural	Ideological
						Purpose



aspects, and sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and other "social" scientists have developed their own methods for studying these aspects. The approach outlined here would rely heavily upon application of these methods. For example, when we want to compare the efficiency of two systems, we would turn to economics, which is better qualified than any other "policy science" to relate output to input. Sociologists would be best qualified to study, among other things, consensus, especially cultural. The several component disciplines of political science similarly have their specialized contributions to make. For example, historians of political philosophy are better qualified than anyone else to study the evolution of consensus on fundamentals for periods for which few primary sociological data are available. (And, incidentally, our diagram, divided into sixteen squares, provides a convenient scheme for classifying political philosophies.) Jurisprudence and, in the United States, constitutional law are the disciplines best suited for the study of procedural fundamentals. Different "schools" of administration, both public and business, are well qualified to compare systems with regard to their stability and efficiency. Psychologists, in addition to providing insights into the decision process,<sup>9</sup> may be most helpful in comparing the flexibility of systems. Students of communications are well qualified to study the flow of policy as it affects consensus. And so forth. But compartmentalization among these several disciplines should be avoided and, consequently, the tendency to think of the objects of their study as separate entities having an existence apart from one another. Any system studied by political science has all these aspects, but what makes it a political system is the processing, by means of certain procedures, of issues arising out of common problems that are obstacles on the road to goals. The procedures are applied to the whole range of problems faced—economic, power, cultural, constitutional, and others. Each of these problem areas provides the data for the several specialized disciplines. As soon as these problems are converted into issues and introduced into the flow of policy, they are, as it were, raised from the rock-bottom level of givenness, and the community that so raises them is a political system. If no problems are

raised in this sense by an otherwise apparently somehow coherent aggregate of human beings, these people do not constitute a political system, except perhaps in the case of a very primitive and therefore pre-political community, unaware of its problems, its capacity to do something about them, and the feasibility of inventing new goals.

Just as this method avoids system compartmentalization, so it also avoids mechanical compartmentalization of functions, like legislation, execution, and adjudication, or policy-making and implementation. Another advantage is the more systematic and symmetrical relation in this approach between functions and the other dimensions of comparison—more than, *e.g.*, the four input and three output functions (of the American separation of powers) of Almond's method, or the seven categories of functional analysis advanced by Lasswell.<sup>10</sup> The latter, incidentally, could easily be "synchronized" with the eight subphases of the political process suggested here.

This approach, further, broadens the conventional identification of politics with power, mainly by returning to Thomas Hobbes' conception of power, which was wider than most contemporary usage of the term. Two advantages result. First, this method can be applied to any political system, regardless of size or scope, instead of being confined, as most current methods still are, to the state as defined by Max Weber. Some applications to different types of political systems, at different levels, will be sketched out below. Secondly, this approach facilitates the systematic inclusion in comparison of more factors, and more relevant factors, than are usually considered.

Partly because it broadens the conventional identification of politics with power, this method can offer improvements upon classifications like the following: constitutional democracy and totalitarianism (or autocracy), democratic and authoritarian, modern and traditional. The first of these pairs is usually defined with respect to power: its concentration and control, its exercise and scope. Friedrich's syndrome of totalitarianism, for example, cannot now be put on some kind of a scale that would permit the systematic comparison of political systems for the purpose of determining which are more or less totalitarian, or constitu-

<sup>9</sup> "Decision-making" was deliberately avoided, because the phrase is redundant: a decision is not a decision unless it has been made. By speaking of decision-making we suggest repeated cut-offs between successive but "separated" powers or functions and thereby deny the fluid continuity of the political process.

<sup>10</sup> Gabriel A. Almond, "The Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), p. 17; Harold D. Lasswell, *The Decision Process* (University of Maryland, 1956), p. 2.

tional, autocratic or democratic.<sup>11</sup> In fact, his syndrome might lead to condemning as potentially totalitarian some new African states as soon as they reach a certain level of industrialization. The method suggested here, by contrast, while taking into account such factors as "totality" of control, terror, propaganda, and "one-party system," would relate all of these systematically to one another *and* to phasing of development, as well as success and the norm of responsibility.<sup>12</sup> A similar improvement could be made upon Eckstein's classification of authority patterns into democracy, authoritarianism, and constitutionalism, in which the main variables are "mass" and "elite," participation, choice, transmission of instructions, autonomy, and a framework of rules.<sup>13</sup> This scheme leads Eckstein to consider certain basic social relations and governmental functions as inherently undemocratic and authoritarian. For instance, if one condition of governmental democracy is "that elections must decide, in some basic way, the outcome of the competition for power and policies,"<sup>14</sup> then evidently there cannot be a high degree of congruence between this governmental authority pattern and the social authority pattern of relations between children and their parents. But the suggestion that, if the latter is not democratic, it therefore tends toward authoritarianism, with a greater or lesser admixture of social equivalents of constitutionalism, hardly helps our systematic understanding of the relation between governmental and non-governmental authority patterns. The method outlined here is designed to facilitate the systematic description and comparison of authority patterns of families and other social and political units.

The various classifications that have been used to describe and explain French politics are another case in point: the traditionalist, bourgeois, and industrial orders; the traditions of authority, liberty, and equality; two "geo-

logical faults," one caused by the Great Revolution, the other by the Industrial Revolution; the forces of order and the forces of movement (311-314); or the representative and administrative traditions.<sup>15</sup> Each of these classifications, and the interpretation based upon it, contains valid insights which, moreover, need not contradict each other. For purposes of relating the phenomena covered by them to a systematic concept of politics, however, and for comparing them with similar or different but parallel phenomena in other political systems, they could easily be "translated" into the scheme proposed here.

Classifications based on the distinction between traditional and modern can also be refined by means of such a translation, which would widen their scope by asking questions like these: Is the stability of a traditional system more substantive or more procedural? Is a modernizing system deliberately recognizing new problems, or are these being forced on, or into, it? Is its flexibility greater with respect to constitutional procedures or technology, the production and distribution of goods, or defense against neighbors? And so forth.

Perhaps the greatest advantage that can be claimed for this approach is a very practical one, namely the easy translatability, noted in passing, of a wealth of extant material, both substantive and methodological, fruits of the labor of all the social sciences. To provide this easy convertibility was an intended purpose of this method. Conversely, the approach could be worked out in its present tentative form only by building it selectively upon the foundation of this wealth of available material. In order to put this method to use, no "staggering amount of empirical work . . . seems required."<sup>16</sup> The questions that it asks have already been asked of and answered about many political systems of all imaginable types, from a variety of small groups to the community of mankind. The empirical material is ready and waiting to be used in a comparative way.

One other advantage should be mentioned before moving on to possible objections. As already suggested in references to new and developing political systems, *e.g.*, in Africa, this scheme is applicable to them. (431-441) In other words, it avoids the ethnocentricity of some other approaches designed to serve similar ends. It especially avoids what might be called the "Anglophile fallacy," into which many western political scientists fall—for perfectly understandable reasons. (336-344)<sup>17</sup> It

<sup>11</sup> Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 9-10.

<sup>12</sup> For a brief effort in this direction, see my *Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara* (Englewood Cliffs, 1962).

<sup>13</sup> Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton, 1961), p. 7. He calls for formulation of "more discriminating," "less ambiguous" categories; p. 45.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System," in Beer and Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe* (New York, 1958), pp. 216-220.

<sup>16</sup> Eckstein, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>17</sup> This bias was brought to my attention by

does *not* make universally valid criteria out of "the two-party system," regular alternation in office, a neutral civil service on the current British model, or "stable democracy." This method avoids the Anglophile fallacy by withdrawing our focus from the relatively transitory content of the problems faced by particular communities in periods of greatest interest to ourselves, and resetting our sights upon the basic goals that all political systems ever have been and will be pursuing. For the same reason it also avoids what might be called the "Cold War fallacy," into which many students of comparative government fall—for even more understandable reasons. They look upon all governments as either totalitarian or constitutionalist or somewhere between these two poles and tending in one or the other direction. They also sometimes convey the impression that the "history of all hitherto existing society" has been nothing but a determined preparation for the Cold War. One can almost detect the affinity of opposites between their approach and that of their Soviet counterparts. The latter assert that Soviet socialism is the penultimate manifestation of man's political genius. Our western colleagues seem to assume that western constitutional democracy is the final expression of human political genius. However, to the leaders of some of the new political systems in Africa, neither of these rather self-satisfied and ethnocentric approaches will appear very convincing. Nor does it to anyone else who retains faith in man's political inventiveness.

### III

Some objections to the approach outlined here can perhaps be anticipated. The first of these is likely to be directed at the definition of *community* that has been used, because it fails to make "the absence or presence of violence as a means to settle disputes" the main criterion.<sup>18</sup> For Haas,

The ideal type of political community . . . assumes, therefore, that the condition toward which the process of integration is to lead is one in which a sufficient body of general consensus imposes limitations upon the violence of group conflict.<sup>19</sup>

Reginald Bartholomew of the University of Chicago. For an illustration, see Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 533, and *passim*.

<sup>18</sup> Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, 1957), cited by Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, 1958), p. xv.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Our notion of community, on the other hand, requires as a minimum only awareness of the pursuit of common goals, and of members' inability to solve alone the problems arising out of these goals. In this sense, there is a community between the parties to a civil or international war, as indeed between the contestants in the current Cold War, *e.g.*, with regard to the goal of the survival of mankind. Non-violence and loyalty to institutions, other components of Haas' definition, were deliberately left out of ours, as part of the effort to shift attention away from the sovereign state and related units. The old focus of attention easily leads to a preoccupation with questions of "obedience" that seems increasingly anachronistic. Community in our sense of the word is worth studying because there exists within it at least some consensus.

A second objection is likely to be raised against failure to make non-violence in the settlement of disputes a criterion of the *political system*. All we require of a community to consider it a political system is that it process its issues—regardless of its style, including the incidence of violence, regardless even of failures to solve its problems. The motive was the same as before; *e.g.*, there is a global political system and various international political systems within it. Most of these may not have been very successful, but they do process issues and sometimes solve some of their problems. They have politics and they are certainly worthy of study. Violence is one of several means of conducting politics and should not be excluded from our purview merely because its use fortunately has been reduced and regularized within many, and between some, modern states—but more in some than in others, which again shows the need for including the incidence of violence in comparisons.

A third objection may be made to apparent neglect of *institutions*, like presidents, cabinets, parliaments, and the like. This omission was intentional, in order to avoid fallacious comparisons, *e.g.*, between the United States Congress and the Swiss Parliament. What matters is not the formal function, like legislation, assigned to an institution by its name or the constitution, but the phases of the flow of policy to which the institution and its personnel contribute. For example, comparison might show that the Swiss Parliament contributes less to the resolution of major issues than the Congress, because in Switzerland resolution is often provided by the referendum. In the global system, formulation has been quite decentralized, except with regard to issues dealt with by some of the older special-

ized international agencies. So is resolution, while at least public deliberation is becoming increasingly centralized upon the United Nations. If we looked first for institutions and then asked what functions they performed, we would get a less comprehensive and less comparable picture than we do by first identifying the political process and then asking which subsystems and subcommunities contribute to its various phases.

A fourth objection might be raised against our apparent neglect of the role of *groups* in politics. This would, however, be based on a misreading of Part I. Communities whose members are aware of sharing special problems in common were discussed and are usually described as interest groups. The same is true of some of the subsystems discussed above. Again, use of the conventional words, including "political parties," was avoided on purpose, because it easily leads to erroneous universalization of the familiar, *e.g.*, by projecting the American relation between interest organizations and parties onto, say, French or Ghanaian politics, or by assuming that interest groups everywhere are most active in bringing problems to the attention of politicians (sub-phase 1) and then later in helping lower level administrators with the solution of their own special problems (sub-phase 8), when they may actually contribute more to deliberation or to resolution.

A fifth objection might be made to the relation between "society" and the political system that we are assuming: which is "prior"? Society and its institutions are chronologically prior in the sense that all deliberately created contemporary political systems were superimposed upon pre-existing societies. But these political systems often were superimposed precisely in order to bring about changes in the society or, frequently, the several societies comprising them, and in their institutions and values. After this kind of change, and to the extent that it brought intended or unintended results, habits and characteristics conventionally called "social" or "national" become effects rather than causes of political style. (192-193)

A sixth but certainly not final objection might raise the question of *agreement among investigators*. Even if two students accepted this approach, could they not come up with quite different descriptions of the same phenomena, *e.g.*, in the exercise of comparison immediately following? That is, could not an issue be described as violent by one scholar, and as pragmatic by another? This kind of disagreement should not be possible after further

refinement of the method, especially with respect to comparisons. But even if it were unavoidable, the method would still have the merit of asking sets of questions that are both comprehensive and systematically interrelated.

#### IV

The purpose of systematic comparison is to facilitate explanation of differences. Without such explanations and the understanding to which they contribute, the conduct of responsible politics is impossible. In this sense, political science can contribute a great deal to the foreknowledge required for improvement of situations of responsibility. The following illustrations do no more than to sketch some suggestions of how this approach can be put to work to provide explanations.

*A Backward Society and the Village in the Vauchuse.* The southern Italian village of Montegrano analyzed by Banfield seems comparable to Wylie's Peyrane.<sup>20</sup> Banfield quotes Hume's saying that an explanation is a place where the mind comes to rest.<sup>21</sup> He considers the moral basis of the society "the strategic, or limiting factor."<sup>22</sup> This moral basis is the ethos of "amoral familism,"

which has been produced by three factors acting in combination: a high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institutions of the extended family.<sup>23</sup>

Banfield suggests that

The village of southern France described by Wylie . . . exemplifies, perhaps, the adaptation the ethos of amoral familism would make to improved economic circumstances. The average income in Peyrane seems to be at least twice that in Montegrano.<sup>24</sup>

Wylie, like Banfield, found that the people he studied "do not unite to work together for any cause. . . ." But life is much better in Peyrane than in Montegrano. Wylie's explanation of his community's relative success is also strongly centered on the family.

These two political systems can easily be compared in terms of the incidence of issues in them. (Figure 16) In internal Montegrano politics, (a) stands for a mild anti-clericalism,

<sup>20</sup> Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, 1958); Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vauchuse* (Cambridge, 1957).

<sup>21</sup> Banfield, *op. cit.*, p. 10, note 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>25</sup> Wylie, *op. cit.*, p. 59.




FIGURE 16. Systematic comparisons of issues, A.

(b) for municipal elections, in which voting patterns are unstable and voting motivation mainly personal resentment against candidates, (c) for criminal violence, (d) for litigation, of which there is a great deal and (e) for petty corruption. In internal Peyrane politics, (a) anti-clericalism is a more lively issue, (b) local elections revolve around less extreme issues than in Montegrano, like the need for a new sewage system and public baths, (c) criminal or other violence is lacking, as are (d) litigation—the men say “*homme de loi, homme de merde*”<sup>26</sup>—and corruption. The mayor got parents of school children to threaten a unanimous school boycott (f), in order to put pressure on the French Government to provide a new school building and, at the same time, to regain local electoral support from the Communists, recently popular as a result of a successful ochre miners’ strike (g). (A village near Montegrano had strikes, but not Montegrano itself.) The organization of annual dances presented a recurrent issue (h). Opposition between Communists and Roman Catholics, while not precluding occasional alliances in municipal campaigns, is a sometimes more ideological, sometimes more pragmatic issue (i). Organization of the hunt club and its affiliation with neighboring clubs is another hotly debated item (j).

The main differences between the two systems are apparent. In Montegrano, the issues are farther from the intersection of the two coordinates than in Peyrane, and there are fewer issues. The issue formulating phase is being performed very poorly in Montegrano. In Peyrane, it is being performed very well, at least relative to the problems that citizens consider important. The conduct of a kind of politics over questions of dance organization or hunt club policies keeps the flow of policy in constant circulation and enables it to pick up the “truly” political issues when necessary. This tends to strengthen procedural consensus

and suggests one intermediate explanation for the different success of the two systems: the people of Peyrane are more experienced in the use of procedures on which they are generally agreed. The people of Montegrano are utterly inexperienced in the use of any political procedures, but if they were experienced, chances are they would be in profound disagreement on the propriety of whatever procedures they were familiar with. This in turn suggests that doubling the level of income in Montegrano by itself would not make it any more successful than it is, because its people are procedurally incapable of absorbing this economic improvement or even recognizing the new problems this would raise, and even less capable of solving them. We could almost describe Montegrano as a pre-political system, because its people are largely unaware of the feasibility of doing something about their common problems. If we compared Montegrano with an economically much more backward African tribe which, however, uses old and widely popular procedures for settling quarrels or allocating land, the Africans would be found more successful in operating their political system than the Montegrani, and would probably prove more flexible in absorbing economic help from the outside.<sup>27</sup>

The pattern of external issues differs from the internal one, because it is part of the pattern of the national Italian or French systems, of which these villages are only small subsystems. (Figure 17) The external issues in Montegrano are (a) an uncomprehending opposition to the outside world which is believed to be utterly capricious in its operations as these affect the village; (b) party conflicts in national politics, on which voting behavior is as erratic as in local elections; (c) a slumbering potential of anti-state violence of the kind that has historically erupted in southern Italian peasant uprisings; and (d) relations with the State

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182.

<sup>27</sup> See my *Politics in Africa*, p. 155 and *passim*.




FIGURE 17. Systematic comparisons of issues, B.

administration, which is concerned almost exclusively with the police aspects of its mission in Montegrano; and (e) the fear of corruption.

The external issues in Peyrane are (a) a more clearly defined feeling of suspicion for *les autres* of the outside world which is, however, believed to operate according to fairly rational procedures, of which the Peyranais avail themselves in order to get out of the French State what they want from it, *e.g.*, in national elections (b); (c) the use of organized violence in defense of firmly cherished values, as by the *maquis* against the Germans during World War II; and (d) relations with various branches of the bureaucracy, in which "contacts" are used pragmatically, but stopping short of bribery and corruption, in order to round out the square compartments of regulated existence into which the administration would like to fit the village and its citizens. In the case of the school issue (f), internal consensus generated by the mayor was applied to the national political process at those points where it was most likely to bring, and did bring, the desired results. Relations with other hunt clubs (j) and many other issues of "external relations"—transportation and communication, conscription, social security, etc.—also play a role, most of them arising near the central intersection.

The difference between the two patterns again revolves around the higher and more centripetal incidence of issues in Peyrane. Montegrano's internal and external patterns differ, in that the former shows no serious ideologism, whereas the latter shows no serious legalism. As members of their subsystem, the Montegranesi are not aware of any constitutional problems arising out of their relations with the Italian State. Consensus on procedures is strong, not because of general familiarity with them, but because the possibility of adapting them to changed needs does not occur to anyone. This strength of consensus, in turn,

has the result of letting potential leaders of substantive reforms—like Montegrano's equivalent of Peyrane's school improvement movement—perceive their roles in a very stagnant, legalistic way: only men in official positions have the right to approach the prefect with such proposals, but they are unlikely to do so, because their official role calls for compliance with administrative instructions. Once more, Montegrano's underdevelopment is mainly procedural. New problems are not recognized in it, only for it by the outside administration, which then formulates and deliberates and, if things ever get that far, resolves issues for Montegrano. In Peyrane, by contrast, this process is operated by the local people themselves, or as part of the national policy flow with their participation. It is true that problems that have gone through the whole political process in Peyrane are not necessarily solved in the end: by the time *The Village in the Vaucluse* was published, the promised school had not yet been built. However, in terms of our criteria, non-solution of an otherwise fully processed problem has to be considered more successful than solution of a problem handled entirely by administrators who are not members of the community. The supreme value is balanced participation in politics itself: man is a political being.<sup>28</sup>

How can these differences be explained? We have already rejected an economic explanation in favor of a procedural one, by making the comparison with the African community. Banfield mentions an historical factor, the late and incomplete abolition of feudalism in southern Italy, by contrast with northern Italy and France. Since the Revolution, the peasants of the Vaucluse have owned their land and have been individually responsible for their own and their families' welfare. They have not been dependent upon resident or non-resident land-

<sup>28</sup> How much this approach owes to Aristotle should by now be evident.

lords. Their community has been much more egalitarian. Peyrane lacks the equivalent of Montegrano's "upper-class circle," between whose members and the rest of the village there is very little community feeling. Individual economic responsibility has combined with egalitarianism to reduce fatalism in Peyrane. Small children, both before and in school, are brought up according to very regular rules, while they are raised capriciously in Montegrano. This could be explained by reference to "family values," but the overwhelming bias of the social sciences in favor of such sociological explanations warrants at least exploration of the reverse. According to this comparison, the much more pragmatic, erratic, capricious, and incomprehensible operation of Italian politics may have contributed to equally deficient child-raising habits, rather than the reverse. The Third Republic and the Italian Monarchy were contemporaries, but France did not have an equivalent of *trasformismo* in its worst form. French deputies had to "produce" for their constituents to get re-elected and—at least as important—the parliamentary system enabled them to produce. For purposes of the present illustration, we cannot pursue this question any further, but it seems something other than a chicken-or-egg question.

Sources of political, but not only of political, authority in Peyrane are procedural, in Montegrano substantive. School children in Peyrane value honesty and non-violence most highly, whereas (though Banfield did not inquire into this) they probably value such qualities as physical strength, good looks, and substantive learning most highly in Montegrano. Banfield agrees with this estimate when he suggests that "Perhaps the best starting place [for reform] would be the organization of village soccer teams."<sup>29</sup> In Peyrane, *boules* is the favorite sport, with very complicated rules, about which people argue a great deal. Of course, *boules* is not cricket, but it is better than nothing and has been played for many generations in the Vaucluse. In any case, the problem of reform initiated from the outside does not arise for Peyrane. Its citizens are in comparatively sound situations of responsibility, in their own view. And if we or other outsiders were to advance proposals for the reform of the political system, the proposals would be torn up—as was the telegram sent to the local communist head of the *maquis* by the departmental "purge chief" upon the Liberation of the Vaucluse, with the words, "*Nous réglons nos affaires en*

*famille!*"<sup>30</sup> *Regler* means "to rule" in the procedural sense.

*France and Great Britain.* The relative failure of French politics is often explained with reference to France's lack of consensus, and the success of British politics in terms of "agreement on fundamentals." We can compare present consensus in the two countries by showing the close clustering of major British issues around the central intersection, and the centrifugal scattering of French issues which shows up strongly in the direction of violence and ideologism. If our mind will come to rest in the England of Henry VIII, we can begin an explanation with his success in making the single problem of relations with Rome the dominant issue of his reign, and in solving this problem in an effective manner. Formulation and solution were of greatest concern in this period. Next, in the seventeenth century, this previous success in solving the religious problem facilitated the processing of another single problem, the overwhelming importance of which was generally recognized, namely, the problem of the constitution. It was solved with the help of ideological commitment (even though new issues about the already "solved" religious problem were raised) and the use of organized force in the Civil Wars. After the Glorious Revolution, sufficient constitutional consensus had been built up to enable the British to be first in recognizing the possibilities of the Industrial Revolution, another problem of single undiluted impact upon the system, and to solve the contemporary manifestations of this problem.

In the French case, the religious, constitutional, and industrial revolutions, each accorded priority by different subsystems, made a simultaneous impact, and violence was used not only to attempt resolution of each issue, but also to resolve the issue of priority among them. As a result, the use of violence itself became an issue. Much less constitutional consensus than in Britain was built up, none of the problems was solved effectively, and the issues down to this day continue to arise at the extremes. French politicians more often enjoy authority from identification with the substantive goals of the groups they lead, than from identification with parliamentary procedures, at least by comparison with British politicians. The same difference is echoed in former colonies of these two powers.<sup>31</sup>

*The Soviet Union.* This approach can be used to compare different periods of one political

<sup>29</sup> Banfield, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>30</sup> Wylie, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

<sup>31</sup> See *Politics in Africa*, p. 143.




FIGURE 18. Styles in successive periods of the Soviet system.

system and thereby to help explain its development. Since the Bolshevik Party "became the State," we have to start this sketch with Lenin before the Revolution (1), when he had nothing but ideological commitment. (Figure 18) Next "comes the Revolution," in which violence was used ruthlessly and ideological principle sometimes sacrificed for pragmatic considerations (2). During the N.E.P. period, Soviet style turned more pragmatic, still less ideological, and somewhat less violent (3). Under Stalin, it was pragmatically violent (4). Since his death, Soviet internal politics has become less violent, somewhat more ideological but also more purposive, and slightly "legal" without becoming excessively legalistic (5). Issues in Soviet domestic policies—both publicized and, more important, behind the scenes—seem to be clustering closer around the central intersection than ever before, though still not as closely as in constitutional systems.

There is no element of determinism in this account. Lenin was initially ideological because of his exclusion and self-exclusion from "legitimate" Russian politics. In the Revolution, power and other resources were harnessed to the ideologically defined goals in order to solve the ideologically defined problems. Because of changes in the environment of the revolutionaries, they also began to show a degree of flexibility, especially with regard to economic aspects of their problems. In the next phase of development, they *could* have turned toward legalism, as colonial independence movements sometimes do at a parallel stage of development, especially if they base their claim to independence on treaty obligations of the colonial power or on their "rights" under constitutional documents like the United Nations Charter. The Soviets did not turn toward legalism partly as a consequence of the Marxist rejection of the state. Similarly, Marxist preoccupation with substantive economic problems led to the increased pragmatism of the N.E.P. period. Development in the last two phases (until the present) suggests—as would comparison with other totalitarian systems—that there are no "inherent laws" of totalitarian development. More important, phases (2)

to (5) illustrate the variety of totalitarianism that is logically and practically possible. An understanding of this variety may be of use in preventing the rise of and combatting totalitarianism.

Sources of authority have also been subject to change in Soviet history. At first, theoretical brilliance or orthodoxy were the most important sources. Revolutionary achievement followed. Both are substantive sources, the former being goal-oriented, the latter problem-oriented. During the N.E.P. period, managerial skills, partly procedural, began to be recognized for the first time, and they have increased in importance in the post-Stalin decade. Meanwhile, however, substantive sources continue to predominate for men in the top positions: identification with the Revolution or with its major figures, demonstrated ability in manipulating the machinery of power or propaganda, "production victories," and the like. But one can anticipate that, when the revolutionary generation has died, one of the hitherto most important sources of authority will dry up, and more procedural trends may develop.

*World Politics.* Since the most important phases of international politics are being conducted increasingly by the leaders of states instead of professional diplomats and military officers as formerly, these leaders' sources of authority and the style of their political systems are of some interest. (442-465) Despite poorer communications, international relations until World War I had a more unified style than they have today. Diplomats and military who, respectively, performed most of the deliberation and resolution, operated within a fairly strong consensus on the rules of diplomacy and warfare. Today, though improved communications are centralizing deliberation, and even the formulation of issues, in the global political process, such consensus is lacking. The sources of authority, for example, of the current candidates for participation in a summit meeting vary widely. A summit meeting, once it reaches agreement on its agenda (formulation of issues), would presumably conduct deliberation in hopes of reaching resolution or, at least,






FIGURE 19. Imbalance in the international system, old and new.

agreement on the postponement of resolution for issues that, for the time being, can be settled only violently. But of the four participants, only Macmillan and Kennedy have procedural sources of authority and much experience with deliberation conducted according to clearly understood rules. General De Gaulle's military career and his achievements as leader of the Free French and founder of the Fifth Republic endow him with quite a different type of authority, somewhat closer to that held by President Eisenhower at the time of his first summit conference. Khrushchev's sources of authority have just been adumbrated. Deliberation of world political issues has the disadvantages of an unbalanced system, already mentioned earlier. It also changes the types of issues that are generated for world politics. Under traditional diplomacy, typical issues related to legal and power problems. Flexibility was the most persistent goal. Today, cultural and economic problems, or the cultural and economic aspects of legal and power problems, are more often introduced into the international flow of policy. Stability is the most persistent goal. (Figure 19) This has a feedback effect by increasing the proportion of ideologically and pragmatically inclined participants in world politics, *e.g.*, in the case of the United States the U.S.I.A. and the C.I.A. Ideologism and pragmatism have been described as true opposites, as have legalism and violence. This means that they cannot "co-exist" in a system at any one time. This fits the international system, in which one political style is usually succeeded by its opposite. While von Clausewitz's dictum was still valid, war was the continuation of diplomacy by other means. Today, subversion and guerrilla warfare are the continuation of propaganda by other means. Perhaps this is the crucial difference between old fashioned international relations and the Cold War.

The importance of propaganda and the possibilities presented by world-wide communications suggest another use to which this approach might be put. An understanding of the style of a political system and its subsystems in terms of the categories suggested here can be

of help in deciding how to "pitch" one's appeal or what sort of "image" to present. Specialists in public relations have, of course, been doing that for decades, in terms of their own categories, and the great propaganda agencies are doing it today. Skillful politicians of all ages have accomplished the same thing more or less intuitively. Most opinion polls or attitude surveys concentrate upon the substance of their subjects' feelings, and this substance has been known to change even more rapidly and more radically than the issues themselves. By getting an accurate picture of the style of politics along lines suggested here, on the other hand, one should be able to get at the more enduring patterns of attitudes and behavior, because this approach focuses on the manner in which people are likely to process whatever problems come their way, rather than on specific reactions to the substance of particular problems. This should be of some use in world politics, too, because of the quick succession of vast changes in the problems that make up its raw material.

This instability and the fluctuating, overlapping, intermeshing, clashing, simultaneously centralizing and fragmenting, expanding and contracting character of world politics points to one final advantage of the method that has been tentatively put forward in this paper. In the beginning (note 6), a warning was issued—in what may have seemed a rather cavalier fashion—against confusing "stability" with "boundary maintenance." Whether this latter function was transferred to politics from biology or physics, in conventional sovereign nation states boundary maintenance is taken care of by the military together with customs and immigration police. But students of politics are no longer concerned primarily with this unit of politics. Political science is concerned with politics at all levels, in all kinds of communities. Today, and in the immediate future, its attention will be drawn especially to politics in the global community of mankind, in and for which a political system is slowly being built up. And the boundaries for that political system do not have to be maintained, they only have to be grown into.

## SUBCOMMITTEES: THE MINIATURE LEGISLATURES OF CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

GEORGE GOODWIN, JR.

*University of Rhode Island*

Woodrow Wilson spoke of the "little legislatures of Congress," in referring to House and Senate standing committees. Perhaps it is not out of place, then, to call subcommittees the "miniature legislatures." Little systematic academic attention has been given them since Burton French's discussion in this REVIEW in 1915.<sup>2</sup> They are worth understanding, however, for subcommittees often leave an indelible mark on legislation. As one Congressional staff member stated, "Given an active subcommittee chairman working in a specialized field with a staff of his own, the parent committee can do no more than change the grammar of a subcommittee report." This article deals with the reasons for the existence and growth of subcommittees, with the variety of ways in which they are organized, and with the issues and methods involved in their control. Conference committees are outside the scope of this study.

### I. THE GROWTH OF SUBCOMMITTEES

Observers have often deplored the proliferation of subcommittees, on the same general grounds that Wilson urged in his criticism of the committee system, both for their dispersion and for their irresponsible concentration of power. Their persistence and extension nevertheless testifies to a functional utility—their convenience and congeniality to the working habits and purposes of members. When the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the number and consolidated and rationalized the jurisdictions of the standing committees, the average number of subcommittees per committee—as might be expected—increased; and the trend has continued upward. In 1945 the count was 180; of these, 106 were in the House, 68 in the Senate, and 6 from joint committees.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The author is indebted to the Faculty Research Council of the University of Massachusetts for funds to support the study that made this article possible. Much of the information was gathered from interviews with members and staff connected with each House and Senate committee in 1960 and 1961.

<sup>2</sup> "Subcommittees of Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 9 (Feb., 1915), pp. 68–92. Congressman French (R., Idaho) later served on the naval appropriations subcommittee, and after retirement from the House taught political science at Miami University (Ohio).

By 1961 the number had grown rather more than one-third to a total of 253 of which 131 were in the House, 109 in the Senate and 13 from joint committees.<sup>4</sup> Senator Dirksen has described the problem this increase has caused for some Congressmen:

I would not dare to say to the people of Illinois that I knew all about all the things that go on, when I serve on five subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, on seven subcommittees of the Committee on the Judiciary, and on three subcommittees of the Committee on Government Operations. To do so I would really need roller skates to get from one subcommittee to another, without even then knowing entirely everything about every subject matter which is considered by the various committees.<sup>5</sup>

A blanket condemnation of the growth of subcommittees, however, is likely to ignore their uses. The most obvious of these is to cope with the growing and shifting specialization of legislative activities as the range and complication of governmental concerns extend to new frontiers. Some changes in the subcommittee structure plainly reflect congressional adjustments to such developments. Senate Banking and Currency, for example, dropped a subcommittee concerned with rents and created a new one on international finance. House Foreign Affairs recently divided its subcommittee on the Near East and Africa into two, and Senate Foreign Relations added one on disarmament. House Judiciary has added a subcommittee on civil rights and Senate Labor one on juvenile delinquency.

Again, some division of committee functions helps solve the ever-present problem of securing a quorum. A wisely worked out subcommittee system can also cut down the total amount of time each member is required to spend with the affairs of a given committee, and at the same time allow for a greater degree of specialization. Senator Robert LaFollette commented on this in 1948:

<sup>3</sup> Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, *The Organization of Congress*, Hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1945), p. 1039.

<sup>4</sup> *Congressional Record* (daily ed.), July 18, 1961, p. 11908.

<sup>5</sup> *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954), p. 1417.

The essential and important difference between a hodgepodge committee system and an integrated scheme is not in the relative number of subcommittees, but rather in the formalization of fixed and definite jurisdictions so that each new piece of legislation in a given field can have the benefit of the staff work and specialized experience of members of Congress.<sup>6</sup>

Further, subcommittees have often "been an outgrowth of internal friction and resentment generated by one-man rule."<sup>7</sup> They can, within limits, allow less senior legislators to gain prestige and to follow their interests and exploit their abilities as they could not in a seniority-governed committee system which tolerated no subcommittees. It is significant, for example, that Albert Rains has been able to establish a subcommittee on housing of the House Banking and Currency Committee, when all its other subcommittees are designated by numbers and given no clear jurisdiction. Other examples are John Moss's subcommittee on governmental information (Government Operations, House) and Henry Jackson's policy machinery subcommittee (Government Operations, Senate).

Whether committees are adapting to increasingly difficult times, providing for greater specialization or giving less senior men a position of greater importance, there comes a point of diminishing returns, and it would seem that Senator Dirksen had passed this point when he confessed his inability to keep up with events. This is largely a problem of the Senate and not of the House, for there are roughly one-quarter as many members to share in a task equal to that of the House of Representatives. An analysis of the number of subcommittee assignments per member in both houses shows that a Representative is likely to have two subcommittee assignments at the most, while a Senator is likely to have at least six.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, *Evaluation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946*, Hearings, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1948), p. 63.

<sup>7</sup> Stewart L. Udall, "A Defense of the Seniority System," *New York Times Magazine*, January 13, 1957, p. 64.

<sup>8</sup> In the 86th Congress, only a third of the House members had two standing committee assignments; the rest had one. Approximately half of the House committee members were assigned to only one subcommittee. In the Senate, however, one-third of the Senators had three committee assignments and the rest had two. Over half of the members of standing committees were assigned to three or more subcommittees.

TABLE I. COMMITTEES THAT HAVE RESISTED SUBCOMMITTEE AUTONOMY, 87TH CONGRESS\*

Type	Senate	House
No standing subcommittees	Finance	Rules Un-American Activities Ways and Means
Numbered subcommittees		Armed Services Banking and Currency District of Columbia
Full committee handles major share of work	Foreign Relations Government Operations	Foreign Affairs Post Office and Civil Service

\* The two space committees are too recently created and work in too changing a field to be included in this table. The Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences had no subcommittees in the 87th Congress, though some *ad hoc* subcommittees had been used previously. The House Committee on Science and Astronautics started its life without subcommittees, moved to number subcommittees without fixed jurisdiction and in 1961 established named subcommittees with fairly clear jurisdiction.

## II. SUBCOMMITTEE ORGANIZATION

There is a startling variety in the pattern of subcommittee organization. Some committees have no subcommittees at all; others a few, perhaps designated by number only and without clear jurisdiction; and some perform most of their important work in full committee, even though they have a well-defined subcommittee system. These committees are listed in Table I. Other committees establish a large number of subcommittees with clear jurisdiction and grant them wide autonomy. What determines whether a committee will subdivide its work or not?

When committee work involves a great deal of detail or when it includes a number of distinct subject matter areas, there is a tendency to form subcommittees, the more so if the work is technical and non-controversial, so that it matters less who handles which assignment; no one wants to be left out of a fight that matters to him. The business of the appropriations and judiciary committees involves so much burdensome detail that subcommittees are inevitable, even though some of the work is controversial. The relatively non-controversial committees concerned with administration, interior and public works (each a consolidation of a number of different committees brought together under the Legislative Reorganization Act) have such varied tasks to perform that they also inevitably work through subcommittees. On the other hand, committees are less likely to subdivide their work if it involves broad policy rather than great detail, or if it does not fall easily into categories that can be assigned to

regular subcommittees. The more controversial this work, the less likely it is to be consigned to subcommittee autonomy. The activities of the House Committee on Rules (which determines the conditions under which most major legislation reaches the floor) and on Un-American Activities (which is primarily an investigating committee) do not lend themselves to subcommittee organization, except, in the latter case, for the limited purpose of holding hearings. A somewhat better case could be made for the use of subcommittees on the two revenue-raising committees, yet they generally handle broad matters which senior members are reluctant to turn over to subcommittees.<sup>9</sup> While the foreign relations committees have carefully organized subcommittee systems for study purposes, because of the broad nature of their work, the major share of it is done by the full committee.

Beyond these limits deriving from the character of a committee's assigned tasks, organization reflects to a great extent the nature of the chairman—his personality, his political ideology and his concept of his role. No recent change of chairmen has illustrated this better than the succession of Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem to the top position on the House Committee on Education and Labor in the 87th Congress. His predecessor, Graham Barden of North Carolina, had succeeded in bottling up many liberal proposals in the eight years of his chairmanship. He formed only those subcommittees made necessary by the varied jurisdiction of his committee, and he saw that they were headed by trusted conservatives, passing over second-ranking Powell in the process. In 1961, Powell brought a burst of activity to the committee which was not expected by some observers, since he had not previously taken his committee work seriously. He followed a novel approach of creating three subcommittees on education and three on labor. Two of these six subcommittees were called "general," two "special" and two "select," but these titles meant nothing. By increasing the number of subcommittees he was able, without depriving existing subcommittee chairmen of their position, to find chairmanships for younger liberals

such as Edith Green, James Roosevelt and Frank Thompson, Jr., and he channelled much of President Kennedy's controversial social program to their subcommittees.

A conservative chairman will not generally want to see much development of subcommittees, especially if he heads one of the important control committees of Congress—House Rules, House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, House and Senate Appropriations. Tight conservative control of these five committees can thwart many legislative programs of the most liberal Congress. As has been noted, the work of the first three does not lend itself to subdivision, while the work on appropriations demands it. If it were physically possible to perform the burdensome work of the appropriations committees without subcommittees, one can be sure that conservative chairmen would do so. As it is, they have to content themselves with careful appointment of subcommittee chairmen. For a conservative chairman, perhaps the next best thing to having no subcommittees is to have numbered subcommittees without specified jurisdiction and to assign bills to them according to their responsiveness to his desires. All 87th Congress examples were in the House, and the chairmen were all Southern conservatives of the older generation: Carl Vinson of Georgia, chairman of Armed Services<sup>10</sup> and 77 at the beginning of the Congress; Brent Spence of Kentucky, chairman of Banking and Currency,<sup>11</sup> 86; and John McMillan of South Carolina, chairman of District of Columbia, 62.<sup>12</sup> Vinson works largely through *ad hoc* subcommittees established to handle specific pieces of legislation, an approach which has been characterized as "the chairman's secret weapon." Finally, the fact that the major part of the work of Senate Government Operations and House Post Office and Civil Service is performed by the full committee can be explained in part by the fact that both chairmen are Southern conservatives.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> This committee has not had subcommittees with clear jurisdiction since the Republican 80th Congress.

<sup>11</sup> One subcommittee on housing has considerable autonomy.

<sup>12</sup> Chairman McMillan did not abandon subcommittees with assigned jurisdiction until the 86th Congress.

<sup>13</sup> It should also be noted that Senate Government Operations is one of the smallest committees in the Senate and all members have two other committee assignments, so there is relatively little membership pressure for the creation of subcommittees.

<sup>9</sup> The House Ways and Means Committee has made use of *ad hoc* subcommittees but has not given them power to recommend legislation to the full committee. In the old days of tariff legislation, the majority members of this committee regularly caucused as a sort of subcommittee to mark up the bill, in order to develop a united front when the bill was reported. See E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York, 1935).

Not all chairmen resist the development of subcommittees. Some may subdivide committee work from a desire for greater committee democracy. Clare Engle, when he was chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, deliberately held his committee with a loose rein. He took a hand in drawing rules which provided for a unique degree of democratic participation in committee activities and a large measure of subcommittee autonomy. Or some may create subcommittees for some strategic reason. It may be a move to prevent a rebellion on the part of the members, which seems to have been the reason for the creation of some subcommittees on House Education and Labor by Chairman Barden; or it may be a desire to maintain friendly relations with outside groups. The chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reportedly found it advisable to divest himself of direct contact with the problems of the aging, for he wanted to remain on good terms with the American Medical Association. A subcommittee was created in the 86th Congress to handle this subject and it was given great autonomy. In the 87th Congress it was made a select committee of the Senate and thus divorced entirely from the Labor Committee.

Two other factors play a part in encouraging the creation of subcommittees, the large size of the House and the desire of outside groups for regular points of contact in Congress. There is certainly pressure for the establishment of subcommittees in the House, which acts as a counterbalance to the tendency of House chairmen to maintain more centralized control. There are more members looking for something to do, and more demands from them for some means of achieving public recognition. Secondly, both non-governmental pressure groups and government agencies find it to their advantage to have subcommittees, preferably with permanent staffs, with which they can work. As an example, both Judiciary subcommittees on immigration, one chaired by Representative Walter and the other by Senator Eastland, provide a point of contact for interests believing in a restrictive immigration policy. Liberal interests in the field have given strong support to Senator Philip Hart's special judiciary subcommittee to investigate problems connected with refugees and escapees.

Most subcommittees are organized to handle a specific functional problem of government such as agricultural production, Indian affairs, education, flood control or disarmament. Some committees, however, have experimented with different bases of organization. The House Agriculture Committee, for example, has two

sets of subcommittees, one concerned with broad agricultural problems such as farm production, and another with specific agricultural commodities. Some staff members prefer the former as a means of getting committee members to take a broader view of agricultural policy. Committee members themselves seem to prefer the commodity organization as a better means of representing their specific clientele interests.<sup>14</sup> It is significant that the commodity subcommittees generally win if there is a jurisdictional dispute between them and the functional subcommittees.

In another variation, both House and Senate foreign affairs committees have subcommittees organized on a geographical basis (Europe, Africa, etc.) as well as those organized to handle such functional problems as disarmament and national security. They are all called "consultative" subcommittees and they are used primarily as a means of liaison with the Department of State.<sup>15</sup> Legislative proposals are handled by the full committee or by *ad hoc* subcommittees, though recently the House committee has begun to assign some bills to the consultative subcommittees. This practice may lead to jurisdictional disputes as to whether a matter should be referred to a geographical or a problem subcommittee.

Subcommittee organization in the Senate is rarely identical with that of the parallel House committee. Where their jurisdiction falls into natural subdivisions, subcommittee organization is more likely to be similar. The Interior committees are examples; incidentally, they are the only committees to have maintained almost the same subcommittee organization since the 80th Congress. The two committees on Government Operations, on the other hand, have a far more vague jurisdiction, encompassing the entire field of government. Their subcommittees tend far more to reflect the interests of the chairmen and individual members.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Charles O. Jones found that, with three exceptions, members of the House Agriculture Committee in the 85th Congress served on subcommittees which dealt with commodities produced in their districts. "Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee," *this REVIEW*, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), p. 358.

<sup>15</sup> The activity of these consultative subcommittees varies greatly with each chairman. Senator John F. Kennedy's African affairs subcommittee, for example, was largely inactive because its chairman found other demands on his time more pressing.

<sup>16</sup> In the 86th Congress, the House Committee on Government Operations had these subcom-

Even though the House and Senate Interior Committees have an almost identical subcommittee pattern, this fact does not seem to lend impetus to bicameral subcommittee cooperation. In fact, there is very little cooperation between House and Senate subcommittees. A questionnaire sent to all committees produced only four examples of joint subcommittee hearings held in recent years: the District of Columbia committees on tax problems, government operations committees on intergovernmental relations, the judiciary committees on the Immigration Act of 1952 and the public works committees on Niagara power. Six sets of committees on Niagara power. But six sets of parallel committees reported fairly close staff cooperation along subcommittee lines.<sup>17</sup>

### III. CONTROL OF SUBCOMMITTEES

Neither the House nor the Senate maintains any kind of detailed control over subcommittee organization. This may seem surprising, for subcommittee recommendations often become the law of the land without suffering major changes in the full committee or in the entire Congress. It is in keeping, however, with the general pattern of committee autonomy and the lack of any very effective party discipline.

The rules of the House and Senate do specify certain procedures which must be followed by subcommittees. For example, all subcommittee hearings, with certain stated exceptions, are to be open, and a subcommittee quorum may not be less than one-third of the membership save at a meeting for the purpose of taking testimony.<sup>18</sup> Laxity in matters of procedural fairness has raised civil liberties issues from time to time in the course of subcommittee investigating activities, particularly when contempt penalties are invoked. An extensive literature deals with this topic, which is outside the scope of the present study.

The parent house has occasionally called for the establishment of specific subcommittees or instructed certain subcommittees to carry out a

designated task, but the overwhelmingly prevalent practice is to leave these decisions to the committees.<sup>19</sup> The parent house may also specifically call for a subcommittee report to be made directly to the floor without the intervening approval of the full committee.<sup>20</sup> Again, however, practice overwhelmingly dictates that the full committee approve and submit subcommittee reports. The major house control is that of granting additional funds for subcommittee staff and expenses beyond the ten positions (four professional and six clerical) automatically allowed each committee by the Legislative Reorganization Act. Committees, however, are rarely denied their requested budgets.

The most effective controls over subcommittees lie clearly in the hands of the individual committees. Whether these controls are exercised by a dominant senior minority of the membership or by a majority of the full committee varies from one committee to the next. There is likely to be a tug of war between the chairman, often joined by other senior members, and the junior members. The latter may attempt to win greater control because they do not agree with the policies of the senior members, because they are impatient with committee inactivity on a particular topic, or even because they seek the publicity that can come from a skillfully timed subcommittee investigation. Chairmen are generally fearful of letting too much power slip into the hands of members. Many chairmen are painfully aware that a subcommittee, especially an investigating subcommittee, can capture the limelight and severely limit the freedom of action of the parent committee. A subcommittee tail, in other words, has more than once wagged a committee dog.<sup>21</sup> Often, though by no means always, chairmen are conservatives reluctant to share power with their more liberal junior colleagues. Again, a chairman may hold out against delegating subcommittee powers to individual committee members because he lacks confidence in their competence or readiness to discharge committee duties adequately.

In this struggle, the chairman deals from a stacked deck. He should be able to maintain

mittees: executive and legislative reorganization, military operations, government activities, intergovernmental relations, foreign operations, and monetary affairs; the Senate Committees had: investigations, reorganization and international organizations, and national policy machinery.

<sup>17</sup> Committees concerned with appropriations, armed services, District of Columbia, foreign affairs, judiciary and labor.

<sup>18</sup> See section 133 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, P.L. 601, 79th Cong., 2d sess.; House Rule XI; Senate Rule XXV.

<sup>19</sup> Charles L. Watkins and Floyd M. Riddick, *Senate Procedure* S. Doc. 93, 85th Cong., 1st sess. 1958), p. 156 and Asher Hinds, *Precedents of the House* (Washington, 1907), Vol. III, sec. 1754.

<sup>20</sup> *Senate Procedure*, p. 529 and *Precedents of the House*, Vol. IV, sec. 4551.

<sup>21</sup> For a fascinating example see Bernard Schwartz, *The Professor and the Commissions* (New York, 1959).

control even against rank-and-file rebellion, unless he is politically inept. He can, in most cases, establish subcommittees, determine their size, establish party ratios, appoint the members, maintain *ex officio* membership, control the referral of bills and either assign or hold back staff and money for subcommittee operations.

The power of a chairman to establish subcommittees has been challenged in the courts on the ground that a competent tribunal must be created by resolution of the full committee. A federal Court of Appeals, however, stated that "it is the unvarying practice of the Senate to follow the method of creating and appointing subcommittees which was employed in this instance."<sup>22</sup> This allows the chairman primary control over subcommittee structure. As already noted, he may allow no subcommittees, work primarily by means of *ad hoc* subcommittees, create standing subcommittees but give them numbers and assign them no continuing jurisdiction, or he may establish standing subcommittees with clearly outlined jurisdiction and some degree of autonomy.

Subcommittee members are chosen by a variety of methods, depending upon custom and individual committee rules. They may be designated by the chairman alone or in consultation with the ranking minority member. Appointments may be designed to punish slackers or to punish enemies and reward friends. Often senior members will be appointed to more subcommittees than junior members, as a means of preventing the newer men from gaining too much control—or introducing their apprenticeships gradually, as a chairman might prefer to put it. Membership approval of appointments is not required on a majority of committees. Those interested in limiting the powers of committee-chairmen often advocate rules that subcommittee chairmen be chosen on the basis of seniority, so as to remove an element of discretion, and hence influence, on the part of chairmen. The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs is the only one which has such a provision written into its rules, but the pattern evidently is widely followed. One of the major reasons for this is that senior members are often unwilling to sit under junior subcommittee chairmen in the seniority-conscious Congress. In the 86th Congress eighteen House committees had subcommittees and in half of these no senior member of the majority party

had been by-passed in the choice of subcommittee chairmen.<sup>23</sup> In the Senate, five of the fourteen subdivided committees followed seniority.<sup>24</sup> Interestingly, in the less party-oriented Senate, two Republicans were allowed subcommittee chairmanships in the Democratic 86th Congress. J. Glenn Beall of Maryland was chairman of the business and commerce subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia and George D. Aiken of Vermont, of the Canadian affairs subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. In both these cases, the geographical proximity of the senator's constituents to the subject matter of his subcommittee's jurisdiction gave him a special interest (and prerogative?) in the assignment, there being no Democratic senator from either Maryland or Vermont.<sup>25</sup>

Party ratios on subcommittees may also be controlled by the chairmen, since the full house exercises no control here. The full committee is less likely to reverse the decisions of large subcommittees, especially with a safe majority party margin. Yet sometimes a small subcommittee can serve a chairman's needs, for he may be helped by absenteeism in the minority party. The ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Armed Services asked, unsuccessfully, at its organization meeting in 1961 that the party ratio on the special investigations subcommittee be raised from three-to-two to four-to-three, so that "at least two members

---

subcommittee chairmanship on the committees on Agriculture, Appropriations, District of Columbia, Education and Labor, Government Operations, Judiciary, Post Office and Civil Service, Science and Astronautics, and Ways and Means. Neither the Rules nor the Un-American Activities committees have subcommittees.

<sup>24</sup> One or more of the senior members did *not* have a subcommittee chairmanship on the committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, Government Operations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Judiciary, and Rules and Administration. Neither Aeronautical and Space Sciences nor the Finance committee had subcommittees. District of Columbia and Foreign Relations each had one Republican subcommittee chairman.

<sup>25</sup> Prior to the 84th Congress, the Judiciary Committee had a reciprocity custom, after a change in party control, of giving the previous chairman of the full committee a subcommittee chairmanship. Senator Wiley was chairman of patents in the 81st and 82d Congresses. Senator McCarran was chairman of judicial machinery in the 83d Congress.

<sup>22</sup> *Meyers v. United States*, 171 F (2d) 800 (1948).

<sup>23</sup> One or more senior members did *not* hold a



could be present most of the time."<sup>26</sup> Occasional complaints reach the stage of floor debate, as in 1951 when Clare E. Hoffman called for a resolution instructing the chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations to divide subcommittee membership between Democrats and Republicans "in as near as possible the same ratio that exists in the House" instead of using this device to "punish members who voted against his pet idea of the way appropriations bills should be handled."<sup>27</sup> A survey of subcommittee ratios during the 86th Congress shows little uniformity. Both houses had roughly two-to-one party ratios, and yet only six Senate subcommittees and no House subcommittees had ratios less favorable to the minority party than two-to-one, and the great majority were more favorably divided.<sup>28</sup>

Chairmen and ranking minority members often retain *ex officio* membership on all subcommittees. While this may not mean that these committee leaders attend regularly, it is another means of exerting control if a need is felt. The rules of ten of the twenty House committees give *ex officio* membership to both chairman and ranking member, while in the case of Armed Services and Judiciary, only the chairman is automatically a member. There is no provision for *ex officio* membership by ranking minority members in the Senate, but the chairman is made a member in five of the sixteen committees.

The less automatic the referral of legislative matters to subcommittees, the greater the chairman's powers. In three House committees in the 86th Congress, for example (Armed Services, Banking and Currency and District of Columbia), subcommittees had no clear field of jurisdiction and referral was entirely at the discretion of the chairman. Other committee chairmen have used this device from time to time in the past. Charles Wolverton, Republican chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce during the 80th Congress (1947-1948) reportedly abolished subcommittee specialization because he was in basic disagreement with some of his senior Republican colleagues. Even the timing of referral can be a means of exerting the chair-

man's power. Lister Hill of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee does not refer important legislative matters until he has done careful preparatory groundwork, whereas in many committees, referral is handled by the clerk in a routine fashion.

Chairmen are also in a position to control committee staff assignments. Most prefer to rotate staff members and not have them permanently assigned to a subcommittee. If a subcommittee can call a permanent staff its own it has taken a major step toward independence from the full committee. In the 86th Congress a total of sixteen subcommittees (a sixth of the total) had their own staff. These were subcommittees of Banking and Currency, Government Operations, Judiciary and Public Works. In the Senate, as might be expected, there was evidence of greater subcommittee autonomy. Forty-one—roughly half of the 86 subcommittees—had their assigned permanent staff. These were subcommittees of Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Government Operations, Interior and Insular Affairs, Judiciary, Labor and Public Welfare and Rules and Administration.<sup>29</sup> The quality of subcommittee staff varies greatly. Particularly on the Senate Judiciary Committee—and despite the admonitions to the contrary in the Legislative Reorganization Act—positions are used as patronage appointments for various subcommittee members, and this practice generally results in inefficiency of operation. Some newer members of this Committee carefully refrain from asking to have their men taken on the staffs so that they will not have to reciprocate when they have a subcommittee of their own.

Chairmen can make skillful use of the allocation of funds to subcommittees. A subcommittee appropriation with few strings attached allows great freedom in the hiring of staff and other subcommittee activities. Also, the allocation of travel funds can be used effectively to reward and punish members.

Finally, a chairman may, in the case of investigating subcommittees, withhold or restrict the subpoena power. Bernard Schwartz, recounting his experiences as staff man for the legislative oversight subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, spoke to this point:

If Moulder [the subcommittee chairman] and I were given the subpoena power and the authority to secure a competent, loyal staff, we would

<sup>26</sup> House Committee on Armed Services, "The Organization of the House Committee on Armed Services," Committee print, Feb. 16, 1961, p. 9.

<sup>27</sup> *Congressional Record*, 82d Cong. 1st sess. (1951), p. 1174.

<sup>28</sup> The Senate exceptions are Appropriations subcommittees for commerce, interior and treasury; Judiciary's subcommittees on patents, codification and constitutional rights.

<sup>29</sup> This information has been gathered from House and Senate telephone directories, legislative calendars of the various committees and interviews with staff members of the 36 committees.



have obtained the very tools we needed to undertake a thorough probe which no one could control.<sup>30</sup>

Taking all these factors into consideration, the Senate Finance Committee is the most centralized committee in Congress. It has no standing subcommittees whatsoever. Its budget is one of the lowest. In the 87th Congress the Committee had a staff of six, only one of whom was carried as a professional. While supposedly it uses the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, some of the less senior members on Finance claim that this staff is readily available only to the three top majority and two top minority members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means committees who make up the membership of the Joint Committee.<sup>31</sup> There is much dissatisfaction with the situation among those members of the Committee who disagree with Chairman Byrd's ultra-conservative views, but there are not enough of them to wrest control.

By all odds, the House Committee on Government Operations is the most decentralized committee in Congress. During Clare Hoffman's chairmanship in the 83d Congress, committee members not only mutinied, but even more unusual, they discussed the whole affair at some length on the floor of the House.<sup>32</sup> Representative Hoffman attempted to cut down on the activities of his standing subcommittees. He made great use of *ad hoc* subcommittees consisting of two Republicans and one Democrat, appointed Democrats without consulting the ranking minority member on the Committee, and in at least one instance evidently failed to notify the ranking Democrat of such a subcommittee's creation. These *ad hoc* subcommittees, according to the charges of the majority, conducted field investigations timed to influence local elections. Rebellion finally

took place on July 15, 1953, when members voted 23 to 1 (6 members abstaining) to prohibit further creation of *ad hoc* subcommittees save by resolution of the full committee. They further voted to grant virtual autonomy to the five existing standing subcommittees, giving each the power to appoint staff members and to fix their pay, to subpoena witnesses and to hold hearings outside Washington. Throughout that Congress subcommittee chairmen signed their own expense vouchers. Even in defeat, however, Hoffman retained his powers to refer bills to subcommittees, and to approve the printing of subcommittee hearings and reports; and he used these to harass the rest of the committee members.<sup>33</sup>

Hoffman's successor, Democratic chairman William L. Dawson, a Negro from Chicago, has encountered no rebellion of this sort; he has also been either unwilling or unable or unambitious to centralize committee control greatly since the 83d Congress. As a result, subcommittees have large permanent staffs and sizeable budgets. They are housed often at some distance from the Committee headquarters, and they issue their own press releases and carry on their own mailing operations.

How is it possible to find in Congress such extremes of centralization and decentralization? Part of the answer lies in the differences between the two committees. The Senate Finance Committee has a fairly clear jurisdiction, and one that is not easy to parcel out among subcommittees. House Government Operations, on the other hand, has a broad, vague jurisdiction, and its work lends itself to subdivision. Further, the subject matter of Finance is far more important than that of Government Operations, and the conservative coalition in Congress seems determined to keep control of this committee in its own hands. Another part of the answer lies in the differing personalities of the two chairmen. Byrd is an accomplished politician who has done many favors and won many allies. He is sensitive to human relations and knows how to loosen his reins of control a little when he senses incipient rebellion. Hoffman, on the other hand, is a lone operator who had few legislative friends and had alienated President Eisenhower at the time of the 1953 revolt. He even failed to win the support of other committee chairmen with his floor comments on the episode, which were

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

<sup>31</sup> It has been claimed that the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation is a device for keeping staff services from the more liberal, less senior members of the two revenue committees. This seems most applicable to the newer members of the Senate Finance Committee. Junior members of House Ways and Means say that they can get all the assistance they need from the Ways and Means staff which is three times as large as that of Finance. It may well be true that liberal members would not receive congenial staff assistance from any of the staff members of the three committees involved.

<sup>32</sup> *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), pp. 9092-9097, 9103-9107, 9242-9254, 10352-10363.

<sup>33</sup> Reportedly, it took great pressure from President Eisenhower to get chairman Hoffman to refer to subcommittees the proposals to establish the Second Hoover Commission and the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

clearly calculated to bring them to his side:

There is nothing unusual in the desire of subcommittee chairmen to increase their authority, to be free agents, to give jobs to an unlimited number of employees, or to hold hearings in this country or elsewhere, wherever fancy or reason might create a desire. . . . Once let this desire prevail and no chairman of any committee of the House will be able to stem the drive for authority and the House itself will be without control over the activities of its members.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), p. 9094. In a brief interview granted the author on August 19, 1960, Congressman Hoff-

This "drive for authority" will continue to express itself in the subcommittee structure, though only rarely in as extreme a form as he confronted. Subcommittees allow greater specialization in the legislative branch in an era which puts a premium on specialization. They also give a flexibility to the seniority system, by allowing less senior committee members to play effective legislative roles. These advantages and the gradual coming to power of younger, more organization-minded chairmen must inevitably cut into the degree of centralized control maintained by such old-time chairmen as Harry Byrd and Carl Vinson.

---

man would only comment that the whole affair was the work of national labor leaders.

## QUASI-PARTISAN CONFLICT IN A ONE-PARTY LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM: THE FLORIDA SENATE, 1947-1961\*

MALCOLM B. PARSONS  
*The Florida State University*

A standard approach to American politics, national, state, or local, distinguishes the two-party and one-party systems, with a range of modifications in between.<sup>1</sup> Florida has long been described as a one-party state, part of the "solid south." Since Reconstruction days, and until very recently, the Republican party there has had virtually no state and local organization, virtually no public office seekers nor office holders, virtually no registered voters, and virtually no supporters at the polls. In recent years this state of affairs has been in perceptible change. Traditionally Democratic Florida went Republican in the last three presidential elections. Indeed, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman are the only Democratic presidential nominees to have won Florida's electoral support since 1924. In the past decade there has been a marked increase in registered Republican voters, in Republican candidates and votes for them; and the state and local Republican organizations have expanded and otherwise appeared to be viable. These political changes seem to be related to other changes—industrialization, urbanization, growing wealth and a population explosion whose principal cause has been immigration from other states, mostly northern.

Yet Florida congressional, state and local politics, with few exceptions, remain essentially the politics of a one-party state in the sense that holding offices at these governmental levels is virtually monopolized by the Democratic party, and in the sense that when competition for them occurs it still occurs predominantly within the Democratic party. It is a matter for speculation, beyond the scope of this study, why the two-party breakthrough has succeeded in, and has so far been chiefly confined to, presidential elections. But it is a matter for investigation, and the subject of this study, how far intra-Democratic state factional divisions conform to the workings of a two-party system. It remains to be seen whether this factionalism

is related to emergent Republicanism in an evolutionary or causal sense.

It is assumed in this paper that the political system in Florida is in transition; that the attitudes, beliefs and preferences of a substantial number of Florida citizens find inadequate accommodation and expression within the national, state, and local components of the traditionally predominant single party. It is further assumed that these aspects of change in the Florida political system are reflected in the operations of the state's one-party legislature.

### I. HYPOTHESIS AND METHOD

This paper reports an investigation of the Florida Senate, 1947-1961, designed to test the following hypothesis: *that there is a pattern of conflict within the one-party dominance of the Florida Senate, displayed on such issues as the control of its presidency and committees and in its divisions on controversial roll call votes, that approximates the operations of a two-party system; and that this pattern occurs along a line of opposition between constituencies of continued Democratic dominance in the face of social change and emergent Republicanism, and Democratic constituencies that lack any strong semblance of either.*<sup>2</sup>

There are many studies of legislative behavior in two-party settings.<sup>3</sup> The principal

<sup>2</sup> The hypothesis is related to the suggestion of the Committee on American Legislatures of the American Political Science Association in 1954, that in states lacking a strong two-party system "factionalism . . . may have much the same effect. . . ." Belle Zeller (ed.), *American State Legislatures* (New York, 1954), p. 192.

<sup>3</sup> The seminal study of party and legislation is A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," *Annual Report of the American Historical Society for the Year 1901*, Vol. I (1902), p. 319 ff. In the Congress, see Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), and David Truman's case study, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959). In state legislatures, see William J. Keefe, "Party Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly," *Northwestern Univ. L. Rev.*, Vol. 47 (March 1952), p. 55 ff., and "Parties, Partisanship, and Public Policy in the Pennsylvania Legislature," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June

\* This investigation was supported in part by the Research Council and the Institute of Governmental Research, both of the Florida State University.

<sup>1</sup> See Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June 1954), p. 477 ff.

difference in the Florida setting is the traditional one-party system.<sup>4</sup> This study is of the Florida Senate rather than the House of Representatives, or both, because of the nearer monopoly of the Democratic party in the Senate;<sup>5</sup> because only senators are chosen from single-member districts; because the Senate with longer terms and fewer members is regarded as having the greater influence; and because of the economy of effort in dealing with one rather than both.

To test the hypothesis in this study, the Florida senatorial districts were classified with respect to three equally weighted variables: (1) the degree of population growth, 1950-1960; (2) the degree of Republican presidential voting strength, 1950-1960; and (3) the degree of Republican gubernatorial voting strength, 1960. It was assumed that cleavages in the legislative behavior of nominally Democratic senators could be correlated with the differences thus identified in their constituencies. A crude Index of Change ranging from 1 to 4 was used to differentiate each senatorial district on the basis of its mean position on all of the three variables, as follows:

Variable 1—Degree of population growth, 1950-1960

- 1=less than 68% of the state's rate of growth
- 2=68% to 99% of the state's rate of growth

1954), p. 450 ff.; Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," *id.*, Vol. 46 (December 1952), p. 1046 ff.; Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," *id.*, Vol. 49 (September 1955), p. 773 ff.; David R. Derge, "Urban-Rural Conflict: The Case in Illinois," in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 218 ff.; Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," *Western Pol. Q.*, Vol. 14 (June 1961), p. 473 ff.

<sup>4</sup> For a study in a one-party setting see Murray C. Havens, *City versus Farm? Urban-Rural Conflict in the Alabama Legislature* (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1957); however it has certain methodological weaknesses which are identified and discussed by Derge, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>5</sup> From 1947-1961, only one Republican has served in the 38-member Senate, and only in the sessions since the 1952 elections. He has been elected from the single-county Pinellas district (St. Petersburg).

3=100% to 149% of the state's rate of growth

4=150% and more of the state's rate of growth

Variable 2—Republican presidential voting strength, 1950-1960

- 1=Democratic in all three presidential elections
- 2=Republican in one presidential election
- 3=Republican in two presidential elections
- 4=Republican in all three presidential elections

Variable 3—Republican gubernatorial voting strength, 1960

- 1=less than 15% of the gubernatorial vote Republican
- 2=15% to 29% of the gubernatorial vote Republican
- 3=30% to 44% of the gubernatorial vote Republican
- 4=45% or more of the gubernatorial vote Republican

For example, the 30th senatorial district (the Ft. Lauderdale area), ranked four on each of the three variables for a mean Index of Change of four. The 2d senatorial district (the Pensacola area), ranked two on the first, one on the second, and two on the third variable for a mean Index of Change of 1.6.

In applying this procedure to the thirty-eight senatorial districts and mapping the results (see Map), it was apparent that the alignment might be made sectional by drawing a nearly diagonal line to bisect the peninsula, leaving twenty-three districts in the northern section, and fifteen in the southern section. Each of the twenty-three northern districts had an Index of Change of 2.3 or less:

- 2.3— 2 districts
- 2.0— 4 "
- 1.6— 3 "
- 1.3— 2 "
- 1.0—12 "

The mean index of these districts was 1.35. With one exception, each of the fifteen southern districts had an Index of Change of 2.6 or more:

- 2.3—1 district(s)
- 2.6—1 "
- 3.0—3 "
- 3.3—4 "
- 3.6—2 "
- 4.0—4 "

The mean index of the southern districts was 3.35. The one exception was an interior district, included in the southern section only for the purpose of geographical symmetry, or simplicity. The twenty-three Democratic northern senators come from districts of scant (if any) population growth and stable Democratic presidential and gubernatorial voting behavior. The fifteen southern senators, with the single exception noted, come from districts of heavy population growth and increasingly significant Republican presidential and gubernatorial voting behavior, though all but one of them are nominally Democrats.

This alignment is not what has been traditionally called urban-rural conflict, although it has some of those characteristics.<sup>6</sup> Following Friedman, constituencies with cities of 50,000 and more population may be classed as urban; constituencies with cities 15,000 to 50,000, as mixed; and constituencies with cities under 15,000 in population, as rural.<sup>7</sup> On this basis, using 1960 census data, the twenty-three northern senators come from two urban, six mixed, and fifteen rural districts; the fifteen southern senators come from ten urban, three mixed, and two rural districts. Two of the state's eight standard metropolitan areas are in the north, six are in the south.

Key has demonstrated that "The cleavage between metropolitan residents and rural and small town dwellers has become a most significant foundation for dual systems of state politics."<sup>8</sup> This study in the Florida setting views the situation from a somewhat different conceptual perspective. As Friedman has said:

conflicts which superficially may be described as setting urban areas against rural areas are more satisfactorily explained in terms of conflict among social, economic, and cultural interests which have incidentally been associated with urban and rural areas, at least in the past.<sup>9</sup>

The hypothesis was tested by seeing to what extent the north-south sectional alignment was actually reflected in the operations of the

<sup>6</sup> V. O. Key, Jr., for example, perceived "an imperfect sort of sectionalism" in Florida, but noted that "the political differences between the two areas are not ordinary sectionalism; they are in fact rural-urban differences." *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949), p. 92.

<sup>7</sup> Robert S. Friedman, "The Urban-Rural Conflict Revisited," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (June 1961), p. 481 ff.

<sup>8</sup> V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York, 1956), pp. 229-230.

<sup>9</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 485.

Florida senate during the period 1947-1961. This period was used because its beginning marked the inception of the present senatorial apportionment and because it coincided with the period of recent political and population change. In this study those who control the senate were defined as those who regularly held its presidency, its key committee chairmanships, membership on its key committees, and who regularly prevailed in controversial roll-call votes. To the extent that sectional alignment provided an accurate perspective for viewing the senate, one would expect the data to show control in the hands of the numerically larger group of northern senators, with the smaller group of southern senators cast in a minority role.

## II. FINDINGS: CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENCY

The President of the Senate has customarily been chosen by a caucus of the members at the beginning of the biennial session two years before the one in which he was to hold the position. For some time it was the practice to restrict the caucus to the holdover senators, *i.e.*, that half of the total number whose terms ran two years beyond the immediate past election. Since 1957 the entire membership has participated—with the exception of the single Republican, as this is a Democratic party caucus.

Of main concern in this study were two powers of the President: his power to appoint members of committees and designate their chairmen, and his power to refer bills to committees.<sup>10</sup> An important use of the latter is multiple referral, *i.e.*, referral of a bill to two or more committees, which increases the difficulty of getting measures to the floor and facilitates killing them.

All presidents during the eight sessions 1947-1961, as well as the president-designate for the 1963 session, were from constituencies in the northern section of the state.<sup>11</sup> (See Table I.)

<sup>10</sup> Two other features of the office may be noted. Florida has no Lieutenant Governor; the President succeeds to the Governorship when it becomes vacant. This feature of the office has been prominent since Senate President Charley Johns succeeded to the Governorship in 1953 upon the death of Governor Dan McCarty. And after the 1961 legislative session, Senate President W. Randolph Hodges was appointed by the Governor to be state Conservation Director. He did not resign as Senate President; under an Attorney General's opinion he is expected to occupy both posts until another Senate President is named in the 1963 session.

<sup>11</sup> In 1955 a senator from the southern section, Harry King, was designated to serve as President

In the preceding nine sessions, 1929-1945, there had been four presidents from the northern section and five from the southern section. A total of nine presidencies had been held by senators from the southern section during the 19 biennia from 1907 to 1945.


### III. FINDINGS: CONTROL OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMANSHIPS AND MEMBERSHIPS

From 1947 to 1961 the Florida Senate worked with 38-40 standing committees per session,

of the 1957 session. He never served, however, as he resigned from the senate to stand trial and conviction on charges of bribing a Representative from his county not to oppose him in the 1956 Democratic senatorial primary.

TABLE I. FLORIDA SENATE PRESIDENTS AND THEIR HOME DISTRICTS, 1947-1963

Session	President	City	District Index of Change
1947	Clarke	Monticello	1
1949	Brackin	Crestview	1.3
1951	Sturgis	Ocala	2
1953	Johns	Starke	1
1955	Davis	Madison	1
1957	Shands	Gainesville	2.3
1959	Johnson	Quincy	1
1961	Hodges	Cedar Key	1
1963	Carraway	Tallahassee	1.6



Sectional Alignment of Florida Senatorial Districts, Based on an Index of Change, 1950-1960.

TABLE II. THE TEN MOST AND THE TEN LEAST IMPORTANT COMMITTEES OF THE FLORIDA SENATE WITH NORTH-SOUTH SECTIONAL\* CORRELATES OF THEIR CHAIRMANSHIPS AND MEMBERSHIPS, 1947-1961

Average Value on Scale of Importance†	Committee	Chairmanship Rate %	Membership Rate %
4.0	Appropriations	87.5 North	70 North
4.0	Finance and Taxation	100 North	63 North
3.94	Rules and Calendar	62.5 North	74 North
3.73	Constitutional Amendments and Governmental Reorganization	92 North	70 North
3.52	Education	50 North-South	58 North
2.89	Welfare	62.5 North	70 North
2.78	Roads	62.5 North	73 North
2.68	Judiciary "A"	50 North-South	50 North-South
2.31	Miscellaneous	62.5 North	54 North
2.31	Judiciary "C"	87.5 North	73 North
1.31	Oil and Natural Resources	62.5 South	53 South
1.26	County Organizations	50 North-South	50 North-South
1.23	Building and Loan Associations	60 South	57 South
1.22	Transportation	62.5 South	52 North
1.15	Pensions and Claims	62.5 South	63 North
1.10	Legislative Management and Population	64 North	74 North
1.10	Industrial and Atomic Energy	66.6 South	52 South
1.0	Publicity and Advertising	50 North-South	54 South
1.0	Corporations	62.5 South	54 South
.68	Veterans Affairs, Radio and TV	50 North-South	52 North

\* See Map. Perfect correspondence with the sectional distribution of senate seats would show proportions of 60.5 North and 39.5 South on all Committees.

† Rated 0-4 in terms of power, influence, and prestige on questionnaire returned by 76% of a panel of experienced members of the Florida press.

each of the 38 senators holding at least one chairmanship. For my purposes, therefore, it was necessary to determine objectively the relative importance of the committees. To this end, they were ranked on the basis of the collective judgment of a panel of experts, consisting of twenty-five members of the press having extensive experience in reporting sessions of the Florida Legislature.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> A questionnaire was mailed to each. The standing committees of the Senate were listed beside a scale of five possible judgments as to their importance: most, much, some, little, and least. Each member of the panel was asked to use this scale to appraise the committees in terms of power, influence and prestige. There was 76 per cent return, and the responses were tabulated on the basis of 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 points for each designation of a committee corresponding to the adjectives on the scale. The values were averaged for each committee, and the committees were ranked accordingly.

There was some manifestation of northern dominance of the chairmanships of the ten most important committees, and southern dominance of the chairmanships of the ten least important committees over the entire period, 1947-1961. (See Table II.) Yet for these twenty committees and eight sessions the sectional pattern did not seem to be statistically significant:  $\chi^2$  for the array was 12.40, d.f.=1, and  $p < .005$ ; the  $\phi$  coefficient of contingency = .03. However, for these twenty committees in the four most recent sessions, 1955-1961, statistical significance of the sectional pattern was more convincing:  $\chi^2 = 16.64$ , d.f.=1, and  $p < .005$ ;  $\phi = .46$ . Restricting the analysis to the five most and the five least important committees over the entire period, 1947-1961, statistical significance of the sectional pattern improved:  $\chi^2 = 19.06$ , d.f.=1,  $p < .005$ ;  $\phi = .51$ . And using only these ten committees and only the four most recent sessions, 1955-1961, the correlation was highly significant:  $\chi^2 = 18.04$ , d.f.=1,  $p < .005$ ;  $\phi = .71$ . The sectional pattern, then,

TABLE III. COMPARATIVE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SUPPORT FOR THE MAJORITY ON CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS, REGULAR SESSIONS OF 1949 AND 1957, FLORIDA SENATE

Index of Support for Majority	1949		1957	
	North No. %	South No. %	North No. %	South No. %
High (67-100)	8 35	10 67	14 61	0 0
Intermediate (51-66)	6 26	1 6	8 35	4 27
Low (50 and below)	9 39	4 27	1 4	11 73
Totals	23 100	15 100	23 100	15 100

operated in control of committee chairmanships most notably in the period 1955-1961, with northern senators dominating the chairmanships of the most important committees, and southern senators dominating the chairmanships of the least important committees.

Committee membership showed substantially the same pattern. (See Table II.) The statistical operations were not performed for membership, though, because the data showed a majority of northern members on all of the most important committees during most of the sessions and because of the long-settled practice of chairmen controlling their committees by casting proxy votes, a practice influenced by the large number of committees, multiple committee membership, and the pressure of legislative work in the sixty days of a biennial session.

#### IV. FINDINGS: SECTIONAL DIVISIONS ON CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS

An overwhelming majority of roll calls in the Florida Senate are perfunctory and unanimous. This reflects the traditional way of handling local bills, and the function of committees in compromising or killing controversial general legislative proposals before they reach the floor. Nevertheless, a sizeable number of divisions occur at roll call on matters of general legislation. In this study a roll call was defined as controversial if the majority comprised less than 70 per cent of those present and voting. There were 666 such roll calls during the period 1947-1961, the number per regular 60-day session ranging from 49 to 88.

A number of techniques were used to test the hypothesis with respect to roll-call voting behavior. The first was an Index of Support for the Majority, computed for each senator as the ratio of the number of times he voted with the winning majority to the total number of controversial roll-calls in a given session.<sup>13</sup> The

computations were mapped so as to show constituencies of high (67-100), intermediate (51-66), or low (50 and below) Indexes of Support for the Majority, and the resultant patterns were compared with the sectional alignment. A map was prepared for each of the eleven regular and special sessions, 1947-1961. None of the support patterns for the five sessions, 1947-1953, was even roughly comparable to the sectional pattern of the model. All of the support patterns for the six sessions, 1955-1961, were strongly similar to the sectional pattern of the model. Comparison of two representative sessions (see Table III) indicated that, for 1949, senators from the northern districts were distributed by approximate thirds among the high, intermediate, and low support categories; whereas two-thirds of the senators from the southern districts were high, somewhat less than one-third low, and the single remaining senator intermediate. In the 1957 session three-fifths of the northern senators were in the high category, more than one-third intermediate, and the one remaining senator low. In marked contrast, approximately three-fourths of the southern senators were low, and the balance intermediate. For the 1949 distribution, with the high and intermediate categories consolidated,  $\chi^2 = .49$ , d.f. = 1, and  $p > .10$ ; the  $\phi$  coefficient of contingency = .01. However, for the 1957 distribution, with the high and intermediate categories consolidated, the statistical significance of the sectional pattern was convincing:  $\chi^2 = 18.19$ , d.f. = 1,  $p < .001$ , and  $\phi = .69$ .

Additional techniques with respect to roll-call voting behavior were applied to sessions in

tion of degree of participation with the majority, whereas the Shapley-Shubik Power Index relates also to the function of the size of the majority. See L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (September 1954), p. 787 ff.

<sup>13</sup> This index is simpler than the Shapley-Shubik Power Index as it relates only to the func-



TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF COHESION INDEXES FOR NORTHERN SENATORS BY SUBJECTS OF CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS, 1955-1961 REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Subject of Controversy	Total No. of Roll Calls	Number of Roll Calls Northern Senators' Cohesion			Per Cent of Roll Calls with High and Intermediate Cohesion (%)
		High (71-100)	Intermediate (41-70)	Low (Below 40)	
1. Legislative Reapportionment	35	20	13	2	94.3
2. Congressional Redistricting	5	1	3	3	80
3. Legislative Management	4	2	1	1	75
4. Miscellaneous	4	0	3	1	75
5. Race Relations	16	8	4	4	75
6. Constitutional Revision	15	8	3	4	73.3
7. Political Processes	7	4	0	3	57
8. Agriculture and Conservation	7	1	2	4	42.8
9. Regulation of Business	80	16	15	49	38.7
10. Education	13	3	2	8	38.5
11. Finance and Taxation	34	1	11	22	35.3
12. Codes and Judicial Processes	40	1	5	34	15
13. Roads and Highway Safety	24	1	2	21	12.5
14. Health and Welfare	21	0	2	19	9.5
Totals	305	66	66	173	Ave. 43.2%

the period 1955-1961, when the sectional alignment could be observed to be operating. These techniques were designed to test the cohesion of the northern and southern groups and the extent of inter-group conflict on controversial roll calls, which were classified according to subject. The Rice Index of Cohesion was used to test the unity of the total membership of a group.<sup>14</sup> The extent of inter-group conflict was measured initially by percentages of the total number of northern and southern senators op-

posing one another, and then more rigorously through the use of the Rice Index of Likeness<sup>15</sup> and the chi square test of the null hypothesis.

There were 305 controversial roll calls in the Florida Senate, 1955-1961. The twenty-three northern senators maintained high (71-100) or intermediate (41-70) cohesion on 43.2 per cent of them. (See Table IV.) The fifteen southern senators maintained high or intermediate cohesion on 50.1 per cent of these roll calls.<sup>16</sup> (See Table V.) The tables show the smaller southern group to be more cohesive than the larger northern group, but both groups maintained significant cohesion on a large number of roll calls and through a wide range of subjects of controversy covering, in the judgment of the writer, every important kind of issue that confronted the Senate.<sup>17</sup> It is not surprising that

<sup>14</sup> Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), p. 207 ff. Relative tests of cohesion have also been used, which reflect the percentage of a group voting on a particular roll call. The principal limitation of such relative tests is that in operation they tend to an elastic definition of the group under scrutiny, by assuming for purposes of measurement that it only comprises those of its members who vote on a given roll call. For example, if 50 per cent of a group voted "aye" and the remainder abstained from voting, a relative measure would show perfect cohesion of those voting, but the Rice Index would show a complete lack of cohesion for the entire group. The problem that each measure deals with, in its own way, is that of construing the significance of the non-voter. In this study the Rice Index was used precisely because it assumes that members of a defined group who do not vote on a roll call contribute to the group's lack of cohesion.

<sup>15</sup> Stuart Rice, *loc. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Two southern seats and one northern seat deviated consistently from the patterns of sectional alignment on controversial roll calls. The rural northern seat from the St. Augustine district sided consistently with the southerners, while the southern seats from the urban Fort Myers and rural Kissimmee districts sided consistently with the northerners.

<sup>17</sup> A detailed analysis of different policy preferences is in preparation. Here it is only intended to suggest the range of subjects through which group conflict and cohesion may be traced. The 305 controversial roll calls, 1955-1961, were grouped

TABLE V. DISTRIBUTION OF COHESION INDEXES FOR SOUTHERN SENATORS BY SUBJECTS OF CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS, 1955-1961 REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Subject of Controversy	Total No. of Roll Calls	Number of Roll Calls Southern Senators' Cohesion			Per Cent of Roll Calls with High and Intermediate Cohesion (%)
		High (71-100)	Intermediate (41-70)	Low (Below 40)	
1. Legislative Reapportionment	35	24	10	1	97.1
2. Health and Welfare	21	14	4	3	85.7
3. Miscellaneous	4	1	2	1	75
4. Race Relations	16	4	8	4	75
5. Political Processes	7	0	5	2	71.4
6. Constitutional Revision	15	9	0	6	60
7. Agriculture and Conservation	7	1	2	4	42.8
8. Regulation of Business	80	10	24	46	42.5
9. Roads and Highway Safety	24	4	6	14	41.6
10. Congressional Redistricting	5	1	1	3	40
11. Education	13	3	1	9	30.7
12. Codes and Judicial Processes	40	3	9	28	30
13. Legislative Management	4	1	0	3	25
14. Finance and Taxation	34	3	3	28	17.6
Totals	305	78	75	152	Ave. 50.1%

into the following thirteen categories (there was an additional "miscellaneous" catch-all) with an example of the kind of issue placed in each: (1) Agriculture and Conservation—establishing marketing standards for navel oranges; (2) Codes and Judicial Processes—abolishing the defense of entrapment in prosecutions for bribery; (3) Congressional Redistricting—providing for twelve congressional districts based on the 1960 census; (4) Constitutional Revision—authorizing the Legislative Council to prepare a revision of the state constitution; (5) Education—providing a chancellor over the presidents of the state universities; (6) Finance and Taxation—requiring consideration of specified factors other than full cash value in assessing the value of property for tax purposes; (7) Health and Welfare—authorizing cities to set and enforce minimum housing standards for human habitations; (8) Legislative Management—amending the rules to provide for open committee meetings; (9) Legislative Reapportionment—proposing changes in the number of legislative seats and reapportioning on that basis; (10) Political Processes—exempting non-state-wide candidates from the requirement of reporting campaign contributions and expenditures; (11) Race Relations—providing for referendum to close racially desegregated schools; (12) Regulation of Business—providing for minimum retail price-fixing for alcoholic beverages; (13) Roads and Highway Safety—establishing a South Florida Turnpike Authority.

both groups maintained the most consistently high cohesion on questions of legislative reapportionment which directly affected their standing in the Senate. The ranking of controversial subjects by the per cent of roll calls with high and intermediate cohesion is similar for both groups—i.e., cohesion on one side evoked cohesion on the other. With the exception of Congressional Redistricting, Legislative Management, and Health and Welfare, no subject's rank on the northern list is as much as eight positions removed on the southern list; three subjects (Legislative Reapportionment, Constitutional Revision, and Codes and Judi-

TABLE VI. PER CENT OF SOUTHERN SENATORS OPPOSING NORTHERN SENATORS ON CONTROVERSIAL ROLL CALLS ON WHICH AT LEAST 60% OF NORTHERN SENATORS VOTED TOGETHER, 1955-1961 REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Per Cent of Southern Senators Opposing North- ern Senators	Number of Roll Calls—Per Cent of Northern Senators Voting Together				
	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-100	Total
90-100	0	0	6	1	7
80-89	1	15	23	16	55
70-79	5	6	12	5	28
60-69	12	19	12	9	52
50-59	5	5	3	0	13
Below 50	27	14	1	0	42
Totals	50	59	57	31	197

cial Processes) occupy identical positions on both lists; and five subjects are only one position apart.

One measure of the variable intensity of inter-group conflict is indicated in Table VI. These data show that from 1955-1961 at least 30 per cent of the northern senators voted together on 197 controversial roll calls—*i.e.*, on nearly two-thirds of the total of 305 controversial roll calls during that period. Further, on 142 (over three-fourths) of these 197 roll calls in which at least 60 per cent of the northern senators voted together, they were opposed by at least 60 per cent of the southern senators. On only 42 (just over one-fifth) of the 197 roll calls did less than one-half of the southern group oppose the northern. Of the total of 305 controversial roll calls, then, 155 (fully half) were marked by identifiable degrees of inter-group conflict.

The data in Table VII represent a refinement of the concept of inter-group conflict through use of the Rice Index of Likeness and the chi square test to offset the possibilities for random occurrence of the distributions. Table VII shows that 132 (not quite half) of the 305 controversial roll calls, 1955-1961, were characterized by significant north-south conflict. North

won 84 per cent and south 16 per cent of these contests. Sixty-one per cent of all roll calls were won with high cohesion, and 39 per cent with intermediate. The contested roll calls ranged through all thirteen subject-matter categories. In each category, north won 75 per cent or more of all north-south conflict roll calls except on Legislative Management, Roads and Highway Safety, Health and Welfare.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS

The data tend to support the hypothesis. During the period 1955-1961, in particular, there has been a quite stable, cohesive bifactionalism in the one-party Florida Senate. It has been consistently demonstrated with reference to control of the Presidency and the committee system. It has characterized divisions on controversial roll calls about half the time, significantly more often than Democratic-Republican cleavage has characterized roll-call divisions in recent sessions of the two-party United States Congress.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> "The Democratic and Republican parties took clearly opposing positions on only 115, or 36 per cent, of the 320 roll-call votes in 1961. . . . The analysis, new this year, examined only those votes

TABLE VII. DISTRIBUTION OF SIGNIFICANT NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT\* ROLL CALLS, BY SUBJECT, WON WITH SPECIFIED COHESION,† RANKED BY PER CENT NORTH WON, 1955-1961  
REGULAR AND SPECIAL SESSIONS, FLORIDA SENATE

Subject of Controversy	Number of North- South Conflict Roll Calls	Won by									
		North		South		North when Voting with:		South when Voting with:			
						High Cohesion (71-100)	Intermediate Cohesion (41-70)	High Cohesion (71-100)	Intermediate Cohesion (41-70)		
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
1. Codes and Judicial Processes	4	4	100			1	25	3	75		
2. Congressional Redistricting	4	4	100			1	25	3	75		
3. Political Processes	4	4	100			4	100				
4. Legislative Reapportionment	35	33	94	2	6	18	51	15	43	1	3
5. Constitutional Revision	11	10	91	1	9	8	73	2	18	1	9
6. Finance and Taxation	10	9	90	1	10	1	10	8	80	1	10
7. Regulation of Business	31	26	84	5	16	16	52	10	32	4	13
8. Race Relations	15	12	80	3	20	8	53	4	27	2	13
9. Education	5	4	80	1	20	4	80			1	20
10. Agriculture and Conservation	4	3	75	1	25	1	25	2	50	1	25
11. Legislative Management	2	1	50	1	50	1	50			1	50
12. Roads and Highway Safety	4	1	25	3	75			1	25	3	75
13. Health and Welfare	3			3	100					2	67
Totals	132	111	84	21	16	63	48	48	36	17	13
										4	3

\* Significant North-South Conflict Roll Calls are those in which the Index of North-South Likeness is less than 60, and according to the chi square test the probability of a random distribution is not greater than .01.

† A Significant North-South Conflict Roll Call won by Northern Senators is one in which the majority winning the roll call comprises a majority of Northern but not Southern Senators; such a roll call won by Southern Senators is one in which the majority winning the roll call comprises a majority of Southern but not Northern Senators.

The alignment so manifested in the Florida Senate has paralleled to a significant degree a sectional alignment of the constituencies. The majority faction has corresponded to those relatively unchanged districts of north Florida where little if any threat to the traditional political monopoly of the Democratic party is perceptible. The minority faction has corresponded to those Democratic constituencies of south Florida that are involved in emergent Republicanism and concomitant population growth, social and economic change.

This kind of sectional alignment, then, pro-

---

on which a majority of voting Northern Democrats and a majority of voting Southern Democrats took the same position, and were opposed by a majority of Republicans." *Congressional Quarterly*, Vol. 19, Weekly Report No. 47 (Nov. 24, 1961).

vides a useful, if limited, way of describing and analyzing certain aspects of conflict within a nominal one-party system. Other aspects would require other techniques. Further, even though there is an impressive correspondence between this kind of sectional alignment and certain aspects of the system, it must not be inferred that the only cues in legislative behavior are related to this cluster of attributes. The attitudes, preferences, perceptions and interactions of legislators, apart from constituency influences, provide other sorts of cues.

In the period 1947-1961, quasi-partisan sectional conflict, and with it, cohesive factions, developed in the one-party Florida Senate. Whether this or something like it will continue in the years ahead, or whether the system will develop in a *bona fide* two-party direction, depends on causal relationships that are still obscure.

# GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: A STATISTICAL NOTE ABOUT AMERICAN CITIES

JOHN H. KESSEL  
*University of Washington*

The commission plan and the city manager plan—new forms of city government launched during the early years of this century—were both devised in response to local circumstances, but were soon being heralded as improvements over the then universal mayor-council system. Enthusiasts for both of these new governmental structures claimed many advantages for them. The hopes for the city manager plan seem to have been somewhat better founded, but the passage of time has shown that both plans had limitations which the reformers did not foresee.

Almost all of the early discussion about the relative merits of the three plans neglected the role of political environment. Proponents of the different systems deduced their arguments from "the principles" on which the plans were based. A three-year study of the actual operation of manager government in the late 1930s called attention to the importance of varying local conditions. "The tremendous variety of local political conditions and administrative habits apparent in the fifty cities covered by this survey," the authors concluded, "makes it impossible to [give general answers to] many questions about the city manager plan."<sup>1</sup>

A more explicit concern with the effects of the political environment was shown in two important papers published in the early 1950s.<sup>2</sup> Specific questions were raised about the affinity between the city manager system and medium-size cities, and the apparent fact that the manager plan was more frequently adopted by cities which were either growing or declining in size. The authors also noted the concentration of manager adoptions in one-party states, and suggested that this plan had a depressing effect on the level of party activity. And they thought it significant that business groups generally supported introduction of the manager system while labor often opposed it.

1960 census data show that the city manager

<sup>1</sup> Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 258.

<sup>2</sup> Wallace S. Sayre, "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities," *Public Administration Review*, 1954, pp. 253-258; and Inter-University Summer Seminar on Political Behavior, "Research in Political Behavior," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December 1952), pp. 1003-1032.




FIGURE 1. Governmental Form and Community Size




FIGURE 2. Governmental Form and City Growth Rate, 1950-60

form now has been adopted by a majority of the medium-size cities. Though the majority is a bare one, 1960 is the first census year which has found the city manager plan the most common in any size-class of cities. The mayor-council system continues to dominate in the very large cities and in the small towns. The distribution of the three plans in cities between 250,000 and 500,000 and in those between 10,000 and 25,000 is very close to that which would occur normally. Therefore it is now possible to speak of three significant groups of cities in this context with dividing lines slightly above 250,000 and slightly below 25,000.

The failure of large cities to abandon the mayor-council plan has been much discussed in the literature. The most common explanation is that the political environment is so complex—there are so many competing interests—that a premium is placed on political leadership which can arbitrate the contest for the stakes of power in the city, and be held responsible by the electorate for its success or failure in doing so. Less has been done in analyzing the politics of the small towns. It would be consistent with our knowledge of small communities to argue that a well defined structure of socio-economic power, and widely shared norms of behavior, are usually decisive elements in the political environment of a small town. The “natives” ordinarily are well aware of the nature of this power structure and the content of these norms. Thus a local resident would probably reach decisions which would accord with local folk-

ways in most situations, and wait for a “sense of the community” to crystallize when a novel problem came along. A city manager who accepted his cues about correct behavior from outside professional sources would be much more likely to act so as to upset the social equilibrium or violate certain local norms.

These speculations about the dominance of the mayor-council form in large cities and small towns are consistent with each other. They could be summarized by stating that a frankly political form of government is often found where there are interests which must be deferred to, or whose claims must be arbitrated, before a policy decision is made. This would imply that when the reverse is true, that when there is no one who can claim deference, or when there is a single dominant group which is disposed to cooperate with the policy maker, then viable conditions exist for a professional administrator. The question is simply whether negotiating skill or professional expertise is more important in any given situation. We have reason to suspect that political aptitudes are necessary in a small town or big city. In the medium-size city, therefore, we should look for conditions which do not call for a special talent for judicious compromise, but which do present problems beyond a layman's grasp, that can be analyzed by one with a manager's technical training.

It is possible to test these hypotheses, at least in a preliminary fashion, by inspecting certain characteristics of the medium-size

cities. (Note in Figure 1, that the frequencies of use of each of the three plans are almost constant for this group of cities.) Figure 2 shows a very strong relationship between the growth rate of these communities and the structure of their governments. There is a high probability that a rapidly growing community will have adopted the city manager system. The mayor-council form is closely associated with cities having relatively stable populations. And the commission form, in the single category in which it appears to be related to the political environment, is found with striking frequency in cities which lost population in the last decade.

These findings modify earlier speculation that the manager plan is associated with growth or decline in population, but are compatible with our ideas about the political and administrative conditions appropriate to each system. A rapidly growing city faces many administrative problems in the course of providing the streets, sewers, and other services required by the expanding population. Since so many new people are arriving the political patterns tend to be rather amorphous. A professional administrator is less likely to face organized opposition. In cities with stable populations, on the other hand, political pressures are apt to be well defined and persistent. Solutions to novel problems are not called for so often as the ability to appease long-standing rivalries. This situation would call for the political responsiveness of the mayor-council system. The concentration of commission governments in declining cities is also of interest. Unless these cities *want* to reduce their populations, it would seem that the commissioners are unable to respond to difficult conditions or that the influential persons in these communities lack the ability to initiate a switch to another form of government.

The states having the highest percentages of medium-size cities with manager plans are Virginia, North Carolina, California, Texas, and Florida. States with marked concentrations of mayor-council cities in the 25,000-to-250,000 range are Indiana, Connecticut, and Ohio. The manager cities, as has been noted frequently, are either in one-party states or in states in which the formal party organization is rather weak. The mayor-council cities are more often found in competitive two-party states. This, in itself, is an insufficient basis for concluding that the introduction of the manager plan depresses party activity. Competitive two-party systems, after all, were not to be found in Virginia, North Carolina, California, Texas, or Florida before the spread of the

manager system. But the survival of strong party organizations in Connecticut, Indiana, and Ohio is suggestive. If we are correct in assuming that the mayor-council system flourishes best in environments which require political skills, then it would follow that these same skills could contribute to vigorous party organizations.

Another way of testing our hypotheses is to look for the presence of some group in the community which would be especially dependent on political activity because of its exclusion from alternative agencies of community integration. We therefore computed the percentage of foreign-born in the population over twenty-one for each city which had a population between 25,000 and 250,000 in 1950.<sup>3</sup> This percentage was chosen to isolate within the potential electorate a group which had arrived too recently for successful assimilation. As Figure 3 shows, the higher the percentage of foreign born in a city, the more likely it is that the city will have a mayor-council form of government. The city manager plan, on the other hand, has been adopted most often by cities composed almost entirely of native-born residents.

We see here an association between the mayor-council form of government and the presence of a sizeable group which lacks social and economic opportunity. Newcomers are rarely offered invitations to long-established men's clubs or seats on the board of directors of a leading bank. As they lack opportunity to express their opinions through social and economic channels, they must voice them through political institutions if they are to be heard at all. And it is precisely in the communities where there is such a need for political opportunities for community participation that the mayor-council form has been most frequently retained. We also see that the manager plan has been adopted most frequently when most of the residents grew up in an American culture. It is possible that the values in such a community would be not only homogeneous, but would also correspond to those of a professional manager.

If we turn from the ethnic composition of the

<sup>3</sup> These data, and those on the percentage of the labor force in a given occupational category, were not available for 1960 at the time this study was made. Therefore we are dealing with a different, and smaller, group of cities. The reader will also note some minor differences in the number of medium-size cities between Figures 1 and 2 and between Figures 3 and 4. These are caused by variations in the availability of data.




FIGURE 3. Governmental Form and Minority Groups: Percentage of over 21 Foreign Born in the City Population




FIGURE 4. Governmental Form and Economic Base: Incidence of Three Systems in Different Types of Cities



city to its economic organization, we can do more than simply infer the existence of an important group whose values correspond to those of a professional manager. An analysis of the governmental forms used by cities having differing economic characteristics can be derived from Howard J. Nelson's "Service Classification" of cities.<sup>4</sup> Nelson computed the mean percentage of the labor force engaged in given occupations in some eight hundred and ninety-seven urbanized areas. He then calculated the standard deviation from each of these means. He was thereby able to classify a city as, for example, "manufacturing" if the percentage of the labor force so engaged was more than one standard deviation above the mean percentage employed in manufacturing in all urbanized areas. In the case of manufacturing, to continue the same example, his calculations led to the conclusion that at least 43.1 per cent of the work force should be employed in manufacturing for an urban area to be so classified. Similar calculations enabled him to identify unusual concentrations of the labor force in personal service, retail trade, finance, the professions, public administration, wholesale trade, transportation, and mining. If an urbanized area had no unusual concentration of the labor force in any of these categories, Nelson designated it a diversified area.

Figure 4 indicates a decreasing use of the manager plan by medium-size cities if they are arranged in this order: personal service, retail, finance, professional, public administration, wholesale, transportation, diversified, manufacturing. This is suggestive for three reasons. First of all, this ranking seems to be directly related to the size of the area within which business is conducted. In the four "manager-type" classifications—personal service, retail, finance, and professional—there exist significant concentrations of businessmen whose principal market is to be found within and immediately around their own city. Diversified cities, by definition, lack any abnormal concentration of businessmen, and the industrialists in manufacturing cities are likely to be concerned with regional and national markets. A second reason for the suggestiveness of this ranking is the

probability that a retail store or an establishment rendering some kind of personal service will be locally owned. A factory, on the other hand, is much more likely to be owned by stockholders and to have its main offices in some distant commercial center. Thus we see that the manager cities tend to have concentrations of local businessmen whose interests are directly related to their own communities. The mayor-council cities either lack such concentrations of businessmen, in the case of the diversified cities, or are neglected by absentee owners who are often preoccupied with national affairs. It is not implausible to assume that the small businessmen in the manager cities supply the consensus which enables the manager to concentrate on administrative problems.

A third implication of this economic classification concerns the nature of the labor force employed in these occupations. The white collar employees in retail stores and financial establishments, to say nothing of the professionals, are prone to regard themselves as self-sufficient. Industrial laborers, on the other hand, are likely to suffer the same kinds of socio-economic handicaps mentioned earlier in connection with ethnic groups. They need political channels for expression, channels which the mayor-council system is more likely to provide.

There are, of course, limits to this kind of statistical analysis. The most important is that the whole argument rests on an assumption that, given the adoptions and abandonments of the past fifty years, each governmental form will be most frequently found in that environment which is congenial to it. There are many reasons for the adoption of one system or another which have little to do with the suitability of the political environment. State laws may encourage one form and prohibit another. Local interests may advocate a different plan from the one they have, simply because they perceive some tactical advantage in changing the ground rules in their favor. A community often imitates the legal structure favored in a neighboring city. A small town frequently lacks the budget to hire a manager. And inertia often causes the retention of a governmental system long after it has ceased to function effectively.

The reader must judge for himself whether this evidence is sufficient to support the hypotheses which have been suggested. But whether we have correctly identified certain linkages between the political environment and governmental structure or not, it should be clear that some sorts of linkages do exist. We should sweep away the lingering traces of dis-

<sup>4</sup> Howard J. Nelson, "A Service Classification of American Cities," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 31 (July, 1955), pp. 180-210. This classification was similar to the "functional classification" of the *Municipal Year Book* except that the latter is based on arbitrary cutting points. The functional classification did not permit identification of any correspondence between economic organization and governmental form.

ciplinary parochialism which still contaminate the study of urban affairs. A few students of public administration still hold that a given form of government is intrinsically superior to any other. Some latter-day Marxists still insist that industrial captains exercise the real power in any community. And certain sociologists would have us believe that "upper-upper" families are able to manipulate affairs because of their status and prestige. If the data we have reviewed are valid, then none of

these arguments are correct. Neither a study of organization charts nor an identification of socio-economic elites is, in itself, a sufficient explanation of urban politics. Neither the formal structure nor the political environment is independent of the other. Studies of legal form and political setting must take into account the influence of the one on the other. Only in this way will we be able to unravel the puzzle of the relationships between them.

# "RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT," SEPARATED POWERS, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS: AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA<sup>1</sup>

J. ROLAND PENNOCK  
*Swarthmore College*

Political scientists today are more cautious than they used to be about comparing forms of government and evaluating their virtues. Moreover, in such comparisons as we do make, we rightly lay more stress on party systems and even more informal aspects of government than on constitutional forms. Yet much of what is said by way of comparing and evaluating the disciplined and programmatic type of political party with the American type carries an undertone of the old arguments. Virtues once attributed to the British style of Parliamentary government, honorifically tagged "responsible government," are now associated with "party government," while the evils earlier (and still) attributed to the separation of powers are now frequently laid at the door of a weak party system. To be sure, many who criticize the American constitutional and political arrangements for irresponsibility make no claim that the British system is superior.<sup>2</sup> Yet when a committee of leading political scientists studied the operation of our party system, its recommendations were based upon the conviction that disciplined and programmatic political parties, after the English model, should be our ideal.<sup>3</sup> It therefore still seems worthwhile to gain all the knowledge and insight we can about the operation of such a system in its native habitat and to compare its

operation with our own political and constitutional system.

The view of the British system of government—both formal and informal—that has gained for it the designation "responsible government" may be briefly summarized. The system simplifies the alternatives placed before the electorate. It energizes and activates public opinion. Responsibility for public policy is centralized, clearly located, and easily subjected to popular control. Beyond this point the theory, seldom articulated, seems to be that the Government, with the benefit of its synoptic view of the public scene, will seek majority support by acting in the general interest. (In this way, the dubious concept of rule by "a majority" enters into the theory.) Conversely, special interests, particularly those associated with "pressure groups," are less able to secure a definition of the public interest on their own terms. Since pressure groups frequently are interested in legislation requiring the expenditure of public funds, more or less directly for their benefit, this aspect of the British system might be expected to manifest itself especially in connection with such expenditures. The inability of Parliament to vote funds in excess of the budget, and the well known device of Treasury control, as well as the disciplined and programmed nature of political parties, all seem to support this expectation. There are, to be sure, other advantages believed to flow from these features of British government, such as a more rational, coherent, and self-consistent legislative product; but the present article will be confined to the question of vulnerability to demands of special interests for subsidization.

The major objective of this essay is to apply to this problem the findings of a comparative study of the politics of agricultural subsidies and price supports in Britain and America during the postwar period.<sup>4</sup> The general method followed is to combine empirical data from the case study with *a priori* arguments in such a way as to contribute both to the appreciation

<sup>1</sup> The basic research from which the materials for this article were drawn was made possible by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, for whose award the writer is deeply grateful. He is also indebted to Professor Charles E. Gilbert for helpful criticism and suggestions.

<sup>2</sup> See for example, James M. Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York, 1949) and Stephen K. Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York, 1950).

<sup>3</sup> "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," Supplement to this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950). For a more recent statement of a similar point of view and for a plea for an outright scrapping of the separation of powers in this country in favor of cabinet government as essential to responsible democracy, see Howard J. McMurray, "The Responsible Majority—Some Reflections on Political Parties," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (June, 1958), pp. 175-182.

<sup>4</sup> For the most part the study was confined to the first decade following the Second World War, although in a few instances materials have been drawn from later years.

of the arguments and to their evaluation. The case material has two aspects, each of which has importance in itself and also gains support from the other. First, there are the substantive results. Political scientists, for understandable reasons, are inclined to focus largely upon governmental processes; yet surely the results—in terms of public policy, however formulated, adopted and executed—are normally of primary importance. It is true that effectuated policies tend to elude objective evaluation. In this case, however, the policy results—in pounds and dollars—are objective enough, though hard to isolate for measurement. To be sure, there are other difficulties, with which, as we proceed, we shall have to cope as best we may. Are the situations truly comparable?—a problem with almost any comparative study. Are variations in results properly attributable to specifiable aspects of the political process? At this point the second aspect of the study—its procedural side—becomes significant. Analysis of process, of the steps leading up to the results, may be useful not only for its own sake but also by adding to or subtracting from the plausibility of the conclusions suggested by the substantive comparisons. In other words, if we identify a difference in results not clearly growing out of differences in the situations, and if we also identify phenomena on the procedural side that might lead to such a difference in results and in a given instance provide every evidence of having done so, we are better off in our search for understanding than we would be if we confined ourselves to investigation of either results or processes alone.

In point of fact, the substantive comparison gives no support to the view that parliamentary government, British style, has any special immunity to group pressure.<sup>5</sup> If anything, it appears that the balance is tilted in the opposite direction. From 1954 to 1961, Britain subsidized her farmers, by most tests, much more heavily than did the United States. For the benefit of a relatively much smaller percentage of the population, British farm subsidies during that period were absorbing nearly three times as large a share of the gross national product as the American. (The detailed figures, using various bases of comparison, together with a discussion of technical and other difficulties in making the comparison, are set forth in the Appendix.) Moreover, the economic position of

British farmers, as compared to the rest of the population, has improved tremendously over the prewar situation—far more than in the United States, where the relative standings are apparently about the same.<sup>6</sup> And more to the point, this relative gain on the part of British farmers appears to be entirely attributable to the subsidy, which in fact constituted roughly two-thirds of their net income.

But, it might be argued, there may be good reasons, quite apart from group pressure, why the British should support agriculture more heavily than we do. There is no simple, conclusive answer to this. Nevertheless the writer has carefully examined the justifications advanced in each country for subsidization, to try to gain some sense of whether they are more powerful in Britain than here. Most of the arguments, like the claimed sociological advantages of the small, family farm, are equally valid or invalid for the two countries. Two arguments, however, the validity of which is debated by the experts, apply uniquely to Britain. They are the strategic argument—that British agriculture must be kept in good fettle so that production can be quickly expanded in the event of war and blockade—and the balance of payments argument—that an expanded agriculture minimizes the drain on foreign exchange for the purchase of feedstuffs. The first of these is not

<sup>5</sup> Between 1938 and 1957 national income in the United Kingdom increased by 266 per cent, while farming net income increased by 461 per cent. On a *per capita* basis, national income increased approximately 237 per cent, while farming net income went up by 475 per cent (for persons engaged in agriculture). In the United States, contrasting 1957 with the 1935–39 average, the total net income of the farm population from farming sources increased by 141 per cent (150 per cent from *all* sources), and their *per capita* income from farm sources rose by 215 per cent (from *all* sources 285 per cent), while the personal income of all persons was increasing by 285 per cent, on a *per capita* basis. In other words, in the United States, the average income from farming failed to keep pace with that of the rest of the population, while in the United Kingdom the farm population advanced at about double the rate of the country as a whole. (Calculations are based on figures from the *Annual Abstract of Statistics* [1958] and the “Annual Review and Determination of Guarantees, 1958” [Cmd. 390], for the United Kingdom; and, for the United States, from *The Farm Income Situation*, No. 169, July, 1958, United States Department of Agriculture, and the *Economic Report of the President*, January, 1962.)

<sup>6</sup> Note that in selecting British government for this study, we are taking the example and type of parliamentary government that should, according to orthodox theory, present the sharpest contrast to the presidential system.

seriously regarded by most of the experts<sup>7</sup> but it undoubtedly possesses a considerable (though probably declining) appeal to the populace at large, inclining the electorate more favorably to agricultural subsidies than they otherwise would be. To what degree the relatively high subsidies are attributable to this factor it is impossible to ascertain. The second uniquely British argument, that of the balance of trade, being more technical, has more appeal in Government circles than with the citizenry. Yet it seems unlikely that the Government has been greatly moved by this argument, although on one occasion they used it as an excuse for setting supports at a higher level than could otherwise be justified.<sup>8</sup>

One other general difference in the agricultural situations of the two countries may be relevant. In the United States, farming is considerably more diversified and a far larger proportion of total farm output consists of feed-stuffs—grain, etc., fed to hogs, cattle and poultry—and of agricultural products not destined for consumption as food—cotton, tobacco, soybeans for industrial uses, etc.—than in Britain. In the one case, one farmer's price is another farmer's cost, and in both cases the purchasers are not consumers, nor even

wholesalers distributing to consumer markets, but rather industrial processors, large commercial organizations and the like. So it may be that conflicts of interests among farmers reduce their political and bargaining strength. And if it is thought that the large buyers to whom these products are sold are better able to assert their interest in lower prices than are unorganized consumers or the suppliers who cater directly to consumer markets, then it might be supposed that the combination of forces working to limit farm subsidies would be relatively stronger in the United States than in Britain. But this is an oversimplified picture, blurring the market effects of farm co-ops, chain store processors, etc., and the political effects of federalism, a bicameral Congress and rural over-representation. There are too many factors to disentangle here, and their net effect in combination is not clear.

It might plausibly be argued that the difference in support levels is to be accounted for neither by governmental systems nor by different felt needs, but by the effectiveness of farm organizations. Most British farmers are members of the National Farmers Union of England and Wales, or the N.F.U. of Scotland. For purposes of representing farmers at Price Reviews (negotiations with the Government for subsidies) and similar occasions, the Unions act as one. There are also commodity groups and regional differences within the national unions that occasionally give the N.F.U. national headquarters a hard time. Nonetheless the degree of bargaining and pressure group unity they maintain is remarkable. American farmers have no such monolithic organization. Many are unorganized. The others are members, often duplicating members, of numerous commodity groups and of certain general purpose farm organizations, of which the American Farm Bureau Federation—with a claimed membership of 1,591,777 farm families out of a total of 5,382,162 farms in 1953—is the largest. Farm Bureau membership is drawn most heavily from the corn-hog area of Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, and from the South. Its political orientation is conservative. The National Grange, with under a million members, is the second largest general farm organization, while the National Farmers Union, with perhaps 200,000 members during the period in question, heavily concentrated in Colorado, Minnesota and the Dakotas, represents a more militant and politically liberal group.

To what extent this difference in the pressure group organization in the two countries qualifies any conclusions that might be drawn from the comparison it is difficult to say. The

<sup>7</sup> They reason (1) that stockpiling can probably meet the challenge of a blockade, especially in view of the probability that a major war in the future will not be extended over many years, and (2) that in any case continuing dependence on foreign sources for food supplies is the best means of assuring the maintenance of a large merchant marine, which in the past has proved invaluable in the event of attempted blockade.

<sup>8</sup> My justification for this statement is partly that government economists themselves, in private conversation, lay little stress on this argument and freely admit that subsidies should be lowered; and partly it is that economists generally, even agricultural economists, are divided on the validity of the argument, with the weight of opinion perhaps on the side of doubting it. Austin Robinson has argued the case for subsidies to save foreign exchange; see "The Problem of Living Within Our Foreign Exchange," *The Three Banks Review*, March, 1954, pp. 3-19. Other economists have disputed his interpretation and contend that, if anything, the balance of payments argument calls for limitation of agricultural subsidies; see Derek T. Healey, "Increased Agriculture or Increased Exports?," *Westminster Bank Review*, May, 1955, pp. 10-12, and Colin Clark, "Britain's Dependence Upon Agricultural Imports," *loc. cit.*, November, 1956 pp. 9-11.

tendency toward monolithic social, economic and political structures that pervades English life manifests itself in two mutually contradictory ways, however, as far as it is relevant to our present concern. It tends to produce strong, centralized political parties and it also facilitates the formation of strong pressure groups, each representing virtually the whole of the interests affected. Here, it might be argued, we have a stand-off. The homogeneity of the country produces strong pressure groups and it also produces strong parties, the better to withstand the pressure groups. The homogeneity of the pressure groups may itself owe something to the concentration of power in British government.

Although we might leave the matter here, it is perhaps desirable to comment on the sharp policy division between the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union.<sup>9</sup> It is by no means clear that this division of forces weakened the pressures for subsidy. A single, all-inclusive organization is not necessarily more aggressive because of its unity; it must find a program that can win the support of most of its members. A smaller, regional organization, heavily representative of one or two commodities, can be more radical. Was even the Farm Bureau less aggressive in support of agriculture than the N.F.U. in Britain? Both organizations in practice recognized the necessity for some retreat from the wartime levels of subsidies or price supports, yet both wished to preserve the bulk of their wartime relative gains. In the United States, however, the Farmers Union was unwilling to make this concession. Inasmuch as this country, unlike Britain, had at least one organization fighting for a more radical and ex-

pensive program than featured the war time experience, it might as plausibly be argued that any difference between the two countries with respect to pressure groups would lead one to anticipate a higher rather than a lower rate of government support for farming in the United States.

So much for the substantive comparison. The end result of agricultural politics in the two countries has been to produce heavier subsidization (in one form or another) in Britain than in the United States, instead of the reverse, which orthodox theory would lead us to anticipate. We have briefly canvassed two out of three possible sets of factors that might lead to this result: the needs or justifications and the organization of interests most directly affected. On balance, it appears doubtful that there is enough here to account for the difference in results, although one can certainly not be dogmatic on the point. At the very least, the substantive comparison suggests the need for examining the matter procedurally—that is, for looking at the processes by which key decisions were made in the two countries and asking whether or not they give support to the standard propositions about the two forms of government.

If the electoral alternatives are kept simple, the man in the voting booth can understand them and wield his power effectively, and anything that strengthens the political effectiveness of the voter-at-large tends to weaken the special interests—so runs the argument. How do the two forms of government stack up in this regard? In one sense there can be no doubt whatever that the British form wins hands down by this test, for at election time there is but one question for the voter to answer—is he for the Government or against it?—with the further possibility that he may have one additional choice if he is against it. There is no question of splitting his ticket. But if we are considering a particular subject, such as agricultural subsidies, the realistic question is whether there is any alternative at all. Since the Second World War there have been five general elections in England. Throughout this period agriculture was the beneficiary of heavy subsidies.<sup>10</sup> At none of these elections was the

<sup>9</sup> The difference can easily be exaggerated if we are thinking about the general level of subsidy. Both organizations favored expenditure of government funds for disposal of farm surpluses in a variety of ways. Both favored price supports. The Farmers Union favored continuation of rigid supports at 90 per cent of parity for "basic" commodities. The Farm Bureau favored supports on a sliding scale, depending upon the supply situation. The Farm Bureau program, a modification of which was enacted in 1954, almost certainly involved a somewhat lower subsidy rate than would have been entailed by the Farmers Union program. On the other hand, in view of falling commodity prices, the Farm Bureau shortly after this date supported the "Soil Bank" program, which was enacted and which involved a much greater subsidy than any possible saving that might have been brought about by the lower support rates.

<sup>10</sup> Until about 1953-54 the Government bought all farm products at fixed prices. Although these prices were much above the level charged for the food (the Government paying the difference), it is possible that no subsidy would have been needed during this period of food shortage had prices been allowed to find their own level. In other words, it might be argued that the sub-

extent of agricultural subsidy a point at issue between the parties. Yet the policy being pursued did not lack for critics. Such journals as the London *Economist* kept up a continuous drum-fire of criticism of agricultural policy under both Labour and Conservative Governments, alleging that subsidies were too high. An occasional Member of Parliament, like Stanley Evans, lashed out against "featherbedding" the farmers.<sup>11</sup> And the weight of opinion of economists, including agricultural economists, favored the view that the subsidies were at a higher rate than was justifiable. On the other hand, the farmers frequently complained that their profits were not keeping pace with the rising standards of living of other occupational groups. Nonetheless, at no election did the level of subsidies become an issue between the parties. Agricultural policy was greatly debated, but the debates consisted in such matters as rival claims for credit for the benefits the farmers had received, charges that the program was being badly administered, that farmers lacked confidence in the Government (or in the Opposition, as the case might be), and so on. Labour, by promising the reinstitution of bulk purchasing and other devices, tried to hold out the prospect of greater price stability, but was careful not to suggest that average prices would be higher (or lower).

The sensitivity of the parties to the farm vote is nowhere better demonstrated than by the difficulties generally experienced by the Liberal Party in squaring its free-trade, anti-subsidy principles with electoral expediency in the matter of agricultural policy. In 1953 the Party Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the gradual abandonment of guaranteed prices and assured markets for agriculture. Not

sidies during this period were really consumer subsidies, redistributing the available food among consumers rather than income among producers. For our purposes, then, the elections of 1955 and 1959 are of greatest significance, for by that time free market conditions prevailed and farmers depended heavily upon direct subsidy.

<sup>11</sup> Evans, a Labour M.P., was forced to resign as Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Food for persisting in this kind of criticism, including such charges as that the taxpayers had had to pay £12 million during the last year for the production of surplus potatoes. *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), Vol. 475, col. 1042. The promptness with which the Government called for Evans' resignation and publicly disavowed his views made it clear that they had no intention of being tagged as favoring any diminution of agricultural support.

only did this action call forth heated debate but, after the adoption of the resolution, a prospective Liberal candidate for Parliament announced that "speaking for at least twelve prospective Parliamentary candidates, we do not feel we can fight an election on the present policy, and give notice that we can not do so."<sup>12</sup> Presumably as a consequence of this pressure, the resolution adopted in 1954 was much more qualified.<sup>13</sup>

A nice test case is supplied by a by-election held in the Division of South Norfolk in January, 1955. The election was of particular interest because the constituency is marginal as between the major parties and highly agricultural, being in the heart of one of the major farm areas of England. The writer followed the campaign closely, attending several campaign meetings. The constituency was actively cultivated by the candidates and by their supporters ranging all the way up to the Minister of Agriculture himself, Mr. Heathcoat Amory, on the Conservative side, and to Messrs. Hugh Gaitskell and Anuerin Bevan on the Labour side. Both sides insisted that they would maintain subsidies, with no "whittling away," while hinting that their rivals were not altogether reliable in this regard. Neither made any suggestion of increasing the subsidies.

The pattern revealed for this campaign was substantially duplicated in the general elections of 1955 and 1959. In the latter year, for instance, the Conservative election manifesto pledged continuance of the long-term assurances to agriculture, continued support to horticulture by means of tariffs and also by means of new improvement grants to the extent of £7½ million. Labour promised to improve farm security, which, it claimed, had been "whittled away" since 1951, and to give the farmer "protection against unfair foreign competition."<sup>14</sup>

In the United States the picture was quite different. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, permanent legislation, provided for price supports for "basic" commodities by means of loan and purchase arrangements at rates varying in accordance with a formula relating the percentage of "parity" at which they would be supported to the supply situation. By agreement of both parties the operation of this Act

<sup>12</sup> *Farmer and Stock-Breeder*, Vol. 67, p. 57, April 14-15, 1953. And see *The Times*, April 4, 1953, p. 3, col. a.

<sup>13</sup> *Farmers Weekly*, April 30, 1954, p. 42.

<sup>14</sup> D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London, 1960), pp. 260 and 275.

had been suspended during the war and afterwards in favor of provision for a rigid support of basic prices at ninety per cent of parity. This temporary legislation was scheduled to expire on December 31, 1948. By a series of extensions, however, the fixed supports at 90 per cent of parity were not allowed to die until six years later. By stages during this period the Democratic Party became identified with maintenance of the "rigid" support system while the Republicans championed a "flexible" arrangement. An Administration-sponsored bill providing for flexible supports was enacted in 1954 with overwhelming Republican support in both Houses, while the Democrats opposed the flexible principle (with its inevitable lowering of the extent of price support) by more than three-to-one. These positions have been adhered to subsequently and were reflected in the party platforms for presidential elections. In short, the American voter, unlike his British opposite number, had a significant electoral choice and accompanying possibility of control with regard to agricultural price supports during the 1950s.<sup>15</sup>

Closely connected to the question of choice and control is the matter of energizing public opinion, also a feature included among the reputed attributes of the British system. It is not really a separate point so much as a presumed consequence of clear issues and simple methods of popular control. There can be no doubt that where the parties in Britain are divided on an issue, both the system of parliamentary debates and the election system tend to focus attention upon, and arouse interest in it. But where party competition produces identical positions on a given point, as it tends to do, and as has been the case with the level of agricultural subsidies in Britain, no occasion for public discussion arises. In this country, on the other hand, substantially this issue has played a significant role at each of the last three presidential elections. This is not to argue that there is anything inherent in the American system that accounts for this difference, or that a similar situation would be found if we examined other policy areas. It is merely to point out that the alleged advantage of the British system does not always materialize and that in certain cases the advantage may lie in precisely the opposite direction.

Having said this much, the supposed merit

<sup>15</sup> This does not mean he would necessarily elect to use it. To vote his convictions on price supports might mean going contrary to his beliefs on other matters which he deemed more important.

of clear and centralized responsibility in British government has already been dealt with, by implication. The responsibility for the level of agricultural subsidies in Britain is clear; it is pin-pointed. There is only one catch: to oust the Government would not alter the situation, although there is an abundance of opinion in the country at large and among experts to the effect that a change is in order.

Among the *a priori* arguments advanced for the theory that British government is exceptionally well fitted to resist the demands of special interest pressures, perhaps the most frequently cited is the strength of party discipline. Members of Parliament, unlike members of Congress, are not generally susceptible to pressure from constituents to vote this or that benefit for them.<sup>16</sup> With rare exceptions, they will vote as the Whips instruct. Closely related to party discipline is the position of the Government. A single committee, the cabinet, thanks to the combination of the two-party system and strong party discipline, has the power, within limits, not only to formulate the Government's program but also to implement it. Its party members in the House are in the majority and they may be counted upon to support the Government's program. Since the Government will stand or fall, at the next election, on its record as a whole and before the electorate as a whole, so the theory goes, it will be to its interest to resist the pressures of special interests insofar as they appear to distort or run counter to the general interest.

How sound is this reasoning? Of course it is true that M.P.s seldom defy the Whips. But the Whips, as is well known, are two-way lines of communication. Through them the party leaders are kept informed of what the rank-and-file want and what they hear from their constituents and, even more pertinently, of how M.P.s, especially those from marginal districts, assess the impact of particular policies on their chances for reelection. Such information is of interest to party leaders in any democratic country. Even in the United States it is highly relevant to the party's welfare and to the outlook for its general policies. But in the United

<sup>16</sup> However, the writer was present in Westminster one day when a delegation of lobbyists for higher old age pensions called a large number of M.P.s, one by one, from the floor of the House, asked their position on the question and, if the reply was not fully satisfactory, informed them that canvassers would cover their constituencies informing the voters of their weakness on this matter. There is evidence to suggest that this kind of pressure was not without effect.



States a party may lose one House and hold the other or it may lose one or both Houses and hold the Presidency. And under such circumstances it may still see many of its policies effectuated—as was clearly demonstrated under the Eisenhower regime. In Britain, on the other hand, the winner takes all. Under such circumstances it is hardly to be supposed that the news that, say, a score of Members of Parliament might lose their seats at the next election unless something is done for the aged, *e.g.*, or for the farmers, will be without influence on the Government.

In this connection, we may well remind ourselves of Hatschek's law,<sup>16a</sup> according to which British political parties start out with well defined sets of principles but progressively lose them and become concerned primarily with obtaining and keeping power. We need only consider the most recent general election campaign to see Hatschek's conclusions substantiated. Each of the major parties seemed to be engaged in trying to prove that, at least in certain important respects, it was not so different from the other as had been thought. The Conservatives proclaimed themselves as the great supporters of the "welfare state," while Labour made light of its attenuated program of nationalization. Such a development undermines the theory that the Government—or for that matter either of the major parties—must have a consistent program. The parties tend to become as free as American parties to bid for the marginal voter, to try to build a majority by seeking the support of various special interest groups—especially those that are particularly aware of their interests and whose votes are believed to be shiftable.<sup>17</sup> Of course, insofar as a bid to one group must obviously be at the expense of other groups or of the whole, some limit is placed to this process. But it is well known that this protective mechanism is very sluggish. Producers tend to be more aware of their interests than consumers or even taxpayers. Moreover, the existence of a large num-

ber of traditional or ideological voters strengthens the hand of the special interests by enabling party managers to maneuver without fear of losses from their hard-core supporters. The British situation with respect to special interests may be put in a nutshell. The parties discipline their members, but no one disciplines the parties; and the parties are subject to the same electoral logic that operates in this country: they must bid for the support of interest groups. Another way to put the matter, using Robert Dahl's expressive phrase, is to say that in Britain, too, what passes for "majority rule" might be more aptly described as "minorities rule."

An examination of British agricultural politics during the postwar period provides numerous examples of the operation of this electoral logic. The case of Stanley Evans, above, is a clear instance of party discipline being used to prevent giving offense to a well-placed pressure group. Although Evans was somewhat of an extremist on this matter, the traditional orientation and class interest of the Labour Party is toward the interests of urban labor. Cheap food, rather than prosperous farmers, would seem to be their natural concern. Moreover, this is the definite and outspoken view of the Cooperative movement, which is affiliated with the Labour Party and sits regularly in its councils. Yet in recent times it has been the prospect of winning a few farm votes from their normal Conservative alignment that has consistently set the course of Labour policy.

How party discipline operates in this kind of situation is well illustrated by a revealing incident that occurred in late 1953 in connection with an Order, laid before Parliament for ratification, increasing the import duties on certain fruits and vegetables. This was an issue calculated to arouse Labour to an anti-farmer stand if anything would, because the cost of the proposed action would be borne directly by consumers. As a matter of fact Labour, then in Opposition, was sharply divided as to what position it should take. Many of its Members, especially those representing the Cooperative movement, were strongly opposed to the tariff increase. Indeed, it appears virtually certain that the Parliamentary Labour Party would have voted to contest the Order had it not been for a strong personal appeal by Tom Williams, Minister of Agriculture in the preceding Labour Government. Although the decision was close, and a number of Labour Members did express themselves vigorously against the order in the House of Commons, the significant fact is that the Party leadership threw its weight behind

<sup>16a</sup> Julius Hatschek, *Englisches Staatsrecht*, Vol. II (1905), pp. 8 ff. Hatschek's law is described and discussed in Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, revised edition (Boston, 1950), p. 417.

<sup>17</sup> In an editorial entitled "The Electoral Auction," the London *Economist* bemoaned the fact that "election manifestoes have been corrupted into expensive shrimping nets for farmers', pensioners', tenants', cotton workers', shipbuilders', shipworkers', and cinema interests' votes. . . ." *The Economist*, September 26, 1959, p. 998.

the farming interest, and prevailed.<sup>18</sup> Here was party discipline in operation—being used to force a reluctant majority to pursue a policy thought by the leaders to be essential for winning certain marginal districts. (Williams and other Labour leaders had often publicly expressed the view that Labour could not hope to return to power without winning back some of the country areas they had won in 1945 and lost in 1950.)

Compared to this situation, party discipline in the United States is notoriously weak. Orthodox theory holds that weak discipline favors the special interest; but it is not necessarily so. Big city Democrats may refuse to go along with their party's policy of favoring high price supports—and they frequently do; and Republicans from agricultural districts may vote against their party's adherence to "flexible" price supports. Under such circumstances, special interests that are powerful in a minority of legislative districts may find it more difficult to obtain legislative support than under a regime of strong party discipline, operating as described above. On at least two occasions during the Eisenhower administration major price support legislation opposed to the official policy of the Democratic Party (which had a majority in both houses of Congress) and opposed by the House Committee on Agriculture, was yet enacted into law.<sup>19</sup>

The British system is also often thought to be less easily influenced by special interests than the American system because of the sub-

ordinated role of committees. Congressional committees have great power and are notoriously likely to be controlled by Congressmen favorably disposed toward the interests whose affairs come under their jurisdiction. It is frequently overlooked, however, that the British system, structurally very different, may lead to functionally similar results. Parliament regularly delegates many important decisions to the Government or to particular Ministries. When legislation takes this form, the Ministries, in certain respects, are cast in the role of Congressional committees: they have great power; their decisions are likely to receive less publicity than those of Parliament, and in any case the process by which they reach their decisions is not one of public debate and ordinarily involves no public scrutiny; they have a tendency—so at least it is alleged in England—to become favorably inclined toward the interests under their wing; and they are readily accessible to those interests.

The case of agriculture illustrates all of these points. The controlling legislation leaves the rate at which agricultural products will be subsidized or supported entirely to Ministerial discretion, operating within the broadest of statutory policy directives.<sup>20</sup> It is true that the Treasury stands always in the immediate background, breathing down the neck of the Ministry, but it must depend largely upon the Ministry's estimate of the needs of the industry. Moreover, all orders made under this provision of law must be made after consultation with representatives of the interests concerned. In practice this means that each year, at what is known as a Price Review, representatives of the Minister of Agriculture sit down with represen-

<sup>18</sup> *Farmer's Weekly*, December 18, 1953, p. 26; *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. 521, cols. 2235-2237 and 2251.

<sup>19</sup> For an analysis of the voting on the first of these occasions, the Agricultural Act of 1954, see J. Roland Pennock, "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 167-210, esp. pp. 184-210. The situation was decidedly complicated by the fact that the largest of the farm organizations, the American Farm Bureau Federation, was opposing the "pro-farmer" policy of the Democratic Party. Consequently it is not a clear instance of a "general interest" prevailing over the organized special interest. Of the 47 Democrats who went contrary to their party policy at this time, however, over half were from metropolitan areas. Their defection can hardly be charged to the position of the Farm Bureau. Similarly the 23 Republicans who voted against the position of their Party and of the Farm Bureau were clearly voting for what they considered to be the special interest of their constituencies in high price supports.

<sup>20</sup> Agriculture Act, 1947; 10 and 11 Geo. 6, ch. 48. The relevant provision reads, in a passage reminiscent of an American party platform, that powers under the Act shall be used, through the devices of guaranteed prices and assured markets, to promote and maintain "a stable and efficient agricultural industry capable of producing such part of the nation's food and other agricultural produce as in the national interest it is desirable to produce in the United Kingdom, and of producing it at minimum prices consistently with proper remuneration and living conditions for farmers and workers in agriculture and an adequate return on capital invested in the industry." [Part I, 1, (1)] Full power to carry out the purposes of this Act are vested in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (now the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries), subject only to being laid before Parliament as an Order, which, theoretically, either House could veto.

tatives of the National Farmers Union and, in an often prolonged series of meetings, negotiate the guaranteed prices for the following year. Each side is provided with an abundance of data. Certain agreed but rather vague standards guide them. But there is much room for judgment, and hence for haggling; for what are sometimes embittered arguments; and for plain horse-trading. It has been said on good authority that the final decisions are frequently made on the basis of considering the effect in certain marginal constituencies.<sup>21</sup>

The experience of the 1955 Price Review is hardly atypical. It had been the expressed hope of those charged with administering the subsidy policy that Exchequer liability could be progressively decreased at a rate approximating, or at least approaching, the increase in farming efficiency, then estimated at about £25 million *per annum* for products covered by the Review. Applying the principles that had been enunciated to the data as to changed costs and the like, and deducting the presumed efficiency increment, the result would have been no net change in guarantees and subsidies. In fact, however, the Ministry granted a net increase of about £40 million. The reasons advanced for this action were two: (1) that during the previous year crops had been seriously damaged by bad weather; and (2) that the balance of trade situation made it desirable to produce more homegrown feedingstuffs. However, the first of these reasons was not supposed to be relevant, since all figures are based on "normal" weather; and it was not even contended that the second argument was sufficient to justify the increases.<sup>22</sup>

To understand the Price Review of 1955 one must know that a General Election was imminent and that the farmers were known to be disgruntled. The mood of the annual meeting of

the National Farmers Union in January was described in the pages of the *Economist* as one of "gloomy resentment."<sup>23</sup> A direct vote of no confidence in the Government's farm policy was narrowly averted; and, as it was, the Union condemned the Government for "gradually undermining" the provisions of the 1947 Act.<sup>24</sup> Off the record, Government officials in a position to know were quite ready to concede (and decri) the effects of the political winds. In Parliament, Labour members, not surprisingly, testified to the same effect. George Brown, Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture under the Labour Government, declared:

The price this year was very nearly not an agreed one. It became an agreed price only because someone politically a little higher than the Minister came along and said, "There will be an election soon, and we must have an agreed price." The Council of the N.F.U. know that. My friends in the industry tell me what is happening.<sup>25</sup>

And Tom Williams, Labour Minister of Agriculture, asserted that the N.F.U. was on the point of voting its lack of confidence in the Government when the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his peace with them in a speech at the N.F.U.'s annual dinner.<sup>26</sup> Note that it was the Chancellor of the Exchequer who was chosen for this task. Possibly he was chosen (or invited by the N.F.U.) because he was a farmer. But if George Brown was right it appears that this was a clear case of political intervention, perhaps by cabinet action, to urge the Minister of Agriculture to go farther on behalf of the farmers than even he was prepared to do on his own initiative.

This incident will also serve as a comment on the frequently heard claim that the British Treasury is a powerful roadblock in the way of special interest demands upon public expenditures. Undoubtedly it is, in many situations; but it may also be acutely vulnerable to electoral pressures.

In appraising the argument for, and evidence of British vulnerability to the demands of a special interest group, it should be remembered, too, that British farmers constitute a small part of the population. As a percentage of total production, agricultural production in Britain is less than two-thirds as large as in the United States. In terms of the percentage of the labor

<sup>21</sup> One of the top Government economists dealing with these matters has been quoted as saying that the annual determinations of agricultural subsidy levels are "primarily political" and hardly susceptible of being explained or justified in terms of "statistical measurements." Private correspondence from J. H. Kirk, quoted in J. Anthony Mollett's "Britain's Postwar Agricultural Expansion: Some Economic Problems and Relationships Involved," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 41 (1959), pp. 3-15, at p. 9, note 15.

<sup>22</sup> See "Annual Review and Determination of Guarantees, 1955" Cmd. 9406; and The National Farmers Union of England and Wales, "Information Service," Vol. 10, No. 1, January/February, 1955.

<sup>23</sup> "Resentment on the Farm," *The Economist*, Vol. 174, Jan. 29, 1955, p. 345.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Vol. 540, col. 1622, May 3, 1955.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1532.

force involved, the discrepancy is even greater. Nor is the distribution of farm voters such as to increase their political effectiveness; but rather the contrary.

Touching another of the weaknesses often attributed to the separation of powers, the division of responsibility, we must be careful to examine both sides of the ledger. Divided responsibility does muddy the waters and so complicate the task of a displeased majority wishing to enforce accountability for the act of commission or omission that occasioned its displeasure. This much is true. But how often, on a particular issue, is there a majority? When pressure groups secure special consideration, it is generally the work of an active minority translating its demands into law thanks to the passivity of a large number of legislators. In the American system there are many check-points to the exercise of power; this is the very meaning of the system of checks and balances. If the farm lobby wins at one point its opponents may effectively defend a roadblock at another. This is precisely what often happens. Critics of the system who emphasize vulnerability to pressure groups all too frequently point to examples of success at a particular point in the process without following through to the ultimate result. Moreover, when that ultimate result is to prevent action, it follows from what has just been said that it is by no means necessarily true that a majority will is being frustrated. On the contrary, the necessity of mobilizing more power, or making it effective at another point, tends to mean that there will be more debate, more public discussion, more general education with respect to the matter in question, with the result that other groups than those immediately affected, consumer groups, for instance, are aroused to support their own interests, with the further consequence that when action is taken it will have a wider representative base—and perhaps a very different one—from what would otherwise have been the case. There is every evidence that this is precisely what happened during the long debate over flexible *versus* rigid price supports. Farm leaders were outraged at moves by Secretary Benson that they interpreted as appeals for consumer support.

Finally, a special word should be said about the presidential veto power, even though it is one of the checks to which reference has just been made. Representing a national constituency, the President is generally in a better position than anyone else to resist the demands of particular interests. The same argument was cited in support of the view that it is to the interest of the Government in England to support a consistent policy, and one that does not give

undue concessions to special interest. Applied to the presidency, this argument tends also to be subject to the same weaknesses. But here an important qualification is to be noted. A British Government desiring to remain in office is wholly dependent upon having its party continue to hold a majority of the seats in Parliament; hence it must consider the electoral situation in all of the constituencies. The President also has a large stake in having his party control the Congress. But it is not so large a stake. It is not all or nothing. He may remain in office even though his party is in the minority in both Houses of Congress and he may even continue to exercise very considerable power under such circumstances. To this extent the "general interest" base provided by the veto power is stronger than its equivalent under the cabinet system.<sup>27</sup>

For examples from agriculture, we may go back to the spring of 1946. Wool production had been heavily subsidized during the war and was in excess supply. In spite of recommendations by the Secretary of Agriculture and a special committee established for the purpose, Congress failed to act. The Secretary of Agriculture then discontinued all support of wool prices, which had been provided under general war powers. Congress responded by passing a bill which included among its provisions a special fee on imported wool. This provision ran directly contrary to our postwar foreign trade policy and its enactment threatened to wreck the Geneva Trade Conference, then in session. In spite of the strong opposition of the Department of State, the bill passed both houses of Congress. The President vetoed the bill and Congress sustained his action. A new bill, omitting the import fee provision, was thereupon speedily enacted. A special interest that was threatening our foreign economic policy was successful in Congress, but was checked by action of the President.

Eight years later another President was able to take advantage of the special interest in wool to prevent the success of a move in behalf of high price supports for basic crops which he believed to be counter to the general interest.

<sup>27</sup> In referring to the "general interest" base of the veto power I do not mean to obscure the fact that the veto may be used in support of special interests. It should be pointed out, too, that the peculiarities of our electoral college system are generally thought to operate in such a way as to favor certain special groups. It is arguable, however, that in a crude fashion, this inequality is offset by the rural orientation of the legislative branch.

The President had recommended a system of production payments for wool, substituting this for commodity loans. He had also recommended reversion to a flexible price support system for basic crops, as already mentioned. The House Committee on Agriculture, apparently in a move to outwit the President, combined his wool bill with an extension of the then-existing price supports for basics at a fixed 90 per cent of parity. However, they had miscalculated. On the eve of the crucial vote, Secretary Benson himself is said to have carried the word to Congressmen from wool states that the President would veto a 90 per cent bill even though it carried the wool payments plan with it. Thus in the end Congressmen from wool states had to vote for flexible supports for basics in order to get their wool subsidy. Five out of a possible 32 did so. This is not a particularly strong case, but it at least suggests the possibility of a situation in which the threat of a veto might bring some pressure on one interest group to help check another.

Many cases can be cited when the bicameral system has tended to work in the same way—to obstruct the demands of special interest groups. In both 1948 and 1949 the House of Representatives first voted to prolong the operation of high price supports, ultimately acceding to the Senate's insistence on a downward modification. Only the Korean war prevented this action from being allowed to take effect. One may find other instances in which either one House of Congress or the other or both or the Administration has manifested a great—perhaps too great—sensitivity to agricultural interests and demands. Frequently, however, the requisite concurrence of all three is lacking.

In spite of what has just been said, it is often true that the inertia of government tends to favor the special interest. Where an emergency situation develops, Congress may act fairly quickly—especially if a well organized interest is prodding it; but, where legislation favoring a special interest is already on the books, it is difficult to get it removed even in the face of conditions that seem to call for such action. But for many situations there is a technique to counter this tendency, and Congress often sees fit to use it. This is simply the device of granting a demand for a limited period, requiring renewal if it is to be extended beyond the original grant. In this way the weight of governmental inertia is shifted. In the battles over flexible *versus* rigid price supports, the proponents of flexible (which in effect meant lower) supports always enjoyed the great advantage that inertia, and therefore the check and balance system, was on their side; for no action at

all meant a return to an even lower level of price guarantees than they were proposing.

To summarize briefly what has been said: the purpose of this case study was to examine the commonly held belief that "responsible government," British style, is markedly superior to the system of separated powers in its ability to resist the demands of special interests—to examine this belief in the light of the evidence of postwar agricultural subsidies and price supports. From that evidence it appears that in Britain, the all-or-none nature of party competition may make leaders extremely sensitive to the demands of pressure groups, and party discipline may be used to suppress elements in the party that would like to resist the demands of those groups. The American system, it is true, may be less responsive to a clear popular majority, when such a majority exists. But, in the more common event that only minorities have clear positions, these minorities have more hurdles to cross, more roadblocks at points where their demands may be checked, than similar groups face in Britain. No single case establishes a general rule. But viewing the case of agricultural subsidies and price supports in combination with more general analysis, the writer concludes there are strong grounds, at least, for doubting that the American form of democracy is any more susceptible than the British to the pressures of minorities.

## APPENDIX

### BRITISH AND AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES: FACTS AND ARGUMENTS

A comparison of rates of subsidy for British and American agriculture can only rest on approximations based on more or less arbitrary assumptions and allocations. The difficulties are several. In Britain, price controls were retained until 1953 and 1954. Before that, during the period of wartime and postwar shortages, the food and agriculture industry was heavily subsidized but (see note 10 above) it is arguable that the subsidies were consumer subsidies. In the United States, war-induced scarcities led to a similar ambiguity. Accordingly, the comparison is confined to the post-price control period.

For the United Kingdom, then, I shall use the years since the free market has been reestablished, 1954–1955 through 1960–1961. The average annual cost of agricultural support in the United Kingdom for that period amounts to \$716 million.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Computed from official data. See *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, Fifth series, Vol. 618, cols. 21–22, Feb. 22, 1960; *ibid.*, Vol. 617, cols. 35–36, Feb. 9, 1960; and *ibid.*, Vol. 634, col. 71, Feb. 8, 1961.

TABLE I. FARM SUBSIDY COST COMPARISONS ON A PER CAPITA BASIS

	United Kingdom		United States	
	Number (in millions)	Subsidy per capita	Number (in millions)	Subsidy per capita
Population <sup>a</sup>	51.0	\$ 13	164.3	\$ 13.44
Population engaged in agriculture <sup>b</sup>	1.1	\$ 651	9.0	\$246
Farm operators <sup>c</sup>	.29	\$2,469	5.4	\$409

<sup>a</sup> Population figures are for the year 1955.

<sup>b</sup> These figures are for the year 1951. I am informed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food that their estimate of the present farm labor in the United Kingdom, reduced by a complex calculation to full-time male adult equivalents, is .9 million.

<sup>c</sup> The United Kingdom figure is from the 1951 census and is for "farmers and farm foremen." The Ministry of Agriculture, using different definitions, estimates that farm operators at present number about 350,000. (Information supplied by Mr. J. H. Kirk, Ministry of Agriculture, letter of February 10, 1959, to the author.)

For the United States, no such accurate measure of costs to the Treasury is possible. Here, in large measure, instead of paying a direct subsidy we (in effect) buy farm products and store them. Some of these stored commodities are eventually sold on the market, some are given away, and some are diverted to secondary (and less remunerative) uses. What our price support program for any given year will cost cannot be ascertained until long after the event, if at all—not, at least, until the commodities have been disposed of and the proceeds realized; these may be in blocked

foreign currencies.<sup>29</sup> The costs actually realized each year can, of course, be calculated. These figures are made available by the Department of Agriculture and we rely on them here.<sup>30</sup> The comparisons set out in Tables I and II use the average of the realized costs for the six years endings June 30, 1960, the latest for which figures are currently available. The figure so derived is \$2,209.6 million.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> During World War II it may be recalled, the entire accumulation of price-supported farm surpluses from the depression years was disposed of at an over-all profit to the Government.

<sup>30</sup> It must be emphasized that we are considering the *cost of agricultural subsidies to the taxpayer*. Much of this sum is expended for storage and other costs that do not go to the farmer. Whether the farmers profit more or less than the cost of the program is, fortunately, not a question that need be answered for the purpose of this article. Incidentally, it would be a difficult question to answer for Britain as well, although there most of the costs of the program go directly into the farmers' pockets.

<sup>31</sup> This calculation includes all farm programs classified by the Department of Agriculture as "primarily for stabilization of farm prices and income" and also the item for Agricultural Conservation Payments. The latter is included to make the total comparable to the figures used for the United Kingdom where so-called "production grants" (*e.g.*, for lime and fertilizer) are used more or less interchangeably with "deficiency payments" and other forms of direct subsidy. Costs

TABLE II. FARM SUBSIDY COST COMPARISONS IN RELATION TO VARIOUS NATIONAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE FIGURES\*

	United Kingdom		United States	
	Amount (in millions) Col. 1	Subsidy as a percentage of amount in Col. 1 Col. 2	Amount (in millions) Col. 3	Subsidy as a percentage of amount in Col. 3 Col. 4
Gross farm income	\$ 3,699.9	19.3	\$ 33,788	6.5
Net agricultural income	\$ 843.1 <sup>a</sup>	84.9	\$ 11,473	19.2
Gross national product	\$49,311.0	1.4	\$400,300	0.5
Governmental expenditures (national govt.)	\$13,821.6	5.1	\$ 68,122	3.2

\* All figures are averages for the six fiscal years 1954-55 through 1959-60.

<sup>a</sup> After allowance for excess of replacement cost over original cost of certain assets used during the period. (Cmnd. 390, pp. 11 and 12.)

Sources for both tables: United Kingdom: *Annual Abstract of Statistics*; 1951 Census, *Occupation Tables*; Cmnd. 390; and private communications from the National Farmers Union and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food; United States: 1950 Census; Census of Agriculture (1950); *The Farm Income Situation*, No. 169, July, 1958; *Agricultural Statistics*, 1966.

At this point a possible objection must be noted: the cost to the public treasury is only part of the social cost of price supports. How much has been added to the consumers' bill for farm products by the existence of price supports? This question takes us into a far more speculative field than the calculation of costs to the government. What would prices be if they were not supported? The answer would depend in large measure upon how much would be produced in the absence of acreage controls. Even more difficult to calculate, and perhaps even more significant, is the effect of price guarantees in encouraging farmers to use more fertilizer, buy more labor-saving machinery, and in other ways improve their efficiency. It may be questioned, however, whether the average voter is much influenced by this factor. He hears about the cost of the farm program to the government, but it is doubtful whether he gives much thought to that part (very small at most) of the cost of a shirt or a loaf of bread that can be charged to price supports.<sup>32</sup>

of the soil bank "acreage reserve program" are included but, following the practice of the Department of Agriculture, the soil bank "conservation reserve program" is excluded. If the latter were included, the average annual cost figure would be increased by \$112.5 million, or about five per cent.

<sup>32</sup> It may be that, under exceptional circumstances, some public opinion can be stirred up

Using the crude cost figures that have just been developed, then, the next step is to make them more comparable, as between the two countries, by reducing them to ratios or percentages of such factors as population, farm operators, farm income, national income, and governmental expenditures for all purposes. This is shown in the opposite page. It will be observed that, by all but one of these measures, during the period in question, British agriculture was subsidized at a much higher rate than American. For the one exception (subsidy *per capita* of total population), subsidy rates were substantially equal.<sup>33</sup> According to the other bases of comparison, the difference ranges (very roughly) from a factor of a little over one and one-half, using total governmental expenditures as the standard, to one of six in another instance (farm operators). Using a sort of rough average of these indices, it would not be grossly misleading to say that the rate of British agricultural subsidies was running, proportionally, at from two to three times the rate of their American counterparts.

against a particular program on the basis of its presumed effect in raising prices. The case of butter before Secretary Benson's cut in the support level of dairy products in the spring of 1954 may be a case in point.

<sup>33</sup> This basis of comparison, of course, leaves out of account the fact that *per capita* income in the United States is far in excess of that in Great Britain; hence the subsidy bears less heavily on the American taxpayer.

## EQUILIBRIUM, STRUCTURE OF INTERESTS AND LEADERSHIP: ADENAUER'S SURVIVAL AS CHANCELLOR<sup>1</sup>

PETER H. MERKL

University of California (Santa Barbara)

In studies comparing the Bonn Republic with the Weimar Republic, few aspects of the former have received more attention from political scientists than its extraordinary political stability. Contrary to all expectations in the immediate postwar era, and under the same leadership, Germany's second try at parliamentary democracy has already outlasted the Nazi millennium and will soon have exceeded—successfully—the life span of its ill-fated democratic predecessor, the Weimar Republic. Interpretations abound which attribute the political stamina of the Bonn government to the economic prosperity of Western Germany, its Allied tutelage, its firm Western-oriented course, or its disenchantment with political extremism of either variety. Of particular interest to political scientists, however, are the theories which identify the political stability of the Bonn Republic with the “reign” of Konrad Adenauer from the beginning to this day.

At the time of the *Bundestag* elections of September, 1961, the octogenarian Chancellor had already governed the Federal Republic for three terms and there were abundant signs that his time was up. Having captured a majority of the *Bundestag* seats in the two previous elections, his Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) now lost their absolute majority to the two opposition parties, the Free Democrats (FDP) and Social Democrats (SPD).<sup>2</sup> The FDP was willing to enter a coalition with the CDU/CSU, but its chairman, Erich Mende, definitely rejected Adenauer as the new Chancellor in favor of Ludwig Erhard or any other prominent CDU/CSU politician. A coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD was an unlikely choice for reasons we shall return to. During the campaign, Adenauer's popularity had slipped far from the heights of public veneration<sup>3</sup> and the press claimed that he was already beginning

to confuse things and names in public speeches and had lost his zeal and touch for appealing to crowds.<sup>4</sup> Most damaging of all, a revolt against him was threatening in his own party where an opposition, the *fronde*, had formed since the presidential elections of 1959,<sup>5</sup> centering around Minister of Economics Erhard, *Bundestag* President Eugen Gerstenmaier, and the Hamburg deputies Bucerius and Blumenfeld.<sup>6</sup> At the height of the election campaign, Adenauer's internal enemies publicly attacked him, when the old Chancellor made the mistake of questioning the personal integrity of the SPD candidate, Willy Brandt, a few days after the outbreak of the Berlin crisis. They began to campaign for Erhard; and the ambitious Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss (CSU), joined them in the last weeks before the elections. It was surprising that the CDU/CSU in spite of this internecine war managed to win a plurality at the polls.

Two days after the elections, therefore, when the 85-year-old Chancellor faced his Executive Board (*Parteivorstand*), angrily upbraiding his critics for showing him the door after twelve years of successful leadership, this seemed to be the end of the Adenauer era. Yet before the week was over, gasps of uncomprehending protest could be heard throughout the editorial offices of the German press. Cartoons appeared depicting Adenauer as a naughty child refusing to go to bed. Newspaper editors wrote the letter of resignation he should have written, and some compared him to the famous surgeon Sauerbruch who, stubbornly refusing to retire from the operating room because of his advanced age, had contributed to the death of several patients. Six weeks later, Adenauer had once more become Chancellor for at least another two years.

<sup>4</sup> *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 6, 1961, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> On this occasion, Adenauer at first decided to go into semiretirement by running for the largely honorific office of Federal President. He changed his mind, however, when he learned that his successor as Chancellor would be Ludwig Erhard, of whom Adenauer declared in public that he lacked the ability and stature for this position.

<sup>6</sup> “Brandt alias Frahm,” *Der Spiegel*, Aug. 23, 1961, p. 18.

<sup>1</sup> This study was made possible by a travel grant from the International and Comparative Fund of the University of California for which credit is due to the Ford Foundation.

<sup>2</sup> The popular vote was distributed as follows: CDU/CSU 45.4% (1957: 50.2); SPD 36.2% (31.8); and FDP 12.8% (7.7).

<sup>3</sup> “Protest ist keine Denkmalsschaendung mehr,” *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (hereafter referred to as *SZ*), Sept. 13, 1961.



What had happened? Could Adenauer's survival against all odds be understood with the help of the various theories advanced by political scientists and other observers to explain his dominant role in West German politics? It is the intention of this study to reexamine these theories of Adenauer's leadership in the light of the revealing events accompanying the formation of his new coalition cabinet, and to supply a new explanation of this phenomenon of leadership and of the peculiarities of the West German political system which sustain it.

# I

A cursory survey of the literature about the astounding stamina of Adenauer as a leadership figure shows a good deal of agreement among political scientists, journalists and other observers about the basic elements of his dominant role. Four major themes recur in most articles, books and comments about him: his personality, his international stature, his constitutional position and the plebiscitary character of West German democracy.

The personality of the Old Man is pictured as sly, authoritarian, paternalistic and single-minded. Sigmund Neumann, for example, describes him as

... one of the great statesmen of the 20th century ... astute and arrogant, committed and cynical, indefatigable and decent, stubborn and sensitive, autocratic and humane. . . .<sup>7</sup>

Richard Hiscocks speaks of "a mixture of judgment and forcefulness, wisdom and astuteness" and of "masterly political tactics" but criticizes his authoritarian attitude toward his cabinet and the *Bundestag*.<sup>8</sup> Arnold J. Heidenheimer, in his book on the subject, explains Adenauer's authoritarianism by pointing to his background as a politico-religious leader of the old Center Party and as the mayor of an important city, a quasi-feudal chief of great skill in dealing with the regional and socio-economic group interests of Weimar Prussia.<sup>9</sup> In another penetrating analysis of Adenauer's leadership,

Heidenheimer draws attention to the fact that, as Lord Mayor of Cologne and member of the Prussian Council of State, Adenauer patterned his role in the bureaucratic tradition of leadership rather than in the Anglo-American tradition of party government.<sup>10</sup> Fellow politicians, the West German press and, in particular, the news magazine *Der Spiegel* often picture the Old Man as a crafty tactician whose chief technique seems to be to let things develop, deal with them one by one as they come up, and not to make any particular effort to force his own concept upon a world of contrary currents of opinion; in other words, a master of Bismarck's art of the possible. Other observers have called him primitive, sterile, unrealistic and lacking depth.<sup>11</sup>

A consensus of opinion also stresses the importance of his international stature for his authority at home.<sup>12</sup> For his West Germans, the Old Man symbolizes their return to a respected position among other nations. Adenauer's rise owes much also to the fact that the time was ripe for his concept of reconstructing the German position step by step from the Rhineland into a definite commitment to the West and to European integration. Georg Wolff in his recent series on Adenauer in *Der Spiegel* even goes so far as to suggest that the domestic policies of the Old Man have to be seen from the standpoint of foreign policy.<sup>13</sup> Guenter Gaus, in an editorial in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, sums up the secret of Adenauer's success and the likely end of his era of inflexibility in the following words:

His imposing one-track-mindedness had to coincide with a corresponding attitude on the part of our Western Allies. Never letting anyone change his preconceived course enabled Adenauer to bring about reconciliation with France and earned him the friendship of John Foster Dulles. For a decade, his basic ideas have coincided so much with those in Washington and Paris that almost every one of his political decisions turned out to

<sup>7</sup> In Taylor Cole, ed., *European Political Systems* (2d rev. ed., New York, 1960), p. 418; also Alfred Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie* (Duesseldorf: Rauch, 1960), pp. 418-20.

<sup>8</sup> *Democracy in Western Germany* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 79, 122-7. See also Robert G. Neumann, *European and Comparative Government* (New York, 1960), p. 423 fn.

<sup>9</sup> *Adenauer and the CDU* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 235-7.

<sup>10</sup> "Der starke Regierungschef und das Parteiensystem: der Kanzlereffekt in der Bundesrepublik," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 2 (Sept. 1961), pp. 251-2.

<sup>11</sup> See especially the comments quoted by George Wolff in "Mein Gott—Was soll aus Deutschland werden?," *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 27, 1961, pp. 60-2.

<sup>12</sup> See Grosser, *op. cit.*, pp. 415-6; Sigmund Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 419; Hiscocks, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80; and Heidenheimer, "Der starke Regierungschef . . .," pp. 257-8.

<sup>13</sup> *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 15, 1961, pp. 57-69.

be right in the end. But who would claim that this will continue to be true?<sup>14</sup>

About the contribution of his constitutional position as Federal Chancellor to the durable dominance of Adenauer in West German politics, there is some disagreement. The Basic Law of 1949 attempted to strengthen the position of the Chancellor *vis-à-vis* cabinet and *Bundestag* in many ways, in the hope of forestalling the ministerial instability of the Weimar Republic. The chief device for this purpose was the so-called "constructive no-confidence vote," a modification of orthodox parliamentary government which requires the election of a new Chancellor for the overthrow of the incumbent. By this means, the framers of the Basic Law hoped to prevent the extreme wings of a multi-party parliament like the Weimar *Reichstag* from combining to topple governments solely for the sake of obstruction and chaos. One prolific writer on German affairs, Alfred Grosser, however, considers it most unlikely that the situation of the last years of the Weimar Republic will ever be repeated. Hence the "constructive no-confidence vote" has never been used in Bonn and plays no particular role in strengthening Adenauer's position.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, Ruediger Altmann, a German political journalist, makes a strong argument for the importance of the "constructive no-confidence vote" in his recent book *Das Erbe Adenauers*.<sup>16</sup> He maintains that this device has brought about the virtual paralysis of West German parliamentarism by setting the price of insurrection against the Chancellor exorbitantly high. Before 1953, dissatisfied coalition partners would have had to line up a new coalition of small parties with the Social Democrats in order to exercise pressure against the Chancellor. Since 1953, and in the crisis year 1951, the price of insurrection would have included the breaking away of parts of the CDU/CSU to form a coalition with the SPD.

On balance, there seems to be some merit on both sides of the argument. A constitutional device designed for the prevention of the unique predicament of the Weimar Republic can hardly hope to be a panacea for all conceivable ills of a nascent parliamentary democracy. In fact, if the constructive no-confidence

vote had been a part of the Weimar Constitution in 1930, it would have stopped neither the inundation of the *Reichstag* by a majority of totalitarians from the right and the left, nor even the legal—not to mention violent—ascendancy to power of Hitler. On the other hand, Altmann is quite right in suggesting that such a considerable modification of parliamentary government was bound to have a noticeable effect on the position of Adenauer with regard to his cabinet, the *Bundestag* and even his own party. But then again, Altmann's argument proves too much: while it may be true that a small coalition party in a pre-1958 French government, for example, could get the ear of the premier without such an extreme step as having to form a new coalition with the opposition, this was not a particularly desirable situation in the interest of democracy and good government. Regarding the supreme sacrifice of party unity, moreover, the dilemma of the labor wing of the CDU/CSU is not unique. It is found also in British parliamentarism where the wings of the party in power have no more authority over the Prime Minister than they can impose at caucus meetings by virtue of their votes. And just as the power of the British Prime Minister over the House of Commons cannot be explained without mentioning his party leadership, Adenauer's authority over his own party in the *Bundestag* is also largely a matter of party cohesion and party leadership. When the CDU/CSU tires of him—and that day may be near—it will replace him without straining the constructive no-confidence vote or any other formal part of law and constitution.

The fourth and perhaps most interesting part of Adenauer's leadership has been the development of West German democracy in the direction of plebiscitary democracy. Whether one believes that the authoritarian charisma of Adenauer made the West German elections into plebiscites for or against him, or that the Germans needed somebody like Adenauer in the wake of Hitler's dictatorship and the disillusionment with politics, there is no denying the fact. Friedrich Naumann, a German writer and politician, predicted this development even before the first World War and the sociologists Max Weber and Alexander Rüstow sought to encourage it under the Weimar Republic: the chief executive office in Germany has become the focal point of the authority of the state which is derived from the people and periodically reaffirmed by them although they do not directly elect the Chancellor. There are different ways of looking at this phenomenon. Erich Kuby, another German political journalist, feels that Adenauer owes his long tenure to the

<sup>14</sup> "Adenauer," *SZ*, November 4/5, 1961.

<sup>15</sup> Grosser, *op. cit.*, p. 415. Richard Hiscocks attributes to it a part of the responsibility for Adenauer's authoritarianism towards cabinet and *Bundestag*; *op. cit.*, p. 428.

<sup>16</sup> (Stuttgart-Degerloch: Seewald, 1960), pp. 31, 37, 41-2.

leadership cult by means of which the Germans are trying to drop their political responsibility into the lap of someone trustworthy so they can concentrate on their pursuit of happiness.<sup>17</sup> Hiscocks talks about "Chancellor democracy," a phrase also used by the German political scientist Theodor Eschenburg and widely adopted in the German press.<sup>18</sup> Heidenheimer, finally, who has dealt with this subject more analytically than anyone else, prefers the term "Chancellor effect" to connote the added authority of office by which Adenauer attracts a vast fringe of unpolitical voters, job seekers, patriots, people who never even vote in state elections and who often lack the interest and knowledge to understand Adenauer's position or the ideology of the CDU/CSU. Heidenheimer uses the same term for Adenauer's hold over a loyal following within his coalition parties, the "Chancellor party," which is said to be latent within the CDU/CSU and all one-time coalition parties of the Old Man. This "Chancellor effect" is partly the creation of Adenauer and partly the result of circumstances tending in this direction. After Adenauer's retirement, Heidenheimer believes that its benefits will accrue to any popular, forceful Chancellor, such as Ludwig Erhard or Willy Brandt.<sup>19</sup>

These four elements of Adenauer's tenacious dominance in West German politics, personality, international stature, constitutional position and the "Chancellor effect," are the basic conceptual tools offered in the endeavor to understand and explain Adenauer's survival against great odds in the almost seven weeks of bargaining over the new coalition government. His personality obviously had much to do with his success: his stubborn refusal to bow to the storm of public indignation and ridicule; the brazenness with which he seized the initiative both toward the public and within his own party;<sup>20</sup> the superior skill with which he outmaneuvered his chief rivals Erhard, Strauss and Gerstenmaier, and finally his future partners of the FDP. His international stature helped him little, although he lost no opportu-

nity to show his own party leaders and the FDP negotiators letters and telegrams he had received from Washington. Later he insisted that he should be reelected soon, since President Kennedy was expecting him in Washington. His constitutional position also did not help him. It may on the contrary have made his prospective partners more wary of him: once they helped reelect him Chancellor, how could they be sure that he would retire at the agreed moment; how could they be certain of a reasonable measure of control over him short of forming a new coalition with the opposition? The charm of the Chancellor effect over the people had already worn thin and was used up even more rapidly by the refusal of the Old Man to resign while his people still respected and admired him. Only over his own party did his call for loyalty still have effect, especially after he had outmaneuvered the *fronde* and his most serious rivals.

Yet when one reviews the changing scenes and battles of the formation of the new Adenauer coalition, these four tools of analysis fall definitely short of explaining how and why Adenauer succeeded once more. They fail to explain, in particular, why Ludwig Erhard, the popular architect of the West German "economic miracle" and the choice for Chancellor of the people,<sup>21</sup> of large parts of the CDU, the FDP and the CSU, did not press through his demand to become Chancellor. Nor can they make plausible the failure of the ambitious Strauss (CSU) to take control of the situation and either to end or to limit to a transitional one-year period the tenure of the Old Man. Nor do they make intelligible the similar failure of Gerstenmaier, the popular and experienced President of the *Bundestag*. These three men certainly did not fail for lack of trying. Least of all can the four elements mentioned above explain the slow but inexorable collapse of the position of Mende and his FDP who started out dictating the end of the Adenauer era and ended up content with little more than an empty gesture of compliance with their minimal request: to share the control over German foreign policy.

## II

Dissatisfaction with these explanations leads us to probe further into the structure and substructure of the political system which made it possible for Adenauer to weather the storm

<sup>17</sup> *Alles im Eimer* (Stuttgart: Goverts, 1960), pp. 203-7. See also Grosser, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

<sup>19</sup> "Der starke Regierungschef . . .," pp. 254-61.

<sup>20</sup> The morning after the *Bundestag* elections, Adenauer called a press conference without consulting his party in order to assert his leadership toward the public from the start. Three days later he disarmed his Party Executive Board so successfully that they appointed him as chief negotiator for the coalition talks, thereby prejudging the question of his continued leadership.

<sup>21</sup> According to *Time* (Atlantic Edition), Nov. 10, 1961, p. 30, a public opinion poll gave Erhard 70% of the electorate over Adenauer as Chancellor. I have not been able to ascertain the source or verify the statistics.

facing him after the 1961 elections. The stability of his leadership, it is submitted, is the consequence of two structural aspects of the West German system which are linked together and will continue to favor anyone with the qualities necessary to become the leader of the CDU/CSU. This statement presupposes, of course, that the political camp to the right of the SPD will continue to enjoy a popular majority. One of the structural factors is the equilibrium among the group forces of which the CDU/CSU is composed. We shall describe in this section how this equilibrium has operated in Adenauer's favor. The other factor consists of the forces which have increasingly driven the German multi-party system into a bipartite mold. After dealing with this second factor in the next section, we can draw the conclusions for any third party from the presence and interaction of these two structural aspects of the West German political system.

By equilibrium among the group forces we mean a relative state of balance among several pairs of distinct and antagonistic groups within the CDU/CSU which tends to operate in favor of the *status quo*. This state of balance need not be static or exclusive of the wax and wane of individual groups. There can be shifts of emphasis or orientation owing to the changing weight of individual groups. It is essential to this concept of equilibrium, however, that there is a consensus among the groups not to wipe out one another at times of superiority and to give each group its due voice, according to its size, in the formation of the policy of the whole organization. Such an equilibrational system will tend to operate similarly to the American system of the great sectional and socio-economic interests, or "veto groups": a candidate for leadership or a new policy, in order to be accepted, must not arouse the strong opposition of any one group. Once a leader or a policy has become accepted and managed to unify the whole system behind it, however, efforts at overthrowing the leader or the policy face the same obstacle: the opposition of a single group, albeit a small minority, can frustrate them once and for all.

The CDU/CSU indeed operates like such an equilibrational system. It is composed of a number of distinct and separate groups which oppose each other in pairs and yet are held together by a consensus mixed of mutual respect, Christian Democratic ideas about government and society, and the tangible advantages of party unity: organized labor and organized business, Protestants and Catholics, centralists and states righters, on the one side Big Business and Big Labor, and on the other, the *Mittelstand*, i.e. farmers, small business and the civil service.

Members and voters of the CDU/CSU come from all layers of society. A web of associations from the Catholic labor organizations to business and farm organizations and the far-flung system of church organizations ties the party to all kinds of groups and social forces in West German society.<sup>22</sup> An elaborate system of party committees on several levels, moreover, channels the programmatic demands of labor, business, the *Mittelstand*, refugees, local government organizations, women and youth groups through Social Policy Committees, *Mittelstand* Policy Committees, and further committees on communal policy, and the women's and youth organizations, respectively, into the policy-making agencies of the party.<sup>23</sup>

As in our equilibrium model, this system has called for a leader who is basically uncommitted to any one group. While Adenauer could not help being a pronounced Catholic, a man of business associations and a former local government official of considerable reputation, he has remained far from becoming the herald of any of these groups. He has bent over backwards to win the confidence of Protestants and to get along with organized labor and the states righters whose interests at times clash with those of the local government organizations. His role as a leader has been mainly that of a moderator and mediator among all the groups, a task which is also implicit in Christian Democratic thinking and in Catholic social philosophy.

This concept of leadership also implies a rather passive role in the making of domestic policy. Under such circumstances, the leader is not expected to come up with an imaginative policy of his own. He fares better if he is content with being the broker of the policy trends developed by the dominant groups of his party, or the executor of the resultant of the parallelogram of forces among these groups. As has been noted by many an observer, Adenauer has never exhibited a pronounced conception of his own in domestic policy.<sup>24</sup> Only in foreign policy, he has a definite commitment to European unification and to the Western alliance.

<sup>22</sup> For details, see Gerhard Schulz, "Die Organisationsstruktur der CDU," *Zeitschrift fuer Politik*, Vol. 3 (1956), p. 161. On the theory of parties of integration, see Sigmund Neumann, "Towards a Theory of Political Parties," *World Politics*, Vol. 6 (1954), p. 501 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Gerhard Schulz, "Die CDU—Merkmale ihres Aufbaus," in Max Gustav Lange, ed., *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik* (Stuttgart-Duesseldorf: Ringverlag, 1955), p. 143.

<sup>24</sup> See the quotations in *Der Spiegel*, Sept. 27, 1961, pp. 64-5.

Adenauer's broker role becomes evident especially if we review the spectacular changes in the economic policy of the CDU/CSU in the period during which he headed his party in the Bizonal Economic Council and later in the Bonn government. The CDU programs of Neheim-Huesten (1946) and Ahlen (1947) still advocated a planned economy and the socialization of the coal industry,<sup>25</sup> thereby reflecting both the hard times and the dominance of the labor wing within the CDU/CSU which at that time also frequently entered coalitions with the SPD. Then came the rise of Erhard's "social market economics," coalitions with the FDP and the Conservatives (DP), and the Duesseldorf Principles of 1949 in which the "regulated competition" of *ordo* liberalism<sup>26</sup> replaced the earlier socialism. In the following four years, the CDU/CSU dropped its labor orientation more and more while its business and *Mittelstand* wing came into full control. After 1952, Erhard and his free enterprise policy increasingly fell out of favor with the protectionist interests of Big Business, the *Mittelstand* and the farmers. This new trend of the CDU/CSU reached its climax with the postponing of Erhard's anti-cartel bill until it was finally passed in an emasculated form in 1957, half a decade after it was first submitted.<sup>27</sup> But while the economic policy of the CDU/CSU thus traversed a half-cycle from socialism to recartelization, Adenauer remained party chairman and Chancellor without even once losing control, due to his lack of commitment and flexibility in domestic affairs.

With this party structure of the CDU/CSU and the corresponding leadership model in mind, we can reexamine the situation which Adenauer was facing after the elections of 1961. With his *Bundestag* majority lost, the Old Man had to choose between SPD and FDP as coalition partners. Apparently he preferred the latter because he would have to share less power with a small party, if for no other reason. However, the FDP had cam-

paigned with the slogan "No more one-party dominance in Bonn" and a promise not to enter a coalition with the SPD under any circumstances—thus encouraging a good many dissatisfied CDU/CSU voters to vote for the FDP instead. It appealed in particular to right-wing voters who had so far voted for Adenauer. Widely acclaimed as the real winner of the 1961 elections, the FDP interpreted its gains as a popular mandate to overthrow the Old Man. Favored by the conservative character of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic and by the position of strength he had created for himself, Adenauer could afford to ignore the popular clamor for his resignation. But the adamant refusal of the FDP and the insurgents within his own ranks were a serious challenge to his survival as Chancellor. Knowing the way in which his party operates, Adenauer apparently decided to tackle his internal opposition first. Once the CDU/CSU had committed itself to reelecting him Chancellor, the fear of losing face would keep it from backing down before the small FDP which would have no choice, therefore, but to accept Adenauer or to go into the opposition. We shall see how the equilibrical system of the CDU/CSU helped the Old Man to stifle his internal opposition.

The FDP had counted on the assurances of Erhard, Strauss, Gerstenmaier and the Hamburg deputies of the CDU to topple Konrad Adenauer. Mende's sharp rejection of Adenauer as Chancellor of the next coalition was to give the cue for this internal revolution. To be sure, a party leader who has headed the government for such a long time is likely to have accumulated supporters who owe their position to him, in this case men like the Minister of the Interior Schroeder, or the Foreign Minister von Brentano. Adenauer also had personal friends from his home state who were likely to support him even at a time of declining popularity, such as the banker Pferdmenges or the trade unionist Blank. Yet it was doubtful whether such supporters were numerous enough to continue him in office against overwhelming odds. As Gerd Bucerius, the most outspoken of the *frondeurs*, argued persuasively in his weekly magazine *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Adenauer had come a long way from his peak in 1957 due to his age and immense burden of work. Unlike Erhard as a Chancellor, Adenauer's continued tenure of office would also cost the CDU/CSU very considerable concessions to the FDP in questions of personnel and policy.<sup>28</sup>

While Adenauer's "Chancellor effect" thus

<sup>25</sup> See Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1961* (Frankfurt: Musterschmidt, 1961), pp. 183, 189; and Bruno Doerpinghaus und Kurt Witt, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU 1950* (Generalsekretariat der Arbeitsgemeinschaft CDU/CSU fuer Deutschland, 1950), pp. 226-9.

<sup>26</sup> *Duesseldorfer Leitsaetze*, July 15, 1949, Sonderdruck des Deutschland-Union-Dienstes. See also Carl J. Friedrich, "The Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (June 1955), pp. 509-25.

<sup>27</sup> "Wege zur Sicherung des freien Wettbewerbs," *Das Parlament*, July 24, 1957, pp. 5-8.

<sup>28</sup> Dieter Schroeder, "Die Erben Adenauers muessen noch warten," *SZ*, Sept. 30/Oct. 1, 1961, p. 4.

failed to save him at this crucial moment, the prospect of a coalition of the CDU/CSU with the FDP under Erhard set into motion the mechanics of the equilibrial system of the CDU/CSU. Wary of the economic and social policy of such an industry- and *Mittelstand*-dominated cabinet, the labor wing of the CDU/CSU utilized the general impasse to extract a number of concessions and promises from Adenauer in exchange for throwing its weight against the attempts to remove him. The CDU/CSU labor wing in the *Bundestag* and in the extra-parliamentary party apparatus has always been a factor to be reckoned with<sup>29</sup> and has lately moved more into the foreground under the leadership of Hans Katzer, the Executive Manager of the Social Policy Committees of the CDU/CSU. According to press comments, Katzer received specific assurances regarding the extension of the Law of Savings Premiums, the "social discount" in the stock of further denationalized enterprises, an increase in the workers' share of productive capital, a reform of corporation law, higher sickness benefits and family allowances, a stronger Cartel Office, and the establishment of an Economic and Social Council to extend labor co-determination above the plant level.<sup>30</sup> The labor wing would probably have preferred a coalition of the CDU/CSU with the SPD, but, rather than upset too much the balance of the equilibrial system, it contented itself with a firm commitment to its program of social policy by a CDU/CSU-FDP government.

Adenauer clearly stood to gain from the motion of the CDU/CSU labor wing to restore the balance as long as he was known to be flexible enough to return to the earlier CDU/CSU tradition of Kaiser and Arnold if need be. At the same time, he wanted to avoid becoming dependent on his new allies. This was the Archimedian point from which he could unhinge his entire opposition and yet retain his freedom of choice. He resolved, therefore, to swing the equilibrial pendulum all the way to the left in order to be sure of a reaction: one

week after the elections, he invited the SPD leaders Ollenhauer, Brandt and Wehner for an extended discussion of German foreign policy which they had already requested months before. There was no mention of a "black-red" coalition, but most observers understood that the Old Man was exploring his only logical alternative for a coalition as long as the FDP refused to accept him. The reaction came instantly: the two top officials of the *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie* came to see Adenauer and assured him that they did not want Erhard as Chancellor either. CSU chairman Strauss and the CDU/CSU Minister President of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Kiesinger, hastened to express their horror of a "black-red" coalition. Most important, industry spokesmen put the FDP under pressure not to drive Adenauer to such an "extreme step." At this point Ludwig Erhard gave in and made it known that he no longer expected to become Chancellor right away. From this we can also gather that the *fronde* was a personal faction rather than one of economic interest. Without their favorite candidate, the internal opposition against Adenauer collapsed and, a mere ten days after the elections, the Old Man received the unanimous endorsement of the CDU/CSU caucus in the *Bundestag*. Erhard took it upon himself, in fact, to persuade his party to reelect Adenauer once more.<sup>31</sup>

At this point it may be well to stop and review the reasons for the failure of Erhard, Strauss and Gerstenmaier to end the Adenauer era. Erhard, who had accumulated broad support in the CDU/CSU as a result of his treatment by Adenauer after the presidential elections of 1959, seems to have underestimated the obstacles in the way of his immediate succession. In particular, he misjudged the tenacity of Adenauer when he saw him faltering during the election campaign and underestimated the power of the groups within his own party that have mental reservations about his economic policies. On the other hand, he overrated the power of public opinion and of his friends in the CDU/CSU and FDP to help him into office. Finally, neither Erhard nor any other important politician would have wanted to incur the odium of being Brutus to the eighty-five year old Caesar. Adenauer not only fought off Erhard's feeble attempt at insurrection, but added further insult to the long list of injuries which Erhard owes to him: when he was pressed by the Erhard faction to designate his Minister of Economics and Vice Chancellor as his heir apparent, he simply said that there

<sup>29</sup> According to Dr. Juergen Domes of the Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft at Heidelberg University, the labor wing of the *Bundestag* CDU/CSU is the most cohesive and well-organized group of the parliamentary party, second only to the CSU Landesgruppe. Its strength has been consistently at 23 or 24% of the total, excepting only the period from 1953 to 1957. It also constitutes the largest single group within the Party Executive Board of the extra-parliamentary party.

<sup>30</sup> *Der Spiegel*, Oct. 11, 1961, pp. 27-8.

<sup>31</sup> See *SZ*, Sept. 25, 26 and 29, 1961.

were many CDU/CSU leaders who might succeed him some day. When Erhard proposed that as the Vice Chancellor and likely successor he ought to be given an opportunity to familiarize himself with his future duties and to participate in foreign policy decisions he was brusquely rebuffed. Finally, at the last stage of the negotiations over the new coalition with the FDP, Adenauer took away further substantial functions from the Ministry of Economics, a process which has gone on since 1952, in order to incorporate them into a new cabinet position for the FDP. This last slight occurred after Adenauer had already promised Erhard that no such transfer of functions would take place. The Minister of Economics consequently left the *Bundestag* at the election of the Chancellor, so as not to have to congratulate him, and the press attributed a good share of the negative votes to the incensed adherents of the humiliated Erhard.<sup>32</sup>

Franz Josef Strauss, in contrast to Erhard, miscalculated the situation in that he expected to cut the Gordian knot with an energetic display of power. The ambitious Minister of Defense tried to force a one-year transitional Chancellorship as a compromise with the FDP upon the old Chancellor. As chairman of the CSU *Landesgruppe* in the *Bundestag*, he intended to use the votes of his Bavarian deputies as a lever to dislodge Adenauer and clear the way for Erhard. The CSU has always jealously guarded its last vestiges of autonomy against the CDU, and Strauss's efforts were generally interpreted as an attempt on the part of the CSU to reestablish itself as an independent party. However, Strauss's CSU deputies fell away from his cause one by one when they were supposed to vote against continuing Adenauer in office without any limitations. The Social Policy Committees and business and industrial interests of the Bavarian CSU, it seems, cherished their federation-wide interests in Bonn far more than the autonomy of the CSU. The Adenauer loyalists in the CDU/CSU were frankly delighted to see the ambitious Minister of Defense fall on his face. As some of his enemies claimed, Strauss wanted to help Erhard into the office of the Chancellor only in order to govern through him and in the hope of succeeding him soon. Now the Minister of Defense fell definitely out of grace with the Old Man who used to treat him fondly as the eventual heir of his system of inflexibility. At the inauguration of the new Adenauer cabinet,

<sup>32</sup> Guenter Gaus, "Der ewige Zweite," *SZ*, Sept. 29, 1961, p. 3. Also *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 15, 1961, pp. 23-6.

TABLE I. SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE NEW COALITION

Time Period	Moves
Sept. 17 (Elections)--19	(1) <i>General Orientation:</i> Adenauer seizes the initiative, meets the press and sounds out the FDP and SPD about a coalition.
Sept. 19-27	(2) <i>Stage-Setting Maneuvers:</i> (a) The labor wing of the CDU/CSU throws its weight behind the Chancellor in exchange for certain promises; (b) Adenauer invites the leaders of the SPD for a discussion of West German foreign policy; (c) Franz Josef Strauss tries to decree a compromise, a transitional Adenauer Cabinet, with the help of his CSU; (d) Representatives of West German business and industry appeal to Adenauer and put pressure on the FDP in order to prevent a "black-red" coalition. (e) Adenauer gains the support of his party (Sept. 27).
Sept. 28-Nov. 7:	(3) <i>Actual Negotiations:</i> (a) First phase of negotiations between a reluctant FDP and a self-confident Adenauer; (b) Second phase: Unsure of itself, the FDP <i>Bundestag</i> caucus calls on the FDP Main Committee to make the basic decision of accepting or rejecting Adenauer; (c) Third phase: Bitter wrangling over the coalition contract between the two parties; (d) Final phase: Pressed by Federal President Luebke's threat to take action, the CDU/CSU and FDP come to a compromise.

an occasion at which one can gauge the political future of a Minister by the seat which he occupies, Strauss no longer was in the front row as at previous inaugurations. Instead, his place was taken by a new pretender to the throne whom Adenauer favors as a counter-weight against both Erhard and Strauss: Heinrich Krone, the former caucus chairman of the *Bundestag* CDU/CSU who was given a cabinet post without portfolio in reward for his loyalty during the negotiations. To forestall Strauss's ambitions for the Foreign Office, moreover, Adenauer chose the old rival of the Minister of Defense, Schroeder, as the successor of von Brentano. Schroeder resembles Adenauer in his



lack of commitment to any social or economic group of the CDU/CSU and in enjoying the firm support of the North Rhine Westphalian CDU. Strauss decided to give no more offense to his Chancellor. But twenty of his CSU deputies were said to have abstained from voting for Adenauer at the election of the Chancellor by the *Bundestag*.<sup>33</sup>

The third aspirant for the Chancellorship, Eugen Gerstenmaier, was considered very eligible not only in the eyes of his friends in the CDU/CSU, but also by the FDP, the SPD and by the Federal President, Heinrich Lübke (CDU). At the 1959 convention of the CDU at Kiel, he defended free enterprise against Katzer and the labor wing of the party and knew, therefore, that his chances of a quick ascent to power were no greater than those of Erhard. Hence he limited himself to encouraging Erhard and the *fronde* spokesman Bucerius who periodically and fruitlessly called for the resignation of Adenauer. When the Old Man was about to come to terms with the FDP on the basis of a coalition contract whose content was kept secret from the public and from the rank and file of the CDU/CSU, reprints of this document suddenly appeared in many German newspapers. First Strauss and then especially Gerstenmaier and his friends were accused of having leaked a copy of the contract to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in order to stir up the rank and file of the CDU/CSU against the coalition. The CDU/CSU deputies indeed appeared with newspaper copies of the contract at the final caucus meeting, and Katzer once more insisted that Adenauer abide by his pledge to the labor wing. But Adenauer seems to have convinced his party (1) that the passages most obnoxious to labor, e.g., the injunction against extending labor co-determination above the plant level, had already been removed from the contract; and (2) that the coalition contract had little significance, either because it could not be legally enforced or because it was unconstitutional in content. The purposive indiscretion at any rate helped the Gerstenmaier group very little as long as Adenauer could claim that the newspaper versions of the coalition contract deviated from the signed original. In the end both Erhard and Gerstenmaier could be seen leaving the caucus

room before the final vote on the new coalition was taken.<sup>34</sup>

In this fashion, Adenauer outmaneuvered the most dangerous threat to his continued tenure. Once the balances of the equilibrial system of the CDU/CSU had begun to rock up and down, the question of continuing an eighty-five-year-old man in the Chancellor's office seemed quite insignificant to the CDU/CSU group leaders as compared to the overriding importance of the relative position of each group in the system.

### III

Once the CDU/CSU was solidly behind Adenauer, he could return to his negotiations with the FDP. Before we can fully understand his final victory over this party, we have to draw into account the forces which have driven the multi-party system of Weimar Germany into a bipartite mold. There may be some doubt whether the long evident trend toward a two-party system in Western Germany was not reversed by the 1961 elections which cost the CDU/CSU its majority and brought a third party, the FDP, dramatic gains.<sup>35</sup> However, it appears that the FDP became a mere appendix of the CDU/CSU from the minute it pledged itself not to enter a coalition with the SPD after the elections, because thereby it allowed itself to become a mere instrument of CDU/CSU voters who desired to register their protest against Adenauer without voting for the SPD. This FDP pledge automatically made the SPD the only alternative to continued CDU/CSU rule and, by implication, made the FDP a splinter of the CDU/CSU which had split off from the mother party over some grievance and now wished to coerce it to mend its ways. If there had been any doubt about the dependence of the FDP on the CDU/CSU, it was quickly dispelled after the elections: for a while, there was still talk that the FDP would simply remain in the opposition, if it could not dislodge Adenauer from his post. Rumor had it that the

<sup>34</sup> *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 15, 1961, pp. 26-8.

<sup>33</sup> Hans Ulrich Kempfski, "Die Kanzlerdemokratie in der Sterbestunde," *SZ*, Sept. 23/24, 1961, p. 3; and Josef Riedmiller, "Franz Josef Strauss auf der Waage," *SZ*, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 3. Also *Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst*, November 8, 1961.

<sup>35</sup> Some observers have called the West German party system a one or a one-and-a-half party system because of the seeming inability of the SPD to challenge the dominant position of the CDU/CSU. However, the West German situation appears to be more like the alternating periods of Republican and Democratic supremacy before and after 1932 in the United States than like comparable post-colonial examples. Cf. Heidenheimer, "Der starke Regierungschef . . .," p. 241 ff.



FDP might prefer to do so in order to avoid the blame for some of the unpopular concessions which Western Germany might have to make with regard to Berlin and reunification.<sup>36</sup> But it soon became evident that the FDP had no such choice, quite apart from the lure of cabinet posts and patronage. It was driven by the same force which has reduced the number of political parties represented in the *Bundestag* from election to election, until in 1961 there were only two left to contend, the CDU/CSU-FDP and the SPD.

At first glance, the difference between the party systems of the Bonn and Weimar Republics is indeed striking and not easy to explain: the Weimar *Reichstag* was composed at times of more than thirty and never of less than eight distinct groups, of which none was able to get more than a third of the vote—except in the final Nazi landslide. There were the Communists, the Social Democrats, at least two middle-class Liberal parties, the Catholic Center, the Bavarian People's Party, the German Nationalists, and the extreme right, not counting the wax and wane of smaller groups in between. The new party system of 1945, by comparison, started significantly with the reappearance of the SPD and the foundation of the CDU/CSU as a broad "political rally to the right of the SPD," to which old Weimar politicians flocked, ranging from former left-wing Liberals (DDP) to the German Nationalists (DNVP). In comparison to these two great forces, SPD and CDU/CSU, there was little else to report: even at the time of its origin, the FDP barely escaped the "rally to the right of the SPD."<sup>37</sup> The Communists did not for long outlast the Sovietization of East Germany. Neofascist parties died out or were outlawed almost as fast as they were founded. The refugees and other splinter groups of discontent failed to survive the economic boom. Regional parties like the Bavarian Party (BP) and the German Party (DP), once called Lower Saxonian Land Party (NLP), did not fare well in Bonn. With the benefit of hindsight, one may say today that the trend toward a two-party system in West Germany was evident from the start.

What could have transformed the complex

Weimar system into the far simpler system of the Federal Republic which in this way resembles the Anglo-American democracies? It was hardly the electoral system, a mixture of single-member district plurality with proportional representation, with the latter rather preponderant.<sup>38</sup> Nor can it be explained satisfactorily with the argument that the West Germans learned to shy away from political extremism, considering that most Weimar parties were not extremist in this sense. Even less plausible would be the statement that the German voters and politicians learned from the Weimar experience. The West German voters are not overwhelmingly in favor of a two-party system.<sup>39</sup> Nor would it be reasonable to expect such a self-conscious electoral conduct from any people, least of all the Germans whose interest in politics has been very low although their voting participation is high. Politicians also can hardly be expected to be motivated by such considerations: for years the FDP and other third parties have campaigned against the trend toward a two-party system and, at the *Laender* level, many CDU/CSU and SPD politicians favor their cause for practical reasons. The only frequently advanced argument which seems to have merit is that Adenauer's domineering role has tended to create two camps, one for and one against him. However, it should be noted that until 1961 the anti-Adenauer voters have always had other alternatives than to vote in increasing numbers for the SPD.

If these arguments fail to explain the change from the Weimar party system to the new bipolar trend, what others are available? A number. In particular, socio-economic and physical changes distinguish the Federal Republic from its predecessor. The Federal Republic is considerably smaller and economically more integrated than its predecessor. The loss of land and sectionalism, for example, removed

<sup>36</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (hereafter referred to as *FAZ*), Sept. 21, 1961.

<sup>37</sup> See especially Hans Georg Wieck, *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergründung des Zentrums im Jahre 1945*, and *Christliche und Freie Demokraten in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden und Württemberg, 1945/46* (Duesseldorf: Droste, 1953 and 1959).

<sup>38</sup> For details, see James K. Pollock, "The West German Electoral Law of 1953," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 49 (March 1955), pp. 107-30. Also Gerhard Loewenberg, "Parliamentarism in Western Germany: The Functioning of the *Bundestag*," *ibid.*, Vol. 55 (March 1961), pp. 87-102.

<sup>39</sup> When in February, 1956, the Institut fuer Demoskopie asked a national sample: "Would you welcome it if only the CDU/CSU and the SPD were left in Germany?" only 36% of the respondents answered yes. Forty per cent said no and 24% were undecided. *Jahrbuch der Oeffentlichen Meinung, 1957* (Allensbach: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1957), p. 260.

the geographic basis of the bulk of German Nationalist support, and has softened the old states rights movements in various parts of the country. The dismemberment of Prussia and the new geopolitical situation at the fringe of the Iron Curtain, moreover, has further reduced the causes of faction which might arise from many alternatives of foreign policy. The class structure of Germany, finally, which was still basic to the Weimar social and party system, was subjected to a long series of shattering experiences—the economic crises under the Weimar Republic, totalitarian and post-totalitarian reshuffling of rank and status, the impoverishment resulting from war, air raids and mass expulsion and, most recently, the socio-economic changes of a rapid economic boom. A few years after the end of the last World War, most Germans were fairly equal in economic terms, namely at the bottom of the economic ladder. The accumulation of wealth since that time has created a new society of status, expressed in the ownership of automobiles, washing machines, refrigerators and television sets, but hardly a society of class distinctions.<sup>40</sup> With the class lines went another important division of the Weimar party system. With most of the old causes of faction removed, a new alignment could form.

One should also mention the organizational changes among parties and interest groups in the direction of greater simplicity and unity which have occurred between the time of the Weimar Republic and its current successor. In the political field, the CDU/CSU now unites Catholics and Protestants, Conservatives and Liberals, and the FDP consolidated the remainders of the several Liberal parties. The cohesion of Adenauer's coalitions and especially the formidable size of the CDU/CSU itself forced the organized interests to coordinate their efforts and align their organizations behind the majority party and its leader rather than trying to have a separate little political party for every little interest. There was also the consolidation of interest groups as a consequence of Nazi regimentation. Under the Weimar Republic, the major and minor inter-

est groups from the trade unions to the farm, business and professional organizations of all kinds were divided along numerous lines according to class prejudices, ideological convictions, geographical considerations, economic interests and political preferences which added up to "an infinitely differentiated labyrinth"<sup>41</sup> and contributed considerably to the political chaos. This complex interest group system was rudely forced into a highly simplified and rigidly controlled "corporative mold" by the Nazis. After 1945, the reconstituted groups tried to undo some of the enforced group consolidations, but by and large retained much of the newly found unity. In most cases they no longer found the issues that once divided them very pressing and appreciated the political advantages of unity in a free society. The result was an interest group system so powerful and well organized that the German political scientist, Theodor Eschenburg, has called the Federal Republic "a federation of associated interest groups, churches, county and city republics,"<sup>42</sup> and interest groups are said to be closer to the voters than the political parties.

It is against this new background of simplified interest and party politics that the rise of Adenauer and his CDU/CSU has to be understood as a bundle of mutually reinforcing processes which have led to this concentration of political power and interests. Somewhat comparable perhaps to Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal Democrats of the 1930s, the rise of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU to their dominant position was less a success of personal mesmerism than a great alliance of important interests held together by the ingenious integrative system through which the CDU/CSU allows them to satisfy their demands. Where the party committees and the more informal devices for channeling demands were not considered sufficient "access" for the more "respectable" groups, in fact, Adenauer personally acted as the master integrator who would satisfy the group demands as he saw fit.<sup>43</sup> The dissatisfied groups and interests left out by this

<sup>40</sup> About the socio-economic changes since the 1920's, see Thomas Wellmann, "Die soziologische Grundlage der Bundesrepublik," *Deutsche Rundschau* (June 1953), pp. 591-600. Regarding the "status symbols," about 30% of West German households in 1961 had television sets and washing machines, mostly of the wringer type. Forty-two per cent had refrigerators and there was one automobile for about every ten persons or three families.

<sup>41</sup> Gerhard Schulz, "Ueber Entstehung und Formen von Interessengruppen in Deutschland seit Beginn der Industrialisierung," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 2 (July 1961), 126.

<sup>42</sup> *Herrschaft der Verbaende* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1955), p. 87.

<sup>43</sup> As Drs. Wolfgang Kralewski and Rupert Breitling of the Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft of Heidelberg University told this writer, this aspect of Chancellor democracy has become more and more prominent during the last term of Adenauer. See also Altmann, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

great rallying around Adenauer's pork barrel then tended to support the SPD as the only opposition party capable of doing something for them.

Many SPD voters, to be sure, are still motivated by traditional attachments. But we must guard against the fallacy of seeing in the new alignment a class alignment. Public opinion polls conducted in 1956 by the *Institut fuer Demoskopie* have shown that the magic word *bourgeois*, which once separated parties like the CDU/CSU and FDP from the SPD and revolutionary movements at both extremes, has a most hazy meaning for the man in the street.<sup>44</sup> During the last federal election campaign it seemed, in fact, as if the new alignment had something to do with the participation in the great economic boom of Western Germany: those who felt the "economic miracle" had passed them by or was unjustly distributed voted SPD. The SPD also enjoyed the support of local government interests, especially in the big cities, of other consumer interests whom the Adenauer government forgot, and of the giant German Trade Union Federation (DGB) with which it has shared many goals. The bipolar arrangement of interests is both partially caused by and behind the new West German trend towards a two-party system.

#### IV

To return to our original question, what does all this have to do with Adenauer's continuation in office? Apparently, this new alignment of interests leaves no secure place for the FDP or for other third parties to the right of the SPD. The FDP is even more dependent than the CDU/CSU on industrial, professional and *Mittelstand* groups—in other words, on the whole combine of interests behind the governing coalition. Their financial support is vital to the party, but the party's fate is not nearly as important to these groups as the fate of the CDU/CSU which is far too large to be ignored or circumvented in the striving for favorable government policies. A brief review of the history of the FDP in Bonn will show that this

was not the first time that the ability of the FDP to maneuver freely between CDU/CSU and SPD was curtailed by the group sponsors and finance sources of the Free Democrats.

Most notably in the 1953 elections, but possibly as early as 1949, the campaign contributions of industry to the FDP were made dependent on a promise not to attack the CDU/CSU but only the SPD. During the second term of Adenauer, the FDP became restless as the partner of a coalition in which the CDU/CSU alone possessed a majority of the *Bundestag* votes and repeatedly outvoted the FDP on key issues. In 1955 another restless coalition partner, the Refugees (BHE), drew the consequences and went into the opposition, leaving behind their leaders who had been cabinet ministers and now joined the CDU/CSU. Early in 1956, chafing over issues of foreign policy and a CDU/CSU threat to introduce an electoral law injurious to the FDP, restlessness turned into open revolt. The "Young Turks of Duesseldorf" broke up their coalition with the CDU in the state government of North Rhine Westphalia and joined with the SPD in a new coalition in order to demonstrate their freedom of choice. Adenauer forced the issue also at the federal level and sent the FDP to the opposition benches, again alienating most of its leadership in ministerial positions. This Adenauer faction of the FDP, sixteen deputies in all, split off, formed the Free People's Party (FVP) and ended up joining the DP, Adenauer's last surviving coalition partner. Immediately after the Duesseldorf rebellion the Sponsor Societies (*Foerderergesellschaften*), through whom the contributions of industry and business flow into the party treasuries of the government coalition, cut off all financial support from the FDP.<sup>45</sup> For the next three years, the FDP maintained a precarious freedom from such entanglement, though not from want. In the election campaign of 1957, the party hammered home the point that it could enter a coalition with the SPD just as well as with the CDU/CSU. The result was an alarmingly low vote (7.7 per cent) barely above the 5 per cent minimum required by law for representation in the *Bundestag*, while Adenauer won his biggest majority ever, 50.2 per cent of the popular vote. Under its new chairman, Erich Mende, a sobered FDP made its peace with the Sponsor Societies in 1959. Once more the vital funds

<sup>44</sup> To the question "Do you feel that the SPD is a bourgeois party?", 36% of the respondents said yes and 35% no. Among workers the percentages were 40% yes and 30% no, among SPD adherents 48% yes and 34% no, and among adherents of the CDU/CSU 34% yes and 39% no. The question is ambiguous, to be sure, but the percentages of positive responses are far too large to have come from the extreme left wing with the exception of a small fringe. *Jahrbuch der Oeffentlichen Meinung* 1957, p. 266.

<sup>45</sup> See also Dieter Schroeder, "Mende's Ziel: Eine liberale Volkspartei," *SZ*, Sept. 23/24, 1961, p. 4. For more details about the Sponsor Societies, see the forthcoming publication of Rupert Breitling on this subject.

began to flow, and advocates of FDP freedom, such as Thomas Dehler or Wolfgang Doering, were relegated more to the background. In the 1961 campaign, the FDP faithfully promised the voters not to enter a coalition with the SPD under any circumstances and thereby bought a short new lease on life. How long this lease will last, however, and whether it will stave off the merciless alternative between financial starvation and the deadly embrace of the CDU/CSU and the interests sustaining it remains to be seen.<sup>46</sup> The right-wing elements that switched their votes from Adenauer to the FDP in 1961 appear to be numerically too weak and politically too unreliable to assure the survival of the FDP between the two blocs. If they have voted CDU/CSU in the past they may do so again.

In 1960, the DP, which had lasted longest as Adenauer's coalition partner, met the same fate at his hands as the BHE and FDP before it. Deprived of some of its leaders, it was forced to go into opposition and finally concluded a disastrous electoral alliance with the remainders of the BHE in order to overcome the 5 per cent hurdle in the 1961 elections. The alliance failed in this attempt, and the last sequel of the DP story occurred like a bad omen for the FDP one week before the reelection of Adenauer as the Chancellor of the new CDU-/CSU-FDP coalition: the long-time chairman, founder and leading spirit of the DP, Heinrich Hellwege, ex-Minister President of Lower Saxony and Federal Minister, became a member of the CDU, taking with him a number of other prominent DP members.

These precedents explain a good part of the fear with which the FDP views Adenauer, its anxiety to replace him with Erhard and its distrust of the CDU/CSU in general. The course of the negotiations over the new coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP likewise bears out the thesis that the FDP has very little choice: the real situation of the FDP revealed itself within a week after the elections encouraged Mende to his proud words "Never again Adenauer" and Strauss to his abortive attempt to force the Old Man into a compromise with the FDP. Let us review the slow but certain retreat of the FDP from position to position, its high-handed treatment by Aden-

auer, and the tension which the painful process of retreat provoked within the FDP.

The erosion of the FDP position during the negotiations involved several distinct aspects. First of all, there was the question of the continuation of Adenauer as Chancellor. Then there were issues of coalition policy and of the FDP share of the personnel of the new cabinet. Finally, there was the controversial coalition contract between the two parties.

On the question of Adenauer's tenure of office, the retreat of the FDP began on the day when Adenauer won the unanimous endorsement of the new CDU/CSU caucus. Before that day, the kindest word about the Old Man had been a suggestion by the *FDP Pressedienst* to create an advisory position for ex-Chancellors in the cabinet. But now the *Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz* began to speak of "new aspects" which had arisen, namely the eagerness of the SPD for a "black-red" coalition and the withdrawal of Erhard as a candidate. At a rally for the by-elections at Cochem, moreover, Mende owned that, "Perhaps the FDP will have to examine whether it cannot give Federal Chancellor Adenauer its confidence for a transitional period."<sup>47</sup> In their despair, the Free Democrats tried to stall for time in the hope that Adenauer would not allow his international prestige to suffer from long delays during a state of crisis. As Mende put it, "Neither typhus, cholera, hunger or danger of war will break out if the new government is not formed right away."<sup>48</sup>

But it was not until a full month after the elections that Adenauer condescended to a declaration that he did not intend to serve another four years but would retire early so as to give his successor time to take charge of the office and to prepare for the elections of 1965. He would announce this intention in a letter to the caucus chairmen of the coalition, but would not name a specific date of retirement. Erhard undertook to defend this stand most eloquently before the CDU/CSU *Bundestag* caucus which endorsed it with warm applause. Unsure of itself, the FDP now responded by demanding a limitation of eighteen months and by turning the decision over to the Federal Main Committee of its extra-parliamentary party. It was a heart-wrenching decision for the FDP, but the Main Committee and even the former party chairmen Theodor Heuss and Reinhold Maier advocated entering a coalition

<sup>46</sup> One of the most popular election posters of the FDP in the 1961 campaign read "People who think ahead vote FDP." Toward the end of the coalition negotiations, a new version of this slogan made the rounds: "People who think ahead might as well vote CDU to begin with."

<sup>47</sup> *SZ*, Sept. 29, 1961; and Guenter Claus, "Die FDP und ihr Wankelmotor," *ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1961, p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> *Der Spiegel*, Oct. 11, 1961, pp. 25-6.

with Adenauer. Mende still tried to allay the fears of the anti-Adenauer wing of his party with the argument that the FDP could topple the Old Man after two years, if necessary, by leaving the government or refusing to pass the budget.<sup>49</sup> And thus it came to pass that the FDP contented itself with the vague promise embodied in the coalition contract:

The coalition partners take as their point of departure that the CDU chairman Dr. Konrad Adenauer will not occupy the office of the Chancellor for the entire legislative period.<sup>50</sup>

On the closely interrelated issues of personnel and policy, the FDP was not much more successful than on the question of ending Adenauer's tenure. At first glance, the biggest obstacle to agreement seemed to be the position of the FDP on foreign and defense policy. In 1956 the FDP had left the government, because, according to Thomas Dehler,

... we recognized the political sterility behind the swashbuckling policy of strength, saw the goal of German reunification recede into the distance and watched the tensions in Central Europe rise instead of fall.<sup>51</sup>

At its Frankfurt Convention in March 1961, the FDP suggested a policy of disengagement, greater flexibility in negotiating for reunification, and, in a pointed rebuff for Strauss, stated that military policy was not a purpose in itself but only an instrument of foreign policy. Germany should support NATO only until its future political and military status after reunification could be secured by a European system of mutual guarantees.<sup>51a</sup> Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, on the other hand, insisted on the continuation of their old foreign policy as their minimal demand for the coalition. If this had really been so important to the CDU/CSU it should have entered a coalition with the SPD rather than the FDP. But this goes to show that the domestic reasons attracting CDU/CSU and FDP to each other, the same reasons which produced the trend towards a two-party system, were much stronger than the adamant insistence of Adenauer on his policy of strength or the "new foreign policy" by which the FDP had distinguished itself both in 1956 and in the 1961 elections.

<sup>49</sup> *SZ*, Oct. 23, 1961.

<sup>50</sup> *FAZ*, Nov. 7, 1961.

<sup>51</sup> *SZ*, Oct. 2, 1961.

<sup>51a</sup> XII. Ordentlicher Bundesparteitag der FDP 23. bis 25. März 1961 in Frankfurt/Main (Bundesparteileitung der FDP, Bonn, no date), pp. 20-3, 81-4, 126.

Then the negotiations turned to matters of economic and social policy where the preferences of the FDP were known to clash with the promises which the CDU/CSU labor wing had extracted from Adenauer as well as with some details of social policy which the *Bundestag* had already enacted into law. Here too, the FDP dropped its demand for a revision of existing legislation, whereupon agreement followed all too quickly. In a short meeting of two hours at which no representative of the CDU/CSU labor wing was present, Adenauer convinced the FDP that there was enough common ground in economic and social policy between their two parties to skip specifics. Since there were rumors about a sell-out of the labor wing goals in the coalition contract, Hans Katzer wrote later in *Soziale Ordnung*, one of the publications of the Social Policy Committees, that the contract contained no provisions that stood in the way of an extension of labor co-determination above the plant level or of the introduction of a compulsory levy for the trade unions.<sup>52</sup>

The discussion of ministerial posts for the FDP began in the midst of the negotiations over questions of policy. The CDU had indicated that it would agree to a ratio of five FDP, four CSU and nine CDU ministers, not counting the Chancellor. But by the time Adenauer had slipped in his new protégé, Krone, and yielded to the pressure of CDU/CSU women for a female minister, the CDU share had increased from nine to eleven without any adjustment for the FDP. A brief look at the ministries the FDP received shows how small its share in the making of government policy was to be. Its biggest catch, the Finance Ministry, is no longer the position of strength it once was under Fritz Schaeffer (CSU).<sup>53</sup> Three further FDP ministries, Justice, Refugees and Federal Property, are not positions of great leverage. The fifth ministry, European Coordination, was painfully carved out of the functions of Erhard's Ministry of Economics. The CSU, by comparison, received two important ministries, Defense and Interior. Furthermore the FDP was granted five state secretaries in ministries it did not receive.<sup>54</sup>

The spirit of distrust which lay over the unequal alliance of FDP and CDU/CSU prompted the FDP to search for further guarantees for a true partnership. A coalition contract is not new in German political practice: previous coalition governments at the

<sup>52</sup> *Soziale Ordnung*, November, 1961.

<sup>53</sup> *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 22, 1961, pp. 25-6.

<sup>54</sup> For a list of the new ministers, see *FAZ*, Nov. 15, 1961.

federal and *Laender* levels, both under Weimar and until 1957 also in Bonn, had committed their policy agreements to paper. The campaign proclamation of the FDP for the 1961 elections had ended with a statement of readiness to join a coalition "in the spirit of partnership," provided that "(1) the political and material aims of the government coalition are committed to writing; (2) all important political questions are discussed and decided by a common coalition commission."<sup>55</sup> As it was laid down in the coalition contract, this commission is to review in weekly meetings all bills and policies emerging from within the cabinet or coalition parties in the *Bundestag* before their submission to cabinet or *Bundestag*. It is composed of the chairmen, vice-chairmen and executive managers of both *Bundestag* parties and occasionally also of experts from the two parties. This formula carefully excluded the party chairman and Federal Chancellor Adenauer.<sup>56</sup>

As already pointed out, this coalition contract embodies in some detail the principles of the foreign, defense, constitutional, economic and social policies agreed upon between the two parties. To be quite safe, the FDP also inserted into the contract the following clause:

The chairmen of the coalition parties and caucuses are obliged to see to it that the coalition parties in the *Bundestag* will not vote in changing majorities; in particular, that individual groups of the coalition parties in the *Bundestag* do not form majorities in some cases with the opposition.<sup>57</sup>

This injunction against a possible combination of the CDU/CSU labor wing with the SPD in voting for projects of social policy and perhaps also other details of the coalition contract provoked a major crisis in the negotiations over the coalition. After fruitless efforts by the CDU/CSU to revise "the FDP paper," as Adenauer called it, Strauss devised the following preamble for it:

<sup>55</sup> *Aufruf der Freien Demokratischen Partei*, zur Bundestagswahl 1961.

<sup>56</sup> Erich Mende, "Regierungspartnerschaft und Koalitionsausschuss," *SZ*, Nov. 25/26, 1961, p. 4; and Thomas Dehler, "Die Stimme der FDP," *Abendzeitung* (Munich), Nov. 9, 1961.

<sup>57</sup> A perhaps less obvious but quite real purpose of this clause might also have been the prevention of cooperation between the CDU/CSU and SPD in matters of foreign policy and European integration, two other fields in which the SPD position is much closer to Adenauer's policies than that of the FDP.

The contents of coalition policy are the notes edited by representatives of both parties on October 20. This document *together with the other papers submitted during the coalition negotiations* represents basis and goal of our common task.<sup>58</sup>

This passage (italics supplied) meant nothing less than that all kinds of memoranda and notes handed to the FDP leaders during the meetings would have just as much force as the coalition contract itself. The FDP caucus rejected this preamble by a vote of 50 to 10. The German press had already blossomed forth with headlines about the "final agreement," when it turned out that the coalition negotiations had once more reached an impasse. It took considerable efforts on the part of Adenauer to overcome the new distrust aroused by this last maneuver. Finally the FDP had the signatures of both parties on its contract, with which it hoped to make up for what it lacked in power and stamina for this *societas leonina*, the coalition between the lion and the mouse.

The efficacy of such a contract under these circumstances is doubtful. First of all there is the question of good faith on the part of the CDU/CSU: the *SPD Pressedienst* claimed that at the signing of the contract by the CDU/CSU, Adenauer told his party that he considered the contract worthless and therefore its questionable constitutionality<sup>59</sup> a moot issue. Then there is its dubious tactical value. To be sure, the FDP has a very real power to walk out on Adenauer if he should violate their agreements. But how can the FDP coerce groups of the CDU/CSU not to break the contract by voting with the SPD? By leaving the government coalition and forming a new one with the SPD or encouraging the CDU/CSU to do so?

We can also gather the limitations upon the FDP's freedom of choice from the treatment which the party had to endure at the hands of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU as well as from

<sup>58</sup> Dieter Schroeder, "Der grosse Zank um das Koalitionspapier," *SZ*, Nov. 4/5, 1961, p. 3; also the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, Nov. 4, 1961.

<sup>59</sup> The coalition contract violates arts. 38 and 65 of the Basic Law. Art. 38 declares that Bundestag deputies are not bound by instructions such as the injunction against voting with the SPD but only by their consciences—which apparently have never been an obstacle to strict party discipline. Art. 65 designates the Federal Chancellor and not a coalition commission as the agency which determines the principles of government policy. See Guenter Gaus, "Ein Koalitionsabkommen ist nicht bindend," *SZ*, Nov. 11/12, 1961, p. 4.

the tensions arising within the party. There was no lack of public statements by CDU/CSU leaders accusing the FDP of being "unrealistic," "disloyal" and an object of understandable distrust. Very revealing, too, was the dispute between SPD and CDU/CSU over whether the *Bundestag* President should have two or four Vice Presidents. The CDU/CSU preferred the latter, which would enable it to give one Vice Presidency to the CSU. The FDP at first inclined to the SPD solution, yet was soon persuaded to vote along with its coalition partner. But even its initial thought of independent action was far more than the CDU/CSU intended to tolerate from the FDP.<sup>60</sup>

The tensions within the FDP provoked by the new coalition with Adenauer also bore witness to the violence done to the party by the circumstances. The initial rejection of Adenauer had behind it a determined minority composed of FDP politicians who remembered his past treatment of the party all too well, others who toyed with the thought of playing the "national opposition" during the international trials and tribulations that lay ahead for Western Germany, Hamburg deputies who feared the wrath of the voters in the imminent state elections, and the Young Democrats who impatiently awaited the end of the Adenauer era. Accepting Adenauer after rejecting him so emphatically was extremely embarrassing and apt to make the FDP the laughing-stock of Western Germany. Under the pressure of events, the internal fronts pro and contra Adenauer soon crystallized. Some state parties, e.g., Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine Westphalia, were for a coalition with the CDU/CSU because they feared that continued resistance to Adenauer would diminish their chances of participating with the CDU in their state governments. In other states, such as Hamburg, Hesse and the Saar, on the other hand, the opposition to Adenauer was so bitter that the state party chairmen of the latter two eventually resigned their positions when the last doubt about his survival vanished.

Three or four weeks after the elections, the FDP leaders in the *Bundestag* were so unsure of themselves that they proposed to call a party convention or at least the Federal Main Committee of their party in order to share the responsibility with the whole party and to avoid offense to the anti-Adenauer minority. After some discussion they called the Main Committee, a body composed of sixty advisory members—mostly *Bundestag* deputies—and 96 voting members of whom 31 were members of

the Party Executive Board and 65 were state party delegates. Adenauer made it difficult for the Main Committee to decide in his favor by insisting a few days before its meeting that he would tolerate no limitation of his tenure, no change in the Foreign Office, and no revision of past legislation on social policy.<sup>61</sup> Still the Main Committee endorsed a coalition with Adenauer and the record of the coalition negotiations to this date, provided that Adenauer's term was somehow limited and that the personnel of the Foreign Office was to the party's satisfaction.<sup>62</sup> But in the end, there was a feeling both among FDP and CDU/CSU deputies that the birth of the new coalition called for a personal sacrifice. Since they had not been able to topple the Old Man, another whipping boy had to be found to save the face of Adenauer's would-be assassins. The *Deutsche Zeitung* published a cartoon showing in the background a guillotine operated by the leaders of the FDP. In the foreground, Mende is imploring Adenauer for "a head, a little head, a very tiny head." Next to Adenauer stands the victim, Foreign Minister von Brentano.<sup>63</sup>

## V

While the political rigidities of the West German system and in particular the persistence of the coalition of interests have prolonged Adenauer's life as Chancellor, they have not been able to remove the causes of his growing weakness: his reelection by the *Bundestag* revealed the waning of his political power. With the prolonged coalition crisis, his popularity reached an all-time low. During and after his visit to Washington, his system of foreign policy showed signs of coming apart at the seams. Least reparable of all, his aged physique responded to the strain of it all with illness. The days of the Adenauer era are numbered.

On November 7, 1961, six and one-half weeks after the elections to the *Bundestag*, Konrad Adenauer for the fourth time was elected Federal Chancellor. Of the 490 deputies present, not counting those from Berlin, he received 258 votes, a slim margin of eight more than he needed. There were 206 votes cast against him and 26 deputies abstained. Forty-nine deputies of his coalition parties either abstained or voted against him. The composition of this internal opposition in the new

<sup>61</sup> *Der Spiegel*, Oct. 25, 1961, p. 28.

<sup>62</sup> *SZ*, Oct. 23, 1961.

<sup>63</sup> Dieter Schroeder, "Bonner Planspiele um Ministersessel," *SZ*, Oct. 14/15, 1961, p. 3. For the cartoon, see the reprint in *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 1, 1961, p. 21.

<sup>60</sup> *FAZ*, Oct. 18, 1961.

TABLE II. CHANCELLOR ELECTIONS BY THE  
*Bundestag*, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961

Year	Legal Number of Deputies	Votes Neces- sary for Election	Deputies Present	Deputies voting		
				Yes	Abstaining	No
1949	402	202	389	202	44	142
1953	487	244	467	305	14	148
1957	497	249	476	274	9	193
1961	499	250	490	258	26	206

coalition government can only be guessed. About 15 FDP deputies may have voted no. Twenty abstentions were said to have come from the CSU. This leaves about eight no votes and six abstentions for the *frondeurs* and friends of the offended Erhard in the CDU. The size of this negative vote surprised many observers, although the press had often estimated Adenauer's secret enemies in the CDU/CSU to number between forty and fifty. If we compare this Chancellor election with the previous elections of Adenauer, it becomes quite clear that his margin of safety has not been so small nor his opposition so large since 1949 (Table II). We can also attempt similar comparisons of the size of his internal opposition in these election years, although we cannot say with certainty when deputies in the opposition parties crossed party lines to support him and thereby made up a deficit in his own coalition parties (Table III). But even a very rough estimate shows clearly that the opposition to Adenauer within the parties of the government coalition has never been as great as at this time.

The decline of Adenauer's popularity is accelerated by the public sentiment that his whole political system is in need of drastic

adjustment and that he is not the man to bring it about. Since the conservative Basic Law deliberately frustrates such sudden popular passions as the desire to remove a party leader from among the eligible men for the office of Chancellor, West Germans experienced the coalition crisis as a crisis of democracy. As CDU Vice President von Hassel wrote in the *Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz*, the critical attitude of the public toward the parties, democracy and the state in reaction to the elections and coalition negotiations has assumed forms reminiscent of the last phase of the Weimar Republic. Other observers call for the democratization of the Basic Law and express their fear that once more, as in 1848, 1908 and 1928, constitutional reform will be delayed in Germany until it is too late.

Already the state elections of Hamburg have shown a significant drop in electoral participation as compared to the last state elections and the federal elections of 1961. But the need for responsibility in foreign policy is no less than in domestic policies, and the real dilemma appears to lie in the accumulation of unsolved problems rather than in the difficulties of any single question. We can conclude, with an editorial writer of the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, that

... the case has now arisen that thoughtful opponents of Adenauer's policies wish he would continue to stay in office, the longer the better, so that one would not have to deal at once with everything that has been left unfinished during the last twelve years. But even if we gain a breathing spell in this manner, the day is near when the politics of the Federal Republic is no longer made by one man.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Guenter Gaus, "Adenauer," *SZ*, Nov. 4/5, 1961.

TABLE III. INTERNAL OPPOSITION AT CHANCELLOR ELECTIONS, 1949 TO 1961

Year	Coalition Parties	Total Coalition	Voting Yes	Internal Opposition	Total Noes and Abstentions	SPD Deputies
1949	CDU/CSU-FDP-DP 139 52 17	208	202	None (?)	186	131
1953	CDU/CSU-FDP-DP-BHE 244 48 15 27	334	305	About 15	162	151
1957	CDU/CSU-DP 270 17	287	274	About 2	202	169
1961	CDU/CSU-FDP 242 67	309	258	49	232	190



## HAGGLING FOR THE EQUILIBRIUM: THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE AUSTRIAN COALITION, 1959\*

FREDERICK C. ENGELMANN

*University of Alberta, Calgary*

On May 10, 1959, Austrian voters, in giving overwhelming support to the coalition that has been governing them since 1945, split their ballots about as evenly as possible between the two competing coalition partners. The Socialist Party (SPOe) obtained 50.3 per cent of the vote cast for the coalition parties; but the People's Party (OeVP), despite a rigorous system of proportional representation,<sup>1</sup> moved into the new Parliament with 79 seats, a plurality of one over the SPOe. The election of 1953 had shown strikingly similar results. Then, the Socialists had not been able to translate the electoral tie into a complete governmental equilibrium.<sup>2</sup> This time, stung by losses sustained in the government negotiations after the OeVP's victory in the 1956 parliamentary election, and encouraged by its own victory in the 1957 presidential election,<sup>3</sup> the Socialists demanded

the formation of a government based on perfect equality of the two partners. They had waged the campaign with a plea to the voters to place the ship of state in equilibrium,<sup>4</sup> and the voters had responded. For eleven weeks following the balloting, OeVP and SPOe engaged in coalition renegotiations which are recounted and analyzed in this study because of the light they throw on the nature of the rigid coalition that has become postwar Austria's contribution to the taxonomy of political institutions.

### I

The rigid coalition between OeVP and SPOe has been introduced—though scantily—to the American reading public. While critics and objective observers agree with Austria's leading politicians in the assessment that the coalition was a response to the civil-war tension of the First Republic,<sup>5</sup> outside observers have generally been satisfied to present the coalition system primarily as a double-veto, double-patronage arrangement of two political organizations.<sup>6</sup> Such a characterization, though

\* Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, supplemented by a grant from the Alfred University Research Foundation, Alfred, N. Y. The writer wishes to express his gratitude to both foundations.

<sup>1</sup> The system, using the Hagenbach-Bischoff method within the basic districts (25), and the d'Hondt method for the figuring of remainders in the superior districts (4), is described in U. W. Kitzinger, "The Austrian Electoral System," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 12 (1959), pp. 392-404. Representation is based on population. Since the birth rate is higher in predominantly OeVP areas, seats come slightly more cheaply to that party; hence the discrepancy between the pluralities of votes and seats in a close election.

<sup>2</sup> In 1953 the Socialists, with 50.5% of the major-party vote, obtained 73 seats, and the OeVP 74. Though the OeVP had declined to this position from a 10-seat advantage in 1949, it was able to maintain its 6:5 preponderance in ministries, though it had to make concessions in policy matters. A revision of the ministerial balance was averted by the OeVP in view of the fact that the SPOe had been, if anything, unduly successful in 1949. In that year, the party, though not victorious, had seized control of the nationalized industries from the coalition partner.

<sup>3</sup> In 1956, the OeVP obtained 45.96%, the national-liberal opposition (FPOe) 6.52% (a total of 52.48%), against 43.04% for the SPOe.

In 1957, Wolfgang Denk, the OeVP-FPOe candidate, received 48.88%, while Adolf Schaerf, the Socialist candidate, was elected with 51.12% of the vote.

<sup>4</sup> The equilibrium theme, which will be discussed throughout this paper, was emphasized, with apparent success, in a widely displayed Socialist election poster which showed the ship of state listing dangerously toward the side of the People's Party. For a presentation of the poster and a discussion of its impact on the campaign, see *Forum* (Vienna), Vol. 6 (1959), pp. 167-169; see also Matthias Glatzl, "Die Zahlen der Wahlen," *Oesterreichische Monatshefte*, May 1959, pp. 2-4, and Kitzinger, "The Austrian Election of 1959," *Political Studies*, Vol. 9 (1961), pp. 119-140, at p. 125.

<sup>5</sup> For accounts of these tensions, see Adam Wandruszka, "Oesterreichs politische Struktur," in Heinrich Benedikt (ed.), *Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich* (Vienna, 1954), pp. 289-485; and Charles A. Gulick's monumental and detailed, but strongly biased, *Austria from Habsburg to Hitler* (Berkeley, 1948).

<sup>6</sup> The only American scholarly writing dealing entirely with the Austrian coalition is Herbert P. Secher, "Coalition Government: The Case of the

justified by the practices of the coalition, fails to do justice to the true nature of Austria's governing alliance. A description of this alliance and of any institution and process through which it operates must come to grips with the central socio-political fact in the life of post-1918 Austria: the Republic had developed under conditions of cleavage so deep as to leave it with a high potential for—and a sporadic actuality of—civil war. The coalition must be viewed as an effort to establish minimum consensus in the face of this cleavage.<sup>7</sup>

Once the Treaty of St. Germain forbade the *Anschluss* of German Austria to Germany, each of the three powerful party-interest-ideology combines—aptly called *Lager*<sup>8</sup>—within the young republic attempted to impose its image on the state. These *Lager* were the Catholic clerical, the Marxist socialist, and the German national; the first two each claimed the steady allegiance of about two-fifths of Austria's

Second Austrian Republic," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 791–808. The coalition is discussed in Richard Hiscocks, *The Rebirth of Austria* (New York, 1953), pp. 46–52, and in Gordon Shepherd, *The Austrian Odyssey* (New York, 1957), pp. 183–188; it is also partially the topic of Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," *Social Research*, Vol. 24 (1957), pp. 127–156, especially pp. 136–152, and of Gulick, "Austria's Socialists in the Trend Toward a Two-Party System," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (1958), pp. 539–562. For a trenchant but only partially valid account of the coalition, with undue emphasis on its personnel practices, see John MacCormac, "The Improbable Coalition that Governs Austria," *Reporter*, January 23, 1958, pp. 33–37. Hiscocks and Gulick (for all his Socialist bias) deal seriously with the basic aspects of the coalition, especially the socio-political and psychological ones, while Shepherd and Secher are concerned more with a critique of its policy-making and personnel practices. Particularly incisive and, at the same time, sympathetic observations on the coalition are contained in Gustav E. Kafka, "Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der politischen Parteien im modernen Staat," *Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer*, Vol. 17 (1959), pp. 53–102.

<sup>7</sup> The juxtaposition of these terms stems from S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), pp. 21–22.

<sup>8</sup> *Lager* means camp, or armed camp. The term stems from Wandruszka, *loc. cit.* See also Alfred Diamant, "The Group Basis of Austrian Politics," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 18 (1958), pp. 134–155.

voters, while the national camp was the weakest until strengthened by Hitler's rise to power in Germany. The *Buergerblock*<sup>9</sup>—an anti-socialist coalition, mostly under clerical domination—governed Austria from 1920 on, with the Social Democrats in total and generally nonconstructive opposition. Some of the political warfare among the three *Lager* was carried on in the streets by para-military organizations. But, despite eighteen years of Christian Social rule, no *Lager* had any lasting success in making itself the state. The Social Democrats were smashed in the frantic attempt of the Mussolini-backed Christian Social dictatorship to establish a united front against Hitler; the Christian Socials and their sterile Patriotic Front were in turn smashed by the Nazis; and the Nazis themselves went under with the ruins of the Austrian section of the Thousand-year Reich. But the seven years of Austria's obliteration by Germany had given some of the leaders of the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials the opportunity to reflect on the tragedy of the First Republic's socio-political tension, often during common imprisonment in Nazi jails and concentration camps. Then, at least a few individuals developed the notion that the two non-national *Lager* would have to collaborate in resurrecting a liberated Austria.<sup>10</sup> The presence of the Red Army in Vienna and Eastern Austria in April, 1945 shaped these notions of collaboration not into a two-party coalition, but rather into an anti-Fascist concentration of Communists, Socialists, and People's Party.<sup>11</sup> Only the sheerest luck, and grave miscalculations of Austrian Communists, led to inter-Allied agreement on free elections to be held in all of Austria in

<sup>9</sup> *Buergerblock* (bourgeois bloc) coalitions consisted invariably of the Christian Social (Catholic clerical) Party, and, simultaneously or alternately, of the Pan-German Party and the Agrarian League, both nationalist groups.

<sup>10</sup> Varying accounts of Socialist-Catholic contacts during the Nazi occupation can be found in Alfred Kasamas, *Programm Oesterreich* (Vienna 1949), pp. 12–13, and Adolf Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Erneuerung 1945–1955* (Vienna, 1955), pp. 21–22.

<sup>11</sup> The most detailed account of the formation of the concentration government is found in Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Wiederaufrichtung in 1945* (Vienna, 1960), pp. 69–86. The formation of the Austrian People's Party—in most respects the successor of the Christian Social Party—in 1945 is reported most reliably in Lois Weinberger, *Tatsachen, Begegnungen und Gespraechе* (Vienna, 1948), pp. 243–248. For the original basis of party collaboration see Kafka, *loc. cit.*, p. 86n.

November, 1945. These elections, in which only the three concentration parties were allowed to compete, gave one half of the vote to the OeVP, and only 5.4 per cent to the Communists.<sup>12</sup> Prior agreement to divide major offices and portfolios according to the proportion of parliamentary seats obtained made the hitherto equally represented Communists a junior partner in the concentration. In a wage-price crisis in 1947, the sole Communist minister resigned from the government, and an OeVP-SPOe coalition, the vision of some of the common sufferers of Nazism, remained.

During the years leading up to 1955, when the Austrian State Treaty ended the occupation on the part of the U. S., Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., the coalition regime and its stability gave Austria maximal unity *vis-à-vis* the occupying powers. The coalition made it impossible for any of these powers to take advantage of Austrian internal politics, it enabled the impoverished country to profit fully from Marshall Plan aid, and it gave Austria the necessary strength to deal with Russian chicaneries. Through the occupation period, then, the coalition was a virtual necessity for Austria, and its strong support by the electorate in 1949 and 1953 was to be expected. By 1955, the coalition had become so much part of the post-war political scene that it was able to attain massive electoral victories in 1956 and 1959.<sup>13</sup>

The continuation of the coalition beyond 1955 shows that it is more than a marriage of convenience. The fact that it binds the chief political exponents of the two major *Lager*<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The OeVP gained 49.9% of the vote, the SPOe 44.7%. The OeVP obtained 85 seats, an absolute majority; the SPOe, 76 seats; the Communists, 4 seats.

<sup>13</sup> This statement remains valid even when it is conceded that the vast majority of Austrian voters vote primarily for one of the coalition parties, and only secondarily for the coalition itself. The voters are of course acquainted with the coalition partners' pre-election resolve to continue the coalition; also, a private public-opinion poll, taken in 1958, showed 90% of those asked as favoring the continuation of the coalition. This poll was commissioned by anti-coalition elements; most friendly to the coalition were housewives, with 94% affirmative replies, and least friendly upper- and middle-income groups, with 86% affirmative replies.

<sup>14</sup> The third *Lager*, the nationalist, does not participate for the very reason that the coalition began as a union of non-Nazi Austrians. The formally organized national-liberal party (League

gives it a second, socio-economic, dimension, especially since the rigid *Lager*-interest tie-up of the First Republic—excellently demonstrated by Alfred Diamant<sup>15</sup>—continues in the Second Republic. Austria has today, to be sure, a supra-partisan Trade Union Federation (OeGB), but all of the workers' unions are led by Socialists and the OeGB is therefore led by its Socialist fraction. Elections to the Chamber of Labor, moreover, show heavy Socialist majorities. Peasants, on the other hand, are heavily in the camp of the OeVP, both organizationally and electorally. The same can be said of the business community, and of many of its white-collar employees.<sup>16</sup> The coalition is thus more than a political coalition of the two major political parties with an extremely stable vote and a history of tense relations; it is also a social coalition between the leaders, organizations, and the bulk of the members of Austrian business and agriculture on the one side, and the leaders, organizations, and the bulk of the members of Austrian labor on the other. The congruence between these social and political line-ups remains despite recent signs of some social mobility, and despite the loosening of the ideological fronts on both sides, of which the principal tokens are the withdrawal of the Catholic church from partisan politics,<sup>17</sup> and the adoption of the new Socialist Party program of 1958.<sup>18</sup> The interests them-

of Independents, VdU; since 1955 Liberal Party, FPÖe) does not contain all of Austria's former active Nazis, nor are all of its adherents former active Nazis. The party was licensed in 1949 after a Socialist drive to bring about the launching of a second non-Socialist group, which would end the parliamentary majority of the OeVP; see Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Erneuerung*, pp. 238-247; Oskar Helmer, *50 Jahre erlebte Geschichte* (Vienna, 1957), pp. 247-248.

<sup>15</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 136-141.

<sup>16</sup> For Austria's chamber and interest structure, see Secher, "Representative Democracy or 'Chamber State': The Ambiguous Role of Interest Groups in Austrian Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (1960), pp. 890-909. Elections held since those reported by Secher have shown similar results.

<sup>17</sup> In 1945 Cardinal Innitzer prohibited political activity and office-holding on the part of the Catholic clergy; Schaerf, *op. cit.*, p. 189. This prohibition was in sharp contrast to the practice of the First Republic. Then, Ignaz Seipel, a cleric, was the principal leader of the Christian Social Party, and twice Federal Chancellor.

<sup>18</sup> The program, drawn up by a committee headed by Benedikt Kautsky—the son of Karl

selves have come to understand one another better through their coalition dealings;<sup>19</sup> but the parties—in a special position in the Second Republic because they were the agencies that took the legitimate steps of reestablishing the Austrian Republic in 1945<sup>20</sup>—maintain their primacy in political life. Thus, at this time when *Lager* mentality tends to decline, the organizational rigidity of the *Lager*, and therefore their political relevance, remain as strong as ever.

In addition to the political and social aspects of the Austrian coalition, a psychological one should be noted. The equality of the parties is to some extent itself the result of two inequalities. The Socialist Party is the better and more rationally organized, and it commands more readily mobilized resources.<sup>21</sup> The People's Party, on the other hand, continues to enjoy a psychological advantage which stems from Austria's past. Neither of the two parties can claim to be the legitimate successor of the Habsburgs; but the Christian Social rule from 1920 to 1938 identified that party with the state—an identification that continues to live in the minds of most people who are not in the Socialist camp.<sup>22</sup> It leads to apprehension on the part of the SPOe that it might at some future date be again relegated to a position of permanent opposition.

The political culture within which the Austrian coalition operates is a typical representative of the Continental European political

system as described by Gabriel Almond.<sup>23</sup> The Austrian *Lager* correspond to Almond's three components, the Catholic pre-industrial, the older middle-class, and the industrial.<sup>24</sup> While the older middle-class sub-culture is weak and partially submerged, the two major components of Austrian society continue to show elements of what Almond calls an alienation from the political market. But the hard-won realization in the Second Republic is that bargain they must, and the coalition emerges, in Almond's terms, as a set of institutionalized under-the-counter transactions,<sup>25</sup> a *modus vivendi* between the two main forces in a cloven society.

## II

The coalition operates in an extra-constitutional area. Its modes and procedures are set by formal agreements between the parties and by practices that have developed since 1945. The process of the coalition will be explained in the following schematic statement.

The dissolution of Parliament (agreed upon prior to the expiration of the four-year term in all cases after 1949) takes place by agreement of the coalition partners, yet most accounts agree that each one of the premature dissolutions resulted from the challenge of one of the partners.<sup>26</sup> The campaign does not start officially till the election date is set, but party newspapers and press services on both sides immediately launch attacks on the partner, which exceed in severity the normal day-to-day criticism each party makes of the partner's policy proposals or vetoes, and of the administration of ministries controlled by the partner. Each partner issues an election manifesto that contains favored policy proposals, and party speakers and the party press labor the issues selected for emphasis by the party executives. At some point, each of the parties announces its intention to continue the coalition after the election, though the OeVP is likely at least to hint at the possibility of including the national liberal opposition (FPÖ) in the coalition, if only to strengthen its bargaining position.<sup>27</sup>

Kautsky—and adopted on May 14, 1958, says: "Socialism and Christianity, the religion of love of one's neighbour, are entirely compatible with each other. There can be no conflict between a Socialism which is based on ethical convictions, and the religious communities, so long as the latter avoid using the machinery of the state for the attainment of denominational demands. . . ." SPOe, *The New Programme of Austrian Socialism* (Vienna, 1958), pp. 6–7.

<sup>19</sup> Secher, *loc. cit.* note 16 above, pp. 904–906.

<sup>20</sup> This point is emphasized by Kafka, *loc. cit.*, pp. 66–67.

<sup>21</sup> The party, united by Victor Adler in 1889, is one of the truly remarkable political organizations of political history; witness its sudden and effective resurrection in 1945, after eleven years of suppression. Its most formidable potential resource is the strike threat it wields through its domination of the OeGB. Paradoxically, the party also controls Austria's largest private bank, the *Arbeiterbank*.

<sup>22</sup> The writer will offer evidence for this and similar assertions in a later work on the Austrian coalition and democracy.

<sup>23</sup> "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 391–409.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 405–408.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 407.

<sup>26</sup> The dissolutions of 1953 and 1959 were urged by the OeVP, that of 1956 by the SPOe. The challenger sustained losses in every case.

<sup>27</sup> See note 14. For a detailed, though hostile, account of OeVP efforts to include the VdU in the coalition (in 1953) see Schaerf, *Oesterreichs Erneuerung*, pp. 328–331, 334–336.

Since the election is not expected to bring about a massive shift of votes, the slightest change in the popular vote and in the distribution of mandates is noted emphatically on either side, in speeches of party leaders and by the party press. The election is followed by negotiations to which both party executives appoint committees. These committees go about the task of renegotiating the terms of the coalition in the light of the election results. There are proposals and counterproposals, some submitted with diplomatic discretion and others broadcast by the party press services. Most of the time and effort of the negotiators is spent in changing, however slightly, the distribution of portfolios between the partners, and their relative influence over government corporations and nationalized industries. Policies receive but scant notice, and the resulting government declaration is essentially a somewhat compromised addition of the competing election manifestoes.<sup>28</sup> The distribution of portfolios, as well as the agreed-upon arrangements concerning government corporations and nationalized industries, are laid down in the final coalition pact.<sup>29</sup> From then on, policy-making, which in all essentials requires agreement of the two partners,<sup>30</sup> tends to take place in an essentially quantitative manner. The coalition committee, a body containing the five principal leaders of each of the partners, normally clears policies only when the negotiators of one party have bought agreement to one of their policies by agreeing to a policy proposed by their partners. These joint policy agreements, called *Junktim*, are, next to the *Proporz* (the much discussed and criticized double-patronage system by which the coalition partners divide public employment between their adherents),<sup>31</sup> the

main point of attack on the coalition from the opposition and the independent press. A *Junktim* may be pointed to with pride by the party press on both sides, or the partner may be attacked for having exacted an undue or an irrelevant price. A refused *Junktim* is almost always made the subject of attacks on the coalition partner.

While the distribution of portfolios has been the main business of all renegotiations of the coalition since 1949, only few have ever changed hands. Finance, education, commerce, and agriculture—portfolios connected with business, agriculture, and religion—have always been the domain of the OeVP; while the Socialists have kept interior, justice, and social welfare—portfolios connected with labor and with the internal protection of the republic. Civil service rules make it impossible to remove all civil servants of the other party (a problem for Socialists only, since virtually all civil servants of the First Republic were non-Socialists), but the government departments just mentioned have become the distinct domain of one or the other of the coalition parties.

### III

Four aspects of the negotiations following the election of 1959 should be noted particularly: first, the implementation of the equilibrium; second, the role of President Schaerf; third, the tension between clericalism and liberalism in the OeVP; fourth, Socialist insistence on the rigid coalition. Concerning the first aspect, the People's Party's predominance gained in 1956 had been turned into an equilibrium between the partners, which could be implemented on the governmental level only after protracted haggling. Regarding the President's role, he entered the scene after Julius Raab and Bruno Pittermann, their parties' chief negotiators, had failed to reach agreement. Schaerf, though himself the former leader of the SPOe, exercised (for the first time in republican history) the function of a "*pouvoir neutre*."<sup>32</sup> His mediating solution, for which he enlisted the aid of the caucus leaders of the Parliament, not that of the deadlocked

<sup>28</sup> In 1959, the government declaration was an amalgam of the wishes of both parties. Earlier declarations had reflected primarily the policy intentions of the chancellor.

<sup>29</sup> Prior to 1956, the coalition pacts were secret. Schaerf, claiming as his justification the publication (in 1954) of the 1949 pact by a VdU journal, published the 1953 pact in *Oesterreichs Erneuerung*, pp. 332-334. The 1956 and 1959 pacts were published in pursuance of inter-party agreement; *Wiener Zeitung*, June 27, 1956, p. 1; July 26, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> The struggle over exceptions to this unanimity requirement (the so-called coalition-free area) is one of the major themes of the two subsequent sections of this article.

<sup>31</sup> Secher, *loc. cit.*, MacCormac, *loc. cit.*, and others have overdrawn the specter of the *Proporz*. The system applies to the personnel of the govern-

ing boards and management of government corporations and nationalized industries, but not to the ordinary bureaucracy. There is, on the other hand, no regular merit system; rather, with exceptions, the party of the minister dominates the appointments to his department. For an accurate description of the *Proporz* see Kafka, *loc. cit.*, pp. 87-91.

<sup>32</sup> For an earlier account of the position of the President, see *ibid.*, p. 82.

Cabinet leaders, was to continue the coalition under Raab's leadership. In respect to the situation within the OeVP, its defeat brought to the fore the tension between its main body of clericalism and agrarianism on the one side, and its liberal wing on the other. This tension, which became apparent in the Kamitz episode (discussed below), continues to beset the party and colors its attitude toward the coalition, which is opposed in whole or part by the liberal wing.

The final aspect, Socialist insistence on the rigid coalition, was manifested in the political, social, and psychological tension of the pre-campaign sparring, the campaign itself, and the negotiations. The OeVP, having tasted victory in 1956, felt a yearning for at least part of its First-Republic primacy. To the SPOe, the removal of the absolute veto on coalition policy would bring about the domination of labor by business and agriculture. If anything, the party's apprehension of a resurrection of the *Buergerblock* was heightened by the gradual removal of socialists from other European governments.

In 1956, the OeVP had outpolled the Socialists largely because of its stand against the nationalization of the enterprises acquired by Austria through the State Treaty of 1955 (oil, civil aviation, broadcasting).<sup>33</sup> In the negotiations, the SPOe lost control of already nationalized industries to a bipartisan body (IBV)<sup>34</sup> in which the Chancellor had the casting vote. One year later, Adolf Schaerf, the SPOe leader, was elected President over a supra-partisan surgeon nominated by Raab; one of the win-

ning slogans was the balancing of a "black" chancellor by a "red" president.<sup>35</sup> The discrepancy of these election returns, a stroke suffered by Raab, alleged intransigence of Pittermann, and a number of scandals (involving primarily, but not solely, the OeVP),<sup>36</sup> all but paralyzed the coalition by 1958. The OeVP, as plurality party, had been the author of most of the items in the government declaration of 1956; in its eagerness to enact some of them despite Socialist opposition (a circumstance necessitating a loosened-up coalition), it wanted to move up the parliamentary election, not due till 1960. The Socialists for their part were in no hurry to go to the polls.

Raab forced the election issue in a statement of March 5, 1959, which contained the following:

In the interest of maintaining Austria's political stability, we will have to rejoin in a coalition once more after the next election. What will have to be changed is the present rigid form of the coalition pact, which contains in practice an absolute veto for a partner who is not willing to negotiate, a feature preventing necessary decisions in vital questions.<sup>37</sup>

The Socialists, whose consent was required for a premature dissolution, agreed on a May 10 election, reminding the voters in their reply of "... the opportunity to decide against the autocracy of one party and for the continuation of ... political and economic collaboration. . . ."<sup>38</sup> Thus, even before the campaign began, the issue was joined between a reluctant and an eager partner, a situation enhanced by a Raab statement that a three-party coalition (including the FPÖe) should be contemplated after the election.<sup>39</sup>

The opposing manifestoes, issued at the official start of the campaign, April 1, brought little that was surprising. While the Socialists came forward with such doctrinaire terms as "collective economy" and "property gained through labor," they mainly advocated a

<sup>33</sup> The OeVP voting percentage climbed from 41.26% in 1953 to 45.96% in 1956. The FPÖe voting percentage showed a corresponding decline, from 10.95% in 1953 (VdU) to 6.52% in 1956. The Socialists more than held their own, rising from 42.11% in 1953 to 43.04% in 1956. In Vienna, however, where the fortunes of the SPOe are watched most closely, its percentage fell from 50.15% to 49.73%, and it actually lost 36,692 votes. The decline, expressed mostly through abstentions, was ascribed by many to the considerable increase in streetcar fares in 1955 by the Socialist city government. The writer was told that many thousands put streetcar tickets instead of ballots in their voting envelopes. For a discussion of the internal issues arising from the State Treaty, see Secher, "Coalition Government," *loc. cit.*, pp. 799-807.

<sup>34</sup> The letters stood for *Industrie- und Bergbauverwaltung* (Industrial and Mining Administration). From 1956 to 1959, the IBV was the parent body for the government of the nationalized industries.

<sup>35</sup> See note 3. Schaerf's voting percentage of 51.12% in the face of bipartisan opposition contrasts with Socialist parliamentary-election percentages of 42.11% in 1953, 43.04% in 1956, and 44.79% in 1959.

<sup>36</sup> The scandals are described concisely by Kitzinger, *loc. cit.*, p. 123. The OeVP, as the party of business, is bound to sustain damage from alleged scandals, just as alleged unseemly trade-union practices are bound to hurt the Socialists.

<sup>37</sup> *Wiener Zeitung*, March 6, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.*, March 7, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.*, March 12, 1959, p. 2; *Die Presse*, March 12, 1959, p. 3.

stepped-up welfare program and steps against political patronage.<sup>40</sup> The manifesto of the People's Party stressed the "Raab-Kamitz Kurs," since 1952 the party's Erhard-like economic program, while some sops were thrown in the direction of the clerical wing. While both programs advocated further collaboration within the coalition, the OeVp noted sternly: "The coalition loses its meaning when, through the egotistically partisan veto policy of the SPOe, it degenerates into a dictatorship of the minority over the majority."<sup>41</sup>

While the bulk of the mutually dull campaign oratory dealt with economic issues, the question of the future nature of the coalition—already foreshadowed by Raab's statement on the FPOe and by the OeVP manifesto—was raised sharply by the main liberal exponent on the side of the OeVP. Reinhard Kamitz, Minister of Finance, non-party member, and spokesman of Austria's larger industries, said to the press on April 3 that "in his opinion, only questions of foreign policy, the currency, and the budget were to be based on common decisions, everything else, if agreement could not be reached, was to be left to the decision of the Parliament."<sup>42</sup> To the Socialists, Kamitz' statement smacked of a new *Buergerblock*, since the reference to the Parliament could only mean an OeVP-FPOe majority outvoting the SPOe. In response, the Socialists developed the theme of the need for preserving the *Gleichgewicht* (equilibrium), the alternative to which was *Alleinherrschaft* (sole rule) by the OeVP. The theme, by nearly general agreement the most potent of the campaign, was countered only feebly by the OeVP with the assertion that to give chancellorship and presidency of Parliament to the party of the "red" President would lead to pure Socialist domination.<sup>43</sup>

When 94 per cent of the Austrians cast their ballots on May 10,<sup>44</sup> the majority of those relatively few voters who do not have a fixed

party allegiance had voted for the reestablishment of the equilibrium between the coalition partners. They did so all over Austria: the People's Party share of the vote decreased in each of the twenty-five electoral districts, and the Socialists' share increased in each district. The total vote for the coalition parties remained quite steady; but the Socialists, 127,000 votes behind the OeVP in 1956, received 1,953,935 votes, the OeVP, 1,928,043. As in 1953, the higher birth rate in OeVP-dominated areas gave the People's Party a plurality of parliamentary seats: they captured 79 as against 78 for the Socialists. What may be called the epitome in equilibrium was reached: one party had an infinitesimal vote advantage, the other the minimal advantage in seats, and a "black" chancellor would continue to balance a "red" president.<sup>45</sup>

#### IV

Elections under the Austrian coalition, Uwe Kitzinger writes, serve "... to furnish a revised index of strength according to which the organized groups can bargain to settle their differences."<sup>46</sup> This bargaining includes the distribution of portfolios and the mode of party collaboration; questions of public policy are left generally to inter-election rather than to the post-election bargaining. Both parties delegated their real leaders to the post-election negotiations of 1959—each of them seven (including the five delegates of each party to the permanent coalition committee).<sup>47</sup> The

<sup>40</sup> There is some room for argument as to what the voters intended. Hans Thuer-Porta (*Salzburger Nachrichten*, May 16, 1959, p. 18) argues strongly that the voters voted for the predominance of their respective parties, and not for the equilibrium. The writer, however, is not convinced by this argument, especially in view of the equilibrial election outcomes of 1953 and 1957, which were of course known to the electorate. One OeVP aide told the writer that his party, by going into the voting with 82 of 165 seats and not asking for a majority mandate, actually asked for a moderate defeat. As is usual in Austria, there are, in the interpretation of political phenomena, three "truths": one "black," one "red," and one anti-coalition.

<sup>41</sup> Kitzinger, *loc. cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>42</sup> When asked about the desirability of having real power vested in an extra-constitutional group, a leading Socialist politician said to the writer: "In no country is there a complete congruence between official and real leaders. In Austria, at least, everyone knows who the real leaders are: the ten members of the coalition committee."

<sup>40</sup> *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, March 29, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>41</sup> *Neue Tageszeitung*, April 3, 1959, pp. 1-2. The economic program of Raab and Kamitz as an election issue is analyzed by Kitzinger, *loc. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

<sup>42</sup> *Wiener Zeitung*, April 4, 1959, p. 2. For Socialist rejoinders, see Oskar Pollak's editorial in *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, April 12, 1959, p. 2, and Pittermann in *Salzburger Nachrichten*, April 14, 1959, p. 10.

<sup>43</sup> Maleta in *Wiener Zeitung*, April 18, 1959, p. 2.

<sup>44</sup> Information in this paragraph was compiled from official returns. Note also Kitzinger's analysis, *loc. cit.*, pp. 137-140.

OeVP delegation, headed by Chancellor Julius Raab, included representatives of the party's constituent federations, of the provincial parties, and of liberals and industry; the SPOe delegation, headed by Vice-Chancellor Bruno Pittermann, included representatives of the trade unions and of "red" Vienna.<sup>48</sup>

This negotiating committee of fourteen delegates first met on May 21, after Raab had been redesignated as Chancellor. Not until two months later, after one major crisis and a successful presidential intervention, were they to emerge with the product of their protracted bargaining: an implementation, on the governmental level, of the equilibrical verdict of the voters, and an essentially negative answer to the OeVP's foredoomed demand to change the basis of the coalition.

It was on the latter issue that the first post-election exchange between the parties dwelled: the OeVP demanded a strengthening of Parliament,<sup>49</sup> while the SPOe, pointing to the voters' "... clear refusal of the plans for the domination by one party ..." insisted that "the future government of the two parties can only be a government based on the complete balance of forces."<sup>50</sup> The OeVP persisted with its demands for free votes in Parliament in its first comprehensive proposal to the negotiating committee, on June 5. The same proposal suggested that the foreign ministry be ceded to the SPOe, in order to approximate a balance of portfolios.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>48</sup> In addition to Raab and Pittermann, the delegates were: for the OeVP, Alfred Maleta (parliamentary caucus chairman and then general party secretary), Alfons Gorbach, the present Chancellor (provinces), Reinhard Kamitz (liberals and industry), Josef Kraus (peasants), Johann Wagner (commerce and small business), and Lois Weinberger (Catholic workers and employees); for the SPOe, Franz Olah, labor's strong man (then parliamentary caucus chairman, now OeGB president), Oskar Helmer (then Minister of the Interior), Karl Waldbrunner (Minister, then for Nationalized Industries, now of Transport), Bruno Kreisky (now Foreign Minister), Otto Probst (central secretary), and Felix Slavik (Vienna).

<sup>49</sup> *Wiener Zeitung*, May 14, 1959, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> *Id.*, May 12, 1959, p. 2.

<sup>51</sup> *Id.*, June 6, 1959, p. 1. In view of Austria's dependent status till 1955, and the neutrality imposed by the State Treaty, an independent foreign ministry had not heretofore been considered essential. Such considerations seem to have guided the OeVP when it selected this ministry for an offer. Another consideration was the decision, most likely reached by that time,

The slumber that had settled over Austrian politics during the dull first post-election month was rudely interrupted by a terse announcement, on June 13, emanating from private talks between Raab and Helmer, both party organization men tied by a long-standing friendship. The announcement stated that Raab had proposed "... the taking over of the Federal Ministry of Finance by a minister of the SPOe. ..." <sup>52</sup> The foreign ministry was to stay with the OeVP and, said the OeVP press, the Socialists, after all their attacks on Kamitz, should now themselves be saddled with the responsibility for the management of Austria's economy. The Socialists accepted Raab's proposal and nominated Kreisky for Minister of Finance.

The "Kamitz sacrifice," as the episode came to be known, must of course be accepted as a sincere attempt by Raab to reactivate the deadlocked negotiations. Yet, more basically, it was also an attempt of the leader of the OeVP's traditional, Catholic, pre-industrial organization to assert primacy over the spokesman of liberal-national industrialism. Raab's offer, by the way, closely followed similar attempts by Konrad Adenauer to exclude Ludwig Erhard, the manager of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, from political leadership. The immediate violent reaction of organized industry and of the non-clerical OeVP provincial organization of Styria<sup>53</sup> showed that the basic issue between Catholicism and liberalism, and between small shopkeepers and industrialists, was clearly understood. Industrialist pressure and the votes of numerous provincial delegates led to the almost unanimous reversal of Raab's offer when the OeVP Executive met on June 15. Yet the repudiated leader was immediately given a vote of confidence and asked to resume negotiations with the Socialists, but on the basis of the withdrawal of the Kamitz sacrifice.<sup>54</sup>

to retire Felix Hurdes as President of Parliament and to replace him with Leopold Figl, then the Foreign Minister.

<sup>52</sup> For the original offer and immediate comments, see *Wiener Zeitung*, June 13, 1959, p. 1; *Die Presse*, June 13, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, June 13, 1959, pp. 1-2, 4.

<sup>53</sup> *Die Presse*, June 13, 1959, pp. 1, 3; June 14, 1959, p. 1; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, June 13, 1959, p. 4; June 15, 1959, pp. 2, 5; *Wiener Zeitung*, June 14, 1959, p. 2; *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, June 14, 1959, pp. 1-2.

<sup>54</sup> *Wiener Zeitung*, June 16, 1959, p. 1; *Die Presse*, June 16, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, June 16, 1959, p. 1; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 17, 1959, folio 1.



The episode indicated that seven years of "Raab-Kamitz Kurs" had enlarged the basis of the OeVP to include liberals who do not have Catholic organizational ties. Although Kamitz exchanged his key post for the presidency of the national bank in 1960, his supporters continued to exert, and still exert, the influence they showed in this episode; despite the outcome of the election and the negotiations of 1959, they continued to struggle against the rigid coalition, and they continue even today.

The withdrawal of the Kamitz sacrifice again paralyzed negotiations, until the SPOe, on June 25, proposed a reversion to the settlement of 1953, when the electoral verdict had been almost identical.<sup>55</sup> The proposal marked a shift in Socialist tactics: no longer were aspirations in the field of finance to be pursued, but the direction of nationalized industries, lost in 1956, was to be recaptured. This new Socialist push appeared successful, and by early July there was general agreement that the SPOe was to control foreign affairs as well as nationalized industries; only details remained to be worked out. On July 7, negotiations broke down over a relatively minor issue concerning the government of the nationalized industries, and Raab resigned.<sup>56</sup>

At this point, President Schaerf acted as *deus ex machina*. Aided by a suggestion of the OeVP Executive to the effect that negotiations should continue in small committees, he devised a roundabout scheme to reach his objective: a continuation of the coalition under the leadership of his erstwhile political opponent, Julius Raab. This objective would perpetuate the partnership of the political parties and the socio-economic partners, and it would insure that both parties would be led by pro-coalition elements. The roundabout scheme was to place the deadlocked negotiations into hands other than those of the leaders. In fact, the delegations nominated by the two parties did not include a single member of the government. On July 9, Maleta, Kraus, Gorbach (OeVP) and Olah, Probst, Slavik (SPOe), all members of the large negotiating committee, met with Schaerf's instructions to solve the governmental crisis by July 11. In order to underline the new spirit of negotiation, they even moved from the Chancellery (the traditional meeting-

place of coalition committees) to the Parliament building.<sup>57</sup>

Agreement was reached in the evening hours of July 10. While details were to be spelled out later in the law delineating the functions of the ministers, in the government declaration, and in the coalition pact, broad outlines of the settlement emerged immediately. The Socialists were to control the now autonomous foreign ministry, whose boundaries with the OeVP-controlled ministry of commerce were spelled out. The IBV was dissolved, and all powers of management of the nationalized industries were lodged with the Socialist Vice-Chancellor. The result of this new distribution of portfolios was to give each party six ministries, and to reestablish the equilibrium between the parties in the economic sphere. In addition, Socialist influence over nationalized banks, the tobacco monopoly, and broadcasting was increased. The mode of collaboration, to be expressed in the new coalition pact, was yet to be worked out by a committee consisting of Maleta, Gorbach, Olah, Slavik, and legal counsel.<sup>58</sup>

On July 17, Raab, sworn in as Chancellor for the third consecutive time, read the government declaration to the Parliament. Though the declaration had been discussed by spokesmen of both coalition partners, it did not emerge as an integrated whole, but was essentially a restatement of some of the electoral demands of the two parties. It therefore resembled more the State of the Union message of a weak president than the Speech from the Throne, and the extent of its fulfillment would depend on day-by-day negotiations in the coalition committee. On the economic side, the declaration did not suggest any major departure from what the OeVP had considered "its" Raab-Kamitz course all along, indicating the essentially consensual nature of such matters as currency stability, full employment, and wage-price stability. A controversial item included by the OeVP was the demand for a stepped-up emission of "people's shares" in nationalized enterprises.<sup>59</sup> Socialist policy dominated the section on housing, but the program to increase

<sup>55</sup> *Wiener Zeitung*, June 26, 1959, pp. 1-2.

<sup>56</sup> *Id.*, July 7, 1959, pp. 1-2; July 8, 1959, pp. 1-2; *Die Presse*, July 7, 1959, pp. 1-2; July 8, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, July 8, 1959, p. 1; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 7, 1959, p. 3.

<sup>57</sup> *Die Presse*, July 9, 1959, pp. 1, 3; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, July 9, 1959, p. 2; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 9, 1959, folio 1; July 10, 1959, folio 2.

<sup>58</sup> *Wiener Zeitung*, July 11, 1959, p. 1; *Die Presse*, July 11, 1959, pp. 1, 3; July 14, 1959, p. 1; *Salzburger Nachrichten*, July 14, 1959, p. 2.

<sup>59</sup> "People's shares" in nationalized industry had been included in the government declaration of 1956, but the SPOe had blocked nearly all action on what it alleged would constitute reprivatization of public property.

the construction of dwellings had been agreed upon by both parties. The OeVP's desire for an increased development of apartment ownership was incorporated also. The People's Party appears to have determined the formulation of the sections on agriculture and religion. While the demand for a general education law stemmed from the OeVP platform, demands for school construction were taken from the Socialist election program. Guides for the general development of pension laws showed some similarity to the Socialist platform as did the demand for a widespread merit system in public employment.<sup>60</sup>

In the brief parliamentary debate on the government declaration, Maleta admitted that his attempt, to turn over to the free decision of the Parliament such matters as were not agreed upon by the coalition committee within a reasonable time, had to be given up. "Coalition means a bond. The fixing of a coalition-free area, meaning an area without such a bond, amounts to squaring the circle."<sup>61</sup> These remarks about the inevitability of a rigid coalition were the first public intimation that the OeVP had failed in its prolonged attempt to establish a coalition-free area in which important decisions could be made by parliamentary majorities rather than by coalition agreement. The decision actually had been made earlier. Under the signatures of Raab, Maleta, Pittermann, and Waldbrunner, the 1959 coalition pact had been concluded as early as July 16. It was published in the press on July 26. The central policy-making provisions were quite similar to those of the 1956 pact. Article I, Section 5, reads as follows:

- (a) Government bills on which the coalition parties represented in the government have reached unanimous agreement as to substance and form, are, on account of their importance, binding on the two coalition parties as represented in the Parliament. Fundamental proposals for amendment require the assent of the coalition committee.
- (b) If no decision was made to require such parliamentary support, both coalition parties have a free hand in Parliament.<sup>62</sup>

The formulation of conditions under which there is to be a coalition-free area differed in only one respect from the 1956 version. Then such an area was to obtain only "if in deciding a government bill the Government has re-

solved to release to the discretion of the coalition parties the parliamentary treatment of a government bill."<sup>63</sup> All the OeVP gained in attempting to establish a coalition-free area of parliamentary discretion was thus a provision for a free vote whenever the coalition committee failed to bind the partners, instead of when the free vote had been agreed upon specifically. The facts of Austrian party discipline and the prevailing mode of operation of the coalition committee render it improbable that the revised clause will bring about any noticeable change.

Thus, the SPOe had not only reached the equilibrium in the distribution of portfolios, it had also prevailed on the question of the mode of collaboration. The SPOe had claimed that one of the foremost mandates of its "equilibrical victory" would be the maintenance of the rigid coalition. The OeVP had asked the voters for more freedom and lost votes and seats in the process. The Socialist "victory" in 1959 left the coalition as rigid as ever.

## V

The basic questions decided by the negotiators in their eleven-week haggling were the same that had been decided in previous post-election negotiations. These questions were: "Who gets to do what?" and "On what terms do things get done?" The first question took up most of the time of the negotiators; on the second, they merely confirmed what can be interpreted as the verdict of the electorate.

The length of the negotiations over the distribution of portfolios can be understood only when one realizes that while the Austrian coalition is a government coalition, departments of government belong, as a rule, to one party or the other. The Hapsburgs once maintained their position in the Holy Roman Empire by maintaining their *Hausmacht* in Austria, Bohemia, and Silesia; the Austrian parties maintain their governmental position through phenomena like the Socialist *Hausmacht* in social welfare and the People's Party *Hausmacht* in education. Looked at in the light of individual ministries that are under one-party domination, the Austrian coalition has in fact, as has been observed several times,<sup>64</sup> two *Reichshaelften*, like the Austro-Hungarian mon-

<sup>60</sup> *Die Presse*, June 27, 1956, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup> For the complete text of the declaration, see *Wiener Zeitung*, July 18, 1959, pp. 1-3.

<sup>62</sup> *Id.*, July 22, 1959, pp. 1-2.

<sup>63</sup> *Id.*, July 26, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>64</sup> The comparison is made with particular poignancy and humor in Roland Nitsche, "Die Jungwaehler werden entscheiden," *Die Weltwoche*, May 1, 1959, p. 27. See also Kafka, *loc. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

archy. To carry the comparison further, one could consider the 1959 settlement an *Ausgleich* like the Austro-Hungarian settlement of 1867.

The 1959 *Ausgleich* was just about as evenly balanced a settlement as could be obtained.<sup>65</sup> The making of the Foreign Office into a full ministry and its transfer from OeVP to Socialist control, and the transfer of the over-all management of the nationalized industries from the bipartisan IBV to the Socialist Vice-Chancellor, did away with the People's Party's preponderance in governmental strength. As a result of the 1959 negotiations everything was balanced: in the economic sector, the OeVP controlled finance and commerce; the SPOe controlled nationalized industry, transport, and electricity. Control of the *Exekutive* (the armed force) is divided, leaving the OeVP in external control with the army, and the SPOe in internal control with police and *Gendarmerie*. Agriculture is "black," social service "red." The OeVP controls education, culture, and religious affairs, the SPOe foreign affairs. The OeVP's over-all leadership through the chancellorship is balanced by Socialist control of justice.

Since the coalition marriage is not only one of convenience but also of distrust, the parties check each other in several respects. There is the shared control, already mentioned, of the economy and the armed force. Control of foreign affairs is divided into Socialist control of the general diplomatic apparatus and OeVP participation in foreign-affairs decisions through the ministries of trade and defense. Finally, there are OeVP state secretaries in the Socialist ministries of the interior and of foreign affairs, and Socialist state secretaries in the OeVP ministries of trade and defense.

With the question of "Who gets to do what?" solved by maximizing the equilibrium solution, there remained the question of "On what terms do things get done?" Prior to 1959, proceedings had been based on bipartisan agreement. The twin formula of no government bill without bipartisan agreement, and disciplined bipartisan vote in Parliament for every government bill, was under the fire of those who agitated for a coalition-free area. It was to this, the area of decision making, that the OeVP wanted to extend the preponderance it enjoyed in the division of portfolios after the 1956 election. The outcome of the 1959 negotiations was of course the maintenance of the two-party equilibrium in the area of policy-making, by

keeping rigid the decision-making features of the coalition pact.

An accounting for the arduousness of the 1959 coalition renegotiations must go beyond a recognition of the amazing electoral balance shown in the voting of May 10. The difficulty in reaching agreement emerges more clearly when the socio-economic aspects of the Austrian coalition are taken into full consideration. The fourteen men who did the negotiating were not just the representatives of rival party organizations; seven of them represented labor, and the other seven a coalition—uneasy at times—of business, agriculture, and white collar employees. It was never seriously questioned that the "black" social partner would retain control of affairs most directly related to business and agriculture, and the "red" social partner control over affairs closest to labor. The point driven home by the representatives of labor was that social partnership as they understood it could only be had by allowing them a codetermination of, and thus a veto on, all policies. The equilibrium registered in the settlement was thus a social as well as an electoral equilibrium.

Furthermore, the negotiations of 1959 constituted a Socialist effort to establish the psychological equilibrium between the two parties and, simultaneously, between the two social partners. Enough remained of the memory of the First Republic to keep alive the image of the OeVP as the governing party, with the SPOe at best in the role of a co-governing party. Most elements in the People's Party, especially the Catholic-clerical ones, knew throughout—either because of conviction or by necessity—that a revival of a First-Republic-type *Buergerblock* government would be ruinous. Yet, OeVP demands for a coalition-free area did much to call back ghosts of the First Republic, especially when these demands were made by such liberal elements within the OeVP as Kamitz or Josef Krainer, the Governor of Styria, or by such independent liberal-bourgeois elements as the Industrial Federation or Austria's major non-party newspapers, the *Vienna Presse* and the *Salzburger Nachrichten*. All of these elements displayed confidence that the eight FPÖe deputies would side with the OeVP whenever economic questions on which there was no agreement within the coalition might be determined by a free vote in Parliament. The extremely strong opposition voiced by these elements to Raab's proposal to sacrifice Kamitz and appoint a Socialist minister of finance only increased Socialist uneasiness over the psychological imbalance between the partners. Only the granting of most of its

<sup>65</sup> For Kafka's interesting observations on the "unstable equilibrium," see *ibid.*, p. 95.

demands and the recognition of a thoroughly rigid coalition by the OeVP sufficed to convince the Socialists themselves that they were "*gleich stark*" (equally strong).

Most equilibrical was the role of President Schaerf. In the absence of any reliable public-opinion data on the 1959 election<sup>66</sup> it would yet seem reasonable to infer that the election was decided by the same narrow segment of voters that had brought about Schaerf's election to the presidency in 1957: a relatively small group of non-socialist independents who voted the Socialist ticket.<sup>67</sup> It was therefore only proper that the same President who was elected by these equilibrium voters should use the weight of his office to help bring about the equilibrium solution: a perfectly balanced government, headed by a "black" chancellor to balance himself, the "red" President. It was ultimately Schaerf's personal intervention which kept Raab from forcing the formation of a minority government under Pittermann, and which prevailed upon Raab himself to head the new government. The people had voted for the equilibrium, but it was reasonable to infer that not only a "black" chancellor, but the venerable person of Julius Raab himself, was part of that equilibrium. And Schaerf, one of the authors of the coalition system, was able to use his office as "*pouvoir neutre*" between the parties, yet partial to the coalition.

Most of the nine-tenths of Austria's voters who supported the major parties on May 10, 1959, voted primarily for the party of their choice; yet most of them knew as individuals that they were in effect casting a vote for the continuance of the coalition. By giving equal votes to the partners, they voted for an equilibrical coalition with a rigid pact, though many realized that this involved all the evils and frustrations of the *Junktim* in policy-making and the *Proporz* in administration. Their response to the OeVP campaign indicates that

<sup>66</sup> There is, however, the 1958 poll referred to in note 13; see also note 45.

<sup>67</sup> Such a mythical voter is described in a little ditty made available to the writer by its author, the drama critic and humorist Hans Weigel. After much soul-searching about his coming vote, this mythical voter opines: "If one could only tell for sure that the 'blacks' will come out ahead, one could safely vote for the 'reds'."

they feel safest under a system which guarantees social peace, under a rigid pact, through the co-determination of issues by the representatives of both the Catholic and the industrial sub-cultures. Their support—prudent rather than fervent—of the coalition registers their feeling that, even with declining ideological acrimony, the organizational fact of the *Lager* persists—especially among professional politicians—and that the system institutionalizes the kind of political bargaining for which Austria is ready.<sup>68</sup>

Repudiators of the system are not restricted to the pitifully weak Communists, the ineffectual FPÖ, and a few high-minded liberal intellectuals. More important loom Austria's independent newspapers and the non-clerically oriented segment of Austria's industry and finance. The latter, long rallied around Kamitz, have been working, with partial success, ever since the Kamitz "sacrifice" on strengthening their influence in the OeVP. In fighting the double shackles of the coalition, they also attempt to overcome clerical, agricultural, and small-business domination of the People's Party. As Austria's industrialization progresses, and her prosperity increases even more, they may eventually win both struggles.

Meanwhile, as long as Austria remains a typical example of a Continental European political system, and one with a civil-war memory at that, neither party is likely to be willing to entrust the country's government solely to the other. Austria may have to approximate Anglo-American political homogeneity, at least to the extent of the Scandinavian countries, before a government-opposition relationship between the two major parties will be considered a stable alternative. Barring this homogeneity, the two major political forces of Austria will continue to prefer the limited bargaining of the coalition to a government-opposition alternation, certainly as long as the present party-interest structure and present social conditions remain. The slide-rule implementation of the electoral verdict of 1959 was a necessary manifestation of this limited-liability arrangement which is Austria's way of bridging, with minimum consensus, her continuing cleavage.

<sup>68</sup> Kafka argues the latter point cogently; *loc. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

## THE PEDAGOGY OF DEMOCRACY: COERCIVE PUBLIC PROTEST IN INDIA

DAVID H. BAYLEY  
*University of Denver*

Throughout the history of Indian politics in the 20th Century runs a curious and disturbing thread. Both before and after the achievement of independence in 1947, large segments of the Indian populace felt that the institutional means of redress for grievances, frustrations and wrongs—actual or fancied—were inadequate. Since the British withdrawal a fuller panoply of democratic procedures for influencing government has been introduced, but a basic suspicion persists that government is still alien and elite—although now the separation is based upon indigenous social division rather than upon foreign conquest and race. The fact is that the gaining of independence has marked very little change in the use of the more direct and agitational modes of public suasion. The Congress Government has been treated to an almost constant tattoo of demands supported by the same techniques popularized during the independence struggle, such as hunger-strikes, black-flag demonstrations, the courting of arrest, impeding of public business, and violent riots.

For the statesmen of contemporary India the continuation of public protests and agitations constitutes a unique problem. They are charged with the task of building a stable democratic polity. Yet they are constantly confronted with a bewildering array of methods of suasion which, if they do not fall altogether outside the bounds of democratic permissibility, at least constitute the development—or continued development—of a supplementary system of representation and redress. In solving this problem, Indian statesmen are severely limited in the means to which they may have recourse. They must create the social, psychological, and economic requisites of democracy without resorting to means which are themselves patent departures from the canons of democratic theory. Put briefly, the question which perplexes and constrains India's leaders is, how can Indian democracy be strengthened democratically? Within these limitations, both of ends and means, the architects of the country's political future must contend with the many forms of coercive public protest so characteristic of its political life.

### I


Coercive public protest has three attributes: (1) it is aggregative;<sup>1</sup> (2) it is public, as opposed to conspiratorial or clandestine; and (3) it imposes a constraint upon government by its presence and actions. Coercive public protest can thus be distinguished clearly from the public excitations and clashes which spring more particularly from social cleavages and which are not directed at affecting the decisions of formally constituted governmental authority.

Coercive public protest may have a specific or a generalized object. For instance, participants may barricade the house of a district magistrate or chancellor of a university, demanding from this particular individual a specific response of accommodation or at least of strong sympathy. On the other hand, coercive public protest may be directed against a more generalized state of affairs with no single, readily discernible focus of action. "Satyagrahas" by railroad commuters, in which all train travel along a rail line is blocked as a protest against late-running trains, are an example of this. The object, if articulated at all, is to dramatize by disrupting; the target is simply officialdom.

Coercive public protest has assumed six primary forms in modern India: (1) processions and public meetings; (2) hartals (work stoppages not aimed at employers), boycotts, and strikes; (3) fasts; (4) obstruction; (5) courting of arrest; (6) riots. These general type-forms can be divided into two main groups, the legal and the illegal. In turn, the category of illegal protest can be subdivided into the violent and the non-violent. These distinctions may be organized schematically as shown in diagram on next page.

Not all of these forms of protest fall outside the preserve of democratic tolerance. Processions and public meetings are an accepted part of democratic interaction. Obstruction and the

<sup>1</sup> Coercive fasting is an apparent exception to this, although its intermediate effect, by building suspense, is to focus the attention of an ever-growing audience on the faster and his demands.



courting of arrest are known in India as *satyagraha*, or nonviolent civil disobedience, and were made popular by Mahatma Gandhi. The dividing line between obstruction and courting of arrest is artificial, to be sure, but the distinction highlights the two most prevalent modes of protest assuming the guise of *satyagraha*. Some of these campaigns, for example, are designed to bring a particular phase of community or governmental activity to a halt. By paralyzing, the *satyagrahis* coerce. The primary motive in this case is not to break the law—although the *satyagrahis* would not shrink from this if it were necessary. On the other hand, other non-violent civil disobedience campaigns have as their avowed object the challenging of constituted authority by deliberately violating promulgated laws and rules. The mark of accomplishment is to be arrested and hauled off to jail. The frequent organized defiance of orders issued under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows police authorities to ban the assembly of five or more persons in designated areas, are instances of law-breaking *satyagrahas*. So, too, are those campaigns in which people refuse to pay taxes. The distinction between the two forms of *satyagrahas* involves a difference in mode of behavior and the degree to which one intention or the other predominates in the minds of their leaders.

Although violence may be ranged upon a continuum with other forms of coercive public protest, as above, it is an extreme form which stands apart in two particulars. First, violence lacks the element of self-control, corporate and individual, which is a feature of most nonviolent protest. Violence usually involves a bursting of restraints. It may, of course, be carried on with dispassionate sang-froid; but generally it is not. Second, the goals to which non-violent agitation is directed are a good deal more definite and explicit than those which impel violence. In violence, self-control, reason, and purpose are generally overmastered by emotion and the individual or group lashes out indiscriminately.

Let us now examine more carefully the precise problem. Specifically, is there indeed a

need for corrective action on the part of the Indian Government? What would be the consequences of allowing coercive public protest to go unrestrained?

In part the answers to these questions are dependent upon the proportions the phenomena have assumed; for it could hardly be argued that isolated instances, even if violent, posed a significant threat to the maintenance of Indian democracy. A detailed examination of these proportions is beyond the purview of this paper. Instead, I shall proceed on the basis of two assertions: (1) the Indian Government is faced with a pervasive and continued threat to the maintenance of law and order and (2) law and order are jeopardized to an extent known only extremely infrequently in either the United States or the United Kingdom and then never for prolonged periods of time.<sup>2</sup>

## II

What interests and concerns are affected by these manifestations? Why should a government concerned with the strengthening of democracy feel impelled to undertake constraining action toward coercive public protest of this magnitude? At least six closely connected reasons may be given for governmental anxiety and action:

First: coercive public protest imposes an economic burden upon the nation. This cost is a consequence of the physical destruction visited upon public and private property, the loss of life and health to individuals, the disruption of services, and the diversion of resources, time and energy from constructive economic programs to the essentially neutral task of maintaining law and order. In an economy already straining to the utmost for rapid economic development the cost may be unacceptable, spelling the difference between Plan success and Plan failure. Political protest in any form, but more particularly in its illegal forms, causes some reallocation of resources;

<sup>2</sup> For the evidence supporting these assertions see my Ph.D. dissertation, "Violent Agitation and the Democratic Process in India," Princeton University, 1961.

established industrial nations may be able to afford it, India perhaps cannot.

Second: one of the most fundamental duties of any government is the preservation of minimal conditions of law and order. No government, whatever its political form, can outlive a successful challenge to its ability to meet this need. If the government is unable to contain violent public protest and enforce its rules and regulations, it may lose its justification for existence, its claim to legitimacy.

Third: coercive public protest which succeeds in its object of affecting the decisions of government represents a derogation from majority rule. It is possible, of course, that demonstrators sometimes present a truer picture of majority sentiments than the elected representative sample. Rather special circumstances must exist to support this hypothesis, circumstances which in the Indian case are most uncommon. Usually, coercive public protest has been the tool of an aggrieved minority. As such, it strikes at the basic premise of democratic government, namely, that the will of the majority as expressed in free elections and through elected representatives is sovereign. If coercive public protest is seen to succeed, the representative integrity and efficacy of the erstwhile democratic government will be lost.

Fourth: coercive public protest represents not only the introduction of a supplementary means for the suasion of government, but a fundamental threat to the rule of law. If laws can be disregarded, sloughed aside arbitrarily, the prospect of equality and impartiality before the law is destroyed, and the efficacy of constituted means of representation and adjudication is impaired.

Fifth: as a result of the destruction of the rule of law and of the rule of the majority, a sort of Gresham's Law begins to affect the nature of political responses. Direct action and recourse to social violence—either threatened or actual—begin to drive out the orderly, constitutional responses demanded in a democratic state. Every success for direct action sets a precedent for its utilization by other groups and individuals. Coercive public protest, if allowed to go unrestrained, will be more widely imitated and become an even greater rival to the processes of peaceful change through democratic government.

Sixth: democracy demands a considerable measure of social discipline in order to work successfully. Coercive public protest involving forms which are illegal or violent represents a breakdown of discipline. It is based upon the destructive principle that certain ends justify recourse to undemocratic means of resolution.

If government fails to apply its sanctions, it allows new linkages to become established between ends and means. Due to the default of government, people are permitted to persist in the belief that certain deeply felt needs, desires, or interests are beyond compromise and that extreme solutions are appropriate to satisfy them. Social accommodation based on compromise tends to give way to a series of internecine wars. The failure of government to restrain coercive public protest represents a failure to secure acceptance of legitimate rules established to govern the relation between articulated wants and the procedures for their fulfillment.

These, then, are the consequences of giving coercive public protest its head. The Government of India has often demonstrated that it is well aware of them. Law and order have often been the subject of parliamentary debate and of *ad hoc* comments by Prime Minister Nehru and other leaders of government. Moreover, special reports on police firings and repeated investigations into important disturbances, as in Assam in 1960 and 1961, have brought out clearly the obligations which rest upon government. Rather less attention, unfortunately, has been given to the other side of the problem, namely, to an examination of the possible consequences of successfully restraining coercive public protest. Yet it seems elementary that any policy which would trench upon a widespread social response must be based on an appraisal not only of need but also of probable repercussions. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to an initial reconnaissance into these neglected regions.

### III

It is important to realize, first, the theoretical implications of a policy of social control in any nascent democracy. Democratic political theory has always recognized that coercion and even violence are sometimes justifiable means for resisting the encroachments of government upon the preserve of human rights. There are boundaries which no authority can be allowed to transgress without provoking, justly, a violent response on the part of its oppressed constituents. The crucial question endlessly debated, and not only by political theorists, is where are these boundaries to be drawn? Are there any principles which can guide policy-makers in the permissible use of organized social power? From time to time in the history of the western democracies first principles have been laid down, often in the form of constitutional clauses or statutory laws; but such strictures are not absolute or immutable. Fundamental

rights are to some extent contingent upon circumstances. Thus, when the Government of India becomes engaged in devising a policy to cope with coercive public protest, it is establishing *de facto* boundaries to permissible governmental regulation. It is engaged, like it or not, in giving operational content to the fundamental rights contained in Part III of its written constitution. In preserving law and order, the Government of India is determining a balance between the inalienable prerogatives of the individual and the legitimate concern of the State. These are the stakes.

Let us look now at the probable response of the Indian people to any policy directed to the repression, or at least regulation, of coercive public protest. Since the *raison d'être* of a policy of restraint is the strengthening of democracy in India, our search is for types of feedback incompatible with the long-run development of a stable democratic polity.

The first probable result of a repressive policy is the heightening of the feeling of impotency and frustration among the people. Underlying this supposition is the familiar hypothesis that social protest acts like a safety-valve for the social system, permitting the dissipation of accumulated discontent. Public displays of anger and dissatisfaction serve the purpose of allowing the people the appearance of an opportunity for lashing out at their milieu in general and for the representation of their smoldering resentment to persons in positions of responsibility. Coercive public protest, according to this hypothesis, represents catharsis. Or, it can be described as the syndrome of socially acceptable responses to situations of stress acknowledged to be such by the group. This alternative formulation underscores the fact that coercive public protest is a human response conforming to a pattern, which, specifying both occasioning stimuli and resulting modality, is familiar to the entire society.

The safety-valve hypothesis—in either of its formulations—points to the important fact that coercive public protest may have social utility. Overt mass responses of anger or disaffection may be functional to the social system. Eliminate this mode of expression and the society might crack apart in other even more serious ways. In the words of one Indian observer: "In India, agitation is not always bad; in fact, in a country [such] as ours it may be dangerous to limit popular urges in inter-election period[s] to strict constitutional methods of petition."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Parliamentary Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 7 (July, 1959), pp. 1-3, editorial.

This view is supported by the observation that coercive public protest often exhibits a formalistic character. In many of its outbreaks there seems to be a tacit reference to rules so that participants and law enforcement officials alike operate within a set of shared expectations. Of the illegal forms of protest, *satyagraha* campaigns most often exhibit this peculiar structured quality. They are, for instance, usually announced publicly well in advance of their occurrence. The *satyagrahis* are schooled in the tactics of the campaign and are kept under strict discipline. An excellent example of this occurred in May, 1956. A *satyagraha* was offered on Netaji Subhas Road in central Calcutta in defiance of an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The campaign had originally been called to protest the proposed merger of Bihar and West Bengal. When the proposal was withdrawn the organizers continued the demonstration as a protest against the general attitude of the Government of West Bengal toward the issue of linguistic states. Police organized the target areas at noon on May 7. One thousand constables and 400 officers were brought to the scene. Large crowds of office workers began to gather to watch the confrontation. The procession of *satyagrahis* appeared in view about 2:15 P. M. and were roundly cheered and applauded by the spectators. The 76-year-old leader of the march climbed upon the back of a bullock cart and read a statement of intent and belief to the assembled throng. He was then ceremonially daubed upon the forehead with colored paste and liberally garlanded. Supporting himself on his bamboo staff, he descended from the cart and moved slowly toward the police cordon. The police allowed him to pass through and then bundled him into a waiting police van. One by one, groups of *satyagrahis* followed their leader through the cordon, there to receive similar treatment. Crowds of volunteers from leftist parties made way for them through the by then dense crowd of onlookers. During the deliberate violating of the law conch shells were blown and flowers were thrown upon the protestors. Representatives of the office employee's union in the Dalhousie Square area gave an orange to each male member of the *satyagraha* just as he crossed the line.

The circumstances of this particular occasion may have been extreme in modality but the mood of ritualistic participation is characteristic. The most common occasions for structured trials of strength with the authorities are the promulgations of Orders under Section 144, usually banning the assembly of five or more persons in a designated area. Magistrates and police both seem to be aware that they are



participating in a public game; accordingly police incitement is kept to a minimum and magistrates award only token fines of one or two rupees to those arrested. The purpose of such a movement is simply to break the law and the mark of accomplishment is the number of persons who voluntarily court arrest. In a "Save Hindi" campaign in the Punjab in 1957 it has been estimated that over 12,000 persons were arrested and detained.<sup>4</sup> Earlier, during two months in the summer of 1955, over six thousand demonstrators were arrested in the Punjab during the Akali Dal's "morcha" or protest.<sup>5</sup> Law breaking in such instances becomes the test of the adherents' perseverance and dedication. The failure of a campaign is marked by a dwindling of volunteers ready to dare arrest and the imposition of a jail sentence or fine.

These ritualistic agitations place the government in an awkward position. If the government does not proceed against all forms of law-breaking, however disciplined, straight-forward, and self-sacrificing, it tacitly condones the flouting of legally promulgated rules. It is then forced into making *ad hoc* decisions in each case based upon the nature of the threat posed to government and society. An element of hesitation and indecision is injected into the situation. Agitating groups begin to claim precedents from other agitations; they charge discrimination by the government; and they are encouraged to toy with the authorities, edging closer to the brink of serious action without actually crossing over. When government moves unsurely, the people, in turn, respond uncertainly.

The Government of India is caught in a cruel dilemma. If it is conceded that even illegal demonstrations are or may be functional to the system, then the government must consider very carefully the consequences of repressing in a blanket fashion all forms of illegal coercive public protest. On the other hand, if the government does not draw the line clearly at illegality, it must draw the line at much more vague and ambiguous points, such as whenever an agitation threatens public welfare, law and order, domestic tranquillity, or economic development. Since the seriousness of a threat depends upon circumstances, such decisions are bound to appear arbitrary, at the whim of officialdom.

In sum, in order to teach the easier lesson—that all law-breaking will be punished—the government runs the strong risk of closing off a

necessary safety-valve and occasioning an even greater revulsion against the system of law enforcement.

Another effect of strict control of organized, illegal public protest is a deterioration of consensus. Democracy thrives on the feeling among its people of joint participation in the affairs of government; the feeling that government is a creature of the people; the feeling that it is amenable to change as a result of popular, or mass, pressures. The Indian people, new to self-government, have habitually thought of government as "They." One of the tasks of the Nehru Government has been, and will continue to be, to convert the image of government as something which happens to people into one of government as something in which people can participate. Every time, however, that the Government restricts the area in which people may maneuver and determine actions for themselves, it drives wedges of alienation between itself and the people. If the government is to win the trust of its people, it must appear to be sympathetic to their pleas. The repression of coercive social protest will seem to many as the negation of sympathetic concern, the denial of the right of petition. The new government, supposedly "of the people," begins to give the impression of becoming just another Raj.

It is ironical that government in India perhaps cannot in fact afford to be truly sympathetic; perhaps consensus must be founded on a pose rather than a reality. To the extent to which the Indian masses are unprepared to accomplish the social changes necessary to the radical economic development which they so stridently demand, the Government of India will be forced to choose between social disaffection consequent upon unfulfilled hopes, on the one hand, and social constraint which will impel requisite development, on the other. If coercive public protest reinforces movements for social change compatible with economic development, then the Indian Government can afford to be more lenient toward it. If, however, coercive public protest is the tool of movements in opposition to requisite development, the government cannot afford to be sympathetic.

In short, democracy demands consensus, but the government in India may not be able to build that consensus without pandering to movements whose designs are set athwart long-run economic development. Harsh social and economic decisions must be made in the next few years, decisions which may in the short run cause a forfeiture of trust among certain sections of the people. When these decisions occasion coercive public protest the government cannot afford to mitigate the feel-

<sup>4</sup> *Indian Civil Liberties Bulletin*, October, 1959, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> *Times of India*, July 13, 1955, p. 1.

ing of alienation, but must, indeed, intensify it by dealing strictly with the manifestations of protest. The Government of India may thus find itself reinforcing an already unfavorable image.

A third form of negative feedback from governmental attempts at regulating public protest works through a peculiarly Indian syndrome. Mahatma Gandhi, during the protracted struggle for independence, capitalized upon traditional elements in Hindu religion and culture to develop his unique form of non-violent civil disobedience. *Satyagraha* stressed the element of individual sacrifice for a cause, for Truth. Unpossessed of political advantage or military strength, the Indian masses were taught to use their very weakness as an instrument of persuasion. The image of uncomplaining and non-violent self-sacrifice laid hold of the Indian mind, and resulted in the sanctification of the violated agitator.

The Gandhian political methodology is still very much a part of the Indian political scene. Unfortunately, it survives today, for the most part, without Gandhi's philosophical integrity or his immense compassion and understanding. What remains is the employment of passive resistance as a tool of naked coercion. There is example after example of governmental attempts at curbing popular protests that result in an intensification of what may be called the Gandhian "martyrdom syndrome." An increase in repression produces an increase in the numbers of people willing to champion the martyr's cause. Through this means the cause draws hitherto quiescent adherents who join not necessarily because they strongly approve the cause, but because the example of selfless sacrifice commands respect and reverence.

There are undoubtedly limits beyond which repression would produce fear and apathy, rather than imitation and respect. During the independence struggle *satyagraha* worked in India precisely because it was directed against an alien race afflicted with an active Liberal conscience; it could hardly have achieved success in Stalin's Russia. But the government of modern India cannot transgress these boundaries either. The Gandhian legacy is most damaging to the Nehru Government because it, like the British government, is committed to democratic principles of social control.

The attractiveness of martyrdom before the law is readily apparent in Indian politics. Few members of Parliament have not served some time in jail, most often at the hands of the British. Parliamentary debates are replete with instances of members claiming special knowl-

edge of the meaning of democracy by virtue of having been incarcerated by an anti-democratic regime, either British or Congress. Hardly a week goes by in the Lok Sabha without notice being given by the Speaker that some MP has become involved with the police, usually as a leader or prominent participant in some campaign of civil disobedience. A. K. Gopalan, former leader of the Communist parliamentary delegation, was the subject of the first test case under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950. S. P. Mookerjee, president of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, was detained under the same Act in Kashmir, 1953. He died in custody and the case became a dramatic *cause célèbre*. The respected Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, prominent leader in the Praja Socialist Party, was detained briefly in 1955. Reports of the arrest of lesser political figures or of esteemed members of the bar are legion. An MP from Uttar Pradesh was arrested in 1958 for defying a Section 144 order;<sup>6</sup> six Praja Socialist Members of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly were arrested, September, 1958, for leading a *satyagraha* against grain storage warehouses;<sup>7</sup> two senior advocates and eleven lawyers were taken into custody in Jaipur, July, 1958, for invading banned areas as a protest against the abolition of a High Court Bench in that territory.<sup>8</sup> The upshot is that no stigma attaches to an elected official who has run afoul of the law. On the contrary, politicians in India win their spurs by spending time in jail in the name of some righteous cause.

Speaking about the debasement of *satyagraha* which has occurred since Gandhi's death, Nehru had this to say in 1956:

Then again, I am a little weary of hearing this word *satyagraha* hurled at me, and having heard this word many times in different contexts previously. When Gandhiji first used it and practiced it, when the time came he told us that nobody in India is a *satyagraha* except himself. He told us that, and quite rightly too. In spite of all our efforts, now everybody in India is a *satyagrahi*. Everybody who breaks the law, everybody who breaks heads is a *satyagrahi*. Every stone-thrower in India is a *satyagrahi*. This is most extraordinary, where words are misused and abused. Well, if a person wants to break a head, if I can stop him, I will stop him. But I do hope that the word "*satyagrahi*" will not be used in that connection.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Times of India*, May 20, 1958, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, September 6, 1958, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, July, 1958.

<sup>9</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 28 May 1956.

Professional politicians have made cynical use of the Indian respect for self-sacrifice. Political groups deliberately seek to create situations in which martyrdom cannot be avoided. A lathi charge, a tear gassing, police arrests, court fines and jail sentences are provoked in order to publicize a case and whip up public support for it. The image is created of dramatic insurgence against overbearing and autocratic government.<sup>10</sup>

The following description by an Indian observer gives a detailed picture of the tactics of mob utilization:

Processions have become a routine affair particularly in large cities. The technique is to have convergent processions surrounding the Legislative Assemblies when they are in session. There is dislocation of traffic when it is even normally most congested and there is a passionate shouting of slogans and fire-eating speeches. The processionists are inevitably held in check by an elaborate arrangement of the police force. Questions are raised by sympathizers inside the Legislature and the Government leaders are requested to meet a deputation from the procession. It is inevitably turned down and the signal for increasing the pressure of the procession is given. The police lathi-charge or tear-gassing the mob is welcomed by the leaders of the processionists in a morbid mood. If there is firing and some are wounded, it is considered a great victory for the day, once again demonstrating the callousness and the brutality of the party in power.<sup>11</sup>

As the preceding illustration would indicate, police firings provide the most emotion-laden instances of the utilization of suffering as a political weapon. Firing upon an unarmed crowd, even a belligerent and unreasonable one, immediately stirs up a wave of popular sympathy for the protagonists and hatred against the law enforcement authorities which engulfs and obscures the merits of the agitation. The issue uppermost in the public mind becomes the investigation and judgment of the action of the police. All thought of inexcusable provocation is wiped away by official killing. The defensive attitude of the government can be seen in the following rather plaintive appeal made by Mr. Nehru on the same occasion in 1956:

There was no doubt reference to police *zulum*.

<sup>10</sup> The Communist Party, in India and elsewhere, has used this tactic for years. See Eugene H. Methvin, "Mob Violence and Communist Strategy," *Orbis* (Summer, 1961), pp. 166-81.

<sup>11</sup> K. K. Sinha, *Towards Pluralistic Society* (Calcutta: Writers House, 1957), p. 25.

It is a constant factor that is brought in everywhere because it is expected that everybody will immediately accept any charge of misbehavior by the police. The poor police is so used to be kicked and cuffed like that and always condemned. It is easy to make a charge against the police. . . . It is becoming intolerable always for this poor policeman to be condemned for trying to do his duty in the most difficult of circumstances. Let us punish the policeman when he is guilty or anybody else when he is guilty. But the stone-thrower becomes a hero and is taken out in procession—may be—and the poor policeman who gets the stone on his head is a person who is guilty of *zulum* and atrocities.<sup>12</sup>

A fourth possible result is the political advantage which may accrue to agitational parties and groups *vis-à-vis* the government. In a country where the meaning of democracy is as yet largely unfixed in the public mind and has not been hallowed by years of reflexive experience, a policy of the government designed to establish rules, particularly rules for the expression of public opinion, can be too easily labelled as anti-democratic by the opposition. If the Government passes a Preventive Detention Act, amends the Indian Penal Code to provide stiffer penalties for incitement to communal violence, arrests "satyagrahis" raiding grain storage warehouses, or simply cordons off troubled areas in large cities, it hands the banner of democratic rectitude to the opposition. Acharya Kripalani, for instance, a respected leader of the Praja Socialist Party, thundered against the Congress Government in these words during a debate on the Preventive Detention Act:

It is not the Opposition, it is not the goondas,<sup>13</sup> it is not the black-marketeers, it is not even the Communists, it is you [referring to the Government] who are the greatest enemies of this infant democracy. If ever this democracy dies, you will be responsible for it. You may live for a day and be no more; but this will be the judgment of history to your everlasting shame.<sup>14</sup>

The Communist Party, especially, uses the law and order policies of the Government to present itself as the sole champion of democracy in India. Their thesis, proclaimed loudly from every rostrum, is that democracy means an absence of restrictions. Resistance by the Government to any popularly held belief or interest is *ipso facto* proof that the Govern-

<sup>12</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 28 May 1956, Col. 9822.

<sup>13</sup> Hooligans.

<sup>14</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13 December 1954, col. 2731.

ment is anti-democratic. "Vox populi, vox dei" is the base line of their propaganda. The relation between freedom and regulation, between discipline and license, is a grudging lesson to teach in any country. It is doubly difficult to understand in India where the public is, first, largely unlettered and inexperienced in the ways of democracy and, second, so surfeited upon extreme portrayals of the nature and benefits of democracy. Any governmental policy of legal restriction will inevitably provide an opposition with an unparalleled opportunity to question the government's integrity and intentions.

The fifth and most immediately serious consequence of a restrictive policy is the damage which it inflicts upon the position and prestige of the police and the law courts. The Indian police establishment must take the van in any attempt to discipline the masses, hence it becomes the primary target for abuse and vilification. The invidious position of the police is not an entirely new development in India, for they have been encumbered from the very beginning by the reputation earned when they were a paid tool of the British. People in India have not quickly forgotten that it was these same police who carried off friends and loved ones into detention, often to be held *incommunicado* for considerable periods of time. They remember the police breaking heads and firing tear gas squibs at non-violent demonstrators protesting for nothing more (or less) than the freedom of their country. An intensified policy of constraint resuscitates memories of this bitter period, memories which the police have strenuously sought to sponge clean since Independence.

The Law Commission, appointed by the central government, had this to say in 1958 about the stock of the police among the Indian people: "It must be conceded that in India, the police force as a whole is not, even today, regarded as a friend of the citizen."<sup>15</sup> This same theme was echoed in a recent article in the *Indian Police Journal* "... in actual fact, the feelings of the people toward the Police are anything but friendly."<sup>16</sup> In part, suspicion of the police can be traced to such ordinary factors as inefficiency, haste, lack of consideration, as well as the usual incidence of corrup-

tion, brutality, and partiality.<sup>17</sup> More important, however, in the opinion of the Law Commission, has been the extensive use of the police for law and order control. So serious has the trend toward non-cooperation with the police become among the mass of the people that the Law Commission recommended in 1958 that the investigating sections of the police establishment be separated from the law and order sections.<sup>18</sup>

The flame of antagonism toward the police is fanned constantly by opposition politicians, both in and out of legislative bodies. There is an axiom among these politicians that if violence occurs, it is the fault of police provocation. A Communist MP replied in these words to the Government's claim that there was a tendency to violence among the people: "How is this violence generated? Is it initially from the people or does it come as a reaction to police violence, the violence on the part of the executive?"<sup>19</sup> And another MP charged:

If violence has occurred, it has occurred not because of any activities of the detenus. It has occurred on account of the activities of the police.<sup>20</sup>

In the Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1955, twenty-two Opposition MLAs tabled the following statement:

It is true that the mob pelted the police with stones—that should not have been done—but when firing and lathi charges are resorted to indiscriminately, it would be too much to expect the people to be totally non-violent. The Government failed to understand the spontaneity of the people's demand and tried to suppress the will of the masses by force.<sup>21</sup>

Even the redoubtable J. P. Narayan has added his voice to the refrain:

The Prime Minister has warned again and again that the days of street demonstrations and the like are over. But let me say humbly that as long as his Government and its officers do not act justly and fairly, there will be demonstrations and things like that. After all why should a lover of freedom and democracy get so upset? Are these not the usual processes of democracy?<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, a comment by the *Eastern Economist*, November 13, 1959, p. 758, about the police force in New Delhi.

<sup>18</sup> *Report of the Law Commission*, Ch. 34, para. 29-31.

<sup>19</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, May 30, 1956, col. 10059.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, December 22, 1953, Col. 2840.

<sup>21</sup> *Times of India*, November 23, 1955, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, September 3, 1955, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> Law Commission of India, *Fourteenth Report* (Ministry of Law, Government of India, 1958), ch. 34, para. 36.

<sup>16</sup> B. N. Mullik, "Police Ethics," *Indian Police Journal*, October, 1960, pp. 1-10.

In the hands of J. P. Narayan such a comment cannot be dismissed lightly, for it sounds a note which has reverberated in modern political history. In the hands of a less scrupulous opposition such a doctrine can become a powerful cudgel with which to beat the government for any enforcement activities.

The police of India have become the chief whipping boys for all disorders. They can expect little cooperation from the people, and often not even a fair hearing of their case. The Indian Government has ample cause to hesitate before it embarks upon any policy which might augment this appreciable burden of hostility.

The attitude of the mass of Indians toward the judicial system is equally subject to deterioration as a result of government repression. Many Indians, particularly in rural areas, continue to exhibit what Sir Percival Spears has called a "slot machine" attitude toward the court system. The more tradition-minded Indian treats the courts not as a means of resolving disputes, of gaining justice, or of deciding the merits of a case, but as an instrument for getting all he can from a situation and, perhaps, for financially ruining his opponent. Courts become convenient adjuncts to personal vendettas. Furthermore, courts are not thought of as the arbiters of impartial justice or as the primary line of defense against the encroachments of predatory government. Rather, they are collaborators with government in the task of exploitation and control and they should be avoided at all costs. The story is told of the litigant who, when his solicitor triumphantly wired "Justice has prevailed," replied immediately, "Appeal at once."<sup>23</sup> Clearly, then, if government should tighten the laws governing public agitation and administer them more strictly, the courts, like the police, will become a focus of hostility. They will be forced to conform to an already distasteful image.

The Report of the Law Commission noted two disturbing signs in this connection. First, that there is a great reluctance on the part of potential witnesses to appear in court. Second, that perjury has been increasing alarmingly of late. "The sanctity of the oath has almost disappeared and persons seem prepared readily to make false statements on oath in courts of law."<sup>24</sup>

An impartial court system and incorruptible and trusted police force are cornerstones of the

system of voluntary social regulation, or regulation by consent, which is the hallmark of democracy. The estrangement of the people from police and judicial systems would represent an ominous portent for the future of modern India.

So far we have noted five possible disadvantages of a policy of limiting coercive public protest: (1) the stoppering of a socially useful or functional response; (2) the weakening of consensus between ruler and ruled; (3) the intensification of the Gandhian martyrdom syndrome; (4) the creation of a tactically advantageous position for the non-democratic political opposition; (5) the alienation of the people from the police and court system. These have one point in common. They work through the responses of the non-participant mass of the people, that is, through those who have played no part in the formulation or implementation of law and order policy. But there may also be negative effects which operate through the participating or ruling elite. I shall name three.

Restriction of coercive public protest impinges directly upon the ability of individuals and groups to dramatize dissident viewpoints and, hence, to affect the course of government policy. The need for some amount of restraint of this process is conceded. At the same time, however, a democratic nation must be quite sure that the rules for the separation of proper from improper protest are clearly formulated and impartially applied. Efforts to discipline the expressions of popular opinion, even for the most unimpeachable reasons, may end in the suppression of all unwanted opinion. Elitism in a country like India exerts a powerful hold over the official mind. Officials are already separated from the masses by a chasm of education, training, and experience. It would be very easy to extend a policy of tutelage in the rules of democratic interaction into one of authoritarian suppression of opposition viewpoints. The task of regulating coercive public protest must not end in the elimination of protest; the purpose of the policy should be the re-canalization of protest. Democratic pedagogy must not become a crutch to elitism.

In any policy of regulation officials should be entirely clear about their aims. The criterion herein adopted has been the creation of the social requisites for democracy. This is a very different goal from, say, yearly increments in per capita income or rate of industrialization. It is not efficiency which is the goal, but the peculiar kind of social interaction known as democracy. India is today straining tensely for

<sup>23</sup> *Statesman*, March 7, 1955, editorial, p. 6.

<sup>24</sup> *Report of the Law Commission*, ch. 40, para. 1.

economic development. It would be perilously easy to substitute a materialistic development criterion for a political one. The difficulty, then, with any policy of social regulation in India is that the bureaucratic impulse may supplant the pedagogic one.

Another risk is implicit in any attempt to limit the scope of political persuasion. The very nature of the task, namely, the inculcation of an understanding of the bounds of propriety in a democracy, suggests that any policy which places reserves of power in the hands of government will be less firmly restrained than in well established democratic states. The inertial conservatism of the people of the United States and England, trained for generations in democracy, causes the political system, when unbalanced, to return as a rule to the familiar ways. In India the familiar ways are not democratic. The society's homeostatic mechanism, whatever it is, will not impel the society back to an anterior democratic condition. Cures to any problem which require the concentration of large amounts of power in a few hands are less likely to be voluntarily relinquished when the moment of crisis is past.

Habituation to power, therefore, may be a destructive after-effect of controlling tightly the various forms of political protest so popular in contemporary India. This tendency among the agents of governmental authority

may operate the more freely because of the relative absence of institutionalized countervailing forces. A return to the *status quo ante*, with regard to accretions of governmental power, would be more dependent upon the character, restraint, and commitment to democratic ideals of India's leaders than would need to be the case in long-established democratic countries.

A policy of social control may, therefore, by the manner of its impingement upon the ruling coalition buttress existing tendencies toward (1) elitist isolation, (2) the pre-eminence of exclusively materialist developmental goals, and (3) authoritarianism.

It should by now be clear that in designing policies for the regulation of coercive social protest, whether exacting or permissive, the Indian Government must steer between Scylla and Charybdis. There are grave dangers implicit in a too rigorous adherence to the letter of the democratic blueprint, and also grave dangers in disregarding portions of it. Decisions should not rest upon theoretical considerations alone. Dogmatic suppression of all forms of illegal, or even violent, protest might well be as damaging to the long-term prospects of democracy as an unperceptive lack of concern. Not doctrinal purity, but pragmatic viability within a framework of ideals, should be the guiding concern.

## COMMUNICATIONS

### EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO VOTE-COUNTING THEORY IN NOMINATING CHOICE

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor William H. Riker's essay on "Voting and the Summation of Preferences" (this REVIEW, Vol. 55, December 1961, pp. 900-11) is a most useful contribution. It needs to be supplemented by some comment on the applicability of this material in the field of nominating choice; also on the applicability of experimental approaches to ascertain the frequency with which the problems that concern Riker may in fact occur in nature.

The best-known elections in the United States in which a choice among three or more alternatives is likely to occur are those involved in making party nominations. In either one party or the other, almost every presidential year has seen three or more candidates competing for a presidential nomination. Situations involving as many as six or seven candidates have been relatively common in state primaries, as for example those involving the gubernatorial candidates in Alabama and Texas in 1962.

If the work by Duncan Black and his predecessors to which Riker calls attention had been known fifty years ago, the evolution of primary elections in this country might conceivably have taken a somewhat different form. Black seems, in fact, to have produced a fundamental discovery showing why either plurality choice without a majority, or a run-off between the two leading first-choice candidates, can easily result in the selection of the "wrong" candidate if the candidate or candidates at the center of the spectrum happen to be weakest in first-choice strength, although strong in second- or third-choice strength—an event which one could suppose must be relatively common.

A simple illustration of a familiar kind will make the point. Suppose three candidates, A, B, and C, of whom A and C are leading, but are strongly opposed to each other. The supporters of each reject the other, but would be willing to accept B, the man in the middle. In this case, the distribution of the voters in terms of their preference orders might be about as follows:

Preference	Per Cent of Voters			
	40	15	10	35
1st	A	B	B	C
2d	B	A	C	B
3d	C	C	A	A

Black argues that in such a case, that candidate should be chosen who could defeat each of the others when paired against them one at a time, as B could do in the present case. Yet B would be defeated in any primary election decided on the basis of an initial plurality or of a run-off between the two first-choice leaders. Such a plurality defeat is exactly what happened to Governor Thomas E. Dewey in the 1948 Wisconsin primary, when the Republican vote divided Stassen 40 per cent, Dewey 24, and MacArthur 36—a situation, moreover, in which Dewey was undoubtedly the candidate of the center and could probably have defeated either of his opponents in a two-way test.

We used Blacks' work to some extent in *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (p. 315, n. 24, and p. 489, n. 7), but if it had come to our attention sooner and we had assimilated it more fully, our treatment of the alternative vote and of the hazards of plurality voting would have been somewhat different. In a more recent study, I applied Black's criterion directly in attempting to assess the results of the Democratic convention of 1960, and concluded, on the basis of the Gallup poll data, that Kennedy probably could have defeated each of the other candidates in a two-way test and could therefore be regarded as a majority choice of his party (David *et al*, *The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-61*, pp. 18-19). In this particular instance, there was no evidence of nontransitivity of social choice. The "Arrow problem" to which Riker devotes so much attention apparently did not arise, although on *a priori* grounds, the situation was especially conducive to nontransitivity because of the cross-cutting effect of the religious issue.

The Arrow problem is so intriguing intellectually that it is easy to overlook the paucity of empirical data demonstrating cases in which it actually occurred, despite the extensive discussion the problem has received over a ten-year period. If I understand Riker's essay correctly, he does not cite a single case of nontransitivity of social choice in an actual situation involving real people, although he refers at pages 909-910 to various types of experimental work leading to somewhat conflicting results. Gordon Tullock of the University of Virginia, co-author with James M. Buchanan of *The Calculus of Consent* (1962), tells me that he not is aware of any documented cases in the

literature, and furthermore seems to be in at least partial disagreement with Riker on the frequency with which such cases might be expected if there were enough experimental work to provide a basis for a conclusion. On *a priori* grounds arising out of theories of his own, Tullock believes that actual cases would be quite infrequent in situations involving only three or four alternatives, although they would occur; while Riker seems to think they might occur rather often.

The subject is one that lends itself readily to classroom experimentation, as well as to use of sample surveys; and the problems involved in a simple lack of majority preference on a first-choice basis will always be important, whatever happens to the Arrow problem. In hopes of finding a factual example of nontransitivity on a legislative issue, as well as other potential results, I made up a ballot offering three alternatives, as follows:

- A. Federal aid for public schools only
- B. Federal aid for public and private (including parochial) schools
- C. No federal aid for either schools

Each respondent was also asked to indicate whether he considered himself a Democrat, Neutral, or Republican.

This ballot was presented to a class in an introductory course in government and 68 usable ballots were obtained. The party split proved to be 24-D, 21-N, and 23-R. The numbers of students in the total group voting each preference order were as follows:

32	11	12	1	11	1
A	A	B	B	C	C
B	C	A	C	A	B
C	B	C	A	B	A

Policy A was thus a heavy majority preference on a first-choice basis, with 43 votes to 13 for B and 12 for C. Policy A was also the majority first-choice for each party group counted separately, although most of the minorities who preferred Policy B as their first choice were Democrats and most of those who preferred Policy C as their first choice were Republicans. Nothing approaching nontransitivity of choice could be found by taking any of these groups separately. Repeated further use of this ballot with other and varying types of groups might find some actual case of nontransitivity, but it doesn't look as easy as it did before the first attempt was made.

A similar experiment was made with a ballot

offering four potential candidates for the Republican presidential nomination of 1964, namely, Nelson Rockefeller, Richard Nixon, George Romney, and Barry Goldwater. With four candidates, 24 different preference orders are possible. In a group of 70 usable ballots, 21 of these possibilities occurred at least once, 16 at least twice, and 10 at least three times; hence only summaries of the voting can be presented. The preference distributions were as follows:

Preference	Rockefeller	Nixon	Romney	Goldwater
1st	26	18	6	20
2d	21	24	16	9
3d	11	18	29	12
4th	12	10	19	29

In this group, no one had a majority as either first choice or last choice. Rockefeller would have been the winner on a first-choice plurality basis; a run-off would have occurred between Rockefeller and Goldwater. In this group, Rockefeller would win the run-off by 41 to 29—assuming no vote-shifting—and in this case a run-off would also produce the "correct" outcome, since Rockefeller could defeat each of the other candidates in a two-way race. Nixon, however, would have defeated Goldwater in a two-way race, 42 to 28, and it could be argued that if there is to be a run-off, it should take place between Rockefeller and Nixon rather than Rockefeller and Goldwater. On a Borda count according to the method of marks (see Black), by which 3 marks are given for each first choice, 2 for each second choice, 1 for each third choice, and 0 for each fourth or last choice, Rockefeller's count was 131, Nixon's 120, Goldwater's 90, and Romney's 79. In a two-way race, however, Romney would have defeated Goldwater by 37 to 33.

The results just given for outcomes in the various two-way combinations were derived from the original counting chart, set up as a series of tree diagrams in which each of the four first-choice possibilities is followed by its three second-choice possibilities, those in turn by their two third-choice possibilities, and those in turn by the corresponding fourth-choice possibilities. Use of such a chart greatly facilitates the original ballot counting and thereafter makes it possible to assemble results on any desired basis with a minimum of retabulation.

When the 23 Republican ballots in this group were tabulated separately, the preference distributions were as follows:



Preference	Rockefeller	Nixon	Romney	Goldwater
1st	5	7	2	9
2d	7	8	6	2
3d	5	4	9	5
4th	6	4	6	7

In this group, again no one has a first-choice majority, but Goldwater would be the winner on a plurality basis. In a run-off, however, Nixon would have his chance and would defeat Goldwater 13 to 10. On a two-way basis, Nixon defeats each of the other candidates, Goldwater defeats Rockefeller and Romney, and Rockefeller defeats Romney; there is no evidence of nontransitivity. The Borda count is Nixon 41, Goldwater 36, Rockefeller 34, and Romney 27.

The four candidates were arranged from left to right in the previous tabulations on the basis of commonly held opinions about their positions in relation to each other. The voting distributions on the tree diagrams, however, provide empirical evidence for an ordering in which Rockefeller and Goldwater occupy the polar positions, with Nixon nearest to Rockefeller and Romney nearest to Goldwater. Evidences of these relationships are apparent in all the diagrams, but especially in those for the 23 Republican voters, where Nixon was the second choice of all the Rockefeller voters, Romney was the principal second choice of the Goldwater voters, and Rockefeller was the second choice of most of the Nixon voters. Goldwater and Romney divided the last choice positions for the Rockefeller and Nixon voters, while Rockefeller and Nixon performed this office for the Goldwater and Romney voters. All of this suggests that the actual voting results can be used to array a group of candidates along a spectrum in the absence of other evidence, if the voting process provides a complete array of preference data, as it could at least in classroom experiments or sample surveys.

These experiments have been reported in part because the results have some intrinsic interest, but primarily to illustrate a method of experimentation that can be used either in the classroom or in sample surveys. This in turn suggests a number of conclusions of some potential interest to the profession:

1. An experimental method is available to demonstrate to students the complexity of preference structures in situations of multiple alternatives. Such properties of opinion as conflict and consensus or the lack of it can be studied. With the addition of other scaling devices, intensity could also be studied.

2. Used repeatedly, such experiments could be used to demonstrate some of the other properties of opinion, notably stability, instability, and latency—properties of special importance in the development of a presidential nominating choice.

3. Such experiments can be used to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in arriving at valid majority decisions in situations involving a choice among multiple alternatives of candidates or policies. This is the classic problem of the national party conventions and of any primary election where there has been no effective pre-election screening of the candidates.

4. Sample surveys along these lines, used effectively with adequate publication of the results, could do much to create a more informed public opinion in situations involving multiple alternatives, including preconvention proceedings on presidential nominations and primary elections in states where multiple candidacies are typical.

5. If some method of accumulating the results can be devised, it would be possible to obtain empirical answers to at least three questions on which answers are needed, namely, (a) whether existing primary election systems involving mere plurality choice or a run-off tend frequently to select nominees who are not in fact the majority choice of their party on any basis; (b) whether such systems tend to select from the extremes more often than from the center in situations of multiple candidacies, as Black implies at page 75 of his book; and (c) whether the problem of non-transitivity of social choice exists in nature with sufficient frequency to deserve consideration in the design of electoral systems.

6. In future election years, substantial research funds could appropriately be invested in sample surveys during the intervals preceding the holding of primary elections in a considerable number of situations involving multiple candidacies. It would be desirable to pre-test situations involving three or more candidates that will be settled by a plurality as well as those that will be settled by a run-off. Sample surveys in as many as fifteen or twenty primary election situations in the same year could do much to clear up the questions raised in the preceding paragraph.

7. Finally, after the steps indicated, presumably it would be possible to develop a vote-counting theory in nominating choice, as well as an improved system for holding primary elections, that would not only rest on a sounder empirical foundation than is presently avail-

able, but could be understood by teachers, students, and opinion leaders after it had been produced.

If it is true that the existing plurality and run-off systems select from the extremes more often than from the center in situations of multiple candidacies, as Black's theories suggest, the result may be a type of instability or of adverse selection that complicates any movement toward a more effective two-party system in states where multiple candidacies are common. On the other hand, it is probably one of the virtues of the national conventions that they tend to move toward the center of each party in the search for a presidential candidate who can be nominated. The reasons why this is

both true and necessary can probably be demonstrated if the appropriate kind of sample survey evidence is obtained in future years; and classroom experiments may be useful for the same purpose in the meantime. At any rate, an exploration of Black's theories has tended to confirm my own faith in the national convention system of presidential nominations.<sup>1</sup>

PAUL T. DAVID

*University of Virginia*

<sup>1</sup> An article of mine on the presidential nominating process, in the Spring 1962 issue of *Law and Contemporary Problems*, deals more fully with some applications of the notions discussed here.

## ON BRZEZINSKI'S USE OF HISTORY

TO THE EDITOR:

May I comment on some aspects of the article on "Deviation Control" in your March issue?

Since differences in organizational purposes may condition methods of action and the kind of organizational unity that is required, I question whether "the most vital and distinctive aspect of the activities of the Church," the "spiritual" aspect "which defines its unique character," "can be altogether excluded from consideration" in a discussion of tactics toward deviation. The role of concentrated force, the rationale of command and obedience, the methods through which cohesion is best attained may very well differ for an organization that hopes to achieve an external remodeling of institutions, through revolutionary seizures of power and through techniques of control preceding general consent, and for an organization that conceives its goal as a continually repeated process, inherently uncoercible, occurring within individual men. The Church has always been aware that diverse and spontaneous movements of thought and action initiated by persons apart from the hierarchy have been a major factor in its success (insistence on conformity of thought and method would have decimated the roster of saints—eliminating Aquinas, among others). As a matter of historical fact, the conditions within which the Church developed gave it no chance to become "a single homogeneous unit" in which "the center" could exercise a degree of control remotely comparable to that of Stalin in the Party. Both its purposes and its possibilities have required it to depend heavily on persuasion, reasoning, tradition, the rule of law, and diplomatic compromise; it has always

had to combine an insistence on some fixed principles and procedures with an acceptance of a considerable degree of internal diversity and autonomy, open debate, and unresolved disagreement. Thus the conception of organizational unity within which issues of deviation are to be considered has never, I suggest, been the same for the Church as for the Party.

Moreover, the relation of doctrine to action differs for the two institutions. The dogmas on which the Church insists do not purport to be determinative of organizational policy in relation to the course of history; they deal with relationships presumed to be invariable; and the maintenance of the faith, believed to be divinely revealed, is itself an intrinsic part of the Church's goal. The concrete applications of the faith to moral conduct and organizational action are understood to be to some degree contingent on shifting circumstance, open to dispute, and subject to merely positive determination; but wherever conceptions of the ultimate, invariable relations of God and man are at issue, the Church is inherently committed to seek consistency and to insist on conformity. In principle, this means that the condemnation of a statement clearly incompatible with dogma already defined can not properly be subordinated to any tactical consideration; to suggest that the Church could maintain its unity through ignoring such a deviation is to suggest that it should abandon what it has always conceived to be its role. But the authoritative definition of doctrines not yet clearly defined must necessarily proceed with great caution and take into account the system of previous commitments and the consensus—or lack of consensus—of theologians. These distinctions, I suggest, are

highly relevant to the cases of deviation that Professor Brzezinski treats.

Descending from principle to historical fact, I would also suggest that the Church's policies have always been conditioned by some major differences between its relations with other systems of power and those of the Party. It has never controlled much of the world's physical force; its economic resources have always been widely dispersed and hard to protect from the acquisitive interests of outsiders; there is a measurable difference between the Soviet Union and the Papal States as a base of operations and a concern of policy. Thus the activity of the Church has been generally dependent on a policy of peaceful co-existence; and, since the nature of its goals does not commit it to an ultimate antagonism to any system of political and economic organization as such, it has a superior capacity for compromise and stable alliance with other centers of power. Such alliances may compensate for, but do not abolish, its intrinsic vulnerability; in practice, such alliances have often been very entangling; and, obviously, the exact state of its relations with other forces at any given moment of history may be highly significant for the prospects of "deviation control."

Aside from these basic differences between the Church and the Party, other differences apply to the Church on the eve of the Reformation. Professor Brzezinski's summary of the Church as, like the Party, a proselytizing and "expansion-oriented" institution, in which "the success of any one unit of the movement" is "the source of satisfaction to the entire membership," is strikingly inappropriate to the Church of that period. It had then, as has often been observed, the characteristic pattern of an *ancien régime*. Except in Spain (and there, under monarchic impetus), it was not proselytizing nor oriented toward expansion. Its various institutional units (including the papacy) were engaged, with considerable mutual jealousy, in the pursuit of particularist interests to a degree that effectively prevented concerted action on the common problems commonly recognized as serious: internal corruption, the century-old Hussite heresy, the advance of the Turks. Its financial resources were under strain, maldistributed, and very noticeably often misspent for non-organizational purposes. Powers once demanded as essential to its operation—especially, control over the appointment of its own officers—had been, in large areas, relinquished. Its officials (including incumbents of the papacy) were too often ill-suited to and uninterested in the organizational functions and insensitive to new movements of

public opinion. The *trahison des clercs* was well under way; popular respect for the *élite* was at an all-time low. Reform movements were still rudimentary. Is the problem of deviation in an *ancien régime* comparable to the problem of deviation in a revolutionary movement on the make? Early Protestantism could perhaps have provided case-histories somewhat comparable with the case of Titoism; but if one must seek a twentieth-century analogy to the situation of the sixteenth-century Church, some of the dilemmas of "capitalistic democracy" are at least as relevant as those of international Communism.

Aside from my distrust of Professor Brzezinski's premises, I am bewildered by his presentation of the case of Luther and the inferences he draws from it. I should have expected an assessment of tactics toward a doctrinal deviant to be based on a careful examination of available alternatives in the light of the total situation at the time: the immediate pattern of interests, purposes, antagonisms, loyalties; the immediate and potential resources of the organization and the deviant, including their immediate and potential allies; the content of the deviant doctrine, its implications, its compatibility or incompatibility with previous commitments, its potential appeal to others. Professor Brzezinski's *résumé* of factors that had in the remote past been useful to organizational unity and papal leadership is no substitute for an analysis of the instruments available in 1517. The Crusades and the military orders are as irrelevant to consideration of Leo X *versus* Luther as Danegeld and the Domesday Survey would be to consideration of the Stuarts *versus* Parliament. The mendicant orders and the universities were not the assets they once had been; one could plausibly argue that they had become liabilities. One wonders why Professor Brzezinski explains the theory of episcopal equality rather than the current theory and status of conciliarism; why he ignores such a vitally relevant topic as the current structure of ecclesiastical finance; why, disregarding the effects of the concordats and their English equivalents, he supposes that the transformation of the Church into a composite of national units was occurring only "underneath the surface" (and why he regards this as analogous to a transformation in the Communist Party, whose officers, I believe, have not yet been appointed by fellow-travelers); why, except for a vague allusion to "national power" (the Elector of Saxony?), he has nothing to say about the religious, political, economic, and intellectual situation in Germany.

His conception of the late-medieval Inquisition as an instrument of papal control and a parallel to the Stalinist purges is remarkable. Control of the Spanish Inquisition had been ceded to Ferdinand; it was an instrument of national unification and of reforming piety. Elsewhere, pre-Reformation applications of the Inquisition were typically sporadic and haphazard, largely dominated by local antagonisms, fears, and avarice, or by the local Inquisitor's professional zeal, and dependent on the collaboration of secular government. (Incidentally, there was an authentic campaign against witchcraft as such.) Professor Brzezinski's assurance that the Inquisition "doubtless" increased papal power is oddly at variance with the actual preoccupations of the Renaissance popes, notably tolerant of free-thinking and not greatly concerned with general leadership in the Church, which they regarded chiefly as the source of certain kinds of income to be spent on the local projects in which they were engrossed. Sixtus IV, in fact, had been willing to jeopardize the universal role of the papacy to transform it into an hereditary monarchy in the Papal States; this abortive project was not, I must add, an ecclesiastical version of "socialism in one country." Professor Brzezinski's summary of the Stalinist spiral ("the result of the purges was a further concentration of power at the center. The fear of violence intensified the violence, and the violence . . . intensified the fear") scarcely applies to the pre-Reformation Church, in which the ultramontane influence of the papacy was diminishing and was exerted largely through financial and political deals; in which doctrinal debate was carried on with more than usual freedom, and widespread, devastating criticism of every facet of the organization, including the papacy, went on unchecked; in which the most important interplay of fear and violence was connected with the activities of quite unpurgeable armies in Italy.

The Lutheran movement was not, of course, "the first major crisis of unity" that the Church had faced. It had struggled for centuries with Arianism; it was still vainly attempting to heal the centuries-old schism of East and West; it had successfully dealt with widespread popular heresies through a major effort requiring a variety of techniques; more recently, it had resolved a quarter-century schism, but was still unable to muster up sufficient resources of force or persuasion to counter the Hussite heresy. Moreover, when Luther first attracted notice, no one imagined that his theological statements, neither novel nor clearly heretical, would lead to "a crisis of unity"; his main

teachings had been expressed a few years earlier by the French theologian, Lefèvre d'Étaples, with no effect on the popular mind. And, as between Luther and Friar Tetzl, it was Tetzl who talked heresy. Initiative in opposition to Luther did not come from "the center" (that easy-going connoisseur, Leo X, scarcely fits the role of Stalin), but from the Archbishop of Mainz and the Dominicans, whose zeal to get Luther silenced was directly motivated by his effect on their lucrative racket. Leo X had to be prodded into taking an interest in what he originally, and with fifty per cent accuracy, regarded as a "squabble of monks." Far from "precipitously" following a routine technique with Luther, Leo, bedeviled by conflicting pressures, had great difficulty in making up his mind what to do about him; the order of arrest of August, 1518 (based on an indictment, not a judgment) followed months of indecision and was quickly withdrawn; the subsequent prolongation of debate, which gave Luther wider publicity and assisted him to clarify his thoughts, was partly due to the influence of his various defenders, partly to the difficulty of catching him in any statement that could with assurance be "branded heretical," and partly to some political strategy with regard to the imperial election, which Leo, unlike Professor Brzezinski, considered worth taking into account.

Granting that the tactics adopted were unsuccessful, I remain unimpressed by the alternatives Professor Brzezinski proposes. His suggestion of a "quiet liquidation" of Luther, without "personalizing the conflict (!)," with a subsequent "open condemnation" (by whom?) "of the improper views" (which?) is quite enchanting, but not quite convincing. I assume that Professor Brzezinski does not mean that preventative assassination of every critic who might later have become a heretic or schismatic should have been adopted as a general Reformation-averting policy: aside from the sizable administrative difficulties it would have entailed, and some incompatibility with the Church's professed goals and habitual procedures, such a wholesale assault on the population of Europe could scarcely have been kept quiet and might, indeed, have contributed to the result it aimed to prevent. Assuming that he contemplates the preventative assassination of Luther only, I can only inquire how anyone could possibly have known, before the debate developed, that it would be Luther's "improper views," rather than those of numerous other people, that would spark an explosion—especially as no one had reason to think that an explosion was imminent. His alternative

recommendation, that Luther should have been "ignored," may seem superficially more feasible; however, even if "the center" had "refused to engage in open debate," it could not possibly have silenced other debaters (I suspect that Professor Brzezinski is visualizing the Stalinist dictatorship rather than the pre-Reformation Church); and if Luther's views had developed under this stimulus, could the pope have continued to ignore them? Professor Brzezinski's confidence that, if Luther could have been eliminated or ignored, the Protestant split would probably have been averted is gratuitous. It tacitly assumes a number of highly controversial theses—about the causes of the Reformation, the indispensability of Luther's role, his mental processes, the reasons for his influence, the potentialities of alternative movements—that can not be taken for granted in this fashion. There is a mass of historical discussion on the difficult questions that Professor Brzezinski glides over here; apparently he is unfamiliar with the literature on the topic and unaware of the terms in which the discussion is, and must be, carried on.

The fact that Jansenism was successfully contained by somewhat different tactics is no indication that these tactics could have been successfully applied to Lutheranism. Professor Brzezinski's analysis ignores significant differences in the situations in which these two doctrinally somewhat similar movements appeared—differences that undermined the potential appeal of Jansenism, regardless of the tactics used. France was not Germany, with its special problems and frustrations; Jansenism lacked the significant political and economic connotations associated with Luther's religious teachings; the French kings had long since been entrenched, through generally satisfactory concordats with the papacy, in ecclesiastical rights that German princes gained only by going Protestant; even at the height of Reformation fervor, Calvinism had captured only a fraction of Frenchmen and, in the seventeenth century, the Huguenots were declining in numbers and zeal. Moreover, Lutheranism and Jansenism are separated by a period in which, unobserved by Professor Brzezinski, the Catholic Church had successfully remodelled and tightened its organization, cleaned up its scandals, rearranged its budget, improved the quality of its personnel, clarified many of its doctrines, developed new techniques of control and persuasion to fit the needs and temper of the time,

regained the respect of its continuing members, intensified their religious earnestness, and embarked, with notable success in France and elsewhere, on a program of proselytization and expansion. (It had, one might say, adapted itself to the Cold War through ecclesiastical equivalents to, *e.g.*, the Dennis Case, NATO, the Common Market, and the Ford Foundation.)

Professor Brzezinski's thesis that experience with Luther had made the Church "deviation-conscious" and thus prepared it for a more moderate handling of the Jansenist problem slides over the fact that the Church had met many cases of "deviation" since the time of Luther and handled them in various ways, though usually with greater decisiveness and harshness rather than greater moderation. His account of the Jansenist controversy is distorted by his failure to notice that the Gallicanism of the French episcopacy and that of the French monarchy were by no means identical nor even, usually, allied; that the papal treatment of Jansenism was conditioned by several considerations besides a hope to keep the Jansenists in the fold; that when the Jansenists focussed their attacks on the Jesuits they quite accurately selected their actual opponent; that the French monarchy (*i.e.*, in effect, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV) was actively anti-Jansenist; that Mazarin and Louis XIV were, in fact, instigators of repeated attempts to secure more thorough-going papal condemnations. The chance that "France might be lost" had its roots, not in Jansenism, but in episcopal Gallicanism—which actually "became defiance" as a result of Innocent XI's intransigence on the quite undocctrinal issue of the *régale*, which temporarily allied the king and the Gallican bishops. The schismatic movement, however, quickly collapsed, since Louis had been playing for a limited objective and was thoroughly averse to heading a schismatic and potentially anti-monarchic church. There is no reason to think that Jansenist defiance could ever have had a greater effect.

Historical comparison can be valuable, but it is always dangerous—history is so annoyingly specific. I have argued that Professor Brzezinski's analogies and inferences are based on some serious misconceptions of the situations that he discusses. I have not commented on some incidental errors, not crucial to his theses.

EWART LEWIS

berlin, Ohio

## ON METHOD, ANALOGY, AND DETERMINISM

TO THE EDITOR:

Much, if not all, of the disagreement between Mrs. Lewis and myself involves ways of looking at the world, of approach and method. She is concerned with making certain that the immensely complex pattern of reality is not distorted or oversimplified by theoretical analysis. I am concerned lest this admittedly complex reality does not obstruct entirely any theoretical analysis or suggestive generalizations.

Thus in comparing the Church and the Party it is not sufficient merely to list a series of factual parallels or differences. It is also essential to compare the two organizations in terms of their dynamic relationship to the world around them, the degree of homogeneity and doctrinal commitment relative to that world in different times, and not just one organization with the other. In this connection, two simple definitions are in order: "Analogy: A relation of likeness *between* two things or *of* one thing *to* or *with* another, consisting in the resemblance not of the things themselves but of two or more attributes, circumstances, or effects"; "Identity: Sameness of essential character. Sameness in all that constitutes the objective reality of a thing; self-sameness; oneness." (*Webster Collegiate Dictionary*, 1946, italics in original.)

Mrs. Lewis' comments, sometimes quite acute, might have been a great deal more relevant had she been more observant of these distinctions. Unfortunately, she did not. Thus much of her effort to prove that the Catholic Church is not the Communist Party is superfluous. I agree that it is not. However, to prove that it is not (*i.e.*, non-identity) is not to prove that there are no pertinent resemblances in orientation, function and organization (*i.e.*, analogy). To assert simply that there were, and are, significant differences, or that the Church's "conception" of unity "has never . . . been the same" as for the Party, or that the Papacy did not have the same power as Stalin, is to suggest that the only basis for making comparisons is a complete identity in experience and behavior, which is simply bad logic for then there would be nothing to compare.

Furthermore, my purpose was not merely to describe a certain similarity in events or patterns although I am pleased that Mrs. Lewis' delightfully specific historical treatise does not shake the factual basis of my effort. I was concerned with attempting some generalizations concerning deviation-control on the basis of the analogous organizational experience of two international, doctrinal movements which are

"action-oriented." Mrs. Lewis, in her effort to demonstrate what appeared to me to be obvious differences between the Church and the Communist Party, may or may not be right when she states categorically that the Church conceived its "goal as . . . inherently uncoercible" but the fact is that coercion was used; and it was with organizational behavior, and its consequences, that I was concerned. It is also quite true that in the time under discussion the Church was not actively engaged in proselytization. I did not say it was. However, it did before and after the period under discussion; at a certain stage the Communist movement also was not actively proselytizing or expanding. That, however, does not prove that either movement is not "inherently committed to proselytization" and *extra ecclesiam, nulla salus* was taken literally for a long time, with certain operational consequences. (Incidentally, Mrs. Lewis' description of the inner decay of the Church on the eve of the unity-crisis bears striking resemblance—I hope she will forgive me—to the inner corruption of the Kremlin in the years 1945–1948, so well described by Džilas in his recent *Conversations with Stalin*.)

Her defense of the Inquisition as an instrument of "reforming piety" is quaint although not central to the issue at hand. (From the point of view of the orthodox Stalinist, the purge was also a "reforming" instrument of purification.) However, even her generous version of it does not contradict the proposition that its effect was the dogmatization of the movement and centripetal political pressure. Furthermore, in her effort to depict the late medieval Church as a pluralist, tolerant community of prayerful pacifists practising "open debate and unresolved disagreement," Mrs. Lewis ignores such minor details as the burning of John Huss and Jerome of Prague by the Council of Constance or the little military expedition led by Cardinal Cesarini, the Papal legate, to suppress the deviants in Bohemia. Nor were the Crusades as anachronistic to Papal Power as she alleges; as late as 1459 Pius II organized a Congress of European princes in order to prepare one.

Mrs. Lewis is somewhat too hasty in alleging that I consider the factors which made for the growth of Papal power to be the factors of power available to the Papacy for dealing with Luther. They were not. In the course of a very brief summary I had no intention of exploring all the ramifications of the relationship between the Papacy and Luther—as I also did not when

dealing with the Stalin-Tito conflict. Instead, I wished to point to certain specific errors of judgment in the center's handling of the crisis. That Luther was not taken seriously in the beginning is quite true but it is not much of an argument. Neither was Tito—but so what? Her subsequent comments, designed to demonstrate that other means also would not have been very effective (although she does find the thought of assassinating Luther “enchanting”) strongly imply that the Reformation was inevitable, irrespective of what the Papacy did with regard to Luther. Contrary to this rigid notion, H. Jedin in his authoritative *A History of the Council of Trent* indicates clearly that errors in handling Luther were of some importance. I suppose a determinist could argue that National Communism was inevitable, irrespective of Stalin's handling of Tito. Determinists have always the advantage of arguing backwards from events which did happen, but that does not necessarily establish the true causes of the events or the degree of probability of alternatives.

Contrary to Mrs. Lewis, the Luther case was “the first major crisis of unity” which the Church, as the type of doctrinal, *international* organization defined in my paper, had faced. So was Tito with respect to the Communist movement, irrespective of Trotsky, Bukharin, the Mensheviks, etc. Conceding Mrs. Lewis' superior knowledge of medieval history (which with justification she explicitly stresses) I am not unaware of Arianism, the East-West schism, etc. My point is that both Christianity and Communism have experienced organizational transformations in relationship to new forms of social-political organization as well as their own expansion.

Lastly, Mrs. Lewis' argument that the Church was more effective against Jansenism because it “had successfully remodeled and tightened its organization . . . clarified many of its doctrines, developed new techniques of control and persuasion . . .” etc., simply elaborates some of my own points. (Mrs. Lewis describes these as “ecclesiastical equivalents to, e.g., the Dennis Case, NATO, the Common Market, and The Ford Foundation.” Might we have avoided our disagreement had I used the word “equivalent” instead of analogy?) The Church had learned its lesson, it became more effective, finally it succeeded. However, here too, Mrs. Lewis falls victim to a propensity to substitute determinism for explanation. Thus in a curious contradiction to her perfectly sound and apt observations cited above, Mrs. Lewis concludes by flatly asserting that “There is no reason to think that Jansenist defiance

could ever have had a greater effect.” Either her first point quoted above is quite irrelevant or her second quote is quite untrue.

To sum up: Mrs. Lewis' criticism suffers from a confusion of analogy with identity which makes it difficult for her to understand a comparative study; from a consequent misunderstanding of my purpose, which was to generalize some principles of deviation-control and not merely to establish factually descriptive symmetry; and from implicit determinism.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Columbia University

#### TO THE EDITOR:

I agree with Professor Brzezinski that the difference between us is partly one of approach and method. But may I restate that difference? There are of course no identities in history; but I would argue that cause-and-effect conclusions drawn from a comparison of non-identical historical situations can be safely made only if one examines, for each instance, the differences as carefully as the resemblances. How otherwise can one know whether the differences were not crucial to the outcome? And if one does not examine equally the context of differences, how can one be sure that what appear to be similarities are really similar?—My position is certainly “determinist,” in the sense that I am accustomed to think that historical processes are determined by the interplay of many factors, and that I can conceive of no way to establish what might have been the effect of changing any single factor except through examining its role in relation to the whole situational context. I consider it debatable whether a different tactic toward Luther could have averted the Protestant Reformation; I see no reason to believe that Jansenism, however defiant, could ever have induced the splitting off of the French church; but I think that the burden of proof is on Professor Brzezinski, and that he has failed to shoulder it.

But our difference is also, I think, a dispute on questions of fact; we apparently disagree widely as to the *analogies* between the Church and the Party “in terms of their dynamic relationship to the world around them, the degree of homogeneity and doctrinal commitment relative to that world,” in the periods under consideration. It was, I thought, precisely from this viewpoint that I criticized Professor Brzezinski's opinions about the state of the Church on the eve of the Reformation; and an assessment of “the dynamic relationship” of the seventeenth-century Church “to the world around it” seems to me rather significantly af-

feeted by our differences of opinion as to whether it was still "seeking new formulae for doctrinal and organizational unity" or had already found them; whether its post-Reformation adjustments had tended toward less or greater doctrinal rigidity; and what was the actual posture of "the most influential Catholic monarchy in Europe."

Two specific points in his reply require some comment. I apologize to him for having misinterpreted his phrase, "its first major crisis of unity." His assumption that the stages of Church and Party history can be made comparable through the use of extremely different time-scales confused me; and, since the Church had been, in many important respects, "a composite of nationally-based units" ever since the break-up of the Roman Empire and the conversion of the barbarian kingdoms, I failed—and still fail—to understand where in its history Professor Brzezinski locates an "internationalization" of the Church that both corresponds to the Party's conquests of the states of Central Europe and also enables him to define the case of Luther as a subsequent "first." Second, without any wish to "defend" the Spanish Inquisition, to discover "pacifists" in the pre-Reformation Church, or to ignore the burning of Huss and the Cesarini expedition, I continue to wonder just how "the power of the center" had been increased by applications of violence that were made by an institution it could not control, were guided by purposes distinct from its own, and that failed to accomplish their intention. The effective "pluralism" of the structure of power in the pre-Reformation Church, the comparative doctrinal tolerance of the Renaissance papacy, and the conspicuous existence of "open debate and unresolved disagreement" are, I believe, commonly recognized features of the Church of this period; it cost me no "effort" to state them.

EWART LEWIS

*Oberlin, Ohio*

TO THE EDITOR:

While Mrs. Lewis is right that the issue is primarily one of method, her argument that it is incumbent upon me to examine all the similarities and all the differences between the medieval Church and the Communist movement before generalizing about deviation-control is absurd. That she really does not mean it is shown in her listing of several "ecclesiastical equivalents to NATO, the Ford Foundation, etc." without once troubling to point out certain obvious differences. Her request is tantamount to requiring every medical researcher engaged in cancer research on mice for the purpose of discovering a cure for human cancer to qualify any findings by a statement that he realizes that a mouse is not a man, certain organic similarities apart.

For her flat assertion that Lutheranism had to come and Jansenism had to fail, her only argument is the deterministic one that this is how it turned out. My point was to suggest that methods used in handling these crises had some bearing on their outcome. Whether they might have succeeded in preventing a rupture is a matter of speculative judgment, and the demand for "proof" is simply unrealistic.

On the "internationalization" of the Church, my point was and is that this process was connected with the emergence of effective, homogeneous political units with a sense of national identity. Her dating of this process is wrong. Finally, the center's power was both expressed and then maximized by initiatives such as the attempted crusade or the Cesarini expedition, a cumulative process, involving the dynamic interaction of the right to initiative and the consequences of such initiative, quite familiar to students of political power. The reader can judge whether her description of the pre-Reformation Church as tolerant of "open debate and unresolved disagreement," and her reference to the burning of Huss and to the Cesarini expedition against deviants are compatible.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

*Columbia University*

## REJOINDER TO CROPSEY

TO THE EDITOR:

Cropsey in his reply to my article (in the June issue, pp. 353-359) argues that in order to make my case I must refute certain of Strauss's assertions as to the implications of positivism and historicism, *viz.*, that positivism leads logically to historicism and that both positivism and historicism are vitiated by the

application of each to itself. This, of course, is neatly to shift the burden of proof. I was only required to demonstrate that Strauss had not made his case. Cropsey deals with my argument concerning the relation between positivism and historicism by ignoring it. However, later in his essay he asserts that I admit the historicist implications of positivism because I



refuse to argue that science itself is "more worthy than other pursuits." (p. 356) I still reply, as, indeed, I wrote in my original essay: it is not a contradiction to assert that the method of science is the only way in which to discover truth, and at the same time to recognize that there is nothing in the structure of the universe which justifies acquiring knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Cropsey also rejects my characterization of Strauss's efforts as an attempt to fuse normative and descriptive judgments. I may misunderstand both Strauss and him here, but the following observations seem in order:

A. The proposition that one cannot describe without evaluating must mean, it seems to me, one of two things. Either it is psychologically impossible to do so, or, given the structure of reality, it is logically impossible to do so. Since, I gather, Strauss is not making a psychological case, he must be developing an ontological argument. To me such an argument involves the fusion by which I characterized it.

B. It is true that Strauss (as I indicated in my original essay) qualifies his argument by the word "important." Again, however, it seems to me that only two alternatives exist. Either it is possible to describe social phenomena without evaluating or it is not. Certainly Strauss offers us no coherent reason for limiting his claim to "important" phenomena only.

C. In his rejoinder Cropsey characterizes Strauss's position as simply that "... judgments of value are not to be excluded from the class of judgments as to fact, and that such judgments as to value cannot be excised from social science without sterilizing it." This argument seems to constitute a retreat from Strauss's original position. However, it does not strengthen his argument, for if judgments of fact and judgments of value are indeed different, although of the same class, it is not impossible on the face of it to make important

judgments of fact without making judgments of value.<sup>2</sup>

Cropsey, incidentally, reverses my charge against Strauss and accuses me of confusing moral with other value judgments. Readers can verify this for themselves, but it still seems to me that when Strauss offers as examples of evaluation the terms "noble" and "base" and "prudent" and "imprudent," without distinguishing between them, in an attempt to prove the "objectivity" of value judgments, he is involved in a confusion of some sort.

Next, and most important, Cropsey denies that Strauss has shifted his position as to the dependence of natural right upon classical cosmology. (He does not, incidentally, deny my point as to Strauss's shift from Hobbes to Machiavelli.) His argument here is in two parts. First, he asserts that, in the passage I quote from *Natural Right and History*, Strauss is merely stating the conventional position, a position which his writing transcends. Second, Cropsey offers some positive arguments to demonstrate that, in fact, natural right is not dependent upon classical physics or classical cosmology.

As to the first, the passage I quoted from Strauss concludes as follows:

The fundamental dilemma, in whose grip we are, is caused by the victory of modern natural science. An adequate solution to the problem of natural right cannot be found before this basic problem has been solved.

Needless to say, the present lectures cannot deal with this problem. They will have to be limited to that aspect of the problem of natural right which can be clarified within the confines of the social sciences.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> It is conceivable that Strauss and Cropsey are merely asserting that social scientists are forced to make judgments of significance. I considered this possibility while writing my original essay but rejected it because, frankly, I regarded such an argument as essentially trivial. No reputable social scientist in the empirical tradition would deny the point, but to use the term "value judgment" so broadly as to include under one rubric both these kinds of judgments and moral judgments proper is to prove one's case by definition and to obscure the issues involved. Particular judgments of significance are compatible with a variety of value systems, as is evidenced by the fact that many people who agree as to the relevant facts still disagree as to which course of action is morally correct in a given situation.

<sup>3</sup> Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (NRH) (Chicago, 1952), p. 8.

<sup>1</sup> Because I argue that the direction of a scientist's efforts may be determined by his interests or commitments, Cropsey builds up a fanciful case, whereby I am supposed to mistake Nagel's critique of Weber for his critique of Strauss and at the same time really to take Weber's position. Since any comparison of my position with Nagel's will reveal that the two are almost exactly the same, I can be confused on this point only if Nagel is. And the remarks made are only irrelevant to a rounded discussion of the relationship between science and values if one assumes the correctness of Cropsey's position. Compare p. 344 of my essay with pp. 486-7 of N. Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York, 1961).

I defy any reasonable man to take these words as a summary of the views of others.

One can find additional support for my analysis on pages 78-9, 166, and 172 of *Natural Right and History*, but I should like, at this point, to quote from a review which Strauss wrote for *Social Research* somewhat earlier (in 1946) and which is reprinted in *What Is Political Philosophy?* (pp. 284-286). The review is of Anton C. Pegis (ed.), *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Strauss criticizes Pegis's introduction to the volume as follows:

An introduction to the work of Thomas must point the way toward overcoming the typical present-day obstacles which prevent its genuine understanding. These obstacles are the two forces that dominate all present-day thought—science and history. With regard to science Pegis simply capitulates; he grants that there is "much bad science" in Thomas, yet he holds that this does not affect the value of his philosophy. Can one as easily as that get rid of the enormous difficulty presented by the inseparable connection between Thomas' physics and his natural theology? It would have been more fruitful to indicate why and how far the questions raised by Thomist, or Aristotelian, physics retain their full significance regardless of any progress that modern science has achieved by raising questions of an entirely different type.<sup>4</sup>

The passage speaks for itself.

As to the second, Cropsey offers two argu-

<sup>4</sup> It is true that at one place in *NRH* (not the passage Cropsey cites, but rather a passage on p. 94) Strauss does imply that classic natural right may not be logically related to classical cosmology. However, given the other evidence, all we can assume from this is that Strauss was of two minds on the question. I should say here that in summarizing Strauss's historical discussion I have, in one sense, been unfair. As far as I can determine Strauss's presentation of the views of the classics is in itself a demonstration of the reasonableness of these views, just as the use of the dialogue form in Plato's *Republic* is, through the example of Socrates, a demonstration of the virtues of philosophy. My failure to summarize the classics (as Strauss views them) in more detail is based on my conviction that no matter how reasonable some of these views seem, the systematic issues are paramount.

Incidentally, Cropsey's remarks as to the relevance of indeterminism (his statement of the principle is incorrect or at least one-sided) to a full discussion of the implications of contemporary physics do not, then, touch on the issues involved.

ments designed to demonstrate that the natural right position does not depend upon classical physics. In the first he tells us that the natural is good essentially because: it simply makes sense to call each thing "excellent" "in the degree to which it can do the things for which its species is naturally equipped." (p. 356) It follows from this that, since man is most naturally defined in terms of reason, both his natural end and his "excellence" are to be defined in these terms.

Of course, most contemporary empiricists would agree that it makes sense to characterize man (in contradistinction to other animals) by his ability to reason. Cropsey's statement of the classical position, then, does not differentiate it clearly from the modern.

The real differences between the classical (and I assume Strauss's) and the modern positions lie (1) in the analysis of what is meant by the word reason, and (2) in the implications of the classification. A definition of man as a reasoning animal does not logically entail the assumption of one "natural end" as against any other unless it can be demonstrated that it is impossible to say anything meaningful about men except in terms of the "natural end" or standard which is accepted. (One can, for example, agree as to the uniqueness of the capacity to reason and argue for an aesthetic life or a life dedicated to the acquisition of power.) I am convinced that Strauss recognizes this, and that his attack on what he calls the reductionism of modern science, and his insistence that neither man nor society can be understood except in terms of its "end," is based on this recognition.

Strauss can demonstrate this assertion in either one of two ways. Either he can argue that contemporary science, contrary to conventional belief, is teleological, or he can argue that while other natural objects can be analyzed non-teleologically man to be understood, must be examined in terms of a "natural end." Strauss does not attempt the first task, and, in fact, Cropsey now denies that he has to do so. The second involves tremendous difficulties, for somehow one must demonstrate that in some decisive way man is different from other natural objects. All that Strauss ever offers us here are remarks about man's reason and conscience. But both "reason" and "conscience" can be dealt with by a social science which (broadly) takes its bearings from natural science.

The second argument involves an attempt by Cropsey to justify understanding provided by "the light of nature." This argument also involves an attack upon the verification principle. The statement that propositions must be

capable of empirical verification to be meaningful, Cropsey argues, is not itself an empirical proposition, but rests on certain assumptions. He then suggests "intelligibility" as a criterion for knowledge and offers the example of the "unmoved mover." Cropsey is, of course, careful to disassociate himself from the example which means, presumably, that he cannot be held responsible for it. Let us examine the position and the example anyway.

The assertion that knowledge must be related to observation is much more compelling than any particular empirical proposition. It is implicit in the very definition of knowledge itself. Unless we insist upon this assumption there is no conceivable way of differentiating fact from fantasy, of differentiating "intelligible" little green devils from "intelligible" automobiles. The requirement does not rule out propositions which, it is claimed, may constitute a *necessary* base for any particular set of statements or, indeed, for all of science. Unfortunately these tend, on the whole, to be extremely difficult to handle in any meaningful way. The assumption of an unmoved mover is neither more nor less self-contradictory than the assumption of a universe infinite in time and space, and neither of these (except for some comforting anthropomorphic elements in the first) is more or less contradictory than the assumption that the universe is its own unmoved mover.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Cropsey asserts that the verification principle rests on the assumption that "to be is to be sensible," and suggests as an alternative the assumption that "to be is to be intelligible." If I understand him correctly the following remarks are in order: First, the statement is simply not true. One may accept the *possibility* of the existence of objects which, by definition, cannot be "sensed," and still argue that we can only have *legitimate* knowledge of that which can in some way be related to sense experience. Second, the statement is inaccurate. The principle should be stated as: "to be is to be sensible or capable of being related to things sensed in certain determinate ways." Scientists believed in the existence of atoms before they had observed them or even were sure they could be observed. Third, the dichotomy is a false one. Contemporary empiricists would agree that "to be is to be intelligible," i.e., capable of being related to a general body of knowledge and explained in terms of general scientific laws. The real difference between Cropsey and me lies in our views as to what constitutes "intelligibility." To the contemporary definition, Cropsey would add understanding in terms of some "end" or "essence."

Finally, in my essay I argued that while Strauss cites America as the only country founded on the basis of an anti-Machiavellian tradition, the whole thrust of his analysis is to the effect that the American tradition is based on Locke, and, hence, represents "respectable" Machiavellianism. Cropsey's reply cites Strauss's chapter on Rousseau in *Natural Right and History* to prove that this interpretation is incorrect. However, there is no evidence in Strauss's writing that he regards Rousseau as having exercised any significant influence on the American experience. Thus, Cropsey's rejoinder is clearly irrelevant. Further, since Rousseau is regarded by Strauss as the source of modern totalitarianism, his remarks actually suggest that Strauss's critique of American values may be even more fundamental than I originally contended.

Just one minor point. Cropsey argues that my characterization of scientists as being motivated by their commitments and interests "incriminates" scientists and social scientists. His point is that by interest I must mean "self-interest." In my use of the term I was thinking primarily of "curiosity," but I accept Cropsey's expansion of it. Only a very sanctimonious person would refuse to admit that scientists and social scientists are motivated, in part, by the desire for professional advancement and recognition, or even by the feeling of power which comes from mastering an element of reality. It is indeed a bloodless morality which denies a role to legitimate self-interest of this type.

STANLEY ROTHMAN

Smith College

TO THE EDITOR:

The exchange between Professors Rothman and Cropsey on "The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy" (June, 1962) turns in one important instance on the well known remarks of Professor Leo Strauss at pp. 7-8 of his *Natural Right and History*. There Strauss speaks of the "victory," not the successes, of modern natural science. This victory "would seem to have" destroyed the teleological view of the universe, "of which the teleological view of man forms a part." The victory, in turn, poses a "fundamental dilemma": on the one hand men today can accept both a non-teleological moral doctrine and a non-teleological science, or they can accept a teleological moral doctrine and a non-teleological science.

The statement "to be is to be intelligible" in Cropsey's terms requires the existence of such essences or ends.

Here—and this is the only instance if I may say so—I have some sympathy for Professor Rothman. This is not the best example of Strauss's clarity nor is there anything "perfectly obvious" about the position he adopts. Cropsey might better honor his mentor by acknowledging that the latter's work is not free of difficulties. And whether Cropsey would want to say so or not, I should venture to suggest that these difficulties stem essentially from the fact that Strauss has not worked out a metaphysics for himself. Indeed, this is the fundamental distinction between him and the "Thomists."

Finally, Cropsey should be aware that

"Thomists" (they are not Straussians, after all) do not find themselves impaled on the "teleological moral doctrine"—"non-teleological science" horns of Strauss's dilemma. The exclusion of finality from the considerations of modern science is a "methodological requirement" of modern science—the necessary consequence of its empirico-logical structure. What is settled about the reality of final cause by the silence of the natural sciences? This silence points to the relationship between metaphysics and the modern sciences and to the resolution of the "dilemma."

JAMES M. ROHERTY

*Mount Mary College*

## BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### REVIEWS OF BOOKS

<i>Zagoria</i> , The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961; <i>Hsieh</i> , Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era; <i>Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar</i> . The Sino-Soviet Dispute. H. ARTHUR STEINER.....	688
<i>Means</i> , Pricing Power and the Public Interest. EARL LATHAM.....	690
<i>Huntington, Ed.</i> , Changing Patterns of Military Politics; <i>Coles, Ed.</i> , Total War and Cold War. LEWIS J. EDINGER.....	692
<i>Kauper</i> , Civil Liberties and the Constitution. ROBERT J. STEAMER.....	694
<i>Engler</i> , The Politics of Oil. HENRY A. TURNER.....	695
<i>Gottmann</i> , Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States. ROBERT H. CONNERY.....	696
<i>Gentile</i> , Genesis and Structure of Society. JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA.....	698

### BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY	700
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS.....	717
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT.....	742
INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZATION.....	759
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED.....	768

## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961.* By DONALD S. ZAGORIA. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 484. \$8.50.)

*Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era.* By ALICE LANGLEY HSIEH. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. xx, 204. \$4.50 (Cloth); \$2.25 (Paper.)

*The Sino-Soviet Dispute. DOCUMENTED AND ANALYZED* BY G. F. HUDSON, RICHARD LOWENTHAL, AND RODERICK MACFARQUHAR (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. ix, 227. \$5.00.)

Mr. Zagoria's analysis of the Sino-Soviet conflict is the product of a heavily documented effort to break the private code the antagonists employ in their open communications with each other and thus pin-point the specific issues around which the controversy revolves. He demonstrates that the conflict is a deep-seated and real one—not an elaborate fiction, as some have argued—which “became acute in recent years because some basic potentialities for conflict were brought to life by a series of developments within and without the Communist world to which Moscow and Peking had different answers and different needs.” While believing that the causes of dispute cannot be eliminated by paper settlements, Zagoria holds “that Communist China and Communist Russia have much more in common with each other than with the Western world,” and hence “that there are rational limits to the conflict between them” that operate to prevent a definitive rupture of their relations.

He finds the “seeds of conflict,” as distinguished from basic causes or potentialities, in the 1956-1957 debate over de-Stalinization and in what he takes to be a “swing to the Left” in Peking begun in June 1957. Somewhat out of time sequence, he deals with the controversy over the Chinese people's communes in 1958-1959, seeing in this an exemplification of such “basic factors producing conflict” as the contests over power, economics, the pace of the revolution, and the different ideological perspectives arising from the Sinoization of Marxism-Leninism. He then passes to the origins of the dialogue on intra-bloc relations and global strategy in 1957-1958, as preliminary to explanation of the intensified controversies of 1959-1960, and concludes with an analysis of the Moscow parties' meeting in 1960 and the breach over Albania in 1961.

A secondary purpose of the study is “to demonstrate the value of the Communists' own

stream of communications as raw material for penetrating through the dialectical fog to the political calculations and conflicts which lay behind it,” although Zagoria concedes that “sometimes . . . the Kremlinologist [defined as “the analyst of Communist communications”] weaves a web of interpretations on too fragmentary evidence.” A separate “note on methodology” identifies some ground rules of the occult art of Kremlinological content analysis, and suggests ways in which the incessant search of the “detective-scholar” for “indicators of political significance” leads him to find clues in many improbable places. Zagoria does not squarely face the fact that Kremlinology, instrumental as it may be, is at best an insufficient substitute for first-hand research in such original sources (now generally denied us) as stenographic reports of private meetings, internal communications, etc., as the vehicle for testing and validating hypotheses and assumptions concerning the purposes and motivations of others. Nor does he explain how the Kremlinologist evaluates third-hand journalistic reports, anonymously attributed to “private,” “reliable,” or “authoritative” sources, concerning the literal textual content of secret communications and conversations (although he appears to rely heavily for several key interpretations on such material from a wide range of papers reaching from *Link* and *Blitz* to *Deutsche Zeitung*, including *Observer* and the *New York Times*). Of course, all scholars who work the Communist beat are compelled to be at least part-time Kremlinologists and share Zagoria's dilemma, but the responsibility for discreet evaluation of sources and for qualifying the most plausible but unverifiable deduction is inescapable.

One of Zagoria's examples of the “polemical tone” of Sino-Soviet communications as one clue available to the Kremlinologist points directly to the problem of translation and raises questions which in a less exacting context might be merely academic. He quotes a sentence from the “Yü Chao-li” article in *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag) of April 1, 1960, from the official NCNA translation as follows: “It is *absolutely impermissible* for us to mistake certain tactical changes on the part of imperialism for changes in the very nature of imperialism.” To Zagoria, “the language clearly suggests that someone, and someone in a position of authority, was doing precisely what *Hung Ch'i* said was impermissible. In this case, the ‘someone’ seemed to be Khrushchev.” Various translations

are possible, but in the original Chinese the first few words of the sentence (*"Wo-men chüeh pu-neng pa. . ."*) are constructed in the first person plural, and a more literal translation would read: "We certainly cannot mistake . . .," a reading which discounts the polemical tone and renders Khrushchev a less likely target. If such "communications" are intended to convey meaning to Khrushchev, it becomes germane to inquire whether his translators have rendered into Russian the punctilious sense of the Chinese original. And, since Khrushchev seldom (if ever) responds by citing chapter and verse, how is the Kremlinologist to be certain that he and Khrushchev have the same appreciation of a particular Chinese "message"?

Zagoria admits that interpretations differing from his own "are sometimes possible," and grants the reader "liberty to make his own judgment" of the significance of the material cited. To this end, he assertedly supplies "a substantial number of extracts from Communist media in part to enable the interested reader to form his own interpretations." At the same time, however, he muffles the warning bell by omitting such qualifying phrases as "the above suggests that," or, "it is likely that", in connection with interpretations where their use would be "appropriate," on the ground that "such qualifiers would soon become tiresome." In such a well-written book as this, where the author carefully pyramids his analyses within a structure characterized by a high degree of internal logical consistency, this policy makes it almost impossible for the reader to exercise a discriminating judgment—unless he happens to have available to him the same total mass of communications that Zagoria has used.

Thus, for example, Mao Tse-tung is represented as going to Moscow in November 1957 to obtain from Khrushchev some assurance that the Soviet Union would actually play a central role of leadership within the bloc and thus suppress the growing "confederal" tendencies to which the Chinese Communists had contributed in their 1956 policy statements. Several problems are involved: one is whether Mao's call of November 6, 1957, to "all socialist countries to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union" was an actual reversal of the previous Chinese policy of emphasizing "the need for genuine discussion rather than *diktat* in resolving differences within the Communist world. . . ." Another is whether the question of solidarity, which received basic emphasis throughout, was to be achieved by the leadership of the Soviet Union other than in the context of intra-bloc

discussion which the Chinese seemed consistently to regard as the pre-condition of solidarity. Nearly every Chinese statement on the subject after 1957 mentions "leadership of the Soviet Union" only within the context of "solidarity," for which discussion appeared to be the necessary prerequisite. Chinese statements acknowledging the "central position" of the Soviet Union because of objective factors of size and development sedulously refrain from attributing to the Soviet Union any measure of ideological or moral pre-eminence. If Mao also had in mind to compel Khrushchev to employ advanced Soviet technology, (then only recently revealed), in the interest of a more adventurist revolutionary policy toward the West (as Zagoria persuasively argues), was it logically compatible for the Chinese to argue in support of a stronger assertion of bloc decision-making at a Soviet center, which would deny them and others the capability of challenging the course of policy then and subsequently followed by the Soviet Union? Zagoria structures his material so tightly and logically as to leave the reader with no awareness that alternative interpretations can be supported by a substantial documentation.

Similarly, the reader has no real alternative but to accept Zagoria's interpretation that the asserted change of Chinese attitude in Moscow had been preceded by a leftward swing in Chinese domestic policy after mid-June 1957. He finds the "best evidence for this" in the belated revival in September 1957 of the Chinese 12-year plan for agriculture, leaving the reader to infer from Chou En-lai's disparagement of it in 1956 that the plan had a highly leftist character and, from other statements, that it somehow foreshadowed the "big leap forward" and the commune movement of 1958. The reader is given no hint that the 12-year plan was cast in the mood of the "high tide of socialism" which saw the substantial completion of cooperativization and practical sequestration of private industry and commerce during 1956, and that it was in largest part concerned with the technical improvement and rationalization of agriculture rather than with suggesting significant revisions of the collective system.

In connection with the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958, Zagoria considers the omission from the Mao-Khrushchev communique of August 3, 1958, of any reference to Taiwan to be highly significant in view of the "liberation" propaganda that had been waged in China in preceding weeks. But the same communique *did* refer to joint consideration by Mao and Khrushchev (accompanied by Malinovsky) of

"major questions confronting the two countries in Asia and Europe," and their complete agreement "on measures to be taken to oppose aggression and safeguard peace"—formulations sufficiently broad to include both Quemoy (where Chinese shelling began within three weeks) and Taiwan, and at least capable of being interpreted as part of an arrangement under which a demonstration of Chinese military power against Quemoy would take advantage of the American obsession with the notion that an attack on Quemoy might be the prelude to an attack on Taiwan. Thus, the common Sino-Soviet interest in bringing the American intervention in Lebanon to an end would have been served. A careful reader would have difficulty in visualizing such admissible interpretation on the basis of Zagoria's presentation and data. This is not the place to perform an exercise in counter-Kremlinology on the detailed scale needed to validate the several lines of alternative interpretation not foreclosed by Zagoria's system.

In evaluating Zagoria's massive work on its substantive merit, however, there can be no doubt that he has contributed significantly to the solution of a great political puzzle of our day. Appreciating that Sino-Soviet conflict engages the politics of the entire complex of bloc countries, he probes in depth the core issues of organization, ideology, personality, economy, and political strategy and tactics that are reshaping the entire Communist world. With imaginative craftsmanship, he has pinned down and identified many essential elements of transition in a rapidly changing situation, and much that is to be written on his subject in the near future will probably take the form of postscripts to his present work.

Mrs. Hsieh's *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* is a RAND Corporation study in Hsietanology, if this term—borrowed from the official quarter in Peking—can be taken as a Chinese equivalent to Kremlinology. On the basis of Chinese statements and documents, Mrs. Hsieh concerns herself with the growing Chinese awareness of the effect of nuclear technology on military strategy after 1954, and its consequences for military doctrine and politics in China and on Sino-Soviet relations (including differences over nuclear weapons-sharing, dependence on the Soviet deterrent shield, etc.). In these respects, she explores Chinese materials on this specialized aspect of potential Sino-Soviet conflict more exhaustively than Zagoria, but their basic treatments of military factors in Sino-Soviet relations are not dissimilar. Mrs. Hsieh is much more

generous in her qualifications of tentative suppositions, and candidly admits that "the range of considerations accounting for the September 1959 shift in [Chinese] military leadership is far from clear." She tends to equate expressed fears in 1955 of "sudden" or "surprise" attack with fears of "nuclear" attack, when legitimate fears of a sudden or surprise attack by conventional means from Taiwan could have been held following the December 1954 treaty between the KMT and the United States. Similarly, the discussion of the politics of "modernization" of the Chinese army seems to infer some equivalence between modernization with respect to conventional weapons (hardly discussed) and modernization of tactics and equipment in anticipation of some relatively early nuclear weapons-delivery capability. If the textbook by Ch'ao Chung-yao and others on *The Theory and Practice of Atomic Power* (*Yüan-tzu-neng ti yüan-li ho ying-yung*, Peking, 1956) is any reflection of the levels of nuclear information then available to the Chinese military, Mrs. Hsieh may have attributed an undue degree of sophistication to Chinese statements concerning nuclear warfare in the 1955-1956 period. The dilemma of identifying the "political" as against the "professional" characteristics of such a top-ranking military figure as Lin Piao is well illustrated by quotations from him that could be "worked" both ways, but in the end Mrs. Hsieh judges that the military reorganization of 1959 politicized the General Staff (under General Lo Jui-ching) and gave fuller responsibility for modernization to the Ministry of National Defense under Lin Piao. We cannot hold Mrs. Hsieh accountable for resulting difficulties in constructing a military organization chart!

*The Sino-Soviet Dispute* is a valuable reference collection of documents bearing mainly on the polemical development of that controversy during 1960. Richard Lowenthal's "Diplomacy and Revolution" is the most significant of the short introductory essays, and his views on the Moscow meeting of 1960 are partly incorporated by reference in Zagoria's treatment of the subject.

H. ARTHUR STEINER

*University of California* (Los Angeles)

*Pricing Power and the Public Interest, A Study Based on Steel.* BY GARDINER C. MEANS. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962. Pp. xxi, 359. \$7.50.)

How can steel companies be induced to forego exorbitant profits, to set prices approxi-



mately at the level of the cost of services, and to keep them steady? One tested approach is to beat them with the heavy sticks of public authority, as President Kennedy did in April 1962 to threaten punitive taxes, to divert Government contracts from the offenders to others, to stimulate Congressional investigations, inaugurate criminal prosecutions, and raise the hue and cry on television and in the press. But the unaesthetic disorder and noise of this rout, its lack of grace and subtlety, the risk it courts of costly political reprisals—these are blemishes of procedure that Agamemnon could have had in mind when, in answer to the complaint of Menelaus, "Woe's me! I have no friends," he said, "Not if you slay them." Although it may seem like a piece of bribery to promote the public interest, Gardiner Means has devised a scheme to keep the steel companies from jacking up their prices and doubling their profits. The existing incentive system rewards managers who do both; he would give the bonuses to managers who did neither.

By now the analysis is familiar—and the early work of Mr. Means did much to make it so—that some business is big, although not monopolistic; that giant corporations are under the control of managers who do not own the enterprises they govern; that competition among the few is different from competition among the many; that competition among the few produces administered prices that exceed cost and subsidize social and economic waste; and that this concentration of pricing power is not only not in the public interest—it works actively against it. The experience of the steel industry since the end of the Second World War is, for the author, a Baedeker of bad practise. Until 1953, he says, price rises in the industry were commensurate with economic change, and were economically justified; but increases between 1953 and 1959 doubled profits from an average of 8% on investment to an average of 16% on investment, and they were not economically justified. The unwarranted increase in the price of steel contributed to the inflation of those years, and helped to create that sad travesty of upside-down economics—a recession (two of them) and inflation at the same time.

Now there is no bar in law or government against high profits in steel. Although economic urgency will, in a general way, control the most egregious forms of managerial cupidity, the decisions of steel managers about price enjoy a considerable immunity from quick and drastic economic retribution. That is to say, in a system of administered prices, the discretion-

ary margin within which levels may be set is broader than it is in more extensively competitive enterprises. In the area of enterprise that Mr. Means calls "administered competition," the constraints of the market simply do not operate as they are supposed to when there is a multiplicity of small sellers and buyers, no one of whom is able by his entry or exit, to influence the price. Big steel has all the privileges of a free market without its discipline.

But because it is in the free sector of the economy, steel is also exempt from the regulation that Government imposes upon monopolies or near monopolies, the object of which is to do by rule what the interaction of thousands of enterprisers does in the classical theory, namely, keep prices somewhere near costs. In sum, it is characteristic of the "gray area" enterprises that they are neither monopolistic nor free, and that they enjoy some of the reputation of the second while they reap some of the advantages of the first.

Borrowing a rejected phrase from the literature of the law, Mr. Means thinks of these businesses as characteristically "affected with a public interest." The original formulation of this concept by Chief Justice Waite was intended to make valid certain forms of direct price control by the Government. Mr. Means does not go so far. In another characterization, he describes the "gray area" firms as "collective enterprises," and he advocates legislation to establish a procedure for so designating them. The corporations to be defined as "collective enterprises" would be those showing "the existence of unregulated pricing power of sufficient magnitude to affect the corporation with a substantial public interest." In the steel industry, these might be the top eight firms, and would certainly be the top three—United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and the Republic Steel Corporation.

For the collective enterprises, measures of "economic performance" would then be devised, presumably by private management engineering firms, although this is not clear: standards which, if met, would realize the classical ideal of the well-tempered economy—the optimum use of resources in the satisfaction of wants. Once these gauges of performance were established, top managers who met the specifications would be given a bonus which, sweetened by certain adjustments in the tax laws (it would be taxed as capital gains, not income, for example), would surpass the net now allowed, and thus increase the incomes possible to the principal company officials. They would receive less than the most for over-

shooting or under-shooting their targets of performance. Optimum economic performance would presumably be assured or, at least, made more likely by this manipulation of economic incentives.

The place of the great corporations in the American society has been a concern of economists and sociologists for some time, but the subject has not attracted the attention of many political scientists. It should be a matter of central interest, inasmuch as the corporation in its internal governance and in its relations with society presents all of the familiar issues of political theory. And in the relations of the corporations with other elements of the economy and with the Government, there is much material to support empirical investigation into the behavior of power holders. What Means—like other commentators whose interest is not politics—tries to develop in default of work by political scientists is a political theory of monopoly power. How should we deal with these concentrations of private power in a democratic system? Galbraith says that other private powers will arise to countervail them. Mills says that they are already irrecoverably out of control. Berle thinks that the welfare of the society can be entrusted to the consciences of corporate commanders. Means would like to purchase their consent.

It would enrich understanding of the problem of the giant corporation in a democracy—it would enrich understanding of the specific proposals made by Mr. Means—if the insights of political science could be brought to bear. This would be true not only for the treatment of great themes of power and authority but for more modest matters of political practice and procedure. The author's proposal that Congress pass an Economic Performance Act, for example, seems a little unreal. He does not consider the necessary political circumstances under which Congress might consent to the characterization of big businesses as "collective enterprises," subject to unusual controls, but the prospect is probably not near. The political difficulties he slights could make the difference between the program he proposes and the pastiche he would get (if anything) from the traditional defenders of the "American way."

But if political experience has lessons for the author, it may also have lessons for the steel companies and other leviathans of enterprise who can make the economic deep "to boil like a pot." If they are to continue to enjoy extraordinary freedom from public control, they will have to conform, by private choice, their behavior to the standard that public authority

may one day enforce. Or—to put the matter as it appears in *The Leopard*—"If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change."

EARL LATHAM

Amherst College

*Changing Patterns of Military Politics.* EDITED BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON (Volume 3, International Year Book of Political Behavior Research. The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. 272. \$7.50.)

*Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military.* EDITED BY HARRY L. COLES. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962. Pp. 300. \$7.00.)

These volumes are most welcome contributions to a field in which scholarly interest and systematic analysis has badly lagged behind public involvement. The subject matter encompassed by the designation "military politics" is vast—as indicated by the excellent bibliographical essay by Huntington in the volume he has edited—and the proliferation of topics discussed in these two symposia greatly complicate the task of a reviewer. It is impossible within the space available here to do justice even to the most important contributions—let alone twenty-one essays. The authors' interests ranged from lofty theories to detailed case studies, from civil-military relations in classical antiquity to the present time, in Western as well as non-Western countries. As Huntington put it disarmingly in his introduction to *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, a symposium of this sort is particularly vulnerable to the charge that it lacks unity and focus. But in that respect, it simply reflects the contemporary state of academic research on civil-military relations. Along with quite a number of theoretical models we have at present numerous case studies of varying quality. What seems missing is the link between the vast generalizations and the detailed investigations, as well as a more explicit distinction between normative and scientific analysis.

*Changing Patterns of Military Politics* includes three theoretical studies by Huntington, Lasswell and Rapoport which may provoke and even irritate, but never bore the reader. Huntington's stimulating discourse on "Patterns of Violence in World Politics" holds that the locus of violence in the world arena has shifted in recent years from the interstate to the intrastate level, particularly in the developing areas. Most important among contemporary forms of interstate violence seem to him revolutionary war and the reform coup d'état. The former he describes as essentially struggle between a

ruling elite and a counter-elite, divorced from the existing political system, for support of a communal or socio-economic group that is more or less alienated from the existing political system. The reform coup, unlike the governmental coup—or palace revolution—and the revolutionary coup, Huntington perceives “as a healthy mechanism of gradual change, the nonconstitutional equivalent of periodic changes in party control through the electoral process.” Based in part on what seem somewhat dubious analogies and assumptions, Huntington’s major hypotheses deserve to be subjected to careful empirical testing so that the field may gain maximum profit from his challenging propositions.

In contrast to Huntington’s essay, Harold Lasswell’s “The Garrison State Hypothesis Today” advances a number of propositions which defy any efforts toward empirical validation. Brilliantly argued, like the original hypothesis of 1937 and 1941, the thesis “that the arena of world politics is moving toward the domination of the specialists in violence” seems to be based on the normative culture-bound impressions of an American liberal rather than the careful observations of a social scientist. Essentially, Lasswell’s “developmental construct,” then as now, seems to belong in the realm of moral philosophy rather than political theory. His essay sounds dire warnings about the future of civil-military relations in the United States in terms of traditional liberal democratic norms. The garrison state hypothesis provides for Lasswell the probable image of the future of our epoch and the only hope he holds out to us is that it may be possible “to civilianize a garrisoning world, thereby cultivating the conditions for its eventual dissolution.”

One man’s garrison state is another’s school for citizenship, as David Rapoport’s “A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types” makes clear. According to his three-fold typology, in the “Praetorian State” the military maintains the rule of a wealthy oligarchy over an impoverished population, in the “Civilian-and-Military Polity” it supports the nation’s foreign policies, and in the “Nation-in-Arms” it provides the principal civic bond for the entire polity. “The dominant ethic of a nation-in-arms is public service—*virtu*—and it is best expressed in military duty,” we are told. Sparta, in classical antiquity and Switzerland and Israel in modern times are cited as cases in point and the nation-in-arms is offered as “an ideal model for those interested in ‘remaking’ praetorian countries” today. Rapoport’s categories seem practically useless for analytical

purposes. Most developed countries are classed under the civilian-and-military type and underdeveloped nations under the praetorian type. Only little Israel and Switzerland qualify, according to Rapoport, as nation-in-arms, and his evidence here is not very convincing. While Lasswell sees the Garrison State as highly undesirable, but well nigh inevitable, Rapoport perceives the nation-in-arms as desirable but highly unlikely in most of the countries of the world.

Four case studies complete the volume edited by Huntington. Laurence Radway provides an analysis of the NATO Defense College. Philip Abrams considers recent efforts to make the British military establishment more “democratic” as well as professional, and Martha Derthick examines the politics of the national guard as a lobby in the missile age. Raoul Giradet, recently arrested for complicity in an attempt to assassinate President deGaulle, offers an enlightening presentation of the principles of the more sophisticated O.A.S. supporters in the French army. It should be read in conjunction with Richard Challener’s contribution to the Coles volume on the role of the French military in the destruction of the Third Republic.

*Total War and Cold War* is more modest in both size and content, though scarcely cheaper, than the Huntington symposium. The eleven essays have a certain common focus, given by the theme of the 1959 conference on civil-military relations at Ohio State University, for which all but one were originally prepared. The useful introduction by the editor further underscores—and somewhat exaggerates—the basic unity in approach and plainly states that most of the essays are concerned with the “positive and constructive approach to civil-military relations” which holds that “the real problem . . . is not so much to recover the principle of political primacy as to modify and adapt it to present-day circumstances.” In this respect, “political control of the military” is declared to be “little different” from “scientists, civil servants, and other technical types.” With the exception of Hinton’s essay on Communist China, all the contributions are concerned with civil-military relations in “advanced, industrial societies characterized by a fairly high degree of internal stability and of professionalism of their military.” These are quite different and not comparable to civil-military relations in underdeveloped areas, according to the editor, and the latter countries were, therefore, arbitrarily excluded from consideration.

Given these restrictions, the authors tend to concentrate on the efficacy, nature, and extent

of civilian control over the military in peace and war, in liberal democracies and in totalitarian dictatorships, in the past and in the present. A number of the papers have appeared previously in one form or another or elaborate merely on points which their authors have stated in earlier publications. While most of them add little that is new, they provide useful overviews of civil-military relations in Britain, Nazi Germany, France, the Soviet Union and China, and the United States which should be read in close conjunction with the essays in the Huntington volume.

LEWIS J. EDINGER

*Michigan State University*

*Civil Liberties and the Constitution.* By PAUL G. KAUPER. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 237. \$6.00.)

In 1961 Professor Paul G. Kauper delivered to the Special Summer School for Lawyers held at the University of Michigan Law School a series of lectures designed to illuminate the "critical areas in current constitutional development." Now fortunately in print, they are worthy of a detailed reading by all serious students of constitutional law. Although the lectures, by Kauper's own admission, are not exhaustive, they are sharply analytical and keenly perceptive in differentiating the subtle distinctions which the Supreme Court has made and continues to make as it attempts to strike a balance between conservation and creativity in the law. Each new term brings to the Court a rash of cases in the broad area of personal rights and liberties, and the Court must make such delicate choices that the logic of one alternative over another rarely points to a clear and unencumbered path.

In his first essay the author discusses the American concept of separation of church and state which he describes as symbolic but not very relevant to the American scene. Our plurality of states and churches makes the phrase legally meaningless, constitutionally indefinite, and useful only for conveying the twin ideas of the religion clause of the First Amendment. Kauper observes correctly that the truly important questions today arise not from any formal confusion of traditional church-state functions but from the practical problems arising out of their interrelationships. Very often the church and the state have identical interests and occasionally they exercise similar functions concurrently. After a careful discussion of governmental practices and Supreme Court decisions, Kauper concludes that the government can constitutionally aid such church-supported functions as hospitals,

schools, and help for the aged and the needy. As a result of a growing secularization the state is merely taking over what was once a virtual church monopoly and the government now supports the *function*, not the religious institution. Kauper argues that since parochial schools serve a recognized public purpose they may be governmentally aided so long as the assistance is not identified with religious instruction.

In his discussion of recent decisions on obscenity the author concludes that the Court's use of the term "prurient" as a constitutional standard for determining obscenity is no substantial advance over the term "obscene" and that further clarifying opinions are needed. In any event the contemporary moral sense of the community as interpreted by jury or judge is what determines finally whether a book is obscene. Professor Kauper registers mild approval of Justice Harlan's (and the late Justice Jackson's) thesis that the Court ought to distinguish between the First Amendment as a direct limitation on Congress and its inclusion in the Due Process Clause as an indirect limitation on the states, with the latter being somewhat less restrictive and permitting the states a latitude under the police power that would be denied Congress because of the First Amendment. Of course, the Harlan position is meaningless so long as the Supreme Court continues to place obscenity, as properly defined, outside the protection of the First Amendment, thus permitting governmental restrictions on any level, federal, state, or municipal. Only if the absolutist concept of Justice Black becomes the standard for decision in this realm will the Jackson-Harlan viewpoint be worthy of consideration.

In a chapter on freedom of association Professor Kauper assesses the dramatic contrast between rights guaranteed those who affiliate with the NAACP as opposed to those who join the Communist Party. In the case of the former the state may not require public disclosure of its membership lists, but the federal government may require all Communist-action organizations to register and furnish a list of their officers and members. The Supreme Court has thus distinguished between types of associations in terms of lawful versus unlawful ends and purposes, and the freedom to associate, though not absolute, has emerged as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. Within this framework the author raises the concomitant question of non-association. May a person be required by law to pay dues to a labor union that carries on political activities with which he disagrees? The Court has skirted the issue but so far has given no clear-cut answer.

The two final sections of the book cover the complex and sensitive areas of private versus governmental action and the role of the federal government as a positive protector of civil liberties. The author suggests that the Supreme Court is still groping for a definitive rationale in these matters. He asks whether it is not the assurance of judicial protection that gives content and meaning to all private rights, and he observes that the critical question is "whether a court in protecting one man's interests is thereby subjecting another person to an unconstitutional impairment of his rights or liberties." There is no easy answer to the question whether enforcement of a trespass statute against Negroes who are staging a sit-in demonstration at a lunch counter is a denial of equal protection of the laws. A trespass statute cannot be enforced at the expense of constitutional rights, but unless a person can claim a statutory or common law right to enter a business establishment and be served, the owner may assert the right to choose his own patrons in a manner that will best promote his business. In this assertion of equally valid claims, the state may legally prefer to protect the owner's interest, which means that the state is protecting the right of a private business to discriminate against Negroes.

This leads Professor Kauper to his final lecture which deals with the recent bold and positive intervention of the federal government in what were formerly either state matters or private affairs for the purpose of protecting personal liberties. Of particular interest is his elucidation of the federal equity power as a means of enforcing equal protection of the laws. Characterizing the injunction as a "peculiarly effective and drastic remedy" because of its flexibility, adaptability, possible rapidity of issuance, and punishment capabilities without a jury trial, the author nevertheless aptly compares the current use of equity power with its application to labor disputes in an earlier period when, as today, the charge of government by judiciary was leveled at the courts. The reach of the equity power was clearly demonstrated in New Orleans during the 1960-61 school year when the desegregation crisis produced injunctions against the Governor, the Attorney General, a state judge, the Superintendent and School Board of New Orleans, and the state legislature. Even a private person whose active racial discrimination is normally beyond the scope of federal judicial authority may be snared in the equity net if he persists in interfering with court decrees which order desegregation.

In a few instances I do not hold with Profes-

sor Kauper's generalizations. For example, I find the balancing-of-interests test unsatisfactory as a judicial standard in civil liberties cases whereas he approves of it, albeit with some reservations. Moreover, I dissent from his persistent contention that one can ignore the wisdom of legislation in assessing its constitutionality. Prudence and constitutionalism are hardly mutually exclusive. But this does not detract from what is a solid treatise and a refreshing diversion from the contemporary output of sociological analyses of the Supreme Court. Not only has the author succeeded in disentangling the web of technical legal issues in the current civil liberties *mélange*, but he has provocatively framed the new, emerging questions which must soon find their way to the Supreme Court's docket.

ROBERT J. STEAMER

*Louisiana State University*

*The Politics of Oil.* By ROBERT ENGLER (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961, Pp. viii, 565, \$7.50.)

Although the relationship of organized interests and government has been a topic for speculation and comment by students of American politics from the days of the founding fathers, recent commentaries in professional journals attest the lack of a universally accepted interest-group theory. Undoubtedly a principal reason for the differing views currently held regarding the group approach to politics is that our knowledge of the manner in which groups organize for political action and function in the political arena is still fragmentary. If viewed in this context, Robert Engler's book, *The Politics of Oil*, is a significant contribution.

The author's central thesis is that the petroleum industry constitutes a private government which seeks to utilize public government to promote its goals of greater economic power and larger profits. Engler asserts that the oil industry "is increasingly public in every aspect except responsibility and profits." With ample documentation, he illuminates the pervasive efforts of oil to influence political decisions on the local, state, national, and international levels. Although he states that the focus of his study is on "the relationship of the new industrial system, as illustrated by oil, and the American political system," his account conveys the impression that oil is unique in its efforts to gain political advantages, for relatively little acknowledgment is made of the fact that there are other powerful economic and social groups competing for political influence.

The book could well serve as a handbook or manual on pressure group methods. According

to his account, virtually the entire gamut of tactics and techniques available to organized interest groups have been employed by segments of the oil industry. Examples are cited of efforts to achieve unity of action within the industry and to influence public opinion, related business and professional groups, party platforms, the nomination and election of officials, the appointment of administrative personnel, and the decisions of both elective and appointive officials. Of particular interest is his discussion of oil's public relations activities, which illustrates the thoroughness with which oilmen have approached the task of shaping the political environment favorable to their industry. In this chapter he describes the well-coordinated efforts of committees and other organized units which have been created for the primary purpose of molding attitudes through such methods as institutional advertising, disseminating literature to the public schools, speakers bureaus, and other means.

Unfortunately, however, the author detracts from the potential influence of his study by engaging in a general criticism of the current social order in a manner reminiscent of the muckrakers of half a century ago. Throughout the volume, the author intersperses his discussion of the organization and political power of oil with discourses on "the corrosive impact of acquisitive society upon democratic assumptions." Cautioning that one should not "too quickly sort the heroes and the villains," he presents an analysis which indicates that few persons in public life have not been influenced in some fashion by oil. Regardless of the appropriateness of the muckraking approach during the Progressive era of American history, muckraking is no longer in style. In this age of continual world crises, a dispassionate approach would have been more effective.

*The Politics of Oil* illustrates the magnitude of the problems posed by powerful organized interests seeking economic and political concessions in a country with decentralized political parties and with a federal system of government characterized on each level by the tripartite division of governmental powers. The author, rejecting the notion that the countervailing power concept provides a satisfactory answer, suggests proposals which he believes are commensurate with the problems. Within the United States, he calls for a coordinated and well defined national oil policy with "careful study" being given to "placing oil in the category of a public utility." An entirely satisfactory solution, in his opinion, demands a "world approach," and "one step toward" such an approach would be achieved

by "placing oil and all energy resources under international authority, with the United Nations as the parent body." Irrespective of the desirability of such proposals, the problems inherent in effecting them are obviously so overwhelming that comment regarding their feasibility appears unnecessary.

Many individuals who are aware of the campaign contributions and other political activities of oilmen, as well as the political controversies in recent years over such issues as the control of the tidelands and the regulation of the natural gas industry, will agree that a comprehensive study of oil and politics has long been overdue. While the reactions to this volume will vary according to the social and economic predilections of the readers, there will be general admiration for the prodigious research efforts of the author. In gathering the data for his book, Engler perused a wide variety of printed sources, including reports of congressional investigations and other government documents, memoirs and biographies, newspapers and periodicals, trade association publications, and corporation reports, newsletters, and other records. In addition he traveled widely interviewing oilmen, public relations personnel, lobbyists, government officials, and newspaper editors and reporters. The book is replete with the names of individuals and business organizations and with facts, figures, and statistics regarding the oil industry; but, because of the logical and coherent presentation of the material and the clarity of literary style, it is not dull or difficult reading. This volume is indeed a valuable source of information regarding the economic and political power-structure of the oil industry, and because of its factual information it should be read by public officials, political scientists, and others interested in American politics.

HENRY A. TURNER

*University of California (Santa Barbara)*

*Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States.* BY JEAN GOTTMANN. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. Pp. xii, 810. \$10.00.)

Gottmann is a French geographer, a professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the School of Political Science at the University of Paris. Recently he has been a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. A man of considerable experience with government both in France and with various international bodies he is widely recognized as an expert on problems of metropolitan growth.

Far from assuming that the northeastern seaboard will, in time, become one monstrous

city, a kind of indefinite extension of Times Square, Gottmann believes that the area contains forces and counter-forces which will develop great variety within its over-all unity. Megalopolis, the name which Gottmann applies to the Northeast, with its population of more than 38 million, is one of the largest industrial belts in existence and the greatest financial and political hub on earth. This study is not intended to be simply a portrait of the area and its people. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze and understand "the extraordinary dynamics they have created, in a place that was a wilderness three centuries ago, the enormous concentration of people and activities now achieved in Megalopolis. Nowhere else have men ever built anything comparable and with such a rhythm."

To be sure, the trend towards concentration of dense population in large urbanized regions has gradually become a worldwide characteristic of this century. But the northeastern region of the United States is unique in many ways. Megalopolis provides the whole of America with so many essential services, of the sort a community used to obtain in its downtown section, that it may deserve its nickname of "Main Street of the nation."

In this area the old distinctions between rural and urban do not apply any more. Even the people living in the so-called rural areas have very little to do with agriculture; "in terms of the interests and work, they are what used to be classified as 'city folks,' but their way of life and the landscapes around their residences do not fit the old meaning of urban."

Tomorrow's society, Gottmann asserts, will certainly be more urban than today's. More and more people will follow non-agricultural ways. In a sense, the Northeast thus might be considered "the cradle of a new order in the organization of inhabited space." Population trends, however, provide less insight into the nature of the area than do the inter-relations that exist between the processes that cause the growth, attracting certain groups and providing the means by which they could live and work together.

The author starts with a sketch of what he calls the dynamics of urbanization and shows in historical terms how the Northeast came to be what it is. Then he considered the modern revolution in land use, noting that urbanization devours time and space as well as food and industrial goods. The new patterns of intense living that have become normal in urban centers exert a strong influence on the economical and social foundations of society. The density of activities and of movement of all

kinds is the most extraordinary feature of the new urban region, but they also present a dilemma. While the growth of the regions owes much to the automobile, now highway traffic jams are beginning to strangle city activities. Finally Gottmann points out the "many millions of people who find themselves neighbors in Megalopolis even though they live in different states and hundreds of miles from one another are barely becoming aware of the imperatives of such a neighborhood." These imperatives include transportation, land use, water supply, cultural activities, use of natural resources and government and politics.

In solving these challenging problems the political scientist can learn much from the geographer. The basic economic, social and political factors of Megalopolis are so interwoven that one is meaningless without consideration for the others. Land is partitioned in many ways—physically by rivers, bays, ridges and valleys, and also by administrative boundaries which frequently follow these same lines. The Hudson river, once a major physical barrier, today is more of a political one. It has not been much more difficult to overcome the physical obstacle of the Hudson than of the East River but it still costs more to cross it than it does the East River. Cheaper tolls on the East River point to the interest of both the city and the state of New York to favor development of territory under their jurisdiction rather than under another state.

In the past, administrative partitioning has favored local growth. Modern technology and economic progress, however, demand more regional integration. The multiplicity of governmental units has put obstacles in the way of economic growth and the more comfortable use of the region's facility. "Financial entanglements are only the budgetary consequences of the governmental partitioning of a space crowded with people and activities."

Much of the discussion regarding problems of government in a growing metropolitan region is not new to readers of Luther Gulick, Victor Jones and Robert Wood. Indeed many of the techniques are similar to those used with profit in Raymond Vernon's New York Metropolitan Regional studies. But Gottmann brings a wealth of facts and a stimulating freshness of approach to these problems. Moreover, his study, profusely illustrated with 280 charts and maps, covers a much larger area than Vernon's and thus he is able to observe relationships between metropolitan clusters. As a foreign scholar who is no stranger to the American scene, Gottmann is able to draw upon a rich experience of more than 20 years of



study of metropolitan problems. These are important factors in making his account particularly useful to American political scientists.

ROBERT H. CONNERY

*Duke University*

*Genesis and Structure of Society.* BY GIOVANNI GENTILE. TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION. BY H. S. HARRIS. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960. Pp. 228. \$4.50.)

Giovanni Gentile was something of an enigma all of his life. He combined the ivory-tower qualities of the abstract philosopher with a passion—consistent with his philosophy—for direct involvement in politics and service to the "State," which he equated with the essence of the individual. Even as the present volume was being written, and shortly prior to his assassination during Italy's bitter civil war, he was the object of bitter attacks from both die-hard Fascists and elements of the Resistance who sought to destroy a political system that was partially his own handiwork. The volume will not erase the enigma. It represents not merely a philosophical exercise but also veiled reflections on Gentile's political past—as well as a rationale for his choosing to identify with a crumbling Fascist state, rather than with emergent democracy, when Il Duce appealed to him in 1943.

For those who would more fully understand a major figure in the Italian idealist school, this excellently translated work is required reading. In the space of 150-odd pages, the reader is treated to Gentile's trenchant hostility toward positivism, empiricism, liberalism—and to any system of thought that fails to understand that the "State is the common aspect of the will," that "positivism or any form of empiricism is absurd," that all forms of realism "are very naive," or that the idea of community as a collection of individuals "smashes and destroys the idea of human community, making it no more than an accident and depriving it of value as an end in itself—the only kind of value that matters." Gentile's anti-pluralist and anti-materialist views are clearly laid out, as are his notions regarding economics, the relationship of religion to the state, the relationship between "public" and "private" acts, the role of philosophers in politics, the problem of a plurality of "infinite" states, and many other subjects. There are more than the usual problems of obtuse Hegelianisms and idealist jargon here; there are also all sorts of contradictions which the translator is assiduous in recognizing and concerning which his frequent explanatory and critical footnotes are of considerable assistance. More than most Anglo-American stu-

dents, Professor Harris knows and understands his Gentile. This, coupled with an extraordinary sensitivity to the nuances of the Italian language, results in a translation that is outstanding for its lucidity—as well as for its frank recognition of passages that might be the object of controversial interpretations. The volume, for many reasons, deserves more recognition than the translator (in a laconic footnote on page 7) predicts for it.

It is difficult, in the space of a short introductory essay such as Harris', to assess all of the problems concerning Gentile that Harris, himself, raises. Some of these problems are strictly philosophical and academic, concerning the translator's assertion that Gentile has often been misread and misunderstood in the Anglo-American world. I do not wish to enter the philosophical controversy, except to say that the essay itself contributes little to its resolution. The reader who is interested in such things will have to repair to the copious bibliography cited by Professor Harris.

Other portions of the introductory essay, however, deal with Gentile's relationship to Fascism, with the nature of Gentile's reforms of Italian education, and with the controversy regarding the impact of the reforms on the Italian school system. Professor Harris is clearly on strong ground when he differentiates Gentile from those in the Fascist movement who crassly sought to substitute a "nationalist" spirit of the party for the "national" spirit of "actual idealism." A superficial equation of the noble and moral constructs of Gentile with the crude practices of the Fascist state involves an injustice to Gentile of considerable magnitude. Those who view him as the willing "philosopher of Fascism," must come to terms with his controversy with the Vatican and his appalled response to the Lateran Agreements. Gentile clearly saw in Fascism a political instrument for the kind of revolutionary changes that Italian society so desperately needed (and needs!). He, like Bottai and many others, was bitterly disillusioned over the realization that ideas were cynically used, that Fascism was essentially sterile of any serious philosophical underpinning, and that anything—certainly any system of ideas—would be sacrificed in the overriding interest of maintaining and expanding power. The kind of state that Mussolini and his cohorts hammered out was clearly not consistent with the philosophical posture Gentile assumes in the volume he wrote in 1943.

Professor Harris, however, is sometimes carried away with his defense of Gentile, as for example, when he is critical of Lamberto



Borghi and others who have underlined the anti-democratic implication of the *Riforma Gentile*. It may be, as Harris claims, that Borghi is unfair to Gentile's "conscious intentions." But, if one is to judge at least in part by empirical consequences, it is obvious that what emerged from Gentile is a school system shot through with historicism, anti-liberalism, class-oriented curricula, authoritarianism, and all sorts of rigidities that have made the Italian educational system widely recognized as incapable of providing the kind of political socialization that a liberal democracy requires. Moreover, as the volume here reviewed clearly illustrates, fragments of Gentile's philosophy could clearly be utilized to justify the creation of a totalitarian school system as well as a

totalitarian state. After all, it was not pure caprice or abject ignorance that moved Il Duce to affix his signature to sections of the *Enciclopedia* written by Gentile. It seems to be the unhappy lot of Hegelians that their true meaning and intentions are never fully understood by mortal men.

As the translator anticipates, it would be easy to poke fun at many of Gentile's formulations. For those who might approach the man and his work more dispassionately, the last ten pages of Professor Harris' essay provide a most lucid presentation of the basic structure of "actual idealism."

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA

*Center for Advanced Study  
in the Behavioral Sciences*

## BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

*A Theory of Foreign Policy.* By GEORGE MODELSKI. (Princeton Studies in World Politics, No. 2. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. xi, 152. \$5.00.)

This reviewer has come to look forward with anticipation to any new publication by George Modelski on the theory of international politics. His *The Communist International System*<sup>1</sup> was an analytical gem. His model was clearly defined and it was applied productively in the analysis of a body of empirical data. His second piece, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System,"<sup>2</sup> is an original contribution to political theory, for it makes the point that international political systems are political systems and are capable of being analyzed, at least in part, with the same conceptual scheme that one uses in the analysis of national political systems. It thus becomes possible to compare international political systems with national ones, and, furthermore, the conceptual scheme which Modelski employs is moving in a direction which will make it possible to compare international political systems with one another (i. e., contemporary subsystems of the international political system, or international political systems at earlier points in time).

It was, therefore, somewhat disappointing to take up Modelski's most recent publication and to find that it falls considerably short of the standard in the two pieces referred to above. It is understandable that his *Theory of Foreign Policy* should fall short of the quality of his other work, since it represents a recent revision of his doctoral dissertation, which he completed in June, 1954, for the University of London. I doubt very much whether Modelski writing today would have produced this kind of book.

Like most of us engaged in reconsidering the categories and analytical schemes of political theory, Modelski is greatly influenced by economic and sociological theory, particularly the former. This is so much the case that the book should properly be called "An Economic Theory of Foreign Policy," just as Anthony Downs called his book, "An Economic Theory of Democracy." Perhaps to an even greater extent than was true

of Downs, Modelski distorts the data of politics in such a form as to render them susceptible of economic analysis. The ultimate goal toward which his theory is directed is to develop a "balance sheet for foreign policy." To make this balance sheet concept seem feasible, he uses a concept of power-input and power-output, which assumes that the means which go to make up power are exchangeable in some common currency. This is where his economic theory misled him, for the means of foreign policy are not exchangeable in a common currency. And what now occupies only a few pages of his book—an explication of the properties of the means of foreign policy—would have occupied several chapters had he been thinking as a political theorist rather than as an economic one.

He asks us to accept two conventions. The first of these is that we reduce political systems to policy-makers and their communities; the second, that we reduce the means of power to a total quantity of power. Modelski's contribution stops where it should properly have begun, first by placing foreign policy in the context of a sound theory of the political system and secondly by explicating the properties of the chief means of instruments of foreign policy, i. e., military, diplomatic, economic and communications means. Had Modelski proceeded this way, he would have found an opening between a theory of foreign policy and a theory of the international political system. While he rejects the theory of national power, he gives us a "theory of foreign policy power" which is equally regressive. It does not lead us forward to a more effective grappling with the empirical data of international transactions and the interactive structure which results from these flows, but offers a spurious simplicity and precision instead. Having said all this, the point should not be overlooked that Modelski has in his theoretical scheme potentialities of great promise. Let him apply his balance sheet theory in a few empirical cases and he will discover the bugs himself and produce a theory of foreign policy which will combine elegance with relevance in the style which his more recent work has led us to expect.—GABRIEL A. ALMOND, *Yale University*.

<sup>1</sup> "The Communist International System," Research Monograph No. 9, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Dec. 1, 1960.

<sup>2</sup> "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System," *World Politics*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, October, 1961, pp. 118-143.

*Beiträge zur Staatssoziologie.* By KARL LOEWENSTEIN. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1961. Pp. 485.)

This book gives the student of politics and constitutional law a convenient access to a number of

articles written during various periods of an exceptionally fruitful intellectual career reaching from the declining days of the Wilhelminian Empire to the post-Stalinist world. The variety of themes included in the selection bears testimony to the author's erudition and catholic range of interest. Loewenstein's chosen method of comparative institutional analysis exercised against a background of intimate historical knowledge of the respective societies and with a constant endeavor of critical confrontation of legislative and constitutional enactments with the corresponding social realities may seem by now an uncontested line of scientific procedure. Yet, Ernst Fraenkel in his thoughtful introductory pages rightly reminds us of its comparative novelty. The author first brought it to bear on his studies of the unique "constitutional laboratory" of the French revolution and especially his justly famous 1923 studies on the sociology of parliamentary representation in 18th and 19th century England. Fortunately reprinted here (though regrettably unavailable in English) they still—after nearly 30 years—stand out as an exemplary picture of the interrelation of constitutional, social and party structure under the conditions of relatively orderly social change.

Among the other items included in the collection, also unavailable in English, the reader's attention should be specially drawn to the article on the constitutional monocracy of Augustus analyzing the process of transformation of Roman institutions, and the critical analysis of W. J. Mommsen's new work on "Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920" showing the risks of reinterpretation under the changed horizon of later generations. The same piece, incidentally, raises some interesting questions as to the use of the charisma concept in present day society and also expresses considerable doubt as to the usefulness of the legality—legitimacy dichotomy. Did Loewenstein, as he says, never make use of the distinction "in his own scientific endeavors," because the analysis of so many stillborn, evanescent, social-reality-wise restructured texts has made him sceptical about attempts to set up untouchable core areas invariably claimed by all and any regimes? His stupendous knowledge of past and present regimes and his realistic analysis of the relations between political authorities and judicial agencies set up for the protection of such core areas—extended in the present volume so as to embrace the constitutional aspects of the South African tragedy—may have made him still more doubtful about the survival chances of specific value structures in a process of rapid change. Is the typologist par excellence of constitutional systems necessarily a relativist? In working his way through this exceptionally rich

collection which unveils the kaleidoscope of shifting institutional arrangements and in this process draws a sort of balance sheet, the attentive reader will doubtless find enough food to draw his own conclusions.—OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University*.

*The Herzl Paradox: Political, Social and Economic Theories of a Realist.* By JOSEPH ADLER. (New York: Hadrian Press and Herzl Press, 1962. Pp. 178. \$5.50.)

Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) was the founder of political Zionism, the prophet of the modern state of Israel. His dramatic vision of statehood as the means to dislodge the Jews from the chronic peculiarity of their history and secure for them a normal place in "western" international society evoked an immediate response among the Jews of eastern Europe. It was they who soon became the dominant element within the Zionist Organization founded by the westerner Herzl, and while they carried Herzl's political solution of the Jewish problem to practical fruition they expanded the ideological context of this concept, making room for a messianic spirit and for social aspirations drawn from a variety of sources other than those which underlay Herzl's own thinking.

A brilliant visionary and charismatic leader, Herzl also exercised unusual diplomatic and political talents. He has been recognized as the most revolutionary figure in nineteen centuries of Jewish history. A prolific writer, Herzl formulated the core of his political analysis in the classic essay "Judenstaat" ("The Jewish State"), while his social ideas were developed in the later romantic novel "Altneuland" ("Old-New Land"). It is Adler's contention that the appreciation of Herzl's practical political genius has proven detrimental to the appraisal of his contribution as a social and economic thinker. As an addition to the Herzl literature Adler's book may stimulate a broader appreciation of the man and the thinker behind the Herzl myth. If the book fails to accomplish this it may be because Herzl's social thought emerges as a banal collection of half-digested ideological clichés, whether that be the fault of Herzl's thought or the author's analysis. A clue to the misfiring of the book may be its inadequate appreciation of Herzl's most original and profound political thought, his analysis of the Jewish problem. It is probably true that the quality of Herzl's thought on the Jewish problem has been neglected by followers and scholars captivated by his magnetic personality and practical political skill. It is now doubtful, in the light of Adler's essay, whether it is worth considering Herzl seriously as a contributor to the mainstream of social and economic thought.

This is a painful verdict to the present reviewer

as an admirer of Herzl who would like, in Herzl's very spirit, to release the brilliant contributions of a galaxy of Zionist thinkers of the turn of the century from the academic ghetto of Jewish historiography, and to place them in their proper relation to the heritage of European social insights from which they are in large part derived. Adler's sincerity of purpose and apparent similarity of motivation render the verdict only the more painful to deliver. Perhaps the fault lies after all with the subject. One might have better luck with Syrkin and Borochoy, who could hardly be accused, justly or unjustly, with Herzl, of utopianism.

Leaving unanswered the question of the quality or poverty of Herzl's social thought on its own merits without Adler's mediation, the inadequacy of Adler's study is apparent in his concluding chapter in which he tackles an interesting side-issue: the measurement of Herzl's influence upon Israeli social ideas and institutions today. One of the more fascinating problems confronting the student of Zionism and Israeli politics is the extent to which the eastern-European principals were or were not influenced by Herzl's social vision. The impact of the labor-Zionist leaders, especially Syrkin, Borochoy, Gordon, and Ben-Gurion, who have shaped Israel's present social institutions, can certainly be broadly understood, plausibly analyzed, without reverting to Herzl. And yet the student cannot escape the suspicion, given the tangential patterns of correspondence, that links might be demonstrable between their social ideas and those of Herzl. But not only does Adler misunderstand the structure and trends of the Israel economy, he also lacks any trace of method in his attempt to connect its contours with Herzl's ideas. The following is typical: "Herzl's concern with town planning has also borne fruit in Israel. . . . It is curious that in the exceptional cases where the state has departed from Herzl's warning not to build shanty towns—as it did under the pressure of heavy immigration—much conflict has arisen. The feeling of insecurity and discontent bred in the *maabaroth* (temporary villages for new immigrants) has re-emphasized for the Israeli Government the wisdom of Herzl's insistence on model towns." As well say that the misery of Hooverville re-affirmed for F.D.R. the profundity of Jefferson's thought.—NOAH LUCATZ, *Southern Illinois University, East St. Louis Center*.

*The Measurement of Social Welfare.* By JEROME ROTHENBERG. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1961, Pp. XII 357, \$7.95)

With great professional skill, even if not with distinguished gifts of lucidity, Rothenberg has provided an excellent survey of the economics of

welfare as it has developed during the last twenty-five years. It is a branch of economics that, despite its frustrations, has clarified and illuminated many once badly posed issues. He has organized his survey around the problem of aggregating individual preferences into something that might be called social choice, giving prominence to Kenneth Arrow's formulation of the problem in *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York; Wiley, 1951) and to proposals from various scholars for resolving or bypassing Arrow's difficulties. Rothenberg's own original contribution is a proposal for a "useful, rather than merely a formally correct, welfare economics."

In elementary terms, the task of measuring social welfare is the task of ranking different social states so that in some useful sense one state of affairs can be said to be better than others. If economists sometimes think of this problem as a kind of technical problem in measurement, political scientists will recognize it as a set of problems in political philosophy fundamental enough to have engaged a long line of powerful intellects, all deeply respectful of the problem's subtleties and surprising scope.

Economists have advanced their work on this age-old problem by characteristic simplification. (Theirs is a profession whose reputation rests on its success with modest assignments.) They have postulated that the best state is the most preferred state; hence evaluation is no more than measurement of preference.

Whose preference? Everybody's. But economists have learned that the mere addition of preferences is not satisfactory—and is not possible anyway. So the problem, as they see it, is of somehow aggregating individual preferences other than by addition. It is a problem of finding some kind of a rule so that, given any combination of preferences in a population, one can declare a collective preference or preferred social choice.

No doubt the conversion of amorphous ethical questions into problems in measurement of preference does simplify. But the problem of evaluation remains formidable. For one's commitment to any rule for "aggregating" individual preferences would imply that one has finally managed to settle many of the great old controversies in distributive ethics. "Aggregate" is a deceptive word, a question-begging word; to aggregate individual preferences into collective preference is in fact to decide who ought to get what.

Rothenberg's proposal for making headway is to abandon the task of aggregating individual preferences by rule and instead "read off" the aggregation of individual values (whether preferences or not) by empirical observation, admittedly expensive and prolonged, of "those strategic social decision-making processes within the so-

ciety which value the kinds of social states pertinent to the economic problem." He thus considers "treating the social ordering (or social preference scale) as the ordering of social states which results from the operation of those processes."

Rothenberg's proposal, which he sometimes refers to as a proposal to accept "prevailing values" as criteria, is an attempt to extend the applicability of the notion of consumer sovereignty. Within some limits, he is saying, whatever a society chooses tells us what we should rate highly. As he recognizes, the proposal therefore seems to have the flavor of "what is, is right." He meets this objection in several ways, all showing that one is permitted to distinguish between those social states that can be presumed to be validated by the decision-making processes and those social states that are in observable fact brought about. In a particular case, the social state brought about may reflect only an aberration of the decision process. Here a reader might imagine that he hears, from a kindred spirit looking over Rothenberg's shoulders: "... the general will is always right, and always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people will always have the same rectitude" (Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Book II, ch. 3).

With his proposal, which is put with more intelligence than my brief summary of it might imply, Rothenberg stumbles out of formal welfare economics onto the edge of a world that the political philosophers have never left. As a welfare economist, he is equipped with new devices for making sense of this world, devices not much used in political philosophy. Yet it is a bigger, more complex, tougher world than Rothenberg's glimpse into has permitted him to see. It is a world in which Rothenberg will be asked whether the key decision processes themselves need sometimes to be evaluated and how, when such an occasion arises, one would propose to do the job. It is also a world in which research evidence that any  $x$  is a prevailing value can be countered by argument that the population has merely been coerced, cajoled, or deceived into acting as though it valued  $x$ . And it is a world in which challenges to consumer sovereignty on principle are much more serious than they are in the special case of the market. To these and other difficulties Rothenberg is sensitive, and he has important things to say. Habituated, however, to the narrow defile of welfare economics, he does not explore the new land far enough to see how wide it ranges.—CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, *Yale University*.

*Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy*. By MARTIN BIRNBACH. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 283. \$6.00.)

This book attempts to extract the elements of a social philosophy from the writings of the Neo-Freudian psychoanalysts. Birnbach presents a short overview of Freud's system of thought and his social philosophy, discusses the Neo-Freudian departures from the Freudian scheme, and analyzes the ideas of six writers: Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Abram Kardiner, Harry Stack Sullivan, Franz Alexander, and Harold Lasswell. The purpose of the volume is to demonstrate that the ideas of these people constitute an important contribution to social philosophy.

What is this contribution? Allowing for many variations among members of the school, a few sentences will suffice to state it.

Man, in the view of the Neo-Freudians, has the capacity for psychic growth; some of them even claim that he strives for mental health. At the same time, man is a product of his social environment, so that growth may be helped or hindered by the individual's social experience. Culture and social institutions may be judged good or bad according to their ability to foster or impede individual growth. By this criterion, modern Western society must be judged wanting. Competitive pressures and the de-personalization of human relations generate anxiety, low self-esteem, and a tendency to regard all things, including one's self, as commodities in the market. This diagnosis of the modern world, together with humanistic principles, leads the Neo-Freudians to a variety of recommendations, ranging from the therapeutic principles of a Horney or Sullivan to the communal socialism of a Fromm.

The views of the Neo-Freudians can hardly be considered a coherent social philosophy, much less a political one. As Birnbach points out, they lack—with few exceptions—specific applications to political processes and programs of action. Nonetheless, they should be considered carefully by political scientists, for they challenge much of what has come to be the consensus of the profession. Lasswell (whom the author was wise to include although he scarcely qualifies as a Neo-Freudian psychoanalyst) has indeed pointed out that much of political life is pathological, partly because professional politics attracts people with serious personality defects, and partly because the symbols bandied about in the political forum tend to mobilize anti-social tendencies which ordinary people repress in their day-to-day relations with others.

Such views were heterodox a generation ago when they were first expressed, and they are perhaps even more heterodox today. For, having shed its earlier moral indignation over corrupt practices in public life, political science has come to believe in a latter-day *Fable of the Bees*—that the private vices of politicians and pressure

groups make for public virtues. Conflict, it is believed, is almost invariably productive, and public debate is the life-blood of democracy. The pith of the Neo-Freudian and Lasswellian critique is that it denies this old-fashioned liberalism. Political competition, instead of resolving issues, may well serve to perpetuate them; and public debate, instead of leading to clarification, may bring only obfuscation and a hardening of positions. One cannot help being reminded of the pathetic futility of so many "great debates," domestic as well as international.

The Neo-Freudian position thus implies a psychology of conflict which could be a powerful tool for political analysis and an important ingredient of an ethic for the profession of political science. If much of competitive political behavior is motivated by anxiety and at the same time reinforces the anxieties from which it stems, we have here a self-perpetuating circular process similar in many respects to the typical course of certain mental diseases. Is it possible that the majority of the professional students of politics regard as healthy the very processes that careful analysis coupled with humanistic convictions would reveal to be symptoms of diseases? Are they doctors who advocate sickness and oppose health?

This, it would seem, is the weighty question which Birnbach attempts to raise through his examination of Neo-Freudian thought. Unfortunately, neither the question nor the content of Neo-Freudian thought emerge from the author's writing with the amount of clarity one might hope for. Psychoanalytic thought is, by itself, complicated enough and it is often far from lucid; yet Birnbach seems to complicate matters further by a dual allegiance to traditional political philosophy and to scientific method.

Whether or not Freud was really a philosophical materialist, and whether Fromm expounds a new version of the natural rights doctrine may be moot points. But what, except the satisfaction of scholastic curiosity, would be gained if such questions could be satisfactorily answered? Also, the author's frequent attempts to translate psychoanalytic propositions into the language of one or another school of social philosophy tend to make the conceptual apparatus more complex and less manageable.

At the same time, the author's commitment to scientific method (as he understands it) leads to rather surprising assertions. He claims that the Neo-Freudians have contributed to social philosophy a "qualitative" method which—for unexplained reasons—he also calls "deductive," as opposed to "quantitative analysis" and "induction." The "method" appears to consist in drawing conclusions about social processes from information obtained in the psychoanalyst's office.

The advantage of this procedure is that it explores human motives in depth. While such depth may be very desirable, the "scientific" procedure here advocated seems to be analogous to exploring a salt-mine and deciding on the basis of the evidence gained that the earth's core is made of salt.

Nor is the author's concern with scientific validity quite credible. Take, for instance, his critique of Fromm's utopia.

"Fromm's application of natural law theory has much to offer. . . . All will acknowledge the *good service* done by that doctrine in furthering the development of modern political institutions under the rule of law. . . . Very probably, however, it is insusceptible to validation [sic] by an empirical investigation of human nature and its formation . . ." (emphasis added).

In what sense does a theory have "much to offer" if it cannot be demonstrated to be true? Evidently, the author is not looking for truth but for an effective social myth—a formula which will do "good service." For the same reason the book makes no attempt to choose among alternative views on the basis of the evidence; rather, there is a tendency to accept and reject ideas because of the consequences to which they may lead.

Birnbach's lack of concern with evidence is further reflected in his choice of authors and texts. He reads exhaustively the writings of his six authors, but he ignores a large and varied literature of studies devoted to the empirical testing of psychoanalytic propositions, including the now classic study of *The Authoritarian Personality*. His is, rather, an interest in writers and schools, and his technique is chiefly that of scriptural interpretation.

The flaws of this volume are perhaps less those of its author than of the intellectual tradition from which it springs. Political philosophy, unfortunately, has foundered in a stale scholasticism. To require it now to be scientific is asking the impossible. To be sure, the factual assumptions upon which a living political philosophy must be built should be consistent with empirical knowledge. But this calls for a concern with evidence rather than the thought of particular writers. Beyond this, one cannot expect the ethical propositions of a social philosophy to be proven rigorously. They should rather, serve as value assumptions for empirical research and as standards of action in human affairs.—FRANK A. PINNER, *Michigan State University*.

*Modern Government*. BY DELL G. HITCHNER AND WILLIAM H. HARBOLD. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1962. Pp. xviii, 718. \$7.50.)

This book, the newest in the Dodd, Mead series in political science, done under the advisory edi-

torship of Professor David Fellman, constitutes an addition to the steadily growing number of texts for the introductory course. The authors are both at the University of Washington in Seattle. Their book is among the very good ones.

In basic organization of material, the book follows the accepted pattern for texts in this area. In order, it deals with the nature of political science—its dimensions, its methodology and its values; with the State—its evolution and differentiation from other social forms; with the evolution of democratic and antidemocratic ideologies; with constitutional government and liberty; with interest groups, parties and elections; with institutions of government—executive, legislative, judicial and administrative; and with international relations. More attention is given to this latter aspect of the subject than in the usual introductory text. Following a short epilogue, there is offered an excellent study guide to political science, covering over 50 pages. It includes listings of reference materials, classics, supplementary readings, periodicals and political novels. It even offers help in the preparation of investigative papers in political science. Beginning students should be grateful indeed for this section. An added attraction is also available to instructors in the course—in the form of an instructor's manual, offering useful suggestions for paper assignments, essay exam questions and multiple choice test items.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the book is its unusual balance. Overall, there is balance in the amount of attention devoted to each of the indicated aspects of political science. Further, within each of these aspects, there is balance in treatment. The authors do not get out on any political limbs. In their analysis of political methodology, for example, they recognize the utility of philosophy, history and empirical research alike, and gently chide some modern political scientists for their total concentration on the latter. In their treatment of democracy, there is the same cautious balance in viewpoint; fair and objective consideration of the modern challenges to democracy, especially communism and fascism, is offered. Even so, the authors elect for democracy, but with qualifications: "if western civilization has erred in its understanding of human life, democracy is meaningless. If we share its values we really have no choice."

The writing is sprightly, and frequently brightened with humor and insight—e.g., "a bottle drifting in the ocean is neither free nor unfree." In one respect the book might have been improved by giving more attention to regional international organization such as EEC. Surely, however, a book with so few faults as this one seems to have, is a very good book indeed.—PAUL G. STEINBICKER, *St. Louis University*.

*Latin American Social Thought.* BY HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS. (Washington, D. C.: The University Press, 1961. Pp. iv, 557. \$7.00.)

Dr. Davis has selected wisely from myriad authors in presenting a spectrum of topics ranging from "beauty" to "Marxism." His volume's parts, although actually arranged by time periods, are headed: 1) "The Enlightenment and Independence," 2) "Liberalism and Utilitarianism," 3) "Positivism," and 4) "Twentieth Century Trends."

Part One (Bolívar, Cecilio del Valle) illustrates contradictions in Latin American thought, with European, North American and Roman Catholic influences contrasted to indigenous aspirations and spirit of revolt. Part Two (Alberdi, Sarmiento) rejects the scientific philosophy of history and the significance of emerging class consciousness. Part Three (Prada, Barbosa, Hostos, Rodo) reflects the conflict between Church and State, and largely accepts the scientific sociology of August Comte. Part Four (Manuel Galvez, Freyre, Arevalo, Figueres and Betancourt) shows the intellectual stimulation of European refugees, the influences of Marxism and of the Mexican revolution. Within the four Parts are 42 sections with biographical data on each writer, and Dr. Davis' characterizations of the man and his influence. There is a selected bibliography of fifty general works, of which a bare half dozen are in English. The absence of an index requires much digging to find patterns, comparisons or contrasts of thought: Martí on revolution is at page 259, the Mexican Luis Mora at page 150. Race is treated by the Brazilian Da Cunha at p. 219, by the Argentine Galvez at p. 424. Nationalism, federalism, regionalism, labor, race, law, marxism, democracy and education are the topics treated most frequently. There is surprisingly little on militarism or caudilloism, and nothing from a feminine pen. The volume consolidates years of gathering of materials and gives representation to some forty Latin American writers in excerpts from their important works. The translations are a bit uneven.

The Latin American writers are commentators upon, rather than the originators of, social thought or of political forms. The excerpts are replete with references to Spinoza, Aquinas, Hegel, Descartes, Locke, Bentham, Engels, Renan, Ortega y Gasset, Carlyle, Spencer, William James and Unamuno. Davis concludes that the Latin Americans are much more given to speculative thought than to descriptive analysis. This volume is a signal contribution in an area regrettably underdeveloped in our country and theirs. It has been a prodigious effort to bring us up to date after the two decades since W. Rex Crawford's "A Century of Latin American

Thought." But events move on, and subsequent to Dr. Davis' volume we have the writings and actions of Quadros and Goulart, of Arosemena and Frondizi, of Guevara and of Castro. And as the Vatican's *Rerum Novarum* of the last century marked many Latin American writings, so the 1961 *Mater et Magistra* may inspire and expand the bounds of social, political, and economic thought in Latin America in the next decades.—WILLARD F. BARBER, *University of Maryland*.

*Political Ideas in the Modern World.* By D. B. HEATER. (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1962. Pp. 208. \$3.00.)

Two things are attempted here. First, (and to this the author's major attention is directed) an analysis and evaluation is conducted of several salient contemporary political ideals and their enveloping movements. Secondly, there is an exposition of the proposition that ideas have consequences, and that the consequences at this particular time are not very pleasant. The entire presentation is directed to a politically and ideologically unsophisticated audience. "It is hoped that examination candidates for (British) university entrance, officers of the armed services preparing for staff college and those who are 'just interested' will find these pages of some use." To this end a rudimentary bibliography is included together with a set of examination questions.

The pursuit of the author's first purpose consists of a series of chapters devoted to nationalism, communism, democracy, and religion, respectively. The basic format of these chapters consists of an examination of the ideational structure appropriate to each movement, the history of the movement's development, and an analysis of the movement's influence in the significant areas of the western and non-western world. A clearer idea of the range of this book can be gained from the subdivision of the chapter concerned with democracy (running 43 pages) which includes: "Classical Greece," "The English, American and French Revolutions," "Utilitarianism and Liberalism," "Democratic Socialism," "The Basic Elements" (equality, popular sovereignty, humanitarianism, the rule of law, liberty), "The Myth of Totalitarian Democracy," "Conditions for Democracy," and "Conclusions." At this point it is only a formality to point out that Mr. Heater has spread himself rather thinly, but there is some merit here. His judgments are temperate throughout, as befits one writing primarily within the liberal tradition ("A strong following for a beneficent idea is, naturally to be encouraged, but fanaticism is always to be deplored."). A further strength (especially noticeable in the chapter treating of nationalism) rests

in the wealth of meaningfully presented historical and other illustrative materials. This, to the reviewer, seems to be the book's principal merit; the "just interested" reader could not but gain from this a broader understanding of the forces shaping the modern world.

However, there are serious deficiencies involved in the overly simplified presentation of political theories and their development. Admittedly, Mr. Heater faced a difficult problem: the significant presentation of complex material to untrained readers, but simplification can bleed into inadequacy. E.g., the analysis of Marxism is routine; the grosser elements are introduced in terms not too remote from journalistic exposition. What is presented is a reasonably fair but quite casual examination. It is to be regretted that the major Marxian contributions to the social sciences and the resultant modification of non-Marxian political philosophies are not made more apparent. A more serious disability, given the author's intent, is the failure to adequately plumb the strengths of communism as an ideology.

Numerous other objections of this kind could be raised. In the final analysis this book is not an adequate base for formal college instruction. The ideas dealt with are too isolated and simplified to permit systematic elaboration. However, as was noted above, in less formal circumstances the book has substantial merit.

Finally, a few words must be said concerning Mr. Heater's second point: the thesis that a powerful malaise has fallen upon political philosophy to the detriment of mankind. Extended remarks to this thesis are unnecessary since the argument is not carefully developed but only briefly sketched in.

Heater holds that the evils to which ideas or philosophies have contributed substantially are twofold: the threatened destruction of civilization as we know it through war, and the engulfment of the individual by the state. His point is not that ideologies, *per se* are dangerous, but that we are attempting to use obsolete political philosophies dating from the 18th and 19th centuries. These are identified as the Benthamite form of liberal democracy, extreme nationalism and Marxism. In each case the idea's obsolescence consists in its assumptions not matching reality (e.g., Marxism doesn't fit the facts of welfare economics, etc.). This *disrapport* between reality and our political ideas partially explains our current predicament.

What is needed therefore, is a set of more realistic political concepts. However, Mr. Heater believes we are encumbered in this by the decline of political philosophy in the modern world; we have lost the propensity to generate alternative systems. He accounts for this failure in familiar



terms (thus logical positivism plays its usual instrumental role, etc.).

In the last three pages there is a tentative solution based upon a "refurbished natural law" which seems to represent a cross between the "biological principle of the preservation and development of the human race" and a myth of unspecified content (to "excite the imagination as well as satisfy the intellect"). So much for one of our current problems; the second problem is killed with the same stone: "Natural law insists

on the natural and indefeasible rights of the individual."

Mr. Heater has thus traced an outline of a reforming political ideal, one sufficient to overcome nationalism and its companions. The substance of the argument is less to be noted here than the style. It is remarkable when one sets about to oppose a monster in a manner so drained of passion, and when judgments are so muted, bangs and whispers can fall together.—WILLIAM A. RITCHIE, *University of Delaware*.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON POLITICAL THEORY

CECELIA M. KENYON  
*Smith College*

Achminow, Herman. Khrushchev's "Creative Development" of Marxism-Leninism. *Studies on the Soviet Union*. 3/II/1962.

Agesta, Luis Sanchez. El principio de función subsidiaria. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1962.

Anan, Seiichi. Some Trends of Legal Thought and Natural Law Study in Japan. *Natural Law Forum*, 1962.

Aron, Raymond. A propos de la théorie politique. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. March, 1962.

Bamborough, Renford. Plato's Modern Friends and Enemies. *Philosophy*. April, 1962.

Bartsch, Günther. Marxismus und Arbeiterbewegung. *Politische Studien*. March-April, 1962.

Bergner, D. Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik würdigt Johann Gottlieb Fichte. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 4/X/1962.

Bracken, Harry M. Locke-Berkeley-Hume. *Indian Journal of Philosophy*. August, 1961.

Buhr, M. Das Verhältnis von Handeln und Denken in der Philosophie Johann Gottlieb Fichtes. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 4/X/1962.

Colwell, James L. The Populist Image of Vernon Louis Parrington. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. June, 1962.

Clarac, Pierre. La politique dans l'oeuvre de Chateaubriand. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. March, 1962.

Constable, George W. Who Can Determine What the Natural Law Is? *Natural Law Forum*. 1962.

Crosson, Frederick J. On the Ground for History in the Classical Philosophy of Human Nature. *The Modern Schoolman*. May, 1962.

Davis, Jim E. Alexander Hamilton and His Politics and Policies. *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. December, 1961.

Dewey, Donald O. Madison's Views on Electoral Reform. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Echeverría, Rafael. El valor político del consentimiento popular. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1962.

d'Entreves, A. Passerin. Due domande intorno al diritto. *Revista di Filosofia*. 1/LIII/1962.

Espinosa, Miguel. La reflexión política configuradora. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1962.

Fairbanks, Matthew J. Pierce and Hegel. *The New Scholasticism*. April, 1962.

Fassò, Guido. On Natural Law as the Basis of Democracy. *Natural Law Forum*. 1962.

Fay, Charles. Toward a Thomistic-Anthropological View of the Evolution of Obligation. *Natural Law Forum*. 1962.

Feinberg, Joel. Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals. *The Philosophical Review*. July, 1962.

Fetscher, Iring. Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus—Zur Kritik des sowjetmarxistischen Faschismusbegriffs. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. March, 1962.

Fetscher, Iring. Marxismus und Bürokratie. *International Review of Social History*. 3/V/1960.

Feuer, Lewis S. Travelers to the Soviet Union 1917-32: The Formation of a Component of New Deal Ideology. *American Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Frisch, Morton J. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Problem of Democratic Liberty. *Ethics*. April, 1962.

Gini, Corrado. Las manías del mundo contemporáneo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1962.

Ginsberg, Morris. The Concept of Law. *British Journal of Sociology*. March, 1962.

Glickman, Harvey. The Toryness of English

- Conservatism. *Journal of British Studies*. November, 1961.
- Gottfried, Alex, and Davidson, Sue. Utopia's Children: An Interpretation of Three Political Novels. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.
- Grasso, Pietro Guiseppe. "Stato di Diritto" e "Stato Sociale" Nell'attuale ordinamento italiano. *Il Politico*. December, 1961.
- Gregor, A. James. La filosofía política de Giovanni Gentile. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1962.
- Greifer, Elisha. The Conservative Pose in America: The Adamses' Search for a Pre-Liberal Past. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.
- Gummere, Richard M. The Classical Ancestry of the United States Constitution. *American Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.
- Hancock, Roger. Ideas of Freedom. *Review of Metaphysics*. June, 1962.
- Hendel, Charles W. The Eighteenth Century as an Age of Ethical Crisis. *Ethics*. April, 1962.
- Hexter, J. H. Thomas More: on the Margins of Modernity. *Journal of British Studies*. November, 1961.
- Higham, John. Beyond Consensus: the Historian as Moral Critic. *American Historical Review*. April, 1962.
- Hilbig, K., and Grohmann, G. Der humanistische Charakter des Programms und der Politik der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion und das antihumanistische Wesen des Imperialismus. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 2/X/1962.
- de la Iglesia, María Rosa Saurin. Momentos y problemas del liberalismo ochocentista alemán. *Hispania: Revista Española de Historia*. No. LXXXV, Vol. XXII, 1962.
- Iribarne, Manuel Fraga. Carl Schmitt: el hombre y la obra. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1962.
- Kaderschafka, G. u. K. Die Rolle des sozialistischen Staates und der sozialistischen Arbeit bei der Herausbildung der sozialistischen Moral. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 2/X/1962.
- Kapadia, B. H. Predecessors of Kautilya. *Journal of Indian History*. December, 1961.
- Keane, E. F. Bertrand Russell and the Emotive Theory. *Indian Journal of Philosophy*. August, 1961.
- King, Robert W. Communism, A Self-Limiting Political Order. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.
- Krippendorff, Ekkehart. Legitimität als Problem der Politikwissenschaft. *Zeitschrift für Politik*. March, 1962.
- Ladd, Jr., Everett C. Helvétius and d'Holbach. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April-June, 1962.
- Leclercq, Jacques. Natural Law and the Unknown. *Natural Law Forum*. 1962.
- Leiserson, Avery. ¿Están trabajando los científicos en problemas importantes? *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1962.
- Levine, Daniel. The Social Philosophy of Albert J. Beveridge. *Indiana Magazine of History*. June, 1962.
- Lévy-Bruhl, H. Juge et prudent. *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger*. January-March, 1962.
- Lindbeck, George A. Natural Law in the Thought of Paul Tillich. *Natural Law Forum*. 1962.
- Lindner, H. Fichtes Humanismus der Tat. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 4/X/1962.
- Lombardi, F. L'elemento politico nella formazione del pensiero speculativo europeo. *Revista di Filosofia*. 1/LIII/1962.
- Losos, Joseph, O. Relativism and the Legal Process. *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. June, 1961.
- Marti, Paul. Tolstoï "Krieg und Frieden" und Pasternaks "Dr. Schiwago." *Schweizer Monatshefte*. April, 1962.
- Mesnard, Pierre. The Psychology and Pneumatology of Jean Bodin. *International Philosophical Quarterly*. May, 1962.
- Midgley, Louis, Paul Tillich's New Science of Values. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.
- Mohler, Armin. Konservativ 1962. *Der Monat*. April, 1962.
- Morgenthau, Hans. A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. *American Political Science Review*. June, 1962.
- Muller, W. Der marxistische Freiheitsbegriff. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*. 4/X/1962.
- de Pablo, Luis Santiago. El tránsito del socialismo al comunismo en la ideología soviética actual. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. January-February, 1962.
- Paechter, Heinz. Radikalismus in den USA. *Der Monat*. February, 1962.
- Plattel, M. G. Personal Response and the Natural Law. *Natural Law Forum*. 1962.
- Pole, J. R. Forward from McCarthyism. *The Political Quarterly*. April-June, 1962.
- Pole, J. R. Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy. *American Historical Review*. April, 1962.
- Pressly, Thomas J. Bullets and Ballots: Lincoln and the "Right of Revolution." *American Historical Review*. April, 1962.
- Rose, Richard. The Political Ideas of English Party Activists. *American Political Science Review*. June, 1962.
- Rothman, Stanley F. Marxism and the Paradox of Contemporary Political Thought. *Review of Politics*. April, 1962.
- Rothman, Stanley F. The Revival of Classical

Political Philosophy: A Critique. *American Political Science Review*. June, 1962.

Rubel, M. Deux interviews de Karl Marx sur la Commune. *Le Mouvement Social*. January-March, 1962.

Sandoz, Ellis. Voegelin's Idea of Historical Form. *Cross Currents*. Winter, 1962.

Schall, James V. Cartesianism and Political Theory. *Review of Politics*. April, 1962.

Shuchman, Philip. Aristotle's Conception of Contract. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April-June, 1962.

Schweitzer, Arthur. Ideological Strategy. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Sigler, Jay A. Politics and the Philosophy of Science. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Sontheimer, Kurt. Der antiliberale Staatsgedanke in der Weimarer Republik. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. March, 1962.

Stocking, George W., Jr. Lamarckianism in Social Thought. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. April-June, 1962.

Stoppino, Mario. Libertà e "Rule of Law." *Il Politico*. December, 1961.

Stumpf, Samuel E. International Law: The Testing Ground of Theory. *Natural Law Forum*. 1962.

Suffel, Jacques. La politique dans l'oeuvre d'Anatole France. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*. April-May, 1962.

Tinder, Glenn. Is Liberalism Out-of-Date? *The Journal of Politics*. May, 1962.

Ulbricht, Walter. Das Banner der Volksdemokratie auf deutschen Boden. *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*. 1/X/1962.

Van Der Kroef, Justus M. Lenin, Mao and Aidit. *The China Quarterly*. April-June, 1962.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Kant, Liberalism, and War. *American Political Science Review*. June, 1962.

Ward, Bernard. Hume's Non-Utilitarianism. *Ethics*. April, 1962.

Wolff, Robert Paul. Reflections on Game Theory and the Nature of Value. *Ethics*. April, 1962.

#### SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

#### METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

JULIAN FELDMAN

University of California, Berkeley

##### Philosophy of Social Science

Allport, F. H. A structuronomic conception of behavior: Individual and collective I. Structural theory and the master problem of social psychology. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 1, January.

##### Research Methods

Banerjee, K. S. A unified statistical approach to the index number problem. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 4, October.

Blau, P. M. Operationalizing a conceptual scheme: The universalism-particularism pattern variable. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 2, April.

Briggs, F. E. A. The influence of errors on the correlation of ratios. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 1, January.

Broadhurst, P. L. Coordinate indexing: a bibliographic aid. *American Psychologist*, 1962, 17, 3, March.

Camilleri, S. F. Theory, probability, and induction in social research. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 2, April.

Campbell, J. T. Assessments of higher-level personnel: I. Background and scope of the research. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, Spring.

Campbell, J. T., Otis, J. L., Liske, R. E., and

Prien, E. P. Assessments of higher-level personnel: II. Validity of the over-all assessment process. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, Spring.

Carter, L. F. Automated instruction. *American Psychologist*, 1961, 16, 11, November.

Cattell, R. B., and Sullivan, W. The scientific nature of factors: A demonstration by cups of coffee. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 2, April.

Charnes, A., and Cooper, W. W. Chance constraints and normal deviates. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 297, March.

Coppinger, N. W., and Saucer, R. T. Multidimensional psychophysics as a method of studying institutions. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, February.

Creager, J. A., and Valentine, L. D., Jr. Regression analysis of linear composite variance. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.

Crozier, R. B., and Darcovich, W. Time series analysis by electronic computers: A report on some recent applications at the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 1962, 28, 1, February.

Easterfield, T. E. A short cut in a class of simulation problems. *Operational Research Quarterly*, 1961, 12, 4, December.

Ehrlich, H. J., Rinehart, J. W., and Howell,

- J. C. The study of role conflict: Explorations in methodology. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.
- Engel, J. F. Tape recorders in consumer research. *Journal of Marketing*, 1962, 26, 2, April.
- Fisher, F. M. Identifiability criteria in nonlinear systems. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 4, October.
- Geisler, M. A. Appraisal of laboratory simulation experiences. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 3, April.
- Gibson, W. A. An asymmetric approach to multiple factor analysis. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 2, November.
- Gibson, W. A. Extending latent class solutions to other variables. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.
- Glasser, G. J. A distribution-free test of independence with a sample of paired observations. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 297, March.
- Gold, D. Independent causation in multivariate analysis: The case of political alienation and attitude toward a school bond issue. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.
- Guertin, W. H. Research with the Wechsler intelligence scales for adults: 1955-60. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 1, January.
- Halpern, S. Hypno introspection: a contribution to the theory of hypnotherapy. Part I. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.
- Hazewinkel, A. Some uses of the square root method as a tool in multiple prediction. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.
- Hirschman, A. O., and Lindblom, C. E. Economic development, research and development, policy making: Some converging views. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 2, April.
- Hoffman, P. J. Assessment of the independent contributions of predictors. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 1, January.
- Hurley, J. R., and Cattell, R. B. The Procrustes program: Producing direct rotation to test a hypothesized factor structure. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 2, April.
- Jarrett, R. F. A note on rotation and psychological space. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 2, November.
- Kahneman, D., and Ghiselli, E. E. Validity and nonlinear heteroscedastic models. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, Spring.
- Kaiser, H. F. Formulas for component scores. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.
- Keats, J. A., and Lord, F. M. A theoretical distribution for mental test scores. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.
- Kennedy, J. L. The system approach: organizational development. *Human Factors*, 1962, 4, 1, February.
- Kindahl, J. K. Estimation of means and totals from finite populations of unknown size. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 297, March.
- Kish, L. Studies of interviewer variance for attitudinal variables. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 297, March.
- Knapp, R. H. A factor analysis of Thorndike's ratings of eminent men. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, February.
- Konijn, H. S. Identification and estimation in a simultaneous equations model with errors in the variables. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 1, January.
- Lazer, W. The role of models in marketing. *Journal of Marketing*, 1962, 26, 2, April.
- Lee, Joan C., and Tucker, R. B. An investigation of clinical judgment: a study in method. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 4, April.
- Leong, Y. S. The use of an iterated moving average in measuring seasonal variations. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 297, March.
- Locke, E. A., and Hulin, C. L. A review and evaluation of the validity studies of activity vector analysis. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, Spring.
- Mandelbrot, B. Paretian distributions and income maximization. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1962, 76, 1, February.
- Mandelbrot, B. Stable Paretian random functions and the multiplicative variation of income. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 4, October.
- McKenney, J. L. Simultaneous processing of jobs on an electronic computer. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 3, April.
- Messinger, S. L. Life as theater: Some notes on the dramaturgic approach to social reality. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.
- Namias, J. A rapid method to detect differences in interviewer performance. *Journal of Marketing*, 1962, 26, 2, April.
- Pearce, I. F. An exact method of consumer demand analysis. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 4, October.
- Ray, W. S., Hundleby, J. D., and Goldstein, D. A. Test skewness and kurtosis as functions of item parameters. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.
- Ross, H. L. The local community: A survey approach. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.
- Rydborg, S. Methods of correcting correlations for indirect restriction of range with non-interval data. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.
- Sandon, F. The means of sections from a normal distribution. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 2, November.
- Stricker, G. The construction and partial validation of an objectively scorable apperception test. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.

Suits, D. B. Forecasting and analysis with an econometric model. *The American Economic Review*, 1962, 52, 1, March.

Textor, R. B. A statistical method for the study of shamanism. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 1, Spring.

Thompson, J. W. Meaningful and unmeaningful rotation of factors. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 3, May.

Vandenberg, S. G., Green, B. F. and Wrigley, C. F. A survey of computer usage in departments of psychology and sociology. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1, January.

Zelditch, M., Jr. Some methodological problems of field studies. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Zellner, A., and Theil, H. Three-stage least squares: Simultaneous estimation of simultaneous equations. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 1, January.

#### Motivation and Personality

Bendig, A. W., A factor analysis of personality scales including the Buss-Durkee hostility inventory. *The Journal of General Psychology*, 1962, 66, 2nd half, April.

Borgatta, E. F. The coincidence of subtests in four personality inventories. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, 2nd half, April.

Bramel, D. A dissonance theory approach to defensive projection. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 2, February.

Budner, S. Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.

Burt, C. The gifted child. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1961, 14, 2, November.

Cerbus, G., and Nichols, R. C. Personality correlates of picture preferences. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 1, January.

Cooper, A., and Cowen, E. L. The social desirability of trait descriptive terms: a study of feeling reactions to adjective descriptions. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, 2nd half, April.

Crockett, H. J., Jr. The achievement motive and differential occupational mobility in the United States. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 2, April.

Dufort, R. H., and Wright, J. H. Food intake as a function of duration of food deprivation. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

Dunnette, M. D., McCartney, J., Carlson, H. C., and Kirchner, W. K. A study of faking behavior on a forced-choice self-description checklist. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, Spring.

Edwards, A. L. Social desirability and expected means on MMPI scales. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1962, 21, 1, Spring.

Epstein, S., and Fenz, W. D. Theory and experi-

ment on the measurement of approach-avoidance conflict. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 2, February.

Epstein, S., and Levitt, H. The influence of hunger on the learning and recall of food related words. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 2, February.

Evans, G. C. The influence of "fake" personality evaluations of self description. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

Field, J. G. An interpersonal validation of the MPI. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 5.

Hetrick, W. R., and Haas, K. Some personality correlates of verbal conditioning. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

Loevinger, J. Measuring personality patterns of women. *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 1962, 65, 1, February.

Longenecker, E. D. Perceptual recognition as a function of anxiety, motivation, and the testing situation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 3, March.

Maccoby, E. A. Class differences in boys' choices of authority roles. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.

Martin, C., and Nichols, R. C. Personality and religious beliefs. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, February.

Miller, N. E. Analytical studies of drive and reward. *American Psychologist*, 1961, 16, 12, December.

Sampson, E. E. Birth order, need achievement, and conformity. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 2, February.

Shaw, M. E. The effectiveness of Whyte's rules: "How to cheat on personality tests." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1962, 46, 1, February.

Spreen, O. The translation of personality scales and their adaptation for cross-cultural and clinical use. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 5.

Veroff, J., Feld, S., and Gurin, G. Achievement motivation and religious background. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 2, April.

Wiggins, J. S. Strategic, method, and stylistic variance in the MMPI. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 3, May.

Wrightman, L. S., Jr. Authoritarianism and self awareness. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, 2nd half, April.

Zander, A., and Curtis, T. Effects of social power on aspiration setting and striving. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 1, January.

#### Opinions and Attitudes

Bolda, R. A., and Lawshe, C. H. Evaluation of role playing. *Personnel Administration*, 1962, 25, 2, March-April.

- Brock, T. C. Cognitive restructuring and attitude change. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 4, April.
- Fishbein, M., and Raven, B. H. The AB scales—an operational definition of belief and attitude. *Human Relations*, 1962, 15, 1, February.
- Geiser, R. L., and Newman, R. W. Psychology and the legal process: Opinion polls as evidence. *American Psychologist*, 1961, 16, 11, November.
- Leventhal, H. The effects of set and discrepancy on impression change. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.
- Rettig, S., and Pasamanick, B. Invariance in factor structure of moral value judgments from American and Korean college students. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.
- Wells, H. K. Religious attitudes at a small denominational college as compared with Harvard and Radcliffe. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.
- Cognitive Processes and Individual Decision Making
- Alberoni, F. Contribution to the study of subjective probability. I. *The Journal of General Psychology*, 1962, 66, 2nd half, April.
- Alberoni, F. Contribution to the study of subjective probability: Prediction. II. *The Journal of General Psychology*, 1962, 66, 2nd half, April.
- Appel, J. B., and Hiss, R. H. The discrimination of contingent from non-contingent reinforcement. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, 1962, 55, 1, February.
- Baker, C. H. Maintaining the level of vigilance by means of knowledge of results about a secondary vigilance task. *Ergonomics*, 1961, 4, 4, October.
- Becker, G. M. Objective measures of subjective probability and utility. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 2, March.
- Becker, S. W., and Siegel, S. Utility and level of aspiration. *The American Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 75, 1, March.
- Bitterman, M. E. Techniques for the study of learning in animals. Analysis and classification. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 2, March.
- Blake, R. R., and Mouton, J. S. Comprehension of points of communality in competing solutions. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.
- Brackbill, Y., Kappy, M. S., and Starr, R. H. Magnitude of reward and probability learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 1, January.
- Chapman, J. P. The spacing of sequentially dependent trials in probability learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 6, December.
- Cohen, J., and Cooper, P. A model for choice in equiprobable situations. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 3.
- Davies, J. C. Toward a theory of revolution. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.
- Demsetz, H. The effect of consumer experience on brand loyalty and the structure of market demand. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 1, January.
- De Soto, C. B., and Bosley, J. J. The cognitive structure of a social structure. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 4, April.
- Edwards, W. Subjective probabilities inferred from decisions. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 2, March.
- Feather, N. T. The study of persistence. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 2, March.
- Ferber, R. Brand choice and social stratification. *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*, 1962, 2, 1, February.
- Ferber, R. Research on household behavior. *The American Economic Review*, 1962, 52, 1, March.
- Fowler, W. Cognitive learning in infancy and early childhood. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 2, March.
- Frank, R. E. Brand choice as a probability process. *The Journal of Business* 1962, 35, 1, January.
- Frijda, N. H., and van de Geer, J. P. Codability and recognition: an experiment with facial expressions. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 5.
- Gagné, R. M. Military training and principles of learning. *American Psychologist*, 1962, 17, 2, February.
- Gagné, R. M., and Smith, E. C., Jr. A study of the effects of verbalization on problem solving. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 1, January.
- Games, P. A. A factorial analysis of verbal learning tasks. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 1, January.
- Gardner, R. A., and Forsythe, J. B. Supplementary Report: Two-choice decision behavior with many alternative events. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 6, December.
- Goetz, B. E., and Bennis, W. G. What we know about learning and training. *Personnel Administration*, 1962, 25, 2, March-April.
- Gogel, W. C. The effect of convergence on perceived size and distance. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.
- Goldstein, M. J., and Himmelfarb, S. Z. The effects of providing knowledge of results upon the perceptual defense effect. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 2, February.
- Griswold, B. J., and Luce, R. D. Choices among uncertain outcomes: A test of a decomposition and two assumptions of transitivity. *The American Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 75, 1, March.
- Gyr, J., Thatcher, J., and Allen, G. Computer

simulation of a model of cognitive organization. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1, January.

Harary, F., and Lipstein, B. The dynamics of brand loyalty: A Markovian approach. *Operations Research*, 1962, 10, 1, January-February.

Holland, H. C. Judgments and the effects of instructions. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 3.

Holt, C. C. Linear decision rules for economic stabilization and growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1962, 76, 1, February.

Haywood, H. C. Novelty-seeking behavior as a function of manifest anxiety and physiological arousal. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.

Jewell, W. S. A linear risk model. *Operational Research Quarterly*, 1961, 12, 4, December.

Kanal, L. A functional equation analysis of two learning models. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.

Kanal, L. The asymptotic distribution for the two-absorbing-barrier beta model. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 1, March.

Kaplan, S. J. Radiation research in psychology: An analysis of techniques in maze experimentation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 2, March.

Karn, H. W., Gregg, L. W., and Pitz, G. F. The effect of systematic and nonsystematic presentation of stimuli on peripheral visual acuity. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

King, H. E. Anticipatory behavior: temporal matching by normal and psychotic subjects. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

Kinkade, R. G., and Kidd, J. S. The use of an operational game as a method of task familiarization. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1962, 46, 1, February.

Koenig, F. W., and King, M. B., Jr. Cognitive simplicity and prejudice. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

Korn, S. J., and Welch, L. Conditioned responses: fact and artifact. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

Krugman, H. E. The learning of consumer preference. *Journal of Marketing*, 1962, 26, 2, April.

Lacey, O. L. The human organism as a random mechanism. *The Journal of General Psychology*, 1962, 66, 2nd half, April.

Lewis, D. J., and Duncan, C. P. Expectation and resistance to extinction under partial reinforcement and risk-taking. *The American Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 75, 1, March.

Lindman, H., and Edwards, W. Supplementary report: Unlearning the gambler's fallacy. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1961, 62, 6, December.

Luce, R. D., and Shipley, E. F. Preference probability between gambles as a step function of event probability. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 1, January.

Luchins, A. S., and Luchins, E. H. The effect of the degree of freedom of choice on learning and perception. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, 2nd half, April.

Mayzner, M. S., and Tresselt, M. E. Verbal concept attainment: a function of the number and strength of positive instances presented. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

Newman, S. E., and Saltz, E. Serial position as a cue in learning. *The American Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 75, 1, March.

Phelan, J. G. An exploration of some personality correlates to business risk-taking behavior. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, 2nd half, April.

Roby, T. B. Utility and futurity. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 2, April.

Roelofs, C. O. Equidistance tendency. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 5.

Rommetveit, R. Perceptual, behavioral and ideational components of discriminatory and conceptual activities. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 3.

Samuel, A. L. Artificial intelligence: A frontier of automation. *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

Schubik, M. Some experimental non-zero sum games with lack of information about the rules. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 2, January.

Singh, S. D., and Singh, V. The effect of stimulant and depressant drugs on the latency of autokinetic illusion. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 5.

Smedslund, J. The utilization of probabilistic cues after 1100 and 4800 stimulus-presentations. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 5.

Spence, D. P., and Bressler, J. Subliminal activation of conceptual associates: a study of "rational" preconscious thinking. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.

Spencer, J. Estimating averages. *Ergonomics*, 1961, 4, 4, October.

Spielberger, C. D., Levin, S. M., and Shepard, M. C. The effects of awareness and attitude toward the reinforcement on the operant conditioning of verbal behavior. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.

Toda, M. The design of a fungus-eater: A model of human behavior in an unsophisticated environment. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 2, April.

Voronin, L. G. Some results of comparative-physiological investigations of higher nervous activity. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 3, May.

Wagner, A. R., and Miller, N. Choice behavior and resistance to extinction. *The Psychological Record*, 1962, 12, 1, January.

Waters, J. E., and Kodman, F., Jr. Abstract conditioning. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

Westfall, R. Psychological factors in predicting product choice. *Journal of Marketing*, 1962, 2, April.

White, L. A. Symboling: a kind of behavior. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

#### Interpersonal Influence

Barth, E. A. T. Community influence systems: Structure and change. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 1, October.

Cohen, A. R. A dissonance analysis of the boomerang effect. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.

Deutsch, M., Krauss, R. M., and Rosenau, N. Dissonance or defensiveness? *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 1, March.

Goldstein, M. J., Himmelfarb, S., and Feder, W. A further study of the relationship between response bias and perceptual defense. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 1, January.

Graham, D. Experimental studies of social influence in simple judgment situations. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, 2nd half, April.

Levitt, E. E., Lubin, B., and Brady, J. P. The effect of the pseudo-volunteer on studies of volunteers for psychology experiments. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1962, 46, 1, February.

McGuire, W. J. Persistence of the resistance to persuasion induced by various types of prior belief defenses. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 4, April.

Manfield, E. Technical change and the rate of imitation. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 4, October.

Richmond, J. F., and Buehler, R. E. Interpersonal communication: A theoretical formulation. *The Journal of Communication*, 1962, 12, 1, March.

Thumin, F. J. What psychologists should know about marketing and advertising research. *The Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 53, April.

#### Group Behavior

Albert, R. S., and Brigante, T. R. The psychology of friendship relations: Social factors. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, February.

Blau, P. M. Patterns of choice in interpersonal relations. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.

Blake, R. R., and Mouton, J. S. Overvaluation of own group's product in intergroup competition. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 3, March.

Calvin, A. D. Social reinforcement. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, February.

Cleveland, S. E., and Morton, R. B. Group behavior and body image: a follow-up study. *Human Relations*, 1962, 15, 1, February.

Cohen, A. M. Changing small-group communi-

cation networks. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 6, 4, March.

Fishman, J. A. Some social and psychological determinants of intergroup relations in changing neighborhoods: An introduction to the Bridgeview study. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 1, October.

Gallo, P. S., and Mc Clintock, C. G. Behavioral, attitudinal, and perceptual differences between leaders and non-leaders in situations of group support and non-support. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, February.

Gidwani, K. A., Valunjkar, T. N., and Chowdry, K. Leader behavior in elected and non-elected groups. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 1, Spring.

Harsanyi, J. C. Measurement of social power in n-person reciprocal power situations. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1 January.

Harsanyi, J. C. Measurement of social power, opportunity costs, and the theory of two-person bargaining games. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1, January.

Hoffman, L. R., Harburg, E., and Maier, N. R. F. Differences and disagreement as factors in creative group problem solving. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 3, March.

Howells, L. T., and Becker, S. W. Seating arrangement and leadership emergence. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 2, February.

Lerner, M. J., and Becker, S. Interpersonal choice as a function of ascribed similarity and definition of the situation. *Human Relations*, 1962, 15, 1, February.

Maier, N. R. F., and Hoffman, L. R. Group decision in England and the United States. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, Spring.

Rapoport, A., Chammah, A., Dwyer, J., and Gyr, J. Three-person non-zero-sum nonnegotiable games. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1, January.

Rapoport, A., and Orwant, C. Experimental games: A review. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1, January.

Shapley, L. S. Simple games: An outline of the descriptive theory. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1, January.

Snoek, J. D. Some effects of rejection upon attraction to a group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 3, March.

Theodorson, G. A. The function of hostility in small groups. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, February.

Tuckman, J., and Lorge, I. Individual ability as a determinant of group superiority. *Human Relations*, 1962, 15, 1, February.

Turk, T., and Turk, H. Group interaction in a formal setting: The case of the triad. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.

Weinstein, E. A., and Geisel, P. N. Family de-



cision making over desegregation. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.

Wilson, K. V., and Bixenstine, V. E. Forms of social control in two-person, two-choice games. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 1, January.

Ziller, R. C., Behringer, R. D., and Goodchilds, J. D. Group creativity under conditions of success or failure and variations in group stability. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1962, 46, 1, February.

#### Organizational Behavior

Ashburn, A. Detroit automation. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

Buckingham, W. The great employment controversy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

Collett, M. J. Simulation as a management development tool. *Personnel Administration*, 1962, 25, 2, March-April.

Daniels, M. J. Levels of organization in the role position of the staff nurse. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

Diebold, J. The application of information technology. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

Emery, F. E. Heuristic models of the marketing process. *Human Relations*, 1962, 15, 1, February.

Emery, F. E., and Marek, J. Some socio-technical aspects of automation. *Human Relations*, 1962, 15, 1, February.

Erbe, W. Gregariousness, group membership, and the flow of information. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Faunce, W. A., Hardin, E., and Jacobson, E. H. Automation and the employee. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

Feinberg, M. R., and Lefkowitz, J. Image of industrial psychology among corporate executives. *American Psychologist*, 1962, 17, 2, February.

Ferguson, C. E., and Pfouts, R. W. Learning and expectations in dynamic duopoly behavior. *Behavioral Science*, 1962, 7, 2, April.

Fisch, G. G. Organization center analysis. *Business Quarterly*, 1961, 26, 4, Winter.

Forehand, G. A., and Guetzkow, H. Judgment and decision-making activities of government executives as described by superiors and co-workers. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 3, April.

Fouraker, L. E., and Harnett, D. L. An experimental disposition of alternative bilateral monopoly models under conditions of price leadership. *Operations Research*, 1962, 10, 1, January-February.

Guetzkow, H., Forehand, G. A., and James, B. J. An evaluation of educational influence on

administrative judgment. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 6, 4, March.

Harris, C. C., Jr., and DeLoach, D. B. Profit motive: A stimulant to federal administrative efficiency? *Public Administration Review*, 1962, 22, 1, Winter.

Harris, E. F., and Fleishman, E. A. Patterns of leadership behavior related to employee grievances and turnover. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, Spring.

Katzell, R. A. Contrasting systems of work organization. *American Psychologist*, 1962, 17, 2, February.

Kornhauser, A. Mental health of factory workers: A Detroit study. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 1, Spring.

Litwak, E., and Hylton, L. F. Interorganizational analysis: A hypothesis on co-ordinating agencies. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 6, 4, March.

Marcson, S. Organization and authority in industrial research. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 1, October.

Parker, J. P. Some organizational variables and their effect upon comprehension. *The Journal of Communication*, 1962, 12, 1, March.

Peabody, R. L. Perceptions of organizational authority: A comparative analysis. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 6, 4, March.

Pearlin, L. I., and Rosenberg, M. Nurse-patient social distance and the structural context of a mental hospital. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.

Read, W. H. Upward communication in industrial hierarchies. *Human Relations*, 1962, 15, 1, February.

Reintjes, J. F. The intellectual foundations of automation. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

Rim, Y. Dimensions of job incentives and personality. *ACTA Psychologica*, 1961, 18, 5.

Roth, J. A. "Management bias" in the study of medical treatment. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 1, Spring.

Shubik, M. Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 3, April.

Speroff, B. J. Automation and human relations: Some problems and predictions. *Personnel Administration*, 1962, 25, 2, March-April.

Sprowls, R. C., and Asimow, M. A model of customer behavior for the Task manufacturing corporation. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 3, April.

Stanton, E. S. Which approach to management-democratic, authoritarian or . . . ? *Personnel Administration*, 1962, 25, 2, March-April.

Stout, T. M. Process control: Past, present, and

future. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

Whisler, T. L., and Shultz, G. P. Automation and the management process. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1962, 340, March.

#### Voting Behavior

Dempsey, Paul. Liberalism-conservatism and party loyalty in the U. S. Senate. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 56, 2nd half, April.

Horton, J. E., and Thompson, W. E. Powerlessness and political negativism: A study of defeated local referendums. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Lustig, N. I. The relationships between demographic characteristics and pro-integration vote of white precincts in a metropolitan southern county. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

Middleton, R. The civil rights issue and presidential voting among southern negroes and whites. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

Searles, R., and Williams, J. A. Jr. Negro college students' participation in sit-ins. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

#### Culture and Institutions

Ball, H. V., Simpson, G. E., and Ikeda, K. Law and social change: Sumner reconsidered. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Becker, E. Socialization, command of performance, and mental illness. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Berkowitz, L., and Green, J. A. The stimulus qualities of the scapegoat. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 4, April.

Bornstein, M. The Soviet price system. *The American Economic Review*, 1962, 52, 1, March.

Bose, S. P. Peasant values and innovation in India. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Catton, W. R., Jr., and Hong, S. C. The relation of apparent minority ethnocentrism to majority antipathy. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 2, April.

Chenery, H. B., Shishido, S., and Watanabe, T. The pattern of Japanese growth, 1914-1954. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 1, January.

Christensen, H. T., and Carpenter, G. R. Value-behavior discrepancies regarding premarital coitus in three western cultures. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.

deCharms, R., and Moeller, G. H. Values expressed in American Children's readers: 1800-1950. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1962, 64, 2, February.

Emerson, R. M. Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.

Greenfield, R. W. Factors associated with attitudes toward desegregation in a Florida residential suburb. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 1, October.

Gusfield, J. R. Mass society and extremist politics. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.

Hughes, E. C. Ethnocentric sociology. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 1, October.

Kogan, N., and Shelton, F. C. Beliefs about "old people:" a comparative study of older and younger samples. *The Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1962, 100, 1st half, March.

Kornai, J., and Liptak, T. A mathematical investigation of some economic effects of profit sharing in socialist firms. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 1, January.

Kriesberg, L. The bases of occupational prestige: The case of dentists. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 2, April.

Kubat, D. Soviet theory of classes. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 1, October.

Medalia, N. Z. Myrdal's assumptions on race relations: A conceptual commentary. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

Mowrer, E. R. Sequential and class variables of the family in the suburban area. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 2, December.

Musgrove, F. The educational and geographical background of some local leaders. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1961, 12, 4, December.

Nye, F. I. Maternal employment and marital interaction: Some contingent conditions. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 2, December.

Pasamanick, B. Comparative psychological studies of negroes and whites in the United States: a clarification. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 3, May.

Peck, R. F., and Galliani, C. Intelligence, ethnicity and social roles in adolescent society. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.

Remmling, G. W. Karl Mannheim: Revision of an intellectual portrait. *Social Forces*, 1961, 40, 1, October.

Ross, H. L. Reasons for moves to and from a central city area. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

Rowntree, G., and Pierce, R. M. Birth control in Britain. *Population Studies*, 1961, 15, 1, July.

Roy, P. The measurement of assimilation: The Spokane Indians. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Sommer, R. The distance for comfortable conversation: A further study. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 1, March.

Stub, H. R. The occupational characteristics of

migrants to Duluth: A retest of Rose's migration hypothesis. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 1, February.

Thomas, E. M. Reinspecting a structural position on occupational prestige. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 5, March.

Vallier, I. Structural differentiation, produc-

tion imperatives and communal norms: The kibbutz in crisis. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 3, March.

Walters, A. A. The theory and measurement of private and social cost of highway congestion. *Econometrica*, 1961, 29, 4, October.

Waterman, A. The National Science Foundation. *Impact of Science on Society* 1961, 11, 4.

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process.* EDITED BY WALTER F. MURPHY AND C. HERMAN PRITCHETT. (New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. xviii, 707. \$4.95.)

Where Francis Heller (*Introduction to Constitutional Law*, 1952) and then Glendon Schubert (*Constitutional Politics*, 1960) proved the relevance of non-case material to casebooks in constitutional law, Murphy and Pritchett show the appropriateness of cases to a book of readings in the nature of the judicial process. Since these amount to almost a third of the items in the book and are marvelously revealing of the judicial process, I conclude that opinions in court cases will always remain central in the study of public law! Cases are not strictly parallel to statutes in being the end product of comparable processes, as is sometimes asserted nowadays. Cases are more than that if only in the many instances where judges relate factors that pushed them toward one decision rather than another.

This book reflects the tension between old and new ways in which political scientists and lawyers look at law. The new ways are at least as old as Holmes' *Common Law* and the old as new as the latest editorial piety that the Constitution is what the Framers said it was. Murphy and Pritchett, like many of the rest of us, find "there are many ways of looking at law and at the function of judges" and this is the feeling that marks their book. Yet they gesture toward current political science ideology by saying, awkwardly enough, that their book attempts "a behavioristic kind of analysis." Further, "we have heard much talk of the governmental process, the administrative process, the legislative process. The process type of analysis contrasts generally with the institutional approach, in which attention is centered on governmental structures and their legal status, functions and powers. Process analysis professes to go beyond the appearance to the reality, beyond the legal facade to the actual operating mechanism." But having made this bow the editors do not rely heavily on the work of political scientists who have recently sought unique approaches to the judicial process. These are by no

means absent but they are not a prominent feature of the book and, moreover, Murphy and Pritchett do not themselves provide a behavioral overview of the subject.

What the book does is to give an eclectic view, a catholic view of American law, chiefly at the Supreme Court level, in relation to the rest of the political landscape. Juxtaposition of contrasting viewpoints, the staple of successful anthologies, is exquisitely achieved at a number of points: Joseph Perry's fresh "How I Got to Be a Federal Judge" next to the Brennan Hearings; Justice Frankfurter's appraisal of the 28 men who came on the Supreme Court without any prior judicial experience next to the Talmadge bill that would require Supreme Court justices to have five years of judicial service; Charles P. Curtis and Henry S. Drinker debating the ethics of advocacy; and Jack Greenberg and Edmond Cahn disagreeing on the social science testimony in the *School Segregation Cases*. Excerpts from seven decisions in Virgil Hawkins' case give one instance of several where the editors pursue a point to its logical (or illogical) end.

*Courts, Judges and Politics* is most clearly suited to undergraduate instruction in political science for several reasons. It is organized in a common-sense way, by topics, to illustrate the variety of conditions that hedge or help judicial action in the United States. It provides introductory essays that will give any student his bearings and fill the cracks among the readings. These essays, 18 in number in addition to the preface, treat theories of the judicial role, the characteristics of state and federal judicial systems, attributes and relations between bar and bench, and access to and sources of judicial review in a democratic government, among others. A collection of readings from Presidential statements, press conferences, messages and letters; from proposed bills, hearings, speeches on the floor of Congress, and statutes; from judicial opinions, court rules and *ex cathedra* writings of justices and judges; and from a range of academic sources the book reflects the range and diversity of the subject. It amply shows that the courts cannot be unzipped for study, apart from the fabric of

society and its government. This is a book that opens many vistas, tells something about each one and indicates that there is yet more to learn. And since individual readings and their relation to others are often exciting, the book will doubtless capture the interest of many students.

The success achieved by Murphy and Pritchett in introducing students to the romance of the subject of judicial politics may possibly make this book inappropriate for graduate students. At least this is a deficiency I see when the book is measured by Whitehead's admonition that the stage of precision should follow that of romance. It fails in at least three ways to serve the interest of advanced students. First, it does not attempt a systematic framework for analysis in spite of the announced aim of contributing to the literature of political behavior. Second, it does not sufficiently mark out the historical dimensions of the topics under study. For one thing there is no indication on the face of the book that about 85 of the 125 odd readings are post-World War II. For another the underlying social, economic and political forces that have influenced the law in this period are not stressed. Third, the selections have been edited so that countless ellipses mark the textual cuts and an apology covers the omitted footnotes. This makes the book far less serviceable than it would otherwise be to serious students. The modern judicial craftsmanship of Black and Frankfurter is concealed by such omissions. This is all the more striking when we read Congressman Patman's charge of the influence of law reviews in Supreme Court citations. Academic craftsmanship is also marred when only parts, and not those dealing with methodology, of a Fowler Harper certiorari article and a Schubert game-theory article are included in a book of readings.

In sum, I think that full documentation is desirable in a book of readings on the judicial process to be used by advanced students. But Murphy and Pritchett have created an excellent, readable, exciting book on the key topics on the relation of politics to courts and judges.—CLEMENT E. VOSE, *Wesleyan University*.

*A Century of Civil Rights*. By MILTON R. KONVITZ—WITH A STUDY OF *State Law Against Discrimination* BY THEODORE LESKES. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. VIII, 272. \$6.00.)

Though the title implies more, this is a book on racial discrimination. The first part by Professor Konvitz is mainly a historical survey of developments at the federal level. The second part by Mr. Leskes supplies a similar survey at the state level. The materials used consist principally of statutes and court decisions. These are carefully

analyzed and their significance assessed. Inevitably in such a work there is included, as in a bride's raiment, "something old and something new." The authors' combined efforts supply the reader with sufficient detail to enable him to follow the main lines of policy, both state and national, that mark attempts to overcome this problem.

The problem of civil rights is, of course, a matter of deep concern to Professor Konvitz. Much of his latest work covers familiar ground. Especially is this true of the content analysis of the Civil War amendments, the five congressional statutes enacted thereunder between 1866 and 1875 and the Supreme Court decision in the *Civil Rights Cases* that discarded most of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. All of this is a familiar story often told with greater detail than Professor Konvitz here attempts. More recent developments are possibly less well known. Of these, analyses are made of the recommendations of the President's Committee on Civil Rights (1947), the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the report of the Commission on Civil Rights created under this law, the Civil Rights Act of 1960, and the Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*.

Probably Professor Konvitz's most novel and interesting contributions are contained in the opening chapter in which he analyses the philosophical background of slavery and in chapter five where he speculates about the constitutionality of student sit-ins. The philosophical analysis traces the conflict between the institution of slavery and the idea of humanity from ancient times down to the present. The ancients believed that to be civilized one had to be a slaveholder and that slave ownership demanded brutality. These views were first challenged by the idea of humanity, with its emphasis on the dignity of the individual, that appeared first among the ancient Hebrews. It has taken over two thousand years for humanistic views to overcome pro-slavery views in the western world. The relevance of this to the American scene is apparent when the point is stressed that the American South removed itself from the mainstream of western thought and its conditioning influence. Slavery, to the southerner, was judged more in terms of race than economics. To him, a slave was not human, or if human, he was of an inferior species. This key difference accounts for the intransigence of the South against manumission and its willingness to adopt extreme repressive measures the residue of which still lingers on.

Student sit-ins present a delicate legal problem because they raise the issue of what action is "state" and what is "private." Professor Konvitz argues that repression of student sit-ins is "state" action and therefore unconstitutional. Clearly state legislation or municipal ordinances denying

Negroes access to places of public accommodation are void. The suggestion is also made that it is "state" action when proprietors of public places refuse service to Negroes merely in conformity with state and local custom. If these propositions are accepted, then the use of police to enforce either the state's or proprietor's race policy becomes state action and hence void. Chief support for this view is found in the restrictive covenant cases. A subsidiary argument is based on the doctrine of *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* that voids acts of enforcement of a valid law when racial discrimination is involved. These are reasonable arguments, but who would predict that they will impress the courts? Possibly those who employ statistics to analyze judicial behavior can give us some advance word.

Mr. Leskes, in slightly less than half of the book, makes a historical survey of state laws against discrimination and their interpretation by state courts. Since public attention tends to be focused more completely on federal than on state action, this portion of the book may, for most readers, prove to be the more informative. State laws and their interpretation by state courts are analyzed with reference to places of accommodation, fair employment practices, fair educational practices and fair housing practices. Approximately one half of the states now have laws on one or more of these subjects. A quick count reveals that Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Washington and Oregon have shown the greatest concern. These are followed closely by Michigan, Wisconsin, California and Colorado. While state courts have generally upheld these laws, they have shown some tendency to construe them narrowly. Mr. Leskes feels that the increasing tendency to place enforcement of antidiscrimination laws in the hands of administrators rather than courts will yield better results through the substitution of education and negotiation for prosecution as means of enforcement.

This book is a clear and concise analysis of the major efforts in the United States to overcome discrimination. It is not concerned with the even more extensive efforts, especially in the South, to preserve discrimination. While the authors' preferences are clear enough, the text is devoid of disputation or critical comment. Scholars, and especially the general reader, will find the book to be a most useful reference.—GLENN G. WILTSEY, *University of Rochester*.

*Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative.* By JAMES A. ROBINSON. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962, Pp. x, 262. \$5.50.)

One of the standard commonplaces in discus-

sions of the separation of powers system of the United States is the observation that the policy role of the Congress has declined in the twentieth century compared to that of the executive. Woodrow Wilson was appalled at the dominance of Congress in policy-making at the beginning of the century; and, though he himself contributed to it, he might have been equally concerned had he viewed the pre-eminence of the Presidency at mid-century. Thoughtful students of the American policy-making process are troubled about the proper roles of the Congress and the executive in an era of harrowing domestic and international crises and of the complexity of problems, issues and alternatives.

It is in this connection that the present book makes a constructive addition to our understanding. James Robinson selects for investigation a policy arena which has traditionally involved the primacy of the President, that of foreign policy. He observes the subordinate role of Congress in foreign policy-making vis-à-vis the President, concisely accounts for it, and then proceeds in a workmanlike fashion to dissect the patterns of influence within the Congress to the extent that it does affect the total foreign policy process.

In developing the theme that the primary influence of Congress in foreign policy is that of legitimating and amending policies originating with the executive partly because of "the changing character of the information or intelligence needs in modern policy-making," Professor Robinson employs a variety of data neatly tied together. He utilizes case studies, interviews with congressmen who occupied foreign policy positions during the 85th Congress, interviews with State Department liaison officers, and the personal and official papers of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, as well as the papers of other key figures in the foreign policy process since the New Deal. The book represents the employment of these varieties of materials blended together in a sophisticated way.

In terms of data utilization, it seems to me that the book makes its outstanding contribution in the manner in which case studies are made the basis of part of the analysis. Robinson presents, in capsulated form, twenty-two cases of foreign policy-making since 1933, from neutrality legislation to the Cuban decision in 1961. Special attention is given to the Monroney Resolution of 1958 as the clearest case of congressional initiative in foreign policy among those examined. The cases are presented, not simply for cumulative or illustrative purposes, however, but for their relevance either in suggesting or testing hypotheses about the behavior of policy-makers in the sphere of foreign policy.

From the viewpoint of findings, I found most

interesting the analysis of the relationships between Congress and the State Department as a communications network. Professor Robinson hypothesizes that the more satisfied congressmen who play foreign policy roles are with inter-institutional information processes, the more likely they will approve Department policy. He finds three information processes significantly correlated with policy approval: satisfaction with responses to requests for foreign policy information, satisfaction with the Department's record for voluntarily furnishing foreign affairs information, and perception of weight given congressional opinion in Departmental decision-making. Further, his data suggest that congressional satisfaction with the information process may be more important for the congressmen whose party affiliation differs from that of the President than for the members of the President's own party. This suggests, says Professor Robinson, "that information processes and satisfaction with them may be an important element in establishing and maintaining bipartisan foreign policies."

The author is worried about the secondary, and still declining, role of Congress in the foreign policy process. While he recognizes and gives attention to some important ways in which the Congress has sought to retain some semblance of initiative in foreign policy-making, he suggests improvements in congressional organization and procedure so as to strengthen its initiating function. He agrees, after thoughtful consideration of its latent effects, with the proposal of the Brookings Institution that a National Security Policy Committee be created, as a joint committee either replacing or supplementing the work of present congressional committees, in order to facilitate coordination of foreign policy considerations. He urges greater centralization of leadership in the House and Senate, lamenting the passing of Lyndon Johnson's central role in the Senate and proposing transfer of coordinating powers in the House from the Rules Committee to the majority party leadership. Finally, he advocates increasing the size and professionalization of committee staffs, primarily to permit independent congressional study of long-range foreign policy objectives.

Here is a book both methodologically and substantively stimulating and thoughtful, clearly written, well-edited and printed, sweetened by the addition of three engaging appendices, and capped with an impressively extensive bibliography. It is a book to be highly recommended.—SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, *State University of Iowa*.

*History of the House of Representatives.* BY GEORGE B. GALLOWAY. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1962. Pp. xii, 333. Price \$7.50.)

Rich in content, clearly and interestingly written, *History of the House of Representatives* succeeds in what it purports to do— "... to promote understanding of our national House of Representatives, where the public's business is performed."

By introducing the reader to the House of Representatives through a series of questions which confronted the writers of the United States Constitution, Mr. Galloway captures the interest of students of government and laymen alike. For among the problems encountered at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were questions so fundamental to our governmental philosophy that some of the governmental problems familiar to today's reader are the same questions raised in 1787 in different form.

The question of "What qualifications should be required of those who were to elect the Congress?" is currently raised in the literacy test bill initiated by the President and filibustered in the Senate. To the question "Should the members of the first branch of the national legislature be elected by the people or by the state legislatures?" one may answer that the House of Representatives is popularly elected, but present overrepresentation of rural areas raises the question of reapportioning seats to follow the population shift to urban areas. This, of course, has just been done, to some extent, based on the 1960 census, but ideal reapportionment certainly has not been achieved. To the question regarding the method of selecting the President we know that the original intention that the President be elected in most instances, not by the Electoral College, but by the House of Representatives found fulfillment only twice. But currently the question is raised in terms of electing the President by a popular majority instead of by a majority of the votes cast in the Electoral College.

Not only does this volume present a comprehensive history of the House of Representatives, but in it one finds factual data analyzed and telescoped in such a manner that one feels the relatedness of historical events to contemporary House practice and procedure. The line of development appears to depict movement from one stage to, in some instances, another almost inevitably logical stage of development. The chapter on the "Evolution of House Rules" is one such example.

Of particular interest to a reader who wishes to know about the relationship that exists between a representative and his constituents in a republican form of government is the chapter on "The Role of the Representative." This is another very basic question, yet unresolved in our system, and unresolved in the book. Should the representative reflect the wishes of his constituents, or should he vote according to his own beliefs and principles, or should he weigh the competing interests with

each other and effect a compromise? According to the opinions cited in the book regarding the representative's view of his relationship to his constituency, more voiced the opinion that voters are to be listened to rather than to be followed. The representative is to vote his own belief, based not necessarily upon moral or ethical principles, but based upon a regard for the general welfare of the whole country. This is a vague, amorphous concept, difficult if at all possible to ascertain. It would appear that the general welfare, in the final analysis, is a concept based upon the individual representative's personal attitudes and opinions which are influenced by his desire for reelection.

Added to the text are ten valuable appendices which facilitate finding some specific information such as the number of laws enacted by each Congress since 1789 and the names of the Clerks of the House of Representatives.

In this volume we are given an over-all view of the history of the House of Representatives, not a jargon-ridden text nor a dry, technically detailed account of the history and workings of the first branch of the national legislature. The book is flavorful, informative, and useful.—Lois B. MORELAND, *Spelman College*.

*Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics.* By AARON WILDAVSKY. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 351. \$6.75.)

This book has two main parts, either of which, with some editorial doctoring, might stand by itself. The first is a detailed history of the complicated Dixon-Yates controversy; and the second is a concluding chapter in which Wildavsky, in effect, backs off, looks at what he has written, and asks what may be learned from it.

The history of Dixon-Yates, although not easy to follow, is a scholarly summary of a huge quantity of data and will be very useful to historians and others interested in the details of the controversy. More casual readers may wonder whether the benefit received is worth the effort required to grasp the intricate account, but the history does convey a sense of the complexity of governmental decision-making and should appeal to teachers on that ground.

The concluding chapter contains some provocative ideas and is likely to be the most interesting part of the book to the majority of readers. One of these ideas is that the degree of inhibition exerted by stereotypes upon decision-makers' perceptions is likely to vary from one kind of issue to another. Decision-makers may look at a novel issue with fresh eyes and may perceive the relevant information available to them. But when they confront old and hard-fought issues they may draw upon a stock of prefabricated attitudes assumed to include all that can be appropriate.

Wildavsky's hypothesis is that the Eisenhower Administration's inability to perceive a conflict of interest in the Dixon-Yates negotiations resulted from the fact that the battle of public vs. private power had been fought for so long and so bitterly that they, like the public power people, had accumulated a kind of standard kit of attitudes. The author suggests that there is likely to be an inverse relationship between the freshness of a decision-maker's approach to an issue and the duration and intensity of previous public conflict over the question.

I am not certain whether Wildavsky sees the use of AEC as the agent for buying Dixon-Yates power as the result of a choice between alternatives. But his evidence suggests that the Administration's assumption that it had some kind of responsibility to meet the power needs of Memphis was the crucial element in the employment of AEC. Although Wildavsky tells us nothing about the origin of this feeling of responsibility for Memphis, once the Administration accepted it (whether or not as the result of a considered choice), then the use of AEC and Dixon-Yates followed as a matter of course, since the Administration was ideologically opposed to expansion of TVA and surmised that it could not get TVA to buy Dixon-Yates power. The question of whether a decision, in the sense of a choice, was actually made is, of course, one that often comes up in studies of decision-making. As Raymond Bauer has written in an unpublished memorandum, "... accepted resolutions of [issues] X and Y may rule out all but one resolution of issue Z, so that when the parties begin to discuss Z they find that without intending to do so they have already taken a stand on Z."

To Wildavsky the ultimate decision of Memphis to build its own plant is an example of the superiority of a decision reached through group conflict over one hierarchically determined and imposed. The Dixon-Yates scheme was the first choice only of the Administration and Dixon-Yates; but the decision of Memphis, although the first choice of only one participant, was the second choice of all the rest. It was the solution that satisfied the widest range of preferences, and I judge that the range of preferences satisfied is Wildavsky's measure of the public interest.—OWEN STRATTON, *Wellesley College*.

*The Political World of American Zionism.* By SAMUEL HALPERIN. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961. Pp. IX, 431. \$8.00.)

This analytical survey, primarily concerned with Zionist efforts to win the support of our Jewish citizenry, should be of considerable interest to Americans of all religious persuasions.

Samuel Halperin provides us with a much needed objective study of developments in the

United States which were instrumental to the creation of Israel. Concentrating on the period 1929-1948 and beginning with the reactions to the Palestinian Arab riots of 1929, he shows how the Jewish community was slowly won over to accepting the views of Theodor Herzl. In 1896 Herzl "transfigured" the Jewish world with his thesis (in *The Jewish State*) that an independent Jewish nation was absolutely necessary if extinction of the culture and of its contribution to humanity was to be avoided.

The majority of American Jews, and their social and religious organizations, were not easily convinced. Until the community fully comprehended the enormity of the horrors being perpetrated by Nazi Germany, it was seriously divided on the question of supporting the Zionist political goal of a new Jewish Commonwealth. Committed, now as then, to a full espousal of this democracy, the heterogeneous leadership procrastinated. Only the Nazi blood-bath shocked it into a change of position, to ensure the salvation of the remnants of European Jewry.

Jewry's spiritual conception of Zion has been and remains quite apart from modern *Zionism*. A longing to be proud and free once again, near holy Mount Zion, was a dream sustaining displaced Hebrews for two thousand years. Dispersed like beads from a broken necklace they made their prayers for deliverance from wandering and oppression a rock of their faith. Behind that cherished vision is seemingly endless suffering, documented in the pages of histories which trace the inhumanity of man to man.

Regarding Zionist programs of this century, each of the three main branches of Judaism in the United States—Orthodox, Conservative and Reform—were cautious about converting the spiritual conception into the practical reality of a new Jewish state. That caution was manifested by considerable divisions amongst the faithful reflecting such divergent reactions as zealous adherence to Zionist programs, luke-warm agreement in principle, and positive anti-Zionist activities.

Professor Halperin deserves commendation for taking an emotionally-charged subject and treating it with scholarly precision and detachment. There is much value in his application of basic principles evolved by contemporary political scientists. He tests his material against the findings of specialists in the public opinion, propaganda, pressure groups and social psychology fields. The author avoids the temptation to take sides. He keeps to his promise that the "only moral I would impart . . . is that the associations observed constitute a legitimate segment of the American political scene and, as such, are to be neither condemned nor praised, but studied and understood."

Not the least consequential contribution of this research, is that it provides evidence that the overwhelming majority of American Jews finally came to espouse the Zionist cause in order to secure a haven for their co-religionists *outside* of the United States. They could not ignore their humane sentiments or the teachings of Jefferson and Jackson and Lincoln. They could not ignore the fact that the peril point had been passed by too many millions in Europe. Israel emerged out of tragedy, partly as a triumph of the Zionist movement. Sadly, that triumph, in large measure, was based on a social affliction cursing all mankind.—BERNARD RUBIN, *Boston University*.

*The Farmer's Dilemma*. By STANLEY ANDREWS. (Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. vii, 184. Price \$4.50.)

Mr. Stanley Andrews has attempted an answer to one of the tantalizing mysteries of the American scene. How can the American farmer be so abundantly productive and yet in almost continual, and worsening, economic straits? He answers this question in a well-written, interesting style. It is plain to the reader just where Andrews stands on this matter of "the farm problem." What he has to say has already been said many times before, for the most part, but his exposition is lucid and logical. The lay person would be well-advised to give this book a careful reading.

Andrews describes the farmer's dilemma in familiar fashion. The commercial farmer is one of the main remnants of our ostensibly competitive economy. Within this environment he is trying to maximize his profit. To do so, he attempts to reduce production costs by the efficient utilization of capital and technological improvements. Improved credit facilities, seeds, fertilizers, cultivation practices and the like have been employed and the farmer's rate of economic growth has clearly exceeded that of urban industry. Nevertheless, within about the last 40 years, the commercial farmer has only been prosperous when the nation has been at war, or in the early post-war years. Relative food costs to the consumer, in terms of his per capita income, have rather constantly decreased; meanwhile the cost-price squeeze has been slowly strangling the farmer.

The dilemma of the low-income farmer is of a different type. Price support programs are of little real value to him. Improved public credit has, to a very limited extent, helped improve his condition. The odds are strongly against him, however. If he moves to the city—which he has done and will continue to do—he is ill-prepared to enter into the skilled labor market or into a white collar job, so his economic position is about as weak as before.

Andrews describes what the federal government



has done, particularly since 1929, to try to improve the conditions of both the commercial and the low-income farmers. He has been directly and importantly involved in the farm politics of the United States during the last 30-odd years, so he brings some new insights into an already well-told story. His analysis of the farm export programs is especially useful and challenging. In the immediate post-World War II period he was director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations in the U. S. Department of Agriculture. He concludes that our export programs have been basically "dumping" programs. We had to get rid of the mounting agricultural surpluses or cut back drastically on the production thereof. Congress and the farm organizations took the easier path—in the short run—and let the U. S. Treasury pay the bill in the form of Public Law 480 and other programs of that type.

Andrews does believe there is value in the export programs and in the domestic legislation which brought about the school lunch, special milk, and food stamp programs. In the area of foreign policy, the export programs have been downright harmful in some instances, clearly helpful in others. Andrews' insightful comments about our food policies relative to India, Pakistan, the southeast Asian countries, and Yugoslavia probably constitute the most original contribution the book has to make.

Why have the attempts on the part of the federal government to improve the farmer's economic condition been so costly and yet only minimally successful? Andrews answers that question accurately, in my opinion. First, for political reasons there has always been considerable "slip-page" in the farm programs: too many loopholes, so to speak, for the farmers to take advantage of, legally to be sure. Secondly, the farm cooperatives have not developed the kind and amount of bargaining power which the farmer needs in order to be in an equal power position with those from whom he buys and those to whom he sells.

Andrews believes that there are two alternative courses of action regarding the future of farming in America. Either the federal government steps out of the scene, at least in terms of meaningful price supports and production controls; or the federal government provides the farmer with price and income assistance which can be of some real economic value to him, for which the farmer will—if he chooses to do so by referendum—cut back substantially on his production. Either we will move to an "estate-based agriculture" in which our food will be produced by some 300,000–500,000 farms; or, we will legislate a supply-management program which will enable the "family farm" to survive and prosper. His choice is clearly for the second alternative.

To bring about the kind of an American agriculture which he considers to be in our national interest, Andrews states eight "fundamental problems" which will have to be resolved. His proposed "national farm policy" cannot be delved into in any detail here, but it resembles, to an important extent, the proposals made by President Kennedy to Congress in early 1962. He calls for "market allotments," "adequate" national food reserves for emergency purposes, an international "food bank," a "sound" international trade policy for agricultural products, more emphasis on assistance to low-income farmers, "fair food prices" to the consumers, farmer-choice in regards to the two alternative programs and—if the supply management route is accepted—farmer-administration of them, and certain structural changes in the bureaucracy of the USDA. All this will have to be sought for, he notes, in a period of declining farmer political power!

This book needs an index, but, much more importantly, it needs to be read.—ROSS B. TALBOT, *Iowa State University*.

*The Development of the Social Security Act.* By EDWIN E. WITTE with a foreword by FRANCES PERKINS. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Pp. xix, 220. \$5.75.)

This volume is a posthumous publication. The manuscript was originally prepared in 1936 at the request of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, but for some reason it remained for more than twenty-five years in the typescript stage, on deposit in the University of Wisconsin and Social Security Administration libraries. In its published form, the book consists of two parts. Part I, entitled "General History of Committee and Act," is a case study highlighting the principal personalities and political relationships involved in the formulation of the organic statute which laid the foundations of American social insurance and welfare policy. The immediate story starts in February, 1934, when the first Wagner-Lewis bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, but the major part begins with the President's message to Congress in June and the appointment of the author as Executive Director of the Committee on Economic Security in July. From that point until the signing of the bill a year later on August 14, 1935, the memorandum is an "instructive lesson in political dynamics, illustrating the interplay of ideas and interests within an Administration, the relations between the President and key persons in Congress (as well as their respective staffs), and the responsiveness of government to political pressures."

Part II, "Provisions of the Social Security Act," describes in detail how and why the major

technical policy provisions of the law came to be written. The presentation is so similar in pattern and style to Part I that it is not clear to the reader why the two were not woven together. Presumably Dr. Witte was responding to different audiences and historical interests, and thought that clarity of the record would be promoted by making the differentiation. At all events, our published literature on the legislative process is now enriched by an outstanding example of participant observation at the highest policy level.

While the book can be accurately described as a legislative case history, it is much more than that. It gives a picture of a remarkable man at work, an expert in the field of labor and social insurance who was also skilled in the arts of research direction, interagency negotiation, legislative counselling, and continuous political mediation and coordination. Witte was called to Washington from a lifetime of work in state government and university teaching to act as secretary of a cabinet committee, a representative advisory council, at the same time directing a research staff and coordinating its work with the deliberations of a high-powered Technical Board of government experts in economic security. Under Executive Order 6757 (June 29, 1934), the (Cabinet) Committee on Economic Security was to report its recommendations within four months, (December 1). Considering the novelty, range and complexity of the problems, in retrospect it is truly amazing that this machinery was put into operation, the report delivered by December 24, and the President's message transmitting the Administration's program and draft legislation sent to Congress by January 17, 1935. There is a model here of one type of policy-formulating strategy in American national government, together with an account of the differences of opinion and principle among the experts that get mixed up with departmental interests and Congressional alignments to obstruct even the best-laid plans. Dr. Witte's analysis of the Advisory Council on Social Security points up the basic difficulties underlying the concept of group representation in politics, although he is careful to point out that group consultation is not only essential but highly constructive, when properly planned and competently conducted. Finally one is given an insight into the peculiar American legislative practice of giving technical assistance and political credit to politicians who oppose bills, thereby securing their support in ultimate passage.

With respect to the substantive issues of social insurance, the reader will find here authoritative explanations of why the same law provides for a wholly federal old age insurance system, a tax-

offset scheme of federally-financed, state-established and administered unemployment compensation, and statutory grants-in-aid to states for the several categories of public assistance. The tax actuarial problems of social insurance are treated in a political rather than a technical perspective, which is simply to say the issues are described in the context as the responsible decision-makers visualized them rather than in the language of economics and insurance. There is no fictitious Congressional "Intent" or "Will" here; there are only persons acting in official and group capacities who took positions and, under political pressures, made agreements out of which public policy was forged.

It is a pleasure to note that two political scientists, Thomas H. Eliot and Joseph P. Harris, find frequent recognition throughout the pages of the book.—AVERY LEISERSON, *Vanderbilt University*.

*Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion.* BY CLINTON ROSSITER. (New York: Vintage Books, 1962. Second Edition, Revised. Pp. xii, 306. \$1.45.)

Seven years after its original publication Professor Rossiter's instructive study re-appears, substantially revised, as a paperback. It could be called the sober second thought of a conservative, were it not that the author now explicitly disavows the label. He locates his position somewhere in the misty mid-regions between Peale and Niebuhr, between Lippmann and Kirk, between Reuther and Goldwater, and admits to being "at once the most liberal of conservatives and the most conservative of liberals." This is artful dodging, but Professor Rossiter may be permitted his little joke.

With a few slight qualifications the major definitions remain the same, as does the taxonomic approach of the early chapters. The useful distinction between Burkean Conservatism and normative American conservatism is retained, though the semantic difficulties have not been entirely overcome. Rugged economic individualism receives, as before, a stern rebuke. The views of Kirk, Buckley, Viereck and other not-so-new conservatives come in for more extensive criticism, though one looks in vain for an adequate analysis of the current Radical Right. The concluding chapters have been thoroughly revised, not merely to bring them up to date but to moderate the hortatory tone which marred the first edition. The excellent bibliography is duly enlarged.

The sober side of the new edition appears in Rossiter's sharpened stress on the difficulties of achieving the kind of reformed conservatism for which he calls. In the face of the "benevolent tyranny" of the dominant liberal tradition of the

United States, conservatism is a "thankless persuasion" indeed. It needs a "viable theory," but "the mere intention to spin out a full-bodied theory is somehow an unconservative impulse," and in any case experience must precede logic: "a conservative way of life must go before and shape a conservative pattern of thought." The conservative, says Rossiter, must hold the middle ground as mediator. But if, as this reviewer supposes, the task of mediation assumes the *givenness* of the positions to be mediated, how shall the conservative also act to brake the present slippage in the political spectrum which carries him willy-nilly toward the Radical Right? The issue of desegregation would seem to furnish a critical test of conservative doctrine, but here, Rossiter admits, the tradition affords no authoritative guide; "the signals are off," and each conservative must muddle through on his own. Seven years have made Rossiter rather less sanguine about the resolution of such dilemmas, yet they must be resolved if conservatism is to become intellectually coherent and relevant.

What, then, are the prospects? Rossiter's answer is ambiguous. On p. 237 he foresees "no sudden check or reversal in the glacial shift of the American intellect" to the Center and Right. But on p. 4 it appears that "we are not quite so conservative a country today" as in 1955. The campuses which in 1955 were said to "run over" with conservative academics now merely "shelter (if they do not exactly teem with)" them. Nevertheless, Rossiter suggests that "a reformed theory of American conservatism" enjoys "excellent prospects." How this can be when the "creative conservative" is expected to perform simultaneously as "the chief sponsor of change in American life, the chief opponent of the reforms that are needed to civilize it, and the chief mourner for the civilization that has gone forever" does not appear.—MICHAEL MCGIFFERT, *University of Denver*.

*Six Crises*. By RICHARD M. NIXON. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1962. Pp. 460. \$5.95.)

In this book the former Vice President gives us an account of the 1960 campaign for the Presidency; his 1959 encounters with Nikita Khrushchev; his tour of Latin America in 1958; his role in the events precipitated by President Eisenhower's heart attack in September, 1955; his fight to stay on the Republican ticket in 1952; and the fall of Alger Hiss. The book is loosely integrated by Mr. Nixon's efforts to describe his personal reactions in each of these situations and "to distill out of my experience a few general principles on the 'crisis syndrome.'" He disavows, however—modestly and rightly—any

pretense to having written a scholarly treatise on conduct in crisis: once distilled, his principles ("Confidence in crisis depends in great part on adequacy of preparation," "Experience is a vitally important factor") turn out to be trite but true and *vice versa*. Scholars will find *Six Crises* interesting mainly as a source of footnotés to recent political history and as an intensely political man's exercise in looking at the past with an eye to the future.

Nixon's comments on his relations with General Eisenhower will provide some of the best fodder for footnotes. On more than one occasion the General was anything but helpful in Nixon's crisis hours. When the fund issue broke in September, 1952, Eisenhower remained out of communication with his running mate for five days—while the attack mounted, influential Republican newspapers called for Nixon's resignation, and the General himself implied in a statement to the press that Nixon would have to prove himself "clean as a hound's tooth." When the General's anxiously awaited call finally came through, he was to say, "I have come to the conclusion that you are the one who has to decide what to do. After all, you've got a big following in this country and if the impression got around that you got off the ticket because I forced you to get off, it is going to be very bad. On the other hand, if I issue a statement now backing you up, in effect people will accuse me of condoning wrongdoing." He recommended that Nixon put his case before the country in a television speech. Later Nixon, only an hour before he was to make that speech, was thrown into confusion by a new communication from Eisenhower headquarters: the top Eisenhower advisers, he was told, presumably with the General's agreement, wanted him to close his speech by submitting his resignation. On a second occasion Eisenhower could properly be charged with having created a crisis for Nixon. Announcing his own intention to seek re-election in 1956, the General evaded any commitment as to a running mate. Nixon, he said, would have "to chart his own course." This statement came after he had privately suggested that Nixon might consider a Cabinet post and had observed that the Vice President was running behind Earl Warren in the Gallup Poll. After several humiliating weeks in which Eisenhower gave him only the most equivocal indications of intent or preference, Nixon was finally forced to ask for a place on the 1956 ticket. In the 1960 campaign, Eisenhower embarrassed his heir apparent at least two more times. In a press conference he said that, if given a week, he might be able to think of an important decision in which Nixon had participated. He later explained that this was intended as a facetious sally, but Nixon regards it as having been a

serious blow to his efforts to capitalize on the experience issue. Finally, in the last days of the campaign, Nixon tried to get approval for a White House announcement that the Justice Department would look into the arrest of Reverend Martin Luther King. His efforts were to no avail. Attorney General William Rogers was ready to act, according to Nixon, but the White House, for some reason, was not.

Although Nixon has these and many other inside stories to report, scholars must proceed with some caution when using *Six Crises* as a source. A statement about Alger Hiss's Woodstock type-writer has had to be corrected in later printings of the book and another—that Allan Dulles briefed John F. Kennedy on CIA preparations for the invasion of Cuba—has been denied by both Kennedy and Dulles. And these are not the only points on which Nixon's comments are apt to be misleading. He says, for instance, that

Looking back, I suppose the politically expedient course would have been for me to grant without argument that we had been standing still for the past eight years and then to promise, if I were elected, to do everything he [Kennedy] had promised, and more besides.

He may be showing the same kind of wry humor here that Eisenhower displayed in his statement about Nixon's participation in the decisions of the Eisenhower Administration; but certainly it is hard to believe that a repudiation of the Republican record would have been Nixon's most expedient course in 1960, or that he believes it would have been. It is equally hard to accept at face value his characterization of the 1960 post-convention session of Congress as "one of the shrewdest moves" of the Democratic campaign. His reasoning: it pinned him to Washington because he might have to break a tie vote in the Senate, while Johnson and Kennedy could roam more freely, secure in the knowledge that they could arrange pairs for their votes.

Although he devotes relatively little space to the discussion of substantive issues in his book, Nixon's current political stance emerges with considerable clarity. He is critical of the "liberalists" who opposed the Un-American Activities Committee's investigation of the Hiss case but careful to note that liberalists "are not even remotely disloyal." He makes a thinly veiled (but nonetheless veiled) attack on the methods of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. He has harsh words to say, *passim*, about the Kennedy Administration's handling of the Cuban invasion and the Laotian crisis. By implication he charges Nelson Rockefeller with opportunism and hypocrisy. He remains a thoroughgoing Eisenhower Republican; any difficulties the General may have caused him, are no sooner described than excused. For Nixon Eisenhower was—and is—a great leader with an

orderly, quick, far-ranging, and versatile mind whose "thoughts far outraced his speech."

Many of Nixon's asides will be of interest to students of image building, but one in particular will intrigue political scientists—his version of "the Great American Legend as to how presidential candidates are born and made":

The legend goes something like this. A mother takes a child on her knee. She senses by looking into his eyes that there is something truly extraordinary about him. She says to herself and perhaps even to him, "You, son, are going to be President some day." From that time on, he is tapped for greatness. He talks before he walks. He reads a thousand words a minute. He is bored by school because he is so much smarter than his teachers. He prepares himself for leadership by taking courses in public speaking and political science. He drives ever upward, calculating every step of the way until he reaches his and—less importantly—the nation's destiny by becoming President of the United States.

Frankly, this reviewer had never been exposed to this account of the Great American Legend before, (it is most probably a Californian interpretation of a Massachusetts variation on the Legend) but was naturally flattered to learn that the members of his profession were central figures in it.—STANLEY KELLEY, JR., *Princeton University*.

*The La Guardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City.* By CHARLES GARRETT. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 423. \$8.50.)

*Thirty Explosive Years in Los Angeles County.* By JOHN ANSON FORD. (San Marino, California: The Huntington Library, 1961. Pp. xv, 232. \$6.00.)

Similarities and contrasts mark these two studies of reform movements in local government, dealing with the geographical extremes of the nation. The Garrett volume recounts machine and reform politics in our largest city over a century and a half, while Ford's work is a first-hand account of demographical changes and governmental reforms during three decades in the nation's fastest growing urban area.

The Garrett volume on New York City leads off with an analysis of machine and reform traditions in American municipal politics. Succeeding chapters carry New York City politics from the earliest days of Tammany Hall to the fusion movement of the early 1930's which put Fiorello H. La Guardia into the mayoralty. The heart of the volume deals with the La Guardia personality and his activities in the realms of administration, finance, the underworld, public welfare, structural changes in government, and the political campaigns that carried reform beyond its usual one-term duration. Garrett's conclusion covers the decline of reformism in New York City and the

mayors and their administrations since the La Guardia years.

Historian Garrett displays insights into the motivations of bosses and reformers, and the differing conceptions of human nature upon which they pattern their actions. His purpose is not to write a biography of La Guardia, but to appraise machine and reform politics in the setting of La Guardia's three terms as mayor.

Professor Garrett is no hero-worshipper, for he sees Mayor La Guardia as a many-faceted personality—on the one hand, humorous, charming, sociable, sentimental, moralistic, while on the other, difficult to get along with, autocratic, impatient, opinionated, and vindictive. This reviewer cannot quarrel with Professor Garrett's summation of La Guardia as New York's greatest mayor.

The political scientist will find particularly valuable the discussions of fusion movements, charter reforms, proportional representation (toward which the author is sympathetic), and campaign techniques utilized in a metropolitan area. The author's notes are profuse, and show especially his use of newspaper files.

The volume by John Anson Ford is on social and governmental changes in Los Angeles County during the past thirty years. His vantage point was that of a participant-observer, having served on the county board of supervisors during twenty-four of those years.

Ford justifies the writing of this volume by citing the county's tremendous growth, diversity of its functions, and the microcosm it provides of the nation. In more than twenty brief chapters he summarizes and provides examples of metropolitan growth problems and attempted solutions. The varied and vast undertakings of Los Angeles County are catalogued and the author indicates the role of the board of supervisors in the government of the county. Of concern to political scientists are Mr. Ford's discussion of county charters, city functions and relationships to counties, the "Lakewood plan" (contract cities plan), financing, purchasing, and personnel procedures, planning and zoning, and establishment of the Los Angeles County sanitation districts—a case in intergovernmental cooperation.

Mr. Ford defines what he calls "the cancer in politics"—the mounting costs of political campaigning and the difficulties arising from dependency on a relatively few large contributors. Candidates frequently, he writes, tell their managers in effect: "Now *you* get the money, but don't tell *me* any of the details as to amounts or who the donors are." The author's proposal, basically the remedy of Theodore Roosevelt a half century ago, is that every voter should share on a minimal basis the cost of campaigning—a

"poll tax." The registrar of voters would collect the estimated dollar per year per voter and disburse these funds to party and nonpartisan committees. "These provisions would not be a cure-all . . . but they would greatly lessen corruption and the inequities . . ." The value of his proposal is not its novelty but the extensive practical political experience of the man who makes it.

This book centers on developments viewed by the author as accomplishments, and therefore seldom deals with shortcomings or failings. Critics go mostly unnoticed, while the author defends some of his past actions as a county official. Personal recollections serve as a principal source of information, for the volume is not documented.—ROSS R. RICE, *Arizona State University*.

*Hawaii Pono: A Social History.* BY LAWRENCE H. FUCHS. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961. Pp. ix, 501. \$6.95)

"*Hawaii Pono* signifies that Hawaii is worthy of praise," explains Professor Fuchs, "since 'pono' means right or excellent." Hawaii is no longer an experiment in race relations for today it presents "the world's best example of dynamic social democracy." The explanation and support of this sweeping assertion is the primary task which Fuchs has set himself in this account of our "50th state, its people and politics, from annexation to statehood."

This attempt to portray the "big picture" necessarily invites comparison with that more popularized account of recent fame, Michener's *Hawaii*. Indeed, such a comparison is directly invited by Michener in a dust-jacket blurb in which he suggests that "a careful reading of *Hawaii Pono*" will enable the reader to "understand where I might have gone wrong in some of my interpretations and where I fell short of writing the detailed truth." Michener's well-taken commentary on his own work points to the essential difference between these two accounts. While both he and Fuchs paint on a broad canvas, Michener enjoyed that artistic license available to those whose writings lie in that never-never land which is located somewhere between the domains of fact and fiction. His historical-fictional technique enabled him to splash his canvas with vivid, undiluted tropical hues and occasionally to achieve brilliant literary effects at the price of considerable historical distortion. Fuchs, by contrast, has produced a more scholarly work which, if it attracts less popular attention, will nevertheless serve the more important long-term purpose of advancing serious research and writing on Hawaii.

Fuchs has succeeded in avoiding the sins of over-simplification in no small measure because of his remarkable capacity to bring together and co-

ordinate the activities of a stalwart band of mainland and Island researchers from a number of disciplines, among them sociology, political science and economics. He and his assistants have labored mightily, both in the archives and in the field, and have produced an account of Hawaii which, if not correct in every detail, is none the less a thorough and largely sound piece of work.

*Hawaii Pono* presents in quick review a series of sketches of the major ethnic groups which have populated modern Hawaii. The perplexing diversity of Hawaii's social fabric becomes somewhat more understandable as viewed through the detailed account of the waves of immigration which first supplemented and then gradually replaced the native Hawaiian stock as it was decimated by disease and diluted through intermarriage. Fuchs depicts with warmth and sensitivity the ensuing human drama as Hawaii was reseeded by successive waves of Haoles (white men or Caucasians), Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos and many other peoples. This portion of Fuchs' work, while intensely interesting, covers largely familiar ground which has been rather intensively explored by such Island sociologists as Lind and Hormann of the University of Hawaii.

It is in his reporting and analysis of the politically decisive developments of twentieth-century Hawaii that Fuchs makes his most important contribution. He presents a balanced account of the rise of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union to dominance in Hawaii's union movement and a long-needed explanation of its role in Island politics. He handles in a constructive manner the politically explosive issue of the I.L.W.U. leadership's alleged Communist Party affiliations. Recounted here adequately for the first time to this reviewer's knowledge is the story of *Imua* (the Hawaiian word for "forward"), the militantly anti-Communist, anti-labor organization which provided the focal point of old-guard resistance to the rising force of unionism. Fuchs also provides a clear and useful account of the difficult battle for statehood. Somewhat less spectacular, but of deeper importance, is his explanation of the rise to political hegemony in Hawaii's legislature of the lawmakers of oriental ancestry, the sons and grandsons by and large of those Japanese and Chinese immigrants who were brought to the Islands as plantation laborers.

Fuchs has purportedly adopted a now conventional mode of analysis by claiming in the subtitle of his work that *Hawaii Pono* is "social history." Fortunately, this claim is largely belied by the work itself, for Fuchs is too sound a political scientist to restrict his analysis merely to social history. It is rather the rich drama of Hawaii's turbulent constitutional history which dominates his work and gives it structure, even when the

author's primary emphasis is placed elsewhere. Accordingly, the attention of the political scientist is drawn persistently to *political* considerations, and he can hardly fail to be instructed by the panorama of constitutional changes which in less than a century and a half have transformed Hawaii from the absolute monarchy of Kamehameha the Great to constitutional monarchy, thence toward oligarchy and currently toward democracy. In the broadest terms, Fuchs thus provides an account of what might be termed "the changing regime in Hawaii," an account which at its best succeeds in relating constitutional changes to such related considerations as economic development, the acquisition of full rights of citizenship by plantation workers or their descendants, and the rise of a militant labor union movement. Fuchs reveals the primacy of the political by showing that the manifold problems associated with the cultural and ethnic diversity of the peoples of Hawaii have been resolved chiefly through the institutions of government.

Those who are skeptical of this interpretation may well ask themselves how it has come about that the contemporary Hawaiian polity differs so radically from that of a number of Latin American "banana republics" which it so nearly resembled some three-quarters of a century ago. In its plantation economy and semi-colonial status, Hawaii closely resembled Cuba. How is it then that the Hawaiian regime has moved strongly in the direction of egalitarian democracy while the planter republics of Latin America have all too frequently been transformed from oligarchies into tyrannies? To understand this difference we must go beyond *Hawaii Pono* in tracing the relationships between Hawaii's "social history" and the constitutional politics of the United States. One may well imagine that questions such as these are very much in the forefront of Fuchs' attention as he currently addresses himself to direction of the Peace Corps program in the Philippines, a nation whose constitutional development could profitably be contrasted to that of the Hawaiian polity.

*Hawaii Pono* will considerably facilitate the task of those mainlanders desirous of acquiring a rudimentary understanding of the politics of Hawaii, while Islanders will find this work useful in dispelling those opinions, myths and rumors which have provided a surprisingly persistent substitute for knowledge within their own community. Above all, it may be hoped that *Hawaii Pono* will provide impetus and encouragement to those scholars who are prepared to provide related accounts of Hawaii's excessively centralized governmental structure, business and labor monopolies and the politically crucial questions stemming from the Island state's unique concen-

tration of land ownership, both public and private.  
—ROBERT HORWITZ, *Michigan State University*.

*National Party Platforms: 1840-1960.* COMPILED BY KIRK PORTER AND DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1961. Pp. 640. \$10.)

It is a truism that American party platforms are not binding on the behavior of party leaders in office, and are often ambiguous trumpetings composed of a medley of themes, aimed at satisfying the various groups or publics to which the parties must appeal. Nonetheless, platforms do express the general, loose central perspectives or ideologies of our parties. A compendium of such statements over the last 120 years offers interesting tracings of ideological change and development.

The present volume, an enlarged edition of Professor Porter's earlier collection, provides an abundance of such materials. It ranges from the first declaration in the Democratic convention of 1840, through the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties and four minor parties in 1960.

Platforms have tended to grow longer as the years passed. Thus, the Democratic "resolutions" of 1840 take less than one large double-column page in this book, and even the tortuous Democratic planks of 1856 consume only a little more than three pages, whereas the defensive Republican platform of 1932 occupies nearly twelve pages and the "New Frontier" Democratic statement of 1960 takes twenty-six. Parties *can* be brief in modern times, as the Democrats were in a two-page platform in 1944. By and large, however, more and more items are included as the complexity of society gives birth to more and more interests and shadings of opinion whose claims must be recognized.

This compendium of platforms provides confirmation for the thesis that American major parties exhibit dualism in a moving consensus, as V. O. Key puts it. Again and again, the aims set forth by a party-of-movement in a given period and originally opposed by a party-of-resistance appear in the later statements of the erstwhile opposition party, though often in a muted, ambiguously formalistic, or modified fashion. Minor parties of protest and such schismatic eras as the 1850s and the Civil War aside, it is hard to find evidence for profound, continuing social cleavage in American party platforms.

It is interesting to note that of more than one hundred minor, fragmentary, or "third" party platforms included by the editors, scarcely a dozen were the products of parties whose position was significantly to the right of the contemporary major parties. The "Know Nothings" of 1856, the

Coughlin-Lehmke Union party of 1936, the "Dixiecrats" of 1948, and the Christian Nationalists of 1952 are representatives of a scarce breed beside the would-be tigers of reform, socialism, or other left protest. Frustration, of course, was the common lot of virtually all of them.

The editors provide brief introductory notes to the platforms of each quadrennial campaign, but one could often wish that the notes were fuller and more informative. Thus, for example, we might like to know more about the circumstances of the framing of this or that major party statement, or about just who the Christian Nationalists were and what their impact was. This is a small complaint, however, about an already very big volume which will remain the standard collection of its kind.—WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

*The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788.* BY JACKSON TURNER MAIN. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press for The Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, 1961. Pp. xv, 308. Price: \$7.50.)

Like poor Patrick Henry, the Antifederalists seem to have been given the short end of the stick in American history in general and in the development of American political institutions in particular. Even the Bill of Rights, their major contribution, are popularly ascribed to Madison who introduced them to Congress only under Antifederal pressure. In part this situation is a natural one due to the unparalleled success of the Constitution. But, by way of contrast to the success of the Federalists, the opposition has been discredited to the point of appearing almost "un-American," to use a vague popular term. Historians have suspected their motives and chastised or pitied them for their lack of vision. With this book, which is a manuscript award winner from the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Professor Main has taken a solid step in the direction of re-assessment which should lead to a new understanding of the Antifederalist dilemma and appreciation of their approach to the problems of political organization.

*The Antifederalists* is a state by state analysis of Antifederal strength according to geography and the significant economic views attached thereto. The author found coastal, commercial, urban environs generally Federal, while the remote agricultural areas were Antifederal. He convincingly demonstrates that the pattern of alignment of forces found in the Constitutional debate of 1788-89 was initiated by the dispute over a Confederate impost beginning in 1781. He documents the close relationship between the economic issues of the day—impost, public debt,

commercial advantages—and the Antifederalist camp. His analysis of issues follows the approach of Charles A. Beard. But whether or not his work is a “vigorous counterstatement to the revisionists,” as the dust jacket states, is another question. Professor Main more than reasonably proves the close proximity of economic and political views, but he does not convincingly demonstrate that the relationship is a strictly causative one.

The second half of the book collects the Antifederal objections to national government and the various counter-proposals to the Constitution. Following these chapters is a convention by convention account of Antifederal defeat at the hands of the Federalists, whose superior organization, greater newspaper coverage and keen sense of political timing turned minorities into majorities and won the day.

Professor Main balances the need for generalization with that of accuracy and detail to present the kind of concise, over-all account essential to an understanding of the Anti-federalists. His abundant footnoting of sources is helpful, while the restraint evident in his conclusions is as refreshing as his straight-forward admission that some important source material is lacking.

While filling a gap in the history of post-Revolutionary War politics, to paraphrase the Introduction, the author does not assess the theoretical foundations of the Antifederal position. In this regard, his work is an *hors-d'oeuvre* rather than a main course. It contains short discussions on the meaning of “federal” and “democracy” before the Federalists succeeded in modifying these terms; the Antifederal view of the incompatibility of a large, diverse country and national government with a democratically based republic; and the Antifederal fear that centralized power would be destructive of liberty. This book is at its best in bringing to life and explaining the political dilemma of the Antifederalists. No less important, it points the way toward assessment and appreciation of their contribution to our political institutions.—ELDON BOWMAN, *College of Wooster*.

*Design of Regional Accounts: Papers presented at the Conference on Regional Accounts, 1960.*

EDITED BY WERNER HOCHWALD. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Pp. xx, 281. \$6.00.)

This volume presents a series of nine papers dealing with various aspects of the design of regional accounts. In addition to the thirteen economists who wrote the major papers, seventeen commentators added their brief evaluations and criticisms. From the point of view of methodology, the approach here represented is one that might well be emulated in political science, for

the critical interaction and interchange among a group of scholars exploring a frontier problem provides a stimulating volume.

This collection of papers is a part of the growing literature on regional economics, much of which has been sponsored and supported by Resources for the Future, Inc. This literature of the new regionalists is to be distinguished from that of twenty-five years ago by its greater rigor and by its search for operational concepts, models and data which can serve as a foundation for analysis and prediction. The interest in policy decisions remains strong, although there is frequent recognition of the primitive state of knowledge and the difficulties of acquiring useable data. Generally restrained is philosophical speculation as to the nature of regional development, and many of the unstated and unanalyzed major premises of earlier regional literature are avoided.

The difficult problem of regional definition has not been solved (if indeed it needs to be solved) and often the contributors make clear that they are speaking about metropolitan regions (the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the Census Bureau). This focus is not particularly justified, although it is clearly implied that these units are used because it is in the SMSA's where most significant economic activity occurs and for which data are collected and organized.

While in the first instance this volume will have a primary appeal for economists (Only the chapter by Edward B. Berman, “Impact of Local Government Policies on Local Capital Formation and Output,” would seem to have an obvious political relevance), it is this reviewer's conviction that these papers and related literature should receive greater attention from political scientists. This conviction rests on two premises: *first*, that political-governmental decisions in the next decades will have to be made in the context of their economic effects, local as well as national, and *second*, that some of the most critical political struggles and conflicts in this period will concern the geographic allocation of public benefits (as well as costs).

Perhaps allocation questions will continue to be settled largely through group alliances and alignments, through horse trades and pork-barrel bargains. But in so far as political science may also be concerned with the development of more rational decisions, it may find the work of the new regionalists useful as indicating some of the constraints within which political decisions may be made. Perhaps, too, political science can build upon the work of the regional economists and upon their data, since their writings often seem oblivious to the nature of political decision-making.

In addition to the paper by Berman referred to



above, the volume includes the following: "A General Structure for Regional Economic Analysis," by Werner Z. Hirsch; "Relative Regional Economic Growth: An Approach to Regional Accounts," by Harvey S. Perloff; "Investment Return as a Measure of Comparative Regional Economic Advantage," by George H. Borts and Jerome L. Stein; "Regional Breakdowns of National Economic Accounts," by Richard Ruggles and Nancy D. Ruggles; "Regional Income and Product Accounts: Construction and Applications," by Charles L. Leven; "Regional Account Projections in the Context of National Projections," by Louis Delwart and Sidney Sonenblum; "Microanalytic Models for Regional Analysis," by George H. Orcutt; and "The Role of Accounts in the Economic Study of the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Region," by Edgar M. Hoover and Benjamin Chinitz.—NORMAN WENGERT, *Wayne State University*.

*The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher Education.* BY ALICE M. RIVLIN. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961. Pp. xii, 179. Price \$3.00, cloth; \$2.00, paper.)

"Direct federal control (of higher education institutions) would in the end produce uniformity, mediocrity, and compliance. Verve, initiative, and originality would disappear. . . . We know of no one who advocates this central control. But those who advocate the extension of federal financial support are treading down this path."

Since 1952 when this warning was sounded by the Commission on Financing Higher Education,<sup>1</sup> the amount of federal aid and its contribution to total higher education income have continued to rise. Yet, the impassioned words of the Commission, though a mere decade old, have an anachronistic sound to the contemporary academic ear. Today lay leaders and educators are more closely in tune with the President's Commission on National Goals: "The federal role must now be expanded. . . . Federal aid to higher education must include increased scholarship and loan funds, support of research as an essential part of the educational process, and direct assistance for buildings and equipment."<sup>2</sup>

Though today the idea of increased federal aid is well-received, only an unusually optimistic educator-recipient would assert that the questions raised by the Commission a decade ago are no longer relevant. Dr. Alice Rivlin's comprehensive review points up the vital questions. Here is an informative account of the history and present

status both of federal support for higher education and of issues of educational philosophy and public policy. In avoiding exhaustive treatment, Dr. Rivlin achieves a valuable overview, with documentation sufficient to illustrate forcefully the issues of policy raised by a continuing accumulation of federal programs and federal dollars.

The story begins with a clear statement of the "crisis" in higher education finance which makes this Brookings Institution study timely. In successive chapters it traces the origins of federal involvement through land grants and other aid programs, the development of federal support of research, programs of student assistance and of funds for buildings, and federal educational institutions. It focuses attention on the impact of changing federal policies upon the colleges, states the case against and for federal subsidies, and appraises principal alternatives in methods of assistance. The subject is treated from the point of view of an economist who is not blind to political reality or to other value considerations.

The timeliness of this study is underlined both by the rapidity of the growth of federal support and by the apparent inevitability that recent trend-lines will continue. The report warns that "Although the primary motivation of federal activity has not been educational, federal actions have profoundly affected the development of our system of higher education." In the report one finds assorted documentation for this statement but none is more impressive than the influence federal support for research has exerted upon higher education through its impact upon the relatively few universities in which it is concentrated. In 1957-58, 36 institutions received approximately 75 percent of all federal research funds for higher education; the same institutions produced a decided majority of all doctorates. These universities have in turn contributed directly, and indirectly through their graduates, to the current dominance of a point of view that places research and graduate instruction on a pinnacle so high that other important functions—such as undergraduate general education—are difficult to include in the same focus. Whether or not this emphasis is entirely healthy is debatable, but that it flows in no small part from the growth of federal support seems undeniable.

There never has been a clearly defined federal policy toward education. Yet, as the federal role increases, federal influence upon the educational system will increase. Against the background that Dr. Rivlin provides it seems important that a wide variety of programs continue to receive varied types of federal aid for there is strength in the very plurality of federal interests. However, the large number of federal agencies involved and the diversity of programs can be a source of

<sup>1</sup> *Nature and Needs of Higher Education* (N. Y., Columbia Univ. Press, 1952), p. 162.

<sup>2</sup> *Goals for Americans* ([Englewood Cliffs, N. J.], Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 7.

strength, rather than a possibly fatal weakness, only if ways can be provided both for educators and for makers of federal policy to take a total view of present and future needs and of the impact or possible impact of present and future federal programs. The President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, the American Assembly (notably Douglas M. Knight), the American Council on Education, and others have concerned themselves with this important point, but little has yet been achieved.

Dr. Rivlin's study points up the significance of higher education control and finance as areas deserving the attention of the political scientist *qua* political scientist as well as *qua* educator.—FRANK C. ABBOTT, *Montana State University*.

*Constraint by Copyright.* By M. B. SCHNAPPER. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1960. Pp. 154. \$3.75.)

Turn to page 80 of M. B. Schnapper's call of protest to the American people against extensive copyrighting of official material by public officials and you will find a reproduction of an advertisement that goes a long way toward making his case for him. The advertisement bears the name of the Chilton Co. of Philadelphia and announces publication of "The United States Secret Service" by Walter S. Bowen and Harry Edward Neal, at \$4.95 in the month of March, 1960.

The title of the book is superimposed over a large and most official looking star bearing the words, U. S. Secret Service. The upper-left fourth of the advertisement contains in large type this eye-catching statement: "4 reasons why we predict this will be one of the best selling books of 1960."

The first reason given is this: "It's the first really authentic story of the U. S. Secret Service, taken straight from the files of the Service itself." Second: "It's filled with spine-tingling dramatic cases of how the Secret Service cracked down on the Mafia, broke up the Ku Klux Klan, arrested members of Congress for land frauds, investigated the Teapot Dome scandal, exposed one of the most gigantic foreign sabotage plots of all time, and much more." Still another reason: "It's written by a former Assistant Chief of the Service and the Official Historian of the Service."

This announcement of the Bowen-Neal book about the United States Secret Service suggests some pertinent questions to Mr. Schnapper. In the lines under the reproduction he asks: "Was the advertising copy writer merely indulging in over-statement or was he sticking pretty close to the truth? Did Messrs. Bowen and Neal obtain most of their material while in the Secret Service? Did either of them prepare for official purposes material constituting a substantial portion of their copyrighted book?"

Numerous other illustrations of the private copyrighting of public material are cited by the author who regards this as a serious evil that should be stopped as contrary to the free speech and free press guarantees of the Bill of Rights, contrary to the constitutional oath that every public official takes, and contrary to specific provisions of the Federal Copyright Act.

The widespread practice, as Mr. Schnapper puts it, is a resort to monopoly via copyright limitations which places "private property restrictions on and around a vast amount of official information that has cost the taxpayer countless billions of dollars." Since copyrights run for a minimum of 28 years and a maximum of 56 years, public information that goes into private commercial hands goes for a long time at the shortest.

But that is not all. Mr. Schnapper's analysis of the situation goes much further. For, to quote him again, "inherent in copyrighting by public officials is presumption of the right to suppress completely whatever they consider their personal property and arrogation of private authority to restrict access to or use of such property if and when they should see fit to disclose its nature."

Here, in short, is a matter about which relatively few Americans have thought anything and about which most have not thought even slightly. Yet it is a matter which should concern us all because it is our government and the materials at stake are owned by the people. M. B. Schnapper deserves widespread appreciation for heading up the effort to bring the abuse to widespread public attention.

The author is executive director of the Public Affairs Press in Washington. Significantly he says on his book's own copyright page: "Statements made by the author can be quoted without permission."—IRVING DILLIARD.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON  
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE  
*University of Maryland*

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Administrative versus Judicial Determinations of Citizenship. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1962.

Cooper, Joseph and Ann. The Legislative Veto and the Constitution. *George Washington Law Review*. March, 1962.

Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue between Congress and the Courts. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1962.

Goldie, L. F. E. The Connally Reservation: A Shield for an Adversary. *University of California, Los Angeles, Law Review*. March, 1962.

Green, Harold P., and Alan Rosenthal. Fusion of Government Power [by Joint Committee on Atomic Energy]. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. June, 1962.

James, Louis C. Senatorial Rejections of Presidential Nominations to the Cabinet: A Study in Constitutional Custom. *Arizona Law Review*. Winter, 1961.

Maxey, David W. Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice or Government Fiat? *Albany Law Review*. June, 1962.

Nieburg, H. L. The Eisenhower AEC and Congress: A Study in Executive-Legislative Relations. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. May, 1962.

Pressly, Thomas J. Bullets and Ballots: Lincoln and the "Right of Revolution." *American Historical Review*. April, 1962.

Riddick, Floyd M. The Eighty-Seventh Congress: First Session. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.

The U. S. A. under Kennedy. [Symposium.] *Political Quarterly*. April-June, 1962.

State Government

Ash, Henry L. The West Virginia Department of Finance and Administration. Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University. 1962.

Bell, James R. State Government Reorganization in California. *State Government*. Spring, 1962.

Carley, David. Legal and Extra-Legal Powers of Wisconsin Governors in Legislative Relations—Part II. *Wisconsin Law Review*. March, 1962.

Hyink, Bernard L. The California Legislature Looks at the State Constitution. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Larson, James E. Reapportionment and the Courts. Bureau of Public Administration, Uni-

versity of Alabama. 1962.

Nusbaum, Joe E. State Departments of Administration. *State Government*. Spring, 1962.

Rothenberg, Leon. State Budgets—1962. *Ibid.*

Trends of State Government in 1962 as Indicated by the Governors' Messages. *Ibid.*

Wheeler, John P., and John E. Bebout. After Reapportionment. *National Civic Review*. May, 1962.

Williams, G. Mennen. A Governor's Notes. Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan. 1961.

Zubrow, Reuben A., and Robert L. Decker. The Taxation of Legalized Gambling in Nevada. *National Tax Journal*. March, 1962.

Local Government

Anderson, Robert M. The Board of Zoning Appeals—Villain or Victim? *Syracuse Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Birkhead, Guthrie S., ed. Metropolitan Issues: Social, Governmental, Fiscal. Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. 1962.

Brazer, Harvey E., Daniel B. Suits, and Muriel W. Converse. Municipal Bond Yields: The Market's Reaction to Michigan's Fiscal Crisis. *National Tax Journal*. March, 1962.

Burnett, John M. Some Problems on Urban Renewal Law. *Santa Clara Lawyer*. Spring, 1962.

Carrell, Jephtha J. The Role of the City Manager: A Survey Report. *Public Management*. April, 1962.

Deming, George H. What Can Citizens Do [about Metropolitan Problems]? *National Civic Review*. April, 1962.

Donovan, Thomas B. Zoning: Variance Administration in Alameda County. *California Law Review*. March, 1962.

Eshelman, W. Richard. Municipal Regulation of House Trailers in Pennsylvania. *Dickinson Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Fitch, Lyle C. A Transit Paradox. *National Civic Review*. April, 1962.

Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for an Old Ill. *Harvard Law Review*. May, 1962.

Jones, Russell D. The Changing Role of the City Manager. *Public Management*. June, 1962.

Labaree, Benjamin W. New England Town Meeting. *American Archivist*. April, 1962.

Lash, James E. Renewal: Area Problem. *Na-*

*tional Civic Review*. April, 1962.

Lockard, Duane. The City Manager, Administrative Theory and Political Power. *Political Science Quarterly*. June 1962.

Magnusson, Jon. Off-Street Parking Facilities for New York. *Brooklyn Law Review*. April, 1962.

Martin, Albert B. Home Rule for Kansas Cities. *University of Kansas Law Review*. May, 1962.

McClain, Jackson M., and Robert B. Highsaw. Dixie City Acts: A Study in Decision-Making. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama. 1962.

Netzer, Dick. Paying for Services. *National Civic Review*. April, 1962.

Public Ownership of Land through Dedication. *Harvard Law Review*. May, 1962.

Rosenfeld, W. P. Conflict of Interest and the Ontario Municipal Act. *Faculty of Law Review, University of Toronto*. April, 1962.

Swanton, James H. The Municipal Quest for Industry. *Public Management*. April, 1962.

Sweet, Morris L., and Finn B. Jensen. The Planned Community. *National Civic Review*. May, 1962.

Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces. *Harvard Law Review*. June, 1962.

Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1962.

Weinstein, James. Organized Business and the City Commission and Manager Movements. *Journal of Southern History*. May, 1962.

Wilson, James, and Robert W. Crowe. Managers in Maine. Bureau for Research in Municipal Government, Bowdoin College. 1962.

Zoning against the Public Welfare: Judicial Limitations on Municipal Parochialism. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1962.

#### Intergovernmental Relations

Cowdery, Richard C. Intergovernmental Transportation Planning. *Public Management*. April, 1962.

Duggar, George S. Federalism and Self-Government in the United States: Urban Renewal as an Example. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. 1961.

Dye, Thomas R. Metropolitan Integration by Bargaining among Sub-Areas. *American Behavioral Scientist*. May, 1962.

Esgain, Albert J. State Authority and Responsibility in the Atomic Energy Field. *Duke Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Humes, Samuel. Organization for Metropolitan Cooperation. *Public Management*. May, 1962.

Jones, Victor. Cooperation Pattern. *National Civic Review*. June, 1962.

Levenson, Rosaline. Improving State Assist-

ance to Local Assessors. Institute of Public Service, University of Connecticut. 1962.

McQuery, Elton K. Interstate Compacts for Traffic Safety. *State Government*. Spring, 1962.

Systems of Economic Accounts and Analysis for Urban Regions. [Symposium.] *American Economic Review*. May, 1962.

#### Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Alfange, Dean, Jr. "Under Color of Law": *Classic and Screws* Revisited. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Barker, Lucius J. The Supreme Court as Policy Maker: The Tidelands Oil Controversy. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1962.

Bartholomew, Paul C. The Supreme Court of the United States, 1960-1961. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Bender, Paul. The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: *Mapp v. Ohio*. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. March, 1962.

Boner, Marian O. *Erie v. Tompkins*: A Study in Judicial Precedent. *Texas Law Review*. April, 1962. Part II. *Ibid.* May, 1962.

Brandwen, Maxwell. The Battle of the First Amendment: A Study in Judicial Interpretation. *North Carolina Law Review*. February, 1962.

Breitenbach, H. Eugene. Due Process of Law for Juveniles Revisited. *Journal of the State Bar of California*. January-February, 1962.

Contempt by Publication: The Limitation on Indirect Contempt of Court. *Virginia Law Review*. April, 1962.

Cox, Archibald. Understanding the Supreme Court. *Natural Resources Journal*. April, 1962.

Fernandez, Ferdinand F. Prisoners' Religious Freedom. *Southern California Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Fisk, Jedolyn Jean Johnson. Compulsory Testimony of the Congressional Witness and the Fifth Amendment. *Oklahoma Law Review*. May, 1962.

Gorski, Jerome C. The Exclusionary Rule and the Question of Standing. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Hardin, Paul, III. Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts. *Yale Law Journal*. April, 1962.

Henkin, Louis. *Shelley v. Kraemer*: Notes for a Revised Opinion. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. February, 1962.

Janoff, Lester D., and Philip I. Aaron. The Law of Search and Seizure—Federal Standards of Reasonableness. *Brooklyn Law Review*. April, 1962.

Krislov, Samuel. Some Enduring Misconceptions of American Constitutional History. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1962.

Lawless, William B. Mr. Justice Jackson: The

Struggle for Federal Supremacy. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. May, 1962.

Legal Responsibility for Extra-Legal Censure. *Columbia Law Review*. March, 1962.

Miller, Arthur S. An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law? *George Washington Law Review*. March, 1962.

Murphy, William P. State Sovereignty and the Ratification of the Constitution. II. *Mississippi Law Journal*. March, 1962. III. *Ibid.* May, 1962.

Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know." *Harvard Law Review*. April, 1962.

Ritz, Wilfred J. Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U. S. Supreme Court. *Washington and Lee Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Sedler, Robert Allen. Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1962.

Smith, Allen E. Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation. *Tulane Law Review*. April, 1962.

Supreme Court Review of State Findings of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases. *Stanford Law Review*. March, 1962.

Torcia, Charles E., and Donald B. King. The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts. *Dickinson Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Westin, Alan F. Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw. *Columbia Law Review*. April, 1962.

Wright, Benjamin F. The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral. *Texas Law Review*. May, 1962.

#### Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

Barrett, Edward F. The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. May, 1962.

Barrett, Edward L., Jr. Police Practices and the Law—From Arrest to Release or Charge. *California Law Review*. March, 1962.

Brennan, William J., Jr. The Administrative Judge—The Key to Effective Court Management. *Journal of the American Judicature Society*. April, 1962.

California Jury Procedure. [Symposium.] *Hastings Law Journal*. May, 1962.

Criminal Law. [Symposium.] *Boston University Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Economos, James P. Justice Court Improvement and Traffic Courts. *State Government*. Spring, 1962.

Eminent Domain—Rights and Remedies of an Uncompensated Landowner. *Washington University Law Quarterly*. April, 1962.

Frautschi, Timothy C. Personal Jurisdiction

Requirements under Federal Change of Venue Statutes. *Wisconsin Law Review*. March, 1962.

Hagan, Raymond James. Interviewing Witnesses in Criminal Cases. *Brooklyn Law Review*. April, 1962.

Inbau, Fred E. Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand. *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*. March, 1962.

Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property. *Harvard Law Review*. April, 1962.

LaFave, Wayne R. The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law—Part II. *Wisconsin Law Review*. March, 1962.

Leavy, Zad, and Jerome M. Kummer. Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws. *Southern California Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Legislative and Constitutional Courts: What Lurks Ahead for Bifurcation. *Yale Law Journal*. April, 1962.

Lenoir, James J. Congressional Control over Suits to Restrain the Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes. *Arizona Law Review*. Winter, 1961.

Northrop, F. S. C. Law, Language and Morals. *Yale Law Journal*. May, 1962.

Oliver, John W. The Grand Jury: An Effort to Get a Dragon out of His Cave. *Washington University Law Quarterly*. April, 1962.

Orfield, Lester B. Indictment and Information in Federal Criminal Procedure. Part III. *Syracuse Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Phillips, Orie L., and A. Sherman Christenson. Should Corporations Be Regarded as Citizens within the Diversity Jurisdiction Provisions? *American Bar Association Journal*. May, 1962.

Professor George H. Dession's Final Draft of the Code of Correction for Puerto Rico. *Yale Law Journal*. May, 1962.

Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts. *Ibid.* April, 1962.

Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law. *Virginia Law Review*. April, 1962.

Schubert, Glendon. Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game. *Stanford Law Review*. March, 1962.

Selected Articles on Eminent Domain Compensation and Valuation Problems. *Virginia Law Review*. April, 1962.

Skoler, Daniel L., and John M. Janewicz. A Survey of Judicial Salaries in the United States and Canada. *Journal of the American Judicature Society*. March, 1962.

Snyder, Orvill C. Criminal Responsibility. *Duke Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Swinney, Everette. Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-1877. *Journal of Southern History*. May, 1962.

Symposium on Insanity as a Defense in Crimi-

nal Law. *Marquette Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Weinstein, Noah, and William J. Shaw. Grand Jury Reports—A Safeguard of Democracy. *Washington University Law Quarterly*. April, 1962.

Zald, Mayer N. Power Balance and Staff Conflict in Correctional Institutions. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Alger, Chadwick F. The External Bureaucracy in United States Foreign Affairs. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Barr, Andrew. Accountants and the Securities and Exchange Commission. *Journal of Accountancy*. April, 1962.

Borchardt, Kurt. Congressional Use of Administrative Organization and Procedure for Policy-Making Purposes: Six Case Studies and Some Conclusions. *George Washington Law Review*. March, 1962.

Brewer, William A. The Federal Power Commission and "The Folklore of Capitalism." *American Bar Association Journal*. May, 1962.

Byse, Clark. Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus. *Harvard Law Review*. June, 1962.

Caldwell, Kenneth S., and Joseph M. Lowery. Role of Management Consultants in Government. *Municipal Finance*. May, 1962.

Caplin, Mortimer M. New Directions in Tax Administration. *Accounting Review*. April, 1962.

Chester, D. N. Research as an Aid in Public Administration. *Public Administration*. Spring, 1962.

Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Symposium. *Public Administration Review*. Winter, 1962.

Connor, Martin F., III. FTC Procedure Revisions: A Critique. *Villanova Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

The Federal Trade Commission and Reform of the Administrative Process. *Columbia Law Review*. April, 1962.

Fick, Winston M. The Reform of Administrative Procedure and the Controversy over Judicialization. *Santa Clara Lawyer*. Spring, 1962.

Friedland, Louis L. Fair Employment Practices in the Public Service. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1962.

Friendly, Henry J. The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards. Part II. *Harvard Law Review*. April, 1962. Part III. *Ibid.* May, 1962.

Gallas, Nesta M. The Use of Sociometric Tests in Personnel Selection. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1962.

Green, David, Jr. Depreciation of General Fixed Assets in Governmental Accounts. *Muni-*

*cipal Finance*. May, 1962.

Harris, Curtis C., Jr., and Daniel B. DeLoach. Profit Motive: A Stimulant to Federal Administrative Efficiency? *Public Administration Review*. Winter, 1962.

Hughes, Charles E., Jr. Problems in Administering Local Records. *American Archivist*. April, 1962.

Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Actions in Indiana. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1962.

Lang, Theodore H. Future Trends in New York City's Personnel Administration. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1962.

Lichty, Lawrence W. The Impact of FCC and FCC Commissioners' Backgrounds on the Regulation of Broadcasting. *Journal of Broadcasting*. Spring, 1962.

Long, Norton E. After the Voting Is Over. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. May, 1962.

Murphy, Charlotte P. Money Penalties—An Administrative Sword of Damocles. *Santa Clara Lawyer*. Spring, 1962.

Public Authorities. [Symposium.] *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Autumn, 1961.

Ralston, Charles S. Inspection of Public Records under California Law. *California Law Review*. March, 1962.

Rauner, Robert M., and Wilbur A. Steger. Simulation and Long-Range Planning for Resource Allocation. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May, 1962.

Riggs, Robert E. Arizona State Personnel Policies. Bureau of Business and Public Research, University of Arizona. 1962.

Scher, Seymour. The Politics of Agency Organization. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Slesinger, Jonathan Avery. Personnel Adaptations in the Federal Junior Management Assistant Program. Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan. 1961. [1962].

Stover, Carl F. The Government of Science. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif. 1962.

Takasaki, Richard S. Measuring Efficiency in Government. *Municipal Finance*. May, 1962.

Thompson, Helen. Atlanta's "Segregated" Approach to Integrated Employment. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1962.

Thorne, John E. The Government Employee and Organized Labor. *Santa Clara Lawyer*. Spring, 1962.

Wade, H. W. R. Law, Opinion and Administration. *Law Quarterly Review*. April, 1962.

Willbern, York. The Public Service. Texas Western College. 1962.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Abernethy, Lloyd M. The Progressive Cam-

paigned in Pennsylvania, 1912. *Pennsylvania History*. April, 1962.

Barrett, Harold. Scott of the *Oregonian* vs. William Jennings Bryan. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. April, 1962.

Blodgett, Geoffrey T. The Mind of the Boston Mugwump. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. March, 1962.

Cain, Marvin R. Edward Bates and the [Republican Nomination] Decision of 1860. *Mid-America*. April, 1962.

Clem, Alan L. South Dakota Political Almanac: A Presentation and Analysis of Election Statistics, 1889-1960. Governmental Research Bureau, State University of South Dakota. 1962.

Clover, Frank. Political Contributions by Labor Unions. *Texas Law Review*. May, 1962.

Converse, Philip E., and Georges Dupeux. Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Cosman, Bernard. Presidential Republicanism in the South, 1960. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1962.

Cox, Edward F. Congressional District Party Strengths and the 1960 Election. *Ibid.*

Dalenius, Tore. Recent Advances in Sample Survey Theory and Methods. *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*. June, 1962.

The Darkened Channels: UHF Television and the FCC. *Harvard Law Review*. June, 1962.

Dempsey, Paul. Liberalism-Conservatism and Party Loyalty in the U. S. Senate. *Journal of Social Psychology*. April, 1962.

Dewey, Donald O. Madison's Views on Electoral Reform. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Flinn, Thomas A. How Mr. Nixon Took Ohio: A Short Reply to Senator Kennedy's Question. *Ibid.* June, 1962.

Frawley, Ernest D. TV and Public Service: A Proposal for Action. *Harvard Business Review*. May-June, 1962.

Frisch, Morton J. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Problem of Democratic Liberty. *Ethics*. April, 1962.

Froman, Lewis A., Jr. Learning Political Attitudes. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Galligan, David J. Program for Citizens [in Practical Politics]. *National Civic Review*. June, 1962.

Gilbert, Charles E., and Christopher Clague. Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities. *Journal of Politics*. May, 1962.

Goldsmith, Adolph O. The Roaring Lion of Vermont. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Graham, Jean Charters. Patronage—Fact and Fancy. *Public Personnel Review*. April, 1962.

Greenberg, Bradley S., and Percy H. Tannenbaum. Communicator Performance under Cognitive Stress. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Haglund, Donn K. The Alaska Marine Highway Referendum: A Case Study in Sectionalism. *Social Science*. April, 1962.

Henderson, Keith M. The Politics of Answering Interview Questions. *American Behavioral Scientist*. May, 1962.

Jacob, Philip E., and James J. Flink. Values and Their Function in Decision-Making. *Ibid.* Supplement.

Johnson, Benton. Ascetic Protestantism and Political Preference. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Jones, Charles O. A Suggested Scheme for Classifying Congressional Campaigns. *Ibid.*

Kerr, Harry P. The Election Sermon: Primer for Revolutionaries. *Speech Monographs*. March, 1962.

Levin, Murray B., and Murray Eden. Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Moore, Joan W. Social Deprivation and Advantage as Sources of Political Values. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.

O'Brien, George Dennis. State, Academy, and Church. *Journal of Religion*. April, 1962.

Pole, J. R. Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy. *American Historical Review*. April, 1962.

The Question of Poll Taxes and Literacy Tests. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest*. May, 1962.

Ross, Hugh. Roosevelt's Third-Term Nomination. *Mid-America*. April, 1962.

Roucek, Joseph S. Political Limits of Cultural Pluralism. *Issues*. Spring, 1962.

Scheinberg, Stephen J. Theodore Roosevelt and the A. F. of L.'s Entry into Politics, 1906-1908. *Labor History*. Spring, 1962.

Takács, Lajos. A Generalization of the Ballot Problem and Its Application in the Theory of Queues. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. June, 1962.

Wilcox, Walter. The Press of the Radical Right: An Exploratory Analysis. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Williams, Donald E. Charles G. Dawes: The Conscience of Normalcy. *Speech Monographs*. March, 1962.

Wimer, Kurt. Woodrow Wilson and a Third Nomination. *Pennsylvania History*. April, 1962.

#### Economic and Social Functions

##### *National Economy*

Brandt, Karl. Economic Conditions for a Free Society. *Modern Age*. Spring, 1962.

Chase, Sam B., Jr. Tax Credits for Investment Spending. *National Tax Journal*. March, 1962.

Goffman, Irving J. The Taxation of Capital Gains: An Economic Analysis. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. May, 1962.

Goode, Richard. Critique of Public Finance.

*Harvard Business Review*. May-June, 1962.

Hansen, Reed R. An Empirical Analysis of the Retail Sales Tax with Policy Recommendations. *National Tax Journal*. March, 1962.

Hazard, Leland. Can We Afford Our National Goals? *Harvard Business Review*. May-June, 1962.

Hirschman, Albert O., and Charles E. Lindblom. Economic Development, Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views. *Behavioral Science*. April, 1962.

Miller, William L. The Magnitude of the Discount Rate for Government Projects. *Southern Economic Journal*. April, 1962.

Moonitz, Maurice. Should We Discard the Income Concept? *Accounting Review*. April, 1962.

Schlesinger, James R. Emerging Attitudes toward Fiscal Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Tax Problems. [Symposium.] *American Economic Review*. May, 1962.

Thompson, John H., et al. Toward a Geography of Economic Health: The Case of New York State. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. March, 1962.

White, William H. Illusions in the Marginal Investment Subsidy. *National Tax Journal*. March, 1962.

#### Natural Resources

Economics of Water Resource Use. [Symposium.] *American Economic Review*. May, 1962.

Fox, Irving K., and Lyle E. Craine. Organizational Arrangements for Water Development. *Natural Resources Journal*. April, 1962.

Hall, George R. Conservation as a Public Policy Goal. *Yale Review*. Spring, 1962.

Hamilton, Roy. The Senate Committee on National Water Resources: An Ethical and Rational Criticism. *Natural Resources Journal*. April, 1962.

Krieger, James H., and Harvey O. Banks. Ground Water Basin Management. *California Law Review*. March, 1962.

O'Connell, Jeffrey. Iowa's New Water Statute—The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing Uses of Water. *Iowa Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Ostrom, Vincent. The Water Economy and Its Organization. *Natural Resources Journal*. April, 1962.

#### Agriculture

Chambers, Clarke A. The Cooperative League of the United States of America, 1916-1961: A Study of Social Theory and Social Action. *Agricultural History*. April, 1962.

The County Officials' Guide to the U. S. Department of Agriculture. *County Officer*. May, 1962.

Fite, Gilbert C. Farmer Opinion and the

Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. March, 1962.

The Political Impasse in Farm Support Legislation. *Yale Law Journal*. April, 1962.

Scruggs, Otey M. The Bracero Program under the Farm Security Administration, 1942-1943. *Labor History*. Spring, 1962.

#### Business and Labor

Aaron, Benjamin. Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy. *University of California, Los Angeles, Law Review*. March, 1962.

———. Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights. *Harvard Law Review*. June, 1962.

The Admissibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1962.

Balmer, Donald G. The Role of Political Leadership in the Passage of Oregon's Migratory Labor Legislation. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Berle, Adolf A. Modern Functions of the Corporate System. *Columbia Law Review*. March, 1962.

Broker Silence and Rule 10b-5: Expanding the Duty to Disclose. *Yale Law Journal*. March, 1962.

Coons, John E. Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense. *Northwestern University Law Review*. January-February, 1962.

Dakin, Melvin G. The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation: Just Compensation, Due Process, and Equal Protection. *Tulane Law Review*. April, 1962.

Day, Richard E. Exclusive Territorial Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws—A Reappraisal. *North Carolina Law Review*. February, 1962.

Dolan, James V., and Richard S. Rebeck. Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of Company Policy. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Feldesman, William. The Supreme Court and Collective Bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. *Labor Law Journal*. May, 1962.

Forkosch, Morris D. The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its Modern Application to Labor: II. *Texas Law Review*. April, 1962.

Gellhorn, Walter, and Louis Lauer. Administration of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law. Part II. *New York University Law Review*. April, 1962.

Gordon, Joseph A. The Rights of the Taxpayer to Withhold Records during a Tax Investigation. *Boston University Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Gould, William B. Taft-Hartley Revisited: The Contrariety of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Plight of the Unorganized. *Labor Law Journal*. May, 1962.

Graves, Glenn R. The Agency Shop vs. the



"Right to Work." *Texas Law Review*. April, 1962.

Indemnification of the Corporate Official for fines and Expenses Resulting from Criminal Antitrust Litigation. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Kamm, Solomon M. Venue in Private Antitrust Suits. *New York University Law Review*. April, 1962.

Kaplan, Bernard I. The Asphalt Clause—A New Weapon in Antitrust Enforcement. *Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Klebaner, Benjamin J. Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers. *Indiana Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Kohn, James A. The Antidumping Act: Its Administration and Place in American Trade Policy. *Michigan Law Review*. February, 1962.

Kreindler, Lee S. Admissibility and Effect of Government Approval and Certification of Aircraft. *Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Lindsey, John M. The Legislative Development of Civil Aviation, 1938–1958. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*. Winter, 1961–62.

Manne, Henry G. The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation. *Columbia Law Review*. March, 1962.

Marcus, Philip. The Big Antitrust Case in the Appellate Courts. *Northwestern University Law Review*. January–February, 1962.

Marshall, Arthur M. Carrier Service and the Picket Line: A Dilemma. *Labor Law Journal*. April, 1962.

Matteoni, Norman E. A New Antitoxin to Advertising Artifice—Television Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission. *Notre Dame Lawyer*. May, 1962.

Paley, Robert J. Antitrust Pitfalls in Exclusive Dealing: Recent Developments under the Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts. *Ibid.*

Petro, Sylvester. Trade Unionism and the "Public Sector." *Modern Age*. Spring, 1962.

Private Recovery under the Robinson-Patman Act. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. March, 1962.

Rockefeller, Edwin S., and Robert L. Wald. Antitrust Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice: A Primer for Small Business. *Dickinson Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

The Role of State Law in Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions. *Harvard Law Review*. May, 1962.

Smith, Russell A. Arbitrability—the Arbitrator, the Courts and the Parties. *Arbitration Journal*. Vol. 17, No. 1. 1962.

Sovern, Michael I. The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination. *Columbia Law Review*. April, 1962.

Spielman, Lester. The Taft-Hartley Law: Its Effect on the Growth of the Labor Movement. *Labor Law Journal*. April, 1962.

Sturges, Wesley A., and Richard E. Reckson. Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems Arising from Their Coexistence. *Minnesota Law Review*. April, 1962.

Summers, Clyde W. American Legislation for Union Democracy. *Modern Law Review*. May, 1962.

Swihart, R. Dale. Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Wealth. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1962.

Transacting Business as a Basis for Venue over a Corporation under the Antitrust Laws. *Washington University Law Quarterly*. April, 1962.

Tucker, William H., and John H. O'Brien. The Public Interest in Railroad Mergers. *Boston University Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Weinstein, Jerome E. Problems in the Field of State Securities Regulation. *Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Weiss, Leo. Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

#### *Health, Education, and Welfare*

Boyer, William W. Sectarian Teachers in Wisconsin Public Schools: A Study in Administrative Decision Making. *Religious Education*. May–June, 1962.

Brestel, W. Christopher, Jr. The California Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Law. *California Law Review*. March, 1962.

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Recent Amendments. *Minnesota Law Review*. April, 1962.

Harrison, Joseph W. The Bible, the Constitution and Public Education. *Tennessee Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Moreland, W. D. State Statutes Affecting the Social Studies Curriculum. *Social Studies*. April, 1962.

Morrison, Joseph L. Josephus Daniels and the Bassett Academic Freedom Case. *Journalism Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Mulrooney, Keith F. Community Responsibility for Mental Health. *Public Management*. June, 1962.

Rada, Edward L. Capital Costs of Cal-Vet Housing. *National Tax Journal*. March, 1962.

Roemer, Ruth. Mental Health Legislation Affecting Patient Care. *Journal of Public Health*. April, 1962.

Shaffer, Helen B. Outdoor Recreation. *Editorial Research Reports*. May 9, 1962.

Wiener, Phyllis R. Doorbell-Ringing for a State Education Measure. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.

*Military Affairs and National Security*

Avins, Alfred. "Important Service" in Military Law. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. March, 1962.

Clayton, James L. Defense Spending: Key to California's Growth. *Western Political Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Disarmament and Coexistence. [Symposium.] *Current History*. May, 1962.

Dupré, J. Stefan, and W. Eric Gustafson. Contracting for Defense: Private Firms and the Public Interest. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Levine, Robert A. Breaking the Arms Stalemate. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. June, 1962.

McAuliffe, A. C. The Role of Local Government in Civil Defense. *County Officer*. April, 1962.

Newton, Isham G. The Negro and the National Guard. *Phylon*. Spring, 1962.

Sutton, John L. The German General Staff in U. S. Defense Policy. *Military Affairs*. Winter, 1961-62.

Warren, Earl. The Bill of Rights and the Military. *New York University Law Review*. April, 1962.

Wildavsky, Aaron B. Nuclear Clubs or Nuclear Wars. *Yale Review*. Spring, 1962.

Winston, Frank D. Criminal Responsibility and Mental Capacity under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. *Santa Clara Lawyer*. Winter, 1962.

Zawodny, J. K., ed. Unconventional Warfare. [Symposium.] *The Annals*. May, 1962.

## Government Documents

*Congress*

House. Committee on Agriculture. To Amend the Smith-Lever Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Education and Labor. Adult Basic Education. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 1551. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Amendments to Davis-Bacon Act, and a Bill to Establish a Work-Hours Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 1554. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Equal Pay for Equal Work. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 1714. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Federal Grants to States for Elementary and Secondary Schools. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. The Improvement of Educational Quality Act of 1962. Hearings before Sub-

committee. Also House Report No. 1752. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Integration in Public Education Programs. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Radiation Workers Compensation Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Special Education and Rehabilitation, 1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Government Operations. The Administration of Grants by the National Institutes of Health. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Civil Defense—1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Evaluation of the Donable Surplus Property Program. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Illegal Actions in the Construction of the Airfield at Fort Lee, Va. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Investigation and Study of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1962 (Office of Science and Technology—National Science Foundation). Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on House Administration. Federal Elections Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. National Cemetery Policy. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. All Channel Television Receivers and Deintermixture. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Child Health Institute. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Clear Channel Broadcast Stations. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Daytime Broadcast Stations. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Intensive Immunization Program. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Water Carrier Bulk Commodity Exemption; To Repeal Inland Waterways Corporation Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Abolition of Poll Tax in Federal Elections. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Improvement of Storm Forecasting

Procedures. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Higher Level Compensation for Postal Employees. Hearing. Also House Report No. 1722. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Improving Federal Transportation Statistics. House Report No. 1700. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Manpower Utilization in the Federal Government. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Public Works. Federal Highway Act of 1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Right-of-Way Acquisition Practices in Massachusetts. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Standby Improvement Act of 1962. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Patent Policies Relating to Aeronautical and Space Research. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications. House Doc. No. 398. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Direct Housing Loans. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Legislative Objectives of Veterans' Organizations. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Veterans' Administration Medical Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Ways and Means. Temporary Increase in Debt Ceiling. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Hearings. Also House Report No. 1818. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

House and Senate. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Review of AEC and Army Food Irradiation Programs. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Communications Satellite Legislation. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Urban Mass Transportation—1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Commerce. All-Channel Television Receivers. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1526. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Communications Satellite Legislation. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Study of the Domestic Textile Industry. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1314. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Finance. Advance Refunding and Debt Management. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Public Assistance Act of 1962. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Revenue Act of 1962. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Create a Commission on Science and Technology. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Functions of the General Accounting Office. Senate Doc. No. 96. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Pyramiding of Profits and Costs in the Missile Procurement Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Outdoor Recreation Act of 1962. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Antitrust Problems of the Space Satellite Communications System. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Appointment of Representatives. Senate Report No. 1449. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Constitutional Amendments. Senate Report No. 1305. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Constitutional Rights. Senate Report No. 1455. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Literacy Tests and Voter Requirements in Federal and State Elections. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Study of the Federal Judiciary System. Senate Report No. 1479. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Improvement of Educational Quality Act of 1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Work Hours Standards Act. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Public Works. Public Works Acceleration. Hearings. Also Senate Report No. 1358. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Rules and Administration. Depository Libraries. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Election Law Guidebook 1962: Summary of Federal and State Laws Regulating the Nomination and Election of United States Senators. Senate Doc. No. 86. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

#### *Other Federal*

Department of Agriculture. Farm Economics Division. Economic Research Service. Farmers and Urban Expansion: A Study of a Michigan Township. By Charles Press and Clarence J. Hein. 1962.

Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. State Sources of Data on Local Government Finances. 1962.

———. Governments Division. Compendium of State Government Finances in 1961. 1962.

———. Finances of Employee-Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments in 1961. 1962.

———. State Distribution of Public Employment in 1961. 1962.

———. Summary of State Government Finances in 1961. 1962.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Public Health Service. Office of the Surgeon General. PHS Public Advisory Groups: Authority, Structure, Functions. 1962.

President's Commission on Campaign Costs. Financing Presidential Campaigns. Report. 1962.

## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan.* By ROBERT A. SCALAPINO AND JUNNOSUKE MASUMI. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. ix, 190. Price \$3.75.)

Within the compass of a seemingly modest little book, the authors succeed in presenting an outstanding interpretation of the nature of party politics in contemporary Japan. The number of questions raised, the complexity of the factors analyzed, the wealth of evidence adduced, and the astuteness of the hypotheses advanced—all without clutter, confusion, or overcrowding—are remarkable for a work of this size.

The mass demonstrations of May-June 1960 serve both as the point of departure and as the concluding test case for this concise but wide-ranging study. Far from being Communist-inspired, anti-American, student riots, these demonstrations are shown to have been the greatest mass movement in Japan's political history, stemming from underlying domestic issues that pertain to the whole nature of Japanese politics. Thus the demonstrations "threw a strong spotlight on the changing character of Japanese politics and the continuing weaknesses of Japanese democracy."

The authors elaborate by examining the historical background, the general trends in postwar Japanese politics, the internal composition of Japanese parties, and the Japanese political process. In accordance with its announced design, the entire book manifests a strong historical sense which points up the cultural background, the element of timing in Japan's modernization,

and the concept of Japanese politics as a developmental process. Also the work goes beyond mere analysis to project meaningful hypotheses about the Japanese political process. Finally the concluding chapter constitutes a case study against which these hypotheses are tested.

In a work so rich and variegated, readers will probably differ as to what aspects are the most significant. At the risk of distortion through oversimplification, it might be ventured that the main theme is the problem of reconciling borrowed political institutions with native social conditions. This dichotomy, however, is not simple. The borrowed political institutions are in effect being modified by the penetration of indigenous procedures, while the native social institutions are undergoing constant "Westernization," or, more accurately, modernization. At any time there is the necessity of finding some arrangement to bridge the differences between the two as they constantly shift in their relationship to each other.

Historically it has generally been the borrowed political institutions that had to be drastically modified to adjust them to the continuing "feudalistic" aspects of Japanese society. The political parties in particular thus took shape as closed groups operating in a closed society. Recently, however, accelerating socio-economic changes are so transforming Japanese society that it is now the political institutions that are lagging behind. While some contrary aspects persist, Japan has now become essentially an open mass society in which the established political components paradoxically continue to remain exclusive closed

groups. Until this anomaly is corrected, Japan will suffer from dangerous tensions.

The characteristics of the closed party system are examined in considerable detail, supported by 24 pages of statistical data. The new open nature of Japanese society does not receive comparable attention. The preponderantly big business orientation of the conservative Liberal-Democratic party, and the almost exclusive identification of the Socialist party with one section of organized labor, are seen as conducive to class warfare. At the same time both parties are disclosed as being loose coalitions of tight little leader-follower groups more loyal to their respective factional interests than to their party, thus adding the instability of intra-party fragmentation to the tension of inter-party polarization. The so-called one-and-a-half party system—in which the conservatives, appealing almost as much to little business and agriculture as to big business, can always outvote the narrowly labor-class socialists—tempts the conservatives to arrogant abuse of parliamentary power and the socialists to forlorn resort to extra-parliamentary obstructionism, resulting in threats to democracy from both directions.

Meanwhile the recent socio-economic changes have created a large mass of intellectuals, technicians, white collar workers, people in the service trades, unorganized labor, and others who fail to find adequate representation in the existing closed party structure, who see no satisfying alternative as between the two major parties, and who are consequently alienated from the established political system. Whenever these politically unorganized but increasingly politically expectant classes are catalyzed by a special set of circumstances into united action, there is likely to be an explosive crisis. Some hope is seen in the emergence of multiple-interest, mass-based groups which will affiliate with political parties and so change the nature of the parties as to correct the imbalance between politics and society.

Stated thus baldly, these may not be especially startling ideas, but they are expounded with the cogency and insight one has come to expect of Professor Scalapino from his earlier masterly study of the prewar Japanese parties. This time the collaboration of a capable Japanese colleague lends added verisimilitude to the work.—KAZUO KAWAI, *The Ohio State University*.

*The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan.* By DOUGLAS H. MENDEL, JR. With a foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. xv, 269. \$6.50.)

Professor Mendel describes the foreign policy

issues faced by Japan, Japanese public opinion concerning these issues, and the implications of popular attitudes for policy makers. In 1953 and 1957, Dr. Mendel hired and supervised teams of university students who personally interviewed samples of 500 voters for about one hour each. To discover rural-urban differences, his surveys were conducted both in a typical farming community (Izumo) and a metropolis (Osaka). Dietmen, prefectural governors, mayors, and municipal assemblymen were also interviewed. The polls of other investigators, notably of Lloyd Free and the *Asahi Shimbun*, are frequently cited, and they tend to confirm Mendel's own data. Popular attitudes remained fairly stable during the period covered. The Japanese public appears to be more divided over basic foreign policy issues than are Americans.

Dr. Mendel omitted nonvoters from his tables "because they tend to be inactive politically, disinterested in foreign affairs and usually made no response to questions." Since the normally apathetic may sometimes be mobilized for political purposes and may often be counted upon to support the decisions of others, it would seem that the attitudes of these "semisovereign people" might bear some study. "Politically inactive" people sometimes hold the political balance of power with surprising results for pollsters. The author frequently uses the plurality index, which shows the percentage spread between yes and no answers rather than indicating the percentages of yeses and noes. This somewhat confusing device has the advantage of simplifying many of the charts, but unfortunately fails to indicate the percentage of "don't know" answers.

Some of the data yielded by the surveys may come as a surprise even to fairly well informed observers of Japanese politics, but there seems little ground to dispute the accuracy of the statistical data. Much more work remains to be done, as Dr. Mendel suggests, in the scientific analysis of *why* people answered the pollsters as they did. It is, of course, difficult to measure the intensity of views or the propensity to action by means of questionnaires alone. Here Dr. Mendel has not come up with much quantified data, but does provide the reader with educated guesses.

Considerations of space apparently prevent the author from analyzing in depth the role of public opinion in the political decision-making process in Japan. The strikes and demonstrations against the U. S.-Japan Security Pact in 1960 made it clear that the foreign policies of the Government ran counter to the views of a substantial number of people. One is today tempted to view with some reservations Professor (now Ambassador) Reischauer's assertion in his foreword that on the whole the domestic and foreign policies of the

Japanese government appear to reflect "quite accurately" the general attitudes of the Japanese people. Partly because of the failure of the government in 1960 to appreciate what popular attitudes were, President Eisenhower's visit to Japan had to be cancelled and Premier Kishi had to resign. It appears that the Japanese government may occasionally disregard popular attitudes and adopt important foreign policies which have little or no support in public opinion. The government may assume such an autocratic posture because, in Diet elections, personal and domestic issues are often of greater importance than foreign policy issues.

The scope of Dr. Mendel's study is very broad, and he has apparently left no aspect of public opinion on foreign policy untouched. The richness of his data permits him to discover subtle nuances in attitudes and to relate these attitudes to specific age, educational, sex, and socioeconomic groups.

He finds, for example, that women are vastly more pacifist and neutralist in their views on rearmament and alliance than are men. Younger, better educated, and urban groups are much less favorably disposed to the American alliance than the older, less educated, and rural groups. It would appear that as this neutralist youth matures and the country becomes better educated and more urbanized, Japan may become less oriented towards America. The United States appears to be the favorite foreign country and the Soviet Union the most disliked of the respondents. There is widespread criticism in Japan of specific American policies, such as the maintenance of United States air bases in Japan, nuclear tests, and the occupation of Okinawa, but the principal complaint of the Japanese is the "selfish superiority" of the Americans. While Liberal-Democratic leaders are prone to support the revision of the disarmament clause of the Constitution, almost half of the Liberal-Democratic voters oppose the proposed revision. Public opinion on constitutional amendment, of course, is decisive, because proposed amendments must be submitted to popular referendum.

The book contains maps illustrating Japan's territorial disputes with South Korea (the Rhee Line and Takeshima), the Soviet Union (the Kurile, Shikotan, and Habomai Islands), and the United States (Okinawa and the Bonins). The data which Professor Mendel has painstakingly assembled is effectively presented and constitutes an important contribution to our understanding of Japanese political behavior and foreign policy. —THEODORE McNELLY, *University of Maryland*.

*The Chinese Anarchist Movement.* BY ROBERT A. SCALAPINO AND GEORGE T. YU. (Berkeley. Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1961. pp. v+81. Paper.)

A good deal of work has recently been done in the United States on the intellectual history of modern China and the University of California has been specially active in this. Though the Chinese anarchist movement died out in the 1920's it was an influence in the general ferment of ideas in the first quarter of this century when active discussion among all sorts of revolutionary groups influenced the thinking of the generation which still rules China.

As the authors point out, "It is most significant that the Chinese intellectuals had so short a time to adjust to the political currents of the modern world." While "The Japanese intellectual had had some four decades of Mill, Locke, Burke and Rousseau before he got the Fabians, Kropotkin, or Marx," only a few Chinese intellectuals had much contact with the West before the beginning of this century and not many until after the 1911 revolution. "Then in less than a decade—and a decade filled with extraordinary political chaos—they were forced to cope with an unending variety of new, often conflicting ideas."

At the beginning of this century Anarcho-Syndicalism was a powerful force in the revolutionary movement in Western Europe and it is not surprising that the main inspiration of the Chinese anarchist movement came from France. In 1902 over twenty students travelled to France with a new Chinese Minister and two of these, from upper class Chinese families, became converts to anarchism. They were deeply influenced by Darwinism and the general prestige of science and attracted by the ideas of Kropotkin and Reclus. Anarchism seemed for them to be the "wave of the future," and their convictions became a strongly felt faith. The members of the Chinese anarchist movement adopted a code of personal austerity and devoted their efforts and resources to the cause, these efforts including the publication of a periodical and schemes to bring Chinese students to France.

The other inspiration of Chinese anarchism came from the anarchist movement in Japan. The movement was, therefore, largely a movement of Chinese students overseas reacting violently against the Chinese tradition and seeking the newest fashion in Western ideas as a new basis but also, in many cases, deeply influenced by the Chinese tradition in which they had been educated and trying to find some basis for their new ideas in the Chinese classical tradition.

After the 1911 revolution many of these students returned to China and formed the "Society to Advance Morality" with various grades of membership of which the higher ones were pledged not to take any part in government. The authors suggest that this had some adverse effect on the early republic by leading some of the few men available with competence and high

standards of morality to refuse official responsibilities.

The high point of anarchism in China came in the years from 1916 to 1920. Thereafter it lost out in competition with Leninist Communism, both in China and among the Chinese students in Europe. Leninism offered a more effective programme of action and was more willing to appeal to nationalism.

The authors give a fairly long account of a controversy between Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, and an anarchist spokesman, Ou Sheng-pai. To meet the anarchist case, Ch'en had to make explicit the authoritarian aspects of the Leninist position—the masses, backward and emotionally unstable, could only be saved through "strict interference" by an "enlightened despotism." One can see echoes of the classical Chinese dispute between the Confucian view that man was by nature good and the Legalist view, here represented by Ch'en that man was by nature evil and could only be reformed by strict government. As in the China of two thousand years ago, the despotic Legalist system has been victorious, but the authors end by suggesting that anarchism represented the goal of "complete freedom for self realization within the limits of social justice" which has also been part of the Chinese tradition.—MICHAEL LINDSAY, *American University*.

*Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960.* By J. D. LEGGE. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961. Pp. xiii, 291. \$5.00.)

One of the most difficult problems confronting Indonesia since independence has been the development of a satisfactory and effective relationship between the centre and the constituent parts of the archipelago. In this carefully documented book, one in the series published under the auspices of the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell, Professor J. D. Legge of Monash University in Victoria, Australia, has sought to deal with the emergence of the system of local administration in Indonesia during the crucial years of 1950-1960.

In a nation of 90,000,000 people, 55,000,000 of them on the island of Java and the rest widely scattered about the islands, the problem of the administrative relationship between the central authority and local units would be certain to be a challenge. Mix this with the fact that Indonesia has a host of diverse ethnic groups and many different languages. Set it against a background of traditional autonomy for many of the local areas. Do this and the motto of the Republic, "Unity in Diversity," becomes more meaningful. It also helps to explain why local administration

in Indonesia has had such an uncertain development thus far.

When the Dutch and Indonesians finally agreed to Indonesian independence in 1949, it was as a federal republic, The United States of Indonesia, that Indonesia was born into the family of nations. From the very beginning, the Indonesians professed distaste for this federal arrangement. This reviewer, who was in Indonesia at the time, can attest to the fervor with which the Djakarta government attacked the federal system; perhaps only the Irian issue has drawn such concentrated central government fire. In less than a year, the federal form had been abolished and a unitary form of government established.

Professor Legge, who made four visits to Indonesia between 1956 and 1960, painstakingly reviews the efforts of the Indonesian government to do two things: one to grant local areas as much autonomy as possible, and the second to enforce the authority of the central government in all areas. That these two goals have often proven difficult to reconcile in practice is shown through the experience with various legislative acts and presidential edicts.

RI Law 22 of 1948 of the original Republic of Indonesia, NIT Law 44 of 1950 for the State of East Indonesia, and Law 1 of 1957 were the main enactments dealing with local administration: the law of 1957 was the "high-water mark" in legislation for local areas. The provisions of these laws are analyzed in considerable detail by the author. Extracts from them are also reproduced in the Appendix to the book. A very useful "Glossary of Indonesian Terms" is also appended.

After tracing the modern origins of Indonesian local government, Legge devotes separate chapters to the areas and units involved, the role of the regional head or *kepala daerah*, the development of local councils, and the powers of both regional heads and councils. He also treats the problem of the development of the civil service at local levels, the matter of financing local administration, and the factor of regional feeling. His discussion of the role of the *pamong praja* (territorial administrative service of the central government) is especially acute.

In Law 1 of 1957, it was stated that "The regional government is composed of the regional representative council and the regional executive council." Much of the story of local government in Indonesia since independence can be told through the analysis of what this statement came to mean in practice. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) or Regional Representative Council and the Dewan Pemerintah Daerah (DPD) or Regional Executive Council were both intended to bring about greater local participation in government and for some months there were signs of progress in this regard.

But along with the formal steps towards greater local participation, there were also other developments which did not bode well for the cause of local government. Various Army colonels in Sumatra and Sulawesi assumed the leadership in 1956 and 1957 of dissident movements directed against the central government. In February 1958 the so-called "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia" was proclaimed in Padang. The author feels that while a desire for greater local autonomy was involved in many of these struggles, other factors were also responsible.

Whatever the exact motivation for these uprisings may have been, the response of the central government in Djakarta was significant for local government. Under his concept of "guided democracy," President Sukarno announced that Indonesia was returning to the Constitution of 1945. Parliament was suspended and the role of political parties curtailed. In September 1959, a Presidential Edict No. 6, announced important modifications of the basic law 1/57 for local government. The controls of the central government over local units were drastically tightened. The move towards greater local autonomy was definitely halted.

Legge's book provides a valuable insight into the efforts of one new Asian state to develop satisfactory institutions of local government. It is a book primarily for the specialist; it should also be of use to Indonesian authorities involved in local government affairs. The book emphasizes the study of forms to a great degree, as the author himself points out. Later study may permit greater attention to the actual workings of Indonesian local government, but this is a first rate study of a complex and important subject.—EDWARD W. MILL, *Occidental College*.

*Venezuela*. By EDWIN LIEUWEN. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. x, 193. \$4.00.)

Area specialists, students, and those simply curious about the prospects of the Alliance for Progress can all be grateful for this most recent addition to the series of introductory Latin American country studies sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Consistent with the format established in earlier volumes, the author deals briefly but perceptively with the geographic and social setting, history, economy, political dynamics and international relations of Venezuela, a country important at present not so much for the strategic significance of its enormous petroleum and iron ore wealth as for its crucial relation to that very vital question: Can fundamental social and economic reform be achieved in Latin America within the context of democratic procedures and institutions? In a very real sense,

the contest between democratic and totalitarian techniques of development and reform, more familiar to most of us in the competition between India and Communist China, is being fought as strenuously, although on a smaller scale, between the Venezuela of Rómulo Betancourt and the Cuba of Fidel Castro. The still heterogeneous forces of reform in the remainder of Latin America will not be indifferent to the outcome. The radical nature of the experiment is indicated by the author's contention that "the key to understanding contemporary Venezuela is to appreciate the inexorable, but for the most part non-violent, social revolution that has been sweeping that nation since the end of the Second World War. In this process, the class structure is being altered; wealth and property are being redistributed; the economy is being transformed; institutions are undergoing drastic changes, and political processes have come under the control, for the first time, of genuine reform elements." Given the country's history of militarist tyranny and the persistence of powerful opposition from both the traditional political right—certain segments of the military, the landowning aristocracy and the conservative faction of the Church—and the radical left, it is unhappily only too clear that the efforts of President Betancourt and the Acción Democrática party enjoy no guarantee of success. Nevertheless, Professor Lieuwen's treatment affords evidence which justifies a guarded optimism.

In view of the brevity required in a handbook of this sort, it is inevitable that some of the author's judgments will seem to the specialist insufficiently established or qualified. The course of events resulting in the revolution of 1945, and the actual extent of Acción Democrática's social, economic and political achievement from 1945 until its overthrow in 1948, for example, are subject to somewhat more controversy than the casual reader would gather from this account. Particularly with respect to the latter, a less exclusive reliance on Betancourt's own massive apologia, *Venezuela: Política y petróleo*, would have been advisable. To refer to a very minor point, this reviewer would also like to suggest that not even the notoriously unreliable character of Latin American statistics can justify including the village of Lagunillas in the list of principal Venezuela cities with an alleged population of 200,000. Something on the order of 5,000 would be considerably more probable. Such criticisms—perhaps quibbles would be a better term—can detract little, however, from Professor Lieuwen's excellent and skillful summary of a situation so complex and a range of materials so varied. He is to be congratulated on a job very well done.—RICHARD D. BAKER, *University of Oklahoma*.



*Government and Politics of Uruguay.* By PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR. (New Orleans: Tulane University, Department of Political Science, 1960. Pp. 285. \$3.00.)

Professor Taylor has provided us with a carefully written report on key aspects of government and politics in a small, relatively advanced republic of Latin America. There is much emphasis on description of institutions and evaluation of policy as well as a wealth of data useful to those interested in development of analytical schemes for cross-cultural examination of political phenomena.

The report is essentially pessimistic in contrast with some earlier studies. The author is telling us that failure to make painful adjustments can only lead to intensification of growing currents of violence with consequent hazards for political stability and moderate government.

Most strategic aspects of Uruguayan political groups and governmental institutions in the 1960's clearly bear the mark of the gifted statesman, José Batlle y Ordoñez, who dominated the country's politics for the greater part of the first half of our century. Since Batlle's death in 1929, the complexity of the system has increased to the point that its operation mystifies most Uruguayans outside those making a career of politics. The result has been a widespread sense of futility in the face of clearly felt need for change.

Too much effort has been directed toward establishment of machinery for temporary accommodation of group interests and too little attention has been given the need for decision-making capability with regard to basic reforms. The "pact of the parties" has never produced power distribution arrangements supported by permanent consensus and has remained a stopgap device for dividing governmental spoils and control. Proportional representation has not helped to mobilize popular support behind the coherent, enduring majorities so necessary for solving basic problems. Under PR it is not uncommon to have a national party, a national party fraction or sub-party and territorial subparties all proposing lists of candidates. Aside from the small, disciplined "ideological parties"—the Communists, the Socialists and the Catholics—the pattern of fluidity in formation and dissolution of coalitions is the keynote of politics.

Hundreds of organized special interests have thrived on this fragmented party situation and parties and subparties have come to depend upon financial and voting support of the special groups. The plural executive for which Uruguay has received such notoriety among students of government has not had a mitigating effect upon the general picture of fragmented power since the majority group of the so-called National Council

of Government generally is divided on major policy questions and is unable to provide the necessary leadership for legislative action.

Inflation, poverty and the threat of revolution, Castro style or Fascist style, have increased significantly during the past five years; but it is difficult to change. Interests have been built upon poor administration of government services and enterprises and upon inadequate budgeting and accounting arrangements. Improvements in these areas might help; so would some concern for austerity, e.g., cutbacks in government services, surplus personnel and subsidies. The crux of the matter has been, and continues to be, the incapacity to make decisions that hurt the powerful interests, i.e., the incapacity of government to mobilize the power necessary to promote a more effectively functioning society.

—L. VINCENT PADGETT, *San Diego State College*

*Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara.* By HERBERT J. SPIRO. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Pp. vi, 185. \$1.95.)

The pace of development of the political process in tropical Africa is proving a sharp challenge to practitioners of the techniques of comparative government. Herbert J. Spiro accepts the practicality of imposing a formal schemata for the interpretation of the turbulent events of the past decade. "To identify the most persistent political patterns in the new states and the independence movements that brought about their establishment I have used the method worked out in my *Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy*. . . . Before examining the degree of success achieved along methodological lines, the value of the book as a lively account of the impressions gained by an exceptionally well equipped scholar from a year's experience in sub-Saharan Africa in 1959-60 should be stressed. Shrewd judgments and imaginative flair combined with meticulous preparation have produced some notable observations on current African politics. However, the author is entitled to an evaluation based on his objective, which was to provide a new perspective for understanding the African political scene in relation to the rest of the world.

In *Government by Constitution*, Spiro stresses the importance of prevailing values. "Prevailing values—the goals in pursuit of which people act in politics—affect the functions of seemingly similar institutions. More than that, dominant values shape the very raw material of politics: the problems that the political system is facing." This viewpoint leads to the conclusion that "completely novel types of political association may be coming to life in Africa." Judgment of the African political process in terms of Western constitutionalism is considered inadequate. This provides

a healthy and exciting start to a fresh appraisal of African governmental processes. Presumably the next step would be to outline the nature and specific character of both "prevailing" and "dominant" values in current African society. It is on this point that the author's method as applied to the African situation must come under question. What are the opportunities for a Western scholar from a background of university life in the United States to assess dominant values of a culture as ill documented as that of tropical Africa? Spiro gives somewhat cavalier treatment to the contributions from the period of colonial administration on the grounds that "they concentrated on the apparently static aspects of 'native' society, which could be manipulated in the interest of the European administration." Possibly true, but what are the alternatives to the experience of decades in the field, accepting responsibility for the solution of day to day problems?

De Tocqueville comes immediately to mind, and we could wish for the appearance of a modern counterpart on the African scene. Even a cursory reading of the French scholar impresses one with the degree of his reliance on the statistics and the governmental documentation of the times. Is there anything approaching a sufficiency of basic materials for a scholarly appraisal of the true objectives of African society at the present time? A glance at the selected bibliography at the end of the book is not reassuring, particularly in light of the omission, perhaps deliberate, of the classic *East Africa Royal Commission (1953-1955) Report*. To determine the true social values of an organized political group it seems essential to probe beneath rhetorical pretensions and discover how the group is prepared to allocate public funds. For example, one would hesitate to describe Britain as a social welfare state without reliance on budget figures open to analysis by competent experts. The budgets of independent African states do not as yet appear available in the open market place of scholarship. Though the author may not be blamed for failure to employ unobtainable information, the right to generalize in the absence of basic material is open to question. Descriptive material tracing institutional evolution from colonial bases still requires collection and arrangement, though it may appear a pedestrian approach. But in the main part of his work Spiro carries out this type of analysis in a penetrating manner. The methodology may fail to fulfil its promises in light of the lack of a sufficiency of the raw material of scholarship, but the capacity of the author to make valuable comments on the African scene is well sustained. THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University*.

*Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952.* By NADAV SAFRAN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 298. \$6.75.)

Nadav Safran, in this interpretative study of the political evolution of modern Egypt, has added a fifth book to the recent, yet already widely esteemed, collection of Harvard Middle Eastern Studies. He attempts here to analyze the basic cause of Egypt's instability which, as he correctly points out, lies in the conflict between traditional ideology and modern reality. He focuses attention on the evolution of ideas in Egypt from 1804 to 1952 using as the analytical structure of his work three historical-sociological propositions. The first is that "a political community cannot be viable and stable unless it is founded upon a more or less generally shared set of ideas, modes of thinking, norms and values"; the second is that "there is an intimate connection between material realities and modes of thought, ideas, norms and values"; the third suggests that there is "one experience which most, if not all, societies must undergo, and which nearly always exerts such pressure on the existing belief-system as to disrupt it and lead to the breakdown of the political community." This reviewer finds these propositions both relevant and applicable.

This objective and sympathetic study does not intend to measure results, but rather attempts to dissect the nature of the conflict and expose the efforts of modern Egyptian intellectual and political leaders to evolve an ideology adapted to modern realities in lieu of the "obsolescent traditional belief-system of Islam"; to elicit the difficulties they encountered, and the reaction which their artificial achievements provoked.

The book is divided into five parts. In Part I, "Modern Historical Evolution Versus Traditional Belief," the author analyzes the outstanding factors of the Islamic ideology which, up to the rise of Muhāmmad 'Ali, had controlled tightly the Egyptian political community, discovering that there existed certain possibilities for initiative in introducing new subjective norms. Then he reviews briefly the main economic, social and political transformations that took place there up to 1882, illustrating the challenge they constituted on the traditional Islamic ideological system. This challenge, one of the basic factors of the 'Urabi revolution, "consisted of a contradiction between the Islamic world view and the world view implicit in the new condition of life."

Part II is an excellent and thorough analysis of the "Main Trends of Ideological Evolution." Here, the author gives a just evaluation of the

impact of the West on Egyptian intellectual and political leaders since 1882, and describes the hasty and timid progress of Egyptian political thought by commenting on the works of outstanding Egyptian Islamic reformists and liberal nationalists. His explanation of the reasons for the failure of the liberal-Islamic program is thought-provoking.

Part III describes the "Triumph of the Liberal Nationalist Movement"; this victory is accurately attributed to a handful of Western-educated and Western-oriented leaders who managed to use advantageously the two elemental forces which moved the Egyptian masses, namely, xenophobia and privation. Safran rightly refuses to see in this triumph any expression of a popular consensus.

Moving on to more practical ground, he examines some of the government's actions which had a direct bearing on the relations between the modern state and traditional Islam in the period between 1919 and 1952.

Part IV focuses attention of the "Progress and Decline of Liberal Nationalism." It contains a chapter devoted to brief biographical sketches of important intellectual leaders. Safran then examines their work ably, showing how the progressive phase, Western in origins and orientation, motivated by a vigorous rationalist spirit and aided by propitious historical conditions, propelled the evolution of Egyptian political thought on a boldly liberal nationalist path. It could not sustain, however, an ominous head-on collision with the Muslim traditionalist forces because of the superficiality of its appeal and the artificiality of its foundations, and because it had become exceedingly vulnerable as a result of the ever-deteriorating historical conditions.

Part V, "The Threat of Traditional Reaction," elucidates certain aspects of the Moslem Brotherhood's program and ideology. Safran finds that because of the Liberal Nationalist's failure to develop a generally accepted ideology, explaining and justifying the existing order of things, a dangerous vacuum developed which the Brotherhood sought to fill with "faith." The final chapter contains some very relevant requisites for an eventual solution of Egypt's search for political community. It remains to be seen if the new regime of President Nasir is taking them into consideration; an answer to this question may be found in P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Army and Politics in the United Arab Republic* (1961).

The conclusion of Safran is unequivocal: "The leaders [have] failed to work out any such viable ideology." Safran, however, attempts to de-emphasize this conclusion by invoking several major extenuating circumstances: (1) Egypt "had to undergo change at a more accelerated rate

than the Christian West." (2) The forces of change were of foreign origin at a time when Egypt was under the sway of foreign imperialism. (3) Islam from the outset had been far more involved in "the politico-social order" than Christianity. These extenuating circumstances are the more convincing because throughout his study Safran compares Egypt to the Christian West in its earlier attempt to respond to the challenge of modernism.

Mr. Safran's ideas on the Islamic views of history have much in common with those of Gustav von Grunebaum, although the approach Safran adopted in his study is indeed original; for he does not, like H. A. R. Gibb, in *Modern Trends in Islam*, D. Lerner, in *The Passing of Traditional Society*, and W. C. Smith, in *Islam in Modern History*, approach his subject solely as an Islamist or a social scientist, but rather, in synthesizing all their views, he analyzes a particular Islamic society from both points of view. All in all, this book is a welcome and scholarly contribution that will be of interest to the Islamist, the political philosopher, and the social scientist and the historian as well as the student of comparative government. Safran's selection of primary sources is, indeed, impressive. This reviewer, however, cannot concur as to the sincerity of Victorian England's declaration of its intention to evacuate Egypt promptly. At any rate, such an argument is both polemic and irrelevant.—ALFRED G. GERTEINY, *St. John's University* (New York).

*Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings.* By ROY C. MACRIDIS AND BERNARD E. BROWN. (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 577. \$5.25, paper.)

This is an unusual volume of readings, unrivalled at present in the field of comparative politics. It is comprehensive in scope and varied in content. It contains traditional and modern readings, and opens its doors generously to the sister disciplines, such as social psychology, and particularly sociology. Perceptive, sophisticated, and well written, though at times over-condensed, introductory notes to the individual chapters weave together often seemingly incongruous material, and give the impression of continuity and coherence to a field of study which is actually in a state of flux.

This wide horizon is manifest also on another level: the various methods of analysis are applied to every kind of contemporary political system. This leads, unfortunately, to certain contradictions which cannot but confuse the beginner. They appear first in the introductory section in which the authors reveal their basic general conception, namely that "a political system is,

above all, a mechanism for the making of decisions," the efficiency of which "can be gauged in terms of its ability to make decisions which are widely accepted." This can be tested by looking into the responses governmental decisions will "elicit among the social groups, interest groups, and voluntary associations." So far so good. But how can one really say without misleading the as yet uninitiated reader that "in a totalitarian system the test is ultimately the same?"

This problem of giving democracies and totalitarian systems the same analytical treatment re-occurs from time to time. The authors state, for instance, that the "mass party" characterizes both modern democracies and dictatorships. In Great Britain and in the Soviet Union "the party remains the most important instrument used by social groups in their quest for power." This is, however, rather effectively contradicted later in this very book by Gabriel Almond, when he says that "the structure we call *party* in the totalitarian system is not a party at all" because it is the manifestation of a totally different political culture.

As one proceeds through this collection, three questions, which have irked the teacher of beginning courses in contemporary politics, constantly come to mind. The answers this volume suggests may be worth further thought. (1) At what point of undergraduate studies should one introduce theory and methods, and on what level of abstraction? If theory and method are necessary to the understanding of case studies, it must be done rather early in the game, no matter how difficult this seems to the student. If, however, theorizing takes place on a highly abstract level and is not followed by application to concrete instances, it may become a pedagogical dud. Pioneering moves in theory should be inspiring to the enterprising and—one hopes—knowledgeable graduate student, but could hopelessly confuse the beginner. (2) Should a highly comparative discussion precede or follow a country-by-country presentation? Here the reply seems clear: the more sophisticated and suggestive the comparative approach, the more it requires from the reader a general idea of the *Gestalt* of at least certain governments, which are representatives of the archetypes compared. (3) Finally, can democracies and totalitarian governments be compared within the same discussion? Clearly, the answer here is negative. While the present volume sheds light on some of the most intricate problems of democracies, totalitarian government seems to appear, on the whole, as a kind of foil. Nowhere can one find a really penetrating discussion of communist government in action, nor is there much attention paid to fascism. The more the

authors try to bring totalitarianism within the ken of their so highly comparative approach, the more it seems to elude them.

Clearly, however, for students who have already been exposed to a country-by-country study, this collection offers more stimulating, important and varied comparative analyses than have ever before been assembled in one volume.—GEORGE A. LANYI, *Oberlin College*.

*The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada.* BY JAMES EAYRS. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 232. \$6.95.)

Professor Eayrs prepared this study of historical developments and contemporary practices in the conduct of Canadian external affairs in conjunction with his participation in the program financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and sponsored by the School of International Service of the American University to investigate the making of foreign policy in various countries. Beginning with a discussion of the role played by the political executive, the author proceeds to examine various agencies concerned with foreign policy including the bureaucracy, Parliament, and the military. Concluding chapters deal with functions of a foreign service: intelligence, planning, negotiation, and propaganda. In these chapters there are some particularly acute comments on the Canadian experience in the modern world, where the diplomat must perform negotiating functions as in the past while also fulfilling the propaganda function in an age when technology has made it first possible and then necessary to address and persuade mass publics at home and abroad.

The development of the Department of External Affairs is expertly traced from its humble origins in a small office (above an Ottawa barber shop) staffed by a Deputy Minister, two clerks, and a secretary to the present large and efficient organization. Personalities of major political figures were an important factor in this development, as might be expected in a country where the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs was held by the Prime Minister until 1946. Consequently, the Prime Ministers adapted the Department of External Affairs to their own goals and operational methods. A considerable knowledge of Canadian politicians and domestic politics enables the author to analyze the making of foreign policy in the context of Canadian government. As W. L. Mackenzie King was Prime Minister longer than any one else, he left his own unique stamp upon the conduct of foreign policy. The picture which emerges is that for much of the twentieth century external affairs have been conducted by a remarkably able bureaucracy under

the suspicious eye of a Prime Minister guided by intuition and domestic political problems while occasionally referring to a Parliament largely indifferent and uninformed in the area of foreign affairs. No less than in other areas, King succeeded in attracting to external affairs a bureaucratic elite largely recruited from "promising young university graduates." Emphasis has been placed on the generalist rather than the specialist in the Department of External Affairs. Not only are members of this elite rotated among the major positions in the Department of External Affairs, but there is also considerable posting of key civil servants from one department to another for the filling of top administrative positions. Formal devices for achieving interdepartmental liaison are reinforced by the intimate and friendly relations among the senior bureaucrats and with many political leaders in the relatively small circle of the elite in Ottawa.

The scholarship represented by this volume is formidable, but presented in a most congenial format. It is apparent that the author is thoroughly familiar not only with Canadian sources but also with the broad spectrum of literature bearing upon his topic, so that he has examined the Canadian experience in the vista of the larger world and has reached conclusions valid to the analysis of other departments concerned with external affairs whether they be the State Department, the Foreign Office, or the recently created ministry of a newly established nation. Particularly in the areas of intelligence and planning the evaluations of the Canadian experience should be useful for anyone searching for general principles of foreign policy and its administration as well as for the specialist in Canadian affairs. There are, for example, cogent comments upon the assumptions with which planning is justified and upon reasons for planning in the liberal democracies.

Professor Eayrs has not hesitated to generalize about national characteristics in the formation of foreign policy so that there are some challenging insights such as in explaining that Canadian policy makers have described their endeavors as "cautious, patient, compromising, flexible" in accord with an ethic based on a non-revolutionary tradition different from that in the United States where "From the American revolutionary tradition derives that characteristically American belief that some swift and spectacular stroke may permanently solve problems which in their nature admit only of amelioration." This difference, the author believes, is part of the reason why Canada has not advocated the "crash program" and enunciated "doctrines" so popular south of the border. Through a pragmatic process of trial and error, the Canadian government, fully aware of

the role and limitations of a small power, has developed an effective technique for responding to particular external factors and situations and has made a virtue of the "art of the possible."—JOHN R. WILLIAMS, *West Virginia University*.

*Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning in Action.* By DANIEL R. MANDELKER. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Pp. 172. \$5.00.)

Contrary to the implication of the title, this study is not an examination of Green Belts as such, but an account of the way planning is administered in England. Green Belts are used as the focus, and applications to develop land are traced from their initial submission to the local planning committee through an appeal to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Green Belts are rings, sometimes several miles deep, around large cities which are kept free of urban development. English practice is contrasted with contemporary planning in the United States. The value of this approach is that it goes below the more frequently publicized policy aims of British planning and investigates the way the system actually works.

As in the United States planning decisions are largely decentralized to the local level. Here some of the similarity ends. The English development plan (a sort of combined zoning ordinance, subdivision ordinance, general land use plan, urban renewal program, and official street map) is wider in scope than a zoning ordinance, but less detailed and not legally binding. It is applied in a general manner by local planning committees and its application is subjected to internal review by the Ministry. External review by the courts, as is the American practice, is virtually non-existent. Professor Mandelker feels that internal administrative checks on local planning action compare favorably with external judicial review. At the same time he documents a need for improved procedures.

English development policy is most restrictive in the Green Belt areas. Even here, however, it is sometimes fuzzy and vague, leaving a great deal to administrative or local discretion. As a consequence there are radical variations in the way it is applied from place to place. Ministerial review of plans and appeals for development is *ad hoc* and has not served to clarify policy or establish precedent on which future action can be based. Further, ministerial directives have not served as a mechanism for clarifying policy. However, the keynote of British planning administration is flexibility. This is an advantage if not carried to its ultimate extreme of haphazard administration. There are in fact many inconsistencies in administration and the workload is staggering.

Administrative delay is common—almost standard operating procedure.

American planners overplan while their English counterparts underplan. Policies restricting development in the Green Belts around large metropolitan areas when combined with an otherwise flexible system of land control have accomplished much. These devices have prevented uneconomic exploitation of land on the periphery, compelled developers to use vacant lots where services are available, and limited sporadic and ribbon development. On the other hand, underplanning in concert with restrictive Green Belt policies have led to a number of serious problems. Existing towns and cities have filled up very rapidly causing an inflated demand for vacant land. Land prices have skyrocketed. Population growth has continued, outstripping the forecasts, and as a result redevelopment is lagging and housing shortages are mounting pressures for change.

This review of British experience is particularly timely for several reasons. First, there are some indications that American planning is moving toward a more flexible system of land control. Therefore it should be of considerable interest to persons considering this course of action. It goes beyond objectives and considers the practical aspects of a flexible system. The use of Green Belts as a focal point is also of current interest as a result of proposals for a federal aid program to preserve open space in our large metropolitan areas. It illustrates the impact of such a policy and documents its side-effects in a nation where open space is a much more critical commodity.

This is a short, well organized treatment of English planning presenting a relatively new approach to the subject, at least insofar as American readers are concerned. Nonetheless this is not a book that can be easily consumed at one sitting. The author successfully bridges the "terminology-gap" by presenting a concise glossary of terms.—G. ROSS STEPHENS, *University of Connecticut*.

*Parliament and Public Ownership.* By A. H. HANSON. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 248. Price \$4.80.)

In the United Kingdom, as Lowell long ago said, it is the cabinet that legislates, with the advice and consent of parliament. At the same time, no one questions the right of members of the legislature to investigate the activities of ministers in the government. As Lowell also noted, the cabinet administers subject to the constant supervision and criticism of the House of Commons. To what extent this principle affects the administration of publicly-owned industries is the subject of Mr. Hanson's book, published for the Hansard Society. Mr. Hanson recognizes

that it may be natural to progress from democracy to socialism to what constitutes a quasi-independent bureaucracy in fact. The thinking of the Labour Party braintrusts such as R. H. Tawney, G. D. H. Cole, and Lord Morrison progressed similarly from belief in politically controlled and/or worker-controlled socialized industries (public corporations were earlier termed examples of "capitalist nationalization") to a position very similar to that of the Conservative Party with regard to the B.B.C. and the L.P.T.B.

Mr. Hanson deals with the public corporation's development in idea and fact. At the end of the second world war there were two major factors of influence: the acceptance of the idea of planning and the election for the first time of a Labour Government with an absolute majority. But the T.U.C., largely ignoring past experience with the public corporation, definitely insisted on ministerial responsibility for the conduct of policy-making. The Coal Industry Nationalization Act of 1946 was drafted with this principle in mind, and was the subject of criticism by the Conservative Opposition. Labour's reply was that parliamentary control would diminish the need for statutory control. Discussion of nationalization bills themselves were more fruitful than subsequent debate on nationalized industries, although annual submission of the report and accounts on each industry provided regular opportunity for such debate. Question Time provides a further (and perhaps better) opportunity, and the author discusses this. Few questions have produced impressive information, although the matter of retention of miners' cottages by former miners no longer employed touched a "controversial issue." The doctrine that the minister might in many cases provide information while disclaiming responsibility received varying applications from Messrs. Shinwell and Gaitskell, and was interpreted by the Conservatives when they took office in 1951 differently from the way in which they had interpreted the doctrine when they were in opposition. The prospect held out when nationalized industries were new that "clearly defined conventions would gradually establish themselves has not materialized." Select Committees have been limited in the scope of their subject matter by the necessity of avoiding majority and minority reports if their authority is not to be jeopardized. The difference in Anglo-Saxon parliamentary tradition from that of continental Europe minimizes the value of taking foreign experience as a guide.

To one observer it seems odd that there is so little suggestion of the establishment in the United Kingdom of a parliamentary equivalent of the congressional investigating committee, to which

directors of public corporations could be summoned. In the United Kingdom there would be no question of executive privilege. But in the absence of such an inconvenience, the tradition that only members of parliament may be questioned by parliament provides, perhaps, an equally insurmountable obstacle, and Select Committees will continue to make "non-controversial" reports.—ARTHUR BUTLER DUGAN, *The University of the South*.

*Questions in Parliament*. By D. N. CHESTER AND NONA BOWRING. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Pp. vi, 335. \$5.60.)

Question time is as British as fish and chips and Hyde Park, and its quaintness and ritual have long attracted the American. Now we have a compendium of information about its development and use, particularly in the latter part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Warden Chester of Nuffield College and his research assistant, Mrs. Bowring, have explored fully the history of the constitutional rules, precedents and usages surrounding this unique institution. They pay particular attention to the developments of the first decade of this century when the present rules achieved something of their form and structure. They then explore its uses from both the Members' and the Ministers' roles.

Their most interesting finding is that in spite of an enormous growth of governmental activities and a much lessened role for the back bench, this form of back bench activity has not greatly increased in use since the days of the Liberal Governments of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith. They explain this, in part, by noting the greatly increased use of private correspondence between Members of Parliament and Ministers, and discuss the value of this form of seeking information and redress as opposed to putting an oral Question in the House. It is clear from their findings that today's M.P. is acquiring errand boy duties for his constituency analogous to those of his American counterpart. That these have not spilled over into a greater number of Questions and demands for an extended Question time surprises the authors and the reader.

The study takes up problems of the degree to which the Question Hour is an influential access for back bench interests and suggests some tentative answers to these questions. But the authors are very reluctant to utilize systematic and statistical techniques to order their mass of detail. They state their belief that each Question put to a Minister is unique, and each Ministerial reply and the set of following supplementary Questions and answers is a particular situation, making statistical analysis difficult if not misleading.

This reviewer, for one, wishes they had been more venturesome in this regard.

The study further suggests to me, without stating or developing the concept, that Parliamentary activity is often the outward sign of hidden activity. The authors do not consider the degree to which Questions are supplied by organized interests, or reflective of such, though they do go into the evidence that some are parts of party campaigns. There are numerous unconscious suggestions of that enormous part of the British political glacier below the ceremonial waters, but these are rarely followed through. The authors do reject the idea that Question Hour is an adequate reflection of the real concerns of back benchers at any one time, and for good reason. But to an American, the problem of reconciliation of particular with broader generalized interests which the British so take for granted is still open for investigation.

This work will probably remain for some time the best study of Questions in Parliament. It is so full of detail that those attempting to construct the shape of the British structure of interests and power may have to do some ferreting to find just what he desires. But the basic material and evidence are there, and we can thank Warden Chester for his long standing interest in this aspect of British politics.—JOHN H. MILLETT, *University of Wichita*.

*Party Politics (Volume III): The Stuff of Politics*. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 493. \$8.50.)

Efforts to synthesize knowledge from the diverse fields of history, philosophy and political science should almost always be applauded. *The Stuff of Politics* gives grounds for the qualification. Sir Ivor wisely notes in his introduction that this book could not have been written unless "the conventional boundaries of academic learning were ignored." Unfortunately, he has also ignored the substantive contributions which these disciplines could make to his attempt to grapple with the chief ideas of party politics in England since the Reformation.

Historians may be put off by the introduction, and underscore the author's admission that "little attention has been paid to primary sources." There is no sense of historical evolution, or even of chronology. The English Civil War, which provides a crucial test for his thesis, is nowhere treated entire. Only by ignoring events since 1918 has the author remained true to the English school of 'modern' history.

Philosophers will not regard this book as a study in philosophy, for Jennings claims he is dealing with politicians, who by definition have no ideas. Hobbes is mentioned only in passing, and

Harrington and T. H. Green are omitted. Joseph Chamberlain bulks far larger than the Utilitarians. Edmund Spenser merits a reference, but not Herbert Spencer. The author's dislike of defining concepts shows he has no time to waste on the linguistic philosophers.

Political scientists will recognize that Jennings is, if only in intention, a political behaviorist. Psychological explanations abound. Political ideas, we are repeatedly told, spring from emotion and inspire emotion; they have no rational basis. They are affectual instruments used by politicians in their perpetual struggle for power. Ideas are useful insofar as they produce favorable responses from voters. They change slowly through time, as new generations come forward. The ordinary person is slow to adapt his ways of thinking, and apathetic towards politics.

Buried within mountains of *obiter dicta* and quotes from pre-1939 secondary sources are sufficient ideas to sustain a reasonable essay on the persistence through the centuries of a common political culture in England. But in this sort of exercise almost everything depends upon how the points are made. (Cf. Professor Oakeshott's *Political Education*.) Jennings' style combines many different faults. First, there is the suggestive epigram which is left unexplored: "There is no Liberal who is not a little conservative, and no Conservative who is not a little liberal." Then there is the platitude: "Changes in the physical environment produce changes in social conventions; and conventions change even when there are no very evident changes in the physical environment." Frequently one finds statements which are accurate only if words are stretched beyond their breaking point: "Newspapers, magazines, books and broadcasts publish much the same ideas." Then there is the inaccurate statement: "One third of the electorate is over 48, one third under 38, and one third between 38 and 48." Legalistic interpretations abound: "The primary purpose of a fiscal law is to raise money for the Crown." Finally, and incessantly, the grating, patronizing chattiness: "The American colonies were juvenile delinquents who needed a good spanking."

The amount of space given to different issues and men is somewhat idiosyncratic. Ten pages are devoted to Ireland before 1690, and hardly two pages to the Commonwealth and Empire since 1918. Foreign policy in this century seems to be of no importance. Eden, rightly, is ignored, but so are Sir Eyre Crowe, Norman Angell, Lord Robert Cecil and the pacifists. Nothing much appears to have happened to the welfare state since the Education Act of 1902; the landmark Act of 1944 is ignored. Professor J. R. Seeley receives full attention as an historian and political

figure; Professor R. H. Tawney is ignored. But then, he is in good company in this. Phillip Snowden appears as an important figure in economics, and the ideas and influence of a mere bursar of Kings, J. M. Keynes, are passed over completely.

Anyone interested in an introduction to the subject which Jennings purports to treat would do far better to read the volumes on the English political tradition edited by Alan Bullock and F. W. D. Deakin or Dicey's *Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century*.—RICHARD ROSE, *University of Manchester*.

*The Administration of British Foreign Relations.*

By DONALD G. BISHOP. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961. Pp. 410. \$7.00.)

Professor Bishop has given us a most interesting and informative book which deals with the governmental structure and operations by which British foreign policy is formulated and administered.

In the opening chapter the nature of the general executive control of foreign relations is explored and detailed consideration is given to the constitutional powers over certain basic foreign affairs—the declaration of war, the making of treaties, and the recognition of new governments. Subsequent chapters are concerned with the role of the Monarch and how the King influences the control of foreign relations, the relations between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet and its influence upon foreign relations, Parliament and its efforts to control foreign affairs, the problem of maintaining continuity in foreign policy, and the role of public opinion and the press in policy determination. Key chapters deal with the organizational aspects and with administrative procedures and problems. Attention is devoted to the historical development of the Foreign Service during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the significant 1943 reforms are closely analyzed. Major personnel problems facing the Foreign Service are examined—recruitment, including efforts made to broaden the educational and social basis of selection, examination techniques, promotional criteria, and remuneration. The present administrative organization of the Foreign Office is described, emphasis being given to the geographical area, the functional subject, and administrative departments.

The analysis of how the Foreign Service actually operates is most informative. The author drawing upon historical materials gives the reader thumb nail sketches of a number of "typical" Foreign Secretaries, analyzes their duties, and charts the major responsibilities of their principal admin-



istrative aids—The Permanent Under-Secretary of State, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and Minister of State. In the overseas sphere, the work of the embassies is dealt with, particularly the issuance and carrying out of diplomatic instructions, the principal duties of diplomats, and the work of the Consular Service. The Foreign Office possesses no monopoly of control over "foreign affairs." Actually, the entire gamut of governmental affairs is involved, particularly the work of the Treasury, the Defense Departments, Board of Trade, and the Home Office.

Professor Bishop concludes that in the future four major problems confront the British government in the conduct and administration of foreign affairs. And, interestingly enough, these are the same problems which continually concern our own leaders and those of other major democratic nations. The first of these is a pressing need to secure the continuous co-ordination of the policies of the various ministries and departments, as they relate to foreign affairs, with the work of the Foreign Office. Today there is a high degree of intermingling of "foreign" and "domestic" problems. Few governmental activities can be exclusively classified as purely "domestic." Another important problem involves the recent democratization of the control of foreign affairs. Since the decline of the Monarch's power, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have been responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. The Cabinet, as a whole, has less real control over foreign affairs than the theory of parliamentary government indicates, and individual members, although they may be well informed of developments, are often unable to influence the making of decisions and must rely primarily upon the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. "Parliament has developed a new and considerable interest in foreign relations," Dr. Bishop observes, "though it has not yet found any effective way to control them." The achievement of continuity in foreign policy has been made possible by the development of a high degree of party responsibility, so that except in isolated instances government proposals are almost certain of approval by the House of Commons. In the modern day issues of foreign policy are openly debated in the Parliament, in the press and in a variety of forums throughout the country. Public opinion affects the making of foreign policy more than in earlier periods, and the Foreign Office of necessity must devote more attention to shaping and cultivating public attitudes. The desire of the press to publish as much news as possible and the necessity of the government to conduct its relations with foreign nations in secrecy still constitute an unsettled dilemma.

The third problem, that of devising the most

effective form of organization for the conduct of foreign relations, is one concerning which most progress has been made. The reorganizations which took place after the end of World War II have done much to raise the administrative efficiency of the Foreign Service to new high levels. The fourth and final problem is the development of a staff broad-visioned enough to deal with the increased scope of foreign affairs in the contemporary world.—JOHN S. HARRIS, *University of Massachusetts*.

*British Broadcasting in Transition.* By BURTON PAULU. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961, Pp. viii, 250, \$5.00.)

This tightly-organized general survey will interest not only students of public opinion and British politics, but also any concerned with framing new policies for American broadcasting. The author, Director of the Department of Radio and Television Broadcasting at Minnesota, based his work on a mixture of observation, interviewing, and printed materials (including reports of scientifically-minded audience researchers). While no interview schedules are found, a listing of respondents suggests a broad coverage of participants and informed observers. Largely a description of the history, policies, programs, and audiences of the competing government and commercial television systems, the study contains separate chapters on programs of "News and Opinion" and "Political Broadcasting." Description is blended with skilled analyses of the effects of the systems upon each other, and of the relationships between outside action and the systems' behavior. Some existing commentary on British political coverage will need revision due to the combined effects of competition in broadcasting and the abolition of the fourteen-day rule. Those desiring fuller background to recent developments in radio should consult Paulu's *British Broadcasting* (1956). Since decision-makers are unlikely to consider seriously a government operated network, those seeking experience relevant to U. S. policy-making will probably find the form of commercial television of primary interest. The Independent Television Authority, a government-established group, establishes and operates transmitters and has broad supervisory powers over the programs which are produced by private corporations. Advertisers have no connection with any program. Without detracting from the present study, it would seem highly desirable that a more systematic analysis of the precise relationship between the Authority and the program companies be performed. Those impressed with the institutions of British commercial television should remember that both regulator and regulated know their

status is subject to official review (ITA's license expires in 1964, as does that of the BBC) and that politically-articulate publics are watching. Review is not likely to end either system, but it may determine standards of regulation and performance for a long period.

Paulu's final chapter contains a summary and evaluation of both networks' past performance as well as detailed suggestions for future policy. Competition has improved British television service, giving viewers a second choice and causing improved performance by the BBC. Although applauding commercial TV for the most part, Paulu opposes proposals for commercial radio. He observes the difficulty already encountered by the BBC in an already-complex frequency jungle, but his main argument is in terms of the wide choice already available to the radio audience. The three BBC programs do not have a monopoly on the radio audience since English-language, commercialized Radio Luxembourg has long attracted a wide following.

Among the most fascinating sections was that discussing how commercial TV came into being. Many Conservative M.P.'s, the Labour Party, and most educators, churchmen, and newspapers formed the opposition. Many were opposed out of fear that standards would be lowered—the specter of U. S. TV haunted them. The BBC license and monopoly would have been renewed by the last Labour government if it had made a decision. The case illustrates an interest (BBC) not having a champion in the decision-making group (Labour cabinet) so that decisions affecting it were delayed through lack of attention. At the end the parties both took stands contrary to the polled opinion of most of their supporters. And the Greek tragedy element was present too—Labour insures the adoption of the policy it dislikes (commercial television) by causing a party issue defeat of what apparently could have been a free vote and victory.—R. J. ALPERIN, *University of Maryland*.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

HIRAM M. STOUT

*The George Washington University*

### General

Apter, D. E. Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New Nations. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. January, 1962.

Economic Development and Planning in Asia and the Far East. *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*. (UN) v. 12, December, 1961.

Perham, Margery F. The Colonial Reckoning. London, Collins, 1961. (The Reith Lectures, 1961).

Von der Mehden, Fred R., and Anderson, Charles W. Political Action by the Military in the Developing Areas. *Social Research*. Winter, 1961.

### United Kingdom and Commonwealth

British Government Information Services. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1961. (R. 5256).

Christoph, James B. Capital Punishment and British Party Responsibility. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Glickman, Harvey. The Toryness of English Conservatism. *The Journal of British Studies*. November, 1961.

Health Services in Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1962. (RF. P. 5154).

How Many Orpingtons? *The Economist*. March 24, 1962.

Keith-Lucas, Bryan. The Government and the Greater London Plan. *Contemporary Review*. February, 1962.

Marquand, David. Has "Lib-Lab" a Future? *Encounter*. April, 1962.

Martin, Christopher. Telling our Left from our Right. *Listener*. April 5, 1962.

Martin, Kingsley. Strange Interlude: Edward VIII's Brief Reign. *Atlantic*, May, 1962.

Martin, Kingsley. The Cost of the Crown. *Atlantic*. June, 1962.

Migration in the Commonwealth: the United Kingdom Bill. *Round Table*. March, 1962.

Social Services in Britain. British Information Services. Reference Division. New York, 1961. (I.D. 780).

Technical Co-operation; a Progress Report by the New Department. London, H.M.S.O., 1962. (Cmd. 1698).

Younger, Kenneth. Reflections on Africa and the Commonwealth. *World Today*. March, 1962.

### Western Europe

Anghelatos, A. G. New-found Political Stability in Greece. *World Today*. March, 1962.

Ashcroft, Edward. How de Gaulle Makes Decisions. *New York Times Magazine*. March 18, 1962.

Blood, Sir Hilary. What Prospect for Malta Now? *New Commonwealth*. April, 1962.

Bone, Robert C. The Dynamics of Dutch Politics. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1962.

Chilcote, Ronald H. Opposition to Portugal's Dictatorship. *Contemporary Review*. April, 1962.

Coddington, George A. Jr. The New Swiss Military Capability. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1962.

Documents on Germany, 1944-1961. U. S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (87th Cong., 1st sess.). Washington, G.P.O., 1961.

Europe's Other Island; a Survey. *The Economist*. March 17, 1962.

Europe's Political Future. *The Times* (air edition). March 26-29, 1962.

Heckscher, Gunnar. The Swedish Constitution—1809-1959. Stockholm, Swedish Institute, 1961.

Hodgson, John H. Postwar Finnish Foreign Policy: Institutions and Personalities. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Jakobson, Max. Finland's Foreign Policy. *International Affairs* (London). April, 1962.

Jallut, Maurice. Propositions pour un Nouveau Régime: Essai sur la Constitution Naturelle de la France. *L'Ordre Français*. February, 1962.

Krippendorff, Ekkehart. Das Ende des Parteienstaates? *Monat*. January, 1962.

Leibholz, Gerhard. Die Stellung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im Rahmen des Bonner Grundgesetzes. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. March, 1962.

Organisation et Aménagement de la Région de Paris; Documents. Paris, Documentation française, 1962. (Precueils et monographies, no. 39).

Philip, André. The Structure of Socialist Parties. *Dissent*. Winter, 1962.

Roditi, Edouard. The Homing Pigeons of Algiers. *Dissent*. Spring, 1962.

#### *Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

Anthem, Thomas. Whither Albania? *Contemporary Review*. April, 1962.

Bird, Christopher. Scholarship and Propaganda. *Problems of Communism*. March-April, 1962.

Crankshaw, Edward. Dissension Inside the Kremlin. *Atlantic*. June, 1962.

Dallin, Alexander. Long Divisions and Fine Fractions. *Problems of Communism*. March-April, 1962.

Dallin, Alexander. The Soviet View of the United Nations. *International Organization*. Winter, 1962.

Degras, Jane. Moscow in Ferment. *Problems of Communism*. March-April, 1962.

Election Results; Membership of the Supreme

Soviet. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. April 11, 1962.

Griffith, William E. Myth and Reality in Czechoslovak History. *East Europe*. March, 1962.

Le Gouvernement, l'Administration et la Justice de la "République Démocratique Allemande." Paris, Documentation française, 1962. (Notes et études documentaires, no. 2876).

Pistrak, Lazar. Soviet Views on Africa. *Problems of Communism*. March-April, 1962.

Schultz, Lothar. Die neue Verfassung der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik. *Europa Archiv*. January 25, 1962.

Skendi, Stavro. Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1962.

The Soviet Electoral System, by A. Gorshenev and I. Chelyapov. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1962. (JPRS: 12931).

Ulysses, pseud. The International Aims and Policies of the Soviet Union: the New Concepts and Strategy of Khrushchev. *Review of Politics*. April, 1962.

#### *Middle East and Arab North Africa*

Capil, M. Middle East 1961—a Political Review. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. February, 1962.

Colombe, Marcel. Où va l'Égypte? *Orient*. 4e trimestre, 1961.

Decentralization in the Sudan. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. April, 1962.

Democratic Party of Kurdistan (Iraq). Program and Administrative Regulations of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (1960). Translated by Harold W. Glidden. *Middle East Journal*. Autumn, 1961.

Ellis, Ellen D. Post-Revolutionary Politics in Turkey. *Current History*. April, 1962.

Haim, Sylvia G. Arab nationalism; an anthology. Selected and edited, with an introduction by Sylvia G. Haim. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962.

Hottinger, Arnold. The Political Struggle in Iran. *Middle East Forum*. March, 1962.

Huebbenet, Georg von. Persien nimmt Pakistan zum Vorbild. *Aussenpolitik*. February, 1962.

Jargy, Simon. La Syrie d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. *Orient*. 4e trimestre, 1961.

Johnston, Scott D. Party Politics and Coalition Cabinets in the Knesset of Israel. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. May, 1962.

Kerr, Malcolm. The un-Egyptian Activities Committee. *SAIS Review*. Spring, 1962.

Lenczowski, George. Syria: a Crisis in Arab Unity. *Current History*. April, 1962.

Lewis, Geoffrey. Turkey: the Thorny Road to Democracy. *World Today*. May, 1962.

Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. Iraq under Kassim. *Current History*. April, 1962.

Loya, A. Radio Propaganda of the United

Arab Republic—an Analysis. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. April, 1962.

Priestly, Vito. The Political Situation in Iraq. *Middle Eastern Affairs*. May, 1962.

Sharabi, H. B. The Egyptian Revolution. *Current History*. April, 1962.

Simpson, Dwight J. Israel: the Continuing Struggle. *Current History*. April, 1962.

Tesdell, Loren. Planning for Technical Assistance: Iraq and Jordan. *Middle East Journal*. Autumn, 1961.

Tusan, Jean. L'Union Nationale de la République Arabe Unie. *Orient*. 4e trimestre, 1961.

Vatikiotis, P. J. Nasser's Second Revolution. *SAIS Review*. Spring, 1962.

Westwood, Andrew F. Reform Government in Iran. *Current History*. April, 1962.

Young, Richard. The State of Syria: Old or New? *American Journal of International Law*. April, 1962.

#### Africa

Adam, Thomas R. Area and Environment in African Political Processes. *American Behavioral Scientist*. April, 1962.

Baring, Arnulf and Bazin, Henri. Nkrumah and Ghanas Afrikanischer Sozialismus. *Aussenpolitik*. February, 1962.

Berg, Elliot J. France's Legacy in Tropical Africa. *Challenge*. March, 1962.

Campbell, Jane. Multiracialism and Politics in Zanzibar. *Political Science Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Decraene, Philippe. La Guinée seule avec elle-meme. *Preuves*. March, 1962.

Franck, Thomas M. Some Thoughts on Legal Studies in Africa. *American Behavioral Scientist*. April, 1962.

Gonidec, P. F. Les Institutions Politiques de la République Fédérale du Cameroun. *Civilisations*. No. 4, 1961.

Greenwood, A. F. Ten Years Local Government in Ghana. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. January, 1962.

Land, Harry. Sierra Leone Needs the Middle Road. *New Commonwealth*. March, 1962.

Lewis, Paul. Nigeria Shows the Federal Way. *New Commonwealth*. April, 1962.

Lye, K. L. Tanganyika since Independence. *British Survey*. Main series, No. 155. February, 1962.

MacColl, René. Gambia: the Colony Nobody Knows. *Atlantic*. May, 1962.

MacLure, Millar, and Anglin, Douglas, eds. Africa: The Political Pattern by Jaja Wachuku et al. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961.

Milverton, Lord. Africa Still Needs a Middle Road Policy. *Optima*. March, 1962.

Percival, J. E. Federal Cameroon Republic. *West African Review*. April, 1962.

Reynier, Anthony S. Tanganyika: Africa's Newest Country. *World Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Roberts, Esther. New Hope for South Africa. *Contemporary Review*. April, 1962.

Senghor, Léopold. Some Thoughts on Africa: a Continent in Development. *International Affairs*. April, 1962.

The Atlantic report on Angola. *Atlantic*. March, 1962.

The Atlantic Report on East Africa. *Atlantic*. May, 1962.

The Evolution of Madagascar since Independence. *Asian Review*. January, 1962.

Uganda. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. London, 1962 (R. 5316).

Uganda: Report of a Commission of Privy Counsellors on a Dispute between Uganda and Bunyoro. London, H.M.S.O., 1962. Cmd. 1717.

United Nations Source Materials for the Study of Africa: a Selected Bibliography. *American Behavioral Scientist*. April, 1962.

Young, Roland. Political Research in the New African Nations. *American Behavioral Scientist*. April, 1962.

Zolberg, Aristide R. One-Party Systems and Government for the People. *Africa Today*. May, 1962.

#### South and Southeast Asia

Anstey, Vera. Land Reform in India. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. April, 1962.

Batwell, Richard. The Four Failures of U Nu's Second Premiership. *Asian Survey*. March, 1962.

Darling, Frank C. Modern Politics in Thailand. *Review of Politics*. April, 1962.

Eberhard, Wolfram. Afghanistan's Young Elite. *Asian Survey*. February, 1962.

Galanter, Marc. Equality and "Protective Discrimination" in India. *Rutgers Law Review*. Fall, 1961.

Grimes, Paul. India: 15 Years of Freedom. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1962. (Headline series, No. 152.)

Kanesalingam, V. Problems of Financial Administration in a New State—with Particular Reference to Ceylon. *Public Finance*. No. 1, 1962.

Khan, Hafeez-ur-Rahman. Pakistan's Relations with the Commonwealth: Political and Strategic Aspects. *Pakistan Horizon*. Second Quarter, 1962.

Maddox, William P. Singapore: Problem Child. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1962.

Newman, K. J. Basic Democracy as an Experiment. *Political Studies*. February, 1962.

North Vietnam; a Special Survey. *China Quarterly*. January-March, 1962.

Rondot, Pierre. Aperçu de Quelques Problèmes du Pakistan. *Orient*. 4e trimestre, 1961.

Sarker, S. C. The General Election in India. *World Today*. May, 1962.

Smith, T. E. Proposals for Malaysia. *World Today*. May, 1962.

Welty, Paul S. Viet-Nam Today. *World Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

The Atlantic Report on Laos. *Atlantic*. May, 1956.

Zinkin, Taya. Caste Today. London, Oxford University Press, 1962.

#### Far East

Barnett, A. Doak. Communist China; Continuing Revolution. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1962. (Headline series, No. 153, May-June, 1962.)

Choh-ming Li. Statistics and Planning at the Hsien Level in Communist China. *China Quarterly*. January-March, 1962.

Communist China: Ruthless Enemy or Paper Tiger? A Bibliographic Survey. Washington, Department of the Army, 1962. (Pam. 20-61.)

Guelzo, Carl M. Korea: the Divided Peace. *Yale Review*. Spring, 1962.

Kim, C. I. Eugene. Japanese Rule in Korea (1905-1910): A Case Study. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*. February, 1962.

La politique étrangère de la République populaire de Chine en 1961. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère*. January, 1961.

Lee, Luke T. Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development. *Michigan Law Review*. February, 1962.

Olson, Lawrence. A Note on Japan. American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, East Asia series, v. 10, No. 2 (Japan). April, 1962.

Pavlov, K. Communist China: a Reluctant Dragon. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. March and April, 1962.

Ravenholt, Albert. A Note on the Philippines. American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Southeast Asia series, v. 10, No. 8 (Philippines). March, 1962.

Ravenholt, Albert. Tony Diaz Runs for Congress. American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Southeast Asia series, v. 9, No. 5 (Philippines). November, 1961.

The Atlantic Report on Japan. *Atlantic*. March, 1962.

#### Australia and New Zealand

Sawyer, Geoffrey. Australian Government To-

day. Paperback ed., rev. and enl. Victoria, Melbourne University Press, 1961.

Tweedie, Alan D. Australia Emergent: the Post-war Pattern. *Colorado Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

#### Latin America and West Indies

Anderson, Charles W. Central American Political Parties: a Functional Approach. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

Brazil and United States Policies. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the Foreign Relations Committee, U. S. Senate. (87th Cong., 2d sess.) Washington, G.P.O., 1962.

Caldera, Rafael. The Christian Democrat Idea. *America*. April 7, 1962.

Crockett, Joseph P. Tax Pattern in Latin America. *National Tax Journal*. March, 1962.

Freyre, Gilberto. Misconceptions of Brazil. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1962.

Huelin, David. Conflicting Forces in Argentina. *World Today*. April, 1962.

Le Pérou. Paris, Documentation Française, 1962. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2,888.)

Linke, Lilo. Ecuador's Politics: President Velasco's Fourth Exit. *World Today*. February, 1962.

Patch, Richard W. The Pro- and Anti-Castristas in La Paz. American Universities Field Staff reports service, West Coast South America series, v. 9, No. 2 (Bolivia). February, 1962.

Phillips, Fred. The Administrative Problems of an Emergent Federation. *Canadian Public Administration*. September, 1961.

Report of the Jamaica Independence Conference, 1962, Held in London in February, 1962. London, H.M.S.O., 1962. (Cmd. 1638.)

Rodrigues, M. R. Local Government in Jamaica. *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*. April, 1962.

Schmitt, Karl M. Communism in Mexico Today. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1962.

#### Canada

Conant, Melvin. Canada's Role in Western Defense. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1962.

Supplement on Canada. *The Times* (air ed.). February 26, 1962.

Waengler, Ernest. Separatism among the French Canadians. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. March, 1962.

## INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZATION

*The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*. By BRYCE WOOD (New York and London: Columbia University Press. 1961. Pp. x, 438. \$7.50.)

For thirty years now the term "good neighbor" has had wide use in the language of international politics in the Western Hemisphere. Like other

commonplaces of this idiom the phrase has served varying purposes in a number of distinct and specialized vocabularies. Statesmen have praised the policy of the Good Neighbor. The policy has helped journalists to fill their columns. Certain entrepreneurs have expressed their doubts about its wisdom. Few of the interested parties, however, have undertaken to examine the policy systematically or to identify its substance. Did the United States government assume the role of the Good Neighbor as a consequence of a searching re-appraisal of interests sometime around 1930? Did policy-makers embark on a program of reform in Latin American relations after an examination of national conscience? Re-appraisal, reform and certain other motivations have been cited as sources of the Good Neighbor Policy without further clarifying of what went into the policy or how it was worked out.

A complete contrast to this general fuzziness is offered in this excellent study by Bryce Wood. The precision and thoroughness of his work give it a two-fold merit which will be immediately obvious to any student of Inter-American affairs. First, Wood succeeds in making a comprehensive identification of the substance and the reality of the Good Neighbor Policy. In the second place, an indirect but not unimportant consequence of his effort is the enrichment of a wide range of scholarship dealing with Latin America and the United States.

In connection with the first, careful research of the whole record between 1926 and 1943 establishes the Good Neighbor Policy in the "patterns of policy actions" that emerged in the period. In the Coolidge administration the possibility of domination of the hemisphere by superior force alone began to lose any attraction it might once have had for United States policy-makers. By Franklin Roosevelt's third term not only the attraction but even the possibility had disappeared. The latter did not vanish because United States interest in Latin America had diminished or because United States involvement in the area had become less intense. It was rather that a new rationale of power and responsibility had emerged from the post-World War I experience of the United States. Wood traces this development chiefly through case studies of Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia, Mexico and Venezuela. These cases, along with other materials, supply the means for delineating the policies of non-intervention and non-interference on the part of the United States and the consequences of these policies in what the author calls the "idea of reciprocity." These developments are related in vivid and convincing detail.

It is perhaps inevitable that readers will here and there take issue with the author on the use

made of some of the detail. For example, the presentation of certain quotes from United States sources, notably Welles' and Caffrey's despatches from Havana, may on occasion appear needlessly ironic, especially when a similar tone is lacking in the presentation of material from Grau San Martin. The difference in tone invites the suggestion that somehow Grau was a wiser or more responsible statesman than the two Ambassadors, a suggestion to which this reader is not prepared to assent. At the most, however, this represents only minor flaws which do not mar the author's real achievement.

As noted above, the second merit of this book is that it constitutes a significant enrichment of the whole range of scholarship in recent and contemporary Latin American studies. Students of United States policy toward Latin America are in large part familiar with the ground that the study covers. They have not, however, previously been presented with so comprehensive an exploration of the political and diplomatic history of the period. The principal sources on which the work is based are the published and unpublished documents of the Department of State and the documents in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Access to the unpublished documents of the State Department has undoubtedly enhanced the value of the study. As the "Note on Sources" at the end of the book makes clear the conditions attached to the permission to consult unpublished documents in no way restricted the author's freedom of interpretation, although the use of certain quotes and references was limited.

The author's independence of judgment, his meticulous research and presentation have combined to produce a first-rate book which, in all probability, will remain the standard reference on the Good Neighbor Policy for a long time to come.—JOHN J. KENNEDY, *University of Virginia*.

*Pan America in Crisis.* BY WILLIAM MANGER. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. vii, 104. Price \$3.25.)

Dr. William Manger, the author of this slender but penetrating volume on the inter-American system, is peculiarly well qualified to write on the subject. For more than four decades he was associated with the Pan American Union, the system's secretariat, and for more than a fourth of that time was the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Few if any people have had a better opportunity to observe the high-level working of an organization of this sort.

The formalized inter-American system, now operating under the rubric of the Organization of American States, is, unfortunately, relatively little known in the United States even though its

headquarters has always been in this country's capital city, almost literally—which was bad for the symbolism of the relationship—under the shadow of the old State Department building. The public often confused, and still does, the OAS with the Pan American Union, its secretariat. Many persons think that all Latin American Countries' ambassadors to the United States are identical with their ambassadors to the OAS.

Dr. Manger dispels these misconceptions. Further, he lays an excellent historical foundation in brief form, in Chapters III and IV for the development of the system through twelve decades from 1826 to 1948. Two other chapters deal with the post-Bogotá (i.e., post-1948) period and the contemporary situation. A final chapter treats of the United States relation to the OAS.

The high point in cooperation and effectiveness, Dr. Manger tells us, was reached in the years from 1945 to 1947. According to the author even at the Bogotá conference in 1948, when the cornerstone of the present structure of the system was laid, the evidences of recession of confidence were beginning to be shown.

In his later chapters Dr. Manger becomes increasingly critical of the operation of the regional organization. A substantial portion of the fault, he maintains, rests with the United States, but Latin American states themselves are by no means free from responsibility as well. One of the current difficult problems which the OAS has not successfully solved, Dr. Manger avers, is that of reconciling the potentially conflicting principles of unilateral nonintervention and collective responsibility for continental peace and security. Relations among the states of the hemisphere have sadly deteriorated in recent years, he says, and the ouster of Cuba from the system, following the ill-fated invasion attempt of April, 1961, and the action involving the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's alleged complicity in the assassination attempt on President Betancourt of Venezuela are but two of the more dramatic evidences of the decline in the effectiveness of the system.

Those officially connected with the inter-American system will doubtless want, and deserve, their day in court to refute some of the accusations made in this volume. Nonetheless, attention must be given to the charges Dr. Manger levies if for no other reason than the soberness and seriousness with which he makes them and the experience from which he writes.

The continuance of a viable inter-American system must necessarily surmount various built-in obstacles, not the least of which is the incongruity of one great power in the hemisphere operating vis-à-vis twenty lesser powers of varying strengths. It is undoubtedly true that abrasive incidents and trends have characterized the operation in recent

years. Still, there are solid bases for hoping that the OAS may yet deserve the label of the most effective as well as the oldest regional organization in the world. Let us hope that Dr. Manger may give us a new edition of his stimulating study in a few years from now, and also that the circumstances of that time may inspire less pessimism and fewer reservations than he now feels.—RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON, *University of California, Los Angeles*.

*Middle Eastern Affairs: Number Two (St. Antony's Papers No. 11)*. ALBERT HOURANI, editor. (U. S. Publisher, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, Illinois). 167 pages, price: \$3.75.

This book consists of five research papers and a "Note," prepared under the auspices of St. Antony's College, Oxford. It is edited by Professor Hourani, a distinguished Oxford scholar on the Middle East. As the papers are written by different scholars on divergent topics, it is best to treat each separately. Elizabeth Monroe of Oxford writes on "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy.'" During his service as Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin was "accused" by "all Jews, most Americans and many Englishmen" of pursuing an "Arab policy." Yet the Arabs never thought of him as "their man." Bevin was able to sway King Abdullah and Nuri al-Sa'id to his side, but these two old men were already pro-British. In the rest of the Arab world he had little success. Monroe rightly attributes his "Arab policy" to the Palestine question. His policy was in line with the British defense considerations in the area, and with the treaties he hoped to sign with the Arab states. The Zionist leanings of his party, the pressure of the U. S. at a time when Britain was her economic dependent, the crisis in Germany, the economic difficulties at home, the little help he got from the Arabs, all conspired to defeat his policy in Palestine. In despair he submitted the conflict to the U.N. The author succeeds in putting Bevin's policy in its proper perspective—as a minor item in a crowded world agenda.

"A Decade of Discovery: America in the Middle East, 1947-1958," is contributed by William Polk of Harvard. After alluding to America's missionary and commercial activities in the Middle East Professor Polk examines briefly but lucidly the increasing American involvement in the area after 1947, when its immediate cause was Britain's inability to carry its post-war imperial burdens. In order to defend Greece and Turkey against Communist threat the "Truman Doctrine" was proclaimed. The U. S. has sought stability in the Middle East through economic aid. Economic policy, however, without a propitious political policy remains ineffective. The author discusses

the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower doctrine, the Suez "war," and correctly examines the American landing in Beirut in the context of the Iraqi coup. However, his figure of 5,000 for the landing force may, in the private opinion of American officials in Beirut, be safely multiplied by two.

"Dragomania: The Dragomans of the British Embassy in Turkey," by Allan Cunningham of the University of London, is an interesting account of the role played by the Dragomans (i.e. interpreters) who worked at the British Embassy in Constantinople during the nineteenth century. They were mostly Levantines-descendants of European families long resident in the East. The Dragomans were not merely interpreters but skilled negotiators who understood the Turkish mind and the labyrinths of the Turkish court. However, they were not always reliable nor liked by the polished ambassador who employed them. They had to do for lack of Turkish-trained Englishmen. In the 1830's there was only "one person in all London teaching Turkish." To tackle the problem a member of the Foreign Office recommended the recruiting of "British subjects upon whom entire trust and reliance may be placed, in lieu of foreigners upon whom no reliance whatever can be placed." In 1877 the Turkish interpreter-ships were made subject to civil service examination. This act meant the end of the Dragoman, but not the end of the "problem of language" in diplomatic intercourse.

"Salisbury and the Tunisian question, 1878-1880," by André Raymond of the University of Bordeaux, is based in part on Raymond's researches at Oxford on British policy toward Tunis, 1830-1881. It provides an enlightening chapter on European diplomacy toward North Africa. Tunis became a pawn of European diplomacy largely through the Bismarckian policy of "compensation," which aimed at solving European difficulties at the expense of Turkey. Bismarck, whose interest was in solidifying Germany's position in Europe, was eager to divert the European powers—namely France and Britain—into African ventures. Salisbury, unlike Palmerston, believed English interests could best be maintained through "territorial re-arrangements" in the Ottoman Empire. Britain's interest in occupying Cyprus pleased Bismarck. "Take Egypt," he added. France, said Bismarck, need not be vexed, she could have Tunis or Syria. "Do what you like in Tunis" was the British advice to the French. Italy's hope of getting British support in annexing Tunis did not materialize. Italy was encouraged to look toward Tripoli. Such was the "international brigandage" of imperial Europe.

The researches of Elie Kedourie of the London School of Economics on Sa'ad Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd deflates, as all researches tend to do,

the myth of a hero. Fortunately, however, his conclusion will never reach the Egyptian masses to whom Sa'ad was a hero, a savior and a national symbol. That he was once moderate, turned an opportunist, and a demagogue, who did not flinch from resorting to religious fanaticism, do not, as the author implies, diminish his qualifications for leadership. Leadership is a relevant concept that accommodates itself to the values of the society in which it operates.—ELIE SALEM, *American University of Beirut, Lebanon*.

*Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary.* By E. WILDER SPAULDING. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. 302. \$4.50.)

This is an era in which criticisms of the diplomatic techniques of the United States have risen to extraordinary heights. Books attacking the professional training and qualifications of our overseas emissaries have won fame and presumably fortune for their authors. At the same time, because of the modern revolution in communications some political scientists have tended to write off diplomacy below the presidential or cabinet level as no longer significant. Adherents of either position could profitably examine the balanced views of this volume.

Dr. E. Wilder Spaulding, historian and State Department officer, has produced an interesting, well-written, and frequently witty book which summarizes the careers of over sixty American diplomats. For purposes of convenience his subjects are classified into "The Old Masters," newspaper men, scholars, college presidents, women and the professionals. A chapter entitled "Pot-pourri" examines the careers of politicians, millionaires, and merchants. As might be expected, the individuals selected range from the sublime to the ridiculous, from the well-known to the obscure. The evidence presented indicates that although the historical procedures by which American diplomats have been selected produced ambassadors with an amazing breadth of background "successes" and "failures" can be found in any of the author's conceptual categories. Apparently there are no reliable criteria by which predictions can be made as to whether skills acquired in one field will be transferable to diplomacy. Advocates of a completely professional foreign service will gain little comfort from Spaulding's temperate conclusion that while the spoils system may be outrageous, a "generous smattering" of amateur appointees may in fact be desirable.

If the purpose of this book is indeed to illustrate the qualities that "go to make a competent diplomat," it falls short of its objective at a number of points. The only clearcut standard for measuring competence which emerges is enthusiasm on the part of the emissary for the country to which he is



assigned. This leads the author to describe Andrew Dickson White as "one of our greatest chiefs of mission . . ." while brushing to one side the fact that during the Spanish American War he permitted the German foreign office to assume that the "United States would not object to a few German naval bases on the former Spanish islands in the Pacific) including the Philippines. . . ." There is never any serious attempt to separate the negotiating efforts of the overseas representatives from those taking place simultaneously in Washington or other capitals, or to consider diplomacy in a power or national interest context. The excellent introductory and concluding chapters are drawn more from the outstanding literature in the field than from the case studies presented in the book. Moreover, analysis in depth is sacrificed for quantity of examples. With only 193 pages devoted to examining the various overseas representatives, the author has allowed himself an average of but slightly over three pages to discuss each of his subjects. This is hardly enough material for the reader to gain any real appreciation of the merits and demerits of the individuals concerned. The result is a series of thumbnail sketches which frequently emphasize the non-diplomatic backgrounds of the subjects more than their competence as negotiators.

Yet, Dr. Spaulding's ability to caricature his subjects with a few well-turned phrases is delightful. Thus: "Joseph Patrick Kennedy . . . was one of the least appropriate appointments that Franklin Roosevelt, famous for his inappropriate appointments, ever conjured up." "Max Gluck had done us no great harm. He had only made his country look ridiculous in the eyes of intelligent foreigners. . . ." "As the man primarily responsible for preventing Napoleon the Little from saving the Confederacy . . . John Bigelow deserves to rank with our greatest. . . ." "As one might expect, *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* found more to be enthusiastic about with regard to Mrs. Luce's Italian venture than did the State Department."

Although biographies of ambassadors are not uncommon, there has never been a serious effort by political scientists to analyze diplomacy through a systematic survey of the careers of our foreign emissaries. Perhaps a biographical school of diplomacy is not necessary, but this book is evidence enough that serious studies in depth which relate the personalities and career backgrounds of diplomats to their negotiating tasks might well shed new light on the perplexing problems of diplomacy.—HUBERT S. GIBBS, *Boston University*.

*Perspectives on Peace, 1910–1960. Published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for In-*

*ternational Peace. FOREWORD BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSON AND BERNARD BUSH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.; London: Stevens & Sons, 1960. Pp. viii, 202. \$3.00.)*

The title of this important collection of essays by world figures does not do it justice. The book does not look backward to 1910, when the Carnegie Endowment was founded. Rather, the authors, distilling a formidable aggregate of experiences, re-assess the past only to draw conclusions for the future. These papers should indeed, as President Johnson says, increase public awareness of the dynamic nature of peace. These men are very much in earnest. Some are deeply worried. Most of them plead for changes and new initiatives they consider imperative to maintain the peace. The book should be pondered, and it should create controversy.

In the first piece, the indefatigable former president of the Endowment, James T. Shotwell, offers wise but not sedate "Reflections on War and Peace," focusing on the background and continued meaning of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. There follow essays by Sir Harold Nicolson (U.K.), Salvador de Madariaga (Spain), Dag Hammarskjöld, Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Jean Monnet (France), Alberto Lleras Camargo (Colombia), Lester B. Pearson (Canada), Ismet İnönü (Turkey), Max Huber (Switzerland), Henri Bonnet (France), and Sir Norman Angell (U.K.) We are told that efforts at wider geographic representation "were unfortunately unsuccessful."

Since most of the pieces are tersely reasoned, and shades of opinion count decisively, no full summary is possible within limited space. But a few characteristics stand out. The author with the longest experience at the U.N.—Mr. Pearson—is the one most satisfied with the U.N. Against the clamor of nationalisms, the most frequent theme is the need for integration. The greatest obstacle to a more harmonious world is mutual fear and suspicion. The principal villain is the clinging to out-dated concepts of sovereignty.

De Madariaga's "Blueprint for a World Commonwealth" goes farthest in this respect. Only self-deception prevents nations from realizing that "their separate destinies have merged" and that they should "surrender their sovereignties to a sovereignty embodying that merged sovereignty." The matter is complicated but also made more urgent by the pluralistic character of the *loci* of sovereignty: many a small country's sovereignty is fictitious, and even within big ones "some institutions become too strong for the national sovereignty to resist." He mentions the Communist Party in the USSR; the army, often, in France; and sees the USA exercising more

"sovereignty" over Guatemala and Panama than over the CIO-AFL or giant corporations at home.

Objectively, "the World Community is already a fact"; hence, it "must be governed, i.e., must become a World Commonwealth." (ital. added) Looking at the East-West conflict, de Madariaga arrives at the same conclusion. He concedes to the USSR two decisive advantages: "it has an aim while the free world has none; and it seeks world unity, which is consonant with the need of our day." (p. 63) The free world must also set its sight at world unity and solidarity. The U.N., "too loosely conceived" and built on the counting of votes, does not fill the bill. He proposes, as basis for discussion, an ultimate "ideal system of federations," consisting of nine large units: the USA; the Commonwealth; Europe up to the Russian frontier (!); the USSR; Yellow Asia; Islam (from Pakistan to Morocco); Africa south of the Sahara; Iberian America. Each unit would be governed by a council and an assembly. A "Council of Nine" would "rule world affairs." A World Court would administer "world law," to be defined by a "World Legislature."

Mr. Pearson emphasizes the link between diplomatic techniques and organizational set-ups. Less critical of open diplomacy than Sir Harold Nicolson, he draws highly significant conclusions from what he calls the guide of unhappy experiences from both secret and public diplomacy. He is not in disfavor of group or bloc diplomacy but credits it with preventing further polarization of the world community. In fact, "the healthier practices of bloc diplomacy may provide the best hope of maintaining orderly diplomatic processes at the U.N. and elsewhere." He is concerned over the lack of progress in such collective diplomacy in NATO, stating that unless a method to take collective political decisions is found, "NATO is not likely to survive." He has much, albeit not un-critical, praise for the U.N. In "these indispensable halls" plans to preserve the peace "are much more likely to emerge . . . than . . . from voyages to Canossa or to Berchtesgaden." He reiterates his well-known view that negotiation is indispensable as the only alternative to nuclear cataclysm. This point is stressed, also, by General İnönü, former president of Turkey: "Mankind must be taught ceaselessly, in every possible way, that at the present stage of civilization, nations are under compulsion to, and should be able to, co-exist peacefully."—JOHN H. E. FRIED, *New York University*.

*Studies in World Public Order.* By MYRES S. MCDUGAL AND ASSOCIATES. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. Pp. xx, 1058. Price \$15.00.)

This volume is a collection of studies and essays

previously published in learned journals over the past two decades by Professor McDougal and associates (Harold Lasswell, Asher Lans, Richard Gardner, and others). Integrated by the conceptual framework of the contextual, policy-oriented jurisprudence espoused by Professors McDougal and Lasswell, the studies suggest effective policies for the achievement of a world legal order. The conceptual framework is set forth in two introductory essays, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," and "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest." The latter essay, containing the authors' initial suggestions that legal education must be training for policy-making and that the content of the law depends upon the goals and values to be achieved, is doubtless well known among those interested in legal studies. In the former essay, one of more recent vintage, the authors consider the effective contribution of students of international law to the establishment of a world legal order based on respect for human dignity. In this regard, they challenge legal scholars "... to develop a jurisprudence . . . which will assist the peoples of the world to distinguish public orders based on human dignity and public orders based either on a law which denies human dignity or a denial of law itself for the simple supremacy of naked force, and . . . to invent and recommend the authority structures and functions . . . necessary to a world public order that harmonizes with the growing aspirations of the overwhelming numbers of the peoples of the globe and is in accord with the proclaimed values of human dignity enunciated by the moral leaders of mankind."

For such a policy-oriented inquiry, the traditional concept of international law as a body of conventional and customary legal rules governing the relations of states is insufficient. International law must instead be envisioned "... as a whole process of authoritative decision in the world arena, a process in which authority and control are appropriately conjoined and which includes, along with an inherited body of flexible prescriptions explicitly related to community policies, both a structure of established decision-makers and a whole arsenal of methods and techniques by which policy is projected and implemented."

In the substantive studies (some of which are quite lengthy), the authors test the conceptual framework by applying it to specific contemporary problems related to the development of a world legal order. These problems include such matters as the interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements, the United Nations Charter and the veto power, the law of the sea, and the law of outer space. Because of

limited space (and the fact that these studies have been previously published), it is unnecessary to assay each one. This reviewer particularly appreciated the study entitled "Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy." Published in 1945, this study (of interest to students of both international and constitutional law) is a scholarly and persuasive statement of the legal equality of the congressional-executive agreement with the treaty instrument. Moreover, the former instrument, the authors assert, is more in accord with the basic principles of American government and more responsive to the national interest than the treaty instrument. Within this context, a discussion of the Bricker proposal of the last decade would have been quite instructive. It is unfortunate, however, that this study and several of the others were not brought up to date for subsequent publication. Their revision in the light of more recent developments would have enhanced the volume's usefulness.

One study of particular interest is that entitled "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security." After examining the traditional legal rules subsumed under the rubric of "freedom of the seas," the authors conclude that under contemporary conditions the claim of the United States to conduct hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific Ocean is a reasonable assertion that contravenes no prescription or policy with respect to the law of the sea.

Although many political scientists and legal scholars may be unsympathetic to Professor McDougal's policy-oriented jurisprudence, none can deny that he exercises a significant impact on legal studies and the study of international law in particular. He is a prolific and persuasive scholar. His deductive analyses of contemporary international legal problems suggest a wealth of further research requirements and possibilities. No student of international law can well ignore his writings. For one interested in a convenient collection of these studies, this volume is a welcome addition to the literature.—DON C. PIPER, *Duke University*.

*World Polity II. A Yearbook of Studies in International Law and Organization.*—(Washington, D. C.: The Institute of World Polity, Georgetown University; Utrecht and Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers, 1960. Pp. 414.)

Such questions as what is right and what is wrong, what is legal and what is not, still puzzle the mind of man. However, it seems that the most immediate question of the day, which is characterized as a status of intermediacy, *i.e.*, a twilight

zone between war and peace, is the question of the survival of nation-states.

The Institute of World Polity of Georgetown University, which gives priority to research on the problems of legal and ethical control of force in international community, in its second volume of *World Polity* reminds those who are committed to the defense of material well-being that the real problem is the revitalization and preservation of the concrete societal order and value systems. The first two contributions in *World Polity II*, namely Professor William H. Roberts' "The Nature of Contemporary Conflict," and Professor William V. O'Brien's "Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War" emphasize the importance of the hierarchy of values established by the deductive natural law school and call for strengthening the conceptual foundation of man and his society. Because of the "balance of terror," the present international conflict may never take the nature of a war as that term is understood in pre-atomic age international law. During this status of intermediacy the free peoples of the world are provided, maybe for the last time, the opportunity to find the real strength in their original value system.

Professors Roberts' and O'Brien's realistic and penetrating analysis of the present day total conflict certainly deserve praise.

Using a morphological method, Professor Roberts discusses the underlying sub-strata of modern international conflict. The writer argues that "the Western world has not yet completely realized the fact that the assumptions on which its policies had been based for centuries do not any more provide an adequate foundation for action intended to cope with modern problems." "In the process of struggling to adjust its principles to changed conditions," Professor Roberts observes, "the West has become lost in existential fear and anxiety." According to the writer the problem is not to be Red or dead but "the survival of man and societies as concretely existing moral entities." Rejecting the materialist creed of the Communists and material prosperity of the West as solutions to the problems of man, Professor Roberts calls for "the establishment of a trans-national societal order ensuring the continued growth and development of Western system of values."

The editor of *World Polity II*, Professor William V. O'Brien, in his article analyzes the dilemma of survival under the threat of nuclear weapons. He goes to the heart of this neglected subject and considers the normative regulation of nuclear weapons. A brilliant student of the late Professor Ernst Feilchenfeld and an authority in his own right on "military necessity," he argues that the "conceptual basis for a law of nuclear

war is to be found . . . in the proper interpretation of the central principle of legitimate military necessity." His study is based on two assumptions: "1. Unlimited nuclear warfare is inadmissible because its predictable effects threaten the physical existence of mankind. . . . 2. But nuclear weapons in some form are an accepted integral part of modern defense establishments and their use in serious international conflicts is virtually inevitable." He would accept defeat instead of resorting to disproportionate, illegal and immoral means. Because "the subordinate place of the State in the natural law hierarchy of values clearly precludes the use of nuclear means which would result in disproportionate injury to the earth, to mankind, to the international society." However, the inevitable counter argument is: but will the Communist play ball according to the Western values of natural law? Professor O'Brien's answer: "From the efforts of decision-makers to reconcile their duty of success with the limitations of natural law there will emerge, in effect, the consensus of mankind which will shape the customary law of nuclear war." To some this may sound like the solution furnished by Suarez to the border line case known as "the plank of Carneades."

Other contributions to *World Polity II* include "Submarine Warfare and International Law" by Lieutenant Commander William H. Barnes II; "Rules of Land Warfare During the War of American Revolution" by Dr. Martin J. Clancy; and "The Law of War: A Bibliography, 1945-1958" by Mr. J. R. Leguey-Feilleux who is the Director of Research of the Institute of World Polity.

Commander Barnes, an expert in the field of submarines, combines his practical experience and extensive knowledge in his article. He argues that today's submarine fleet and guided missiles introduce new dimensions of naval warfare. Coupled with the failure of great powers to comply with the limitations of conventional rules with respect to submarine warfare, the atomic age and its unpredictable destructive capacity makes imperative the regulation and limitation of submarine warfare. Commander Barnes' proposals with respect to submarine warfare tie in very closely with Professor O'Brien's concept of legitimate military necessity.

The summary of the War of the American Revolution told by Dr. Clancy is a serious legal treatise exploring the practice of the Revolutionary War. The "civilized warfare" of the Eighteenth century revolutions is brought once again to the attention of responsible officials of the nuclear age. Dr. Clancy's "Rules of Land Warfare During the War of the American Revolution" is certainly a notable contribution to the

efforts of revitalizing the International Law of War.

Jean-Robert Leguey-Feilleux must have spent long and arduous hours in preparing this excellent bibliography on the laws of war for the years 1945-1958. He presents a carefully organized listing of some 1,900 studies, covering systematically the entire field of the law of war. Since two of the contributions in *World Polity II* originally were theses, one wonders why he has left out the unpublished Masters theses and Doctoral dissertations in this field. This would be also of great service to the student, the writer and the publicist.

The reviewer is of the opinion that the essays in *World Polity II* are most provocative and will stimulate the mind of any reader who is very much concerned with the sub-strata of the present day total conflict and the development of the international law of war in the nuclear age.—METIN TAMKO, *Middle East Technical University* (Ankara).

*Geschichte der Internationale.* BY JULIUS BRAUNTHAL. (Hannover, West Germany: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH, Hannover, 1961. Vol. I. Pp. 404.)

This is the first volume of what I assume will be a two-volume history of the "International." The present work covers the predecessors and beginnings of the international Socialist movement through the First and Second Internationals up to 1914. The outbreak of the First World War offers an almost self-evident divide in the history not only of the International, but of the West in general: this was really the end of the 19th century, the beginning of the great seismic shocks from which date a new epoch in human history.

The outline of the book is primarily chronological, though with one or two important exceptions. The first part, which begins with the French revolution, runs to the founding of the First International whose life takes up the second section of the book. The last part covers the period from 1889, the founding of the Second International, to July 28, 1914—the day when the Bureau of the International met for the last time before Armageddon. The author has been personally involved in the workings of the international socialist movement, partly before World War II, but primarily as Secretary of the reconstructed Socialist International after the war. The book is dedicated to Friedrich Adler who held office as General Secretary of the Labor and Socialist International in the Twenties and Thirties.

The treatment is primarily in ideological terms. Thus the history of the First International is presented as the evolution of the struggle be-

tween the Anarchists and Marx for the "right" doctrine of the international Socialist movement. The relationship among doctrine, the stage of economic development, the progress of industrialization, the political and social institutions of the area concerned is not in the center of the author's interest, although in some parts of the book such considerations are not completely neglected. Thus the rise of reformism is explained by the growth of the machine of the movement and the development of a rich variety of institutions. As an intellectual history and a reasoned report on developments in the international Socialist movement, this book is a first-rate addition to the literature.

Readers will particularly enjoy the brief but penetrating discussion of the conflict between Proudhon and Bakunin on one hand, and Marx on the other; of the remarkable ability of the First International to shift its policy when conditions changed as they did on September 4, 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, when the French Republic was proclaimed. Contemporary problems—such as the Yugoslav experiment in local self-government—can be seen in a new focus thanks to the author's splendid analysis of the Paris Commune while the alliance of communism and nationalism and peasant rebellion—one of Lenin's strategic masterpieces—can be traced back to Marx' view of the Irish question.

The story of the Second International is told mainly in terms of the great debates in the International itself—the famous "Millerand case," the revisionist conflict, the general or mass strike debate, and those on colonialism and war. As is inevitable and probably desirable in a book of this kind, the author is not merely a distant observer but emotionally and intellectually involved. This becomes particularly clear in Brauntal's report on the revisionist debate. There can be little doubt left today that on the main issues regarding the evolution of Capitalism Bernstein was far closer to the truth than his orthodox opponents, particularly Kautsky and Bebel. The author would probably not deny this, but he seems to think that from the point of view of the life of the movement and its enthusiasm the "myth" of the great historical mission of the working class was an indispensable element. For supporters of "scientific socialism" this seems a remarkable "deviation" into the philosophy that animated Sorel.

One major omission in this excellent book relates to trade unionism. The somewhat peculiar relationship between the trade unions and the Socialists on the international scene would deserve detailed treatment, particularly as this helps understand the delayed development of a separate trade union international. The Menshevik-Bolshevik split is, I assume, to be treated in

the next volume even though chronologically it would belong in the present book.

Some minor requests may be in order in view of a possible English translation of the book, which I hope will soon be forthcoming. Some data on membership figures of the organizations affiliated with the Socialist International at various dates would be enlightening, as would be the more liberal use of dates in the text. A few misprints should be eliminated. American readers would enjoy learning more about the—sometimes surprisingly intimate—relations between events in this country and the evolution of the Socialist International.

Many illustrations and an excellent index add to the usefulness of the book for the student. In view of the high quality of this first volume, we shall be looking forward eagerly to its sequel.—ADOLF STURMTHAL, *University of Illinois*.

*The Position of the Individual in International Law according to Grotius and Vattel.* BY PETER P. REMEC. PREFACE BY QUINCY WRIGHT. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Pp. xii, 260. \$4.70.)

This scholarly study contains more than a mere discussion of the question of the position of the individual in international law according to Grotius and Vattel. After a 40 page survey of the current doctrine on the question the author gives his reasons for the reexamination of just these two classical writers. However, even if the *magna opera* under discussion had not had, in recent years, their bicentennial and tercentenary, respectively (which occasions would be reason enough for considering them, especially from such an important angle as that of the position of the individual) no apology for this reexamination is necessary if the study is interesting in itself; and if it is not, good reasons for undertaking it do not enhance its significance.

The two main chapters of the book deal primarily and interestingly with the general theory of international law of Grotius and Vattel, in particular with the relationship between natural and positive law, while the specific question of the position of the individual occupies only a relatively minor part of the discussion. Dr. Remec then takes up the question: "How would Grotius or Vattel solve certain problems which, according to the present exigencies of international life, involve the individual as such?", limiting the comparison of the two authors "to the possibility of international protection of the rights of the individual against oppression by his own state." His answer is that "both authors admit the possibility of an individual appeal beyond the municipal law to the law of nature. Both admit the possibility of violent resistance in extreme

cases . . . on the ground of the law of nature". In general, however, "Grotius recognizes but Vattel denies the possibility of international protection of human rights against one's own state," the former permitting "just humanitarian intervention," the latter holding for nonintervention.

One of the main purposes of the study is to establish whether, in view of "the modern trend of international law doctrine . . . to abandon the purely positivistic conceptions" and of the " manifold return to natural law principles," "the fundamental principles of the law of nature and of nations held by either of the two classic authors are suitable, at least in part, for a modern reapplication." Those of Vattel would not seem to be suitable while those of Grotius would have to be qualified in terms of collective intervention, intervention by international organization, in order to avoid the dangers of unilateral interven-

tion. It is submitted that such results can be and have been obtained without recourse to natural law principles. Natural law can be used both to justify and to attack an existing *status quo*. "Positivists,"<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, do not necessarily agree with the *lex lata*; only they do not claim that their proposed *lex ferenda* is the only admissible one. It would be difficult to argue, as the learned author seems to imply, that the extension of the *Rechts- und Handlungsfähigkeit* of the individual in international law, which has taken place in particular since the First World War, is due only to natural law concepts. On the other hand, all the natural law of the world has not saved the victims of Hitler or Stalin.—SALO ENGEL, *The University of Tennessee*.

<sup>1</sup> If one is to continue the use of these labels, see e.g. Kunz in 55, *The American Journal of International Law* 951 (1961), and Rubin in 56 *ibid.*, 514 (1962).

## OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

- AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, *The United States and the Far East*. (Second edition edited by Willard L. Thorp) (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. 188. \$1.95, Paper. \$3.95, Cloth.)
- APPLEBY, PAUL H., *Citizens as Sovereigns*. (Syracuse: University Press. 1962. Pp. xxiv, 200. \$5.50.)
- ARMSTRONG, ANNE, *Unconditional Surrender: Impact of Casablanca Policy upon World War II*. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 304. \$6.50.)
- ASBELL, BERNARD, *When F. D. R. Died*. (New York: The New American Library. 1962. Pp. xi, 191. \$0.75, Paper.)
- BALES, JAMES D., *Communism: Its Faith and Fallacies*. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. 1962. Pp. 214. \$3.95.)
- BARBASH, JACK, *Labor's Grass Roots*. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1961. Pp. viii, 250. \$4.95.)
- BARR, STRINGFELLOW, *The Pilgrimage of Western Man: A History of Europe 1500-1961*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, Co. 1962. Pp. xiii, 369. \$1.95, Paper. \$5.95, Cloth.)
- BELL, JACK, *Mr. Conservative: Barry Goldwater*. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1961. Pp. 312. \$4.50.)
- BENEDICT, BUELL, AND ELLISON, *Comparing Career Service Systems: A Preliminary Study*. (Chicago: Public Personnel Association. 1962. Pp. 20. \$2.50, Paper.)
- BENGTSON, JOHN ROBERT, *Nazi War Aims*. (Rock Island, Illinois: Augustana College Library. 1962. Pp. xi, 155. \$3.95.)
- BENNETT, JOHN C., Editor, *Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1962. Pp. 188, \$3.95.)
- BENNIS, W. G., BENNE, K. D., CHIN, ROBERT, Editors, *The Planning of Change: Readings in the Applied Behavioral Sciences*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 781. \$8.50.)
- BENTON, WILLIAM, *The Voice of Latin America*. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1961. Pp. xix, 204. \$3.95.)
- BERNSTEIN, PETER L., *The Price of Prosperity*. (New York: Doubleday and Company. 1962. Pp. xii, 273. \$4.50.)
- BETH, LOREN P., *Politics, The Constitution, and the Supreme Court*. (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co. Pp. x, 166. \$2.25, Paper.)
- BLIJ, HARM J. DE, *Africa South*. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 399. \$5.95.)
- BODIN, JEAN, Edited by Kenneth Douglas McRae. *The Six Books of a Commonweale*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1962.)
- BOSWORTH, WILLIAM, *Catholicism and Crisis in Modern France*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. xv, 407. \$8.50.)
- BOURNE, EDWARD GAYLORD, *Spain in America 1450-1580*. (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1962. Pp. xi, 366. \$2.25, Paper. \$5.00, Cloth.)
- BOYD, ANDREW AND VAN RENSBURG, PATRICK, *An Atlas of African Affairs*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. 133. \$3.50, Cloth. \$1.75, Paper.)
- BOYKIN, JAMES H., *North Carolina in 1861*. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1962. Pp. 237. \$5.00.)
- BRADFORD, SAX, *Spain in the World*. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1962. Pp. v, 121. \$1.45, Paper.)

- BRAILSFORD, H. N., *The Levellers and the English Revolution*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961. Pp. 715. \$10.00.)
- BRECHER, MICHAEL, *Nekru: A Political Biography*. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 267. \$1.95, Paper.)
- BRONFENBRENNER, MARTIN, *Academic Encounter*. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. 1962. Pp. ix, 259, \$6.00.)
- BRUMBERG, ABRAHAM, Editor, *Russia under Khrushchev: An Anthology from Problems of Communism*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. vii, 660. \$8.75, Cloth. \$2.50, Paper.)
- BURGESS, M. ELAINE, *Negro Leadership in a Southern City*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 231. \$6.00.)
- BURTNESS, P. E. AND OBER, WARREN U., Editors, *The Puzzle of Pearl Harbor*. (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co. Pp. ix, 244. \$2.25, Paper.)
- CAPERS, GERALD M., *John C. Calhoun, Opportunist*. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1960. Pp. 269. \$6.75.)
- CHESTER, EDWARD W., *Europe Views America*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1962. Pp. 182. \$4.50.)
- CHRISTENSON, REO M. AND MCWILLIAMS, ROBERT O., *Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1962. Pp. ix, 485. \$4.95, Paper.)
- CLANCY, HERBERT J., *The Democratic Party: Jefferson to Jackson*. (New York: Fordham University Press. 1962. Pp. 240. \$5.00.)
- CLARKE, CHARLES WALTER, *Taboo: The Story of the Pioneers of Social Hygiene*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1962. Pp. vii, 109. \$3.25.)
- CLARKE, JACQUELYNE J., *These Rights They Seek*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1962. Pp. vii, 85. \$3.25.)
- CLERICETTI, DARIO, *L'Affaire Ambatielos*. (Geneva: E. Dorz. 1962. Pp. 184. 15 Sw. Fr., Paper.)
- CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION STAFF, Editors, *Chapters in Western Civilization Vol. II*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1962. Pp. 477. \$6.00.)
- COX, OLIVER C., *Capitalism and American Leadership*. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1962. \$6.00.)
- CRESSEY, GEORGE B., *Soviet Potentials: A Geographic Appraisal*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1962. Pp. xvii, 232. \$5.75.)
- DAVIS, J. WILLIAM, AND ODEN, WILLIAM E., *Municipal and County Government (Texas)*. (Dallas: The Arnold Foundation. 1961. Pp. vi, 130. \$1.00, Paper.)
- DESMONDE, WILLIAM, *Magic, Myth and Money*. (New York: The Free Press. 1962. Pp. xv, 208. \$5.00.)
- DIA, MAMADOU, *The African Nations and World Solidarity*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xii, 145. \$4.85, Cloth. \$1.85, Paper.)
- DIESING, PAUL, *Reason in Society*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1962. Pp. 262. \$5.75.)
- DIVINE, ROBERT A., *The Illusion of Neutrality: The Struggle over the Arms-embargo Issue in the Years of the New Deal*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. ix, 370. \$6.50.)
- DORSEY, GEORGE, *Christopher of San Francisco*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1962. Pp. 238. \$5.00.)
- DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O., *Democracy's Manifesto*. (New York: Doubleday and Co. 1962. Pp. 48. \$2.00.)
- DRAPER, THEODORE, *Castro's Revolution*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962. Pp. vi, 211. \$4.50.)
- DUGGAR, GEORGE D., *Federalism and Self-Government in the U. S.: Urban Renewal as an Example*. (Berkeley: University of California Bureau of Public Administration. Pp. 13. Paper.)
- DUGGAR, GEORGE S., *The New Renewal: The Next Big Tasks in Urban Renewal*. (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California. 1961. Pp. xix, 158. \$3.75, Paper.)
- DYKEMAN, WILMA, AND STOKELY, JAMES, *Seeds of Southern Change: The Life of Will Alexander*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. xvi, 343. \$5.95.)
- ECKSTEIN, ALEXANDER, *The National Income of Communist China*. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. 1962. Pp. 215. \$6.75.)
- ENGLEMAN, FRED L., *The Peace of Christmas Eve*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1962. Pp. xii, 333. \$6.95.)
- ESSIEN-UDOM, E. U., *Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. xi, 367. \$6.95.)
- FEHRENBACHER, DON E., *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850's*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1960. Pp. 205. \$4.75.)
- FERGUSON, J. H. AND MCHENRY, D. E., *Elements of American Government*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1962. Pp. ix, 489. \$6.95.)
- FONER, PHILIP S., *A History of Cuba and its Relations with the United States*. Vol. I. (New York: International Publishers. 1962. Pp. 256. \$3.75.)
- FOOT, M. R. D., *Men in Uniform*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 161. \$3.50.)
- FREMANTLE, ANNE, Editor, *Mao Tse-Tung: Anthology of his Writings*. (New York: The

- New American Library. 1962. Pp. xlviii, 300. \$0.75, Paper.)
- FROMM, ERICH, *May Man Prevail?* (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1961. Pp. xi, 252. \$4.50, Cloth. \$0.95, Paper.)
- FRYKLUND, RICHARD, *100 Million Lives: Maximum Survival in a Nuclear War.* (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1962. Pp. xii, 175. \$3.95.)
- FULLER, EDMUND, Editor, *Schools and Scholarship: The Christian Idea of Education Part II.* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 345. \$6.50.)
- GLAZER, SIDNEY, *A Study of Progress: The Middle West.* (New York: Bookman Associates. 1962. Pp. 135. \$3.50.)
- GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH, *Economic Development in Perspective.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1962. Pp. vi, 76. \$2.50.)
- GARBARINO, JOSEPH W., *Wage Policy and Long-Term Contracts.* (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1962. Pp. 145. \$2.00, Paper. \$3.00, Cloth.)
- GERBER, ROSALIE B., *The Responsibilities of Man.* (Washington: Public Affairs Press. Pp. vi, 147. \$3.25.)
- GHIBAUDI, SILVIA ROTA, *La Fortuna Di Rousseau in Italia (1750-1815).* (Torino: Istituto di Scienze Politiche, Dell' Università. 1961. Pp. 373. L. 2.800, Paper.)
- GOEN, C. C., *Revivalism and Separatism in New England, 1740-1800.* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1962. Pp. x, 370. \$7.50.)
- GOLDBERG HARVEY, *The Life of Jean Jaurès.* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1961. Pp. 590. \$12.00.)
- GOLDRICH, DANIEL, *Radical Nationalism: The Political Orientations of Panamanian Law Students.* (East Lansing: Michigan State University. 1962. Pp. 44. Paper.)
- GOULD, JAMES W., *Americans in Sumatra.* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1961. Pp. vii, 185. 14.25 guilders.)
- GOURE, LEON, *The Siege of Leningrad.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 363. \$6.95.)
- GRAY, ROBERT KEITH, *Eighteen Acres Under Glass.* (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1962. Pp. 372. \$4.95.)
- GREEN, CONSTANCE McLAUGHLIN, *Washington: Village and Capital, 1800-1878.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. xix, 445. \$8.50.)
- GREENBERGER, MARTIN, Editor, *Management and the Computer of the Future.* (Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 1962. Pp. xxvi, 340. \$6.00.)
- GREENE, FELIX, *Awakened China.* (New York: Doubleday & Company. 1961. Pp. 425. \$5.95.)
- GYORGY, ANDREW, AND GIBBS, HUBERT S., Editors, *Problems in International Relations.* Second edition. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. xii, 386. \$5.25, Paper.)
- HAIM, SYLVIA G., Editor, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology.* (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1962. Pp. 255. \$6.00.)
- HAIRE, MASON, Editor, *Organization Theory in Industrial Practice.* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1962. Pp. x, 173. \$5.75.)
- HAMLIN, D. L. B., *Diplomacy in Evolution.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1961. Pp. viii, 128. \$2.00, Paper.)
- HANSARD, *Parliamentary Debates* (24th Parliament, February, March 1962) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.)
- HARGREAVES, REGINALD, *Red Sun Rising: The Siege of Port Arthur.* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1962. Pp. xi, 210. \$3.95.)
- HARRIS, C. LOWELL, *Selected Readings in Economics* (Second edition). (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. xv, 557. Paper.)
- HARTMANN, FREDERICK H., *World in Crisis: Readings in International Relations.* (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1962. Pp. xvi, 398. \$3.25, Paper.)
- HAYRAN, MARTIN J., *The Catholics in Caroline England.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1962. Pp. ix, 208. \$4.75.)
- HEARD, ALEXANDER, *The Costs of Democracy. Financing American Political Campaigns.* (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1962. Pp. 446. \$1.95, Paper.)
- HEILBRUNN, OTTO, *Partisan Warfare.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962. Pp. 199.)
- HENKIN, LOUIS, Editor, *Arms Controls.* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961. Pp. 207. \$3.50.)
- HIBBERT, CHRISTOPHER, *Il Duce: The Life of Benito Mussolini.* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1962. Pp. xii, 368. \$6.00.)
- HIGH, JAMES, *Teaching Secondary School Social Studies.* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1962. Pp. xii, 481. \$6.95.)
- HIGHAM, ROBIN, *The British Rigid Airship. 1908-1931.* (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, Inc. 1962. Pp. xvi, 426. \$9.00.)
- HIRSCHFIELD, ROBERT S., *The Constitution and the Court.* (New York: Random House, Inc. 1962. Pp. 257. \$1.95, Paper.)
- HOPTNER, J. B., *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941.* (New York: Columbia University Press. 1962. Pp. xv, 328. \$6.50.)
- HOUN, FRANKLIN W., *To Change a Nation.* (New York: The Free Press. 1961. Pp. x, 250.)
- HSIAO, TSO-LIANG, *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934: A Study of Documents.* (Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 404. \$7.50.)
- HSÜEH, CHÜN-TU, *Huang Hsing and the Chinese*



- Revolution*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 260. \$5.75.)
- HUTCHINSON AND RACHEL. Editors. *The Papers of James Madison*. Vol. I: 1751-1779. Vol. II: 1780-1781. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. Vol. I: xlii, 344. \$10.00. Vol. II: xix, 344. \$10.00.)
- HUTTENBACK, ROBERT A., *British Relations with Sind. 1799-1843: An Anatomy of Imperialism*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1962. Pp. ix, 161. \$4.00.)
- INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE HAUTES ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES, *La Première Internationale: Recueil de documents*. (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz. 1962. Pp. Vol. I: xxxiii, 454. Vol. II: 499.)
- INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, *Angola, A Symposium: Views of a Revolt*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. 160. \$2.25. Paper.)
- JACKSON, W. A. DOUGLAS, *Russo-Chinese Borderlands*. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1962. Pp. vii, 126. \$1.45, Paper.)
- JACOBS, DAN N., Editor, *The New Communist Manifesto*. Second edition. (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co. Pp. 250. \$1.45, Paper.)
- JASNY, NAUM, *Essays on the Soviet Economy*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962. Pp. xiv, 297. \$6.00.)
- KENNEDY, JOHN F., *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy 1961*. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1962. Pp. 908. \$6.00.)
- KENT, RAYMOND K., *From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. ix, 182. \$4.85.)
- KOLKO, GABRIEL, *Wealth and Power in America*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. xii, 178. \$4.85.)
- KRUPP, SHERMAN, *Pattern in Organization Analysis*. (Philadelphia: Chilton Co. 1961. Pp. 201. \$5.00.)
- KULKARNI, V. B., *British Statesmen in India*. (Bombay: Orient Longmans, Ltd. 1962. Pp. ix, 550. RS. 20/—)
- LAWRENCE, JOHN, *A History of Russia*. (New York: The New American Library. 1962. Pp. vii, 230. \$0.75, Paper.)
- LEFEVER, ERNEST W., Editor, *Arms and Arms Control*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. xvii, 334. \$6.75, Cloth. \$1.95, Paper.)
- LEGUM, COLIN, *Africa: A Handbook to the Continent*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. xiv, 553. \$15.00.)
- LEIFER, MICHAEL, *Cambodia and Neutrality*. (Canberra: Australian National University. Pp. 51. 5/—, Paper.)
- LETWIN, WILLIAM, Editor, *A Documentary History of American Economic Policy since 1789*. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. xxx, 406. \$7.50.)
- LIPSET, TROW, AND COLEMAN, *Union Democracy*. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1962. Pp. xxvi, 512. \$1.95, Paper.)
- LOVELL, COLIN R., *English Constitution History*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 589. \$8.00.)
- MACARTNEY, C. A., AND PALMER, A. W., *Independent Eastern Europe: A History*. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1962. Pp. vi, 499. \$12.00.)
- MADARIAGA, ISABEL DE, *Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780*. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1962. Pp. xiv, 496. \$8.75.)
- MANUEL, FRANK E., *The Prophets of Paris*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1962. Pp. x, 349. \$7.50.)
- MARDIN, SERIF, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 456. \$10.00.)
- MCCLAINE, JACKSON M. AND HIGHSAW, ROBERT B., *Dixie City Acts: A Study in Decision Making*. (University: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama. 1962. Pp. vii, 53. Paper.)
- MCCUTCHEN, FERSH, AND CLARK, *Goals of Democracy: A Problems Approach*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1962. Pp. viii, 664.)
- MCNICKLE, D'ARCY, *The Indian Tribes of the U. S.: Ethnic and Cultural Survival*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. 79. \$1.75, Paper.)
- MEHNERT, KLAUS, *Soviet Man and His World*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. vii, 310.)
- MEYER, LOUIS S., *Federal Aid to Education: Its Impact on Arizona*. (Tempe: Arizona State University. 1962. Pp. v, 36. \$1.00, Paper.)
- MILLER, J. P., Editor, *Competition, Cartels and their Regulation*. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. 428. \$9.80.)
- MITCHELL, BROADUS, *Alexander Hamilton* Vol. II. (New York: The MacMillan Co. 1962. Pp. viii, 805. \$12.50.)
- MOBERG, DAVID O., *The Church as a Social Institution*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. vi, 569. \$7.50.)
- MOON, PENDEREL, *Divide and Quit (Ending of British Rule in India)*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1962. Pp. 302. \$5.50.)
- NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. x, 635. \$12.50.)
- NOLLAU, GÜNTHER, *International Communism and World Revolution*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xv, 357. \$7.50.)
- NUTTER, G. WARREN, *The Growth of Industrial*

- Production in the Soviet Union.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. xxvii, 706. \$15.00.)
- OBERNDÖRFER, DIETER, Editor, *Wissenschaftliche Politik: Eine Einführung in Grundfragen Ihrer Tradition und Theorie.* (Freiburg um Breisgau: Rombach. 1962. Pp. 428. 45 DM.)
- OKUMA, THOMAS, *Angola in Ferment.* (Boston: Beacon Press. 1962. Pp. xviii, 137. \$3.50.)
- ONODY, OLIVER, *A Inflação Brasileira (1820-1958).* (Rio de Janeiro. 1960. Pp. 419. Paper.)
- PADOVER, SAUL K., *To Secure These Blessings: The Great Debates of 1787.* (New York: Washington Square and Ridge Press. 1962. Pp. 464. \$7.50.)
- PANIKKAR, K. MADHU, *Revolution in Africa.* (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. 1961. Pp. 202. \$6.50.)
- PECK, M. J. AND SCHERER, F. M., *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis.* (Cambridge: Harvard Business School. 1962. Pp. xxxii, 736. \$10.00.)
- PELTASON, J. W., AND BURNS, JAMES M., Editors, *Functions and Policies of American Government (second edition).* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. xiv, 450. \$5.95.)
- PHILLIPS, N. C., *Yorkshire and English National Politics, 1788-1784.* (Christchurch: University of Canterbury. 1961. Pp. 60. 6/6d., Paper.)
- POLDERVAART, ARIE, *New Mexico Probate Manual.* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1962. Pp. 193. \$3.50, Paper.)
- POMFRET, JOHN E., *The Province of East New Jersey, 1609-1702: The Rebellious Proprietary.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. x, 407. \$10.00.)
- POUNDS, NORMAN J. G., *Divided Germany and Berlin.* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1962. Pp. v, 128. \$1.45.)
- RAY, DONALD P., Editor, *Trends in Social Science.* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1961. Pp. 169. \$4.75.)
- READ, JAMES M., *The United Nations and Refugees: Changing Concepts.* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1962. Pp. 60. \$.35, Paper.)
- RICH, CLIFFORD A. L., Editor, *European Politics and Government.* (New York: The Ronald Press. 1962. Pp. vii, 780. \$8.00.)
- RIPKA, HUBERT, *Eastern Europe in the Post War World.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. xv, 266. \$5.95.)
- RIVERO, NICOLAS, *Castro's Cuba: An American Dilemma.* (Washington: Robert B. Luce, Inc. 1962. Pp. xiii, 239. \$4.50.)
- ROSENOW, BEVERLY PAULIK, Editor, *Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889.* (Seattle: Book Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. xv, 930. \$18.00.)
- ROTHBARD, MURRAY N., *The Panic of 1819.* (New York: Columbia University Press. 1962. Pp. vi, 261. \$6.00.)
- SCHLEICHER, CHARLES P., *International Relations: Cooperation and Conflict.* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. xiii, 651. \$8.75.)
- SCHMANDT, STEINBICKER, AND WENDEL, *Metropolitan Reform in St. Louis: A Case Study.* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1961. Pp. xi, 73. Paper.)
- SCHWARTZ, HARRY, *The Many Faces of Communism.* (New York: Berkeley Publishing Corporation. 1962. Pp. 254. \$.50, Paper.)
- SCIGLIANO, ROBERT, *The Courts: A Reader in the Judicial Process.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1962. Pp. viii, 405. Paper.)
- SHAW, TODD, AND VIEDERMAN, Editors, *The American Bibliography of Russian and East European Studies for 1960.* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. 1962. Pp. xvi, 124. Paper.)
- SHIPMAN, LAMPMAN, AND MIYAMOTO, *Medical Service Corporations in the State of Washington.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1962. Pp. xi, 215. \$6.50.)
- SINCLAIR, T. C., AND GRUNBAUM, WERNER F., *Personal Rights and Liberties (Texas).* (Dallas: The Arnold Foundation. 1960. Pp. vi, 95. \$1.00, Paper.)
- SMITH, A. ROBERT, *The Tiger in the Senate: A Biography of Senator Wayne Morse.* (New York: Doubleday and Company. 1962. Pp. 455. \$4.95.)
- SOULE, LEON CYPRIAN, *The Know-Nothing Party in New Orleans.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Historical Association. 1962. Pp. 128. \$5.00.)
- SOWLE, CLAUDE R., Editor, *Police Power and Individual Freedom.* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 1962. Pp. 287. \$7.50.)
- SPARKS, GEORGE F., Editor, *A Many-Colored Toga: The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashhurst.* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 1962. Pp. xvi, 416. \$7.50.)
- SPECTOR, IVAR, *The First Russian Revolution: Its Impact on Asia.* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1962. Pp. viii, 180. \$1.95, Paper. \$3.95, Cloth.)
- SPIER, HANS, *Divided Berlin.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. 201. \$4.95.)
- SPENCER, FRANK, Editor, *The Fourth Earl of Sandwich: Diplomatic Correspondence 1763-1765.* (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc. 1962. Pp. vii, 334. \$9.00.)
- STARR, JOSEPH R., *Manuel Para La Preparacion de Tesis Con Referencia Especial a La Administracion Publica.* (Panama: University of Panama. 1962. Pp. 115. Paper.)
- STYPULKOWSKI, ZBIGNIEW, *Invitation to Moscow.* (New York: Walker & Co. 1962. Pp. xvi, 360. \$5.95.)

- EDITORS OF "SURVEY," *Hungary Today*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1962. Pp. 104. \$3.85.)
- TAURAS, K. V., *Guerilla Warfare on the Amber Coast*. (New York: Voyages Press. 1962. Pp. xi, 110. \$3.00. Paper.)
- TELLER, EDWARD, WITH BROWN, ALLEN, *The Legacy of Hiroshima*. (New York: Doubleday and Company. 1962. Pp. ix, 325. \$4.95.)
- TEMPEL, B. VAN DEN, *The Evolution of Social Systems in Europe*. (London: Robert Hale, Ltd. 1962. Pp. 128. 15/—.)
- TURNBULL, WILLIAMS, AND CHEIT, *Economic and Social Security (second edition)*. (New York: The Ronald Press Co. 1962. Pp. v, 552. \$8.00.)
- TUSSMAN, JOSEPH, Editor, *The Supreme Court on Church and State*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1962. Pp. xxiv, 305. Paper.)
- TWITTY, W. BRADLEY, *Y'All Come: "Big Jim" Folsom*. (Nashville: Hermitage Press. 1962. Pp. 169. \$5.00.)
- TYLER, GUS, *Organized Crime in America*. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1962. Pp. xvi, 421. \$7.50.)
- U.S.S.R. *The Soviet Stand on Disarmament (Documents)*. (New York: Cross-currents Press, Inc. 1962. \$1.00, Paper.)
- ULLMAN, RICHARD A., *Intervention and The War*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. 360. \$7.50.)
- UNITED NATIONS, *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament*. (New York: United Nations. 1962. Pp. 66. \$.75, Paper.)
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, *Communist China: Ruthless Enemy or Paper Tiger: Bibliographic Survey*. (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army. 1962. Pp. vi, 137.)
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Foreign Relations of the U. S.: 1943, China*. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1957. Pp. vi, 908. \$4.00.)
- U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1941. Vol. V. The Far East*. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1956. Pp. 938. \$4.00.)
- URS, D. V., Editor, for the University of Mysore, India, *Kautilya: A Review of International Affairs Vol. 2 No. 1*. (Bangalore: Hosali Press. 1962. Pp. ix, 140. \$3.00, Paper.) Bi-Annual.
- VAKAR, NICHOLAS P., *The Taproot of Soviet Society: The Impact of Russia's Peasant Culture Upon the Soviet State*. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1962. Pp. xiii, 203. \$4.75.)
- VARMA, V. P., *Political Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo*. (New York: Asia Publishing House. 1961. Pp. xxii, 471. \$6.50.)
- WADDELL, D. A. G., *British Honduras*. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. 151. \$2.90.)
- WAGNER, PHILIP L., AND MIKESELL, MARVIN, Editors, *Readings in Cultural Geography*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 589. \$8.50.)
- WALLAS, GRAHAM, *Human Nature in Politics*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1962. Pp. 313. \$1.40, Paper.)
- WANDYCZ, PIOTR S., *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962. Pp. ix, 454. \$8.50.)
- WARNER, DENIS, *Hurricane from China*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1961. Pp. ix, 210. \$3.95.)
- WASKOW, ARTHUR I., *The Limits of Defense*. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1962. Pp. 119. \$2.95.)
- WIENS, HAROLD J., *Pacific Island Bastions of the U. S.* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1962. Pp. iv, 127. \$1.45, Paper.)
- WILLIAMS, ERNEST W., JR., *Freight Transportation in the Soviet Union*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp. xxi, 221. \$4.50.)
- WILLIAMSON, A. A., *Biological Forces in World Affairs*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. iv, 58. \$1.00, Paper.)
- WILLIS, F. ROY, *The French in Germany 1945-1949*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 308. \$6.00.)
- WILLMOTT, DONALD E., *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. 1961. Pp. xi, 139. \$3.00, Paper.)
- WOELFEL, NORMAN, *Educational Goals for America*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1962. Pp. vi, 167. \$3.75.)
- WOLPERT, STANLEY A., *Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1962. Pp. xv, 370. \$7.50.)
- WOODCOCK, GEORGE, *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements*. (New York: Meridian Books. 1962. Pp. 504. \$1.95, Paper.)
- WOOSTER, RALPH A., *The Secession Conventions of the South*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962. Pp. viii, 294. \$6.50.)
- WRAGE, E. J. AND BASKERVILLE, BARNET, *Contemporary Forum: American Speeches on Twentieth Century Issues*. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1962. Pp. x, 376. \$7.50.)
- YOUNG, WILLIAM H., Editor *Ogg and Ray's Introduction to American Government, The National Government (12th edition)*. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1962. Pp. xiii, 748. \$7.50.)
- YOUNG, WILLIAM H., Editor, *Ogg and Ray's Introduction to American Government (12th edition)*. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1962. Pp. xiii, 957. \$8.00.)
- ZIEGLER, BENJAMIN M., *The Supreme Court and Economic Life*. (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co. 1962. Pp. xi, 273. \$2.40, Paper.)

# DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA\*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER

*Deputy Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*

## I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1961 LISTING

### POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

#### *Additions*

- H. Angell*, The Regulation, Limitation and Subsidization of Election Campaign Funds. *McGill*.
- Hoyt B. Ballard*, Some Contemporary Views on the Nature and Function of Political Philosophy. *Texas*.
- George D. Beam*, The Use of Logical Models in Political Science. *Michigan*.
- Pushpa Bhana*, The Concept of "Class" in Utilitarian Thought. *Toronto*.
- Franklyn G. Bonn*, The Idea of Political Party in Early Jeffersonian Thought. *Minnesota*.
- A. Bromke*, Poland's Own Road to Socialism. *McGill*.
- Ian Budge*, Political Decision. *Yale*.
- Harold M. Cady*, James Madison's Theories of Federalism and Their Impact on the American Constitutional System. *Claremont*.
- Ann Cagan*, Political Thought of Contemporary Scientists. *Harvard*.
- Vilma A. Cavallaro*, Jose Ortega y Gasset: His

Philosophy of Politics and History. *New York University*.

*Philip C. Chapman*, The Image of the Mass. *California* (Berkeley).

*N. T. Cieplak*, Sorel's Theory of Syndicalism. *McGill*.

*John R. Crutcher*, Sanctions of African Rule in Tanganyika: The Transformation of Religio-Political Symbolism. *Notre Dame*.

*Theodore Denno*, Evolution of the Marxian Utopia. *Maryland*.

*Spynos Dialismas*, The Origins and Development of Athenian Democracy. *American*.

*Sharron E. Doerner*, The Political Community: A Critique of Select Thinkers. *Indiana*.

*Paul Eidelsberg*, The Political Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Reinterpretation of the Intention of the Founding Fathers. *Chicago*.

*John Ellsworth*, Individualism and Community in the 17th Century. *Claremont*.

*Gerald Friedberg*, Socialism in America, A Case Study: The Life and Times of John Spargo. *Harvard*.

*Gerard A. Gibbons*, Reason of State and the Right of Resistance. *New York University*.

*Arthur S. Goldberg*, Consensus-Cleavage and Political Stability. *Yale*.

*H. P. Habib*, A Case Study of Egyptian Conservatism: Ismail Sidqi. *McGill*.

*George Heiman*, A Comparative Study of the German and English Idea of Freedom in the 19th Century. *Toronto*.

*Joseph A. Hennessy*, The Political Philosophy of Maurice Barres: A Critical Analysis. *Notre Dame*.

*Morton Horwitz*, Rise of the Doctrine of Tyranny of the Majority. *Harvard*.

*W. Marvin Kendrick*, Xenophon's Political Philosophy. *Chicago*.

*Frederick E. Kidder*, The Political Philosophy of Luis Munoz Rivera (1859-1916) of Puerto Rico. *Florida*.

*F. A. F. Kunz*, The Senate of Canada, 1925-1961. *McGill*.

*George Mace*, The Comparative Influence of

\* Similar lists have been printed in the *Review* annually since 1911, except for 1915-19, 1921 and 1923-24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1961, list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes, and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

The lists printed in the *Review* are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science; to avoid misunderstandings, entries are not accepted from individual candidates for degrees. The subject matter classification of an entry by the department concerned, if given, is followed. Each entry is listed under one classification only.

For a fuller note about coverage and subject matter classification, and for references to dissertation lists in cognate fields, see the 1960 list, LIV, 816.

For a chart which classifies, by subject category, the numbers of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this *Review*, LII, 916.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Hobbes and Locke on The Federalist Papers. *Claremont*.

H. H. Macquarrie, Sir Robert Borden and the Conservative Party of Canada. *McGill*.

Frank B. Mallonee, Jr., An Exposition of the Political Ideas of Jefferson Davis. *Emory*.

Louis C. Midgley, Politics, Power and Ultimate Concern: The Political Philosophy of Paul Tillich. *Brown*.

Larry D. Nachman, The Liberal Politics of John Stuart Mill. *Columbia*.

P. C. Noble, Regionalism in International Organization: Theory and Practice. *McGill*.

Alan Ritter, Political Thought of Proudhon. *Harvard*.

James W. Roberts, Lenin's Theory of Imperialism: Evolution and Present Meaning. *North Carolina*.

Esther E. Rowland, Ernest Jones, Chartist. *Columbia*.

Peter Sampo, Mazzini and the Church: A Study in Political Symbolism. *Notre Dame*.

Elizabeth B. Sass, The Contribution of American Political Science to Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

Marvin Schick, The United States Court of Appeals: A Study in Judicial Behavior. *New York University*.

Thomas Schrock, The Political Thought of Daniel Defoe. *Chicago*.

Barbara Silberdick, The Political Thought of Oliver Cromwell: The Search for a Stable Constitutional Order. *Yale*.

James A. Steintrager, Human Nature and Political Society: An Examination of the Ethical Basis of J. S. Mill's Political Thought. *Chicago*.

Rolf H. Theen, The Political Thought of Peter Nikitich Tkachev. *Indiana*.

Jean P. Tournon, The Nature and Role of the Political Group. *California* (Berkeley).

Hihun Pak, Logical Positivism and Political Theory. *Minnesota*.

Rev. Joseph Pittau, Political Theory in Early Meiji Japan: The Making of the Major Constitution. *Harvard*.

Ernest J. Walters, Social Science and Democracy: A Study of Graham Wallis. *Chicago*.

Richard S. Wells, Political Ideology and the Legal Profession: The Case of the Carr Law Firm of Manchester, Iowa. *Iowa*.

Burton Zwiebach, The Political Thought of R. H. Tawney. *Columbia*.

#### Changes

Jerome I. Cooperman, The Philosophical Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Leo Strauss, T. O. Weldon, J. P. Sartre. *Kulgers*.

Gordon J. Schochet, Robert Filmer and His Critics: A Study in Conflicting Theories of Obligation

in Seventeenth Century English Political Thought. *Minnesota*.

#### Deletions

Jason M. Aronson, Shaftesbury's Political Thought and Its Philosophical Foundations. *Chicago*.

#### GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

##### Additions

Marjorie E. Aghassi, Attitudes toward Channeling of U. S. Foreign Aid through the United Nations: A Case Study of Interest Groups before Congress. *Columbia*.

Samuel B. Bloom, Federal Aid to Higher Education and the Doctrine of Separation of Church and State in Education. *California* (Berkeley).

Ruth E. Cowart, The Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960: A Study of the Legislative Process. *American*.

William J. Crotty, Jr., The Democratic Advisory Council: An Analysis. *North Carolina*.

John E. Crow, Lawyers and Politics: A Behavioral View. *Washington* (Seattle).

J. Clarence Davies, 3d, Target Groups and Urban Renewal. *Columbia*.

Donald M. Freeman, Religion and Southern Politics: A Study of the Political Behavior of Southern White Protestants. *North Carolina*.

Louis C. Gawthrop, Congressional Control of Foreign Aid Agencies, 1948-1960. *Johns Hopkins*.

Jackson A. Giddens, The United States Information Agency: Its Organization and Operation. *Fletcher School*.

John Grupenhoff, A Study of the Politics of Cincinnati, Ohio and of Hamilton County, since 1924. *Texas*.

John E. Harr, Specialization and the Senior Officer in the Conduct of U. S. Foreign Affairs. *California* (Berkeley).

Richard Hofferbert, Out-Party Power Consolidation: A Case Study of Routine Political Career Building. *Indiana*.

Joseph P. Kelly, An Analysis of a Montana Democratic Congressional Candidate's Primary and General Campaigns in the 1960 Election. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Helenan Lewis, The Teenage Joiner and His Orientations Toward Public Affairs: A Test of Two Hypotheses about Multiple Group Membership. *Michigan State*.

Diane Monson, Interests and Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. *New York University*.

Richard E. Morgan, The Religious Interest Group in American Politics: A Case Study of

the Protestants and other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. *Columbia*.

*Edwin E. Olson*, Congressional Attitudes toward the Federal Public Service. *American*.

*Milton Pabon*, Study of Political Legitimacy in Puerto Rico. *Chicago*.

*Robert L. Piper*, The Attempt to Draft Adlai Stevenson for the 1960 Presidential Nomination. *Syracuse*.

*Quentin L. Quade*, Harry S. Truman and the Conduct of Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Presidential Leadership. *Notre Dame*.

*Mark Reader*, The Political Criticism of George Orwell. *Michigan*.

*Michael P. Rogin*, McCarthyism and Agrarian Radicalism. *Chicago*.

*Bernard Samoff*, Influence of NLRB Decisions: Statutory Protection of Job Rights from Union-Caused Discrimination. *Pennsylvania*.

*Alan H. Schechter*, The Businessman as Statesman: A Study of the Influence of Government Service on Attitudes and Perceptions of Business Executives. *Columbia*.

*Edward Schneider*, The House Committee on Un-American Activities and Its Client Groups. *Claremont*.

*Captain John Seigle*, Internal War: The United States Response. *Harvard*.

*Wayne W. Shannon*, The House Conservative Coalition: The Case of the 86th Congress. *Cornell*.

*David A. Smeltzer*, The Problem of Alternatives: The Role of Congressional Committee Hearings. *Michigan*.

#### Changes

*Allen B. Davis*, The Excess Land Law in the Central Valley of California. *California* (Berkeley).

*Robert S. Getz*, Congressional Conflict of Interest: A Study in Legislative Policy. *Rutgers*.

*James R. Kerr*, Congressmen as Overseers: Congressional Surveillance of the Civilian Space Program. *Stanford*.

*David M. Olson*, The Government Relations Programs of the American Petroleum Institute and the Independent Petroleum Association of America: A Comparative Study. *California* (Berkeley).

*Herbert C. Phillips*, Depressed Areas Legislation and West Virginia Politics. *Pittsburgh*.

#### Deletions

*Joseph D. Lubin*, The Item Veto and the Presidency. *California* (Berkeley).

*Robert L. Skinner*, Principles, Policy and Pressure. A Study of the Americans for Democratic Action. *Johns Hopkins*.

## CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

### Additions

*Brother Norbert Brockman*, Constitutional Theories of the American Bar Association. *Catholic University*.

*Ida M. Chiaraviglio*, The Contribution of the State of Georgia to the Development of the Concept of Federalism. *Emory*.

*Marcus H. Evans, Jr.*, The Negro, the Courts and Equal Protection of the Laws. *Duke*.

*Robert K. Faulkner*, The Constitutional Understanding of John Marshall. *Chicago*.

*Lawrence E. Green*, The Development of Military Due Process by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals. *Stanford*.

*Richard C. C. Kim*, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Supreme Court. *Oklahoma*.

*George R. LaNoue*, Church and State Compromises in Contemporary Education. *Yale*.

*Brother E. Adrian Leonard*, Mr. Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1947. *Notre Dame*.

*Orma Linford*, The Mormons and the Law. *Wisconsin*.

*Clifford M. Lytle*, The Warren Court and Its Critics. *Pittsburgh*.

*Leonard G. Miller*, Double Jeopardy in the Federal System. *Chicago*.

*Robert Mollan*, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program—The Eisenhower Years. *Minnesota*.

*John A. Morgan, Jr.*, The Concept of Congressional Intent in Decisions of the Warren Court. *Duke*.

*Lawrence Parkus*, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Appointments to the District and Circuit Courts. *Cornell*.

*Denny E. Pilant*, No Preferred Status: An Examination of the Supreme Court's "No Preference" Interpretation of the First Amendment. *Duke*.

*Leon I. Salomon*, The Solicitor General of the United States. *Columbia*.

*Michael D. Shmidman*, Judicial Definition and Determination of "Religion" and "Religious Activity"—A Case Study of Selected State Court Decisions, in the Past Decade. *Columbia*.

*Donald F. Vance*, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty: The Development of a Judicial Definition of Religion by the Supreme Court of the United States. *Indiana*.

### Changes

*John Quincy Adams*, The Protection of Civil Rights in Texas. *Texas*.

*Harry M. Clor*, Justice Frankfurter and the Nature of Constitutional Government. *Chicago*.

*Maria J. Falco*, Accusatorial versus Inquisitorial

- Methods of Judicial Procedure. *Bryn Mawr*.  
 Robert E. Newton, Conceptions of Judicial Self-Restraint in the Opinions of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter. *Catholic University*.  
 Eugene C. Price, Administrative Practices of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. *California* (Berkeley).  
 Otis H. Stephens, The Fourteenth Amendment and Confessions of Guilt: Role of the Supreme Court. *Johns Hopkins*.

#### AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

##### Additions

- James M. Banovetz, Governmental Cost Burdens and Service Benefits in Metropolitan Areas. *Minnesota*.  
 John Buechner, The Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1961-62 and Local Government: A Case Study. *Michigan*.  
 Carl P. Chelf, Politics and Education: A Case Study of Western Kentucky State College and Its First President. *Nebraska*.  
 Mary M. Conway, Constituency Influences and Legislative Voting Behavior in the Indiana General Assembly. *Indiana*.  
 Beverly B. Cook, Political Organization and Ideology in a Non-Partisan City: A Case Study of Claremont, California. *Claremont*.  
 Robert E. Doubleday, The Politics of the 1947 Constitutional Revision in New Jersey. *New York University*.  
 Alvin Dozeman, The Modern Role of the North Carolina Republican Party. *Duke*.  
 Donald C. Flesche, The Illinois School Problems Commission: Its Role in the State Decision Making Processes. *Washington* (St. Louis).  
 Arthur Galub, The Politics of Court Reform in New York State. *Columbia*.  
 Millard L. Gieske, The Politics of Knute Nelson, 1912-1920. *Minnesota*.  
 Leonard E. Goodall, The Response of Municipalities to State Regulation of Local Indebtedness: A Study in the Avoidance of State Law. *Illinois*.  
 Joah Gotwals, Study of the Decisions of the Urban Traffic and Transportation Board, 1953-55. *Pennsylvania*.  
 J. David Greenstone, Working Class Politics: The Organization, Tactics and Ideology of Labor's Committee on Political Education. *Chicago*.  
 George C. Little, The Role of an Interim Committee in The State Legislative System: The New York Wiretap Committee. *New York University*.  
 Judson L. James, The Politics of Party Leadership: The Inter-relationships of Democratic State and County Party Organizations in New York State, 1955-1958. *Columbia*.

- David T. Livingston, Factors Associated with Expenditure Patterns among Suburban Governments. *Pennsylvania*.  
 David W. McCoy, The Conflict in Purpose of Political Patronage. *Chicago*.  
 Donald J. McWherter, The Politics of Education: A Case Study, Columbia, Missouri. *Missouri*.  
 Charles G. Mayo, The 1961 Mayoralty Election in Los Angeles: The Political Party in a Non-partisan Election. *Southern California*.  
 Alexander V. Prisley, A Study of the 1961-62 Rhode Island General Assembly. *Brown*.  
 Morley Segal, The Political Career of James Rolph, Jr., 1912-1933. *Claremont*.  
 Clarence Stone, Community Power Elite and the Role of the City Manager. *Duke*.  
 Tandy Tollerson III, Absentee Voting in Missouri, Missouri.  
 Joseph B. Tucker, A Functional Analysis of Political Patronage in Nine Illinois Counties. *Illinois*.  
 Thomas M. Watts, Indiana Primary Elections: The Selection of County Candidates and the Distribution of Power. *Indiana*.  
 T. Phillip Wolf, Comparative Party Organization: California 1962. *Stanford*.  
 Michael J. Zavacky, A Comparative Study of Structure and Process in the Juvenile Court System of Pennsylvania. *Pittsburgh*.

##### Changes

- Ronald C. Cease, The Alaska Borough System: Plan and Promise. *Claremont*.  
 Shirley Chapman, The Dynamics of Federalism: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Reflected in Metropolitan Atlanta 1945-1960. *Emory*.  
 James B. Hobbs, The Impact of Selected Supreme Court Decisions in Kansas City, Missouri. *Missouri*.

#### CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

##### Additions

- David E. Haight, "Sharing of Functions" in Canadian Federalism. *Chicago*.  
 Gad Horowitz, Labour in Politics: The Case of Canada. *Harvard*.  
 Allan Kornberg, Some Differences in Role Perceptions between Ontario and Quebec Provincial Legislators. *Michigan*.  
 Walter L. White, The Treasury Board in Canada. *Michigan*.

#### PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

##### Additions

- Maurice Apstein, The Role of the Government Laboratory in Defense. *American*.  
 John F. Aronne, Managing the Airspace: A Study

- of Air Traffic Control. *New York University*.
- Aljit M. Banerjee*, Recruitment and Training of All-India Central Service Personnel. *New York University*.
- Ali-Reza Besharat*, Political and Administrative Decentralization. *Southern California*.
- Edward C. Bishop*, Efficient Administration Through Delegation of Authority in a Federal Field Office. *New York University*.
- William B. Boise*, The Use of Formal Negative Sanctions in Securing Employee Conformity in a Public Bureaucracy. *Pennsylvania*.
- Herbert S. Duncombe*, Administrative Discretion in the Administration of Public Assistance. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- John P. Eberle*, Scheduling, Control, and Reporting for Processing a Major Census. *American*.
- Margaret Feiler*, The Austrian Civil Service from 1933-1945: The Influence of Political and Constitutional Changes on the Structure of Bureaucracy. *New York University*.
- Max B. Franc*, The Critical Incident Technique and Follow-up Study of Public Administration Students. *New York University*.
- Abram F. Goldman*, The County Board of Equalization in California: An Administrative Study of its Action. *Southern California*.
- Charles J. Green*, The Federal Older Worker Program. *American*.
- Chester G. Hall, Jr.*, The United States Civil Service Commission: An Arm of the President or of Congress? *American*.
- W. Joseph Heffernan, Jr.*, Public Assistance as a Government Function: A Case Study of Professional and Official Attitudes. *North Carolina*.
- Mel Huden*, Factors Affecting the Mobility of Public Employees. *Southern California*.
- Allen A. Hyman*, Significant Aspects of the Growth and Potential of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO. *Pennsylvania*.
- Walter Langway*, Employment Security in Sweden. *New York University*.
- Edward F. Marek*, The Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York. *New York University*.
- Alexandre M. Mattos*, Standards and Patterns of Administrative Reorganization in the U. S. 1945-55. *Southern California*.
- Joseph Mehr*, The Implications of Quantitative Analysis to Administration and Management. *New York University*.
- A. Warren Meixner*, The Public Authority as a Governmental Technique in New Jersey: A Case Study of the Development and Operation of the N. J. Turnpike Authority and the N. J. Highway Authority. *New York University*.
- Mohammad A. Niaz*, Strategy of Change. *Southern California*.
- Modestus W. Notoatmodjo*, The Concept of Gotong Rojong in Modern Indonesia. *Indiana*.
- Margaret Oslund*, Elements of Organized Behavior: A Study of Delegation. *Southern California*.
- Donovan Perkins*, Determination of Physicians' Attitudes Pertaining to Home Care Programs. *Southern California*.
- George M. Platt*, Agriculture and Administration in Mexico and Pakistan. *Syracuse*.
- John W. Ramsey*, Impact of the Bureau of the Budget on Policy Formation, 1946-49. *Missouri*.
- Chung-Hyun Ro*, A Comparative Analysis of Manpower Administration in Developing Countries. *New York University*.
- Robert L. Rosholt*, Organizing the United States Civilian Space Effort: A Study of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with Special Emphasis on Structural Change and Program Coordination. *Minnesota*.
- William Sachau*, Samuel Leask, Jr.: A Study in Administrative Behavior. *Southern California*.
- Eleanor A. Schwab*, Transportation in the Metropolitan Area: A Case Study of the Illinois-Missouri Bi-State Development Agency. *New York University*.
- Elinor A. Scott*, The Administrative State Revisited. *California (Los Angeles)*.
- Robert H. Simmons*, Washington State Government: The Plural Executive. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- Abraham A. Stern*, Supervisory Concepts and Practices in Representative Voluntary and Public School Welfare Agencies in New York City. *New York University*.
- Isadore S. Sussna*, Land Use and Zoning in Staten Island. *New York University*.
- Leland Swanson*, Real Time System for Law Enforcement in Los Angeles County. *Southern California*.
- Donald T. Wells*, The Administration of Small Watersheds: The Tributary Development Program of the Tennessee Valley Authority. *Alabama*.
- Marvin M. Wofsey*, Management of Automatic Data Processing Systems. *American*.
- Buchari Zainun*, Toward the Achievement of Administrative Efficiency through the Development Program of Bureaucratic Machinery of Indonesian Government. *Indiana*.

#### Changes

- Todd R. La Porte*, Research Management: Objectives, Roles, and Administration in an Industrial Research Organization. *Stanford*.
- Iskandar B. Shalhoub*, The Administration of Public Administration Technical Assistance in Lebanon. *Syracuse*.
- Gilbert B. Siegal*, The Central Executive Staff



Agency in the Federal Republic of Brazil: A Study of the Administrative and Political Significance of the Development of the Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público. *Pittsburgh.*

#### Deletions

*Daniel D. Daniels*, Promotion of Officers in the United States Navy from 1947 to Present. *American.*

#### FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

##### Additions

*Ali Ahmed AbdelKader*, A Secular Definition of Arab Nationalism. *Indiana.*

*Fuad S. Abu-Zayyad*, The United Arab Republic—A Case Study in Arab Unity. *Fletcher School.*

*Will Adams*, Capital Punishment as an Instrument of Soviet Social Control. *Columbia.*

*Reginald Bartholomew*, The Politics of the Notable: The French Modérés since the War. *Chicago.*

*Sergio Barzanti*, The Economic Impact of European Integration and Particularly of the European Economic Community, upon Certain Underdeveloped Areas in Italy, Southwest France and Other Members of the Community. *New York University.*

*Edward Baum*, Foundations and Formulation of United States Foreign Policy towards Africa since World War II. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Herbert M. Berk*, Persia and the European State System: From Unilateralism to Reciprocity in Persian Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century. *Columbia.*

*Edwin R. Black*, Canadian Concepts of Federalism. *Duke.*

*Paul Brass*, Party Politics in Uttar Pradesh. *Chicago.*

*Charles P. Butler*, Political Controls in the Military Forces of the USSR. *Johns Hopkins.*

*John R. Cartwright*, Canadian Pressure Groups. *Toronto.*

*Edwin T. Chapman*, The Problem of Housing in Latin America. *Harvard.*

*Soo Bock Choi*, A Critical Inquiry into the Political Power System of Korea, 1876-1905. *Maryland.*

*William Y. Chuko*, Concepts of Regionalism in Southeast Asia. *New York University.*

*Ernest J. Goodman*, The Role of the Military in Israeli Politics. *Nebraska.*

*Norma L. Corigliano*, Peaceful Coexistence and Panch Sheel: The Dynamics of Soviet-Indian Relations 1956-1961. *Indiana.*

*Rebecca Grajower*, Revolutions in Underdeveloped Areas. *Yale.*

*Donald Cregier*, Lloyd George and the Decline of the British Liberal Party. *Clark.*

*Joseph A. Curtis*, The New Crime of "Social Dis-solution." *Utah.*

*John DeLuca*, Political Biography of Palmiro Togliatti. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Roderick B. Dugliss*, The Church of England as a Pressure Group in Contemporary Politics: the Effectiveness of Establishment. *Duke.*

*Robert L. Eckelberry*, Proportional Representation and Swedish Government and Politics. *Nebraska.*

*Edgar S. Efrat*, The Adaptation of Federalism to West and Central Africa. *Texas.*

*Ahmed H. El-Afandi*, The Role of Parliamentary Groups in the French Fourth Republic. *Missouri.*

*Francine Frankel*, Second Level Leadership of the Indian National Congress. *Chicago.*

*Anthony Fusaro*, The Australian Senate: Politics in a Federal Second Chamber. *Penn State.*

*George H. Gadbois, Jr.*, Judicial Review and the Supreme Court of India: 1950-1962. *Duke.*

*Charles G. Gati*, Laszlo Nemeth and the Ideology of Hungarian Populism. *Indiana.*

*Jerome M. Gilson*, The Bolshevik Image of the Future Communist Society, 1902-1962. *Columbia.*

*Philip Gillette*, Political Study of Agricultural Procurement in USSR, 1930-1962. *Harvard.*

*R. William Gilmore*, The Decline of Continental Socialism: A Study of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in the Post World War II Period. *Pittsburgh.*

*James Gould*, Freie Deutsche Jugend: A Study of a Soviet-Type Youth Organization. *Indiana.*

*Thomas H. Green*, Contemporary French Communist Party. *Cornell.*

*H. Gaylon Greenhill*, The Norwegian Agrarian Party: A Case Study of a Single Interest Party. *Illinois.*

*Philip N. Hablutzel*, The Nuremberg Trial and Its Effect on Law in the Federal Republic of Germany. *Chicago.*

*John P. Haithcox*, M. N. Roy and the Radical Democratic Party in India. *California* (Berkeley).

*Soeleiman Amir Hamzah*, An Analysis of the Managerial Problems Facing the Central Government in Implementing the Principles of Pantjasila in Indonesia. *Indiana.*

*Frederick A. Hargadon*, Soviet Political Thought, 1953-1961: The Theory of the Party. *Cornell.*

*Mikio Higa*, The Role of Bureaucracy in Contemporary Japanese Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

*Joseph Jiang*, Political Change and Pariah Entrepreneurship. *Indiana.*

*Robert E. Johnston*, Interest Articulation in a

- Developing Country: Case Study of Agricultural Policy Making in Sierra Leone. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Robert L. Johnston, The Prime Ministership of Sir Anthony Eden (April 1955 to January 1957): A Study of the Man and the Office. *California* (Berkeley).
- Stanley A. Kochanek, The Organization of Power in the Indian National Congress: A Non-Western Experience. *Pennsylvania*.
- Roman Kolkowicz, The Political Role of the Military Establishment in the Soviet Union. *Chicago*.
- Louis Kushnick, Secularization of the British Labor Party. *Yale*.
- Arend Lijphart, West New Guinea as an Issue in Dutch Domestic Politics. *Yale*.
- Michael F. Lofchie, Pluralism and Political Conflict in the Tanganyika African National Union. *California* (Berkeley).
- Irving L. Markovitz, Ideology, Opposition, and Consensus Formation in Developing Areas. *California* (Berkeley).
- Marvin Markowitz, The Political Role of Catholic and Protestant Missions in the Belgian Congo (1908-1960). *Columbia*.
- John D. Martz, III, Acción Democrática and an Emergent People. *North Carolina*.
- Orville D. Menard, The Role of the Military in French Politics. *Nebraska*.
- Norman N. Miller, Second and Third Generation Political Elites in East Africa. *Indiana*.
- Andrew J. Milnor, Saskatchewan Politics, 1929-1948. *Duke*.
- Thawatt Mokarapong, The June Revolution of 1932 in Thailand: A Study in Political Behavior. *Indiana*.
- William J. Moore, Ideology and Economic Development in China and Japan. *Claremont*.
- Frank J. Moreno, Elements of Political Power in Post-Peron Argentina. *New York University*.
- Frank Myers, The "Ban-the-Bomb" Campaign in Britain: Its History and Political Impact. *Columbia*.
- Baldev Raj Nayar, Contemporary Political Leadership in the Punjab. *Chicago*.
- Wilbur Nelson, Relations of Private Schools to National Objectives in the Republic of China. *Claremont*.
- Joseph Nye, Political and Economic Integration in East Africa. *Harvard*.
- Harold Pashkofsky, The Nationalities Problem of Yugoslavia. *New School*.
- René Peritz, The Evolving Politics of Singapore—A Study of Contemporary Trends and Issues. *Pennsylvania*.
- Thomas Porter, Political Role of the Mexican Labor Unions. *Harvard*.
- Thomas Remeikis, An Analysis of the Communist Party in Lithuania. *Illinois*.
- Randall B. Ripley, The Politics of Focus: The Roles and Relation of Congress, the Executive, the Universities and the Foundation in American Aid to India. *Harvard*.
- Ramashray Roy, A Case Study of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee, Bihar, India. *California* (Berkeley).
- William Safran, The "Krankerkasse" in the German Federal Republic. *Columbia*.
- John S. Saloma, British Conservatism and the Welfare State: An Analysis of the Policy-Process in the British Conservative Party. *Harvard*.
- Lawrence Scheinman, The Formulation and Administration of French Atomic Energy Policy. *Michigan*.
- Frederick F. Schindeler, The United Farmers of Ontario. *Toronto*.
- George Schwab, Recent Referenda in Switzerland on Armament Issues. *Columbia*.
- Robert S. Sharlet, E. B. Pashukanis and the Politics of Soviet Law, 1918-1937. *Indiana*.
- John Shenis, Provincial and Local Administration in Cyprus in Comparative and Historical Perspective. *New York University*.
- Kasem Sirisumpundh, Emergence of the Modern National State in Burma and Thailand. *Wisconsin*.
- Ilie Smultea, Romania between Two World Wars—Politically, Economically, and Socially. *California* (Berkeley).
- Peter G. Snow, The Radical Parties of Argentina and Chile: A Comparison. *Virginia*.
- Margaret Sodarberg, The Politics of Catholic Youth: A Comparative Study. *Washington* (St. Louis).
- Samuel Speck, Political Development of an Urban African Community. *Harvard*.
- Hugh W. Stephens, Social Mobilization and Political Development in Tanganyika. *Yale*.
- Philip D. Stewart, Oblast Government under Khrushchev. *Indiana*.
- Walter E. Stewart, The Evolution of the British Guiana Constitution. *Columbia*.
- Richard R. Strout, The Recruitment of Parliamentary Candidates by the Liberal Party in Contemporary Britain: A Study of the Selection Process and the Social Background of Liberal Candidates. *North Carolina*.
- Newell M. Stultz, The Growth of the National Party in the South African Electorate, 1938-1948. *Boston University*.
- James D. Thomas, Role of the Courts in India in Natural Resources Planning. *Claremont*.
- Soji Tomikawa, The Japanese Procurement Agency. *Syracuse*.
- Arpad J. von Lazar, Decompression in Total-

- itarian Control: Limits and Problems. *North Carolina*.
- Howard K. Walker, The Great Debate in the Gold Coast—1954–57: A Study of the Range of Political Consensus on Selected Issues between the National Liberation Movement and the Convention Peoples Party. *Boston University*.
- Harold D. Weaver, Soviet Cultural and Academic Relations with Africa. *New York University*.
- James Wolfe, German Reunification. *Maryland*.
- Brian Weinstein, Building the Gabonese Nation: The Search for a New Order and the Importance of the Fang Tribe in This Process. *Harvard*.
- Donna C. Wonnacott, Steeling the Cadres of the Chinese Communist Party—A Study of the "Movement to Transfer Cadres Downward." *Columbia*.
- Michael D. Wormser, Political Parties and Representation in the European Parliamentary Assembly of the European Economic Community. *Pittsburgh*.
- Freeman J. Wright, The Chilean Experiment with Parliamentary Government. *Johns Hopkins*.

#### Changes

- Wilfried Braje, The Foreign Policy of the German Social Democratic Party, 1949–57. *Clark University*.
- John C. Donnell, Conflicting Conceptions of Political Authority and Citizenship in the Republic of Vietnam. *California* (Berkeley).
- Gantcho G. Gavrilloff, The British Prime Minister as Leader in Parliament, 1930–1950. *Missouri*.
- Charles H. Kunsman, Jr., The Origins and Development of Political Parties in the British West Indies. *California* (Berkeley).
- John D. May, Party Prowess: The Case of Bolshevism. *California* (Berkeley).
- Tran H. Phat, Development of Vietnamese Nationalism up to 1954. *Harvard*.
- Phyllis J. Rolnick, The Relationship of Political Ideology to Social Structure in India. *Cornell*.
- Thomas L. Alexander, The Projection and Impact of the American Cultural Image by the Information Center Service (United States Information Agency) on West German Public Opinion. *American*.
- Yonah Alexander, The Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Activities of the United Nations Technical Assistance Expert. *Columbia*.
- Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Dimensions of Voting in the United Nations. *Yale*.
- Tai Sung An, Communist China and Peaceful Co-existence: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy. *Pennsylvania*.
- Salvatore Arcilesti, United States Policy in Iran, 1954–1960. *Virginia*.
- Michael Armacost, Long-Range Missiles: A Study of Weapons Innovation in the Cold War. *Columbia*.
- Joseph Barrat, The Relations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Goberdhan Bhagat, America's Early Relations with India. *Yale*.
- Joseph B. Board, The State and Travel: A Study in the Development of Travel as an Instrument of State Policy. *Indiana*.
- George Brown, The Role of the Military Elite in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. *Claremont*.
- Janet W. Brown, Burmese Foreign Policy as Revealed through the United Nations. *American*.
- Seyom Brown, A Supranational Nuclear Deterrent System. *Chicago*.
- Bernard Browne, The Democratic Party and Foreign Policy 1953–58. *Notre Dame*.
- Duncan H. Cameron, The Importance to the United States of Its Control of the Panama Canal. *Columbia*.
- David E. Carmack, Law in French Diplomacy from the Treaty of Westphalia to the French Revolution (1648–1789). *Virginia*.
- M. E. Chacko, The Charter of the United Nations and the Concept of the Big Powers. *New York University*.
- Stephen Chin-Shan Chen, America's Non-Recognition Policy toward Chinese Governments: A Historical-Political Analysis, Applied to the Peiping Regime. *Southern Illinois*.
- Li Tze Chung, International Criminal Jurisdiction. *New School*.
- Carl Clement, The Atomic Weapons Debate in Sweden. *Minnesota*.
- Hashim Ahmed Dabbas, The Problems and Prospects of Arab Unity since 1945. *Missouri*.
- Norma DeCandido, Technical Assistance in Public Administration in Latin America. *Columbia*.
- Naginder Singh Dhillon, India's Views on the Right of Self-Determination. *New York University*.
- James E. Dornan, Jr., The Origins of the Na-

- Changes
- Deletions
- Peter Alevra, Sir Winston Churchill and the British Constitution. *Texas*.

#### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION POLITICS AND LAW

##### Additions

- Yasushi Akashi, The Formation of Japanese Policy toward the United Nations. *Columbia*.
- Kwaku Mensa Akude, The United Nations Public Administration Training Program in Africa, South of the Sahara. *New York University*.
- Manuel S. Aldana, International Responsibility of States—New Trends. *Minnesota*.

- tional Interest: The Founding Fathers and the Security-Dilemma in Early American Foreign Policy. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Patrick T. Dougherty, Catholic Opinion and United States Recognition Policy. *Missouri*.
- Raga S. Elim, Theory and Practice of Neutralism. *American*.
- Carl P. Epstein, United States Policy of Nuclear Control 1953-1960. *American*.
- Alvin R. Field, Anglo-Nepalese Relations 1767-1804. *American*.
- Michael P. Gehlen, The Ideological Determinants of Foreign Policy under Khrushchev. *Texas*.
- Theodore B. Giuttari, The Effect of Executive Determinations in the American Courts in Cases Involving Issues of International Law. *Columbia*.
- Leo N. Goche, Moscow and the Austrian Communist Party during the Allied Occupation, 1945-1955. *American*.
- Necdet Goze, Modernism and Traditionalism in the Ottoman Empire 1790-1918. *American*.
- Michael Haas, Some Societal Correlates of International Political Behavior. *Stanford*.
- Jamal Haddad, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Persia: 1856-1906. *New York University*.
- Paul A. Hamori, Soviet Influences on the Establishment and Maintenance of the Hungarian Government, 1945-56. *Michigan*.
- John H. Hedley, Public and Elite Attitudes and Performance in the Formulation of American China Policy during 1948. *Missouri*.
- Donald L. Herman, The Comintern in Mexico, 1919-43. *Michigan*.
- Kenneth L. Hill, India's Foreign Policy in Relation to Tension Areas: A Study in Non-Alignment. *New York University*.
- Choong-Shick Hong, Politics of Economic Regionalism: A Comparative Study of United Nations Regional Economic Commissions. *New York University*.
- Richard Hughes, Soviet Foreign Policy and Germany, 1945-1948. *Claremont*.
- Lloyd Jensen, The Disarmament Negotiations: A Study in American-Soviet Behavior. *Michigan*.
- Harold S. Johnson, The Plebiscite as an Internationally Recognized Means for Self-Determination. *Michigan*.
- Wynfred Joshua, French Attitudes towards NATO. *Pittsburgh*.
- Ernest Katin, The Continental Shelf, with Special Reference to Action Taken by the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea. *Minnesota*.
- Young Whan Kihl, A Study of Functionalism in International Organization: With Special Reference to the Formation of Supranational Political Communities. *New York University*.
- Benedict S. Kim, The United States and SEATO. *Yale*.
- Kyung-Won Kim, Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon: A Study in the Political Dynamics on Modern War. *Harvard*.
- Ray B. Knapp, The Communicative Aspects of Strategic Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. *Southern California*.
- Youngnok Koo, The Dissenters and the United Nations: The Political Meaning of the Bricker Amendment. *Michigan*.
- Soon-won Lee, The Korean-Japanese Discord, 1945-1961: A Case Study of International Conflict. *Rutgers*.
- Howard M. Lentner, The Political Role of the United Nations Secretariat. *Syracuse*.
- Joseph P. Lia, Britain and European Integration since the Messina Conference. *California* (Berkeley).
- John P. Lovell, The Professional Socialization of the West Pointer. *Wisconsin*.
- Donald L. McQueen, Nationalism in Uzbekistan. *American*.
- Ahmed A. Majid, Development of International Law by the General Assembly. *New York University*.
- Ismail Makled, Comparative International Behavior in the Suez Crisis. *Pittsburgh*.
- Gerhard Mally, Austria and Europe: The Foreign Policy of the Second Republic and European Integration (1955-1962). *Pennsylvania*.
- Pritam T. Merani, International Law Concerning Territorial Disputes with Emphasis on Post World War II Period. *Johns Hopkins*.
- Kusma Lata Mittal, India's Attitude and Policy Towards the Problem of Human Rights in the United Nations. *Toronto*.
- Yasin T. Mughir, The Arab States, The Arab League, and the United Nations. *Yale*.
- Mumulla V. R. Naidu, The United Nations (Collective) Force and the Role of the Non-permanent Members with Special Reference to the Role of India. *Minnesota*.
- Henry T. Nash, United States Government Attitudes Towards Disarmament: A Case Study of Group Conflict in Government. *New York University*.
- Stephanie Neuman, Patterns of Elite Development in Indonesia. *New York University*.
- Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Great Britain and the European Economic Community: A Study of British Expectations and Transactions. *Pennsylvania*.
- Ronald S. Pugsley, Congressional Critics of Foreign Aid: An Analysis of the Congressional Opposition to Foreign Economic Assistance, 1947-60. *Michigan*.
- Mohy I. Quandhour, A Diplomatic Political History of the Caucasus, 1830-1864. *Claremont*.

- Amir Rafat*, Nationalization of the Private Property of Aliens in Recent International Law (Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Cuba). *Minneapolis*.
- Andrew C. Remson*, The Restoration of Relations with Soviet Russia, 1918-1922. *Columbia*.
- Arthur H. Rice*, The United States Cooperation with EURATCM. *American*.
- C. N. Satyapalan*, Sino-Indian Relations 1954 to Present. *Pennsylvania*.
- Seymour Scheinberg*, The Role of Bhutan in Sino-Indian Relations. *Claremont*.
- Brent Scowcroft*, Ideology and Foreign Aid: An Analysis of Congressional Reaction to the Foreign Aid Programs to Spain and Yugoslavia. *Columbia*.
- Valerie H. Shinavar*, The Neutralist Bloc in the United Nations. *Iowa*.
- Maung Hla Shwe*, The Participation of the United States in the 1932-1934 Geneva Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Arms. *American*.
- Sheldon Simon*, Foreign Policies and International Organization: An Interlevel Analysis Focusing on Reciprocal Influences and Typologies of Political Maturation. *Minnesota*.
- William Spencer*, The Mosul Question in International Relations. *American*.
- Stanley Stein*, German-Polish Diplomatic Relations between Munich Conference and the Fourth Partition of Poland. *American*.
- Il Ro Suh*, National Judges in International Tribunals. *Nebraska*.
- David Surralgar*, The Law Governing Economic Development Agreements. *Columbia*.
- Keyvan Tabari*, Iranian-American Relations as Viewed from Iran, 1940-1960. *Columbia*.
- Cedric W. Tarr*, Graduated Deterrence: The Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited War. *Southern California*.
- A. Paul Theil*, The Singhalese-Tamil Culture Contact: The British Period. *Claremont*.
- William B. Thomas*, Antecedents of the Security Council as Factors in Its Development in the United Nations. *New York University*.
- Robert J. Weber*, United States Non-Governmental Organizations in the Political Action Field: Their Purpose since World War II to Increase the Sources, Scope and/or Institutions of Public International Law. *American*.
- Larman C. Wilson*, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Inter-American Relations. *Maryland*.
- William Zimmerman, IV*, Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on International Relations Theory. *Columbia*.

#### Changes

- Franklin C. Balch*, Diplomatic Relations and Assistance to Spain after the Second World War. *Fletcher School*.
- Martin T. Kyre*, United States Army Civil Affairs Policy: An Attempt to Discover Its Predictable Ingredients. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- Janet E. Ragatz*, Motivations Behind Australian, Japanese and American Assistance to Southeast Asia. *Ohio State*.
- James P. Sewell*, An Evaluation of the Functional Approach to International Organization, with Emphasis on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development.
- Saul N. Silverman*, Bolshevik Theories of International Relations before 1917. *Yale*.
- Ernest Stern*, The Economic Development of Turkey: 1948-60. *Fletcher School*.
- Barbara B. Stevens*, Quasi-Military Groups and International Relations. *Yale*.
- Frank E. Trout*, The Moroccan Frontier in the Sahara: A Study in Political Geography. *Yale*.

#### Deletions

- Brent Allinson*, The Teaching of History for International Understanding. *Chicago*.
- Jay V. Groves*, American Consular Representation in Southeast Arabia, 1880-1924. *Michigan*.
- Bonifacio Salamanca*, The Beginnings of Philippine-American Affinity. *Yale*.

## II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

### POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

- Tatsuo Arima*; B.A., Harvard, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Failure of Freedom: An Intellectual Portrait of Taisho Japan. *Harvard*.
- Eldon G. Bowman*; A.B., Claremont, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Patrick Henry's Political Philosophy. *Claremont*.
- George Carey*; A.B., Northwestern, 1955; M.A., Illinois, 1958; Ph.D., Indiana, 1961. The Principle of Political Equality in Theories of Democratic Government. *Indiana*.
- D. Raymond Cloutier*; A.B., Bates College, 1949; M.P.A., Michigan, 1951; Ph.D., Alabama, 1961. The Political Philosophy of Sir Ernest Barker. *Alabama*.
- Miriam B. Conant*; A.B., Bryn Mawr, 1951; M.I.A., Columbia, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Political and Social Ideas of Morelly, with Emphasis on Early Imitators and Recent Critics. *Columbia*.
- JeDon A. Emenhiser*; B.A., University of Red-

- lands, 1955; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1962. *Armed Politics: An Analysis and Comparison of Six Cases. Minnesota.*
- Wayne Francis; A.B., Wabash, 1957; M.A., Indiana, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. *Interaction and Influence in the Indiana General Assembly. Indiana.*
- William L. Hathaway; B.A., University of Kansas City, 1941; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1962. *Interest in Politics: Measured by Readership of News About Politics in a Metropolitan Daily Newspaper, 1950-1959. Minnesota.*
- Charles Jacob; A.B., Michigan, 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., Cornell, 1961. *The Political Ideas of Elihu Root. Cornell.*
- Kenneth Janda; A.B., Illinois State Normal, 1957; M.A., Indiana, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. *Representative-Constituency Relationships: Constructing and Empirically Verifying a Behavioral Theory. Indiana.*
- Hwa Yol Jung; A.B., Emory, 1957; A.M., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Florida, 1962. *God, Man and Politics: The Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain. Florida.*
- Edward N. MacConomy; B.A., William and Mary, 1938; M.A., Maryland, 1943; A.M.L.S., Michigan, 1951. Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *The Political Thought of William Temple, Archbishop of York, 1929-1942, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1942-1944. Michigan.*
- Roger D. Masters; A.B., Harvard, 1955; A.M., Chicago, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. *Political Right and the Art of Politics in Rousseau's Thought. Chicago.*
- Mary S. Power; A.B., Wells College, 1957; M.S., Stanford, 1960; Ph.D., Illinois, 1961. *Vernon Louis Parrington and J. Allen Smith: An American Political Tradition. Illinois.*
- Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr.; B.A., Minnesota, 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1961. *The Foundations of American Legal Realism. Johns Hopkins.*
- Charles E. Schutz; A.M., Chicago, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *The Development and Significance of the Political Thought of Walter Lippmann. Chicago.*
- George A. Shanker; B.A., Northeastern, 1941; M.A., Colorado, 1947; Ph.D., New School, 1962. *The Political Thought of Daniel Webster. New School.*
- John E. Tashjean; A.B., College of St. Thomas, 1951; M.A., Georgetown, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *Franz Borkenau: A Study of His Social and Political Ideas. Georgetown.*
- Michael Walzer; B.A., Brandeis, 1956; Ph.D., Harvard, 1961. *The Revolution of the Saints. Harvard.*
- Edward R. Wright, Jr.; B.A., Emory, 1952; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., Duke, 1961. *The Social and Political Thought of William Temple. Duke.*
- Victor Zitta; B.A., Western Ontario, 1953; M.A., Michigan, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *George Lukacs: A Study in the Genesis and the Nature of His Marxist Outlook and Communist Involvement. Michigan.*

#### GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

- James E. Anderson; B.S., Southwest Texas State College, 1955; Ph.D., Texas, 1960. *The Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State: A Study of American Ideas on the Regulation of Economic Enterprise, 1885-1917. Texas.*
- Douglas L. Bailey; A.B., Colgate, 1954; A.M., Fletcher School, 1957; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. *Federalism and United States Foreign Affairs. Fletcher School.*
- John P. Bradley; B.A., Wesleyan, 1950; M.A., Washington, Seattle, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *Party Platforms and Party Performance: Social Security, 1920-1960. Washington (Seattle).*
- Rulon L. Bradley; A.B., Brigham Young, 1947; M.S., Utah, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *The Use of the Mass Media in the 1960 Election. Utah.*
- Demetrios Caraley; A.B., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *The Politics of Military Unification, 1943-1947. A Study in Political Conflict. Columbia.*
- Walker F. Connor; A.B., University of Massachusetts, 1951; M.A., Georgetown, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *Foreign Aid and the National Interest: The Objectives of America's Program of Aid to Underdeveloped Countries. Georgetown.*
- James W. Davis; B.A., Valley City State Teachers College, 1941; M.A., Minnesota, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *The Presidential Primary, 1928-1960. Minnesota.*
- Martha Derthick; B.A. Hiram, 1954; M.A., Radcliffe, 1956; Ph.D., Harvard, 1962. *Citizen Soldier on Capital Hill: The Political Life of the National Guard. Harvard.*
- Harry S. Hall; A.B., Harvard, 1943; A.M., Chicago, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. *Congressional Attitudes toward Science and Scientists: A Study of Legislative Reactions to Atomic Energy and the Political Participation of Scientists. Chicago.*
- Herbert Hamilton; A.B., Ball State, 1930; M.A., *ibid.*, 1934; J.D., Indiana, 1947; LL.M., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. *A Study of Land Use Regulations by Municipal Corporations for Aesthetic Purposes. Indiana.*
- Edward Handler; B.A., Harvard, 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. *The Two Worlds of John Adams. Harvard.*

- Howard K. Hyde; A.M., Chicago, 1935; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Business Management in Defense. *Chicago*.
- Erwin A. Jaffe; B.A., Rutgers, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Passage of the McCarran-Walter Act: The Reiteration of American Immigration Policy. *Rutgers*.
- Robert L. Keighton; B.A., Swarthmore, 1953; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Executive Privilege and the Congressional Right to Know: A Study of the Investigatory Powers of Congressional Committees. *Pennsylvania*.
- Frank J. Kendrick; A.B., Grinnell College, 1950; A.M., Chicago, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. McCarthy and the Senate. *Chicago*.
- Martin Lease; A.B., Indiana, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. William Howard Taft and the Powers of the President. *Indiana*.
- Kenneth Marcus; A.B., Michigan, 1952; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., Illinois, 1962. The National Government and the Natural Gas Industry 1946-56: A Study in the Making of a National Policy. *Illinois*.
- John K. Moriarty; A.B., Birmingham-Southern College, 1941; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1962. Democracy and American Military Strategy: A Biography of the American Society and its Approach to the Making of War. *Georgetown*.
- Allan D. Nelson; A.B., Chicago, 1952; A.M., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Political Implications of Modern Public Opinion Research. *Chicago*.
- Charles A. Raith; A.B., Pennsylvania, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Anti-UN Coalition before the Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees during the Years 1945-1955. *Pennsylvania*.
- Joseph K. Roberts, Jr.; A.B., Princeton, 1953; Ph.D., Columbia, 1961. The Politics of Emergency: The Oil Lift, 1956-57. *Columbia*.
- Robert F. Sasseen; A.B., Notre Dame, 1957; A.M., Chicago, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Political Science and the Problem of Party Reform: A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Political Science. *Chicago*.
- Jack M. Schick; A.B., Augustana College, 1957; A.M., Chicago, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Limits of War: A Study of Politics and the Polaris. *Chicago*.
- Bradbury Seasholes; A.B., Oberlin, 1955; M.A., North Carolina, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Negro Political Participation in Two North Carolina Cities. *North Carolina*.
- Donald A. Strickland; A.B., Reed College, 1956; A.M., Chicago, 1957; J.D., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Governmental Interaction with Four Marginal Political Groups. *Chicago*.
- Henry Teune; A.B., Central, 1957; M.A., Illinois, 1958; Ph.D., Indiana, 1961. Indiana Legislative Candidates' Attitudes towards Interest Groups. *Indiana*.
- CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
- Duncan Baird; B.A., Yale, 1939; LL.B., Michigan, 1942; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1962. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Minnesota: Analysis and Reform Proposals. *Minnesota*.
- James Bolner; B.S., Louisiana State, 1958; M.A., *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., Virginia, 1962. Chief Justice Vinson: A Study of His Politics and His Constitutional Law. *Virginia*.
- Ruth McVey Bosma; A.B., Bryn Mawr, 1952; M.A., Radcliffe, 1954; Ph.D., Cornell, 1961. International Communist Colonial Policy and the Development of Indonesian Communism. *Cornell*.
- Walter D. Burnham; B.A., Johns Hopkins, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Harvard, 1961. Activism, Self-Restraint and the Warren Court: A Judicial Dilemma of Means and Ends. *Harvard*.
- Richard C. Cortner; B.A., Oklahoma, 1956; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1958; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1961. The Wagner Act Cases. *Wisconsin*.
- C. Peter Magrath; A.B., University of New Hampshire, 1955; Ph.D., Cornell, 1961. The Supreme Court under Morrison R. Waite. *Cornell*.
- Joseph R. Morice; A.B., LaSalle, 1947; M. Litt., Pittsburgh, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Justice Stephen J. Field and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Re-Evaluation. *Pittsburgh*.
- Jay A. Sigler; B.A., Rutgers (Newark), 1954; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1957; M.A., Rutgers, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Double Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal and Social Policy. *Rutgers*.
- Israel Stolper; Adj. A., Harvard, 1945; M.A., Boston University, 1947; LL.B., Northeastern, 1955; Ph.D., Harvard, 1962. First Amendment Freedoms (1812-1962) Applicable As a Restriction upon the States by Way of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
- Gelachen Abdi; B.A., University College of Addis Ababa, 1957; M.P.A. Syracuse, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. African Nationalism: The Role of Political Parties in African Nationalism with Special Reference to Its Implications in Ghana. *Syracuse*.
- Curtis B. Akenson; B.Sc., Minnesota, 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Selected Facets of Community Influence on Political Power in the Redevelopment of the Minneapolis Lower Loop. *Minnesota*.
- Dee A. Akers; A.B., Kentucky, 1948; LL.B., *ibid.*,

- 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Administrative Rule-making Authority in Kentucky. *Kentucky*.
- Raymond V. Anderson; B.S., Moorhead State College, 1946; M.A., Minnesota, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Operation of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall in North Dakota. *Minnesota*.
- Alexander Cloner; A.B., California (Berkeley) 1942; M.S., Southern California, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Legislative Compensation in California: An Appraisal of Alternative Salary Criteria. *Southern California*.
- Bernice M. Deutrich; A.B., George Washington, 1951; M.A., American, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Southeastern Wisconsin's Four Largest Cities—Their Budget and Related Financial Practices. *American*.
- Carl DeVane; A.B., Shaw, 1936; M.A., Atlanta, 1937; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1962. Government Budget Administration: A Problem Study with Special Reference to the City of Philadelphia. *Pennsylvania*.
- Alfred E. Diamond; B.S., U. S. Military Academy, 1937; M.A., Ohio State, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Establishment of a State Governmental Structure for Civil Defense: A Problem in Intergovernmental Relations. *Ohio State*.
- Rowland E. Dietz; A.B., Swarthmore, 1942; M.A., Columbia, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Amateurs in Politics. *Columbia*.
- Robert Drake; A.B., Ohio Wesleyan, 1953; M.A., Indiana, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Role of the Council in a Strong-Mayor Council. *Indiana*.
- Thomas R. Dye; A.B., Pennsylvania State, 1957; M.A., *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1962. Certain Political Correlates of the Areal Differentiation and Stratification of Sub-population in a Metropolitan Area. *Pennsylvania*.
- Robbins L. Gates; A.B., Washington & Lee, 1948; M.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954-56. *Columbia*.
- Kan Ori; A.B., Taylor, 1956; M.A., Indiana, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Basic Ideas in Federal-State Relations: The Indiana "Revolt" of 1951. *Indiana*.
- Myles M. Platt; Ph.B., Detroit, 1949; A.M., Wayne State, 1952; Ph.D., Michigan, 1962. The Detroit Metropolitan Airport: A Case Study in Bureaucratic Power, Leadership, and Frustration. *Michigan*.
- Henry J. Pratt; A.B., Dartmouth, 1956; M.P.A., Michigan, 1958; Ph.D., Columbia, 1962. The Protestant Council of the City of New York as a Political Interest Group. *Columbia*.
- George Roberts; B.S., Purdue, 1953; M.A., Indiana, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Democratic Party of Indiana, 1952-58. *Indiana*.
- William C. Thomas, Jr.; B.S., Utah, 1942; M.S., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., Columbia, 1962. The Politics of Bureaucracy: Ninety-one New York City Bureau Chiefs. *Columbia*.
- Lewis P. Welch; B.A., Bowdoin, 1954; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. County Reorganization in Upstate New York. *Syracuse*.

#### CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- James K. Spicer; B.A., Toronto, 1956; Diplôme de l'Institut d'Études Politiques, 1958; Ph.D., Toronto, 1962. External Aid in Canadian Foreign Policy. *Toronto*.

#### PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

- Amin Alimard; B.A., American University, Beirut, 1956; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; D.P.A., California (Los Angeles), 1961. A Study of the University Bureaus of Public Administration. *Southern California*.
- Dong Suh Bark; LL.B., Seoul National University, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1962. Public Personnel Administration in Korea: A Mixed Heritage in Contemporary Practice. *Minnesota*.
- Karim L. Darwish; M.P.A., New York University, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Bureaucracy and Social Change in Modern Egypt. *New York University*.
- Warren Donnelly; B.S., Queens College, 1942; M.P.A., New York University, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Government Operations for Nuclear Energy in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. *New York University*.
- James J. Finley; B.S., American, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Postage Stamp Program of the United States Government: Administrative Aspects. *American*.
- Gerald D. Fitzgerald; B.A., Brooklyn College, 1945; M.P.A., City College of New York, 1956; Ph.D., New York University, 1961. Wage and Position Classification Administration in Selected American Jurisdictions. *New York University*.
- Robert French; B.A., New York State College (Teachers), 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; M.P.A., New York University, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Organization and Administration of a Public Employee Training Program. *New York University*.
- Allen Z. Gammage; B.A., Texas, 1938; M.A., *ibid.*, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1959. The California Highway Patrol: A Study in Administration. *Texas*.
- Theodore F. Gaultschi; B.S., California, 1944; M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1957; D.P.A., Southern California, 1961. An Investi-



- gation of the Management of Research and Development Projects. *Southern California*.
- Harry A. Green; B.S., Middle Tennessee State College, 1957; M.S., Florida State University, 1958; Ph.D., Colorado, 1962. A Study of National Housing Organization. *Colorado*.
- Howard B. Gundy; B.A., Syracuse, 1939; M.S.S., Buffalo, 1948; D.P.A., Syracuse, 1961. Grants-in-Aid for Public Assistance and New York State-Federal Relationships. *Syracuse*.
- James J. Heaphey; A.B., Western Reserve, 1957; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Theoretical Aspects of CAPAC and ICP Case Studies. *California* (Berkeley).
- Nguyen Thi Hue; B.S., Columbia, 1958; M.P.A., Michigan, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Training for Community Development: A Comparative Study of National Programs in Ghana, India, and the Philippines. *Michigan*.
- Sun Kil Kim; A.B., Stetson, 1958; M.A., American, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Congressional Authorization of Public Debt Transaction as a Means of Backdoor Financing. *American*.
- Avelino Lim; B.A., University of the Philippines, 1953; L.L.B., *ibid.*, 1955; M.P.S., *ibid.*, 1955; D.P.A., Syracuse, 1961. The Setting of Philippine Fiscal Administration. *Syracuse*.
- Leonard Lund; B.S., E. Stroudsburg Teachers College, 1951; M.A., New York University, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Forty Years of Failure: The Commuter Problems in the New York Area. *New York University*.
- Conrad L. McBride; B.S., Utah State Agricultural College, 1947; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1949; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1962. Federal-State Relations in the Development of the Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Omega R. McQuown; A.B., Kentucky, 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Florida, 1961. From National Agency to Regional Institution: A Study of TVA in the Political Process. *Florida*.
- Murray Nesbitt; B.A., New York University, 1948; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1950; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Civil Service Merit System and Collective Bargaining. *New York University*.
- Chung H. Oh; B.S., Florida Southern College, 1955; M.A., Southern Illinois University, 1956; Ph.D., New York University, 1961. The Civil Service of the Republic of Korea. *New York University*.
- Chong Mo Pak; B.A., Huron College, 1953; M.A., Wisconsin, 1955; D.P.A., Southern California, 1961. The Dynamics of Governmental Reorganization. *Southern California*.
- Vishwambher A. Pai Panandiker; A.B., Poona, 1955; M.A., Bombay, 1957; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1958; M.P.A., Michigan, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Personnel Administration in the Union Government of India. *Michigan*.
- Harold Pellish; B.A., Brooklyn College, 1941; Ph.D., New York University, 1962. Regulation of Insurance by the State of New York. *New York University*.
- Ben Posner; B.S., Arizona; M.A., George Washington; Ph.D., American, 1962. Major Budgetary and Programming Problems of the United States Information Agency in its Operation of Overseas Missions. *American*.
- Raymond L. Randall; A.B., George Washington, 1941; M.S., Syracuse, 1947; Ph.D., American, 1962. An Analysis of Intensive Short-term Executive Development Programs for Government Officials. *American*.
- John C. Ries; B.A., Santa Clara University, 1951; M.A., Detroit, 1953; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1962. Unification of the Armed Services: An Administrative Analysis of Recent Trends in United States Defense Organization. *California* (Los Angeles).
- Chung-Hyun Ro; LL.B., Korea University, 1955; M.P.A., New York University, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. A Comparative Analysis of Manpower Administration in Developing Countries. *New York University*.
- Winslow Rouse; A. B., California (Los Angeles), 1947; M.S.W., *ibid.*, (Berkeley), 1949; Ph.D., Claremont, 1961. The Problem of Adult Correction: A Case Study of Penal Administration in California. *Claremont*.
- Harry R. Seymour; A.B., Hamilton, 1950; M.A., Syracuse, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. National-State Employment Security Programs in the United States: Issues in Policy and Administration. *Syracuse*.
- John Sullivan; B.S., Southern California, 1956; D.P.A., *ibid.*, 1961. The Electric Computer: A Challenge to Organization in Public Administration. *Southern California*.
- Kasim Suwangul; B.A., Chulalongkorn University (Thailand), 1952; M.P.A., New York University, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Civil Service of Thailand. *New York University*.
- Liela I. Takla; LL.B., Cairo University (Egypt), 1949; M.S. W., Southern California, 1954; Ph.D., New York University, 1962. A Study of the Aid to Dependent Children Program and Delinquency Among its Recipients. *New York University*.
- Clarence E. Thurber; A.B., Stanford, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Problems of Training Americans for Service Abroad in United States Government Technical Cooperation Programs. *Stanford*.
- Leandro Viloria; A.B., Far Eastern University 1951; M.P.A., University of the Philippines, 1955; D.P.A., Syracuse, 1962. U. S. Technical

Assistance in Public Administration in the Philippines: Establishing a Management Program. *Syracuse*.

*Eugene Walton*; B.A., Washington, 1952; M.S., Boston, 1957; D.P.A., Southern California, 1962. A Magnetic Theory of Organizational Communication. *Southern California*.

*Andrew J. Wann*; A.B., Drury (Springfield, Missouri), 1940; Ph.D., Missouri, 1961. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Administrative Organization of the Executive Branch. *Missouri*.

*David Welborn*; B.A., Texas, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Certification of Motor Common Carriers of Property: A Study in National Regulatory Administration. *Texas*.

#### FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*John H. Badgley*; A.B., Montana, 1952; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1957; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1962. Progress and Polity in Burma. *California* (Berkeley).

*Allen B. Ballard, Jr.*; B.A., Kenyon, 1955; M.A., Reg. Studies, Harvard, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The State Farm System of the USSR. *Harvard*.

*Arifin Bey*; Diploma, Tokyo International Institute, 1945; M.A., New School, 1957; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1962. A Dialogue in Search of Consensus: The Roots of the Indonesian Political Conduct, 1949-1959. *Georgetown*.

*Father George L. Bissonnette*; A.B., Assumption College, 1944; M.A., Fordham, 1952; Ph.D., Columbia, 1962. Pufendorf and the Church Reforms of Peter the Great. *Columbia*.

*Peter J. Boyce*; B.A., Western Australia, 1957; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., Duke, 1962. Australian Relations with the Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore, 1941-1961. *Duke*.

*James M. Clark*; B.A., Michigan, 1952; M.A., University of the Philippines, 1955; Ph.D., Michigan, 1962. Teachers and Politics: A Pressure Group Study of the Federation de l'Education Nationale. *Michigan*.

*Alfred B. Clubok*; B.A., Michigan, 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Political Party Organization and Activities in Rural Japan. *Michigan*.

*Robert H. Dix*; B.A., Harvard, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Colombia: A Two-Party System in Crisis. *Harvard*.

*Herbert Feith*; A.B., Melbourne University, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., Cornell, 1961. Indonesian Politics 1949-1957: The Decline of Representative Government. *Cornell*.

*Charles C. Frost*; A.B., Tufts, 1951; A.M., Fletcher School, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Economic Development of Communist China's Machine-Building Industry: A Case Study in

the Application of Soviet Development Doctrine to a Labor-Surplus Economy. *Fletcher School*.

*William J. Hanna*; B.A., California (Los Angeles), 1957; M.A., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Operational Code of the Soviet Political Elite in the United Nations Security Council. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Eli Kaminsky*; B.A., Harvard, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. An Anti-Subversive Program in the French Public Service: The Epuration Administrative of 1944-1953. *Harvard*.

*Wilbert A. Klerruu*; B.A., London, 1958; M.A., California (Los Angeles), 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Nile Waters Question: Political Aspects of the Utilization of the Nile Waters. *California* (Los Angeles).

*John P. LeDonne*; B.S., Columbia, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. From Gubernia to Oblast: Soviet Territorial-Administrative Reform, 1917-1923. *Columbia*.

*Chong-Sik Lee*; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1956; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1961. The Korean Nationalist Movement, 1904-1945. *California* (Berkeley).

*Oliver M. Lee*; B.A., Harvard, 1951; M.A., Chicago, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. An Analysis of Communist China's Diplomacy towards the Non-Communist World, 1949-1956. *Chicago*.

*Victor T. LeVine*; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence. *California* (Los Angeles).

*John W. Lewis*; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Leadership Techniques in the Chinese Communist Party. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Arsa Meksawan*; LL.B., Thammasat, 1950; M.A., Indiana, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Role of the Provincial Governor in Thailand. *Indiana*.

*Leila Meo*; A.B., American University, Cairo, 1947; M.A., Syracuse, 1949; Ph.D., Indiana, 1961. The Separation of Lebanon from Greater Syria: A Case Study in Lebanese Politics. *Indiana*.

*Frank O. Miller*; A.B., Ohio State, 1940; M.A., *ibid.*, 1943; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1961. Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan. *California* (Berkeley).

*Henry W. Mott*; A.B., Colgate, 1955; M.A., Columbia, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Cabinet Promotion—An Analysis of the Social and Political Backgrounds of British Cabinet Members, 1924-1961. *Columbia*.

*Belden H. Paulson*; A.B., Oberlin, 1950; A.M., Chicago, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Revolution in the Villages of South Italy. *Chicago*.

*Robert L. Peterson*; B.A., Iowa State, 1958; M.A., *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., Pennsylvania State, 1962.

- Social Structure and the Political Process in Central America. *Pennsylvania State*.
- George L. Rueckert; B.A., Wisconsin, 1955; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Parliamentary Party Cohesion in the West German Bundestag. *Wisconsin*.
- Joseph I. Salameh; A.B., American University, Beirut, 1947; M.A., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1962. Lebanon at the United Nations: A Case Study. *Georgetown*.
- Josef Silverstein; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1952; Ph.D., Cornell, 1960. The Union of Burma's Struggle for National Unity. *Cornell*.
- Baljit Singh; A.B., Agra University, 1950; M.A., Aligarh University, 1953; Ph.D., Maryland, 1961. The Political Process and National Politics in India. *Maryland*.
- Emil Starr; B.A., Tufts, 1946; Ph.D., Chicago, 1962. The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union, 1939-1949. *Chicago*.
- David L. Sudhalter; A.B., Massachusetts, 1949; M.A., Boston University, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Political and Psychological Indoctrination of School Children in the U.S.S.R. *Boston University*.
- Thomas P. Trombetas; Diploma, Athens (School of Law), 1950; M.P.A., Washington (Seattle), 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Problem of Political Change in Greece and Turkey, 1945-1960. *Washington (Seattle)*.
- Donald W. Urquidi; A.B., California, 1950; A.M., Columbia, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Origins of the Italian Communist Party, 1918-1921. *Columbia*.
- Frederic Wurzburg; B.S., Columbia, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Politics of the Bloc National. *Columbia*.
- George T. Yu; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Party Movement in Republican China: The Kuomintang 1912-1924. *California (Berkeley)*.
- Lawrence Ziring; B.S., Columbia, 1955; M.I.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan: East Pakistan and the Central Government, 1947-1958. *Columbia*.
- Aristide R. Zolberg; A.B., Columbia, 1953; A.M., Boston University, 1956; Ph.D., Chicago, 1961. One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast. *Chicago*.
- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION  
POLITICS AND LAW
- Stanley V. Anderson; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1949; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Nordic Council: An Institutional Analysis. *California (Berkeley)*.
- Anne Armstrong; A.B., New Jersey State Teachers College, 1944; M.A., Columbia, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Unconditional Surrender. *Columbia*.
- Norman A. Bailey; A.B., Oberlin, 1953; M.I.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Inter-American Peace and Security System for Dealing with Threats to the Peace and Breaches of the Peace, 1948-1959. *Columbia*.
- Sylvan M. Berman; A.B., Michigan, 1947; M.A., American, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Hitler: A Study of Ideology and "Real Politik" in German-Soviet Relations, 1938-1941. *American*.
- Krishnaprasad G. Bhansali; Diploma, Visva-Bharati University, 1950; Ph.D., American, 1962. India's Role in the Settlement of the Ind-China Conflict, 1947-1958. *American*.
- Gertrude C. Boland; B.A., Mt. St. Mary's College, Los Angeles, 1936; B.S., Georgetown, 1949; M.A., Catholic University, 1950; Ph.D., Claremont, 1961. India and the United Nations: India's Role in the General Assembly, 1947-1957. *Claremont*.
- David Brook; A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1954; M.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The United Nations and Arab-Israel Armistice System, 1949-1959. *Columbia*.
- Tao Cheng; M.A., Temple, 1951; Ph.D., Columbia, 1961. The Treatment of Aliens and British Commercial Treaties. *Columbia*.
- Suchati Chuthasmit; B.L., Thammasat, 1951; M. Econ. Hons., *ibid.*, 1954; A.M., Syracuse, 1958; A.M., Fletcher School, 1959; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Experience of the United States and Its Allies in Controlling Trade with the Red Bloc. *Fletcher School*.
- Walter C. Clemens, Jr.; A.B., Notre Dame, 1955; M.A., Columbia, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Origins of the Soviet Campaign for Disarmament: The Soviet Position on Peace, Security, and Revolution at the Genoa, Moscow and Lausanne Conferences, 1922-23. *Columbia*.
- Herbert Corkran; A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1945; M.A., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., Indiana, 1961. Changing Patterns of International Organization in the Caribbean. *Indiana*.
- William M. David, Jr.; A.B., Dartmouth, 1941; M.A., Columbia, 1942; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Development of United States Policy toward the Baltic States, 1917-1922. *Columbia*.
- Mohamed M. El-Behairy; B. Com., Cairo University, 1953; M.A., Minnesota, 1955; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1961. The Suez Canal in World Politics, 1945-1961. *Ohio State*.
- Oli Y. El-Khalil; A.B., American (Beirut), 1955; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., American, 1962. The Socialist Parties in Syria and Lebanon. *American*.
- Oleh S. Fedyshyn; A.B., Brooklyn, 1953; M.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. German Plans and Policies in the Ukraine and Crimea, 1917-1918. *Columbia*.

- Robert L. Friedheim*; A.B., Columbia, 1955; M.A., *ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., Washington (Seattle), 1962. The Politics of the Sea: A Study of Law-Making by Conference. *Washington*, (Seattle).
- William W. Fry*; A.B., Minnesota, 1941; M.A., California, 1946; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1962. Communist United Front Strategy and Tactics: Origins and Some Recent Applications. *Georgetown*.
- Mohamed Hosny Gaber*; Certificate of License of Teaching Al-Azhor University, Egypt, 1948; M.A., Maryland, 1958; Ph.D., American 1962. The Early Islamic State with Special Reference to the Evolution of the Principles of Islamic International Law, 632-750 A.D. *American*.
- Arthur N. Gilbert*; A.B., Rhode Island, 1958; A.M., Fletcher School, 1959; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1960. Ph.D., Fletcher School, 1962. International Cooperation and the Election of 1924. *Fletcher School*.
- Walter Goldstein*; B. Sc., University of London, 1955; A.M., Northwestern, 1956; Ph.D., Chicago, 1961. The Labour Party and the Middle East Crisis, 1956. *Chicago*.
- Robert W. Hattery*; Ph.B., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Impact of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination on American Foreign Relations. *Chicago*.
- Kalevi J. Holsti*; A.B., Stanford, 1956; A.M., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy, from 1918-22. Rudolf Holsti's Role in the Formulation of Policy. *Stanford*.
- Gordon Joiner*; A.B., Howard College, 1954; Ph.D., Indiana, 1961. The World Court and the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. *Indiana*.
- Amos A. Jordan, Jr.*; B.S., U. S. Military Academy, 1946; M.A., University of Oxford, 1955; Ph.D., Columbia, 1961. Foreign Aid and Defense: U. S. Military and Related Economic Assistance to Southeast Asia. *Columbia*.
- Sungjook Jun*; B.A., Korea University, 1953; M.A., Tennessee, 1957; Ph.D., Illinois, 1961. Politics of the Veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. *Illinois*.
- Tae Jing Kahng*; A.B., Kent State, 1955; M.A., Columbia, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Handling by the Security Council of Legal Questions Involved in International Disputes and Situations. *Columbia*.
- Niazul Hag Khan*; B.A., University of Allahabad, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; L.L.B., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Virginia, 1962. The Alabama Arbitration. *Virginia*.
- Habeeb A. Khayat*; B.S., Xavier University, 1954; Ph.D., *American*, 1961. Waqf in Israel. *American*.
- George B. Lane, Jr.*; B.A., Trinity, 1951; Ph.D., *American*, 1962. The Role of John Barrett in the Development of the Pan American Union. *American*.
- Ernest D. Lehman*; B.A., Notre Dame, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., Chicago, 1961. The Attitudes of Selected Business Groups toward American Foreign Economic Policy, 1945-1955. *Chicago*.
- Robert W. Macdonald*; A.B., Clark University, 1948; M.A., Brown University, 1951; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1962. The League of Arab States, 1945-1960. A Case Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization. *Georgetown*.
- Seigen Miyasato*; B.A., Muskingum College, 1955; M.A., Western Reserve, 1958; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1961. American Foreign Policy toward South Asian Neutralism, 1947-1957. *Ohio State*.
- Raymond A. Moore, Jr.*; A.B., New School for Social Research, 1951; M.A., Columbia, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Foreign Policy Image of Aneurin Bevan. *Columbia*.
- William T. Nichols*; B.A., Virginia, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Development of Foreign Investment Protection in the League of Nations and the United Nations. *Virginia*.
- Harry J. Psomiades*; A.B., Boston University, 1953; M.I.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Greek-Turkish Relations, 1923-30: A Study in the Politics of Rapprochement. *Columbia*.
- Robert H. Puckett*; A.B., DePauw University, 1957; A.M., Chicago, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. International Control and Limitation of Space Activities: The American National Interest. *Chicago*.
- Young J. Rew*; B.A., State College, Washington, 1956; M.A., George Washington, 1959; Ph.D., *American*, 1962. A Study of the Governor-General of Korea: 1919-1937. *American*.
- George W. Rice*; B.A., Ohio Wesleyan, 1951; M.A., Ohio State, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Soviet Position on Dependent Territories in the United Nations. *Ohio State*.
- Raymond S. Rodgers*; A.B., Sir Williams College, 1957; M.I.A., Columbia, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Facilitation Problems of International Associations. *Columbia*.
- Gabriella E. Rosner*; A.B., Vassar 1954; M.I.A., Columbia, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The United Nations Emergency Fund. *Columbia*.
- John C. Satra*; Jur. D., Charles University (Prague), 1948; Ph.D., Florida, 1961. The Fate of Jean Monnet's Concept of European Integration in the Light of Cross Pressures on the European Coal and Steel Community. *Florida*.

- George Stambuk*; University of Zagreb; M.A., Indiana, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. American Military Forces Abroad: A Postwar Pattern in International Relations. *Indiana*.
- Leonard S. Stein*; A.M., Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. Consistency of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy. *Chicago*.
- Edward S. Su*; LL.B., National Anwei University, 1944; B.A., Fresno State, 1950; M.A., Illinois, 1951; M.S., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., Fordham, 1962. Sino-Russian Relations in Sinkiang: A Comparison of International Relationships Outside and Inside the Communist System. *Fordham*.
- Usha Roy Sud*; A.B., University of Allahabad, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Michigan, 1962. The General Assembly and Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 1943-59. *Michigan*.
- Hung Chao Tai*; B.A., National Taiwan University, 1954; M.A., Illinois, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. United Nations Membership Problems. *Illinois*.
- Brady Tyson*; B.A., Rice Institute, 1949; B.D., Perkins School of Theology, 1949-1952; Ph.D., American, 1962. Herbert Butterfield's Concept of International Relations: An Analysis and Comparison of a Christian Approach. *American*.
- William R. Vizzard, Jr.*; B.S., San Francisco, 1949; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Prisoner of War Policy in Relation to Changing Concepts of War. *California* (Berkeley).
- Miner L. Weems*; A.B., Washington, 1954; M.A., Georgetown, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1962. The Propaganda Struggle in the Middle East 1955-1958: A Comparative Study of the Role of Propaganda as a Legitimate Tool of Government in the Cold War. *Georgetown*.
- Gordon L. Weil*; A.B., Bowdoin, 1958; Ph.D., Columbia, 1962. The European Convention on Human Rights: Background, Development and Prospects. *Columbia*.
- Ann R. Willner*; B.A., Hunter College, 1945; M.A., Yale, 1946; Ph.D., Chicago, 1961. From Rice-Field to Factory: The Industrialization of a Rural Labor Force in Java. *Chicago*.
- Andrez J. Wojcik*; A.B., Georgetown, 1953; M.A., Columbia, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. Attitudes of Certain Western Public Communication Media toward the Polish Frontier Issues, 1939-40. *Columbia*.
- Gregory B. Wolfe*; A.B., Reed, 1943; A.M., Fletcher School, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. The Montevideo Conference of 1933; Reactions of the North and South American Press to the Foreign Policy of the U. S. *Fletcher School*.
- Manaspas Xuto*; B.A., Hons., Chulalongkorn, 1956; A.M., Fletcher School, 1957; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1961. United States Policy toward Formosa, 1850-1955. *Fletcher School*.

## NEWS AND NOTES

With this number, Victor T. Le Vine of Washington University (St. Louis) becomes Acting Book Review Editor, *vice* Thomas H. Eliot, who resigned upon becoming Chancellor of Washington University. Professor Le Vine will act until Professor Austin Ranney is able to assume the post, in the spring of 1963.—MAN. ED.

### PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The New York State Political Science Association held its sixteenth annual meeting April 13-14 on the campus of Union College, Schenectady, New York. The general theme of the conference was "The Political Implications of Nuclear Energy." Lt. Gen. F. W. Farrell, Director, New York State Civil Defense Commission, discussed "Civil Defense Problems" and Samuel S. Stratton, Representative from the 32d District, New York, spoke on "Our Nuclear Defense Policy." In addition, there were panel discussions on "Civil or Uncivil Defense" and "Arms Control—The International Issues."

President William R. Willoughby chaired the business meeting of the conference, which elected the following new officers: Channing B. Richardson, Hamilton, president; Herbert Rosenbaum, Hofstra, vice-president; James A. Riedel, Union College, secretary-treasurer; and members of the executive council, Sterling Spero, New York University; Carolyn Landau, Dutchess Community College; Seldon Kruger, Agricultural and Technical Institute, Delhi, State University of New York.

The 1962 annual meeting of the Iowa Conference of political scientists was held at Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, on April 7, 1962. The sessions were directed mainly at the study of Iowa political parties and elections. The principal address was given by Louis Harris, president of Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., New York City, who spoke on: "Some Observations on the Contribution of Political Party Organization in American Politics." John R. Schmidhauser, associate professor of political science at the State University of Iowa, was elected president of the conference for 1962-63.

The Northern California political science association held its fourteenth annual meeting at the University of San Francisco on April 28. Panels discussed "The Role of the Electorate in Governmental Policy-Making" and "Approaches to Foreign Policy." Dean Leo A. Huard, University of Santa Clara Law School, addressed the meeting

on the topic "Law and Order on the Space Frontier." The Presidential Citation Award for teaching, service to the profession, community service and research was given to Dean R. Cresap of San Jose State College. Officers elected for 1962-63 were: president, John H. Bunzel, Stanford University; vice-president, Paul R. Murray, Sacramento State College; secretary-treasurer, John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. The following were elected to the council: Paul F. Ashby, San Francisco State College; Donald W. Brandon, University of San Francisco; Benjamin G. Franklin, Chico State College; Jack F. Leach, Monterey Peninsula College; Eugene C. Lee, University of California; Cheryl J. Petersen, Sonoma State College; and William W. Young, Fresno State College.

The new officers of the New England Political Science Association are: Sigmund Neumann, Wesleyan, president; Merle Fainsod, Harvard, vice-president; together with Ruth Schachter Morgenthau (BU African Studies), Elmer Cornwell (Brown) and Robert Dishman (New Hampshire) as members of the executive committee.

The Midwest conference of political scientists held its twentieth annual meeting April 26 to 28 at the University of Notre Dame. General sessions of the conference were addressed by Professor Leo Strauss on the functions of political theory and by president Charles S. Hyneman of the American Political Science Association on "Policing the Democratic Process."

Panel sessions featured papers and discussions on the following topics: "The Scope of Comparative Analysis," "The Role of the Suburbs in the Metropolis," "The Political Act as an Act of Will," "Foreign Policy and the Stationing of Military Forces Abroad," "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," "Mass Parties and National Integration in Africa," "Measuring Legislative Malapportionment," "The 'Unconscious' Political Implications of Institutional Procedures in Administration," "Judicial Attitudes in the

Labor Relations Decisions of the Warren Court," "Albert Camus as a Political Philosopher," "Social Change and Election Politics in Israel," "The Role of the Judiciary in State Political Systems," "Foreign-Aid Programs and Parties: Problems for 1962," and "Constituency Influence in Congress."

President Richard C. Spencer chaired the business meeting of the conference, which elected the following new officers: E. Allen Helms, Ohio State University, president; Richard G. Browne, Illinois State Normal University, vice-president, and as members of the executive council, Louis C. Kesselman, University of Louisville and G. Theodore Mitau, Macalester College. Phillip Monypenny of the University of Illinois will be the new editor of the *Midwest Journal of Political*

*Science*. Harry R. Davis of Beloit College was re-elected as secretary-treasurer.

The 1963 meeting will be held at the University of Chicago on April 25 to 27. The program chairman is Leon Epstein, University of Wisconsin.

The next annual meeting of the Conference on the History of Western America will be held at the Albany Hotel, Denver, Colorado, October 11-13, 1962, with the University of Denver as the host institution. Robert G. Athearn of the University of Colorado, is the program chairman and Allen D. Breck, of the University of Denver, is in charge of local arrangements. Papers will represent disciplines in social sciences, the humanities, and the sciences. A preliminary program will be available.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Social Science Research Council's annual announcement describing fellowships and grants to be awarded in 1962-63 will be ready for distribution in early September. It will list the following programs which are to be continued without major changes: Research Training Fellowships, predoctoral and postdoctoral; Faculty Research Fellowships; Grants-in-Aid of Research; Fellowships in Political Theory and Legal Philosophy; Grants for Research on American Governmental and Legal Processes.

International Conference Travel Grants will again be offered to American social scientists for travel to certain meetings outside North America.

Under joint sponsorship with the American Council of Learned Societies, grants will be offered to mature scholars for research in the social sciences and humanities on certain foreign areas. Grants for research on Africa South of the Sahara, on Latin America, and on the Near and Middle East (including North Africa) will be administered by the Social Science Research Council; while those for Asian Studies and for Slavic and East European Studies will be administered by the American Council of Learned Societies, to which correspondence relating to the latter programs should be directed.

Inquiries and requests for the detailed announcement when issued may be addressed to the Social Science Research Council, Fellowships and Grants, 230 Park Avenue, New York 17, New York.

Applications for some categories of awards will be due not later than November 1.

An Inter-university Consortium for Political Research has been created by a group of cooper-

ating universities and the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan to promote graduate research training and to facilitate basic research on politics. The Consortium was formally established during a two-day conference at Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 1 and 2. Representatives from some twenty departments of political science met with members of the staff of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan and agreed upon a tentative mode of organization and a set of operating principles to guide the new organization during its first years of operation.

The Consortium represents an innovation in academic organization in the social sciences. Although it was not modelled on existing natural science counterparts, it shares with them the feature of being an association of institutions organized for cooperation around the more or less unique facilities of a research organization. The ultimate objective of the ICPR is to stimulate basic research on problems of politics and government. Advanced training in social science research methodology and in the methods and techniques of political analysis will be formally organized for faculty members as well as advanced graduate students from the participating schools. Research conferences devoted to the consideration of new problems in theory construction and data collection and interpretation in such areas as legislative behavior, judicial behavior and the historical analysis of aggregative data will be developed for participating faculty members.

Both the research and the training aspects of ICPR activity will be developed initially around the facilities of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. One of the important goals of the organization is to increase access to the archival and instructional facilities of the Center

and to enable the profession to make more efficient use of the data repository created at SRC through its research program in political behavior. The research materials already collected by SRC, including not only the data from six national election surveys but also election statistics, census materials and congressional roll call records, will be augmented by new data collections undertaken by Consortium participants and by the addition of other collections of data already in existence elsewhere.

The ICPR staff will also undertake to provide a clearing house facility for the individual participants. Communications among American researchers sharing common research interests and with foreign research scholars and their institutions abroad will be improved through a newsletter and other forms of current research reports. As with the research conferences, the clearing house activities will attempt to speed up the dissemination of new ideas and information among interested scholars, reduce inadvertent duplication of efforts and facilitate the pooling of intellectual resources committed to research in political science.

Each of the participating schools will be represented at an annual meeting of the Committee of Representatives. A five-man Council will be responsible for overseeing Consortium activities throughout the year. At the June meeting the Committee of Representatives elected James Prothro, University of North Carolina, as its chairman; the other four Council members, elected at the same time, are: David Easton, University of Chicago; Robert Lane, Yale University; Austin Ranney, University of Illinois; and William Riker, University of Rochester. The Consortium staff is headed by Warren E. Miller, Survey Research Center, as Executive Director and includes two other SRC staff members, Donald Stokes and Philip Converse, as Associate Directors. Membership in the ICPR is limited to the institutional participation of institutions of higher education; special provision for participation by persons not affiliated with a member institution may be made by the Council upon request by the individual. The current list of member institutions is Cornell University, The University of Chicago, University of Florida, Georgetown University, University of Illinois, State University of Iowa, The University of Kansas, The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Minnesota, The University of North Carolina, Northwestern University, University of Oregon, Princeton University, The University of Rochester, University of California at Los Angeles, Vanderbilt University, Washington University, Wayne State University, The University of Wisconsin, and Yale University. Inquiries concerning membership or individual

participation should be addressed to Warren E. Miller, Executive Director, ICPR, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The United States Department of State and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University are publishing jointly *A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1920-1945*.

This Catalog, consisting of three volumes, will list for the period 1920 to 1945 all files from the political archives of the German Foreign Ministry that were seized by the American and British armies at the end of World War II. It will continue and complete the work of the *Catalog of German Foreign Ministry Files and Microfilms, 1867-1920* which was published by the American Historical Association in 1959.

The Catalog will include the title, number, and date of all files contained in the archives, and the corresponding serial and frame numbers of those files that were microfilmed. It was compiled and prepared for printing by Dr. George O. Kent of the Historical Office of the Department of State, and its publication and distribution will be financed by the Hoover Institution. Volume I is scheduled to be published in the summer of 1962. The remaining volumes are scheduled to appear, respectively, late in 1962 and in 1963.

A major accomplishment in the flow of foreign scholarly and cultural publications to American libraries was hailed in the Library of Congress last May 23, with an informal meeting signaling the first receipt of some 200,000 items that have been purchased since January in India, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic, with the U. S.-owned foreign currencies under the new Library of Congress Public Law 480 program. Congressman John D. Dingell of Michigan sponsored the amendment, P. L. 85-931, that authorized this trade of food for thought, in aid of the acquisition of foreign publications for selected American research centers.

The Max Weber Centennial Commission has been established in order to mark the year 1964 as the one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the German social scientist by focusing attention on Weber's impact on the social sciences.

The Commission is designed to coordinate the efforts of cooperating institutions of higher learning and academic organizations by arranging visiting professorships, exchange lectureships, seminars, and institutes. It is intended that special attention will be given to social science problems in the areas of Weber's interests. The activities of the Commission will culminate in a symposium scheduled for April, 1964, in Kansas City.

Preliminary planning has been made possible



by a grant from the Kansas City Association of Trusts and Foundations. Members of the steering committee are Jephtha Carrell, Community Studies, Inc.; Robert W. Habenstein, University of Missouri; Jerzy Hauptmann, Park College; Francis Heller, University of Kansas; Berndt Kolker, University of Kansas City; Warren A. Peterson, Community Studies, Inc.; Wayne Wheeler, University of Chicago. Hauptmann and Wheeler serve as co-chairmen. The Commission's headquarters are located at 716 Railway Exchange Building, 706 Grand Avenue, Kansas City 6, Missouri.

CHARLES S. ASCHER of Brooklyn College, during a summer of international meetings, chaired sessions of the conference of non-governmental organizations, of which he is president, in Geneva; of the section on administrative law of the congress of comparative law in Hamburg; and of the section on legal and economic problems at the international congress on housing and planning in Paris.

DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD will be visiting at the school for advanced international studies, Johns Hopkins University (Washington, D. C.), for the academic year 1962-63.

JOHN W. BAKER, chairman and professor, department of political science, College of Wooster, is on research leave for the 1962-63 school year. He will be a research associate at the University of California, Berkeley and will spend part of the spring semester in Nigeria and Ghana.

During 1962-63, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI will be on research leave from Columbia, having received a Guggenheim grant.

VIOLET BUTLER has been appointed part-time temporary instructor for the academic year 1962-63 at Kent State University.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN has been elected as Miembro de Honor, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Spain.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Southern California, has been granted a year's leave of absence for the academic year 1962-63. During the year he will hold the Chair of International Law at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, Ohio State University, is in Britain for the 1962-63 academic year to study British politics on a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

ARCH T. DOTSON, associate professor of govern-

ment at Cornell University, has been given a leave of absence to serve as director of the Ford Foundation Project to develop a city plan for Calcutta.

ELEANOR DULLES is joining the department of political science, Duke University, as a visiting professor for the fall semester, 1962.

RAYMOND ENGLISH, professor and chairman of the political science department, Kenyon College, will be on sabbatical leave, 1962-63. He has received a Lilly Fellowship from the Hazen foundation for research during his leave of absence.

WILLIAM T. R. FOX will be on research leave from Columbia during 1962-63.

WILLIAM R. GABLE of the institute of public administration and the department of political science of the University of Michigan is chief of party of an American contract team to assist in the establishment of an institute of public and business administration in Taiwan. The institute is being established by the Chinese government under contract with AID and the University of Michigan. Professor Gable will be in Taiwan for 18 months.

ELLIOT R. GOODMAN, associate professor, Brown University, has received a Guggenheim fellowship and a NATO research fellowship, and will be on a year's leave in Paris. Mr. Goodman's replacement for this coming academic year will be visiting associate professor LEONARD ROWE, who comes from Harvard.

JOHN GROOM, assistant professor of political science, will serve on the staff of the University of Redlands in Europe at Salzburg, Austria, for the year 1962-63.

BERTRAM M. GROSS has been on leave during 1961-62 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. His leave has been extended to allow him to accept an appointment for the remainder of 1962 as Leatherbee lecturer on management at the Harvard graduate school of business administration.

JOHN H. HERZ, of the College of the City of New York, will serve as Visiting Lecturer on International Politics at the Fletcher School during the fall term of 1962-63.

ROBERT H. HUCKSHORN, assistant professor at the University of Idaho, is on leave as the 1962-63 Republican national committee faculty fellow. This award is co-sponsored by the National Center for Education in Politics.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, of Columbia University, will be on research leave during 1962-63,

occupying the Ford research professorship during the autumn term and serving as research associate in the institute of war and peace studies during the spring.

EDWARD G. JANOSIK, University of Pennsylvania, has received grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council for a study of factionalism in the relationships between constituency Labour parties and national Labor Party organs. He will be on sabbatical leave 1962-63.

PAUL KECSKEMETI has been appointed a Senior Fellow of the research institute on Communist affairs of Columbia University for the academic year 1962-63. He will also serve as a visiting professor in the department of public law and government of Columbia University.

WILLMOORE KENDALL has been appointed visiting professor of government at Los Angeles State College for the 1962-63 academic year.

HANS KOHN has joined the University of Denver faculty in September as a visiting professor of international relations.

MORTON KROLL of the University of Washington will be on leave next year to serve under a Smith-Mundt award as visiting professor of political science at the University College of the University of British West Indies.

WERNER LEVI, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, will serve as visiting professor during 1962-63 at the University of Hawaii, where he will assist in the development of an international relations center.

WARNER E. MILLS, JR., associate professor of government at Beloit College, is on sabbatical leave during 1962-63 for study and research into political behavior in small cities.

O. WILLIAM PERLMUTTER, American Academic adviser of the institute of European studies, will serve as visiting professor of political science during 1962-63 at the University of Minnesota.

FRED W. RIGGS, professor of government at Indiana University, has accepted a scholarship in the institute of advanced projects at the East-West Center in the University of Hawaii for the academic year 1962-63, where he will work with several Asian scholars from southeast Asia on comparative studies of public administration in developing countries.

JOHN P. ROCHE, Morris Hillquit professor of labor and social thought, Brandeis University, will spend the year 1962-63 as visiting professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

CHARLES P. SCHLEICHER of the University of Oregon has received a Fulbright grant for 1962-63, and will do research and teach at Delhi University, India.

DEAN CATHERYN SECKLER-HUDSON of the school of government and public administration of the American University received the honorary degree of LHD from Ohio Wesleyan University on June 3, 1962. June of 1960, she received an LLD from Gettysburg College.

MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, will serve as visiting professor during 1962-63 at Cornell University.

JOHN SPANIER was visiting professor of government at the University of Texas during the 1962-spring semester. He will be visiting professor of political science at Haverford College for the 1962-63 academic year.

JOHN G. STOEßINGER of Hunter College will serve again in 1962-63 as visiting associate professor of international relations at Columbia.

HIRAM M. STOUT of Duke University served as visiting professor in the department of political science for the spring semester, 1962.

WILLIAM L. STRAUSS, associate professor of political science, Arizona State College, has been appointed as a Fulbright lecturer at Seoul National University in Seoul, Korea for the academic year 1962-63.

HOWARD J. TAUBERFELD has received the appointment of Carnegie visiting research scholar for 1962-63 and will be on leave from the school of law, Southern Methodist University for that full year. His office will be at the Carnegie Endowment, U.N. Plaza at 46th Street, New York City.

THOMAS L. THORSON, assistant professor, has received the Kiekhof award for outstanding teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He will be on leave 1962-63 on a Guggenheim fellowship.

HANS B. THORELLI, University of Chicago, will be a visiting professor of business administration, international center for the advancement of management education, Stanford University, fall, 1962.

DAVID B. TRUMAN will be abroad on sabbatical leave during the winter term of 1962-63. Herbert A. Deane will serve as acting chairman of the department of public law and government, Columbia University.

PIO ULIASI has been appointed a senior fellow of the research institute on Communist affairs of

Columbia University for the academic year 1962-63.

H. ODELL WALDBY, professor of government at Florida State University, is technical advisor to an American contract team to assist in the establishment of an Institute of Public and Business Administration in Taiwan.

CLINTON IVAN WINSLOW of the department of political science at Goucher College has been named professor emeritus as of September, 1962. Dr. Winslow has served in the department since 1923, and as its chairman for 32 years.

PAMELA WRINCH, who has been working on a

research project at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, has accepted the position of visiting assistant professor in the political science department, West Virginia University, 1962-63.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN of the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina has been granted a leave of absence for the year 1962-63 to accept a Rockefeller Foundation research grant for travel and research in West Africa.

ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin, is directing the training program for Peace Corps members going to the Ivory Coast.

## APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

HENRY J. ABRAHAM has been promoted to the rank of full professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

ALAN ALTSHULER, formerly of the University of Chicago, has been appointed an assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

JVAN AVAKUMOVIC has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science and international relations at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada.

HANS H. BAERWALD, formerly of Miami University, Ohio, has been appointed lecturer in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

RICHARD C. BAKER of Southern Illinois University, Alton Center, has been appointed as chairman of the department of political science of Rockford College, effective September, 1962.

SIDNEY BALDWIN, assistant director of the Inter-University Case Program, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Baruch School of Business and Public Administration of the City College of the City University of New York.

CARL BECK has been promoted to the rank of associate professor, department of political science, University of Pittsburgh.

DANIEL M. BERMAN, formerly of Washington College, has been appointed associate professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

JOSEPH L. BERND has been promoted to associate professor at Southern Methodist University.

JEROME J. BOLNER, who obtained his Ph.D. in June, 1962 at University of Virginia, has been appointed assistant professor of political science, University of Alabama.

FRANKLYN G. BONN, JR., receiving his Ph.D. at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed an assistant professor at University of Wisconsin for 1962-63.

BERNARD C. BORNING, chairman of political science at the University of Idaho, has been promoted to professor.

ELDON BOWMAN has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the College of Wooster.

DONALD BRANDON has been promoted to associate professor in the department of political science at the University of San Francisco.

EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, chairman of the Ford Foundation Grant Committee, has been promoted to university professor at Indiana University, department of government.

RONALD F. BUNN, Texas, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

FREDERIC S. BURIN, II, formerly of the Department of State, has been appointed associate professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN assumed the duties of vice president of Columbia University on April 1, 1962.

WARNER O. CHAPMAN, director of departmental undergraduate program, has been promoted to

associate professor at Indiana University, department of government.

PATRICK J. CONKLIN, of the University of Tulsa, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri.

JEROME I. COOPERMAN, formerly of Rutgers University, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science at Goucher College.

RICHARD W. COTTAM, department of political science, University of Pittsburgh, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

RALPH CROW, American University of Beirut, has been appointed visiting associate professor at Indiana University, department of government.

ALEXANDER DALLIN has been named director of the Russian institute at Columbia.

JOHN A. DAVIS has been promoted to professor of political science at the City College of the City University of New York.

VERA MICHELES DEAN has been named professor of international development at New York University's Graduate School of Public Administration.

GUY H. DODGE is retiring from the chairmanship of the department of political science, Brown University, after having served for twelve years. He will continue in the department as a professor of political science. His successor, as of July 1, will be ELMER E. CORNWELL.

H. SYDNEY DUNCOMBE has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Idaho.

CHESTER B. EARLE has been promoted to the rank of professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, from Princeton has resigned to accept a position as professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

JACK D. EDWARDS, formerly of the University of Nevada, has been appointed assistant professor at the College of William and Mary.

ROWLAND A. EGGER, chairman of the departments of political science and foreign affairs, has been named Edward R. Stettinius professor of foreign affairs, University of Virginia.

E. U. ESSIEN-UDOM, who will teach the African

course—Contemporary Africa and Its Background—at Brown University, comes from Harvard.

BLAIR EWING of the University of Chicago has become instructor in political science at Harpur College.

JAMES FARGANIS, presently a graduate student at Cornell University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Harpur College.

LEONARD J. FEIN, who completed his doctoral work this year at Michigan State University, has been appointed assistant professor in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

WERNER J. FELD has resigned from North Georgia College to become assistant professor of political science at Moorhead State College, Moorhead, Minn.

ALFRED P. FERNBACH has been promoted to professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia. During 1961-62, Mr. Fernbach has held a Fulbright appointment in India.

WALTER O. FILLEY has been promoted to the rank of professor at Harpur College.

DONALD C. FLESCHÉ of Washington University has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Kalamazoo College, Michigan.

HARRY J. FRIEDMAN has been appointed associate professor in the department of government and the East-West Center, University of Hawaii.

MURRAY FROST, formerly of Michigan State University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, senior specialist in American Government at the Library of Congress, has been appointed executive secretary of the United States Group of the Interparliamentary Union. In this capacity he attended the spring meeting of the IPU in Rome, Italy, April 23-29.

CHARLES E. GILBERT has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Swarthmore College.

RALPH M. GOLDMAN has accepted appointment as professor of government at San Francisco State College.

CHARLES H. GOODMAN, professor of the school of government and public administration at the American University, has been appointed assistant dean of the school.

CULLEN B. GOSNELL retired as a professor of political science at Emory University at the end of the spring quarter after thirty-seven years of teaching at the University. He was the first chairman of the department and one of the original organizers of the Southern Political Science Association.

CHARLES J. GRAHAM, professor of political science, Wisconsin State College (River Falls), has been named chairman of the department of social sciences. He was on leave a year and a half while serving as legislative assistant to Senator William Proxmire in Washington.

SVEN GROENINGS, Stanford, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

J. V. GROVES has been appointed associate professor at West Virginia Wesleyan College.

WILLIAM ROBERT GUMP has been appointed instructor in government at Miami University, Ohio.

LOUIS K. HARRIS has been promoted to full professor, Kent State University.

HORACE V. HARRISON, associate professor, has been appointed director of graduate studies of the department of government and politics, University of Maryland. He is on sabbatical leave in the fall, 1962, to prepare a study on "United States-Latin American Relations."

LAWRENCE J. R. HERSON has been appointed professor and chairman of the department of political science at The Ohio State University.

LOUIS HENKIN of the Pennsylvania Law School will join Columbia in 1962-63 with a joint assignment as professor of law and professor of international law and diplomacy.

DUANE W. HILL, Montana State College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at University of Wyoming.

DONALD HINDLEY, previously at the school of international affairs, Australian National University, Canberra, has been appointed assistant professor of politics at Brandeis University.

WILLIAM H. HUNT has been appointed instructor of political science at Wabash College for 1962-63.

J. WOODFORD HOWARD is joining the department of political science, Duke University, as assistant professor. He was formerly at Lafayette College and last year was a fellow at the Harvard Law School.

CARROLL P. HURD, University of Wyoming, has

resigned in order to become president of Sheridan Community College, September, 1962.

WILLIAM P. IRWIN has been appointed professor and chairman of the department of political science at Western Reserve University. He was with NCEP and earlier, associate professor of political science at Colorado State University.

HERBERT JACOB of Tulane University has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin for 1962-63.

DAN N. JACOBS has been promoted to associate professor of government at Miami University, Ohio.

WALTER D. JACOBS has been appointed assistant professor in government and politics at the University of Maryland; he formerly held an appointment in the University of Maryland overseas program.

ROBERT BENESON JANES, who has been a graduate student in department of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, has been appointed instructor in political science at Birmingham-Southern College.

CECIL E. JOHNSON of Southern Methodist University has been promoted to associate professor.

RAYMOND H. KAARET, chairman of the department of political science at Rockford College, has resigned to accept an appointment as chairman of the department of political science at Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York.

HAROLD KAPLAN, who served as lecturer in government at Columbia during the past year has accepted a post at York University, Toronto, Canada.

BERNARD W. KLEIN was appointed supervisor of the Lansing Office of the Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan.

EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ of the legislative reference staff at the Library of Congress has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Virginia.

RICHARD J. KOZICKI has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

FRED KRINSKY, formerly of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, has accepted a position as an associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Southern California.

LOUIS E. LAMBERT, assistant chairman of government, has been promoted to associate professor, Indiana University.

OLIVER M. LEE resigned his instructorship in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland to accept an appointment with the Library of Congress.

J. GUS LIEBENOW, associate professor, has been named chairman of the African studies program at Indiana University, department of government.

JOHN W. LEWIS has been appointed assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

ORMA LINFORD of the University of Wisconsin has been appointed instructor in government at Beloit College.

ROBERT D. LOEY, formerly of the Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science and associate director of the Field Politics Center at Goucher College.

JOHN LOVELL, Wisconsin, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

C. PETER MAGRATH, instructor, has been promoted to an assistant professor at Brown University.

CHARLES E. MARTIN of the University of Washington retired in June, 1962 after having served the department since 1924. He has accepted appointment as professor of American studies at the University of the Philippines.

CHARLES MCCALL, Yale, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

CARL A. MCCANDLESS, professor of political science, Washington University, St. Louis, has been appointed chairman of the department.

THEODORE MCNELLY has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

MARTIN MEADOWS, formerly of the University of Maryland, has been appointed assistant professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University.

EDWARD N. MEGAY, formerly of the College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

WILLIAM E. MELVIN has been appointed

public administration advisor (personnel) by the Agency for International Development, Quito, Ecuador. His former position was in the Office of Personnel, AID, Washington, D. C.

CHARLES A. MICAUD, who has been professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, has been appointed professor of international relations at the University of Denver.

FRANK MILLER, formerly an instructor at Ohio State University, has been appointed as assistant professor of political science at the College of Wooster.

ARTHUR J. MISNER has been promoted to professor of government, Los Angeles State College.

EMMET V. MITTLEBEELEER has been promoted to the rank of professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University. He has received a Fulbright award to lecture in political science at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland for the academic year 1962-63.

JOHN A. MORGAN is joining the department of political science, Duke University, as instructor for the 1962-63 academic year. He is formerly of Southwestern Louisiana University.

STEVEN MULLER has been promoted to associate professor of government and appointed director of Cornell's center for international studies.

DONALD C. MUNDINGER has been appointed assistant dean of the college of arts and sciences of Valparaiso University, Indiana.

JOSEPH S. MURPHY has been promoted to assistant professor of politics at Brandeis University.

WILLIAM T. NICHOLS, who obtained his Ph.D. in foreign affairs in June, 1962 at the University of Virginia has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Georgia.

LAWRENCE E. NOBLE, JR., of Centre College has been appointed to an associate professorship in political science at the University of Mississippi.

DALE W. OLSEN has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, as of March 15, 1962.

EDWIN E. OLSON, a Ph.D. candidate at American University, has accepted a position as instructor in the department of political science at the University of Southern California.

ROBERT OSBORN, Columbia, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

ARTHUR M. OSTEEN, previously in Pakistan at the Academy for Village Development on a Fellowship from Syracuse University's Afro-Asian Program, has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina.

CHARLES EDWIN PATTERSON, JR., who completed his Ph.D. work at the University of Illinois in August, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Lehigh University.

GEORGE A. PEEK, JR. of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of professor.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK has been appointed to the newly created Richter professorship of political science at Swarthmore College. He will be on leave during the first semester of 1962-63.

DWYNAL B. PETTENGILL has been appointed assistant professor at the College of William and Mary.

JOHN N. PLANK, assistant professor of government at Harvard, has been appointed to a new post of Latin American Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

NATHANIEL S. PRESTON, formerly of Trinity College, has been appointed assistant professor in the faculty of the school of government and public administration of the American University. He will serve as coordinator of the school's Washington Semester Program.

HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE will leave Columbia to become associate professor at Syracuse University.

JEFFREY L. RADELL, recently appointed associate professor in the department of political science at Niagara University, has been named director of its Soviet and East European Institute.

AUSTIN RANNEY has accepted an appointment as a professor at the University of Wisconsin, effective February, 1963.

DAVID O. RANKIN, completing his doctoral studies at the University of Idaho, has been appointed instructor of political science at Cornell College, Iowa.

A. M. RICH, completing his doctoral studies at the University of Idaho, has accepted the position of assistant director, bureau of municipal research and service, Portland, Oregon.

BENJAMIN RIVLIN has been promoted to full professor at Brooklyn College.

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, the Catholic University of America, has been appointed director of edi-

torial planning and a member of the executive staff of the New Catholic Encyclopedia.

CYRIL B. ROSEMAN has been appointed instructor in political science at Swarthmore College, 1962-63.

JOSEPH A. ROTHSCHILD has been promoted to associate professor at Columbia University.

THOMAS A. RUSCH has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

JOHN S. SALOMA III, Harvard University and Congressional Fellow (1961-62), has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

LEON I. SALOMON, a doctoral candidate at Columbia and lately a lecturer at Brooklyn College, has been appointed instructor in government in Trinity College, Hartford.

ALLAN F. SAUNDERS, dean of the college of arts and sciences, has been designated senior professor of government at the University of Hawaii.

HOWARD A. SCARROW has been appointed associate professor of political science at the State University of New York, Long Island Center.

LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN was appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

WARNER R. SCHILLING has been promoted to associate professor at Columbia University.

THOMAS M. SCOTT of Northwestern University has been appointed instructor in the department of political science of the University of Minnesota, in the field of metropolitan government.

OTIS H. SHAO of Moravian College has been appointed associate professor of political science at Florida Presbyterian College.

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN, associate director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and formerly Special Assistant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, has been appointed professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, offering courses in the fields of international politics and Soviet diplomacy.

ROBERT H. SIMMONS, formerly of New Mexico Highlands University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

ROBERT SITTIG has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

DAVID A. SMELTZER was appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

DAVID G. SMITH has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

RICHARD G. SMOLKA has been appointed assistant professor in the school of government and public administration of the American University.

PETER G. SNOW, Thomas Jefferson Foundation Fellow in political science at the University of Virginia, has been appointed to the staff of the department of political science at the University of Iowa.

MARGARET SODERBERG of Washington University has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois.

RICHARD F. STAAR was promoted from an associate professor to a full professor to begin with the fall quarter, 1962.

ALBERT L. STURM, formerly of West Virginia University, was a visiting member of the Institute of public administration at the University of Michigan during the second semester. He has become director of the institute of governmental research and professor of government at Florida State University.

JOSEPH L. SUTTON, chairman of the Asian studies committee, has been promoted to professor at Indiana University, department of government.

E. HAROLD SWAYZE of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

NORMAN C. THOMAS of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to assistant professor.

SAMUEL F. THOMAS has been promoted to professor of political science at the Baruch School of business and public administration of the City College of the City University of New York.

R. J. TRESOLINI professor of political science at Lehigh University has been named head of a newly created department of government.

GORDON TULLOCK, formerly of the department of international studies of the University of South Carolina, has accepted an associate professorship in the department of economics at the University of Virginia. He remains a research associate of the institute of international studies at the University of South Carolina.

WAYNE UNTEREINER has been appointed associate professor at Indiana University, department of government.

DONALD URQUIDI, formerly of Michigan State University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

HERBERT WALTZER has been promoted to associate professor of government at Miami University, Ohio.

MORRIS WATNICK has been appointed associate professor of politics at Brandeis University.

THOMAS WATTS, Indiana University, has been appointed lecturer at Indiana University, department of government.

RICHARD S. WHEELER, assistant professor of political science at Duke University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

GARY WILHELM, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Illinois, has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at the Ohio State University.

LARMAN C. WILSON has been appointed instructor in government and politics at the University of Maryland in the fall, 1962.

JOHN P. WHITE of the department of political science at the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

JAMES H. WOLFE of the University of Maryland has accepted a position as assistant professor in the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina.

DAVID O. WURFEL, of International Christian University in Tokyo, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri effective September, 1962.

W. ROSS YATES, associate professor of political science at Lehigh University, has been named associate dean of the college of arts and sciences.



## IN MEMORIAM

MORRIS BRYAN LAMBIE, who was professor of government and director of the bureau of municipal administration at Harvard University, 1935-54, and professor of political science, director of the Municipal Reference Bureau, and executive secretary of the League of Minnesota Municipalities, at the University of Minnesota, 1921-35, died on March 23, 1962, in Jordan, where he was teaching public administration at Bir Zeit University under a combined Department of State and Ford Foundation grant. After his retirement from the faculty of Harvard University, Professor Lambie had taught at Tufts University, Boston University, and Boston College. Among many public activities, he served as chairman of the advisory council of the Massachusetts Division of Employment Security and consultant to the Greater Boston Economic Study Commission.

HAROLD ZINK, professor of political science at Ohio State University, died June 19, 1962, of a heart failure after several weeks of trying illness.

Prior to joining the faculty at Ohio State, Professor Zink was chairman of the department at DePauw University. He lectured at European and Asian universities and frequently contributed to the academic journals. He was the author of more than a dozen books, including *American Military*

*Government* (1947), and *The United States and Germany* (1957).

During World War II, he was assigned to SHAEF, first in London and then in France, as a staff officer. He was American editor of the Handbook for Military Government in Germany and a consultant to the Allied Control Council on the reorganization of the German Government.

Professor Zink made many contributions to the literature of political science; and his book on city bosses is widely regarded as a classic in its field. During his later years he devoted himself to the study of comparative government, especially of British institutions in their domestic and overseas settings. He brought to that subject a keen concern for governmental changes and evolution: a concern that made him a "field researcher" and constant world traveller, bringing to his classroom and his books the most up-to-date knowledge of the world's governments. He also directed a research project on local government in Sweden, Italy and India, sponsored by UNESCO, from 1954 through 1957.

He was active in the formation of the Midwest Conference, and a regular participant in the programs of the American and the International Political Science Associations.—LAWRENCE J. R. HERSON

WOODROW WILSON FELLOWSHIP COMPETITION  
For 1963-1964

Nominations from faculty members to Regional Chairman due:  
October 31, 1962.  
Information form from candidates due:  
Immediately after receipt.  
Credentials of Nominees due:  
November 20, 1962.

# OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

## *President*

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN  
Indiana University

## *President-Elect*

CARL J. FRIEDRICH  
Harvard University

## *Vice Presidents*

GABRIEL A. ALMOND  
Yale University

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT  
University of Chicago

DWIGHT WALDO  
University of California

## *Secretary*

MARIAN IRISH  
Florida State University

## *Treasurer*

MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
Washington, D. C.

## *Executive Director*

EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK  
1726 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.  
Washington 6, D. C.

## *Assistant Director*

DONALD G. TACHERON

## *Managing Editor, APSR*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD  
The Ohio State University

# COUNCIL

## *Above-named Officers ex officio*

LAWRENCE DURISCH  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
WILLIAM O. FARBER  
University of South Dakota  
IVAN H. HINDERAKER  
University of California, Los Angeles  
JOHN T. HOLDEN  
University of New Hampshire  
GLADYS M. KAMMERER  
University of Florida  
RICHARD C. SNYDER  
Northwestern University  
KENNETH W. THOMPSON  
Rockefeller Foundation  
JOHN D. WILLIAMS  
University of Utah

ALFRED DEGRAZIA  
New York University  
JOHN HALLOWELL  
Duke University  
SIGMUND NEUMANN  
Wesleyan University  
LEO C. RIETHMAYER  
University of Colorado  
LESTER G. SELIGMAN  
University of Oregon  
VERNON VAN DYKE  
State University of Iowa  
ROBERT E. WARD  
University of Michigan  
BRYCE WOOD  
Social Science Research Council

# FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW  
ALBERT SHAW  
FREDERIC N. JUDSON  
JAMES BRYCE  
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL  
WOODROW WILSON  
SIMEON E. BALDWIN  
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART  
W. W. WILLOUGHBY  
JOHN BASSETT MOORE  
ERNST FREUND  
JESSE MACY  
MUNROE SMITH  
HENRY JONES FORD  
PAUL S. REINSCH  
LEO S. ROWE  
WILLIAM A. DUNNING  
HARRY A. GARFIELD  
JAMES W. GARNER

CHARLES E. MERRIAM  
CHARLES A. BEARD  
WILLIAM B. MUNRO  
JESSE S. REEVES  
JOHN A. FAIRLIE  
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH  
EDWARD S. CORWIN  
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY  
ISIDOR LOEB  
WALTER J. SHEPARD  
FRANCIS W. COKER  
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE  
THOMAS REED POWELL  
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA  
CHARLES GROVE HAINES  
ROBERT C. BROOKS  
FREDERIC A. OGG  
WILLIAM ANDERSON

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN  
LEONARD D. WHITE  
JOHN M. GAUS  
WALTER F. DODD  
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON  
HENRY R. SPENCER  
QUINCY WRIGHT  
JAMES POLLOCK  
PETER H. ODEGARD  
LUTHER H. GULICK  
PENDLETON HERRING  
RALPH J. BUNCHE  
CHARLES MCKINLEY  
HAROLD D. LASSWELL  
E. E. SCHATTSCNEIDER  
V. O. KEY, JR.  
R. TAYLOR COLE  
CARL B. SWISHER  
EMMETTE S. REDFORD

# APSA 1963 WORLD TOUR-SEMINAR

## 12 Countries—41 Days

The American Political Science Association announces the opportunity for APSA members to explore the political life of 12 critically important nations in Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Europe through direct conversations with their respective political and diplomatic leaders. In conjunction with these high-level sessions, participants will also engage in numerous briefings and informal gatherings with faculties of local universities, U.S. Foreign Service personnel, foreign press representatives, etc. Opportunity will be provided for a limited amount of personal research and sightseeing. The entire trip is being planned with the cooperation and support of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Information Service.

### Itinerary

The World Tour-Seminar will depart from San Francisco on August 1, 1963 and arrive in New York on September 10, 1963. The following intermediate stops are scheduled: Honolulu, Tokyo, Taipei (Quemoy), Hong Kong, Bangkok, New Delhi, Cairo, Istanbul, Athens, Belgrade, Madrid, and Lisbon.

### Transportation

The participants will travel around-the-world on a chartered Lockheed Super-H Constellation. The plane and flight crew will remain with the trip thereby avoiding the inconveniences and delays frequently encountered due to changing planes and airlines. Personal belongings and baggage can be stored on the plane during stopovers.

### Expenses

The cost of the APSA World Tour-Seminar will be under \$1550.00 per person. This price will include around-the-world charter air fare (including first-class meal and complimentary beverage service aloft), first-class hotel accommodations, numerous meal functions, baggage handling, airport transfers, entire schedule of meetings, interviews, and briefings, and appropriate sightseeing activities.

On the basis of past experience, participants can expect that the cost of this educational activity will be accepted as a deductible expense on Federal income tax returns.

*For further information concerning this unique educational, research, and travel opportunity, write immediately to: APSA 1963 World Tour-Seminar, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. A brochure giving full details and reservation information will be mailed to you.*

## **European Politics and Government**

### **A Comparative Approach**

**Clifford A. L. Rich, Oklahoma State University; Robert O. Gibbon, Wisconsin State College, Eau Claire; Lowell G. Noonan, San Fernando Valley State College; Helmut Bader, El Camino College; and Karel Hulicka, University of Buffalo. Edited by Clifford A. L. Rich**

This new textbook is designed for the first course in comparative government. It presents a detailed, balanced, and comprehensive account of the politics and government of five major European powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S.S.R. Specialists on each country analyze the causal determinants of political action, providing students with a sound basis for drawing comparative conclusions. The governing process is systematically dealt with in order to impart a clear understanding of how the major European systems compare with that of the United States. The final chapter summarizes the politics and institutions of European union. 1962. 780 pp., illus. \$8.00

## **Public Finance**

**Earl R. Rolph and George F. Break  
—both University of California, Berkeley**

Thoroughly class tested, this textbook sets forth the theoretical and technical issues in public finance involved at all levels of government. It effectively demonstrates how economic intelligence can be applied to illuminate the problems of public finance; provides a descriptive-historical analysis of government finance today and its role in the economy. The various tax resources available to the government are presented in detail. Book draws mainly on American experience in fiscal affairs, but evidence from other countries is incorporated where applicable. Current social security programs, the problems arising from the rapid growth of metropolitan areas, and fiscal theory and policy are examined in detail. 1961. 586 pp., illus. \$7.50

## **Public Administration**


**John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California; and  
Robert V. Presthus, Cornell University**

Standard textbook provides a comprehensive account of public administration today. It integrates the descriptive-institutional material of administrative science and the behavioral analyses of administration in action. Book analyzes the nature of public bureaucracy as well as the political environment and its attendant pressures on the public administrator; incorporates material on decision-making and data processing in fact-finding and planning; reflects recent research in group behavior, individual motivation, leadership dynamics, etc. 4th Ed., 1960. 570 pp. \$7.50

## **THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY**

**15 East 26th Street, New York 10, New York**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



# Praeger

## PAPERBACKS

### IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

John A. Armstrong \$1.65

### THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICA

K. A. Busia \$1.75

### POLYCENTRISM The New Factor in International Communism

Walter Laqueur and  
Leopold Labedz, Eds. \$1.75

### INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Constitutional Foundations

Ruth C. Lawson, Ed. \$2.50

### THE KREMLIN SINCE STALIN

Wolfgang Leonhard \$2.95

### MARXISM An Historical and Critical Study

George Lichtheim \$2.50

### NEUTRALISM AND NONALIGNMENT The New States in World Affairs

Laurence W. Martin, Ed. \$2.25

### THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID American Experience in Southeast Asia

John D. Montgomery \$2.25

### THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Revised Ed.)

Pierre Rondot \$1.95

### THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. \$2.50

### THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship

John W. Spanier and  
Joseph L. Noguee \$1.95

### COMMUNIST CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE

A. Doak Barnett \$1.35

### COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

R. G. Boyd \$1.75

### RUSSIA UNDER KHRUSHCHEV

An Anthology from  
Problems of Communism  
Abraham Brumberg, Ed. \$2.50

### SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY—AND TOMORROW A Political Analysis

Richard Butwell \$1.75

### THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives

Alexander Dallin \$1.95

### CASTRO'S REVOLUTION Myths and Realities

Theodore Draper \$1.75

### SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (Revised Ed.)

Raymond L. Garthoff \$2.25

### PAN-AFRICANISM A Short Political Guide

Colin Legum \$1.95

### GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN JAPAN

The Road to Democracy  
John M. Maki \$1.95

### THE POLITICS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM Challenge to American Policy

George W. Shepherd, Jr. \$1.95

### AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II (Revised Ed.)

John W. Spanier \$1.95

### THE SOVIET UNION TODAY A Concise Handbook

Kenneth R. Whiting \$2.25

## FREDERICK A. PRAEGER

### PUBLISHER

64 University Place, New York 3, N.Y.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## APSA CHARTER FLIGHTS TO EUROPE

**FLIGHT A—Approximately June 15 to September 1, 1963**

**FLIGHT B—Approximately August 1 to 31, 1963**

For the fourth successive summer, the Association will provide chartered air service to Europe for its members.

Both flights will originate at New York International Airport and arrive on the continent of Europe. The cost per seat will be under \$275.00.

A deposit of \$100.00 per seat is required. Deadline for deposits for charter flights A and B are March 1 and April 1 respectively.

*For further information write to:*

*Miss Patricia Pearson  
American Political Science Association  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.*



## GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

sums up his convictions on

## THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM

based on his 1962 Godkin Lectures  
at Harvard University

*and THE PRESS comments:*

JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS in THE WASHINGTON POST — "He does the Nation great service when he propounds the theme of this book . . . it is bold in its conception and sets America's sights high."

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE editorial, What States Owe to Federalism—"Mr. Rockefeller preached at Harvard what he has practiced as Governor — and the Federal system would be stronger if more Governors did likewise."

TIME MAGAZINE cover story, June 15, 1962 — "A revealing record of his philosophy of government and politics."

\$2.75 at your bookstore

**H**ARVARD  
UNIVERSITY PRESS  
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## New and recent OXFORD texts

.....

### **THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France**

by Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania

1962 384 pp. paperbound \$2.25

### **THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE**

edited by Joseph Tussman, Wesleyan University

1962 329 pp. paperbound \$1.95

### **READINGS IN ECONOMICS**

edited by H. C. Harlan

1961 704 pp. paperbound \$2.75

### **READINGS IN WORLD POLITICS**

edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with Ralph Lerner and Gerald Stourzh

1959 590 pp. paperbound \$2.25

### **READINGS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with Ralph Lerner and Gerald Stourzh

1959 712 pp. paperbound \$2.75

### **READINGS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY**

edited by Gerald Stourzh and Ralph Lerner

1959 496 pp. paperbound \$2.25

### **READINGS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with Gerald Stourzh and Marvin Zetterbaum

1959 792 pp. paperbound \$2.75

### **OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC**

by Joseph Tussman, Wesleyan University

1961 152 pp. paperbound \$2.25

### *Announcing*

### **MATERIALS ON AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,**

Revised Edition

edited by John M. Swarthout, Portland State College, and Ernest R. Bartley, University of Florida

Fall 1962 608 pp. paperbound prob. \$4.50

### **THE SUPREME COURT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**

edited by Joseph Tussman, Wesleyan University

Spring 1963 416 pp. paperbound prob. \$1.95

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 417 Fifth Ave., New York 16**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## *New and Recent Texts*

12th EDITION      OGG AND RAY'S

### INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By William H. Young, University of Wisconsin

The 12th edition of this well-known best seller includes rewritten and expanded chapters on civil rights, elections, foreign affairs, and national defense. A new chapter has been added on government in metropolitan areas. The book is fully up-to-date, including the major new programs, policies and events of 1961.

*957 pages, illus., \$8.00*

Also available, the 12th edition of INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, *The National Government*. *748 pages, illus., \$7.50*

4th EDITION      BISHOP AND HENDEL

### BASIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

By Hillman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel,  
both New York University

Revised to keep abreast of present-day issues, the Fourth Edition of this collection of stimulating readings on American democracy contains 21 new selections. Retaining the basic premises of earlier editions, the editors have selected persuasively reasoned and authoritative statements dealing with the fundamental values and persistent issues of our democracy. They have expanded their treatment in this edition, however, to include such current topics as the lawfulness of the desegregation decisions, the fundamental premises and applications of the Loyalty-Security Program, the demand for a more responsible two-party system, the political implications of the development of atomic weapons, and the question of co-existence.

*528 pages, paperbound, \$2.95*

# APPLETON - CENTURY - CROFTS

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## *from Appleton-Century-Crofts*

### FRENCH POLITICS AND ALGERIA

By William G. Andrews, Tufts University

This book provides a comparative case study in the functioning of French governmental systems. From a wealth of documentary material and statistical data, the writer has woven a lucid account of policy in the making. His study demonstrates how the governmental and political institutions of the Fourth and Fifth French republics have functioned in dealing with the rebellion in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. To be published this month.

*About 224 pages, paper, \$1.95 (tent.)*

### THE REVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY

By Neal Riemer, University of Pennsylvania

In this original work of scholarship, the author analyzes the decline of democratic theory and presents a strong case for its revival. After giving the reasons for the decline, he outlines a scheme for American democracy and provides a framework within which it may operate. Throughout, the underlying definition of political theory is that of the critical study concerned with harmoniously relating the normative, empirical, and prudential components of political science.

*190 pages, paper, \$1.95*

### 2nd EDITION      JACOBSON'S DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

By Thornton Anderson, University of Maryland

A survey history of American political ideas which combines analysis and exposition with readings from primary sources. Selections from documents illustrate the diversity of political thinking, and essays explain the geographical, social and cultural forces that influenced it. While retaining many of the original highly praised essays, Dr. Anderson has revised and brought this time-honored text up-to-date.

*672 pages, \$7.50*

**34 West 33rd Street, New York 1, New York  
Division of Meredith Publishing Company**



*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



NEW FALL BOOKS FROM COLUMBIA



SPAIN AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1936-1941

By Dante A. Puzzo

Analyzing the complex of men, forces and circumstances that attended the violent overthrow of the Spanish Republic and the emergence of Falangist Spain as an Axis satellite, Professor Puzzo traces the course of events in Republican Spain which led to the conflict and describes political pressures which the Great Powers exercised on Loyalist parties and rebel forces. Finding the essence of the Spanish story in the policy of appeasement that characterized much of the diplomacy of the 1930's, the author presents a fully documented account of its formulation and implementation with respect to Spain as well as evidence substantiating the claim that the Spanish Republic suffered defeat on the battlefield only after, and because, it had been abandoned in the chancelleries of the Western democracies.

336 pages

\$7.50

STRATEGY, POLITICS, AND DEFENSE BUDGETS

By Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder

These three challenging studies of U. S. national security policy and defense budgets of the period of 1948-1955 scrutinize the interaction of international politics, domestic politics and attitudes, strategic theories, and governmental organization as these factors focus on the formulation of defense budgets. Discussed are the fiscal 1950 budget; the NSC-68, a document prepared in the spring of 1950 by the National Security Council dealing with the problem of meeting unlimited challenge in a limited time with great but not infinite resources; the "New Look" military policy of the Eisenhower administration—a preparedness policy which was to rely on strategic nuclear power and to de-emphasize use of "conventional" land, naval and air forces.

541 pages

\$10.00

FORRESTAL AND THE NAVY

By Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery  
with the collaboration of Jennie Barnes Pope

A skillful and authoritative examination of James V. Forrestal's career in the United States Navy Department from his position as Under Secretary in 1940, through his Secretaryship, to the newly created office of Secretary of Defense in 1947.

370 pages

\$6.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

*Write for free Fall 1962 Paperback Catalog*



## Capitalism and Freedom

*By Milton Friedman.* The author of *A Program for Monetary Stability* expounds his view of the proper role of competitive capitalism as simultaneously a device for achieving economic freedom and a necessary condition for political freedom. 320 pages. \$3.95

## The American Partnership

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN THE  
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES

*By Daniel J. Elazar.* A strong argument that the American system of combining national programs with effective state government is not a twentieth-century innovation but an evolutionary development already used in the last century. \$6.50

## In Defense of Politics

*By Bernard Crick.* This polished and witty essay describes "the minimum benefits of politics as a civilized activity," and defends the tendency toward haggling and compromise as the hallmark of democratic liberal society—a virtue, rather than a defect. \$3.75

## Landmarks in Political Economy

*Earl J. Hamilton, Albert Rees, and Harry G. Johnson, editors.* This distinguished collection from 70 years of the *Journal of Political Economy* includes key works by Veblen, Pareto, Viner, Schumpeter, Paul H. Douglas and Milton Friedman, to name but a few. 544 pages. \$10.00


*through your bookseller, or*

**UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**

Chicago 37, Illinois

IN CANADA: The University of Toronto Press

# NEW VIEWS OF POLITICAL ACTION IN AMERICA...



## **THE WOUND IN THE HEART: America and the Spanish Civil War**

**By Allen Guttman, Amherst College**

Probes the special impact of the Spanish Civil War on American intellectual and social history.

Allen Guttman provides the first full-fledged analysis of how Americans saw the conflict and why the fate of the Spanish republic moved them to such deep and lasting partisanship.

Books, pamphlets, magazines, drawings, cartoons, propaganda releases, letters, films, paintings, speeches, radio broadcasts — the author has combed all these contemporary materials in his search for the sources of the nation's responses.

His analysis covers the American political spectrum from right to left, beginning with "pre-liberal" irrational responses and moving through conservative, liberal, and radical interpretations to "post-liberal" responses. He also delves into such controversial matters as the dilemma of an authoritarian church or a radical party in American society, with its predominantly liberal political tradition.

**Just published, \$5.95**

## **CLASS AND PARTY IN THE EISENHOWER YEARS**

**By Heinz Eulau, Stanford University**

Professor Eulau has written a careful study of political behavior during the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. Based on interviews with national samples of the electorate, it scrutinizes classes and parties as influential sources of political loyalty and dissent. It also explores the interplay of class and party in political attitudes, preferences, perceptions, and actions.

**Just published, \$4.50**

## **POLITICAL IDEOLOGY**

### **Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does**

**By Robert E. Lane, Yale University**

This important addition to the empirical literature of political behavior interprets the personal, often unconscious, meanings of political ideas to the American common man. Using depth interviewing techniques on a sample of working and lower middle class men, the author traces the social and cultural sources of political beliefs — and their consequences for the American political system as a whole.

**Just published, \$10.00**



**THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE**

A Division of The Macmillan Company, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## The Sovereign Prerogative *The Supreme Court and the Quest for Law*

by Eugene V. Rostow

This group of essays by the Dean of the Yale Law School states a theory of law and a policy for judicial action, and applies them to the work of the Supreme Court, criticizing some of its decisions, upholding others. Strongly defending the democratic character of judicial review, the book presents and illustrates a policy through which the Supreme Court could wisely and affirmatively use the great powers entrusted to it by history in enforcing the commands of the constitutional tradition to help improve the democratic quality of American life. "With grace and power, and from high ground, Dean Rostow illuminates the role of the judiciary in maintaining a constitutional democracy. The book brings a much-needed philosophic perspective to the current and recurring controversies over the performance of our Supreme Court."—Paul A. Freund. \$6.00

## The Public Order of the Oceans *A Contemporary International Law of the Sea*

by Myres S. McDougal and William T. Burke

Following a tradition which antedates Grotius, the authors offer a comprehensive survey of the process of decision by which the general world community allocates access to, and authority over, the oceans during times of relative peace. Previously published companion books in a series increasingly influential: *Studies in World Public Order*, by Myres S. McDougal and Associates, which was the recipient of the Certificate of Merit of the American Society of International Law for 1962; and *Law and Minimum World Public Order*, by Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano. \$15.00

## Russian Foreign Policy *Essays in Historical Perspective*

edited by Ivo J. Lederer

This pioneer effort by leading American specialists is the first major attempt to deal with the interrelation of Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy. Individual essays interpret Russian national interest and objectives; Russian attitudes toward the West; the effect of internal politics on foreign policy; the role of personalities, the foreign ministry, and economics; and such instruments of diplomacy as the military apparatus, propaganda, international movements, and negotiation. Contributors include George Vernadsky, Cyril E. Black, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Hajo Holborn, and George F. Kennan. \$10.00

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS  
New Haven and London

## APSA PERSONNEL SERVICE

*Recently reorganized, the Personnel Service lists the largest number of teaching and research positions in the country.*

**MEMBERSHIP**—available to every member of the Association for \$5.00 yearly.

**NEWSLETTER**—issued every 4-6 weeks. Contains a listing of current teaching and research vacancies. Upon request, the Association forwards biographical information forms directly to employers.

*For further information write to:*

Miss Cora Prifold, *Director Personnel Service*  
American Political Science Association  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

## TO RESTORE AND IMPROVE

*the standards of higher education  
in America*

## THE UNIVERSITY BOOKMAN

*A Quarterly Review edited by*

**RUSSELL KIRK**

- ★ **REVIEWS** . . . of university and college textbooks
- ★ **ESSAYS** . . . on educational theory and practice
- ★ **CONTRIBUTORS** . . . include such sound scholars and competent writers as Gerhart Niemeyer, Thomas Molnar, Ernest Van Den Haag, Felix Wittmer, John Abbot Clark, John A. Lukacs, George C. S. Benson, Arther S. Trace Jr.
- ★ **IT COSTS** \$2.00 (4 issues)

*The University Bookman* should be read by everyone interested in significant criticism and evaluation of American education.

**SUBSCRIBE NOW! Write today to:**

---

## THE UNIVERSITY BOOKMAN

---

Box 3070  
Grand Central Station  
New York, N. Y.

Dept. 9,

---

# ANNOUNCING

A New Series  
*from Prentice-Hall*

## FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edited by ROBERT A. DAHL, Eugene Meyer Professor of Political Science,  
Yale University

Here, in the *Foundations of Political Science*, is a series of books that provides a scientific, analytical approach to the *complete* introductory course in political science or American government—and that integrates the major aspects of modern political science. Guided by the highest standards of contemporary scholarship and a concern for the major historic problems of politics, the series will make available to the beginning student the fruits of the most recent empirical and theoretical studies in political science.

These comprehensive, yet short volumes, offer the instructor a thoroughly flexible teaching tool. They can be used individually as collateral readings, in groups as core volumes for a course, or combined as basic text material. Thus, the series is intended to shorten, by a decade or more, the process of converting the best knowledge of modern political science into integrated and highly readable texts.

The books will be attractively designed in a 6" × 9" format, and moderately priced at \$1.50 paperback, and \$2.95 clothbound.

### *Coming in Spring '63*

#### **Modern Political Analysis**

by Robert A. Dahl, Eugene Meyer, Professor  
of Political Science, Yale University

#### **Governing States and Localities in America**

by Herbert Kaufman, Professor of Political  
Science, Yale University

#### **Constitutional Law**

by Charles L. Black, Jr. Professor of Political  
Science, Yale University

#### **Political Parties and Political Behavior**

by Fred I. Greenstein, Assistant Professor of  
Political Science, Wesleyan University

#### **Public Opinion and Ideology**

by Robert E. Lane, Professor of Political  
Science, Yale University, and David Sears, As-  
sistant Professor of Psychology, University of  
California, Los Angeles

### *Forthcoming*

#### **Public Administration**

by James W. Fesler, Professor of Political  
Science, Yale University

#### **Political Theory**

by Frederick M. Watkins, Professor of  
Political Science, Yale University

#### **International Relations**

by Karl W. Deutsch, Professor of Political  
Science, Yale University

#### **Comparative Government**

by Dankwart A. Rustow, Associate Professor  
of Government, Columbia University

#### **The Congress and the Presidency**

by Nelson W. Polsby, Assistant Professor of  
Political Science, Wesleyan University

#### **Readings in American Political Behavior**

by Raymond E. Wolfinger, Assistant Professor  
of Political Science, Stanford University

For further information, write: BOX 903

PRENTICE-HALL, Inc.  
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

---

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# *from* RANDOM

---

## *State and Local Government and Politics*

REVISED EDITION

by ROBERT S. BABCOCK, *University of Vermont*

Lucid, well-organized, and highly informative this text is infused with the sense of excitement and practical wisdom derived from the author's own successful participation in grass roots politics. The book is now thoroughly updated and revised.

Fall 1962; 500 pages; \$5.75 text

## *Patterns of Government*

THE MAJOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE

REVISED EDITION

by SAMUEL H. BEER, ADAM B. ULAM, and NICHOLAS WAHL  
*all of Harvard University*

HARRY ECKSTEIN, *Princeton University* HERBERT J. SPIRO, *Amherst College*

This distinguished text, widely used in comparative government courses since it was first published in 1958, examines the governments and politics of four major world powers—Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union—against the general background of their respective political cultures. The authors, each a well-known authority in his field, have incorporated the latest significant developments in this newly revised and expanded edition.

Fall 1962; 832 pages; \$7.95 text

## *The Might of Nations*

WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME

by JOHN G. STOEßINGER, *Hunter College*

It is a pleasure to read this well-written text and to have the use of its unusually thorough chapter bibliographies. The organization is sound and reflects a judicious and relevant selection of issues and events. The final chapter contributes effectively to the conceptualization of international relations.

—Daniel S. Cheever, *University of Pittsburgh*

468 pages; \$6.25 text

---

**RANDOM HOUSE · The College Department**

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers





# HOUSE

---

## *Government by Constitution*

by HERBERT J. SPIRO, *Amherst College*

. . . A provocative and thoughtful book which stimulates and challenges the reader . . . its approach is fresh and mature without being verbose or jargonistic.

—Josef Silverstein, *Wesleyan University*

496 pages; \$6.75 text

## *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy*

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

by CARL COHEN, *University of Michigan*

An excellent collection of theoretical essays about the main ISMS agitating the contemporary world. The selections were chosen with unusual cogency, and the editorial organization could scarcely be better

—Francis Wilhoit, *Drake University*

704 pages; \$3.95 paperbound text

*To be Published Winter 1962*

## *Power and International Relations*

by INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., *University of Michigan*

320 pages; \$4.50 text

*Send for a list of Random House Studies in Political Science, a series of original works attractively bound in paper covers. The newest book in this series is CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Robert C. Bone, Jr. Priced from 95 cents.*

---

501 Madison Avenue · New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# *current*

A monthly magazine for the concerned citizen bringing together in one place the significant new material from all sources on the frontier problems of today.

John W. Gardner, President  
Carnegie Corporation of New York

"Current is one of the most interesting and useful journals that cross my desk. It is unique in its coverage of contemporary ideas and issues."

**current** 905 Madison Avenue, New York 21, N. Y.

Please enter my subscription to Current at the special rate for students and faculty of \$5. (Regular subscription \$8.) I shall receive a full year of Current (12 issues). My payment (\$5.) is enclosed.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_


City \_\_\_\_\_ Zone \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_

School Affiliation \_\_\_\_\_

I am not eligible for the Educational Rate; please enter my subscription at the Introductory Rate of \$7. for one year \_\_\_\_\_ (Regular Rate \$8.) My payment is enclosed.

P-1

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



### **The Two Faces of Tass**

by THEODORE E. KRUGLAK. Traces the development of the Soviet news agency and analyzes its present-day operations. Harrison Salisbury, former Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times*, says: "This is an extremely useful study of the TASS agency—an evaluation that is most timely in a field that has been sorely neglected."

\$5.00

### **China's Politics in Prospective**

by HAROLD S. QUIGLEY. A concise, realistic view of the Chinese situation today, seen in the perspective of social, economic, and political developments. Allen S. Whiting of the Rand Corporation commented: "This is a fine study, neither simplistic in its treatment nor unnecessarily cluttered with details."

\$4.50

### **British Broadcasting in Transition**

by BURTON PAULU. An analysis of British television and radio broadcasting since the introduction of commercial television. "A superb book on one of Britain's most important contributions to the world of communications—broadcasting." *World Affairs*.

\$5.00

### **France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925**

by PIOTR S. WANDYCZ. A study of the intricate relations between France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia from the time of the Paris peace conference to the Locarno pact.

\$8.50

### **Man Takes Control:**

(CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT  
AND AMERICAN AID)

by CHARLES J. ERASMUS. An investigation of the causes of cultural change, with a case study of a technical assistance program in Mexico. "May well become a standard reference for all students of cultural change." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.

\$6.50

*To be published soon:*

### **SENATOR GERALD P. NYE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS**

by WAYNE S. COLE

\$5.75

Order from your bookseller or from

**UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS**

2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis 14, Minnesota

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



# American Political Parties

*Their Natural History*

by WILFRED E. BINKLEY, *Ohio Northern University*

This is a revised and updated edition of a book which penetrates into the political mores of the American people and presents a strikingly fresh interpretation of the development of parties and statesmen. Among the many subjects examined in this original and stimulating text, Dr. Binkley discusses the way new parties germinate and grow and the climate of opinion in which some flourish and others die. An entirely new chapter has been added which brings the history of American political parties down to the present day.

Fall 1962; 520 pages; \$5.00 text

# Peace Theory

*Preconditions of Disarmament*

by JOHN W. BURTON, *Australian National University*  
*Canberra, Australia*

In this exciting new book the former Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs makes an important contribution to the study of international relations. Accepting the principle of conflict as an inevitable component in world politics, he proceeds in behaviorist terms to analyze the S/R relationship and to delineate those policies by which peace can be maintained. Illustrating his argument from the rich background of his own career as practical diplomat and statesman, he has given us an excellent text for advanced courses in international politics.

1962; 225 pages; \$4.00 text

ALFRED A. KNOPF, *Publisher*

College Department

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## Public Opinion and American Democracy

by V. O. KEY, JR., *Harvard University*, 602 pages; \$7.50 text

## The Organizational Society

by ROBERT PRESTHUS, *Cornell University*, 1962; 340 pages; \$4.50 text

## Modern Organization

by VICTOR A. THOMPSON, *Illinois Institute of Technology*, 192 pages; \$3.75 text

## Politics Among Nations

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *University of Chicago*, 660 pages; \$7.50 text

## Introduction to Government

Third Edition

by ROBERT RIENOW, *State University of New York*, by Spring 1963

Paperbacks

**VINTAGE BOOKS**

Paperbacks

Caravelle Editions

SOUTHERN POLITICS, by V. O. Key, Jr. \$2.95

THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET, by Richard F. Fenno, Jr. \$1.95

U. S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD, by Donald R. Matthews \$1.95

ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, by Robert G. McCloskey \$1.95

THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, by Robert H. Jackson \$1.95

DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW, by Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence

Clyde Ferguson, Jr. \$1.95

A Complete list of Vintage books available upon request

**ALFRED A. KNOPF, Publisher**

College Department

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## Re: COMMUNISM

four new DUTTON PAPERBACKS observe the Party,  
the national character, and the outlook

### A PRIMER ON COMMUNISM, Revised Edition by George W. Cronyn. Edited by Howard Oiseth.

Two trained analysts of Russian affairs give answers-in-depth to 200 questions representing a wide cross section of public curiosity about every aspect of communism. The collection—ranging from family life, taxes, law, labor, production patterns, education and delinquency, to Berlin, Cuba, and the Sino-Soviet conflict—“deserves the highest praise and widespread use” says Evron Kirkpatrick of the American Political Science Association. \$1.15

### RUSSIANS AS PEOPLE by Wright Miller. Preface by Alexander Dallin.

An extraordinary first-hand portrait of Russians as individuals, and how they behave in such spheres as manners, morals, politics and family. The N. Y. Times Book Review assessed it as “One of the most impressive of all contemporary reports on Russia.” Illustrated \$1.35

### THE COMMUNIST BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE: Complete Texts of all Four Communist Manifestos 1848-1961 With an Introduction by Thomas P. Whitney, formerly chief of the American Embassy Economic Section and Moscow correspondent for the Associated Press

This book is *the only single source for all the major communist documents!* It includes: all the central statements of the Soviet Communist party on domestic and foreign policy; the Party's 1961 Draft Program, the original Manifesto of 1848; the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875); the Programs of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (1903) and of the Bolsheviks (1919). Absolutely invaluable as a reference and key to the future. \$1.75

### A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIA by R. D. Charques

A chronological narrative—relating the present to the past. “The most readable and illuminating one-volume treatment in either English or Russian . . .” *Maurice Hindus, SATURDAY REVIEW. Maps. \$1.35*

Write for free catalog of other interesting DUTTON PAPERBACKS to



**E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY** 201 Park Avenue South, New York 3, N. Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## **NEW from Prentice-Hall**

**Quality paperbacks in the Spectrum  Series**

**S-41 GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

*by Maurice Harari, Ford Foundation*

A concise analysis on a country-by-country basis of political institutions in major countries of a tumultuous region. Dr. Harari documents regional struggles and examines political institutions, international relations in the Middle East and their effect on the cold war. 192 pp. (orig.), December 1962, paperbound \$1.95, clothbound \$3.95

**S-45 DISCRIMINATION**

*by Wallace Mendelson, University of Texas*

Based on the Report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights—the facts of racial discrimination in America today. Openly discusses the scope and effect of racial discrimination in major aspects of American life—and the extent of government involvement. 192 pp. (orig.), October 1962, paperbound \$1.95, clothbound \$4.25.

**S-AA-7 AUTOMATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE**

*An American Assembly Book edited by John T. Dunlop, Harvard University*

Nine leading authorities consider the possibilities of advancing industrial technology: if oriented toward human values, it could mean a better age for mankind—or it could impose a mechanical jig on its creators. 184 pp. (orig.), 1962, paperbound \$1.95, clothbound \$3.95.

**S-38 SOCIAL JUSTICE**

*edited by R. B. Brandt, Swarthmore College*

The concept of justice—as seen by the political theorist, philosopher, economist, and lawyer. This is the first book-length treatment of social justice for several decades—the first to use modern analytic concepts drawn from philosophy. 192 pp. (orig.) October 1962, paperbound \$1.95, clothbound \$3.95.

**S-25 SCIENCE AND THE NATION Policy and Politics by T. Stefan Dupré and**

**Sanford A. Lakoff, both of Harvard University. 181 pp. (orig.), 1962, paperbound \$1.95, clothbound \$3.95.**

**S-28 MASTERY OF THE METROPOLIS by Webb Fiser, Syracuse University.**

**168 pp. (orig.), 1962, paperbound \$1.95, clothbound \$3.95.**

**S-AA-6 THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST 2nd Edition, 1962. An**

**American Assembly Book edited by Willard L. Thorpe, The Merrill Center for Economics. 188 pp., 1962, paperbound \$1.95, clothbound \$3.95.**

**S-32 COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR ERA A Rand**

**Corporation Study by Alice Langley Hsieh. 204 pp. (orig.), 1962, paperbound \$2.25, clothbound \$4.50.**

*For a complete Spectrum Catalog, Write Dept. CAC*

**SPECTRUM  BOOKS: SYMBOL OF GOOD READING**

*Available at your Bookstore*

**PRENTICE-HALL, INC. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## **The Political and Social Thought of Charles A. Beard**

BY BERNARD C. BORNING. Evolution of Beard's philosophy in relation to American social thought during the first half of the twentieth century. Shows important relationships between political reality and theoretical concepts of the time and includes a complete bibliography of Beard's published writings. 1962. 344 pages. \$6.75

## **The Better Part of Valor**

MORE, ERASMUS, COLET, AND VIVES ON HUMANISM, WAR, AND PEACE, 1496-1535. BY ROBERT P. ADAMS. A complete study of the ideas on peace and a good society—in contrast to war and tyranny—expressed by the four greatest humanists in Henry VIII's England. "A book of very substantial value . . . brings in much fresh or unfamiliar documentation in support of its theme." —Douglas Bush, Harvard University. 1962. 368 pages. \$7.00

## **Chinese in American Life**

SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR HISTORY, STATUS, PROBLEMS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS. BY S. W. KUNG. Chinese in the United States as significant contributors to science, education, business, industry, and the arts. Describes also the history of their exclusion and immigration here and in other countries. 1962. 368 pages. \$7.50

## **Boss Cermak of Chicago**

A STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. BY ALEX GOTTFRIED. "A definitive, well-researched, and thoroughly documented biography of one of the most unusual political leaders in recent American history."—*Chicago Daily News*. 1962. 472 pages. \$6.50

## **The Politics of Freedom**

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE. BY C. W. CASSINELLI. Competitive elections, freedom of speech and the press, a complex constitution, a high standard of living, and responsibility of government to the people observed and analyzed as essential and interdependent elements of all modern western democracies. 1961. 224 pages. \$4.75

## **Politics and Grass**

THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. BY PHILLIP O. FOSS. "This scholarly study by a mature political scientist who has lived many years with his subject brings much light into one corner of our domestic politics."—*American Political Science Review*. 1960. 246 pages. \$4.50

## **Washington State Government**

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS. BY DONALD H. WEBSTER, ERNEST H. CAMPBELL, AND GEORGE D. SMITH. A comprehensive description of the state's legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 1948, revised 1962 by DAVID W. STEVENS. 270 pages. \$5.00

*from your bookseller or*

university of washington press · seattle 5

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*





---

## **Systematic Politics:**

ELEMENTA POLITICA ET SOCIOLOGICA

*by George E. Gordon Catlin*

"Not since the eighteenth century—or, more exactly, perhaps, not since Spinoza in the seventeenth century—has there appeared a study of politics so comprehensive in scope and so vigorous in analysis as Catlin's *Systematic Politics*." Francis D. Wormuth

440 pages      \$7.50

## **The British Cabinet**

*by John P. Mackintosh*

"A book . . . which supersedes all those so far written on the subject. It is a penetrating, stringent, well organised account. Mr. Mackintosh is clearly a historian of distinction . . . a highly acute observer of the contemporary scene." *Manchester Guardian*

560 pages      \$8.25

*And being published soon . . .*

## **The Canadian General Election of 1957**

*by John Meisel*

Twenty years of Liberal government ended dramatically in Spring, 1957. Why? An objective and perceptive study of issues, policies, campaigns, leadership, and public opinion.

376 pages, maps      Approx. \$7.50

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

Toronto 5, Canada

*Books shipped in the United States from our Brooklyn warehouse*

---

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## ***From the Macmillan political science list***

### **A BILL BECOMES A LAW: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1960**

Daniel Berman, The American University

How Congressional procedures play decisive roles in shaping legislation—a step-by-step analysis of the legislative history of one particular bill. Among the unusual procedural devices illustrated are: teller vote, discharge petition, quorum call, and cloture attempt.

*1962, 143 pages, paper, \$1.75*

### **THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  
and George A. Lincoln, United States Military Academy

Provides a method of systematic analysis applicable to the world order at any time in history. Contemporary issues receive special attention — population explosion, the impact of technology on weapons and communications, problems of economic assistance, and the security problem.

*1962, 719 pages, \$7.50*

### **THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS, Second Edition**

Frederick H. Hartmann, University of Florida

Offers fresh material on Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, plus a substantial increase in the number of maps. National interests common to all states are examined and the approaches of various states compared.

*1962, 710 pages, \$7.50*

### **WORLD IN CRISIS: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2nd Edition**

Frederick H. Hartmann

Forty-six thought-provoking readings, many of them classics in the field. A variety of contrasting opinions appear, as well as approaches of different eras juxtaposed to illustrate the evolution of opinion. The analyses are primarily contemporary.

*1962, 398 pages, paper, \$3.25*

### **POLITICS U.S.A.: CASES IN THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS**

Andrew M. Scott and Earle Wallace, both of the University of North Carolina

An anthology of case histories illustrating important phases of politics and government. Emphasis is on events within the memory of today's students. Selections are drawn from a wide range of authoritative sources.

*1961, 571 pages, paper, \$3.50*

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N.Y.

# ***From the Free Press political science list***

The first three volumes of *The International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research*, under the General Editorship of Heinz Eulau:

## **COMMUNITY POLITICAL SYSTEMS**

Edited by Morris Janowitz, University of Chicago

"The selections are...excellent. As case studies of unique and particular community political structures, they provide stimulation and insight for the reader."—*Public Administration Review*

"Valuable contributions to the theory and methodology of community power studies."  
—*The Journal of Politics* 259 pages, \$7.50

## **POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS**

Edited by Dwaine Marvick, University of California (Los Angeles)

"The papers...are of...high interest and quality.... They illustrate the richness and diversity of the possible approaches to the study of political elites—and political behavior in general.... Such systematic study...involve[s] commitment to more general standards of evidence, inference, and analysis. Such standards are exhibited in this volume."—*The American Political Science Review* 347 pages, \$7.50

## **CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY POLITICS**

Edited by Samuel P. Huntington, Columbia University

"This book is a useful...addition to the growing literature of military politics... providing something of interest to almost any student of politics—from the historian of political ideas to the investigator of small group behavior."—*Midwest Journal of Political Science*

"Not least among the contributions... is the thirty-page critical bibliography of military writing, the best this reviewer has seen to date."—*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 272 pages, \$7.50

---

## **FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING**

### **An Approach to the Study of International Politics**

Edited by Richard C. Snyder, Northwestern University, H. W. Bruck, Penn-Jersey Transportation Study, and Burton Sapin, U. S. Department of State

This book examines the intellectual foundations and strategies necessary for a science of international politics—and the applications of these strategies to demanding situations. The result is a thorough study of the decision-making process that draws upon techniques from other fields and shows how they may be used in international politics.  
Just published, \$5.00



THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE A Division of The Macmillan Company

## PUBLICATIONS OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

### PERIODICALS

	Single Copy	Annual Subscription
Indian Journal of Public Administration (Quarterly) .....	\$1.00	\$4.00

### PUBLICATIONS

The Communal System of Yugoslavia <i>by</i> B. Mukerji .....	\$0.60
The Development and Impact of British Administration in India—A Bibliographic Essay <i>by</i> Bernard S. Cohn .....	\$1.00
Training for Social Welfare Work: Courses and Institutions (Mimeographed) .....	\$0.50

### REPORTS OF SEMINARS & CONFERENCES (Mimeographed)

The Pattern of Rural Government (1958) .....	\$0.60
Improving City Government (1958) .....	\$1.00
Morale in the Public Services (1959) .....	\$0.75
Budgeting in India .....	\$0.50

(Postage extra)

For fuller information, please write to: The Administration Officer, Indian Institute of  
Public Administration, Indraprastha Estate, Ring Road, New Delhi-1.

## ESPECIALLY RECOMMENDED

### PUBLIC POWER IN NEBRASKA

A Report on State Ownership

By Robert E. Firth

Although Nebraska became the only "all public power" state in the nation three decades ago, this is the first definitive account of its history and development. Dr. Firth also provides a forthright discussion of current policy questions besetting the system. 402 pp. \$6.00

### THE YEAR WE HAD NO PRESIDENT

By Richard H. Hansen

Foreword by Senator Estes Kefauver

A study of the power vacuum problems created by the temporary inability of the President. The author suggests proposals for insuring continuity of leadership. 182 pp. \$3.50 (Paper, \$1.60)

### HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS


By Graham Wallas

Introduction by A. L. Rowse

"The work stands alone and has a large value for the students of politics." (*American Library Association Bulletin*). An indispensable collateral reading text. \$1.40



*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



# The Alliance For Progress

Problems  
and Perspectives

Commentaries by Milton S. Eisenhower,  
José Figueres, Raúl Prebisch, Teodoro Moscoso, and Dean Rusk

Edited by JOHN C. DREIER. Marking the first anniversary of the historic Alliance between the U.S. and Latin America, these essays cover its origin, achievement, and outlook. 146 pages. \$3.95

## MODERN LIBYA

A Study in Political Development

By MAJID KHADDURI. First full-scale political study of Libya in the postwar era—an account of her formation as an independent nation, her economic, legal and constitutional problems, and her foreign policy. 452 pages. \$7.50

## BRITAIN AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

By SAUL ROSE. Chronicle of British dominion in Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Borneo, Singapore, and other areas of south-east Asia—beginning with the first trade outposts of the East India Company, and carrying through the troublesome years after World War II. 256 pages. \$5.00

## THE FUTURE OF ALASKA

Economic Consequences of Statehood

By GEORGE W. ROGERS. Study of Alaska's political environment, and forecast of the long-range political and economic effects of statehood. By the author of *Alaska in Transition*. 320 pages. \$6.50

*At your bookseller's . . . or order from*

**THE Johns Hopkins**  
**PRESS**

*Baltimore 18, Maryland*



*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## 5 important books . . . from McGraw-Hill

### • AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

By C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, The University of Chicago. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* 480 pages, \$4.50 (paper), \$5.95 (cloth).

Approximately 50 Supreme Court decisions needed for an understanding of basic American constitutional issues are presented in this case book for American constitutional law and American government courses. The author provides for each constitutional issue a succinct analysis of the historical developments and previous judicial holdings as background for a thorough understanding of the cases selected for this book. The organization is based on issues with about 40 issues included. Dissenting opinions are reprinted as fully as majority views; so that students will have full benefit of the conflict of opinion. Increased emphasis placed on newer issues of civil liberty.

### • INCOME AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES

By JAMES N. MORGAN, HARVEY E. BRAZER, WILBUR J. COHEN, all of the University of Michigan; and MARTIN H. DAVID, The University of Wisconsin. 544 pages, \$7.95.

A national personal-interview survey is employed to study the distribution and redistribution of income, what determines peoples' incomes, and the intergenerational transmission pattern. The analysis of this survey combines demographic, economic, and social-psychological measurements on each family studied to give a detailed explanation of what determines the economic position of that family.

### • TOWARD WORLD ORDER

By AMRY VANDENBOSCH, University of Kentucky, and WILLARD N. HOGAN, State University College, New Paltz, New York. Available January, 1963.

This complete revision of THE UNITED NATIONS provides an explanation of international organization in the context of the modern world political system. A synthesis of descriptive and analytical approaches, book presents both factual information and a critical analysis of problems and issues. It was written for introductory college courses, but is highly recommended for anyone interested in a serious study of the United Nations and other contemporary international organizations.

### • POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

By NORMAN J. G. POUNDS, Indiana University. *McGraw-Hill Series in Geography.* Available November.

An analysis and explanation of how and why the earth's surface is divided politically. Using a functional approach, this advanced text examines the state and its function and discusses the bases of political power, internal and external. The last chapter discusses the alleged geographical control on political events. Contains a unique discussion on international rivers, transit rights, straits and sea canals of international significance.

### • CASES IN PRACTICAL POLITICS

By THE EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. \$0.50 each, available only in multiples of 5 at \$2.50 per package.

Utilizing the case method, already applied successfully to business and public administration curricula, the Eagleton Cases are designed to increase understanding of the vital contribution to American democracy of partisan political activity. The cases provide an inside look at practical politics . . . help improve student interest and performance in introductory through graduate courses. The program is a continuous one which will provide constant replenishment of cases and casebooks to assure comprehensive coverage of current political realities, student interests, and teaching needs.

send for your approval copies now

**McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY**

330 West 42nd Street

New York 36, N.Y.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



**BOOKS**

## **The Revolution in World Politics**

*Edited by* MORTON A. KAPLAN, *The University of Chicago*. This book offers a collection of essays by well-known experts in political science and international affairs on salient problems and crises in current world politics. Problem areas covered include the challenge of Communist expansion, protest movements in developed and underdeveloped areas, the arms race, and the maintenance of an international legal and political order. Contributors include such figures as Norman Birnbaum, Leonard Binder, Richard A. Falk, Malcolm W. Hoag, and Herman Kahn. 1962. Approx. 528 pages. Prob. \$7.95.

## **Governing the Metropolis**

*By* SCOTT GREER, *Northwestern University*. A penetrating analysis of the factors that produce large metropolitan agglomerations and the effects of these agglomerations upon the community power structure and governmental system. 1962. 153 pages. Cloth: \$4.50. Paper: \$2.45.

## **Intergroup Relations and Leadership**

**Approaches and Research in Industrial, Ethnic, Cultural, and Political Areas**

*Edited by* MUZAFER SHERIF, *University of Oklahoma*. Presents a series of detailed studies by leading social scientists which explore problems of inter- and intragroup relations within the contexts of industrial, labor-management, ethnic, community, and international relations. 1962. 284 pages. \$5.95.

## **Organization Theory in Industrial Practice**

**A Symposium of the Foundation for Research on Human Behavior**

*Edited by* MASON HAIRE, *University of California, Berkeley*. A collection of contemporary approaches to industrial organization written by successful executives in successful companies. The material covers a wide range of problems, including decentralization, staff, role, change, and authority. 1962. 173 pages. \$5.75.

## **The Political Writings of Jean**

**Jacques Rousseau — in Two Volumes**

*With notes and introduction by* C. E. VAUGHN. First published in 1915 and out of print for many years, this edition has long been regarded as the definitive edition of Rousseau's political writings. 1962. *In press*.

*Send for examination copies.*

**John Wiley & Sons, Inc.**

**440 Park Avenue South, New York 16, N.Y.**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

Eyck, Caves, Sylos-Labini, Schmidt

## ***A History of the Weimar Republic***

**VOLUME I: FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE EMPIRE  
TO HINDENBURG'S ELECTION**

*By Erich Eyck.* This is the first English translation of Eyck's famous history of the Weimar Republic. Men who supported the Republic—Ebert, Rathenau, Stresemann—and their opponents, advocates of nationalistic totalitarianism—Papen, Hugenberg, Schleicher, Hindenburg, Hitler—are discussed and evaluated. German history in domestic and international contexts is analyzed—to the death of President Ebert, with which the first volume ends.

\$10.00

## ***Air Transporters and Its Regulators***

**AN INDUSTRY STUDY**

*By Richard E. Caves.* Mr. Caves analyzes the market structure, conduct and performance of the United States domestic passenger lines and shows that the airline industry has structural characteristics that would ensure market results of reasonable quality with less extensive economic regulations.

\$10.00

## ***The Law of Labour Relations in Sweden***

*By Folke Schmidt.* Sweden's "middle way" in labor relations has meant a balance between employer and union in a context of free enterprise. Mr. Schmidt examines the history of the Swedish development and analyzes its basic implementation—as in the role of the Labour Court.

\$4.25

o

## ***Oligopoly and Technical Progress***

*By Paolo Sylos-Labini.* The author believes that mainly as a consequence of industrial concentration the modern structure of production in advanced countries differs significantly from that of the past century. In industrial markets concentrated and differentiated oligopoly has taken the place of quasi-competitive conditions. *Harvard Economic Studies.*

\$4.75

**H**ARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers





## ***Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision***

**ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER**

*Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling.* This carefully documented work has been called by Samuel Eliot Morison "The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor. . . . It ought finally to dispose of some of the nonsense about Pearl Harbor that has been written." By reconstructing in detail the intelligence picture as it looked to the participants *before* the Pearl Harbor attack, the author illuminates controversies that have raged for over twenty years. \$7.50

## ***Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power***

***The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945***

**CHALMERS A. JOHNSON**

This book offers a radically new and altogether convincing interpretation of the Chinese Communists' rise to power. After establishing a tentative definition of mass nationalism, the author tests this definition against a detailed history of the Chinese resistance movement during the Japanese occupation, using as a control the rise of the Yugoslav Partisan movement.

November. \$5.75

## ***Soviet Administrative Legality***

***The Role of the Attorney General's Office***

**GLENN G. MORGAN**

A study of the function of the Soviet Procuracy (Attorney General's Office): ascertaining the conformity of enactments issued by lower authorities with laws and decrees promulgated by higher governmental agencies, and checking on the "strict execution of the laws" by various offices and officials. The history of this dual function under the Soviets and its uses as a tool in implementing the policies of the regime is examined. September. \$6.00

*Order from your bookstore, please*

**STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

## **OXFORD BOOKS**

### **OF EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST**

---

#### **STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY**

By J. M. MACKINTOSH. This book examines the major policy decisions of the U.S.S.R. made since 1944, the year which saw the beginnings of the Soviet bloc as we know it today. The author shows which types of decision are likely to be abandoned as unfruitful, and which are fundamental to Soviet policy and of both immediate and long-range concern to the Western world.  
\$8.00

#### **MEXICO**

*Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960*

By HOWARD F. CLINE. The Director of the Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress, presents the history of the two eventful decades since the exciting days of General Cardenas. He discusses the booming Mexican economy; Mexican political stability, and the famous single-party democracy; agrarian reform; labor movements; education; and international affairs. *19 statistical appendices; annotated select bibliography; 25 maps; 5 diagrams. (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*  
\$6.75

#### **DEMOCRACY AND THE COST OF POLITICS IN BRITAIN**

By W. B. GWYN. This volume shows the relationship between the 19th-century transition to political democracy and the cost of a parliamentary career in Britain, concentrating on the years 1832-1918. An epilogue delineates election expenditures from 1918-1959.  
\$5.60

#### **DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1917-1939**

Edited by WALTER A. RIDDELL. This first collection of documents on Canadian foreign policy ever to be published gives a clear picture of Canada's external policies during the vital period when the country attained full independence. Professor Riddell's introduction summarizes events up to 1917, and synthesizes his subject groupings of the documents by giving a connected account of the conduct of external relations.  
\$13.50

*At all bookstores*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**New York 16**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## OXFORD BOOKS

### OF EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST

---

#### NOMADS AND COMMISSARS

*Mongolia Revisited*

By OWEN LATTIMORE. A lively picture of Mongolia today, by the only American who has traveled in all the major regions of the China-Russia frontier and also speaks and reads the three most important languages of that frontier. Beginning with a geographical and historical survey, the author goes on to explain how Marxism succeeded in a country of nomads, and how Mongolia keeps its balance between the two giants of Communism. 8 pages of halftones. \$5.75

#### MITRE AND SCEPTRE

*Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, Personalities, and Politics 1689-1775*

By CARL BRIDENBAUGH. "A most excellent study. It documents fully from both English and Colonial sources the manner in which the drive for an established Anglican Church in the Colonies fostered the rise of revolutionary demands for complete civil and religious liberty . . . A fascinating account . . . It definitely will supersede all the older accounts." L. J. TRINTERUD, McCormick Theological Seminary. 3 halftones. \$7.50

#### LINCOLN AND THE NEGRO

By BENJAMIN QUARLES. A leading scholar of American Negro history traces, for the first time in detail, the important changes in Lincoln's attitude toward the Negro—and the equally important changes in the Negro's attitude that were vital in giving Lincoln his unique place in American history. "Professor Quarles handles his ambiguous theme with candor, realism, and excellent balance."—*N.Y. Herald Tribune*. 4 pages of halftones. \$6.50

#### PATRIOTIC GORE

*Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War*

By EDMUND WILSON. "A monumental achievement."—WILLIAM BARRETT, *Atlantic Monthly*. "Really a great book . . . it makes the passion that went into the war, and the disillusionment that followed it, more affecting than has any book in recent memory."—ALFRED KAZIN, *The Reporter*. Over 850 pages. \$8.50

*At all bookstores*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**New York 16**

---

The Galleon Series in Economics, History, Philosophy and  
Political Science

---

*Just Out*

**CANADA VOTES: Howard A. Scarrow**

A handbook of Federal and Provincial Election data.

**\$12.00**

LC 62-14822

**THE CONFLICT SOCIETY: Reaction and Revolution in  
Latin America**

By **KALMAN H. SILVERT, Tulane University**

*The Conflict Society* attempts to breathe order into the complex events  
of social change in today's Latin America.

**\$7.50**

LC 61-12686

**THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS, A British View:**

**The Journal of Major C. R. FORREST**

Hugh F. Rankin, Editor

**\$2.00**

LC 61-13685

*Recent Publications*

**EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA, By G. V. LA FOREST**

A comprehensive treatment of Canadian law and practice in interna-  
tional and inter-Commonwealth extradition.

**\$6.50**

LC 61-7029

**THE CATHOLIC VOTE, By JOHN H. FENTON**

"This competent study is written without bias, and constitutes a reliable  
exposition of a problem of great topicality at the present time."

*The Book Exchange* (London)

**\$4.75**

LC 60-12512

**U. S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND  
INTERNATIONAL LAW, By ROBERT R. WILSON**

". . . an authoritative contribution to the literature on treaty law . . ."

*American Political Science Review*

**\$6.50**

LC 60-11021

**CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS, By CARL BECK**

"A masterful organization of material . . . essential for any law library  
with pretention to adequacy." *Law Library Journal*

**\$4.50**

LC 59-15941

Wartime Origins of the East-West

**DILEMMA OVER GERMANY, By JOHN L. SNELL**

"His account of the development of United States policy is the fullest  
and most painstaking currently available." *Journal of Politics*

**\$7.00**

LC 59-12404

**POLITICS IN THE BORDER STATES, By JOHN H. FENTON**

". . . excellent example of the combination of historical, statistical, and  
interviewing techniques in the study of state politics." *Public Admin-  
istration Review*

**\$5.50**

LC 58-16327

*Once Again Available*

*A Distinguished Text*

**AN INTRODUCTION TO**

**PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY, By JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN**

**\$7.00**

**THE HAUSER PRESS**

720 POYDRAS ST.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

*new!*

## FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

by Harold G. Sprout  
and Margaret Sprout

—the continuing scientific and technological revolution, new dimensions of violence, shrinking space, dwindling climatic obstacles, rising consumption of natural resources, the strains and stresses of societies everywhere, spreading literacy, shifting ideological appeals, developing international institutions—

Against a background of these characteristics, and many other features of our changing world, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS views the historic international system, its successive transformations, and its current transitions toward new patterns. The emphasis throughout is on the changes in foundations—changes which render increasingly obsolete old and accustomed ways of thinking about world affairs. This book represents a fresh effort in providing the student with a frame of concepts, theories, and basic knowledge that have enduring value for understanding the rapidly changing international scene. The authors have integrated with their original writing (well over half the total) carefully chosen selections from a wide variety of sources.

740 pages

September

Text Ed. \$8.75

The VAN NOSTRAND POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

General Editor

Dr. Franklin L. Burdette, University of Maryland

*new!*

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BASIC DOCUMENTS

Second Edition

By Elmer Plischke

—proven as the key to an effective study of foreign governments—  
Documents, tables, structure and generic charts, series of sequential documents, facsimiles of diplomatic consular credentials, and full texts of major charters and covenants—organized by principal topical areas.

206 pages

Fall

Prob. \$4.25

*new!*

## GOVERNMENT and POLITICS in the middle east in the twentieth century

by H. B. Sharabi

6 x 9

295 pages

\$8.75

*new!*


## SEARCHLIGHT BOOKS

October

Under the general editorship of  
G. ETZEL PEARCY and  
GEORGE W. HOFFMAN

original paperback editions \$1.45

- 5 THE COMMON MARKET: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN ACTION  
by J. Warren Nystrom and Peter Melof
- 6 CENTRAL AMERICA—LAND OF LORDS AND LIZARDS  
by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi
- 7 PUERTO RICO—ALLY FOR PROGRESS  
by Earl Parker Hanson
- 8 SPACE: FRONTIER UNLIMITED  
by Harold Leland Goodwin



**D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC**

120 ALEXANDER STREET  
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

# American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy

*By Robert Gilpin*

The author contends that the emergence of the scientist into the mainstream of American political life is one of the great events of our history. He emphasizes the growing need for effective measures for integrating scientist-advisers into national policy-making processes. This well documented book will be of lasting value to both scientists and public administrators, and it will be of vital interest to all concerned with problems of the nuclear era.

368 pages. \$6.95



*Order from your bookstore, or*

**PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS**

*Princeton, New Jersey*

## 1963-64 CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIPS

The deadline for submitting applications for the 1963-64 Congressional Fellowship Program is December 1, 1962. Applicants must be between the ages of 23 and 35.

### *Qualifications:*

- **For Political Scientists** —Completion or near completion of Ph.D. in political science. Preference will be given to persons who are teaching or who intend to teach.
- **For Journalists** —Bachelor's degree and at least one year of professional experience in newspaper, magazine, radio or television work. Graduate students who intend to enter journalism also will be considered.
- **For Law School Faculty—LL.B. degree and at least one year's teaching experience in an accredited law school.**  
**Members**

*Further information and application blanks may be obtained from:*

**The American Political Science Association**  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

**BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY**  
**of**  
**THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION**

FOURTH EDITION, 1961

Edited by FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE  
*University of Maryland*

- The latest biographical material on all individual members of the Association, including degrees, academic and non-academic careers, publications and fields of interest.
- Two listings of members—one alphabetically, one geographically.
- Members classified into fields of primary interest.
- Concise format for easy reference.
- Descriptive and background material about the Association.

Clothbound: \$12.50

Paperbound: \$10.00

Orders should be sent to:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

**APSA GROUP**  
**TERM INSURANCE**

On November 1, 1962 the program of Group Term Insurance sponsored by the Association will begin its third year. During the first year, more than 600 members of the Association joined the Program for a total of well over six million dollars worth of insurance in force.

In view of the unusually good actuarial experience of the Association, the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company has agreed to modify the medical provisions for members of the Association who failed to take out the insurance at the inception of the Program. Members can now apply by merely filling out a short yes-or-no questionnaire supplied by the Company. New members, of course, can still join the program by merely filling out an application blank.

For additional information, members should write directly to the Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

Appleton-Century-Crofts . . . . .	810, 811	The Macmillan Company . . . . .	828
Atherton Press . . . . .	554	McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. . . . .	832
		University of Minnesota Press . . . . .	821
University of Chicago Press . . . . .	813	University of Nebraska Press . . . . .	830
Columbia University Press . . . . .	812		
Cornell University Press . . . . .	Cover III	Oxford University Press . . . . .	809, 836, 837
CURRENT . . . . .	820	Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher . . . . .	807
		Prentice-Hall, Inc. . . . .	817, 825
E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. . . . .	824	Princeton University Press . . . . .	840
The Free Press of Glencoe . . . . .	814, 829	Rand McNally & Company . . . . .	Cover IV
		Random House . . . . .	818, 819
Harper & Row, Publishers . . . . .	Cover II, 551	The Ronald Press Company . . . . .	806
Harvard University Press . . . . .	808, 834		
The Hauser Press . . . . .	838	Stanford University Press . . . . .	835
Holt, Rinehart & Winston . . . . .	553	University Bookman . . . . .	816
		University of Toronto Press . . . . .	827
Johns Hopkins Press . . . . .	831	D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. . . . .	839
The INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION . . . . .	830	University of Washington Press . . . . .	826
		John Wiley & Sons, Inc. . . . .	833
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. . . . .	822, 823	Yale University Press . . . . .	815

---

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

---



## THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION'S

### *Personnel Service . . .*

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a "clearing house," bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration in the service is open to all members of the Association. Here are the details of its operation.

#### **Position Openings**

- A Newsletter is mailed monthly to those seeking positions through the Personnel Service.
- The Newsletter lists, by code number, position openings and job descriptions.

#### **Referral of Applications**

- Biographical data sheets and letters of reference are maintained in an individual file for all of those registered with the Personnel Service.
- These materials are mailed, on request, to prospective employers listing job openings in the Newsletter.

#### **Employers Using the Service**

- Any employer may use the Association's Personnel Service.
- Types of positions listed include teaching and research on the university level, research and administrative positions with professional organizations, research and administrative positions with federal, state and local government agencies.

#### **Registration Fee**

- An annual fee of \$5.00 entitles members of the Association to register with the Personnel Service.

*For further information concerning registration write to:*

**Miss Cora Prifold, Director, Personnel Service**  
**The American Political Science Association**  
**1726 Massachusetts Avenue N.W., Washington 6, D.C.**

## APSA CHARTER FLIGHTS TO EUROPE

### **Summer—1963**

The Association will again sponsor charter flights to Europe during the summer of 1963. Two flights are planned:

- Flight A will leave approximately June 15 and return approximately September 1.
- Flight B will leave approximately August 1 and return approximately August 31.

The round-trip price will be under \$275.00 per seat. Both flights will originate at New York International Airport.

A deposit of \$100.00 per seat is required. Deadline for deposits for charter flights A and B are March 1 and April 1 respectively.

*For further information write to:*

*Miss Patricia Pearson*  
*American Political Science Association*  
*1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.*  
*Washington 6, D.C.*

# THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

*Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association*

## EDITORIAL BOARD

- HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Managing Editor, Ohio State University*  
SAMUEL H. BEER, *Associate Editor, Harvard University*  
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University*  
ANDREW HACKER, *Cornell University*  
DWIGHT WALDO, *University of California, Berkeley*  
HAROLD STEIN, *Princeton University*  
JOHN D. LEWIS, *Oberlin College*  
ROWLAND EGGER, *University of Virginia*

## EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

- VICTOR T. LE VINE, *Acting Book Review Editor, Washington University*  
RALPH A. STRAETZ, *News and Notes Editor, New York University*  
JULIAN FELDMAN, *University of California*  
CECELIA M. KENYON, *Smith College*  
FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, *University of Maryland*  
HIRAM M. STOUT, *George Washington University*  
CORINNE SILVERMAN, *Index and Retrieval Systems, Inc.*

## EDITORIAL OFFICE

*Managing Editor, APSR*  
100 University Hall, Ohio State  
University, 216 N. Oval Dr.,  
Columbus 10, Ohio

## EXECUTIVE OFFICE

*Executive Director, APSA*  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

---

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are \$15.00 a year (\$6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of \$1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

*Current issues* are priced at \$3.75 per copy. Prices of other issues are furnished on request.

*Applications for membership*, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 5th day of the month of publication.

*Address correspondence about contributions* to the REVIEW to Harvey C. Mansfield, 100 University Hall, 216 N. Oval Dr., Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio; *books intended for review*, to Victor T. Le Vine, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.; *News and Notes items*, to Ralph A. Straetz, Department of Political Science, New York University, University Heights, New York 53, N.Y.; *advertising correspondence*, to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The *International Index to Periodicals* indexes current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

---

*Office of publication:* Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

*Foreign Agent:* P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1963, by The American Political Science Association.

---

---

# explorations in political science . . .

---

## **SOVIET UNION: Paradox and Change**

*Robert T. Holt, John E. Turner, both of the University of Minnesota, et. al.*

A group of experts on Soviet affairs have contributed a variety of perceptive essays to this unusual new book. Their comments throw valuable light on seven key areas of contemporary life in the USSR: city growth; economic changes; agricultural production; science and technology; education; youth; radio and television. (1962; 256 pp.; \$2.50 paper; \$4.50 cloth)

## **THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY**

*Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, both of Western Michigan University*

Over 1,100 political terms are defined and placed in their proper context by political science professors Plano and Greenberg. The important "working vocabulary" essential to the political scientist or informed citizen is concisely presented in relation to the problems, practices, institutions, and organizations within our democratic government. (1962; 395 pp.; \$3.95 paper; \$5.95 case bound)

## **THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY**

*Thomas Landon Thorson, University of Wisconsin*

This courageous, scholarly and perceptive evaluation of democracy utilizes the technique of modern logical analysis. The central ideologies of political democracy are critically defined in a uniquely objective discussion that is sure to provoke constructive discussion on crucial contemporary issues. (1962; 172 pp.; \$2.25 paper)

## **ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS**

*Herbert J. Storing (editor), University of Chicago; Walter Berns, Cornell University; Robert Horwitz, Michigan State University; Leo Strauss, University of Chicago; Leo Weinstein, Smith College*

Frankly critical essays examine a controversial mode of political conduct. The five eminently qualified contributors discuss such questions as the use of modern political science for propaganda; the scientific approach as a guide to decision making; the credibility of a totally objective science of politics. (1962; 340 pp.; \$5.50)

# HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, INC.

383 Madison Avenue, New York 17

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# NEW AND FORTHCOMING BOOKS FROM ATHERTON PRESS

Just published

## **THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT**

Malcolm E. Jewell, *University of Kentucky*, Editor

Legislative and Congressional apportionment has long been a matter of concern to political scientists and politicians who recognize the startling inequalities in representation existing in many states. Since the Supreme Court's decision in *Baker v. Carr*, reapportionment has also come to the forefront of public interest. This timely book—the only one in print dealing in detail with the problem on a state-by-state level—examines in eighteen original essays the causes and cures of a situation which threatens the very existence of representative democracy. In his introductory chapter Malcolm Jewell reviews some of the unanswered questions raised by the court's decision. In the remaining chapters, the problems and prospects of reapportionment are discussed for Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, California, New York, North Carolina, West Virginia, Tennessee, Maryland, Michigan, Florida, Colorado, Kentucky, and Texas. *November 1962. Pp. xii + 334. \$6.75 net.\**

## **CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO CREATIVE THINKING**

Edited by H. Gruber, G. Terrell, M. Wertheimer, with original essays by Jerome Bruner, *The Conditions of Creativity*; Mary Henle, *The Birth and Death of Ideas*; Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert A. Simon, *The Processes of Creative Thinking*; Richard Crutchfield, *Conformity and Creative Thinking*; David McClelland, *On the Psychodynamics of Creative Physical Scientists*; and Robert MacLeod, *Retrospect and Prospect*.

The breadth of scholarship represented in these six essays brings to bear on the vital problem of human creativity the experience of centuries and many disciplines. This book reflects the thinking of some of the best minds in behavioral science and sketches the direction in which the future study of creativity might go. *October 1962. Pp. xv + 223. \$6.50 net.\**

March 1963 publication

## **COURT ON TRIAL**

Charles S. Hyneman, *Indiana University*

## **AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY:**

### **The Issue of Foreign Trade**

Raymond A. Bauer, *Harvard University*; Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*; and Lewis A. Dexter

## **GOVERNMENT OF THE ATOM:**

### **The Integration of Powers**

Harold P. Green, *Attorney, Washington, D.C.*; and Alan Rosenthal, *Hunter College*

\* Please order all books directly from the publisher.

---

**ATHERTON PRESS**

---

70 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK 11, NEW YORK

---

A DIVISION OF PRENTICE-HALL, INCORPORATED

---

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

# The American Political Science Review

VOL. LVI

DECEMBER, 1962

NO. 4

## FREE SPEECH: AT WHAT PRICE?\*

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN  
*Indiana University*

It is now 30 years since Mr. Felix Frankfurter, then law teacher, called upon the political scientists for help. I propose to consider in what manner we might respond to his appeal.

In a review of the first book by one of our now distinguished colleagues, Mr. Frankfurter urged political scientists and economists to quit trying to be lawyers and to act more like specialists in the study of human relationships. "What we have a right to expect from economists and political scientists," he said, "is an analysis of what true governmental problems are, in the light of what actually goes on in the world and wholly apart from the technicalities of American constitutional law. . . . Until the economists and political scientists attend to their special tasks and we lawyers to ours and each has awareness of the other's problems, we shall continue to have . . . cross-sterilization of the social disciplines."<sup>1</sup>

Last week Mr. Frankfurter terminated a quarter century of service on the nation's highest tribunal. From that tribunal come oracular pronouncements of profound significance, fixing bounds to the power of law-making assemblies. I have read many of these pronouncements with considerable care, and I am convinced that the men who utter them need a kind of assistance which the political scientists can supply. I propose, therefore, to give you my judgment as to how this profession may render a service which one of the nation's most eminent jurists called for 30 years ago.

I shall speak about the problem of putting meaning into the Constitution's declaration that Congress—and by extension the 50 state

legislatures—shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. And my objectives will be to identify certain aspects of that problem most likely to be illuminated by the political scientist's kind of attack and, having found the site for our effort, to say enough about what we might do to convince you that we ought to move in with our tools.

The Supreme Court has not yet come to agreement on the basic presumptions which will underlie the decision of nicer issues of legislative authority relating to speech and press. At least two present members of the Court, Justices Black and Douglas, have declared their commitment to a presumption that the prohibitions of the First Amendment are absolute—that the prohibitions of laws which abridge the freedom of speech or press are absolute denials of power to impose restraints on speech and press. It will come out in a moment, however, that they favor a qualified absoluteness.

Opposed to the idea of absolute prohibition is the so-called balancing doctrine—the contention that the nation's interest in freedom of speech and press is in competition with its interests in some other valued things that sometimes are endangered by unrestrained expression, that the competing interests ought to be evaluated and balanced out, and therefore that a test of reasonableness ought to be applied in litigation where abridgment of speech or press is charged.

A third point of view about the fundamental character of the free speech guarantee has been pressed with great persistence by Professor Alexander Meikeljohn of the University of Chicago. The First Amendment, according to him, protects political communication only. It is designed to keep government from restraining what people say in their efforts to instruct, criticize, and control their govern-

\* Presidential address, American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 5, 1962.

<sup>1</sup> *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 45 (1932), p. 764.

ment. As respects political speech, the prohibition is absolute. As respects all other expression, Professor Meikeljohn argues, government may abridge freedom of speech and press so long as it does not violate any of the constitutional limitations found elsewhere in the Constitution. When a restraint of non-political speech is challenged on due process grounds, for instance, a court should evaluate the gains and losses which can be credited to the act, and determine its validity by application of tests of reasonableness.

No matter which of these three basic presumptions controls judicial thinking about laws that have an impact on self-expression and communication, critical decisions will turn on tests of reasonableness. This is admittedly so, and obviously so, in the case of the balancing doctrine; reason inevitably must rule when choice is made among competing values. Reason, therefore, must rule under the Meikeljohn formula when the restraining act is found to encumber non-political speech.

It has been argued that the concept of absolute prohibition excludes a concept of reasonableness. Justice Douglas has stated emphatically and repeatedly that inquiry into what is reasonable is wholly inappropriate when a court is convinced that speech or press has in fact been restrained. Indeed, I think it likely that Justices Douglas and Black, and Professor Meikeljohn when he contemplates utterances that have political significance, endorse the idea of absolute prohibition because they expect it to remove controversy about what is reasonable from the judicial forum.

In my judgment this is a vain hope. The absolute prohibition doctrine runs squarely into issues of reasonableness at three points. When you examine what Justices Black and Douglas have said from the bench and in addresses delivered at other places, you learn that one of them or both of them has asserted: *first*, that the First Amendment does *not* protect *all* kinds of verbal expression; *second*, that expression which the First Amendment does protect sometimes loses protection because it is inextricably mixed up with other action; and *third*, that statements which ordinarily are immune from restraint by government may be forbidden if the words can be said to be the efficient cause of certain punishable actions.

Consider these statements by the two men who have, more than once, said that the prohibitions imposed by the First Amendment are absolute:

Justice Black in a public address, two years ago: "There is a question as to whether the

First Amendment was intended to protect speech that courts find 'obscene'.<sup>2</sup>

Justice Douglas, speaking also for Justice Black and Chief Justice Warren in 1957: "Of course, we have always recognized that picketing has aspects which make it more than speech. . . . I would adhere to the principle . . . that this form of expression can be regulated or prohibited only to the extent that it forms an essential part of a course of conduct which the State can regulate or prohibit."<sup>3</sup>

Justice Douglas, speaking only for himself, in the Dennis case in 1951: "The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious conduct should be beyond the pale along with obscenity and immorality."

The bounds of legislative power to abridge speech and press on each of these three frontiers, can be fixed only after the judge has decided where a reasonable man would draw the line. I have not time to trace the reasoning which leads to this conclusion. Call to mind the consequences of John Marshall's effort to skirt around the morass of reasonableness inherent in the necessary and proper clause. Find out, he said, whether the act of Congress falls within the commerce power; if the act is an exercise of the commerce power we need not inquire whether it is necessary and proper for the regulation of commerce, for the power to regulate commerce is plenary, whole, complete. By this strategy the judges slipped away from questions of reasonableness at one point, only to walk straight into them at another—when does commerce begin and end?—what is a direct and what is an indirect impact on goods in movement?—and so on. I trust you have not forgotten the *E. C. Knight* case, *Hammer v. Dagenhart*, *Carter v. Carter Coal Company*.

Believing, as I do, that a rule of reason will control the decisions that mark the front of a developing constitutional law of free speech and press, I can tell the political scientist where he should stake out his claim and assemble his tools. The scholarly study which helps lawmakers and judges decide what government may *reasonably* do to regulate the speech and other expression of the nation—this is what God had in mind for them to do when he created political scientists.

This is a worthy and urgent mission. How shall we go about the job? I shall comment

<sup>2</sup> "Bill of Rights," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 35, p. 865, at p. 867.

<sup>3</sup> *International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt*, 354 U. S. 284, at 297 (1957).

briefly on each of three gateways into this jungle of human relationships.

*One.* There is need for a fuller and more careful ordering of communication and non-communicative expression, and their relationships to the values, beliefs, expectations, and behavior of men and women.

*Two.* It is obvious on a reading of judicial opinions and scholarly literature, that our best thought would profit from a few alternative analytic designs—models of analysis designed to identify and relate to one another the components of an issue of unrestrained speech versus restricted speech.

*Three.* There is need for a fresh look, and a hard look, at the intellectual supports for the grand presumption in favor of unrestrained verbal expression which underlies virtually every bit of our serious literature.

An equal attention to all three of these points would allow very little time for any of them. I prefer to expand my remarks on the first two. The scrutiny of intellectual foundations, which any of you, or Justice Frankfurter, might think the Number 1 assignment for political scientists will be disposed of right now in the few sentences I can allow.

A hard look at the intellectual foundations might reveal that the case for free speech, as it is made in contemporary American literature, rests mainly on a distrust of government rather than on a high esteem for a free flow of information and a lively combat among the ideas that compete to control action. Note the lack of acknowledgment in this literature that legal regulation of a communication problem, in many instances, may have as its result a freeing rather than a trammeling of communication—this result because enactment of a law on the subject gives the moderates in the community a talking point which restrains the more passionate part of the population from a do-it-ourselves job of policing. The hard look might help us put together more intelligently our supposition that the pen is mightier than the sword and our wish to secure and preserve certain cultural gains. Can anyone doubt that the communication of man to man facilitates the step backward as well as the step forward? Are we so committed to an idea of progress that we must believe that all social change is for the better—therefore that all argument and agitation for change must inevitably result in cultural advance? Contemplating the history of pogroms and genocide in our own time, I am unable to understand why there is so little support, if indeed there is any support in our literature, for governmental action designed to

lessen or prevent the indoctrination of children which produces adults who seek relief in persecution. Do we believe that impregnation with hate ought to be tolerated so that all of us may be enlightened and ennobled by the debate it excites? Or are we simply overpowered by uncertainties, not trusting our elected officials to select for extirpation at the stage of character formation the evil which we will later demand that they destroy on the battlefield?

You will see why I believe we need a speculative attack on the free speech problem by a mind as disciplined as that of John Stuart Mill, and as free from compulsion by previous writing as Mill appears to have been. You may see, also, why I am reluctant to foreguess what I will be told when one of you writes that book.

I speak with more confidence about the other two enterprises I recommend—the careful ordering of situations in which issues of free speech versus restraint arise, and the development of models for analysis of such issues.

On the first of these assignments, the general survey which reveals where the problems lie, let us start with the forum. Most of our writing is about communication from man to man out in the open. If this be the ordinary situation, then there are special situations that ought to be brought into fuller cognition and recognition.

*Citizen to His Government.* Possibly this is where speech and press ought to be most unrestrained. But there must be limits as to when and where the citizen can speak to his servant. The judge must be immune from the helpful coaching which interested spectators can supply throughout the trial. And the Senators have a point when they say they hear enough if they listen only to one another when they sit in formal session. If we thought more about it, we might conclude that we ought to impose some further conditions on the forum when the individual competes with the great organization in pressing his interests on elected officials or administrative agents. I think this is a hard surface on which we should sharpen our ideas about equality.

*Government to Citizen.* When the President was elected, I stood firmly planted in a state of nature, determined to scrutinize the deeds of my servant and help remove him from office if he did not meet my expectations. By the time his first term was up I had been made over. When I voted to give him a second term, and a third term, and a fourth term, did my vote testify to a conviction that a public servant had fulfilled my expectations? Or did my voting merely prove that I had been sweet-talked into

accepting anything he chose to give? If you think this is a dilemma only for fuzzy thinkers, ponder the uses of the bureaucracy. The Congressmen may not enact a law which forbids the individual or a group to conduct a propaganda campaign designed to terminate a social practice or uproot a moral commitment of the population. May the Congressmen set a bureaucratic force on a counter propaganda campaign intended to smother the reformers and make ineffective the communication which they are guaranteed a right to advance—and pay for the governmentally based campaign with money exacted from you, me, and the man who got buried?

*Communication within Government.* A few days ago Senator Hubert Humphrey, the majority party's whip in the Senate, introduced me to some of his friends from Minnesota—introduced me as one of his teachers. I told the Senator's friends that there was one thing I had failed to teach the Senator—that is, that a leader of the Democratic party can never be sure who is going to filibuster. I am sorry the Senator is not here tonight, for I would have reminded him that, throughout the decade before he was born, United States Senators who called themselves liberals, were chafing at gag rule. Abuses of speech and restrictions of speech within government are not likely to be litigated under the First Amendment. But they lie in that universe of expression and communication to which the nation must bring order, and in respect to which the political scientists must bring counsel.

*Communication within Non-Governmental Organizations.* I think Justice Holmes did us a disservice with his reference to yelling "Fire!" in a theatre. Speaking from the floor while the play is in progress on the stage ought not be governed by the rules which govern communication on the street corner. We have supposed that the presiding officer properly determines the order of speakers where all have an invitation to speak. Would anyone argue that the Constitution forbids lawmakers to empower presiding officers, school teachers, and football referees to impose silence on the many while one person makes himself heard?

*The Carriers of Messages.* Does the guarantee of free press deny government the power to impose an obligation to carry messages? Is the right of an editor to print his own crazy ideas a right to keep out of his publication the ideas of all other men he thinks to be crazy—or the ideas he thinks worthy but unsuitable for immature readers? Consider the public need for news in a one-newspaper town; the stranglehold on the flow of information and ideas that lies

within the power of the great newsgathering organizations like Associated Press.

Finally, that special forum, *The Schoolroom*. What is the right of government to intervene in the development of character and the equipment of a child for a man's understanding? Does the wish of the constitution-makers and our own confirming determination to have a system of free speech deny us the right to use government to impose educational goals on unwilling parents? Silly question? Consider this confident statement by a man of considerable distinction in the literature of constitutional law as it relates to civil rights. Professor Milton R. Konvitz speaking:

The state may compel parents to send their child to a public or private school where he would acquire the basic means with which to search for the truth *in his own way* . . . it would follow that the state may prescribe only the minimum number of subjects, study of which would be compulsory, such as English, spelling, arithmetic, American history and geography, and hygiene. . . . The state should not make *secondary* education compulsory as against the claims of religious objectors; for I do not see that a free, pluralistic society stands to lose in the long run if some people know their holy books thoroughly but are ignorant of Faulkner and Hemingway or even of Shakespeare, as long as they have acquired the basic tools for the pursuit of secular knowledge and there is a public library in their community to which they can go for books.<sup>4</sup>

I trust I have said enough to make clear what kind of assignment I recommend for political scientists when I urge them to provide an orderly array of the significant relationships between our verbal expression and our other interests and activities. My brief remarks do not disclose the magnitude of that assignment. A scholar's report of the significant relationships will attend to the content of expression and the ear that hears the message, as well as the forum in which the word is delivered. If tests of reasonableness are to determine whether government may impede or inhibit a particular expression, the judge will have to satisfy himself as to the importance of the message to the individual who utters it, to the individual who receives, and to the society which may profit or lose if such messages move freely among the population. When you put the values which support the application of restraint on the scales with the personal and social evaluation of the message, the outcome

<sup>4</sup> *Fundamental Liberties of a Free People* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 122.



will vary according to whether the utterance is a groan or a grunt, a foul expletive, a blasphemous assertion of conviction, the idle chatter of a rattle brain, and on through a succession of categories up to the vital message that answers the question: What shall I do to be saved?

Intermixed with the importance of the message—perhaps inseparably blended—is the character of the audience. You would not allow adults to go about the playgrounds advising white children to beat up their Negro playmates; you might be reluctant to forbid the publication of a book which urged the same course of action on adults. The textbook intended for students in medical school may appropriately carry instructions which you would not permit in a book advertised as a do-it-yourself handbook of abortion. (Credit Mr. Malcolm Cowley for the illustration.<sup>5</sup>) The remark which is thought highly appropriate if whispered to an attractive companion may fall before the test of reasonableness if addressed to a group of old ladies.

I am confident that Justice Frankfurter will endorse the surveying job which I have described as eminently suited to the special competence of political scientists. He might insist that lawyers are better equipped than political scientists for the next assignment which I present for your consideration. I referred to it earlier as the development of models of analysis which have as their purpose to identify and relate to one another the components of a free speech case. How do you evaluate an act of government—legislative, administrative, or judicial—which imposes a restraint upon speech or press? This is what the judge must do in any litigation where the validity of the restraint stands or falls on tests of reasonableness. I am convinced that none of the judges to date—and this goes for Justice Black, Justice Douglas, Justice Frankfurter, and Judge Learned Hand—I am convinced that none of the judges has so far produced an opinion that stands as proof that his decision rests on a comprehensive, sharply discriminating, and systematic scrutiny of the known and probable social consequences of the act under consideration. I think that the interests and the training which mark the thoughtful and competent political scientist make our discipline a prime hope for fulfillment of this need.

We must presume that there is more than one rewarding way of going about the evaluation of a public policy. I would not venture

even to guess what alternative approaches and procedures may be turned up in a generation of assiduous scholarly study. In order to make sure that you understand what kind of enterprise I have in mind, I will give you the outlines of my personal attack on this problem.

The structure which I have adopted to guide my own analysis rests on three foundations: value position; suppositions and beliefs about effectiveness of means to ends; and attitudes toward uncertainty.

I can handle value position when I view a thing, a matter, as instrumental; I can do nothing with value viewed as ultimate, self-fulfilling, esthetic. If you tell me that nothing, absolutely nothing, gives you more satisfaction than popping your knuckles, about all I can do to straighten you out is to call your attention to other things you might value more highly if you gave them a trial. But if you say you pop your knuckles because that is the best way you have found to attract attention and cause people to seek your company, I can make a display of evidence glued together by reasoning which may convince you that you had better look for another way of making friends and influencing people. Value, to be a useful concept in analysis, must be instrumental value.

You can fix a value for free speech and press by generalizing the utility of expression—by a conception that free expression is essential to an open society, or to maintenance of democratic government, or to some other end equally sweeping and inclusive. The generalized approach, in which the instrumental value of expression is seen as diffused rather than identified with particular goals, is helpful in fixing foundation presumptions concerning public policy. As I see it, the usefulness of the generalized approach ends with the fixing of presumption. I regret that the limits you fix for listening prevent an explanation of why I believe this.

The identification, differentiation, and evaluation of means to an end is extremely difficult in any social situation that we conceive to be a significant problem. It is especially so where the problem is the rightfulness of an act of government which impedes or inhibits verbal expression. Consider the simple case of courtship and the hospital. Value 1—Romance. Value 2—Quiet for hospital patients. Means to romance—the serenade from the sidewalk and the call to trysting place when the nurse sticks her head out of the window. Means to quiet for patients—a city ordinance which, admittedly abridging the freedom of communication, makes it a penal offense to play a banjo, sing joyfully or plaintively, or call out in a loud

<sup>5</sup> In *Saturday Review* for July 7, 1962.

voice on side walk or street adjacent to hospital grounds.

Two central points then, in the evaluation of means to valued ends. First courtship. Maybe the nurse will ordinarily or always not hear the call to romance. If she does hear, the public exposure of her availability may excite a disposition to mayhem which thwarts the swain's visions of fond embrace. Countless are the obstacles which obstruct the path of true love.

This is only one side of the end-means equation. Consider means for achieving Value 2—the quiet which promises rest for patients in hospitals. Maybe patients never hear serenades and yelling from the sidewalk because doctors and nurses make too big a racket. If heard maybe the sound is a reassuring connection with the outside world. Indeed, the behavior which the city fathers sought to frustrate may have therapeutic effects worthy of an appropriation for periodic serenades.

I choose this simple illustration because it presents the elements of decision which confront us in all cases of actual or proposed restraint of speech or press. Always, I am sure, there are differences of belief about what the particular speech or publication is good for—what valued end the speech or publication advances and how surely it advances that end. Always, I am sure, there are differences of belief about what the proposed restraint is good for. Will the law which forbids the address actually keep the message from being broadcast? Will the restraints which are imposed neatly excise the evil they are intended to combat, or will they spread their effects to consequences we are unwilling to incur? And so on.

This is only the start of analysis. Are there not other means by which the valued end could be achieved? The swain can make a call on the telephone or send a letter—with flowers. The hospital can be insulated against outside noises. We remove the jury temporarily from society so as to allow communication to proceed unconfined. Perhaps we should adopt the same policy for patients who need hospital care.

Beyond all this lies a complex of questions about what might happen if public officials do not attempt to regulate the speech or press that some people find offensive. Individuals or non-governmental groups may put their own regulations into effect and do greater damage to self-expression and public communication

than a thoughtfully drafted legislative act could conceivably do.

Running throughout these imagined events and relationships is a disturbing uncertainty. Not always is the one who evaluates an abridgment of speech or press firmly set in his value position. Rarely, indeed, can he be certain that he estimates accurately the effectiveness of a means to an intended end. Perhaps never can he be wholly confident that he foresees the unintended consequences of an act. Faced with such uncertainties, one man may be loyal to his intellectual processes and do what his analysis recommends; another man, less willing to assume risk, may rush back to the cover of a basic presumption.

It may be that I should have knocked out a few paragraphs of what I have already said, to make room for some comment on the practical use of the analytic scheme I have described. I will say only that it has put in place, for me, some of the formulae which have dominated judicial opinions—clear and present danger, dangerous tendency, gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability. When you spread out in your conception the values which compete for aggrandizement, the complicated pattern of relationships between chosen means and other available means to valued ends, the uncertainties which beset every aspect of your problem—when you spread out all of this in your mind you see better what the familiar judicial formulae are good for and you are alerted to sectors of the social problem which they do not comprehend and put in place. This has been my experience with the particular analytic design which I have inadequately developed for my own use.

You have, in these remarks, one response to Professor Frankfurter's challenge. I have indicated the character of three inquiries which I believe political scientists eminently qualified to undertake. I do not see a more urgent call for our service. A social environment, cordial to self expression and hospitable to sure and easy communication, is essential to the free life we have fixed as our highest goal. But uninhibited self expression and unrestricted communication are not free gifts of nature; they come at a price. I see no more worthy task for this profession than the instruction of lay citizens, judges, and statesmen who must calculate the price and decide how much free speech and free press are worth—when, where, and for whom.

## CONSTITUTIONALISM: A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION\*

GIOVANNI SARTORI  
*University of Florence*

In the 19th century what was meant by the term "constitution" was reasonably definite and clear. Paradoxically enough, if the word retained some ambiguity, this was because of the British constitution; that is, because the mother country of modern constitutionalism appeared to have an obscure constitution, or even—according to some of the standards that seemed very important elsewhere—no constitution at all.

### I

Yet the very term "constitution" has acquired its modern meaning in English, in the course of the evolution of the English legal terminology. The Latin term *constitutio* meant the very opposite of what is now understood by "constitution." A *constitutio* was an enactment; later, after the 2d century, the plural form *constitutiones* came to mean a collection of laws enacted by the Sovereign; and subsequently the Church, too, adopted the term for canonical law. The terms *constitutio* and *constitutiones* were not frequently used, however, by the English medieval glossators (while frequently used, as a synonym for *lex* and *edictum*, by the Italian ones). This explains why, in the course of time, the word constitution became a "vacant term"—i.e., a term available for a new employment—in English (this does not necessarily mean in England), and not in those languages which had retained the Roman legal terminology.

For terminological reasons also, then, we have to refer to an English meaning of the word constitution,<sup>1</sup> although the United Kingdom has a difficult and *sui generis* constitution, deriving from a tortuous sedimentation of common law, acts and conventional usage, partly legal and partly extra-legal, and despite the fact that, when one reads the British constitutional

lawyers, one is often reminded of what was said in a review of Stirling's book, *The Secret of Hegel*: "never has a secret been better kept."

For one thing, English constitutional lawyers appear to take a particular pleasure in pointing out to foreign jurists and political thinkers (beginning with Montesquieu) that their understanding of the English system is quite wrong. To be sure, this has been and still is very often the case. But one remains with a feeling that the British find a special gratification in confounding alien scholars: there is an element of polemic coquetry in the emphasis they lay on the principle of the supremacy of Parliament (exhibited as being unlimited, arbitrary, omnipotent, *supra* and *contra legem*, etc.); in the somewhat provocative and bold statement that, according to the American and French meaning of the term, the United Kingdom does not have a constitution,<sup>2</sup> in the point that the British system is based not on the "division" but on the "fusion" of powers;<sup>3</sup> or in the way in which Sir Ivor Jennings puts forward that, "Since Great Britain has no written constitution, there is no special protection for 'fundamental rights'."<sup>4</sup> And one could quote at length.

All these statements are, to be sure, true. But they are "literally true," and one is brought to wonder why the emphasis is laid on the *letter* so much more than on the *spirit* of the law of the constitution. After all, constitutionalism has a prescriptive purpose; whereas English scholars appear more inclined to address themselves to an MP by saying "you could" rather than "you cannot."

Let us take, for instance, the principle of the supremacy of Parliament. Would it be far from the mark to say that if the principle is related to the historical circumstances of its establishment, it hardly carries with it the dangerous implications that British scholars somewhat proudly expound?<sup>5</sup> Parliament, in the English terminology, means the King, the Lords and

\* A paper presented at the Freudenstadt Round Table meeting of the International Political Science Association, September 1962.

<sup>1</sup> Despite Jellinek's contrary opinion. According to Jellinek, "constitution" derives from the Latin phrase *rem publicam constituere*. Cf. *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin, 1914, 3d ed.), vol. III, ch. iv. However, no historical continuity appears to exist between *constituere* and "constitution" (see *infra* notes 21, 25), and this derivation is bound to give us a misleading start.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., e.g., K. C. Wheare, *Modern Constitutions* (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, ch. ii.

<sup>4</sup> *The Law and the Constitution*, 5th ed. (London, University of London Press, 1959), p. 40.

<sup>5</sup> Bagehot is no exception when he asserts that "a new House of Commons can *despotically* . . . resolve" [my italics]. *Op. cit.*, ch. vii.

the Commons acting together as the supreme governing body of the realm. Thus, if the principle of the supremacy of Parliament is translated into continental terminology, it amounts to what is otherwise called the "sovereignty of the State." Historically speaking, moreover, the principle of the supremacy of Parliament is the counterpart of the principle of the supremacy of the Crown, and what it really meant when it was affirmed was that the King had no power *outside* of Parliament, that his prerogatives could only be exercised according to the formula of the King *in* Parliament. If this be so, would it be very wrong to conclude, despite the contrary opinion of British scholars, that parliamentary sovereignty in England actually contradicts the idea of a "higher law" no more than any flexible constitution does, and that the conventions of the constitution hardly allow a parliamentary majority to pass *any* law whatever?<sup>6</sup> (The point being the "any." Let us remember that the difference between accepted political behavior and wicked Machiavellian politics is rendered by the difference between the sentence, "The end justifies the means," and "The end justifies *any* mean.")

Probably I shall be told that I am wrong. However, as I was trying recently to sort out the juridical features of present-day dictatorial systems, it occurred to me that some English constitutional textbooks would be of great help. "No higher law and limitless legislative power," "fusion of powers," "no special protection for fundamental rights," etc.—all these principles applied very nicely to dictatorships. What is more, the very definition given in Wheare's textbook, "The British constitution is the collection of legal rules and nonlegal rules which govern the government in Britain,"<sup>7</sup> appeared to be—but for the terms, "British" and "Britain"—the most fitted to describe dictatorial constitutions. (For "rules" applies to any kind of rule—including the rule of rulership—and the specification "non-legal rules" just gives the final touch of perfection to the concept of unchecked, uncontrolled and absolute exercise of power.) I have not made the experiment the other way around, that is, using the apologetic writings on dictatorial constitutions in order to get highlights on the virtues of the English one: but my guess is

that, again changing but one word (the geographic referent), the English constitution would come out in brighter colors following this procedure than it appears, *e.g.*, to the reader of Jennings' *The Law and the Constitution*.<sup>8</sup>

So, I may well be wrong. But something must be wrong too in the way in which many English scholars understate their constitution, seem to make a particular point of not being helpful, and leave the alien reader with the feeling that the British constitution really amounts to the fact that, in the final analysis, the British people are clever and fine people who know how to go about in politics. I am personally convinced of this. But allow me to repeat that this conclusion is not very helpful.

I have drawn attention to the British habit (and perhaps coquetry) of understatement, for unless this element is taken into account, one is likely to miss some important points. To begin with, this point: that, despite the English "mystery," in the 19th century, all over Europe as well as in the United States, a general agreement prevailed as to the basic meaning of the term "constitution." In 1830, and especially during the 1848 revolutions, it was very clear on both sides of the Channel what the people were asking for when they claimed a constitution.<sup>9</sup> If, in England, "constitution" meant the system of British liberties, *mutatis mutandis* the Europeans wanted exactly the same thing: a system of protected freedom for the individual, which—according to the American usage of the English vocabulary—they called a "constitutional system." Having to start from naught, people on the Continent (as was first achieved by the Americans) wanted a written document, a charter, which would firmly establish the overall supreme law of the land. The British too, however,

<sup>8</sup> A comparison between Jennings' classic text and Vishinsky's *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, 1951), would be to the point. According to Vishinsky, Stalin's Constitution draws "ever broader masses of the people into the government of the State," constantly strengthens "the bonds between the apparatus of authority and the people"; and Soviet constitutions in general "confirm genuinely democratic rights and freedoms," "establish and emphasize material guarantees," etc. (pp. 88-89).

<sup>9</sup> In 1860, the formula for the Italian plebiscites said only: "Do you want to enter the constitutional monarchy of King Victor Emanuel II?" Evidently, the mere adjective "constitutional" was assumed to be understood as implying all the difference.

<sup>6</sup> This is to deny that there is a substantial difference between the British and the Continental principle of parliamentary sovereignty. If the term of reference is the American Congress then, of course, there is a good deal of difference.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

had, from time to time, relied on particularly solemn written documents: the Magna Charta, the Confirmation Acts, the 1610-1628 Petition of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, etc. The circumstance that these British "supreme laws" are not collected in a single document does not really mean that England has an unwritten constitution. I would rather say that the English do not have a codified constitution, *i.e.*, that Britain has a constitution which is written only in part (or, even better, unwritten to a much greater extent than "written" constitutions are), in a piecemeal fashion, and scattered in a variety of sources.

However that may be, and if it pleases the British to emphasize the fact that they have a constitution which is not written, this question is of secondary importance. I mean that the written, complete document is only a means. What really matters is the end, the *telos*. And the purpose, the *telos*, of English, American and European constitutionalism was, from the outset, identical. If the English vocabulary had not to this day refused to import the word (another paradox!), this common purpose could be expressed and synthesized by just one word: the French (and Italian) term *garantisme*.<sup>10</sup> In other terms, all over the Western area people requested, or cherished, "the constitution," because this term meant to them a fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a "limited government." And during the whole of the 19th century and until World War I, "constitutions" remained, in the United States, in England, and in Europe, different means (technically speaking) which had nevertheless the same common purpose in view. That is, for almost 150 years "constitution" has been—on the whole—an unambiguous term.

## II

In the 20th century, in the few decades following the first World War, this situation of over-all basic agreement has come to an end rapidly and radically. So rapidly and so rad-

<sup>10</sup> Of course the query, "What do the guarantees include?" (*e.g.*, a certain technique of allocation of power, a bill of rights, the rule of law, judicial review, etc.) receives different, complex and changing answers. This is all the more reason for adopting a general term, reminding us both of the goal, and particularly of the fact that unless we think that *somebody needs protection against somebody else*, there is no point in being concerned with constitutionalism.

ically that one must wonder why. The main reason (or, we might say, the specific agent of change) has been, I believe, the following: that legal terminology—to the extent that it affects what Rousseau would have called *droit politique*, political right—shares the same destiny as political terminology in general: that is, it tends to be abused and corrupted. And this is all the more the case in a time in which politicians have become ever more conscious of the "power of words."

In our minds, constitution is a "good word." It has favorable emotive properties, like freedom, justice or democracy. Therefore, the word is retained, or adopted, even when the association between the utterance "constitution" and the behavioral response that it elicits (*e.g.*, "The constitution must be praised, for it protects my liberties") becomes entirely baseless. More precisely, the political exploitation and manipulation of language takes advantage of the fact that the emotive properties of a word survive—at times for a surprisingly long time—despite the fact that what the word denotes, *i.e.*, the "thing," comes to be a completely different thing.<sup>11</sup>

To be sure, the agent of change has not only been insincerity and the political debasement of language. For technical reasons of their own, jurists too have been gradually covering up the *garantiste* feature of "constitution." This technicojuridical explanation cannot be pushed too far, however. It is quite true that Continental constitutional lawyers have never been at ease when confronted with the problem of putting forward the "strictly juridical" point of view. On the other hand, the fact remains that, more or less until the 1920's, they managed to combine the requirements of "pure law" with the *telos* of constitutionalism. If one reads, for instance, the *Leçons* of a representative figure of the pre-1848 period, Pellegrino Rossi,<sup>12</sup> one

<sup>11</sup> The extent to which political terminology is subject to this kind of abuse can be exemplified by the very term "politics." In the Middle Ages the expression *dominium politicum* meant (in contrast to *dominium regale*) government deriving from, or given consent by, the people (*i.e.*, by the *polites*, the inhabitant of the *polis*). That is to say that *politicum*, or *police* (in French), was coined—having reference to the Greek root—as a good word. Nowadays this originally pleasant word denotes the most unpleasant reality of politics: those who are entitled to arrest us. Let us hope that "constitution" may not have a similar destiny.

<sup>12</sup> Pellegrino Rossi (1787-1848) was professor of law in Bologna in 1814, the framer of the

finds both the statement that "every State has a constitution" (*ex hypothesis*), and the statement that "a constitution is the law of the free countries." Let us face it: the two statements are not consistent. Nevertheless they introduce and represent an approach which received wide acceptance in the European juridical literature for almost a century. It is interesting to realize, therefore, why the Continental constitutional lawyers took this approach, and how they found a way of giving consistency to an inconsistency.

Descriptively speaking, and having reference, e.g., to the terminology of the Constitution of Pennsylvania of September 28, 1776, a constitution contains two basic elements: a "plan (or frame) of government," and a "bill of rights." For the framers of the 18th century charters it was self-evident that the two component parts could not be separated: both were needed for a constitution to be a constitution. They did not mean in the least that *any* plan of government amounted to a constitution: they meant that this was the case only when a frame of government provided for a bill of rights and the institutional devices that would secure its observance. Continental jurists, however, were anxious to put their rationalistically trained juridical consciences at ease by finding a "universal" definition of constitution. And for this purpose they found it expedient to separate the universal trait (the "plan of government" meaning) from the *garantiste* component. Therefore, often enough, they did come to say—*qua* pure jurists—that any "frame of government" amounted to a constitution. They said it, but—let me stress this point—they immediately denied it. For they went on to say that "it had become customary"<sup>13</sup> to use the term constitution in a more specific *garantiste* sense; and therefore that, according to this practice, it was improper to hold that every state was a constitutional state. *Every* state had a "constitution," but only *some* states were "constitutional."

Unquestionably, the distinction is very thin; and moreover it is hard to explain why the phrase, "It has become customary," should have been accepted by jurists as a juridical argument. The interesting fact is therefore that they did accept it. And they accepted it—among other reasons—because they fully realized that their "universal" definition had no

denotative value: it indicated *everything*, not *something*. Thus, generation after generation, European public law went ahead riding simultaneously two horses: the constitution as any "State order," and constitutionalism as a specific "content" of guarantees.

It was an uneasy equilibrium, I grant. It made them vulnerable, exposed. But one can have an Achilles heel and nevertheless survive. So, despite this weakness, I believe my former assertions still hold good, namely: (i) that for almost 150 years "constitution" has been associated with *garantisme*; and (ii) that the primary agent of change cannot be located in the inner logic of development of the European juristic tradition. Continental constitutional lawyers were hardly in a position to resist change; but they did not start the change. What started the new trend was the impact of the political atmosphere of the 1920's. For a new look about politics was taking shape in those years. "Feeble politics," so to speak, was giving way to "intense politics"; that is, the peaceful-legalitarian approach to political relationships was giving way to a warlike view of politics.

I have said "political atmosphere." It is fair to add that in some countries it was not only a question of atmosphere. In Italy, and in the 1930's in Germany, jurists were somehow compelled to adopt a merely formal, "organizational," neutral definition of constitution. This is not surprising, and Italian and German constitutional lawyers can hardly be blamed for this. What is surprising is that in the meantime the British, too, had come to adopt very much the same position.

Let me refer again to Wheare's definition, according to which the English constitution is "the collection of legal rules and non-legal rules which govern the government in Britain." Or allow me to quote, as another instance, Jennings' definition, according to which a constitution is "the document in which are set out the rules governing the composition, powers and methods of operation of the main institutions of government."<sup>14</sup> The peculiar feature of these definitions is not only the unspecified use of the term rule (even games have "rules": are they the same kind of rules?), but the silence which covers the *telos* of constitutionalism. Actually they are purely "formal" definitions, in the sense that they can be filled with any content whatever. We are thus faced,

1832 project of reform of the Swiss constitution, and subsequently a celebrated professor of constitutional law at the *Collège de France* in Paris.

<sup>13</sup> The wording varies, but this was, in substance, the invariable gist of their argument.

<sup>14</sup> Or, where no such document exists, simply "the rules determining the creation and operation of governmental institutions." *The Law and the Constitution*, pp. 33, 36.

nowadays, with this puzzling situation: that the very inventors of the constitutional solution provide us with a definition which amounts to saying that any instrument of government, any "traffic rule," is a constitution. And this according to the most authoritative yardstick. It is not astonishing, therefore, if the Continental theory of constitutionalism has shown, since World War II, very little evidence of recovery. For whenever somebody claims that "constitutional dictatorships" have proved that *garantisme* remains the core of constitutionalism, one is likely to be confronted with this reply: why should we be concerned with this problem more than the English?

My reply is—and this is the second point that I wish to stress, having reference to the English habit of understatement—that one must be very careful about importing the British constitutional textbooks. They have not been written for export. They have been written for a happy people whose constitutional system is liable to work nicely anyhow. If the alien scholar does not make explicit what often remains implicit, and does not say what is often left unsaid, the British case easily lends itself to bearing false witness.<sup>15</sup> Of course, English liberties remain protected even if English constitutionalists forget to mention that this is why Britain has a constitution. But the case might be very different elsewhere.

### III

The foregoing *mise au point* has a bearing on what will follow, but it certainly does not alter the fact that nowadays "constitution" has become an ambiguous term, covering two very different meanings: a strict, substantive meaning (the *garantiste* meaning), and a formal, cosmic meaning. It follows from this that whereas in the 19th century a question such as, "What is the role of a constitution in a political system?", could be answered without asking first, "What is a constitution?", this is no longer the case.

It is equally clear—at least to me—that if a constitution is defined as "any way of giving form to any State whatever," then the question

"What is the role of a constitution in a political system?" either cannot be answered, or can be answered only country by country, and even then in a very uninteresting and banal way. For in this case the answer is that the constitution plays no role, properly speaking: It is only a shorthand report which may describe—assuming that the constitution in question is applied—the formalization of the power structure of the given country. (This is not to deny that the conclusion, "The constitution plays no role," may not be reached also after applying the standards of the *garantiste* type of constitution. I am simply pointing out that the query is relevant only if we consider the constitutions which are supposed to play a role.)

On both accounts, then, we have to make up our minds and to look for a convincing answer to the question, "What is a constitution?"

In the first place, we may say: "This is what I understand when I use this term." This kind of answer, however, leaves untouched a very basic point, namely: What is the truth-value of this definition? Is it only a "stipulative definition"?

Therefore, and in the second place, we may also find it necessary to say: "The term constitution *ought* to be used in this way."

In the third place, we may have recourse to a classification. We may say: given the fact that we are now using the term constitution in very different meanings and to cover altogether different referents, then let us speak specifically of this and that type of constitution.

These three lines of approach are not mutually exclusive. The contrary is true. But in most cases political scientists either follow solution number one, or solution number three, or both. At any rate, they usually bypass step number two, that is, they usually refrain from saying that the term constitution *ought* to mean this and not that. I wonder, however, whether the "ought" can really be avoided.

When general agreement prevails—as was the case with "constitution" in the 19th century—"ought-propositions" (if I may call them so) are superfluous. In this case one need not discuss whether a definition of "constitution" is merely a private convention of the stipulator (*i.e.*, a stipulative definition), or a lexical kind of definition,<sup>16</sup> or something more, *i.e.*, a definition having warranted truth-value. Agreement automatically settles all these problems. But we live in a world—let me stress—

<sup>15</sup> Or else to bear no witness. Thus in F. A. Hayek's *The Constitution of Liberty* (London, Routledge, 1960), the 12th chapter bears the title: "The American Contribution: Constitutionalism." To be sure, Americans have made an outstanding contribution to constitutionalism. But to say more than this is saying too much, even though Hayek's conclusion is hardly surprising if one is not cautioned against the British mood of understatement.

<sup>16</sup> See R. Robinson, *Definition* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 35–92. For an application of these criteria, see M. Cranston, *Freedom—A New Analysis* (London, 1953).

of terminological cleavage in which the "war of words" plays a very important role. Our first reaction has therefore been to make some fine distinctions (e.g., the one between stipulative and lexicographic definitions), and to have recourse to a classification of the various meanings and referents of the word constitution.

On second thought, however, one is bound to discover that the stipulative approach is only a fire escape (and an unsafe one at that) which actually helps the fire to grow, and that classifications cannot, *per se*, solve our problems either. Classifications are only *prima facie* a neutral device. Classifications have a purpose in view, and differ according to their purpose. Therefore, classifications cannot replace definitions. They follow a definition of constitution, and imply that we have previously taken a stand *vis-à-vis* its nuclear meaning, so to speak. And this stand cannot be provided by the stipulative approach.

According to this approach, the speaker says: I propose to use the term constitution in this sense, and this is *my* definition of it. The emphasis is laid on the "my," for stipulations are an arbitrary choice. As Richard Robinson asserts in his valuable book "In stipulation we freely make any word mean anything we choose."<sup>17</sup> This is hardly a way out, however. Let us assume, for instance, that one meets with the following definition: a constitution is the will of the sovereign. In some cases one could hardly object that this definition is factually false. According both to the *Führerprinzip* and to actual practice, it would be quite realistic to say that during Hitler's decade the German constitution amounted to the will of the *Führer*. And Stalin's constitution can well be resumed in similar terms. As these extreme but very relevant examples go to show, if one wishes to retort that Hitler's or Stalin's regime was not a constitutional regime, this cannot be done on the ground that the sentence, "The Soviet constitution was the arbitrary will of Stalin," is factually false, but on the ground that one does not accept the meaning "will of the sovereign" as a permissible meaning of constitution: *i.e.*, because one refuses the definition.

Yet, if definitions are just arbitrary and private stipulations of each speaker, on what grounds may one discuss the definitions of constitution which differ from his own stipulation? Clearly, one can write a book of 500 pages to show that Hitler's or Stalin's so-called constitution amounted to a non-constitutional

system; anybody can simply dismiss it by saying: This is your stipulation, but I have mine, and that is that. How easy, and how convenient!

I cannot develop here the criticism of the conventional approach.<sup>18</sup> In my view definitions are not private conventions of each speaker, but (whenever they have a historical referent) storehouses of past experience shaped by former practice. We bring them up to date, but their ultimate truth-value lies in the fact that they tell us how to behave *as experienced people* in matters regarding which each generation starts by having no experience. And this is precisely the reason why we are not condemned to a solipsistic conventionalism, and why we are entitled to discuss and to look for a "true definition" (touching on a basic meaning, of course) of equality, of liberty, of law, of constitution, etc. In particular, the definition of constitution which has objective worth is the one that appears to be the outcome of a long and painstaking process of trial-and-error concerned with the question: How can we be governed without being oppressed?

Implicitly I have already indicated why I attach a great importance to whether the sentence "This is the meaning of the term constitution" has a normative undertone or not. For if the speaker takes the view that his definition cannot be phrased as a normative proposition—*i.e.*, in the form, "This is also what 'constitution' ought to mean"—then, no matter how unwittingly, he is surrendering to the stipulative and conventionalistic approach.

To be sure, one may not be concerned with long-range consequences of this kind. Nevertheless, we must decide here and now the test, or the criteria, according to which we declare: This is the meaning given in this text to the word constitution. Now, are we going to ascertain what "constitution" means in the 20th century by asking the Russians, the Chinese, the Egyptians, and so forth, or by inquiring what the Italians and the Germans were taught to believe a constitutional system to be under Mussolini and Hitler? If so, then I grant that there is no "ought" about it. But otherwise (that is, if we do not believe that knowledge follows a majority principle), then the "ought" is inevitably there—no matter whether openly or not—for surely we are not speaking of what "constitution" actually means to all the people of the world in the 20th century, but of a correct meaning which we find advis-

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>18</sup> For my views on the truth-value of definitions, see G. Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, Wayne Univ. Press, 1962), ch. 10.



able to propose for future observance.

I am acquainted with the sophisticated methodological reasons that are being brought forward to explain why the form "ought" should be expelled from the realm of science, and in particular of political science. Yet, my guess is that future historians will find a much simpler explanation for our "ought complexes." They will say that we have been unable to meet the challenge of the environment; and rightly so, I believe. For since the beginning of time the people entrusted with the development of learning have followed this very simple rule: to use the form "is" when they agreed with general usage, and the form "ought" when they did not. Yet now we refrain from saying "This is what the term constitution *ought* to mean," even though we are well aware of the fact that "constitution" no longer bears a common acceptance and even though we are in a good position to realize that a situation of ambiguity and confusion is being deliberately fostered by political double-talk and insincerity, with the precise purpose of deceiving the audience.

Let there be no misunderstanding. I am not advocating a behavioral "ought," but a terminological and logical "ought."<sup>19</sup> The meaning of "constitution" is neither an arbitrary stipulation, nor something to be discovered in the "popular mind" of semi-literate majorities. At least, if we believe that rational discourse and an intelligible vocabulary are to be maintained, then the meaning of "constitution" has been decided by historical testing, and has to be ascertained by adequate information and sound thinking. And if these criteria bring us to a definition which no longer receives common acceptance, then it is not only right but necessary to say: This is what the term constitution *ought* to mean (for otherwise it is meaningless, or superfluous, or deceiving, or whatever). This does not imply that people are being requested to respond favorably to a certain pattern of constitution defined as the "true constitution." I am only saying that terminological clarity is a basic requirement for any science, and that political scientists in particular have to take stock of the fact that the vocabulary of politics tends to be used for the purpose of beguiling the listener. I am not advocating, therefore, the preferability of one type of constitutional *telos* in relation to another. I am simply saying that it is a scientific requirement to discuss whether it is proper to use "constitution" where, in order

that the public (and even, at times, the expert) be not deceived, we should *not* use this term.

#### IV

The objection will be that even if we reject the stipulative approach, even then "constitution" is, by its own constitution, an ambiguous term.<sup>20</sup> That is, even if one agrees that constitutions have been shaped by historical experience in order to protect the freedom and the rights of the power addressees, the fact nonetheless remains that constitution has always been a Janus-faced concept, hovering as it were between the idea of "political order" on the one hand and of "limit" on the other. I would however disagree with this statement.

The history of the word in its modern meaning only begins in the 18th century.<sup>21</sup> Let us not confuse the noun with the concept, or, we might say, the Latin *constitutio* with our "constitution," a homonymy with a homology. In its present-day conceptualization, "constitution" only emerges, perhaps, with Bolingbroke,<sup>22</sup> and the term really gained ground and acquired a definite connotation only in America during the years 1776-1787. (The French did not receive it directly from England, but from the Philadelphia Convention. This is not surprising for it was Paine, not Burke and the English writers in general, who gave the first explicit, complete account of the modern concept.<sup>23</sup>)

<sup>20</sup> I am no longer referring to the strictly juridical approach mentioned previously, but to the overall issue of constitutionalism as discussed in the history of political thought and in philosophy of law.

<sup>21</sup> Cicero's use, in *De Republica*, I, 45, 69, was quite casual, and left no trace in the following literature. Actually, this much-quoted Roman precedent cannot claim precedent status. This is so true that the 15th and 16th century commentators rendered Cicero's *constitutio* with the terms *status publicus* (Jean de Terre Rouge), *status Reipublicae* (Bodin), or *politicum* (Fortescue), *police* (Seyssell).

<sup>22</sup> I say "perhaps" on account of McIlwain's reservation: "Bolingbroke in fact is only restating views as old as the *Politicus* of Plato. . . ." *Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> On Paine see esp. C. H. McIlwain, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10. In Burke "constitution" was used much more loosely as a synonym for "commonwealth" (*Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents*), for "engagement and pact of society" (*Reflections*), for "frame" and "pattern" (*Speech on Reform*); all in all, it meant the substantive principles deriving from the British political tradition

<sup>19</sup> The form "ought" is not necessarily related to ethical imperatives.

Now, it is undeniable that the whole of the American tradition has understood "constitution" as a means for "limited government." The same is true, from the outset, for French constitutionalism (should one be reminded of article 16 of the Declaration of Rights of 1789? Or, for the following period, of Benjamin Constant?). And I have previously explained at length why I firmly hold—despite the possibility of exhibiting numberless quotations to the contrary effect—that English constitutionalism belongs entirely to the same tradition: the British advocate, and have advocated from the time of Glanville and Bracton, an "unlimited government" just as much, or, rather, just as little as the Americans.<sup>24</sup>

It is not unsafe to conclude, therefore, that, with the decline of the age of Absolutism, people began to cast about for a word which would denote the techniques to be used for controlling the exercise of State power. This term turned out to be (Americans decided this issue) "constitution."<sup>25</sup> And "constitution" was in no way born as a Janus-faced concept. The term was re-conceived, adopted and cherished not because it merely meant "political order," but because it meant much more, because it meant "political freedom." We may put it thus: because it denoted the distinctive political order which would protect their liberties; or—to paraphrase Friedrich's felicitous wording—because it not only "gave form" but also because it "limited" governmental action.<sup>26</sup>

and to be inferred from the working of the institutions.

<sup>24</sup> Cf., e.g., Burke: "In [our] Constitution . . . I feel both that I am free, and that I am not free dangerously to myself and to others. I know that no power on earth, acting as I ought to do, can touch my life, my liberty, my own property" (*Speech on Reform of Representation*.) Let it be noted that, according to the letter of the constitution, in 1782 the doctrine of the omnipotence of Parliament was already established. Was Burke wrong, then? Or should we not question, instead, the validity—for a constitution largely based on conventions—of the "literal" approach?

<sup>25</sup> In this connection, recall that in the years of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate (1649–1660) the English made several attempts to establish a written constitution. However, they never called these documents "constitution": they made recourse to terms such as covenant, instrument, agreement, model, paramount or fundamental law.

<sup>26</sup> Carl J. Friedrich, *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective* (University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 220.

The idea that this specific, *garantiste*, meaning derives from a pre-existing wide, unspecified meaning, is an optical illusion, which has been suggested—I believe—by the commentators and translators of Aristotle. As is well known, Aristotle's term was *politeia*, and, surely, *politeia* is difficult to translate. So occasionally, the authors having Plato's and especially Aristotle's writings in mind, found it expedient to render it by the term constitution. This, however, happened only occasionally (the relevant example is Montesquieu)<sup>27</sup> until the time when "constitution" acquired a specific meaning. It was only at this stage that "constitution" came to be used consistently as the proper equivalent of *politeia*. Wrongly, to be sure. For *politeia* only conveys the idea of the way in which a polity is patterned. And if Aristotle meant by *politeia* the ethico-political system as a whole, we cannot infer from this that "constitution" has in Aristotle a loose meaning. The only correct conclusion is that Aristotle has been mistranslated. For to us "constitution" means—a frame of political society, *organized through and by the law*, for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power. And surely nothing resembling this concept was in the mind of Aristotle.<sup>28</sup>

## V

Having established the frame of reference (the historically valid "nuclear meaning" of constitution), we may now turn to the problem of how we should go about classifying the variety of present-day so-called constitutions. I shall deal swiftly with this problem, for I

<sup>27</sup> In the famous ch. 6, Book XI of the *Esprit des Lois* the term *constitution* appears only in the title.

<sup>28</sup> I grant that there are a few passages in Aristotle's *Politics* in which the term *politeia* specifically refers to the way in which the *polis* magistracies are ordained. Cf., e.g., 1278 b. However, this meaning appears in passing, and it cannot be denied, I believe, that (i) the ethico-political all-embracing meaning of *politeia* is by far the prevalent one, and, on the other hand, (ii) the term never appears in Aristotle in our juridical meaning, that is, in the sense of being an institutionalized way of controlling the dynamics of political freedom. Actually, I find it quite absurd to speak of a Greek "constitutionalism." Only the Romans indirectly tackled the problem, and only from the "rule of law" angle (as Jhering and Bryce have remarked), that is, very much in the same way in which—according to Dicey—the principles of the English constitution are inductions and generalizations resulting from judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons.

agree very much (in substance, even though not in terminology) with the threefold classification suggested by Loewenstein.<sup>29</sup>

Basically we are confronted with three possibilities: (i) *garantiste* constitution (constitution, proper); (ii) nominal constitution; (iii) façade constitution (or fake constitution).

I call "nominal" the constitutions that Loewenstein labels "semantic" (a difficult, and perhaps not quite appropriate labelling). Apart from this semantic divergency, I entirely underwrite his description of the specimen: "The constitution is fully applied and activated, but its ontological reality is nothing but the formalization of the existing location of political power for the exclusive benefit of the actual power holders" (p. 149). Nominal constitutions are therefore "nominal" in the very simple sense that they bear the "name" constitution. This amounts to saying that nominal constitutions are merely organizational constitutions, i.e., the collection of rules which organize but do not restrain the exercise of political power in a given polity.<sup>30</sup> Actually, nominal constitutions do not really pretend to be "real constitutions." They frankly describe a system of limitless, unchecked power. They are not a dead letter. It is only that this letter is irrelevant to the *telos* of constitutionalism.

The façade constitutions are different from the nominal ones in that they take the appearance of "true constitutions." What makes them untrue is that they are disregarded (at least in their essential *garantiste* features). Actually they are "trap-constitutions." As far as the techniques of liberty and the rights of the power addressees are concerned, they are a dead letter.

I suppose that the labeling "façade constitution" will be criticized on the ground that it implicitly rules out the possibility of an educational purpose. But I do not think that a fake constitution has an educational *purpose*. It may turn out that it has an educational *effect*. But this is a very different matter. We are not historians dealing with past events and looking for their *a posteriori* justification. We are concerned with actual will and actual doings. And to credit with an "educational role" the in-

stances that make forecasts all the more dubious (as in the case when we are confronted with discretionary power) is very much like toying with wishful thinking. Moreover, and in point of principle, education is not the purpose of constitutions. I mean, this is not a sufficient (or sufficiently pertinent) criterion for singling out a special class of "educational constitutions."<sup>31</sup> A constitution may contain, to be sure, statements of "aspiration," and thereby provide "incentives," even pedagogic incentives. However, this occurrence does not indicate an essential constitutional feature; it merely indicates a possible content of any type of constitution.

There is often a considerable overlapping between nominal and façade constitutions. The distinction is nevertheless basic, for the two cases are indeed very different. Nominal constitutions actually describe the working of the political system (they do not abide by the *telos* of constitutionalism, but they are sincere reports), while the façade constitutions give us no reliable information about the real governmental process. In most cases one can clearly perceive, despite the overlaps, which is the prevalent aspect: I mean, whether a constitution is basically nominal or basically a disguise. At any rate, or otherwise, the distinction is serviceable for analytical purposes, that is, for dissecting the component parts of a "mixed type" (partly nominal and partly fake) of pseudo-constitution.

The distinction is serviceable from another point of view as well, for it goes to show that if we refuse the *garantiste* qualification, then no line can be drawn between "constitution" and "constitutional government." To be sure, if a constitution is not applied, this is an instance of constitution without constitutional government. But this argument applies only to the façade constitutions. What about the other possibility? In the case of nominal constitutions we no longer have a "prerogative state" that replaces *de facto* the "legal state"; we have instead a prerogative state legitimized by the constitution. In this latter case, then, we are confronted with a government which, by definition, will always govern according to the constitution. On what grounds may we maintain that this is not a "constitutional government"? Certainly not on the grounds of logical syntax. Therefore, either we adhere to *garantisme*, or the distinction between constitution and constitutional government really becomes meaningless.

<sup>31</sup> Car accidents may serve the purpose of improving our driving. Would this be a reason for creating the category "educational accidents"?

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Karl Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (University of Chicago Press, 1957), esp. pp. 147 ff.

<sup>30</sup> It is often held that the mere ordering, the mere existence of a definite and stable "form," is in itself a "limit." This may well be—but not a *garantiste* kind of limit. Armies are usually well ordered, but this fact does not necessarily protect subordinates *vis-à-vis* their superiors.

Some troublesome problems arise when one focusses further attention on: (i) the *décalage* between the written and the living constitution, and on (ii) the frequent disregard of some of the constitutional provisions. In this connection the point can be made that a clear-cut distinction between real constitutions and façade constitutions is hardly realistic, since the real ones too come to differ widely, in practice, from their original formalization, or may not be fully activated (the former being usually the case with old constitutions, and the latter with recent ones).

Personally I am not dismayed by the first indictment. If a constitution is written, then, with the passing of time, the formal document and the living constitution inevitably come to be related much as the past is related to the present. (In this sense, then, written constitutions too become, in part, non-written.) However, as long as the spirit and the *telos* of the original document are maintained in the new circumstances, the *décalage* only affects the myth of a "fixed constitution"; and the American experience goes to show, if anything, that written constitutions can endure despite the anti-historical assumption upon which they have been conceived.

On the other hand, the remedy for this could hardly be found in a non-written constitution. The drawbacks and the dangers of this solution are so serious, that only the British can afford the luxury of not formalizing their constitution. And it remains questionable whether it is really true that the British constitution is unwritten. (I would be tempted to say that it is "written differently.")

The thorny point is instead the non-fulfillment of constitutional provisions not because of the time factor, because they have gradually become outdated, but with reference to norms that have never been activated owing to the unwillingness of the executive or of the legislative body to give them life. This problem cannot be dismissed lightly, if we consider that "delinquencies in the application" of the constitution (as Loewenstein calls them) are rather frequent in most countries. It is safe to ask: "Why?". Is it because the constitutional spirit (as well as the corresponding type of the constitutional gentleman) is withering away? Or is it because of other reasons?

It is well to remind ourselves that most countries have a recent constitution, either because they have re-written their previous charters, or because they have started anew. And contemporary constitutions are, as a rule, bad constitu-

tions—technically speaking.<sup>32</sup> They have come to include unrealistic promises and glamorous professions of faith on the one hand, and numberless frivolous details on the other. Some of them are by now so "democratic" that either they are no longer constitutions (for a constitution limits the "will of the people" concept of democracy just as much as it limits the will of the power holders),<sup>33</sup> or they make the working of the machinery of government too cumbersome for government to work, or both. Under these conditions, non-application may well be a remedy for inapplicability. I mean by this that it may also serve the purpose of saving the constitutional system as a working system.

So we should not react dramatically in all cases, but only in those in which the disregard actually has a direct bearing on the withering away of the constitutional *telos*. This implies that we can no longer partake, in all instances, of the strict juristic view that "all the Constitution *must* be applied at whatever cost." Personally speaking at least, I take the view that we should always ascertain whether the non-application affects the machinery of government in its *garantiste* aspect and the basic purposes of constitutionalism, or not. In the former case it is proper to speak of "delinquencies"; in the latter I confess that I remain quite indifferent. And if we follow this rule of thumb the difference between "real constitutions" and "façade constitutions" remains very firm despite the fact that even in the context of the real constitutions a number of provisions may not be activated.

## VI

Summing up my line of argument, I have tentatively submitted the following theses:

(1) That the word constitution has been re-conceptualized, if I may say so, for a specific purpose, and more precisely to denote a distinctive and unprecedented "technique of liberty" (as Mirkine-Guetzévitch would have said), the

<sup>32</sup> Contemporary constitutions are being said to improve on the former ones in that they are no longer "negative" but "positive." If positive means that they are also an instrument for social and economic policy then let us be happy with this positive development. Under one condition however: that the follow-up, *i.e.*, the "economic tail, should not eat the "political" head.

<sup>33</sup> Among other reasons, because a constitution cannot effectively limit the will of the power holders if they can outflank constitutional impediments by making direct appeals to the will of the people.

features of which had already materialized clearly enough when, for instance, Montesquieu was visiting England in 1730.

(2) That this purpose has often been obscured by the complexity of the original model (the English constitution) on the one hand, and by a somewhat polemic isolationism of the British scholars on the other hand. Despite these unfortunate circumstances, however, the fact remains that the idea of limit is basic to the English prototype just as much as to the American and the French subsequent models.

(3) That the view that the *garantiste* meaning of "constitution" was preceded by a loose, formal meaning lacks historical proof, for this view actually goes back to a mistranslation, or to a casual way of referring to Aristotle's term *politeia*.

(4) That the equivalence "constitution = any state form" is therefore not the older but indeed a recent loosening up of the concept, reflecting either the juridic illusion of attaining a "purified," universal depoliticized right, or reflecting the purpose of exploiting the word constitution as a trap word.

(5) That on both accounts it should be pointed out that either the term is used in its specific *garantiste* meaning, or it is a meaningless (and deceiving) duplicate of terms such as organization, structure, form, pattern, political system, and the like.

(6) That, according to this view, the variety of so-called "constitutions" of our time may be classified in three categories: real, nominal and facade.

(7) That the existence of nominal constitutions implies that either we abide by *garantisme*, or we can no longer draw a line between "constitution" and "constitutional government."

(8) That the political scientist, in particular, is responsible for ruling out insincere language, for two reasons: the general reason being that the language of the observer is required to improve (whenever necessary) the language of the observed; while the specific reason is that terminological housecleaning is all the more necessary whenever the political scientist is confronted with terminological distortions that are deliberately fostered with a view to deceiving the audience.

Speaking of political scientists, a final question should perhaps be raised, namely: why should we, *qua* political scientists, be concerned with the constitutional problem?

Actually, constitutionalism is not a traditional subject matter of political science. To the

extent that political scientists have been concerned with it, they have either leaned on a previous legal training of the individual scholar, or they have shown a tendency to underplay the role and importance of constitutional checks as compared with social and political pluralistic checks.<sup>34</sup> In the first case it could be said that their treatment of the topic constitutionalism belongs to the "old" political science. In the second case it can be shown, I believe, that the "new" political science is hardly equipped to discuss the problem at all. For one thing, political science is keen about informal processes, not about formal structures. In particular, the new generation of political scientists distrusts concepts having a high degree of abstraction (such as State), concentrates very much on elementary grass roots units (such as groups), and has developed a keen feeling for dynamics, for change, for "something doing," to use Bentley's telling expression. Now, clearly, from this platform constitutions appear to be: (i) the juridical counterpart and support of the abstract entity, "the State"; (ii) certainly not the "raw material" of politics; and (iii) the expression *par excellence* of a typically static view of the political process. (The foregoing are, of course, very broad and very rough generalizations.)

If these underlying premises are duly weighed, the present-day mood of skepticism toward the efficacy of constitutional devices and mechanisms was only to be expected. However, where is the error? In the purview of the observer, or in the constitutional solution? All in all, my feeling is that contemporary political science has not found, as yet, the strategic juncture in which and from which it can make a positive contribution to the understanding of constitutionalism. My own tentative suggestion is that, perhaps, this strategic point is to be found in the "role theory" approach,<sup>35</sup> that is, by examining the constitutional solution as a pre-

<sup>34</sup> This is not to deny that pluralism is a requisite condition for the proper working of constitutional systems. My own view, however, is that the relationship between societal pluralism and constitutional patterns of behavior is a two-way relationship, at least in the sense that it is very important, for pluralism, to have the constitution on its side.

<sup>35</sup> I have in mind, *e.g.*, the approach devised by Heinz Eulau and associates in a related subject. Cf. Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, *The Legislative System—Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York, 1962).

ordained, binding technique of *role-enforcement* (in its difference from a spontaneous role-taking.)

Within the limits of a preliminary perusal, I cannot push the argument further. I leave it as an open suggestion for discussion that the query, "What is the role of a constitution in the political system?" could perhaps be fruitfully approached from the following angle: what is the impact, or the role, of a constitution *vis-à-vis* the role-taking of the power holders? That is, does it help to enforce, and if so to what extent, a desired "role performance" upon the persons in office?

Whatever the merit of this suggestion, I do feel that political scientists should go back with a fresh look to the vital issues that con-

stitutional lawyers have been neglecting. For the experience of the last 30-40 years has shown, particularly in Italy and in Germany, that when a political problem—and constitutionalism is, inescapably, a juridical solution of a political problem—is depoliticized, the real consequences of taking the juridical "neutral" attitude are (no matter how unwittingly) political. I mean that when the time of trial comes, one discovers that what the "pure" jurists have really been doing—under the shield of their juridical indifference to meta-juridical matters—was to pave the way for allowing unscrupulous politicians to make a discretionary use of power under the camouflage of a good word. Politics cannot be taken out of politics, so to speak.

## THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

H. L. NIEBURG

*Case Institute of Technology*

The threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence—which gives the threat credibility—are essential elements in peaceful social change not only in international, but also in national communities.<sup>1</sup> Individuals and groups, no less than nations, exploit the threat as an everyday matter. This induces flexibility and stability in democratic institutions.

I refer not only to the police power of the state and the recognized right of self-defense, but also to private individual or group violence, whether purposive or futile, deliberate or desperate. Violence and the threat of violence, far from being meaningful only in international politics, are underlying, tacit, recognized, and omnipresent facts of domestic life, in the shadow of which democratic politics are carried on. They instill dynamism into the structure and growth of the law, the settlement of disputes, the processes of accommodating interests, and they induce general respect for the verdict of the polls.

An effort by the state to obtain an absolute monopoly over violence, threatened or used in behalf of private interests, leads inexorably—as in a prison—to complete totalitarian repression of all activities and associations which may, however remotely, create a basis of anti-state action. A democratic system preserves the right of organized action by private groups, risking their implicit capability of violence. By intervening at the earliest possible point in private activities, the totalitarian state increases the likelihood that potential violence will have to be demonstrated before it is socially effective. On the other hand, by permitting a pluralistic basis for action, the democratic state permits potential violence to have a social effect with only a token demonstration, thus assuring greater opportunities for peaceful political and social change. A democratic system has greater viability and stability; it is not forced, like the totalitarian, to create an infinite deterrent to all non-state (and thus potentially anti-state) activities. The early Jeffersonians recognized this essential element of social change when they guaranteed the private right to keep and bear arms, in the Second Amendment. The

<sup>1</sup> "Violence" is defined as direct or indirect action applied to restrain, injure, or destroy persons or property.

possibility of a violent revolution once each generation is a powerful solvent of political rigidity, making such revolutions unnecessary.

The argument of this essay is that the risk of violence is necessary and useful in preserving national societies.<sup>2</sup> This specifically includes sporadic, uncontrolled, "irrational" violence in all its forms. It is true that domestic violence, no less than international violence, may become a self-generating vortex which destroys all values, inducing anarchy and chaos. Efforts to prevent this by extreme measures, however, only succeed in making totalitarian societies that are more liable to such collapses. Democracies assume the risk of such catastrophes, and thereby make them less likely.

Violence has two inextricable aspects: its actual use (political demonstrations, self-immolation, suicide, crimes of passion, property, or politics, etc.), and its potential (threatened) use. The actual outbreak or demonstration of violence must occur from time to time in order to give plausibility to its threatened outbreak, and thereby to gain efficacy for the threat as an instrument of social and political change. The two aspects, demonstration and threat, therefore cannot be separated. If the capability of actual demonstration is not present, the threat will have little effect in inducing a willingness to bargain politically. In fact, such a threat may instead provoke "pre-emptive" counter-violence.

The "rational" goal of the threat of violence is an accommodation of interests, not the provocation of actual violence. Similarly, the "rational" goal of actual violence is demonstration of the will and capability of action, establishing a measure of the credibility of future threats,

<sup>2</sup> The role of violence in political organizations is vividly demonstrated by a recent event among a group of elk at the Bronx Zoo. A 4-year old bull elk, Teddy, had his magnificent antlers sawed off to one-inch stumps. He had reigned as undisputed boss of a herd of six cow elk and one younger bull. But the breeding season was on, and he was becoming "a bit of a martinet." With his antlers off, he gets a new perspective on his authority and becomes a tolerable leader. A younger bull may try to take over as paramount leader of the herd, but if he does, the veterinarian will saw off his antlers, too. *New York Times*, September 26, 1962, p. 35.

not the exhaustion of that capability in unlimited conflict.<sup>3</sup> An investigation of the function of violence begins with an outline of concepts.

#### I. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND CONSENSUS.

We assume that all human relationships, both individual and institutional, are involved in a dynamic process of consensus and competition. These are opposites only as conceptual poles of a continuum. In real relationships, it is often difficult to distinguish objectively between the two. The distinction is sharp only subjectively, for the participant, and his perception of consensus or competition may change from moment to moment, depending on his political role and the objective circumstances.<sup>4</sup> A political role is defined in terms of the many political systems in which the individual objectively or subjectively (by identification of interests) plays a part. A political system contains a hierarchy of authority and values. Each system has a complex structure of leadership and influence but, because of the nature of its task (maximizing and allocating certain values), policy and decision-making power is usually vested in one or a few roles at the top of the pyramid of authority (the elite). Formal and informal political systems exist at all levels of group life (children's play groups, families, lodges, gangs, work groups, nation-states, international alignments, etc.), interpenetrating each other among and between levels. Each isolated system has an interdependent structure of roles, involving loyalty to certain values, symbols, leaders, and patterns of behavior according to system norms. The discrete individual, part of many different systems, must structure his own hierarchy of commitment to meet the simultaneous demands made upon him by many different roles.

Within the individual, the conflicting demands of these roles create tension. Similarly, within each system conflicting values between members are constantly adjusted as roles change, maintaining a state of tension. And political systems as wholes have an objective,

dynamic interrelationship, structured into the hierarchy of macro-systems. Within the latter, each sub-system has a role much like that of the individual in smaller constellations. Each sub-system may be part of several macro-systems, imposing conflicting demands upon it. Consequently, within macro-systems there is maintained a state of constant tension between sub-systems.

This objective tension, existing on all levels, is perceived subjectively in terms both of competition and consensus, depending on the comparative degrees of collaboration and conflict which exist in the situation at any given moment.

So any two or more systems may appear as hostile at any given time. From the viewpoint of the participants, the conceptual framework of competition overrides underlying consensus. Decisions and policies of the rival elites there are rationalized in terms of hostility to the values and leaders of the other system. However, if events transpire to place a higher value on a hostile tactical situation involving the macro-system of which both smaller systems are a part, their relationship will be transformed quickly to a conceptual framework of consensus which will override and mute the unresolved competitive elements. Such an event may also bring about internal leadership changes in both sub-systems, if their elites were too firmly wedded to the requirements of the now-irrelevant competitive situation.

Objectively, tension is always present among all roles and systems; that is, elements of both competition and consensus go together. The subjective emphasis which each pole of the continuum receives depends on the value which the tactical situation places on acts and attitudes of hostility or collaboration among the various systems at various times. Degrees of hostility and collaboration are structured by a hierarchy of values within and among all roles and systems all the time. All are involved in a dynamic process.

Conflict, in functional terms, is the means of discovering or reaching consensus, of creating agreed terms of collaboration. Because of our personal roles in the macro-system of nation-states, we tend to view the Cold War in terms of competition. Similarly, because of our role in the sub-system of the family group, we tend to view family problems in terms of consensus (until the system breaks down completely).

One can reverse these conceptual fields. The Cold War can be viewed in terms of the large areas of consensus that exist between the two power-blocs. For example, the wish to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to each other's

<sup>3</sup> By "rational" here is meant: having a conceptual link to a given end, a logical or symbolic means-ends relationship which can be demonstrated to others or, if not demonstrable, is accepted by others (but not necessarily all) as proven.

<sup>4</sup> Essentially, the perception by an individual of his relationship to others within a framework of hostility or cooperation is the subjective basis of "ideology," using the term as Karl Mannheim does in "Sociology of Knowledge," *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1957), pp. 265-66.



allies; the wish to avoid giving each other's allies the power of precipitating general war between the main antagonists; the common interest in reducing accidental provocations; the common interest in establishing some norms of predictability in each other's behavior; etc. Conflict can therefore be considered merely as the means of perfecting these areas of consensus. In the same way, one can view the family situation negatively in terms of competition and hostility. As in an O'Neill drama, one would dwell on all the things that divide the family members and interpret all actions in terms of maneuvers to subdue each other's will. Consensus then becomes a residual category *hors de combat*, and therefore of no importance. One might dwell upon the collaborative aspects of international affairs or the disruptive aspects of family affairs. A policy-maker should do both in the former area, just as a psychiatrist does both in the latter. The collaborative view of the Cold War should not, however, induce euphoria about the nature of the relationship (as it unfortunately does for some), since so many crimes of violence occur in families, and so many murders involve lovers or ex-lovers.<sup>5</sup> In performing this exercise, the relativistic nature of the concepts of consensus and competition becomes evident. It is impossible to reach any consensus without competition and every consensus, no matter how stable, is still only provisional, since it represents for all its members a submerging of other values. All collaborating individuals, groups, or nations constantly try to exploit favorable opportunities to improve their roles or to impose a larger part of their own value structures upon a larger political system. In an important sense, all individuals, groups, or nations desire to "rule the world," but are constrained to collaborate with others on less desirable terms because of the objective limits of their own power or the cost of the exertion required.

The commitment required to produce a credible threat of violence, sufficient to induce peaceable accommodation, is one of a very high order. Not all individuals nor all political systems are capable of credibly using the threat of violence in order to induce greater deference by others to their values. People generally recognize the kinds of values which can and cannot elicit the high degree of commitment required to make the threat credible.

<sup>5</sup> See E. Frankel, "One Thousand Murderers," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. 29 (1938-39), pp. 687-88, cited in Marshall B. Clinard, *Sociology of Deviant Behavior* (New York, 1957), p. 216.

By and large, all violence has a rational aspect, for somebody, if not for the perpetrator. Acts of violence can consequently be rationalized (*i.e.*, put to rational use), whether they are directed against others or against oneself. This is true because people who may be anxious to apply the threat of violence to achieve a social or political bargaining position are nevertheless usually reluctant also to pay the costs or take the risks of an actual demonstration of that threat. Incoherent acts of violence can be exploited by elites as a means of improving their roles or imposing a larger part of their values upon a greater political system. The more obvious the logical connection between such an act and the ends sought by the elite, the easier it is to assimilate the act and claim it as a demonstration of the potential violence available to the elite if its demands are ignored. The rapidity with which insurgent movements create martyrs from the demise of hapless bystanders, and the reluctance of governments to give martyrs to the opposition, are evidence of this.

## II. NATIONS, LAWS, AND BALLOTS

The nation is a highly organized, formal political system, whose structure is well defined by law and custom, reinforced by sanctions legally imposed by the near-monopoly violence (police power) of the state. The central problem of lawful societies is to develop principles, procedures, institutions and expectations that create conditions of continuity and predictability in the lives of its members. The legal system is an abstract model of the society, designed to crystallize relationships of the *status quo*, maintain their continuity in the midst of political and social change, and provide lawful methods of resisting or accommodating change. Law itself tends to maintain the *status quo* and, with the instruments of state power, to resist change. But relationships in organized societies change anyway. The process for codifying changed conditions and relationships is called "politics." Political systems legitimize certain kinds of potential violence within controlled limits; it then becomes force.<sup>6</sup> However, law almost never serves the interests of all equally. Rather, it protects some against

<sup>6</sup> The distinction between "violence" and "force" (one uncontrolled, the other controlled), was common in pre-Lasswellian literature. They are often difficult to distinguish objectively. Assessments of controllability may be almost entirely ideological. I prefer to use "force" to designate the objective capabilities, *i.e.*, the concrete means or instruments for violence.

others or gives advantages to some over others. By placing the force of the state behind the interests of some, law serves to neutralize the potential violence behind the demands of others. In a sense, it thus raises the threshold of violence required to make social protests against the law efficacious. This guarantees that the law cannot be changed easily or quickly by any group, thus giving it greater permanence and stability.

Pressures for political and social change must therefore be substantial before the threat of violence and the fear of the breakdown of law and order rise above the threshold set by the force held by the state. While the threat and fear remain below the threshold, the *status quo* often responds to challenges against the law by more severe enforcement, augmented police and enlarged prisons. But when the threat and fear come near or cross the threshold, a general tendency toward non-enforcement of the law sets in. The *status quo* interests begin to share with the disaffected groups a desire to evade and to change the law.

Private demonstrations of force are illegal in all domestic societies. Toleration is accorded to threats of potential violence, however, to the extent that the laws and institutions are democratic. In all systems, the state, to deserve its name, must apply adequate force to control outbreaks of actual violence by private sources—or tolerate some more or less recognised “off-limits” areas for outlawry.<sup>7</sup> If the instrumentalities of state power are not equal to broad private threats, indeed, the government in power ceases to rule. Vigilantism or the private threat of violence has then in fact become the last resort of authority in the system. Why do governments sometimes fall when there is a general strike, or a street demonstration? Why don’t they ignore outbreaks with which they cannot cope? And say: “All right, go ahead and strike, fight each other for control of the streets, snake-dance down the avenue. We will sit here

in our offices anyway making decisions!” Governments fall when their capabilities for dealing with threatened violence fail. The emerging political system which proves itself capable of raising a higher threshold of violence (than the established government can or will surmount with its force) becomes *de facto* the highest authority, and *de jure* the new government.

Laws are not merely the rules of a game of economic and political competition. They are also a means of winning the game, if some of the players can, as in fact they do, write the laws. The ideal system may be one in which the rules are written with perfect dispassion, so that they accord no special advantages to anyone. This ideal is never realized. The process of politics which underlies the making and unmaking of laws is not dispassionate. Indeed, it is one of the most passionate of human affairs. No matter how scrupulously fair may be the original constitution and the representation of governing institutions, the tensions of political systems soon intrude historical hierarchies of advantage. Whoever enjoys early advantages in the game soon enjoys that and more by law, with the heightened threshold of the force available at the beckoning of the state to vouchsafe them. In this manner the law tends always to become to some extent the instrument of the *status quo*, resisting change.

In democratic societies, however, the law also guarantees the right of voluntary association, among other political liberties, and restrains (by a constitutional distribution of authority) arbitrary use of the police power. These permit opponents of the *status quo* to establish and maintain a base of political action that may become formidable. It may then be difficult for the regime to find legal pretexts for controlling this base while its potential for anti-state violence is still within the state’s control capability. Once its potential equals or grows greater than that of the state, repression is no longer a realistic policy. Changing the law, or treating it as a dead letter, gains precedence over enforcing it, even for *status quo* leaders who wish to preserve what control remains over informal political systems in which they are the elite. Once this process of peaceful political change has been successfully set in motion, both the emerging and the declining political elites have a high interest in maintaining a general freedom to threaten violence without initiating or provoking it, either on the part of the state or by other groups. For the *status quo* elites, there is more to be gained in preserving the continuity of the laws than in initiating and provoking the demonstration of violence at an unpredictable level. For the insurgent elites,

<sup>7</sup> There are many areas outside the effective—if not the nominal—jurisdiction of formal governmental authority, as, for example, “off-limit” slum areas where police seldom penetrate, or the Mafia areas of Sicily. Such areas represent political sub-systems which possess a high degree of sovereignty, tolerated, for one reason or another, by the general government. Within such areas, the *de facto* authority is often the elite able to maintain the highest threshold of potential violence, not the formal government. In such areas, an unwritten law usually makes it a severely punished offense to call upon the authority of the general government.

there is usually more to be gained in preserving the continuity of the laws than in appealing to the uncertain results of violence.

In democratic systems, the ballot becomes the non-provocative symbol by which the elites may measure their capabilities for threatening direct action. In a real sense, voting is an approximation of picking sides before a street fight. Once the sides are picked, the leaders are able to gauge their bargaining strengths and make the best possible deal for themselves and their cohorts. The appeal to actual battle not only is unnecessary, but also, for the weaker side (the only side with an interest in challenging the results of the count), it does not promise to change the results, and may in fact undermine the authority of the polls as a method for reversing one's future position.

The threat of violence implicit in counting heads is an ambiguous measure of the power available to the political systems into which people group themselves at election time. The extent of voter commitment in these systems is uncertain and probably, in most cases, unequal to demands for supporting action. There are very few national elections in the United States—although many elsewhere—in which the results prefigure a plausible threat of civil war as the means by which the defeated candidates can gain concessions and appointments from the winning side. In general, democratic political leaders share a common interest in resolving disputes without invoking real violence. Neither side can be confident that the loyalty of its voters will stand the test of a demonstration of strength. Voting is a very imperfect register of loyalty, but rather conveys a miscellany of emotions, difficult to penetrate or to order rationally. Strenuous efforts are made by defeated candidates to restrain a show of violence by their own followers. Public concessions of defeat, homiletic congratulations, and avowals of support for the winner, are designed to communicate to their backers the finality of the verdict at the polls, which is subject to revision, not by a demonstration of violence, but by renewed peaceful efforts in the next election.

In 1960, after the close result of the Kennedy-Nixon election, what dangers could have been unleashed if Nixon had publicly repudiated the poll and openly supported minority efforts to hold recounts in California and Illinois? In a situation of this kind, it is clear how close to the surface lies the threat of violence implicit in the voting process.

### III. THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS

Many people blithely argue for law as a substitute for violence, as though there was a

choice between the two. They call for international law and world government to eliminate war. This point of view reveals a blissful ignorance of the functions of violence in domestic legal systems. A viable system based on law protects the conditions of group action which make threats of violence tolerable. Law always rests on force, a legitimate monopoly in the hands of the state, and it can be changed by the threat of private violence. The threat of violence and the fear of the breakdown of law and order cast their shadows ahead; they operate to moderate demands and positions, thereby setting into peaceful motion the informal political processes of negotiation, concession, compromise, and agreement. Although there is no centralized monopoly of force in the international forum, the processes of mediation and negotiation function in much the same way. The credible threat of violence in the hands of nations has a similarly stabilizing effect, providing statesmen are attentive to the maintenance of their national capability for demonstrating violence, and providing their ambitions are commensurate to the bargaining position which their armaments achieve. More comprehensive legal codes and a world government may not improve the stability of the world community in any case, since the possibility of civil conflict exists in all political systems. Civil wars are frequently bloodier and more unforgiving than wars between sovereign nations.

In international politics also, the threat of violence tends to create stability and maintain peace. Here the threat is more directly responsive to policy controls. The nation-state has greater continuity than the informal political systems that coalesce and dissolve in the course of domestic social change. The threat of force can be asserted much more deliberately and can be demonstrated under full control, as in "good will" Navy visits, army maneuvers near a sensitive border, partial mobilization, etc. Because of the greater continuity of these macro-systems, the national leaders must strive to maintain the prestige of a nation's might and will. If the reputation of a nation's military power is allowed to tarnish, future bargaining power will be weakened. The country may feel obliged to re-establish that prestige by invoking a test of arms, as a means of inducing greater respect for its position from other nations. Strong nations prefer to demonstrate their military power peaceably in order that their prestige will afford them the bargaining power they deserve without a test of arms.

Because the threat of international violence is a conscious instrument of national policy, it generally lacks the random character of domes-

tic violence. This means that if the armaments of nations fall out of balance, if the prestige of nations is no longer commensurate with their ambitions, if the will to take the risks of limited military conflicts is lacking, if domestic political considerations distort the national response to external threat, then the time becomes ripe for the outbreak of violence that may escalate out of control.

In general, the dangers of escalating international conflict induce greater, not lesser, restraint on the part of national leaders in their relations with each other. Attempts to achieve infinite security—and consequent irresponsibility—for the nation are as self-defeating as similar attempts for a domestic regime.

The functioning of consensus and competition between nations is not fundamentally different from that of domestic politics. The most striking difference is that in domestic politics the level of centralized force available to the state creates a high threshold of stability against the threats brought to bear within the system by private groups. In the international forum, the closest approximation to such a threshold is the array of decentralized forces available to the great powers. An aggressive power interested in modifying the *status quo* must cross the threshold of its own threat of force in order to induce other powers to choose between concessions to its demands or the costs and risks of an arms race. To the extent that the *status quo* powers are able and willing to pay the costs and take the risks, their own threshold can be raised, depriving the challenger of any political advantages from his investment. When all of the great powers are attentive to the equations of potential violence, no nation can hope to gain conclusive political advantages from an arms race. This situation makes possible international agreements or a tacit consensus for stabilizing arms and bringing about political settlements. Diplomatic ceremonies, like the ceremonies of personal relations which we call "manners," serve to minimize the dangers of provocation and threat in the day-to-day relations between nations.

#### IV. THE DOMESTIC PROCESS

Underneath the norms of legal and institutional behavior in national societies lies the great beast, the people's capability for outraged, uncontrolled, bitter and bloody violence. This is common to totalitarian as well as democratic societies, and is a major restraint against completely arbitrary government. Even totalitarian regimes can hope for stability only if they reflect in some degree the changing currents of political interest of the people and if

they are willing to recruit members of the elites from the potentially disaffected group which they rule. Even a totalitarian state must purvey some concept of fairness and flexibility; an ability to change in response to the changing internal and external demands put upon it. Indeed, to the extent that a totalitarian regime permits the threat of violence to be raised against it in the form of political pressure, it loses some of its totalitarian quality. The dynamics of totalitarianism, however, generally make this kind of evolution difficult, if not impossible. Dictatorships of one or a few raise the level of official terror to offset or deter the threat of violence from below. Terror and counter-terror may escalate until the whole system collapses in an orgy of violence. The prospects for raising anything but another such dictatorship out of such wreckage would seem remote, except that people tire of violence and presently respond to it with passivity. Dictators are sometimes suspected of seeking a escape from this iron logic by provoking international wars which unite the country behind the leader, postponing issues of internal dissension.

The threat to carry political dissent outside peaceable channels can distract the government from the pursuit of other values, can impose upon it as its first and major responsibility the re-establishment of domestic peace and order and can lure it into shortsighted measures to suppress violence, measures that may instead widen the base of opposition and increase the occasions for anti-government protests.

The mere threat of private violence directed against the government has a very great influence upon government actions. By causing reallocations of the resources of the society into the essentially negative goals of internal security, the opposition may succeed in defeating or crippling the positive goals whose accomplishment might legitimize and strengthen government authority. To avoid this predicament even totalitarian governments occasionally go out of their way to appease their critics. The alternative to reform is ruthless suppression not only of the sources of the threat, but also of every symptom of united social action. Bowling clubs, assemblies of three or more people on street corners—there is no rational way to identify the first links of the chain which lead to social action. All must be broken up. The hopeless search for infinite security begins in this way; its logical end is the downfall of the regime. With this choice before it, it is easy to see why even a dictatorial regime may prefer social and political reform to the threat of violence. This is why so many kings and tsars

rather than destroying their rivals and opponents, often sent them instead on enforced vacations and educational tours abroad.

In democratic societies this sharp dilemma is avoided far short of infinite deterrence. The institutional distribution of authority—constitutionalism—precludes unilateral attempts to centralize all the police powers in the hands of one agent. Also the law proscribes the overt threat of private violence and the existence of para-military forces, although it tolerates and protects the implied threat of violent outbreaks if political accommodation fails. Violence is demonstrated, not in organized forms, but rather in sporadic outbursts. Disgruntled elites who possess a clear capability for causing a planned demonstration—who have, that is, organized groups with a deep sense of moral outrage and injustice—avoid incriminating themselves and provoking counter-action against themselves. Instead they carry out “peaceable demonstrations” designed to reveal their numbers and the intensity of their commitment. These may have the bonus effects of provoking violent action against them, causing government intervention, or causing their more inflammable followers to ignite into unplanned outbursts of violence. Such potentials are implicit in the situation.

The leaders of the agitators then are placed in a position of minimum risk and maximum effectiveness, that of playing the role of “responsible leader.” They can bargain with formal authorities and with all the other members of the society in this way: “You must accept our just complaints and you must deal with us; otherwise, we will not be able to control our people. Unspeakable things may happen. We do not desire this to happen, but it is up to you to help us prevent it.” While playing this role, the reformist leaders may not be unhappy to have their prophecies partially fulfilled by sporadic outbreaks. Events which demonstrate violence (and thus induce other elites to make concessions) do not have to be planned. Once the emotions of a real social movement are churned up, the problem is to keep the events from happening.

The irresponsible elements may be disowned, but the bargaining power of the responsible leaders is enhanced. In the bargaining process, the moderate leaders often accept concessions which fall short of those demanded by some of their more extremist followers. Opportunists or “realists” often inherit the benefits wrought by the blood of martyrs. This is a healthy mode of exploiting the demonstration of violence without condoning it, enabling compromises to be reached which isolate the extremists and render

them less dangerous to the body politic. Most followers in social movements will follow responsible leadership through the gives-and-takes of compromise, because they share the general fear of unlimited violence and counter-violence, with its unpredictable results and the defeat of all rational goals. Accommodations can be reached, even if only provisionally, which preserve the general consensus in maintaining the form and continuity of society and law.

#### V. SOME CONCRETE EXAMPLES

Let us turn to some concrete examples of how violence works its effects in practice.

A classical case of its actual demonstration against the legality of existing authority is the founding of the state of Israel in 1949. The Irgun, an underground terror organization, created conditions in Palestine which made further British occupation impractical. There is some doubt whether the British government would have honored their commitment to the Jewish Agency or honored it when they did, had it not been for the Irgun's role. Yet the Jewish Agency, the responsible and moderate leadership, negotiated the partition of Palestine and played the major role in the founding of the new state, all the while disavowing the terrorist acts and methods of the Irgun. Before the launching of Irgunist terror, the British government stalled the Jewish Agency and accorded it little respect.

More instructive are cases of domestic violence where the actual demonstration is minimal and where the implicit threat is all, as in the current campaign for Negro rights. Until the last decade, little sustained pressure was exerted to improve the Southern Negro's position by governmental action. Even with the growth of Negro voting power in the big cities of the North, Washington authorities have generally shown great respect for the implicit capabilities of violence of well-organized white supremacists. Partly because of the power of the White South in the Congress, in Democratic National Conventions, and in the Electoral College, presidents have acted with restraint in protecting the rights of Southern Negroes. So long as the possibility of violence was asymmetrical, the Whites well-organized and armed, the Negroes apathetic, intimidated, and disorganized, Negro attempts to register to vote, to protest lynchings and other injustices, could easily be tranquillized by the County Sheriffs, the local police, and the KKK. In the last decade, Negroes have been in the throes of a new self-consciousness, confidence, organization, and leadership. The Black Muslims, the Committee on Racial Equality, the NAACP,

etc. have now demonstrated that the Southern Negro is capable of social action and of organized demonstrations of strength. As the capability grows for effective counter-violence against White Citizen Council activities—or, what is more significant, non-violent demonstrations which invoke violence by the extremist Whites—the Negro will gain increasing consideration for his demands, increasing support from “moderate” white leaders, and increasing attention and support from the federal authorities. Just as the existence of the White Citizens Councils strengthened the hand of southern moderates in trying to restrain civil rights action from Washington, so the existence of the Black Muslims and CORE now strengthens the position of the NAACP in seeking concessions from Southern Whites and action by the Justice Department. The threat of uncontrolled violent outbursts, hovering just beneath the surface, acts as a moderating influence, maintaining the institutions of peaceful process, inducing *status quo* groups to a greater readiness to yield some privileges, and restraining the responsible leaders of the insurgent Negroes from extremist demands.<sup>8</sup>

The strategy of non-violent social action (passive resistance or pacifism) does not abandon the threat of force as an instrument of social change. Rather, the threat operates within a civilized society by its provocative effects. By provoking the use of force by others, it forces the government to intervene on the behalf of the non-violent demonstrators, while evoking the sympathies of those less intensely involved. But as an international ideology, pacifism or unilateral non-violence may fail to achieve its objectives. Unless those who pursue it succeed in invoking some force in their behalf, they will be destroyed with impunity by their enemies.

The Dukhobor Sons of Freedom (of Vancouver, British Columbia) have adopted a novel tactic of demonstrating violence as they

conduct their immemorial campaign against compulsory public education. They set fire to their own homes and barns, standing by and watching the blaze. They also parade naked down the center of city streets. The significance of these demonstrations is plain. Their religion forbids them to threaten or use violence against others. Instead, they symbolically demonstrate their discipline and passionate commitment to their own way of life by inflicting violence upon their own property. The naked marches provoke arrests and imprisonment and the house-burnings force the welfare agencies to provide temporary shelter. Both actions impose on the government responsibilities it is ill disposed to carry out, especially if such demonstrations are to continue indefinitely and involve the entire Dukhobor settlement. In addition, the demonstrations invoke public attention and sympathy for the believers. All of this may well give the local authorities an incentive to ignore Dukhobor defiance of school attendance laws. In fact, this is what has happened during the last 50 years. Efforts to enforce the law have been spasmodic and half-hearted, while the law has been generally evaded.

The relations of suicide and crime to social change form too large a topic for treatment here.<sup>9</sup> Durkheim studied these phenomena as an indicator or measure of social disorganization. They might also be studied in terms of demonstrating violence as an instrument of political and social change. When teenagers commit crimes, their legitimate grievances get more attention. When someone commits suicide, those who sense the circumstances that drove him to it are led to re-examine their own lives, and may be strengthened in convictions concerning the society in which they live. A suicide by an over-extended installment buyer in Chicago led to efforts to reform state and national laws governing loan-shark interest rates and collection of unpaid installment debts. A suicide, apart from its real motives, may be quickly exploited by those with a social cause. In effect, a suicide resembles a resignation from a government: it challenges values and institutions, evoking from all survivors a sense of the unresolved tensions which surround them, threatening the prospects for their own survival.<sup>10</sup> Suicides and crimes, however obscure

<sup>8</sup> The recent violence at Oxford, Mississippi, involving the registration of Negro James Meredith at the State University, is likely to expedite Negro integration throughout the South. By precipitating violence (which resulted in two deaths), the White Extremists may have strengthened the ranks of the Moderates. Fearing a recurrence, white leadership in future situations may be more concerned with controlling the firebrands than in using them to force concessions from the Justice Department. Gunnar Myrdal put his finger on this when he referred to the “positive” aspect of the riots. “The riots make people think,” he declared. *New York Times*, October 4, 1962, p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> See summary of some pertinent research: Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, Jr., *Suicide and Homicide* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954), pp. 69–81.

<sup>10</sup> According to numerous press reports, the suicide of Marilyn Monroe led within a few days to a flurry of suicides by women. In the same manner, it may also have led to many decisions to live, which were not recorded.

and ambiguous, threaten the world and thus change it.

#### VI. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

Several points may be made in conclusion. Demonstrations of domestic violence serve to establish the intensity of commitment of members of the political system. The more intense the commitment, the greater the risks the system will take in challenging the *status quo*. Accordingly, the greater will be the bargaining efficacy of future threats. Social change often occurs legalistically. Rationalization in terms of the continuity of abstract legal models is a useful means of stressing consensus over competition, adding to the stability of the whole society. However, it is obvious that a legal or ideological syllogism is meaningless except in terms of the emotional force which members of the society attach to the first principle. The infinite regress of syllogistic reasoning ends somewhere with a commitment of self. Such commitments cannot be explained or understood by reasoning alone. Efforts to adduce

rational principles for explaining social and political change are futile unless one grapples with the often irrational and illogical intensity of self-commitment which marks social movements.

No system can hope to survive unless it can live with and adjust itself to the multitudinous threats of violence which are the basis of social change. Democracies have shown a greater ability to do this. Yet democratic forms can be subverted to become totalitarian in substance, if the search for infinite security in the international forum is reflected internally in a search for infinite deterrence of threats against the social and political *status quo*. Major social changes have major social causes; they are not the result of isolated conspiracies and plots. They cannot be arrested by an effort to stamp out all conspiracies and plots. In healthy democracies, all political leaders and would-be leaders are, in effect, conspirators and plotters. They must be. This kind of activity is the heart of political democracy.

# REINHOLD NIEBUHR: NEW ORTHODOXY FOR OLD LIBERALISM

WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS  
*Oberlin College*

Reinhold Niebuhr has profoundly affected American thought in theology, on society, and about politics.<sup>1</sup> He has puzzled more than one of his many critics and commentators, especially by the veritable panorama of doctrines which, at one time or another, he has appeared to advocate: several varieties of socialism, liberalism, and what seems to be a sort of mellow conservatism. The confusion engendered by this ideological medley has not been alleviated either by the voluminous extent of his writings, or by his teutonic, yet highly personal style.<sup>2</sup> But Niebuhr's policy suggestions have been shaped in response to changing conditions in the political world. Deeper analysis re-

veals a remarkably consistent teaching, present in all essential respects at least as early as his *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, which if not philosophy, is at least a theology of politics. The scope of this paper prevents any examination of the entire intellectual pilgrimage of Reinhold Niebuhr; I shall confine my attention to the main lines of his political teaching.<sup>3</sup>

Most critics and analysts would agree that whatever else he may have been, Niebuhr has been a critic of liberalism, modernity, and American culture. Yet, as so often is the case with Niebuhr, appearances can be misleading. It is true that his characteristic *bêtes noires* have been such comparatively modern thinkers as John Dewey. But this paper will endeavor to demonstrate that Niebuhr's basic political ideas are essentially the same as those of the liberals he seeks to criticize. His criticism is often devastating; but beginning as a critic, it ends with concepts and convictions drawn from the core of the liberal tradition. In this he is not unique. Niebuhr shares the intellectual tendencies of the generation of which he is a part, which, both attracted and disillusioned by the rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson and the crusade of 1917-1918, was and remains affected by anti-rationalism, doubtful of human nature and suspicious of enthusiasms in politics. Yet Louis Hartz has indicated that the most scathing critics of post-Wilson America were unable to escape the "irrational Lockeanism" of the American liberal tradition, and came to terms with it after a period of voluntary expatriation. At the approach of World War II the critics

<sup>1</sup> In referring to Niebuhr's major works, I have adopted a system of abbreviations, as listed below. Unless otherwise noted, the publisher is Scribner's, New York.

- BT *Beyond Tragedy*, 1938
- CPP *Christianity and Power Politics*, 1940
- CRPP *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, 1953
- DCR *Does Civilization Need Religion?* (Macmillan, 1944; orig. 1927)
- SOT *Discerning the Signs of the Times*, 1946
- FH *Faith and History*, 1949
- ICE *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (Harper, 1935)
- MMIS *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 1932
- REE *Reflections on the End of an Era*, 1934
- CLCD *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, 1944
- IAH *The Irony of American History*, 1954
- HN *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (vol. I), 1951
- HD *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (vol. II), 1951
- SDH *The Self and the Dramas of History*, 1955
- SNE *The Structure of Nations and Empires*, 1959
- WCAR *The World Crisis and American Responsibility*, E. Lefever, ed., (Associated Press, New York, 1958)

<sup>2</sup> Paul Tillich has suggested that Niebuhr's major stylistic fault is an "overpredilection for paradox"; "Niebuhr's Theory of Knowledge" in C. Kegley and R. Bretall, eds., *Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought* (New York, 1956).

<sup>3</sup> Critical writings about Niebuhr are almost as numerous as his own writings. Among the most useful are: Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*; Kenneth W. Thompson, "Beyond the National Interest," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 17 (April 1955), pp. 167-188 and "Toward a Theory of International Relations," *this Review*, Vol. 49 (September 1955) pp. 733-746; Levi Olan, "Reinhold Niebuhr and the Hebraic Spirit," *Judaism*, Vol. 5 (Spring 1956), pp. 1-15; N. P. Jacobson, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Philosophy of History," *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 37 (October 1944), pp. 237-266; also the sections on Niebuhr in Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (Boston, 1956) and Charles Frankel, *The Case for Modern Man* (New York, 1956).



the 1920s became horrified at the destructive effects of their criticism on the national myth and advocated "responsibility."<sup>4</sup> This pattern is quite descriptive of Reinhold Niebuhr's intellectual history.

But Niebuhr is far too subtle and profound a thinker to be disposed of within the confines of a "generation." Any such effort would do violence to the real character of his contribution to that generation which has so frequently, and frantically, urged America to "come of age." The refurbishing of the liberal creed has not been an easy task. The "truths" which had been so daringly held self-evident in the 18th century had come to be the "inarticulate major premise," in Holmes' phrase, of American civilization by the early 19th century. It is difficult to tell whether the inarticulateness was due to the universal acceptance of these "truths" or to the development of doubts about their self-evident qualities.<sup>5</sup> The original theorists credited the discovery of the "self-evident truths" to reason. Yet they also believed in another, instrumental, reason which was the "servant of the passions," so in some ways they were progenitors of the anti-rationalism of our times.<sup>6</sup> The discoveries of that instrumental, scientific, and empirical reason have dealt rather roughly with the premises of the old liberal creed. The panoply of beliefs of liberal utopianism, of men "born free and equal," of men forever devoted to increasing individual liberty, and of progress and perfectibility in history, has been radically undermined on a rational level.<sup>7</sup> Niebuhr has often noted that liberalism has become a "holding action."<sup>8</sup> Indeed, his own criticism of reason has not been notably different from that of a number of critics, whether earlier, such as Hume, or more contemporary. In part, it is a criticism of the "pretension" of instrumental rationalism that Niebuhr finds in such theorists as John Dewey. But revealingly, it is not a criticism of instrumental rationalism as such; when reason is re-

duced to the proportions of a technique, Niebuhr favors employing it instrumentally. His criticism is an effort to reduce it to those proportions, to prevent instrumental reason from "absolutizing" its "finite" perspectives. Niebuhr's quest is for a safer basis than reason on which to rest the great liberal premises. His criticism presents the arguments of a long line of critics to establish the failure of reason to uphold the old creed. But this denial constitutes, in Niebuhr's eyes, a "negative validation" of a faith which comes to embody the articles of the liberal system, especially its central conception of freedom. His argument retains the characteristic argumentative style of early liberalism, what Max Weber called *Wertrationalismus*: the willingness to use means given by reason for ends discerned by "inspiration." But where the early liberals called the inspiration rational, Niebuhr calls it religious or theological. This goes a long way toward explaining the curious fact, which has baffled many critics, that Niebuhr makes a "virtue of incomprehensibility."<sup>9</sup> In fact, the title of Niebuhr's early work *Does Civilization Need Religion?* is incomplete. It is not "civilization" but that civilization of which Niebuhr is a part that is involved; not civilization, but liberalism, "needs religion."

In the analysis which follows I shall attempt to demonstrate that Niebuhr adheres, at least in "this-worldly" and political terms, to four central liberal doctrines: (1) the perfectibility of man, (2) the identification of freedom with the social good, (3) the contractarian conception of the state, and (4) the idea of progress in history. Since he has devoted much of his attention to international affairs, the argument will conclude with the contention that Niebuhr's view of international politics reflects these four doctrines, as well as the equally vital liberal concept of the "brotherhood of man."

# I

Niebuhr has been cited as a "realist" as often as he has been called a critic of liberalism. Of course, "realist" is an appealing term to apply to oneself; every theorist likes to believe himself to be truly "realistic." Yet curiously, "realism" represents only a part of Niebuhr's reality. "Realism" is identified with the comprehension of physical nature, a world governed by an often grim necessity, if unified by an equally deterministic set of "pre-ordained harmonies." But man is more than physical, and more than "realism" is able to realize. Niebuhr's "prophetic" insight reveals to him a radical human freedom, which is "transcend-

<sup>4</sup> Louis Hartz, "The Coming of Age of America," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (June 1957), pp. 474-483.

<sup>5</sup> Russel B. Nye, "The Search for the Individual, 1750-1850," *Centennial Review*, Vol. V (Winter 1961), pp. 1-20.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey Clive, *The Romantic Enlightenment; Ambiguity and Paradox in the Western Mind, 1750-1920* (Meridian Books, New York, 1960), pp. 19-38.

<sup>7</sup> John H. Schaar, *Loyalty in America* (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957), pp. 116-119.

<sup>8</sup> SDH 36, 222; WCAR 11; IAH, ch. vi.

<sup>9</sup> Olan, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 7.

ent" and which seeks the absolute and the infinite, beyond any of the limitations imposed by time or nature.<sup>10</sup> But though these elements may be separated analytically they are never separated in Niebuhrean man. Man forever combines the two and can never escape the resultant tension and ambiguity, an ambiguity productive of anxiety which leads him to the futile effort to escape the demands of nature on one hand, or of the spirit on the other. Nature imposes self-seeking passion and egoism on the spirit, and roots the spirit in the finite; the sin of the spirit is to seek to deny that finite or temporal element in man, and hence to be guilty of pretension and pride. Moreover, the spirit breaks the "pre-ordained" harmonies of nature and makes the prudent and limited attributes of "natural man" become infinite and insatiable, leading to conflict, competition, and disorder.<sup>11</sup>

Intermediate between spirit and nature is the area of "human contrivance" or "rational freedom." Though reason is always an instrument of the natural self-seeking of man, it qualifies and restrains it by a kind of prudence and calculation. The purely harmonic world of nature is forever destroyed, yet man, a "creator" as well as a "creature" of history, is able by techniques, institutions, and science to harness nature to his purposes and increasingly to master it.<sup>12</sup> But, of course, the more that man masters nature, the more his own natural passions are freed from restraint; the more that men can obtain, the more they will want. Conflict remains eternal, contradictions perpetual.

But this world of conflict and struggle is not the world of nature; it is the product of the spirit and of reason in nature. Consequently, a purely secular "realism" which is typified for Niebuhr by Hobbes and Machiavelli understands neither the true nature of man nor of conflict in the world. "Realism," it will be seen, represents a doctrine about the world which is developed by empirical and unaided reason; it becomes identified with a curiously old-style brand of naturalism, of the conflict of passions,

and of man the acquisitive animal.<sup>13</sup> Nor need "realism" necessarily be secular. St. Augustine represents the "theological realist." Aided by theology and faith, Augustine perceived the radical freedom of the human spirit but he made too sharp a separation between the spirit and nature. While it is by no means true (as Niebuhr seems to imply) that Augustine was prepared to let the world run without ethical restraints, he provided far too small a role for the idealistic element of human nature in this world to satisfy Niebuhr, who regards Augustine as "excessively realistic."<sup>14</sup> Theological realism makes too many concessions to the natural world, and regards Christianity as an essentially other-worldly ethic. Niebuhr, despite his long distrust of the "utopian" effort to apply Christian or other perfectionist teachings directly to the world, will not allow such teachings to be separated from it. He has always contended that the "impossible ethical ideal" remains "relevant."<sup>15</sup> He is not a realist on his own terms; he is better regarded as a "realistic" or moderate utopian. Niebuhr has laid stress on the limits which restrict the degree to which any utopia may be attained. But within the ultimate limits, his awareness of the problem of "less and more" has been quite intense, the intensity being especially marked in the years just preceding the outbreak of World War II.<sup>16</sup> In fact, all realists, contemporary or historical, have conceded that given the limits which attach to human endeavor man should always strive to approach the limits: to become as perfect as his imperfections allow.<sup>17</sup>

Two factors determine the content of such a teaching. The first, and perhaps crucial, question is the nature of the Good toward which human striving should aim. The second question, of importance in "realistic" or pragmatic terms, is the character and scope of the limits

<sup>13</sup> SNE 133; CPP 215; SDH 109-111, 119.

<sup>14</sup> SNE 105-107, 291; CRPP 127; REE 205-231.

<sup>15</sup> Even so friendly a critic as K. W. Thompson has found the relevance "not clear": "The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," in Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*, p. 169 and "Beyond the National Interest," *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> CPP, *passim*; IAH 157; HD 191-195, 233-234; FH 27-28; SNE 28-31, 298-299; "Peace and the Liberal Illusion," *The Nation*, Vol. 149 (28 January 1939), pp. 117-119.

<sup>17</sup> Norman Jacobson, "Political Realism in the Age of Reason: The Anti-Rationalist Heritage in America," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 15 (October 1953), pp. 446-469.

<sup>10</sup> SNE 287-290, 298-299, 7; MMIS 25; HN 4, 11, 26-27, 48, 68, 125; HD 95-96, 155, 240, 284, 308; SDH 13-15, 23, 128; CLCD 6, 49, 53-55, 187.

<sup>11</sup> *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 9 (Spring 1945), pp. 7-8; IAH 156-158; NH 178-190, 249-250; BT ch. vi; SOT 68; SNE 107, 287-288.

<sup>12</sup> SNE 40-41, 105-107, 289; thus man is said to be able to "deflect" history without changing its direction. The Baconian roots of the doctrine are evident: FH 71-94; SOT 65; CLCD 154; MMIS 29; IAH 4-7, 71-77.

that are thought to restrict the attainment of the ultimate and yet impossible standard.

It is quite revealing that, in answer to this second question, Niebuhr is content with the assertion that limits exist; he is adamant in his refusal to specify them more precisely. For to claim to know the limits of human perfection is to claim Divine knowledge. If it is prideful to seek to establish goodness in the world, to escape limits altogether, then to seek to define the limits is, in his eyes, no less so. And while the first has at least the merit of overestimating man, the second runs the risk of limiting man to a level of baseness lower than necessary.<sup>18</sup> Niebuhr frequently denounces all theories of "natural law" because they compromise too readily with that nature which man may increasingly "master."<sup>19</sup> His denunciations of these, and other theories, from Catholic Rationalism to Marxist-Leninist, center on their supposed identification of a particular political order with the ultimately perfect. It is to be hoped that Niebuhr knows better than that. Almost all the "pretensions" he indicates did not constitute claims that a given state was perfect but that it represented the best attainable state in the conditions and limitations under which men operated.

Niebuhr's attack on the "absolutizing" of such "finite" perspectives has a dual nature. His attack on some theorists is actually a criticism of the good which they defined, *different* from that which Niebuhr holds as a standard. Others perceived the nature of the good, but set the standard at too low a level of attainment, or identified it too much with the preconceptions of an age. Thus democracy, a "perennial necessity," had to be extricated from the "bourgeois" associations of its origin.<sup>20</sup>

Niebuhr's language is apt to delude the reader. Despite his denials, his theory contains an implicit "natural law" or "natural right," that is, a conception of the best state in this world. Despite his "historical relativism" his teaching contains a number of such "perennial necessities" and "constant factors" in politics. To assert that progress is always possible leads to an emphasis on a society which is open to change, as Niebuhr's theory does. But such a

state becomes a this-worldly "best state." In fact, such a state is necessary if the "fanatical" effort to establish the ultimately perfect state is to be avoided. For immediate purposes, the significance is that, although Niebuhr denies that man can ever be perfect or that progress is limitless, his theory strives to, and to a large degree does make the limitations meaningless in political terms; that is, his effort is to salvage as much of the liberal creed as is possible in an age that doubts it.

## II

The content of Niebuhr's "best state" in the world is determined by the nature of the other-worldly best which it strives to imitate, just as his pragmatic opponents, in order to discern policies or states which are "better" must have a standard of the "best" by which to judge them so. Niebuhr's distinctive stance—which often obscures his meaning—is that in a period accustomed to pragmatic evasions, he begins with an ultimate and reasons down to the world. The ultimate standard gives the character to Niebuhr's political teaching as a whole.

There is little doubt as to the "human good" in Niebuhr's teaching: it is contained in the spiritual, in the element of man's nature characterized by "transcendent freedom" and the quest for the ultimate. In fact, this element constitutes the "true" nature of man; without such a teleological conception much of Niebuhr's rhetoric of pathos concerning the human condition would be pointless.<sup>21</sup>

Yet such a good is quite different from classical definitions of virtue, in that it is without content. It is an ability or a way of doing things which does not describe what is done. Niebuhr's terms, used in describing this virtue, are suggestive: man the "creator" as opposed to "creature," "transcending" his nation, class or place in history. All suggest an almost romantic individuality, or those conceptions of "creativity" or "autonomy" which have been so fashionable in recent years.<sup>22</sup> One may summarize Niebuhr's idea of the ethical rather simply. It is freedom. The more things of which man becomes free—time, space, passion, class, or nation—the better he becomes. Now it is true that Niebuhr attacks modern theorists for "exaggerating" the degree to which freedom

<sup>18</sup> FH 34, 54, 71–83, 91, 123, 174, 180, 238–239; IAH 130, 158; HD 47, 85, 95–96, 155, 232; HN 197, 281; SOT 65; CRPP 133; SNE 291, 298–299; Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

<sup>19</sup> FH 77, 174; HD 48, 55, 281; CRPP 3, 200–201; DCR 26, 170–175, 218–219; SDH 109, 229; ICE 41–46, 114, 188; HN 178, 281.

<sup>20</sup> SNE 59–61; HD 249; SOT 100; CLCD 48–49, 118; IAH 96–100.

<sup>21</sup> Frankel, *op. cit.*, describes Niebuhr's ethics as "masochism, not wisdom" for much this reason, p. 115; MMIS 257; CRPP 159; CPP 215; FH 174–185; HN 16, 48, 249.

<sup>22</sup> Kenneth Keniston, "Alienation and the Decline of Utopia," *American Scholar*, Vol. 29 (Spring 1960), pp. 161–200.

and virtue can be identified.<sup>23</sup> But to suggest an "exaggeration" is to suggest that they can be identified to some degree. And, moreover, the reason modern theorists are said to be in error is that they fail to discern the "natural" element in man. Thus, freedom and virtue cannot be identified completely in this world, not because they are not ultimately identifiable but because *total* freedom is impossible and impracticable. But it remains the standard toward which man ought to strive. Love, of course, is the ultimate value beyond freedom. But love demands freedom because it cannot be commanded or coerced. And, moreover, love itself is defined in terms of "self-sacrifice" and of over-coming "egoism." Not only is it true that from another point of view this is surely "self-realization" or "fulfillment," but the very existence of "egoism" in Niebuhr's teaching is bound up with the fact that man is in nature.<sup>24</sup>

Much of Niebuhr's discussion and concept of freedom has obvious roots in Kantian idealism; so does his corollary concern that individuals be used as "ends and not means" and with the ethic of "good will."<sup>25</sup> Ultimately, Niebuhr agrees with the idealists as to the nature of virtue. Given his great stress on the inevitable corruption of freedom by egoism in the world, it follows that not only can freedom and virtue not be *simply* identified but that greater freedom runs the peril of greater evil as well as greater good. Niebuhr has, in fact, made a point of this. While such a fact demands a certain prudence, Niebuhr's refusal to set limits to perfectibility places him in the idealist camp. Prudential ethics concede too much to "nature." Moreover, they cannot guide men in the extreme case where "heroism" is demanded for the choice between opposite goals: freedom or slavery, tyranny or anarchy.<sup>26</sup> Prudential ethics are valid only if they assume the ultimate importance of freedom. Man's involvement in nature demands that a certain amount of self-interest be "legitimated," as must concern for self-preservation. But, not surprisingly, this merely emphasizes that the pursuit of self-

interest and freedom should be "enlightened."<sup>27</sup> This enlightenment has two characteristics, the realization of the perils of "natural self-interest" in one's own freedom, and a readiness to pursue self-interest in ways compatible with the freedom of others.

Indeed, Niebuhr's "realism," said to reside in his "recognition of the effects of power," is itself part of that idealistic element of his thought we have discussed. Freedom demands power, the power to free the spirit from nature by "conquering" the natural, a belief which unites Niebuhr with modern theorists from Bacon forward. While the quest will ultimately fail, increasing increments of power will make man freer of the natural. It is for this reason in fact—that power is never sufficient to free man from nature—that for practical purposes freedom is defined as power.<sup>28</sup> Thus the quest for power (which produces conflict) and historical "progress" (which is ambiguous precisely because power may be used for good or evil) must both be judged good in a relative, "this worldly," sense. This decisively sets Niebuhr apart from a theorist like Hobbes, who regarded conflict and the quest for power as among the chief evils of man and set his goal instead at the attainment of social peace. It puts Niebuhr in the camp of the liberals, beginning with John Locke, who regarded the state of war as merely an annoyance compared with the loss of "freedom" that would be entailed by accepting the iron peace of Hobbes' *Leviathan*.<sup>29</sup> As Niebuhr has put it,

Self-interest may be a source of discord ultimately but it is tentatively necessary to prevent the harmony of the whole from destroying the vitality of the parts.<sup>30</sup>

Niebuhr's concept of the state follows this liberal Lockean model, and although he criti-

<sup>27</sup> SDH 30-35, 139; SOT 39; WCAR 41-42; or "pragmatic" in IAH, *passim*.

<sup>28</sup> HN 141; FH 94, 219; IAH 30; SOT 48, 65; MMIS 2; CLCD 154; Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.* p. 432, even to the shocking and Machiavellian statement "powerless goodness ends on the cross" which is clearly indicated as a stricture, SOT 143; ICE 237. For a discussion of the concept of liberty as power, see Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty* (University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 248-275.

<sup>29</sup> John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, ch. vii, 93; HN 101; SOT 101-105; CPI 15, 42-43, 93; SDH 14-15, 229.

<sup>30</sup> "The Moral Issue in International Relations," cited in Thompson, "Toward a Theory of International Relations," *op. cit.*, p. 742.

<sup>23</sup> SDH 38-53; HD 69, 144.

<sup>24</sup> HN 14, 178-190, 249-250, 260, 288-289; HD 78, 149-151; IAH 57, 84; SOT 17, 21; CLCD 79; SDH 30-32, 169.

<sup>25</sup> SOT 101-103, 176, 181, 195-201; FH 77; DCR 19, 22, 126; MMIS 170-175; HN 22, 30-33, 77; SDH 61; CPP 139; ICE 41, 52, 112, 194.

<sup>26</sup> CRPP 110, 132-135; CLCD 19-21, 61; FH 119, 134, 174; SDH 31, 139; ICE 21, 39, 41, 111, 206, 65; WCAR 42; DCR 152-153, 76; HN 178, 214, 281; BT 146, 292, 306.

cizes the "social contract" theory, his criticism suggests that he accepts that theory in all essential respects. Like Locke, he posits a state of "pre-ordained" harmonies as the "natural" state of man before he "fell." The condition of man after the fall was, as in liberal theory, a "state of war" which led to the establishment of the state.<sup>31</sup> By placing the "state of nature" in Eden—and outside history—Niebuhr avoids the great dilemma of liberal contractarian theory: the question of how conflict arose among pacific "natural men." Indeed, for practical purposes, Locke and his successors equated the natural state of man with the state of war and may have regarded the idea of a period of harmony as a somewhat deceptive myth.<sup>32</sup> But to both the liberals and to Niebuhr what follows is that the state is produced only to avoid the state of war; and yet, given the "natural" condition of fallen man, conflict is inevitable. Hence the state, a "human contrivance" exists to channel the conflict into relatively bloodless and law-abiding ways. Niebuhr's attack on the contract theory denies that the contract took place at any definite time; rather, it developed through "organic" and historical processes.<sup>33</sup> (Burke, of course, made the same argument, yet Burke, as we too often forget nowadays, called himself a Whig and not a Tory.<sup>34</sup>) In any case, most contractarian theorists treated the historicity of the social contract as unimportant. It represented a necessary postulate to account for man's escape from the state of war; how long such a development took—or even whether it had taken place—was of little concern.<sup>35</sup> Liberal theorists, who often sought to show that the "original" contract, even granting its existence, had been corrupted and was not yet embodied in government, were even less concerned with the event. Niebuhr's unwillingness to credit the state to an act of speculative or scientific reason

is important but it does not change the concept of the state as such.

For Niebuhr, as for early liberals, the political order is not among the higher ethical achievements of man. Man is not a political animal but an animal "born free." Community is based on "animal gregariousness," and not on human freedom; the goal of harmony within the civil order is "uncivilized" or tribal.<sup>36</sup> The state, since it employs coercion to attain its ends, is perhaps even less desirable than purely natural community. The state is never more than a product of necessity, to which men "give up" freedoms in the effort to escape the state of war. Hence political society is always "ambiguous" and forever "frustrates" the higher impulses of man.<sup>37</sup>

Since the state of war is apparently produced by the action of the spirit in "transmuting" natural harmonies, it might be suggested that the spirit be directed toward the purely spiritual, toward the contemplative life. But here Niebuhr's "idealism" asserts itself strongly; he is unwilling to allow such a separation even at the cost of conflict. St. Augustine and the Medieval theorists committed this fault: that they set the standard of human attainment too low. They paid too high a "price in order" and denied sufficient scope for freedom. "Freedom" in this case is notably a freedom to act in and to change the political order, a liberal and not a notably Christian definition of liberty. Medievalism restricted "cultural vitalities" in a quest for unity. The synthesis of Medievalism was broken up, he asserts, by "creative chaos."<sup>38</sup> Though medievalism may be extreme in this quest for unity, it represents only part of a general rule: that all political orders are morally mediocre because they "exalt peace over freedom."<sup>39</sup> Given the fact that political orders are, however, necessary due to the presence of evil and the propensity to war, justice consists in that harmony which provides maximum scope for the "unique vitality and freedom of the parts."<sup>40</sup>

One of Niebuhr's "perennial necessities" is

<sup>31</sup> SNE 50-51, 40-41.

<sup>32</sup> Richard Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960).

<sup>33</sup> SNE 50-51.

<sup>34</sup> I am indebted for the reminder to Harvey Mansfield, Jr., Harvard University; for further evidence see Ralph Barton Perry, *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York, 1944), p. 14, in which Perry identifies Burke with the "fundamental philosophy of the Declaration of Independence."

<sup>35</sup> Thus Hobbes: "It may, peradventure be thought that there never was such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so. . . . But though there had never been any time. . . ." (*Leviathan*, Bk. I, ch. 13).

<sup>36</sup> CRPP 91; SOT 21, 25, 180; SDH 17, 222; CPP 63, 119; HN 270; HD 79, 310; CLCD 53.

<sup>37</sup> SDH 10-11, 137, 235; SNE 33, 50, Introduction, 291; MMIS, *passim*; FH 77, 96-97, 196, 219; HD 79, 267-268, 310; SOT 168.

<sup>38</sup> SNE 135-139, 108-112, 4, 146-163, 44-48, 51-59, 105.

<sup>39</sup> SOT 175-181; FH 129, 219; SDH 229; CPP 104; CRPP 155-158; HD 310; HN 270.

<sup>40</sup> "The Moral Issue in International Relations," *op. cit.*, p. 742.

the existence of a social balance of power.<sup>41</sup> This "necessity" is "perennial" in precisely the way that the "Rights of Man" were conceived to be inalienable: it is necessary to a just order. The balance prevents just that concentration of power in the hands of a few which limits the freedom of the many precisely because it concentrates the stuff of freedom, power. Hence a state should "institutionalize" conflict to keep power divided. And since "love" is the regulative principle of justice in absolute ethics, and freedom is the condition of love, the balance should be weighted in the direction of more, rather than less, freedom for the parts.<sup>42</sup> Niebuhr is not unaware that a justice whose principal virtue consists in preventing tyranny is "negative." But, he asserts, in "advanced" societies only a "rough justice" or "minimum harmony" is possible.<sup>43</sup> One might ask why such societies are considered "advanced." The answer can only be, because they make "freedom" possible. Justice, although a moral norm within the limits of human life, is less desirable than freedom. A "negative" justice which permits freedom, then, is better than a "positive" justice which does not.

Like all his sometime antagonists, whether Marxist or Liberal, Niebuhr sees "chaos" as oftentimes creative, conflict a good, and not merely a mournful necessity. If conflict is the price of freedom, then Niebuhr will accept conflict; and not only accept it, but sanctify it in the name of a higher morality. If Niebuhr chastizes "rationalists" for the belief that freedom is always compatible with order, it is not because, as a conservative might, he means that freedom must sometimes be restrained, but rather that one must be prepared to sacrifice order to maintain freedom.<sup>44</sup>

Despite his frequent criticism of that idealism which denies the limits imposed on man by nature, Niebuhr argues for the utility of even these trans-historical perspectives in the attack on political orders from a more perfectionistic

stance.<sup>45</sup> Niebuhr's analysis of the limitations of medievalism on "cultural vitalities" suggests Marx's notion of "fetters on the modes of production." But Niebuhr goes beyond this to suggest not only that the "synthesis" became outdated but that it had paid too high a "price in order" from the outset. Both the idea of a trans-historical standard of criticism and the belief in the desirability of historical change suggest a theory of progress. And while Niebuhr regards history as "inconclusive" and progress as a mixture of good and evil, he nonetheless regards the movement of history as a forward one. His emphasis on the mixture of good and evil merely makes progress dialectic, rather than linear.<sup>46</sup> "Like Hegel's new logic," he once conceded, without its "premature finality."<sup>47</sup> Hegel's standard was also set too low. Niebuhr's theory resembles Kant's claim of a "cunning" in war and conflict in history, and progress as virtually limitless.<sup>48</sup> Although they differ in that Niebuhr puts the heavenly city outside of history while Kant put it inside, the concept of historical progress through conflict is the same for both. And the standard by which progress is measured, the goal of perfect peace in total freedom, is the same whichever side of the history/post-history dividing line it is placed on. Niebuhr strives valiantly to relate this idea of progress to Christian ideas of Providence. Yet orthodox Christianity saw divine providence as essentially eschatological. God's judgment at the end of history did not guarantee that events in historical time would "lead" to that judgment by a humanly discernible progression.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>45</sup> SNE 11-13, 105, 59-61, 291.

<sup>46</sup> FH 20-35, 54, 66, 69, 227; SNE 297-298; HD 47, 186, 287-292, 315, 320; SDH 52; MMIS 60-62; SOT 48, 65; thus, Niebuhr retains the conviction that "time is on our side"—or at least he did in 1956: "A Qualified Faith," *New Republic*, Vol. 134 (13 Feb. 1956), pp. 14-15. Equally illustrative is Niebuhr's conviction that historical "meaning" is a "necessary affirmation": HN 4, 10, 240; FH 114; BT 5, 18.

<sup>47</sup> CRPP 177; cf. FH 214-232.

<sup>48</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism and War," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), pp. 331-340. Niebuhr's continuing belief in the virtue of "rising social forces" is connected to his earlier belief in the utility of catastrophe in advancing progress, and his continuing belief in the role of conflict. REE, passim; FH 227; SDH 151, 196; BT, ch. ii; CPP 198; MMIS 222; CLCD 118.

<sup>49</sup> N. P. Jacobson, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-266, 275. See also J. D. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (Dover, New York, 1955), p. 21 and the brilliant analyses

<sup>41</sup> WCAR 26; HD 253-266; SDH 198; CRPP 134-135.

<sup>42</sup> FH 34, 128-129, 133, 227; CLCD 118, 173-174; SDH 38, 51, 71, 168, 196-198; ICE 61, 88; 103-106, 117, 155-159, 189-191; REE 246-247, CRPP 31, 148-150; CPP 19, 27, 29; SOT 46, 68, 81, 134-135; IAH 2, 84-85; HD 277; MMIS 29, 257.

<sup>43</sup> BT 140; HD 252-258, 266; CPP 104, 107; ICE 60; MMIS 22; IAH 96-108; SDH 38, 178, 198, 229.

<sup>44</sup> "The Unity and Depth of Our Culture," *Sewanee Review*, Vol. 53 (1944), p. 193; CLCD 66; SOT 177; SDH 1; ICE 122, 171.

Yet despite these basically liberal perspectives, Niebuhr has continually asserted a difference between his position and that of liberalism. That he believes this difference to be one of practicability is indicated by his use of the term "realism." Liberals and social scientists, Niebuhr declares, have a "fundamental goal" of anarchy.<sup>50</sup> Yet although anarchy is presumably impractical, Niebuhr is not prone to deny the virtue of freedom or the evil of coercion.<sup>51</sup> His claim to a distinct position rests on the dubious proposition that the presumed anarchist aims of liberals ever constituted the actual goals of their policy, or that they believed that social harmony could be obtained "easily." But of far more significance is the fact that Niebuhr accepts the liberal goal as the valid goal of social policy. Religion, in a rather unusual role, has very little to say about ends of life and policy which liberalism does not say. It teaches prudence in attempting to achieve them and a safe basis on which to rest them. But the Heavenly City of Reinhold Niebuhr retains a distinctly modern form in which to cast its eternal perfections.

In fact, the best state in this world—as opposed to the heavenly ultimate—seems strikingly to resemble the United States. Niebuhr's best state must be an "open" and a "pluralist" society which, at the same time, must have an "organ of dominion and authority." Democracy, a perennial necessity, is also desirable in that it "obscures" the element of domination in the central organ by making it public, rather than the preserve of a ruling class.<sup>52</sup> Despite the ambiguities of technology, the state should also be technological, so as to maximize freedom over nature.<sup>53</sup> We may pass over the question of how far this picture actually represents the reality of American politics today; it is apparent that the image suggests the ideal of the most traditional American theorists and present day social scientists.

of Karl Löwith in Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-290, and *Meaning and History* (Phoenix Books, Chicago, 1950), pp. 160-173.

<sup>50</sup> CLCD 66, SDH 1; MMIS xvii; ICE 61, 122, 171; SOT 177; "The Unity and Depth of Our Culture," *op. cit.*

<sup>51</sup> CRPP 148-150; FH 219; SOT 81, 145; ICE 147, 164, 171, 191, 209.

<sup>52</sup> SNE 34-35, 28, 59-65, 234-238, 291-294; CRPP 91, 96, 148-150; CLCD 1, 47-49, 118-120; HD 194-195, 249, 254-258, 266-268; SDH 38, 51, 178, 196, 198, 229; SOT 100; IAH 96-100, 108; ICE 77-78.

<sup>53</sup> FH 71-94; CLCD 154; IAH 71; MMIS 9; IAH 18, 30, 95, 54-58; HN 22, 57, 68.

Niebuhr has less faith in institutional change than many liberals, and is unwilling to credit the "best state" to rational contrivance. We have "stumbled on" the "constant factors" in the human situation. Democracy is not possible for all states at all times.<sup>54</sup> Hamilton and Madison would have disagreed with little of that analysis. They certainly did believe that they had discovered a "science of politics." They were equally aware, however, that what had been "stumbled on" was the opportunity to put this science into practice, and that America represented a unique historical situation in which experiment was possible.<sup>55</sup> Niebuhr's ideal remains, in any case, the same. If his hopes for the realization of that ideal have come to rest more on historical development than on institutional change, he reflects a general tendency among 19th century liberals, once the hopes of the Enlightenment for despots who would establish their program were dissipated. Perhaps even more, he reflects the alienation from a seemingly hostile world and the sudden desperate clinging to institutions which once seemed secure that has characterized "the responsible" liberalism of his generation.

### III

Niebuhr's view of man, the social good and the best state are directly connected to his conceptions of international politics. Like Kant and the liberals, Niebuhr believes, as we have noted, not only that conflict and the quest for power are inevitable, but that they are beneficial in tendency. Nations are aggregations of individuals (but without the restraints of the individual moral conscience) and must minimally leave men no less free than they were on entering the state. But since a policy based on the goal of stability is impracticable and undesirable, the state must seek to add power, to make its citizens "freer than they were before." Thus Jefferson, whose policy of "protective imperialism" sought only the power needed to preserve his country, is classified as only partially "realistic."<sup>56</sup> A genuine realist, then, must add power in order to increase national

<sup>54</sup> "A Qualified Faith," *op. cit.*; SNE 61-65, 34-35, 294; IAH *passim*.

<sup>55</sup> For example, *The Federalist*, No. 1; see also Martin Diamond, "Democracy and the *Federalist*: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent," this *Review*, Vol. 53 (March 1959), pp. 52-68.

<sup>56</sup> Thus, to Niebuhr all communities are "imperialist" and oriented toward expansion. SDH 137; SNE 190-191; FH 97; CPP 18, 108; HD 89, 284-285; REE 18, 26, 36, 53, 68, 157-158.

freedom. Niebuhr's criticism of the "pretension" of empires does not imply that all imperial aims are equally bad. He regards some empires, such as the British, as clearly preferable to others. The "pretension" of empires consists in the effort to deny that all efforts to add power are equally justifiable and equally good. Differences between empires arise from the effects of their rule on others. As an act of state, however, the addition of power is always morally the same and, in adding freedom to the state concerned, morally defensible. "Universal pretensions," whether religious or ideological, are undesirable because they deny the legitimacy of the freedom of others; the "nationalistic imperialisms" of the 17th-19th centuries, Niebuhr argues, avoided this fault.<sup>57</sup> Yet imperial ideologies of that period reveal a number of pretensions, not the least of these being the doctrine of Social Darwinism, the claim that imperial states obeyed a "law of nature" and of progress in subjecting the weak. Presumably, Niebuhr does not regard this as a "universalist pretension" because it allows each state an equal opportunity to subject others, although it is possible that he deems the doctrine unpretentious because he believes it to be true.

But one need not go so far. Niebuhr's picture of international politics regards nations as fundamentally analogous to groups or individuals in the domestic political system, except that nations are somewhat less ethical. Hence, he advocates pluralism among power centers, change and openness, conflict and balance in the international, as well as the domestic, political world. He has always been aware that the balance of power alone could not prevent war.<sup>58</sup> But if the alternative to war is the empire of a single state, or even of a world state based around a single center of power, Niebuhr is quite as hostile as he would be to the rule of an elite in domestic politics. The "current" approval Niebuhr gives the balance of power arises not only from its "necessity" but from the fact that it is inherently more just, morally preferable to either of the alternatives described above.<sup>59</sup> For peace itself is not desirable unless it is compatible with the quest for freedom.<sup>60</sup> Of course, peace is a good and especially

so in our day. States should therefore conduct themselves according to the dictates of "enlightened self-interest," seeking to add only so much power as is compatible with the maintenance of international order. To be exact, the policy of states should be a certain moderate variety of imperialism.<sup>61</sup>

This view of international politics is quite characteristic of "realist" theorists; fundamentally it is a kind of nostalgic appeal to the image of nineteenth-century European diplomacy.<sup>62</sup> Such diplomacy not only was permitted the luxury of a large number of centers of power, it was able to look with comparative equanimity on those conflicts which developed into open warfare, and to see such conflict as contributing to historical "progress." That Niebuhr's entire view would be shaken by the development of weapons capable of almost universal destruction is evident. Indeed, he admits that the development of these weapons has upset the traditional balance between "potential good" and "potential evil" in the increase of human power over nature; that balance, of course, is at the core of his concept of historical progress. Men, he concedes, no longer have control of the technology they have created. The power available to man has passed the point where "human contrivance" could harness it to the effort to conquer nature.<sup>63</sup> And Niebuhr is not without a Hobbesian aside to the effect that the peril of universal destruction may cause both the great empires of our time to prefer life to death.<sup>64</sup>

Yet, despite these new perceptions, Niebuhr's theory remains unchanged in its identity with older liberalism. While it is presumably desirable that both empires should prefer life, capitulation is undesirable, because it entails the loss of freedom.<sup>65</sup> And—one must presume—it is undesirable whether the United States or the U.S.S.R. were to be the state capitulating. And, he adds, by far the greater number of states, when confronted with a choice between survival and liberty, have chosen the latter. This is more than an empirical observation. It merely repeats his old argument that to make

<sup>57</sup> SNE 22-27, 146-149, 201-216.

<sup>58</sup> CLCD 173; HD 258, 266, 285.

<sup>59</sup> *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 18 (4 May 1958); SDH 202-205, 208; IAH 2, 18, 40, 77, 91, 97, 129, 133, 140-142; CLCD 161, 172, 187; CPP 125, 42, 15; CRPP 31; WCAR 85-104, 126; FH 121, 129.

<sup>60</sup> *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 10 (20 Feb. 1950); CPP, *passim*; SOT 194; SDH 213; CRPP 136.

<sup>62</sup> Michael Oakeshott, "Scientific Politics," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 1 (March 1948), pp. 347-358; Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," *World Politics*, Vol. 4 (October 1951), pp. 39-65.

<sup>63</sup> SNE ch. xvi, 190-191, 282-290; MMIS 2, 142, 176; REE 91, 99; IAH 10; SDH 36, 222.

<sup>64</sup> SNE 31-32.

<sup>65</sup> SNE 278-279, 25-27.



any other choice would be "morally perverse."<sup>66</sup> As so frequently in his thought, his argument that a given event must take place, given "human nature" or "history," conceals the optimistic assumption that it ought to take place, a point to which we shall return.

Niebuhr's criticism of liberal attitudes toward foreign affairs is that liberals have seen nothing between the nation-state and the "vague universalism" represented by the idea of a world community. But he is not himself without commitments to just such a "vague universalism." Classical political philosophy and much of modern utopian theory took the small state as ideal. Niebuhr rejects the small state not only because of its lack of power but because it cannot satisfy the "limitless demand" of humanity for brotherhood, a demand to the realization of which he also refuses to assign limits.<sup>67</sup> In other words, the demand for "brotherhood" is treated in precisely the same terms as is the demand for freedom. But, though the terms are fundamentally the same, he offers even less discussion of this presumed human goal. This is not at all unique. Liberal and modern discussions of "fraternity" have been few, especially in comparison to the extensive theoretical discussions of the relationship of liberty and equality.<sup>68</sup> This may not have resulted from any sense that the Brotherhood of Man was an unimportant or secondary goal, to be realized on the attainment of liberty and equality, but rather from the belief that human fraternity was the primary goal which could only be achieved when men were free and equal. It is likely that just such a concept unites the two schools of liberalism, the older school which demanded "unfraternal" conduct and competitive ethics in the interest of a "long-run" human unity, and the more sentimental and short-term ethics of modern welfare liberalism.<sup>69</sup> Nor is it accidental that Niebuhr, like most of the early liberals, sees an "irresolvable" tension between "planned justice" and "laissez-faire," yet regards both as legitimate values.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>66</sup> CPP, ch. 1, SNE ch. xvi.

<sup>67</sup> HD 245-246, 85, 95-96; CLCD 48-49, 154, 187; SOT 48, 84; WCAR 47; CRPP 16, 155-158.

<sup>68</sup> Kenneth Benne, "The Uses of Fraternity," *Daedalus*, Vol. 90 (Spring 1961), pp. 233-246.

<sup>69</sup> Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood* (Princeton, 1949).

<sup>70</sup> IAH 108; BT ch. iii; SDH 195-200; DCR 85, 175; "Liberalism: Illusions and Realities," *New Republic*, Vol. 133 (4 July 1955), pp. 11-13; "Liberals and the Marxist Heresy," *id.*, Vol. 129

The universalism of traditional liberalism sought an expression in which peace and freedom would be compatible through the medium of a world federation, as opposed to a world state or empire. Niebuhr has persistently attacked this as an "illusion."<sup>71</sup> Government, he notes, is founded on community, and men will not be frightened into forming a world regime without a sense of community throughout the world. This seeming despair would appear to make his universalism even vaguer than that of the liberals he attacks. But he does not completely give up the goal. The mistake of his opponents is to believe world government possible immediately, without waiting for "history."<sup>72</sup> Man was terrorized out of the state of war and into society and thence to larger political units only by slow historical growth and "accretions" of loyalty and community. Niebuhr is again in agreement with Kant's pre-Darwinian ethic of natural selection, "historical cunning." Implicit in Niebuhr's argument is the conviction that time will bring a world regime into being. Hence his concern with political units between the "parliament of man" and the nation state: with regionalism and with empires. These, presumably, men are sufficiently terrorized to form, given the present stage of the growth of loyalty and community.

Yet by his own showing, the forces and balances which he has relied on to control nature have broken down; his, and the traditional liberal view of history are no longer adequate. One cannot be sure that man and civilization will survive long enough for history. Niebuhr is not without hopes that a disaster can be avoided, presumably long enough for history to do its work. We may, he counsels us, hope for more democracy in the government of the U.S.S.R. This is assumed to be an "improvement" either because of a belief that democracies are peaceful or because a more democratic regime in the U.S.S.R. might be more willing to form a world regime. Yet there is little reason to believe either to be the case, within Niebuhr's theory. For the "freer" a government is, the more it will feel obliged to pursue the aim of adding power; and so the more it will come into conflict with others. Niebuhr apparently connects the hope for increased democracy in the Soviet Union with his belief that war will be best avoided if states are "less rigid and righteous" and if they "realize their involve-

(12 October 1953), pp. 13-15. For the same problem in early liberalism, see E. Halevy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism* (Boston, 1955).

<sup>71</sup> SNE 28, 66-88, 256, 266, 289; CRPP ch. 2.

<sup>72</sup> SNE 279.

ment in a common fate."<sup>73</sup> That is, if they gave up "universalist claims" (but not universalist *beliefs*, such as the belief in the "freedom of all nations") states would be more inclined to accommodate the claims of others, which would be recognized as quite as legitimate as their own. Moreover, it is presumably true that if states did not make universal claims, they would be less inclined to come into conflict with others in the first place. But even if "democratic" states are more likely to lack righteous and rigid attitudes the belief that the absence of such attitudes conduces to peace, however, true, is itself a suggestive one. The absence of rigidity, the willingness to compromise, to accept the interests of others as legitimate, comprise once again the traditional liberal belief in "enlightened self-interest" and in the "natural harmony" of the interests of nations. To be sure, Niebuhr stresses the necessity of the sense of a "common fate." But that sense too was part of the liberal creed in the "vague universalism" to which we have had reference, the belief that free, equal and democratic nations would sense the "brotherhood of nations" just as individuals were to sense human fraternity, and by the same process. That Niebuhr's theory relies a good deal on this sense of community being produced by terror is no new addition. For terror and the fear of violence have long been involved in the modern hope to realize in practice the vision of human brotherhood, from the Machiavellian belief that necessity and the fear of death make men virtuous, through Rousseau's willingness to force men to be free, to Wilson's use of war in the service of universal democracy.<sup>74</sup> Reformation through violence has always been close to the center of the liberal-modernist creed, a creed which, in its Jacobin form, was described so brilliantly by Chamfort, "*Sois mon frère, ou je te tue.*"

#### IV

Niebuhr's dilemma is not his alone. It is the dilemma of modern liberalism, and of those radical ideas based on liberal premises such as

orthodox Marxism. For contemporary events have made the faith in historical progress through struggle, the belief that the vital human goal is the conquest of Nature, and even that man is born with a desire to be free, seem more and more doubtful, dangerous, or irrelevant. In this light the widespread appeal of Niebuhr's work, even to those Morton White calls the "atheists for Niebuhr," can be understood.<sup>75</sup> For as a theologian Niebuhr can do what the secular liberal cannot: he can elevate the doubtful basis of liberalism to an area of "prophetic" and revealed insight where it may be safe from disconfirming experience in the world and criticism at the hands of reason. If there is a cost for the liberal, that his utopia is placed beyond the possibility of complete attainment, then that cost is small considering the added security of his cherished beliefs. For liberals have come to doubt the possibility of that utopia themselves, and Niebuhr's teaching leaves them the chance to approach ever more closely that undefined set of "limits" which he postulates. To the "vague universalism" of liberalism he has added a "vague utopianism" which is both more vague and more secure by being beyond argument in the sphere of faith. His "realism," his repeated attacks on "utopians," and his rhetoric of "metaphysical pathos" merely enable him to avoid a discussion or clarification of the goals which he believes a man or a state should pursue. Niebuhr notes that the moral issue is persistently raised because men "cannot follow their interest without claiming to do so in obedience to some general scheme of values."<sup>76</sup> But what such a comment overlooks is that men cannot know what their "interest" is without reference to some scheme of values. "Interest" is, after all, a term without intrinsic meaning. That Niebuhr, like so many American writers, can use it as though it had such a meaning merely reflects the American "liberal tradition," a connected set of beliefs regarding human nature and moral values which are not discussed at all. He approaches the issues from a curious stance because "realism" is not only a statement of what is practical; when supplemented by a knowledge of man's "free spirit" it is also a statement of what is desirable. The social good is one which "works" for him as for the liberals, because that good is power over nature, the power to "predict and control" the world. The problem of the ends toward

<sup>73</sup> SNE 280-283, 236-238, 276-277, 246-255.

<sup>74</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, "Machiavellian Utopia," *Ethics*, Vol. 55 (January 1945) pp. 145-148; Allan Bloom, "Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community: An Interpretation of Othello," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (March 1960), pp. 130-157, or Michael Polanyi's recently published pamphlet, "Beyond Nihilism." A brilliant and closely related discussion is John F. R. Taylor's "Politics and the Human Covenant," *Centennial Review*, Vol. 6 (Winter 1962), pp. 1-18.

<sup>75</sup> "Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning," *Confluence*, Vol. 3 (1954), pp. 402-412.

<sup>76</sup> "The Moral Issue in International Relations," *op. cit.*, p. 740.

which control should strive may be ignored: control is itself the end. For Niebuhr the free man is in essence the good man; virtue follows automatically from freedom. Man's imperfections arise from his involvement in nature—an inevitable involvement, to be sure, but one rooted in lack of power and not of virtue in the classical sense.

Plato and Aristotle, Niebuhr argues, believed the *polis* to be the "final form" of the state. They believed that the small state was the best for man because they distrusted the expansionist urge and its consequent imperialism. They did not claim, as Niebuhr seems to believe, that the *polis* would always endure. His contention that the empires which succeeded the city state sacrificed order and community for domination would seem to support their view.<sup>77</sup> But the classic theorists were less concerned than Niebuhr with predicting history or with what form of state "works best," preferring to defer such

questions until it became clear what form of state is best and forms the standard of human aspiration.

Niebuhr, the liberals, and many social scientists have excoriated "utopians." But they did not thereby avoid having a utopia. They simply avoided discussing it. And that lack of discussion conceals the fact that they identify ideality with practicality, and virtue with necessity, what works with what is right. If man in our times feels a "prisoner of forces" outside himself, it is often because he has abdicated to those forces the eternal responsibility to articulate a vision of what is best. The very bankruptcy of Niebuhr's ideas, his inability to offer a new vision even at a time when by his showing the old ideas have proved themselves false, may have a function. That bankruptcy may provide us with the courage, as we already have the opportunity, to resume from history and necessity the old quest to discover by reason the nature of the good life, of virtue, and of Utopia.

<sup>77</sup> SNE 42-43, 288.

## COMMUNISM, NATIONALISM AND THE GROWTH OF THE COMMUNIST COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II

PAUL SHOUP  
*Kenyon College*

In the apocalyptic visions of Marx, the world revolution which was to destroy capitalist society was also to sweep away the entire system of nation-states, and in its place to substitute a world proletarian society, a new supra-national community ruled over by the victorious working class.

Of all the prophecies of early Marxism, none proved more ill-founded than this belief in an international socialist order. The revolution, when it came, was confined to Russia. Only after the victories of the Soviet armies in World War II did it become possible to extend Communist rule beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. After less than two decades, this new international Communist community of nations has become divided into blocs of quarrelling states, and the goal of international Communism seems still distant. The Communists, like other universalistic movements of the past, have apparently proved incapable of surmounting the limits of the nation-state system they set out to destroy. Why?

It seems immediately obvious that the Communists were themselves divided by the forces of nationalism. But this observation, while not necessarily incorrect, needs more precise formulation and further analysis. In the pages to follow, the formation and the growth of the Communist community of nations after World War II will be re-examined, to reveal more clearly the dynamics of the process. The central point, which will emerge as the discussion proceeds, is that nationalism did not lie at the root of the centrifugal pressures which appeared within the Communist bloc. Nationalism came later, and when it did, developed a variety of forms which reflected the unique conditions under which each Communist state evolved. Before we get into the details of this process, however, it will be necessary to comment briefly on two points: the meaning of nationalism, and Communist views prior to World War II on the subject of supra-national integration.

### I. THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM

Definitions pose one of the most exasperating problems in all the literature dealing with nationalism. Those who have wrestled with them seem to agree on one point only: nation-

alism is an elusive phenomenon that defies exact description.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, definitions cannot be avoided. This is especially true when dealing with the emergence of nationalism in Communist nations. The confusion which this problem has engendered can often be traced to the lack of common agreement on the meaning of the terms employed. Rather than formulate one comprehensive definition of nationalism, we shall attempt to deal with the difficulty by suggesting several complementary situations, each of which can be said to reflect the presence of nationalism. These distinctions will be useful in analyzing the character which nationalism has assumed in Communist states.

*National Pride.* Many writers have suggested that nationalism is a state of mind in which the individual ascribes special virtues to the national way of life (language, culture, or national history), and so demands that the supreme loyalty of each citizen be given to the individual nation-state.<sup>2</sup> This approach is legitimate if not construed too narrowly. The idea of nationalism may develop in a revolutionary context, in which it can be inspired by ideals which transcend the framework of the nation-state. "Supreme" loyalty to the state is never unconditional: it rests on underlying assumptions of what the desirable state is. For our purposes it is sufficient to allow that *nationalism, is, in one sense, the product of a fundamental attachment to the values embodied in the national culture and history of a people.*

*National Independence.* Nationalism may also refer to the process, so often noted in discussions of international politics, by which states, unsure of each other's motives and seeking the fullest possible security, attempt to maximize their power and maintain their

<sup>1</sup> For a useful summary see Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953), ch. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Hans Kohn defines nationalism as "A state of mind permeating the large majority of the people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the source of all creative cultural energy and well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore rooted in and made possible by its welfare." *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1944), p. 16.

independence of action. Here again, there is no absolute standard for determining what is and what is not a "national" position. Cooperation between nations may be in the national interest, even to the point of giving up considerable freedom of action. On the other hand, nations which are linked through mutual understanding and compatibility of interests may still deem it wise to pursue independent paths which lead to clashes of national interest. Taking these factors into consideration, we suggest that *a second form of nationalism manifests itself in the belief that there exists a fundamental need—arising from fear, lack of understanding, or the unpredictable nature of international politics—for the maintenance of a considerable degree of national independence and for giving priority, in most cases, to one's own immediate national interests.*

*The Nation-State as a Vehicle of Progress.* In the course of the vast social and economic revolutions of the past several centuries, the nation-state has emerged as the most effective sociopolitical mechanism by which change can be stimulated or channelled by a ruling elite or dominant class. There is no need to interpret this process—as the Marxists have done—in terms of narrow class interest. On the contrary, the mechanisms of the state, acting through a national culture or economy, may be used for an infinite variety of purposes, and today these channels of action are more and more becoming associated with the pursuit of economic progress through industrialization.

We therefore suggest that in this day and age *nationalism also reveals itself in the belief that progress toward whatever new goals men aspire to comes about through the creation of the nation-state and the stimulation of its growth, strength and effectiveness, regardless of whether the final end may be narrower than the state (a class or group interest) or universal in scope.*

*National communism* may be interpreted in a number of ways. It may mean the adoption, by a national party, of certain ideas or methods not generally approved by the rest of the Communist bloc. A recent work on the Communist bloc follows this approach in defining national communism as "the explicit assignment of priority to internal considerations even if openly challenged by those who consider themselves to be the central spokesmen of international communism."<sup>3</sup> Such a situation could of course arise even if nationalism never entered into the picture. Our own interpretation of national communism, to be given later, will suggest that

the term is most appropriately used in association with the third type of nationalism just described.

## II. VIEWS ON SUPRA-NATIONAL INTEGRATION PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

Before the Second World War the Communists gave surprisingly little attention to the subject of the integration of states into a supra-national community. Early Marxist writings seldom bothered with the issue, for it was assumed that the victory of the proletariat would bring the final destruction of the nation-state system.<sup>4</sup> After the victory of communism in the Soviet Union, reference was made to a World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics, but discussion even of this goal vanished in the 1930s.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, the Soviet party prior to World War II developed positions on the question of nationalism and relations among Communist parties that were of central importance for any future Communist community of nations. Although these developments were complex, we can only deal briefly with them here.

First, communism came to be identified with suppressed national aspirations, a position we shall refer to as "revolutionary nationalism." Revolutionary nationalism differed from the original Marxist views insofar as it recognized the importance of national feelings and encouraged the notion that every nationality exhibits its own particular virtues (language, culture, history) and therefore enjoys the right to its own existence. The practice of appealing to revolutionary nationalism first arose during the Russian revolution and was later extended to the colonial countries. The doctrine was fully articulated in the theory of Soviet federalism, according to which each Soviet Republic was "sovereign" and free to develop national cultural forms with a socialist content.

Second, the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia established the doctrine as well as the fact that the world Communist movement would operate on the basis of monolithic unity under the control of the Soviet party. The dogmatic insistence on the need for monolithic unity, and the ruthless fashion in which the Soviet party applied this Leninist precept, are

<sup>4</sup> Marx and Engels wrote little on the national problem. For their views, see E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. I (New York, 1951), pp. 410–28 and Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 1957), ch. 1.

<sup>5</sup> For Communist views on the world state, see Elliot Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York, 1960), ch. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, 1960), p. 62.

too well known to require further elucidation.

Third, the consolidation of Stalin's power in the Soviet Union was paralleled by the growth of Soviet nationalism. The necessity of building socialism in one country encouraged a fusion of Russian nationalism and Soviet patriotism; Soviet totalitarianism, when it matured in the 1930s, proved to be a blend of both revolutionary and traditional Russian elements.<sup>6</sup> The international Communist movement, under Soviet leadership, was forced to subordinate the aim of world revolution to the national interests of the Soviet Union—often to the discomfiture of communist parties in other countries.

At first glance it might seem difficult to reconcile the doctrines of revolutionary nationalism, monolithic unity and the supremacy of Soviet national interests. For some, of course, it was more than difficult; it became impossible. But for the hard-core Communists who were later to come to power in Eastern Europe, the Communist interpretation of these problems was consistent and beyond criticism. Revolutionary nationalism, although it tolerated a certain degree of national feeling, made a sharp distinction between "Socialist patriotism" (which was acceptable) and "nationalism" (always a pejorative term). Nationalism was associated with attachment to a pre-revolutionary way of life and a refusal to give supreme loyalty to the goal of world communism. Ultimately, the toleration of national cultures would lead to their fusion in a world socialist culture; when this point was reached, concessions to revolutionary nationalism would no longer be necessary.<sup>7</sup> Dedicated Communists saw no contradiction in subordinating themselves to an international movement whose primary aim was to advance the interests of the Soviet Union; after all, the Soviet Union stood alone, encircled by capitalist foes, and the first duty of Communists everywhere was to come to her defense. Revolutionary unity, under the leadership of the Soviet party, was accepted as an absolutely necessary pre-condition for the success of the revolution in other parts of the world.

In general, the Communist approach to the problem of establishing an international socialist system was conditioned by the importance of the current struggle to defend the Soviet Union and strengthen the revolutionary move-

ment in capitalist countries. No concrete plans seem to have been made to meet the problems which would arise if Communist states were formed outside the Soviet Union, in particular in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless there were some hints, long prior to the war, of the eventual Soviet view on the form of a Communist community of nations. There is evidence that Stalin himself did not fully accept the position that Soviet federalism could be applied at the international level.<sup>8</sup> Another fact of importance was the introduction in the mid-1930s of the idea of "Proletarian United Front Governments."<sup>9</sup> These were to be transitional, between bour-

<sup>8</sup> At the 2d Congress of the Comintern in 1920 Stalin suggested that the future international Communist community be designated a confederation ("an alliance of independent states") out of consideration for national differences, rather than a federation, which was the appropriate form within the framework of the old Russian Empire. Lenin rejected the proposal, and the future world state was referred to as a federation. See Goodman, pp. 232-33. Earlier, in his work *Marrism and the National Question*, Stalin had shown a rather conservative view toward socialist internationalism by incorporating elements into his description of the nation which magnified the importance of the nation and were therefore unacceptable to Lenin at the time. See Pipes, p. 39. Stalin also made a connection between national conditions and forms of Communist rule when, in 1928, he suggested that nations in which capitalism had only begun to develop (Poland and Rumania were used as examples) could not adopt Soviet institutions immediately; rather, these were areas where "the victory of the revolution, in order to lead to a proletarian dictatorship, can and will certainly require certain intermediate stages, in the form, say, of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" *Works*, Vol. XI (Moscow, 1954), p. 162. The rationale for a transitional period is here based on socio-economic conditions, and should be distinguished from the reasons behind the proposals for "proletarian united front governments" in the 1930s (*infra*).

<sup>9</sup> "If . . . it will prove possible, and necessary, in the interests of the proletariat, to create a *proletarian united front government*, which is not yet a government of the proletarian dictatorship, but one which undertakes to put into effect decisive measures against fascism and reaction, the Communist Party must see to it that such a government is formed . . ." (italics in the original). *Resolutions, Seventh Congress of the Communist International* (New York, Workers Library), pp. 30-31.

<sup>6</sup> These developments are analyzed in detail in Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York, 1956).

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the future world culture as interpreted by the Communists, see Goodman, ch. 7.

geois democracy and socialism, Communist-dominated, and apparently free from any machinery of supra-national control or coordination. In fact, they were the original concept from which the "Peoples' Democracies" of Eastern Europe developed after the war.

### III. THE METHOD OF CONSOLIDATING COMMUNIST POWER IN EASTERN EUROPE

On the basis of this ill-digested body of doctrines concerning the world Communist state, the construction of a new Communist community of nations began after World War II. The power of the Soviet Union was such that she might conceivably have absorbed these nations directly into the Soviet federation. But a host of practical considerations weighed against this course of action. It would have needlessly antagonized the West, weakened the international Communist movement, and, at the very least, complicated enormously the tasks of occupation, if it did not, indeed, provoke the peoples of Eastern Europe to revolt against the newly established Communist regimes. National differences in Eastern Europe were simply too great to be ignored. On similar grounds Hitler in 1940 had chosen to establish the Vichy regime rather than occupy all France; and a century earlier, *mutatis mutandis*, the British had preferred a system of indirect rule in India and elsewhere. Purely tactical considerations were therefore sufficient to dictate a policy of Soviet caution in integrating the new states within some supra-national framework.

These differences among the peoples of Eastern Europe did not, however, exist within the national Communist parties. The party leaders in Eastern Europe were a group apart, trained and selected by Moscow in the years prior to the war. They came to power convinced of the need for monolithic unity, contemptuous of the bourgeois nationalism of the people, and eager to begin the process which would eventually lead to a new supranational Communist order. The strong national feelings of the people were not, therefore, automatically transferred to the Communists who assumed power in Eastern Europe. Nor did the obvious obstacles to immediate integration of the newly formed Communist nations imposed by the attitude of their masses rule out the formulation of a policy by which this goal might sooner or later be achieved.

A different sort of difficulty arose from the fact that Moscow now had to deal with established parties and official governments rather than with the revolutionary movements which had struggled so desperately to survive between the two world wars. Indeed, it was unwise in

the altered circumstances to formalize the power of the Soviet party over the new officials in Eastern Europe in a set of rules analogous to those which existed within each party. And it would seem only natural that the national party leaders, under the influence of their lately acquired power and prestige, might interpret a too direct Soviet supervision of their actions as unwarranted control over the "domestic" affairs of the nation.

It would be wrong, however, to consider this new-found legality a decisive factor for the development of the Communist system in Eastern Europe after the war. In all likelihood the majority of national party leaders did feel that their new formal authority should be acknowledged by the Soviet Union. But the proper limits of interference by Moscow were never clearly defined, and practical necessities kept reminding them of their dependence on the Russians. More important, the Communist leaders of Eastern Europe continued to acknowledge the primacy of Moscow in all matters touching on the monolithic unity of the bloc, a position which, in the last analysis, recognized the right of the Soviet party to play a decisive role in the concerns of the national parties.

Finally, it could be argued that the Communist parties of Eastern Europe had, in coming to power, assumed the burden of protecting the national interests of their peoples, and that this was bound to create special problems which did not exist before the war by revealing the contradictions involved in equating the interests of each Communist party with the national interests of the Soviet Union.

While there is much to be said for this interpretation of the situation created by the formation of Communist governments outside the Soviet Union, it leaves too much unexplained. Although not couched exactly in these terms, the discussion in the pages to follow will be aimed at analyzing more closely just what "national interest" meant in the context of the Communists' views on the method to be pursued in constructing a totalitarian system in Eastern Europe. For the postwar developments in Eastern Europe cannot be fully understood without reference to a broader issue closely connected with the ultimate aim of supra-national integration: the method by which Communist power was to be consolidated throughout the bloc as a whole. Although means, not ultimate ends, may originally have been at stake, this was not the first occasion in the Communist experience when means became ends in themselves and profoundly influenced the course of Communist evolution.

Theoretical analyses of totalitarianism agree

on its built-in bias toward unlimited expansion.<sup>10</sup> But there is also agreement that a totalitarian system may, through its own methods of operation, put obstacles in its path to world domination. The Nazi method of empire building was an obvious case in point. The Stalinist type of totalitarianism, we think, must also be analyzed from this point of view.

To understand how Soviet totalitarianism developed in ways detrimental to its own universalistic aspirations, we must re-examine the concept of building socialism in one country alone. The idea was a natural one, since world revolution did not seem imminent. But the decision to pursue such a policy was arbitrary in so far as it implied that circumstances unfavorable to the creation of a Communist utopia (the existing obstacles to the creation of an advanced economy or socialist society, such as lack of a working class) could be overcome by sheer determination and will on the part of the revolutionary party and its leadership. This underlying assumption became a mystique in the Soviet Union with the emergence of Stalinist totalitarianism in the 1930s. To its disciples, Soviet development seemed to prove that by mobilizing political power through a disciplined party one might destroy the existing society, build up an industrial base, and attain socialism through one's own efforts. The size of the country, and other material factors relevant to its potential industrial capacity, were largely overlooked.

We think these assumptions, so different from the original precepts of world revolution, were in fact a decisive influence on the development of the international Communist community. After World War II a strong bias arose toward transforming the principle of building totalitarianism ("socialism") in one country alone into a more general principle which, for want of a more appropriate term, we may call the building of Communist totalitarianism in each country separately.

Did the Soviet Union actively inculcate this notion among national party leaders in Eastern Europe after World War II? The answer to this question is by no means clear-cut, for the Soviet position was shifting and ambiguous. First let us deal with its ideological aspects, and then turn to the practical policies guiding Soviet actions in the satellite nations.

In Soviet writings after the war the Commu-

nist states of Eastern Europe were referred to as "Peoples' Democracies," a transitional form of Communist rule less advanced than the Soviet Union's. The significance of the Peoples' Democracies was first said to lie in the fact that they were pioneers in the development of a new path to socialism.<sup>11</sup> After 1948 (the year of the Soviet-Yugoslav break) the line changed, and Soviet writers insisted that Peoples' Democracies were following the laws of development first applied in the Soviet Union. "National" roads to communism—such as Tito's—were made the object of a vicious, uncompromising attack.

The earlier interpretation of the meaning of People's Democracy seemed a linear descendant of the pre-war notion of the "Proletarian United Front Government."<sup>12</sup> This view suggested that conditions in Eastern Europe precluded simple imitation of Soviet development. For this reason, it might be expected to find favor among those satellite leaders who wished to build socialism in one country by adapting Soviet practices to local conditions. By comparison, the post-1948, "narrow" interpretation of People's Democracy left the satellites with little room for independent development. But it is important to note—and this is often overlooked—that after 1948 it was clearly spelled out for the first time that each Eastern European nation, since it must follow the Soviet path, *could* do so. Soviet socialism could be duplicated in each Communist state. Communist totalitarianism could be built in each country separately.

In one sense, at least, this suggested more, not less power for the new Communist states: if the East European nations could duplicate the Soviet performance, they might one day become her equals. Imitation of the Soviet Union, after all, did not necessarily imply subordination and dependence. It could also mean power and independence for each Communist nation separately. But the Soviets were at pains to

<sup>11</sup> See the remarks of E. Varga that "the social structure of these states is distinguished from all known to us up to now; it appears as something completely new in the history of humanity." "Demokratia novago tipa," *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, No. 3, 1947, p. 3. For an exhaustive analysis of the term see H. Gordon Skilling, "People's Democracy in Soviet Theory," *Soviet Studies*, III, pp. 16-33 and 131-49.

<sup>12</sup> The origins of the theory of People's Democracy have been the source of some disagreement. For other views, cf. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, ch. 2, and G. Ginsburgs, *Soviet Studies*, XIII, p. 451.

<sup>10</sup> See Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, 1956), ch. 6, and Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1958), p. 391.



deny just this set of conclusions after 1948. It was claimed instead that the formation and development of the Peoples' Democracies rested on the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after World War II. Indeed, the aim of Soviet policy after 1948 was to bind the satellites even more tightly to the Soviet Union, and the new version of Peoples' Democracy was rightly interpreted as one means to this end.

The ideological issue was even more complex than this brief summary suggests. But enough has been said to indicate that national party leaders, especially those most imbued with Stalinist concepts of building totalitarianism in each country separately, might accept the premise of Soviet theory—the necessity of following Soviet laws of development—and reject the important *caveat* that the process would result in greater, not less, dependence on the Soviet Union.

The policy of the Soviet Union in regard to economic and political matters also suggested that the methods of building totalitarianism in each country separately were being applied, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, to build communism and to favor the narrow interests of the Soviet Union.

As noted earlier, Stalin had on occasion made a distinction between the federal form of government, suitable for the Soviet Union, and a looser confederation, suitable for a number of Communist states. In the years 1945–1948, Soviet policy went to considerable lengths to adjust to the special problems facing the formation of an integrated Communist community among formerly independent nation-states. During this time satellite leaders were permitted a degree of flexibility which allowed them to consolidate their power in accordance with local conditions.<sup>13</sup> In 1948 a reversal of policy took place. The national parties were then forced to apply Soviet cultural standards as well as Soviet political methods without regard for local conditions or the national feelings of the population.

Even after 1948, however, there was ample

evidence that the Soviets continued to develop their policies within the framework of the existing pattern of nation-states in Eastern Europe. One striking example of this was the manner in which treaties between the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe adhered to traditional concepts of territorial integrity and diplomatic rights.<sup>14</sup> More important was the increasing emphasis on autarchic economic development<sup>15</sup> within each Eastern European state after 1948. The exact reasons for the adoption of such a policy have remained a source of debate. Both the Soviets and the satellites seem to have had complete faith in the methods of economic development which had worked so well in the Soviet Union, even when the arguments for economic autarchy would seem difficult to justify under East European conditions.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, Stalin's sup-

<sup>14</sup> See John N. Hazard, "Soviet Socialism as a Public Order System," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1959, pp. 36–37. Border treaties carefully dealt with questions of land mass, waterways and airspace in a manner designed to protect the sovereign rights of each partner. Consular conventions between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies carefully defined diplomatic privileges and immunities—including the right to the use of cipher in communicating with the home country!

<sup>15</sup> Although the term "economic autarchy" is normally used to describe the economic development of Eastern Europe in this period, the situation was complicated by the fact that each of the Eastern European nations depended heavily on trade, especially with the Soviet Union, to supply it with basic raw materials, and further by the tendency of the major partner to set the terms of this trade to its own advantage. Still, autarchy—in the sense of constructing all the components of heavy industry—was the goal of these countries.

<sup>16</sup> The economic benefits of such a policy for Eastern Europe were argued by David Granick, "The Pattern of Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe and Its Relations to Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 68, pp. 366–400. Granick suggested that the satellites were following a policy of "balanced national economy," meaning that "each country should produce sufficient agricultural and industrial products to meet its own consumption needs, that it should provide the means of production necessary to make this possible, and that the remainder of its production should be geared to heavy industry and the construction of machinery with which to further industrialize its economy." Dealing with this problem at a later date, Granick suggested that the forced pace of economic development led

<sup>13</sup> See Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, pp. 32–36, for a description of how the Eastern European parties and the Soviet Union adjusted their policies in the light of the strong nationalism of the Eastern European peoples immediately after the war. Brzezinski emphasizes how, in this period, the national parties masked their designs under appeals to national interests. Thus (p. 36), "the founding declaration of the Polish Workers (Communist) Party reads almost like a national harangue."

port for this policy can be interpreted as consistent with his desire to isolate the satellite nations from one another in order to assure their control by the Soviet Union. Stalin may also have calculated that self-contained autarchic development would permit the maximum exploitation of the East European economies.<sup>17</sup>

In our opinion, Stalin accepted the principle

to repeated bottle-necks and uncertainty of supply, compensated by efforts to be self-sufficient. This general pressure toward autarchy can be observed in the Soviet enterprise and can be extended, in principle, to the nations of the Communist bloc. See Norman J. G. Pounds and Nicolai Spulber (eds.), *Resources and Planning in Eastern Europe*, p. 140. The small size of the Eastern European states may not have been as great a barrier to the policy of economic autarchy as was once thought; a recent discussion of the economic problems posed by the limited size of nations suggests that it is easy to over-estimate the role of economies of scale achieved by large states. See Austin Robinson (ed.), *The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations* (New York, 1960), p. xvii. Only in "small" countries of under 10 to 15 million do economies of scale make it unwise to engage in the construction of certain key industries such as large machine tools or heavy electrical equipment (without access to an adequate foreign market). This very rough criterion suggests that in Eastern Europe, Albania and Bulgaria were too small to engage in an all-out program of heavy industry construction, while Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia were borderline cases.

On the other hand, the policy of economic autarchy produced obvious distortions in the Eastern European economies, and was subject to bitter attack after 1955 by the more liberal Communist elements as economically indefensible. See Imre Nagy, *On Communism* (New York, 1957), ch. 20, and Oscar Lange, *The Political Economy of Socialism* (The Hague, 1958).

<sup>17</sup> Granick, in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, rejected the thesis that the pattern of economic development in Eastern Europe was governed by Soviet interests in exploiting the area, suggesting that if this were the case, the Soviet Union would not have encouraged heavy industry, but a type of economy more complementary to her own (consumer goods, for example). For a contrary view—that the Soviets were primarily interested in exploiting the East European economies in the Stalinist period—see Alfred Zauberman, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," *Problems of Communism*, VIII, No. 4, pp. 23-29.

of building totalitarianism in each country separately as the basic method of consolidating Communist rule. Within, and sometimes contrary to this principle, he attempted to exploit and control the satellite nations. Certainly the frame of reference for the international Communist community as a whole, even before 1948, was the duplication, through a series of stages, of Soviet development within the existing nation-state system, rather than political and economic integration throughout the bloc as a whole. The pattern of development which was to lead to a world Communist state was therefore unique. It was not integrative so much as it was reproductive. One could say that each nation was going along parallel tracks, guided by Moscow. More concretely each was engaged in an effort to duplicate, *in toto*, the structure of Soviet totalitarianism.

#### IV. STRAINS IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC AFTER WORLD WAR II

As a result of the Communist approach to the problem of consolidating power, the historical nation-state came to have a central importance for those Communists faced with the postwar task of constructing a totalitarian system in Eastern Europe. The ultimate goal was still to create a uniform pattern of totalitarian rule that would destroy all differences among nations. But it is clear from the discussion of People's Democracy above that considerable confusion prevailed concerning the immediate consequences of the development of totalitarianism in each country separately.

Broadly speaking, three possible alternatives were envisaged: (i) the nation in question might develop a form of Communist rule somewhat different from that in the Soviet Union but adapted to her own conditions (a pattern hereinafter referred to as "domesticism"<sup>18</sup>); (ii) the nation might adopt Soviet institutions and practices in their entirety but remain so dependent on the Soviet Union that any form of integration would only make permanent the inferior status of the satellite nation and its party; (iii) the nation might pattern herself after the Soviet Union in the belief that the successful construction of a totalitarian state required (and would lead to) the duplication not only of Soviet institutions, but also of Soviet power. In this case integration, if and when it took place, would have to be among equals.

<sup>18</sup> A term coined by Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, p. 52, to refer to the adaptation to local circumstances by a national party within the general pattern.

The kinds of problems that arose in relations between members of the Communist bloc after World War II can be associated, for the most part, with attempts to pursue one or another of these courses of development. It might be supposed that the choice among these alternatives, since it revolved around means rather than ultimate ends, would not necessarily have been of importance for the new Communist nations. Yet the dynamics of the process did indeed create strains between the national parties and Moscow, and ultimately prejudiced the end of supranational integration itself.

The manner in which Eastern Europe developed these distinctive patterns is well known. In the countries where the national parties were weak (such as Poland), there was a tendency to accept the first alternative suggested above—domesticism. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the third alternative—the duplication of Soviet institutions *and* Soviet power—came to be accepted as the only proper method of building communism in each country separately. After 1948, the nations within the Soviet orbit were forced to accept the second course—duplication of Soviet institutions artificially and with extreme reliance on Soviet power.

The trend toward domesticism has sometimes seemed to be potentially the most divisive force. It is closely associated with nationalism and the desire to question the infallibility of Soviet methods. But such an interpretation makes too mechanical a connection between the lingering effects of nationalism and the dynamics of Communist development—at least in the years immediately after the war. If our analysis is correct, the trend toward domesticism in the immediate postwar period was not a preferred choice but essentially a sign of weakness among parties that were not yet able to duplicate the Soviet pattern of development. Poland is a case in point. Here, opposition to the Soviet demands for conformity from the satellites in 1948 was inspired not by a wish to pioneer in the development of new institutions, but by a desire to move slowly in the introduction of Soviet methods, especially in the field of agriculture.<sup>19</sup>

It was the Yugoslav path to Communism which, as events proved, posed the greatest threat to the unity of the Communist bloc. The Yugoslav case is extremely instructive, for the party leaders, working in a multi-national state to begin with, had no strong national loyalties and were the most eager, among the Communists of Eastern Europe, to follow the Soviet

path of development. On the other hand the Yugoslav Communists had, since the time of the Partisan campaigns in World War II, developed the habit of independent thinking and an overbearing confidence in their own abilities. This arrogance has been well described as "Partisan chauvinism." It led the Yugoslav Communist Party to believe that it was the dominant party in the Balkans and not unnaturally produced friction with the Soviet leadership. Many of the difficulties that then arose, far from being peculiarly national in origin, can be traced back to differences over the tactics to be pursued in the world revolutionary struggle for the consolidation and spread of Communist power.<sup>20</sup>

The dispute between the Yugoslav and Soviet parties might be described in this context alone. But to do so would overlook another essential element in the struggle. The Yugoslav Communists had been led, by their very success in building communism, to believe that they had become indispensable for the task of socialist construction in Yugoslavia. Within the broad and ambiguous bounds of the prevailing mystique of building totalitarianism in each country separately, this position of duplicating Soviet institutions *and* power seemed absolutely orthodox to the Yugoslav Communists, although it immediately precipitated them into conflict with the Soviet party. Matters were only made worse when the Soviets accused the Yugoslavs of moving *too fast* down the road to socialism.<sup>21</sup> Correctly or not, their own Stalinist outlook led Tito and his associates to the conclusion that Moscow, by questioning the means pursued by the Yugoslav Communist party, had renounced the end of socialism itself—at least as far as Yugoslavia was concerned. Thus fortified by the belief that the very fate of the revolution was at stake in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Communists were able to take the momentous step of openly defying the military, political and ideological pressures brought to bear by the Soviet Union.

The Chinese party also adhered to the method of building communism followed by the Yugoslavs. Stalin learned from his experience in 1948 that strong-arm tactics could not re-

<sup>20</sup> There is evidence that the Yugoslavs associated themselves with the Zhdanov faction within the Soviet leadership, and that the discrediting of this group in the spring of 1948 helped touch off the attack on Yugoslavia. See R. Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (New York, 1961), pp. 101-02.

<sup>21</sup> See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London, 1948).

<sup>19</sup> See Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 174-78.

verse this trend, while the Chinese, for their part, were careful not to provoke a split with the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> The outward unity between these two great Communist powers could nevertheless not disguise the fact that the Chinese party had decided upon an autarchic path of economic development resting on an independent power base. Thus it came to pass that historical national boundaries, which should only have been incidental factors in Communist plans for the future world society, came instead to represent crucial dividing lines between separate, and often clashing, concentrations of power.

#### V. THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM

We can now return to the problem of nationalism and inquire more closely into its role in the development of the Communist bloc after World War II. Nationalism, as already noted, should be considered in its several meanings: first, as a positive commitment to the values embodied in the national culture and history; second, as a belief in the fundamental need to maintain independence in the international sphere; and third, as a belief that progress comes about through the vehicle of the nation-state. "National communism" was tentatively associated with this third type of nationalism.

Following one line of argument, the failure of the Communists to establish a supra-national state after World War II could be interpreted as the last of a series of concessions on the part of communism to one or another of these forms of nationalism. In support of this theory one could point to the acceptance of the idea of revolutionary nationalism; the rise of aggressive Soviet chauvinism; and, finally, the application of the concept of building totalitarianism in each country separately. The logical conclusion, after such an enumeration, might be that nationalism had swallowed communism.

Yet this view oversimplifies the situation. Our analysis has not indicated that the first type of nationalism listed above was of crucial importance after the war: *i.e.*, that the Communist leaders of Eastern Europe were infected with the nationalistic prejudices of the former ruling groups in their countries, or that Soviet chauvinism came into immediate conflict with the principles associated with revolutionary nationalism. Nor would it be correct to say that Tito's national communism, although it gave priority to the interests of the Yugoslav state, was originally motivated by a belief in the

desirability of establishing independence for Yugoslavia in the international sphere (the second type above).

Might we say that the pattern of development in the Communist bloc after World War II reflected the acceptance of nationalism in the third sense—the belief that progress is accomplished through development of the nation-state? Here we meet a curious paradox. As we have described it, the process of building Stalinist totalitarianism took place within the boundaries of existing historical states for precisely the opposite reason, not out of a desire to strengthen the nation-state, but in order to carry out more swiftly the "de-nationalization" of the states concerned and the "atomization" of their populations.

On the other hand, those who most faithfully followed the Soviet method of building totalitarianism—the Yugoslavs and the Chinese—came almost immediately to champion the need and desirability of an independent power base built within the existing pattern of nation-states, in order to carry out the construction of a Communist totalitarian state in the most ruthless and effective manner. The result was at least in the short run, to reinforce rather than to destroy the role of the nation-state as vehicle of change.

Some of the reasons why this was so have already been suggested: the difficulty of insisting on uniform practices throughout the Communist bloc at an early stage of its development before national differences had been levelled; the feelings of the Yugoslavs and Chinese that the rapid progress of communism in their state was the result of their own efforts; and, finally, the suspicion that Moscow did not actually wish communism to develop as rapidly in these countries as the national leaders felt was possible.

The most important point remains, however: the context in which these problems arose: the doctrine of building totalitarianism in each country separately. This perspective, by assuming that industrialism and socialism were the product of political factors, completely divorced the concept of progress through economic betterment from its original class determinants (the international proletariat) or environmental factors (resources, population, the location of markets) and gave the concept of the nation-state a new significance which, although the product of the totalitarian mentality, was akin to the third type of nationalism we have distinguished.

As long as this mystique held sway it would seem impossible to envisage any real integr-

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Brzezinski, "Deviation Control," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (March 1962), pp. 5-22.

tion of the Communist bloc under the conditions prevailing after World War II. Upon reflection it seems clear that none of the three alternative modes of building communism in each country separately (domesticism; the duplication of Soviet institutions on a weak power base; the duplication of Soviet institutions and Soviet power) could really create the pre-conditions for integration. The most likely path in the short run, the duplication of Soviet institutions on a weak power base, was thoroughly compromised by the Stalinist excesses between 1948 and 1953. Domesticism was either the result of weakness (the situation in most European nations between 1945 and 1948) or was transformed into a reaction against Stalinist exploitation. In the former case it was largely a temporary phenomenon; in the latter, an explosive force that stimulated a national reaction against the whole idea of duplicating Soviet institutions—of which more presently.

Building Soviet institutions and power might seem the most realistic path to eventual integration if all the parties in question were willing to accept each other as equals. Militating against this solution, however, was a dogma equally as strong as that of building totalitarianism in each country separately—that of monolithic solidarity based on the dominance of one party. This latter principle, usually considered a cohesive force in the Communist bloc, was ultimately responsible for the collapse of the Communist international order, for it made integration between equals an impossibility and forced the more radical and powerful parties of Yugoslavia and China to abandon the goal of integration entirely.

In general, the articulation of nationalism in its more concrete forms begins in each Communist country *after* these alternative paths to integration have been foreclosed, and the doctrine of building socialism in each country separately is no longer viewed as a means to an end but as an end in itself. In its least complicated aspect, such nationalism should most closely resemble the third type of nationalism we have mentioned (the belief that progress is made possible through developing the nation-state). And its identification would be most sure when a Communist country has incorporated this idea into its ideological view of the national question.

Yugoslavia has, indeed, made such an ideological re-evaluation, criticizing the canons of Marxism-Leninism in this field—in particular, Stalin's *Marxism and the National Question*. The present Yugoslav view is strongly internationalistic. But it departs significantly from

earlier Marxist-Leninist views by stressing the essential role of the nation-state in the building of socialism, even after the revolution.<sup>23</sup>

Whether articulated in the ideology or not, the primary role of this third type of nationalism has been to facilitate a re-interpretation of the *goals* of communism in the light of national capabilities. The process should be distinguished from the domesticism of the period immediately following World War II and in our view is the only case where the term national communism is correctly applicable. The development of Titoism in Yugoslavia illustrates this type of change. The introduction of the communes in China is a similar, although less clear-cut, example.

The Soviet Union, after several years of hesitation in the mid 1950s, has now launched a counter-attack within her own orbit against this form of nationalism. Khrushchev, while avoiding the excesses of the Stalinist period, has pressed the nations of Eastern Europe to adopt Soviet practices, especially the collectivization of agriculture. These nations are now to work for the elimination of differences in levels of economic development within their own ranks. Eventually, they are to reach the same stage of development as the Soviet Union, and all will enter the stage of "communism" more or less simultaneously.<sup>24</sup> The emphasis on eliminating differences within the bloc has been paralleled by a cautious modification of the principle of economic autarchy, and forms of economic cooperation unknown in the Stalinist era have

<sup>23</sup> See, in particular, Sperans [Edvard Kardelj], *Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja* (2d ed; Belgrade, 1958). Kardelj defined the nation as "a specific community of peoples arising on the basis of the social division of labor in the epoch of capitalism in a compact territory and within the framework of a common language and close ethnic and cultural similarity in general" (p. 104). The insertion of the phrase, "on the basis of the social division of labor in the epoch of capitalism," differentiates this from Stalin's classic definition of a nation given in *Marxism and the National Question*. For Kardelj, this addition was meant to signify that nations are a progressive factor in developing socio-economic relations, and will not disappear until they have exhausted their functions in this regard, the victory of a Communist revolution notwithstanding.

<sup>24</sup> A statement of these plans for Eastern Europe can be found in the *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Part Two, Section VI, "Communist Construction in the USSR and Cooperation of the Socialist Countries."

now developed within the Soviet sphere.<sup>25</sup>

By re-examining the practice of economic autarchy, the nations of the Soviet bloc have initiated a trend away from the dogma of building totalitarianism in each country separately. Conceivably, this could lead to new forms of integration impossible in the Stalinist period. In practice, however, each satellite state has resisted proposals which would work to its own economic disadvantage.<sup>26</sup> These disagreements have operated to strengthen the feeling that each country must protect its own interests in building socialism, thus encouraging the type of nationalism about which we are speaking. Poland has even refused to collectivize agriculture, and sustains a form of national communism in which the goals of socialism are re-interpreted in accordance with local Polish conditions. The Communist world as a whole seems to have reached a stage where competing modes of socialism encourage, to an ever greater degree, the identification of national institutions with universally desired ends.

It would still be premature, however, to predict the ultimate victory of nationalism over communism in this way. No fixed pattern has yet emerged. Much will depend on the future commitment of each nation to autarchic economic development. It would also be misleading, in our opinion, to identify centrifugal forces within the Communist bloc solely, or even primarily, with this form of nationalism. In Yugoslavia, for example, the trend toward nationalism must also be measured by the degree to which the regime has stressed non-alignment in foreign affairs and the protection of immediate national interests (the second type of nationalism described earlier). Yugoslavia interprets many of her most vital inter-

ests from the perspective of a neutral power in the East-West struggle, and this stand, far more than her domestic innovations, has led to Yugoslavia's isolation from the rest of the Communist world.

The crystallization of the second type of nationalism takes place, we would suggest, *after* a Communist nation is isolated from the bloc by a concerted attack against its leadership.<sup>27</sup> Such a country is then obliged to consider its former partners as enemies and potential aggressors. This situation—and therefore the nationalism it breeds—seems most likely to arise in the case of small Communist states whose powers of resistance to attack by the rest of the bloc have been underestimated by Moscow (Yugoslavia, and now, perhaps, Albania). Unfortunately for the West, this second form of nationalism, while it is of decisive importance for the balance of power in the cold war, is therefore apt to develop in the least important of the Communist states.

The failure of post-war plans to consolidate the Communist bloc have also created conditions for the appearance of the first type of nationalism (a positive commitment to the values embodied in the national culture and history). Here again the pattern is a complex one, and generalizations are dangerous. Some brief comments may nevertheless serve to clarify the problem. First, if nationalism was to appear in this form a necessary preliminary was to re-interpret the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism in such a way that it could provide a link with the bourgeois nationalism of the masses and the pre-revolutionary ruling elites. In Yugoslavia and China, the ground was laid for such a step by the attempt to build socialism on an independent power base. Under such conditions, a gradual infusion of nationalistic values into the system would enable the leadership to strengthen its power and thus actually facilitate a rapid transformation of the society and the economy.<sup>28</sup> In this case, a parallel can

<sup>25</sup> For the development of economic integration generally, see Zauberman, pp. 23–29. Information on the coordination of heavy industry under the Council for Mutual Economic Aid can be found in Nikolai Kent, "Soviet Plans for Developing Heavy Industry in the Satellite Countries," *Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR*, VIII, No. 2, pp. 3–9. *Eastern Europe*, XI, No. 7, p. 30, contains an account of recent developments, including the publication of the "Basic Principles of the International Division of Labor," approved at the June, 1962, meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. For the principles governing economic integration see the reference in note 24, above.

<sup>26</sup> The differences among the Eastern European states over economic interests are well described by Michael Gamarnikow, "The Future of COMECON," *East Europe*, XI, No. 6, pp. 3–10.

<sup>27</sup> The origins of such a dispute are, of course, quite another matter. In the Yugoslav case, as we have seen, nationalism of the second type was a result, not a cause, of the break with the Soviet Union.

<sup>28</sup> Thus, in 1958 in China the Great Leap Forward, by departing from accepted methods of industrialization and putting great strains on the Chinese social and economic structure, gave rise to nationalistic appeals to discard Western methods in favor of traditional Chinese practices in the sciences, medicine, and other fields. See Geoffrey Hudson, *et al.*, *The Chinese Communes* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1960), p. 35. Conditions in

be drawn with the growth of Soviet nationalism in the 1930s. In the East European satellites of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, revolutionary nationalism came to be associated with bourgeois national values as a result of the reaction against Soviet cultural chauvinism in the period 1948-1953. The situation at that time encouraged the Communists of these nations to identify their plight with that of the oppressed peoples of the non-Communist world for whom the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism had originally been formulated. In its origins, therefore, this reaction did not imply a re-interpretation of the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism, but only a demand that the doctrine be faithfully observed. When the satellite leaders realized the necessity of re-establishing links with the masses after the campaign to duplicate Soviet institutions on a weak power base was abandoned in the post-Stalin period, the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism became infused with nationalistic elements, above all in Poland and Hungary.

Local conditions must be taken into account from this point on. The decisive stage in the development of this type of nationalism comes when the nation in question admits to an historical continuity between past and present, between the pre- and post-revolutionary systems. If the nation has an imperial tradition, such an identification will be easier, as in the case of China. The existence of large national minorities in neighboring states may also encourage appeals to this type of national feeling, as in the case of Albania's quarrel with Yugoslavia. On the other hand, nationalism of this sort may be curbed in a multi-national state. Thus ethnocentrism has never developed in Yugoslavia because of the delicate nationalities question within that country.

The growth of this sentimental form of nationalism, and its association with the national forms of communism discussed earlier, would indeed mean the triumph of nationalism over communism. But here again a word of caution is in order. No Communist nation, not even the Soviet Union, has gone so far as to claim that its own form of communism is the product of the unique genius of its people, thus transforming communism from a universalistic to a particularistic philosophy. To do so would be to undercut the revolutionary appeal of the doctrine, and this no Communist nation is at present prepared to do. Nor should the divisive effects of this form of nationalism be overestimated. Relations between Poland and the

Soviet Union in recent years have demonstrated how mutual interest and sheer necessity can overcome national antipathies. The post-war history of the Communist bloc suggests that disputes over minorities or boundaries have become acute only when the countries in question were already at odds for other reasons.

These observations all must be viewed in the light of current transitions within the Communist bloc; predictions concerning its future evolution are hazardous. Nationalism, in its various forms, seems on the increase. This should not, however, lead us to forget that some of the strongest centrifugal forces within the bloc originated in the "pre-national" period after World War II, and that the conditions of that time were in many ways unique. Communist doctrine was committed to the construction of a supra-national community on the basis of a universalistic model of socialism—the Soviet Union—and the monolithic solidarity of national parties under Soviet leadership. However sound a basis this might at first glance seem to provide for beginning the construction of a supra-national community, the facts were otherwise. Soviet totalitarianism, by its fascination with what could be achieved through political power and organizational skills—to the almost total disregard of other factors—encouraged the consolidation of power separately within existing nation-states. This delayed the obvious first step to integration, the development of a supra-national economic bloc, and meant that integration could only be achieved through sharing power at the top—something the Soviet Union would not agree to and something which, even if it had been achieved, would probably have destroyed the monolithic unity on which the whole structure of the supra-national community supposedly rested.

National boundaries thus became crucial dividing lines between separate and often clashing centers of power. But could not a new start now be made toward integrating the Communist nations, when the shortcomings of economic autarchy are slowly becoming appreciated, and when the Soviet leadership is increasingly willing to tolerate diversity within the Communist bloc? The possibility should be considered, even in the face of the current drift toward nationalism and the importance of Sino-Soviet tensions. For paradoxical as it may appear, only through the consolidation of nationalism may the conditions ultimately be created for the integration of the Communist nations. First, the principle of monolithic unity under the direction of one party must give way to a flexible form of cooperation which will

Yugoslavia dictated the more theoretical approach of Kardelj, *supra*.

permit the internationalization of the leadership of the world Communist movement. Only then can the national parties be assured of equal treatment in a supra-national union. Second, the drive for world domination must spend its force. As long as this dynamic goal is urging on the nations of the Communist bloc, quarrels such as that presently going on between China and the Soviet Union over the proper tactics of the revolutionary struggle seem inevitable. Third, the powerful nations of the Communist bloc must exhaust the possibilities inherent in development within national boundaries in order to re-focus their energies on the construction of supra-national institutions. National consolidation would favor such a process; the growth of virulent nationalism would, of course, have an opposite effect, destroying any hope of integration. Situations conducive to the second type of nationalism would have to be avoided.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> For a discussion of the concept of the "Socialist Commonwealth," which the Communists have developed recently in response to changing conditions within and outside the bloc, see Kurt L. London, "The 'Socialist Commonwealth of Nations': Pattern for Communist World Organization," *Orbis*, III, pp. 424-42. London speaks of the problem of "establishing a conceptual framework vast and flexible enough to

We believe, on reflection, that the West may take comfort at what lies ahead. It seems difficult to imagine that the Communist states will be able to meet the conditions just laid down for effective integration across national boundaries. But this is not all; for while the powerful supra-national community of Communists dreams may not be entirely a chimera, its realization may well entail a prior national development which would emasculate those elements of the Communist system most dangerous to our survival. The nation-state system will then have performed its function of stemming the Communist drive for world conquest. While the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917 was indeed a setback for those who believe in national self-determination and democracy, we may also be thankful that Communism appeared when it did, before integration of the nations of the world had progressed to the point—as it someday may—when the groundwork for an international totalitarian state would already have been laid.

contain the organizational structure within which world communism could be achieved," and sees this in the concept of the Socialist Commonwealth. The term still lacks clarity, however, and is used by the Communists almost interchangeably with the phrases "socialist camp" and "world socialist system" (*ibid.*, p. 430).



## THE GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM AND THE 1961 FEDERAL ELECTION<sup>1</sup>

SAMUEL H. BARNES, FRANK GRACE, JAMES K. POLLOCK  
AND PETER W. SPERLICH  
*The University of Michigan*

Each German federal election since 1949 has resulted in a reduction in the number of parties securing representation in the Bundestag. While this trend continued in 1961, there is evidence that the party system is becoming stabilized, making it unlikely that any of the present parties will disappear in the near future. This article examines the 1961 election and its significance for the German party system.

### I

The major outlines of the present German party system became apparent as early as 1946, when party activities were resumed on a zonal basis. The principal parties then in the field were the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union, and the Free Democratic Party.<sup>2</sup> The last two

of these were known differently in different sections of West Germany, but today, with very few exceptions, the designation for each group is the same throughout the Federal Republic.

In the first election held in the Federal Republic, the Bundestag election of 1949, no less than ten parties won seats.<sup>3</sup> The CDU/CSU emerged as the strongest, and its chief opposition, then as now, was the SPD. The third major party, winning more seats than the total of the next three (DP, BP, and KPD), was the FDP.<sup>4</sup> Inasmuch as no party had received a majority it became necessary for Adenauer, elected chancellor by a one-vote majority of the Bundestag, to form a coalition cabinet. Of its thirteen ministries, eight went to the CDU/CSU, three to the FDP, and two to the DP. The parties of the center and the right thus formed the first government, leaving the SPD in the opposition role and excluding completely from any role of significance the extreme left (KPD), the radical right (DRP) and the special interest, strictly regional and particularist groups (ZP, BP, WAV and SSW).<sup>5</sup>

In the second Bundestag election in 1953 "a radical simplification of the political spectrum" had already become quite pronounced: only six parties were successful in winning seats. The CDU/CSU was able to increase its share to 243 (49.9 per cent) of the total of 487; and the SPD, although taking a small loss in terms of its percentage of seats (from 32.7 to 31.2), was nevertheless able to increase its bloc of seats from 131 to 151. The FDP, the DP, and the ZP suffered losses both absolutely and in percentage terms. None of the other parties which had won seats in 1949 was successful, but in 1953 the new "Refugee Party" (BHE), had appeared and was able in its first election to surpass all but the three leading parties (the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP) and win 27 (5.1 per cent) of the 487 seats.<sup>6</sup>

The two major parties together accounted for

<sup>3</sup> Three seats were won by independent candidates.

<sup>4</sup> See Table XII, *infra*, for the distribution.

<sup>5</sup> The six minor opposition parties held a total of only sixty (14.8%) of the Bundestag seats.

<sup>6</sup> See Table XII, *infra*.

<sup>1</sup> The authors wish to express their gratitude to the Whiting Foundation for enabling them to observe the German election during August and September of 1961.

<sup>2</sup> The abbreviated designations contained in the following glossary will be used through the rest of the paper:

CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union  
(Christian Social Union in Bavaria).

SPD: Social Democratic Party.

FDP (DVP) (BDV): Free Democratic Party  
(Democratic People's Party in Wuerttemberg, Bremen Democratic People's Party in Bremen).

KPD: Communist Party of Germany.

BP: Bavarian Party.

DP: German Party.

DKP/DRP: German Conservative Party,  
German Rightist Party.

EVD: European People's Movement of  
Germany.

RSF: Radical Social Freedom Party.

RWVP: Rhenish-Westphalian People's Party.

SSW: South-Schleswig Voters' Association.

WAV: Economic Reconstruction Association.

ZP: Center Party.

BHE: Refugee Party.

DFU: German Peace Union.

GDB: All-German Bloc.

DRP: German Reich Party.

DG: German Community.

394 (81.1 per cent) of the Bundestag seats, and an impartial observer viewing this election might have concluded that a two party system was emerging in West Germany. The radical groups, both left and right, had, for all practical purposes, suffered a total defeat; and the CDU/CSU was able to draw the FDP, the DP, and the BHE into its coalition, leaving only the SPD in opposition.<sup>7</sup>

The further weakening or elimination of the minor parties continued apace. By 1957 only four parties retained representation in the Bundestag. In that year the CDU/CSU was able to win an absolute majority of the seats (270 or 54.3 per cent of the 497), and for the first time in the history of democratic Germany it became possible for a single party to organize a government without a coalition. The SPD was able to increase its strength to 169 seats, 34.1 per cent of the total. The FDP lost seven seats; and the DP, although regaining two it had lost in 1953, nevertheless lost in proportion of total seats as compared with 1949.<sup>8</sup> After the 1957 election, all evidence pointed toward Germany's arrival at a stage at which the doctrinaire, programmatic party is discouraged and in which the spirit of compromise so necessary and conducive to a two-party system appears.

## II

A number of changes within the parties took place between 1957 and 1961 and affected their fortunes in the fourth Bundestag election. The condition of the parties on the eve of the campaign therefore deserves mention.

The CDU/CSU continued the policies of pragmatism and compromise that had brought it increasing majorities in previous elections. It is Christian but not in any narrowly confessional sense. It has asserted the inviolability of the rights of persons and property and in conse-

quence has opposed such concentrations of power as constitute a threat to these rights. It has stood for both economic and political decentralization and the separation of Church and state. And perhaps none of its tenets is adhered to more fervently than the alliance with the democracies of the West.

The CDU/CSU unites Catholics and Protestants, businessmen and trade unionists, Bavarian particularists and refugee nationalist within its ranks; it is an amalgam of virtually every element in the body politic, and considerable skill is necessary to maintain this precarious balance of interests. In fact, the CDU/CSU is two parties, and the composition of the Government has always reflected this. The CSU has always considered itself a separate party working in alliance with the CDU for reasons of mutual advantage, but in no sense subservient to it. It is pertinent to note that although the CDU/CSU lost strength nationally in 1961, the CSU losses in Bayern were less than in any other state except Niedersachsen (a special case), a fact tending to indicate that its strength is not entirely dependent on that of its ally.

To date Chancellor Adenauer, by his great political skill and his successes, has managed to hold the party together. Paradoxically, this strength is also a potential party weakness: we do not know the extent to which he personally is responsible for its unity, nor whether its unity can be preserved when the problem of Adenauer's succession presents itself.

Unquestionably, Adenauer has lost prestige since the zenith of 1957. His actions in the recent campaign in the face of the Berlin crisis to be described later, no doubt account for much of the loss. Perhaps he suffered even more from his maneuvers in connection with the election of a successor to President Heuss in 1959. In this year, fearing that Carlo Schmid, the popular and respected SPD leader, might be elected to the presidency, Adenauer urged the election of Dr. Ludwig Erhard, the ever more popular architect of the *Wirtschaftswunder*. Dr. Erhard, however, suspected that Adenauer's support was inspired principally by a desire to elevate him upstairs to a position of much less influence than the one he held. When the ensuing disagreement threatened the unity of the party, Adenauer announced that he himself would seek the presidency and that if he attained it he would make it into an office of real power and influence. Soon, however, he came to realize that his choice for chancellor, the minister of finance, Franz Eitzel, was no nearly so popular with the party as Erhard, and that there was a real possibility of his losing or

<sup>7</sup> The Center Party, in its last effort in a federal election, won three seats. One of these can be attributed to the planned absence of CDU opposition, while a second was won by a CDU member running on the ZP list.

<sup>8</sup> Of the six direct seats the DP won, five were unopposed by CDU candidates. The BHE was completely unsuccessful, but it is reasonable to assume that a part of its 1953 following had shifted allegiance to the CDU/CSU. It is equally reasonable, however, to assume that it had lost its *raison d'être*, that the refugees of 1953 had by 1957 for the most part become integrated into West German society, and, as a consequence, identified themselves with one or another of the older and less particularistic political groupings.

both the presidential and chancellor fronts. Whereupon he reversed himself and announced that he would remain chancellor. This quite high-handed and arbitrary behavior, together with his age and a resentment in some quarters of the alleged growing influence of the German Catholic hierarchy, portended no little disaffection and loss of confidence as he prepared to lead his party into the campaign of 1961. The only question was the degree of his loss.

After the election of 1957 the Social Democrats, soundly defeated in three consecutive elections, began what must have been a painful process of self-criticism. The economic system which had produced the *Wirtschaftswunder* was highly popular, and an overwhelming majority of West Germans also approved maintaining strong ties with the West and sharing in the responsibility of keeping Western defenses at a level sufficient to discourage Russian aggression. A new program was adopted at Bad Godesberg in 1959 which, although perhaps repugnant to many of the older and more doctrinaire elements within the party, represented a triumph for the realists. With the promulgation of this program, the SPD abandoned its Marxist trappings, and accepted both the free market and the necessity of participating in NATO. In terms of its declared objectives, the SPD after Bad Godesberg became a middle-of-the-road party with a program designed to appeal to almost all segments of the populace.

This new posture was also reflected in the new leadership to which the SPD turned. By accepting Willy Brandt as its standard bearer in August, 1960 the party added a new dimension to the qualities it sought in its leaders. A new emphasis had been placed upon popular image and appeal, and a consequent de-emphasis of such traditional qualifications as length of service to the party and orthodoxy of view. As the 1961 election approached, the SPD was prepared as never before to compete with the CDU/CSU in the middle ground of democratic politics where majorities are obtained. Although it had little hope of obtaining a majority in 1961, it had come to realize the direction in which future success must be sought.

The importance of the third major force in the 1961 election, the FDP, could not have been foreseen in 1957. In that year it lost both absolutely and relatively for the second time. Its own history and that of other minority parties in the Federal Republic warranted an anticipation of a still further decline in support—even to the point of being denied any seats in the Bundestag through the operation of the 5 per cent-3 direct seats clause. The FDP had suffered severely from internal strife, from the

absence of effective leadership, and from the fact that its economic program had been taken over by the CDU/CSU and implemented in an amazingly successful way by Dr. Erhard. Its loss of positive appeal was also compounded by a certain loss of negative appeal after the SPD issued its Bad Godesberg program.

The fortunes of the FDP, however, took a turn for the better when in 1960 Dr. Erich Mende succeeded to its chairmanship. With a strong, forceful personality, a fine appearance and a distinguished World War II record, Dr. Mende was able to bring to the FDP a unity long lacking, and to infuse it with a wholly new vitality. By the summer of 1961 it had succeeded in putting together an effective and well financed organization which could exploit all available opportunities. Among these was a considerable dissatisfaction with the cultural policies of the CDU/CSU, and particularly with its reputedly close alliance with the Catholic Church, already noted. A vague unhappiness with Adenauer was unsettling in some quarters, and the FDP emphasized "Adenauer's policies without Adenauer."

Another unknown factor in the 1961 election was a new political party, the All German Party (GDP), composed of the surviving elements of the BHE and the DP. In 1957 the BHE secured only 4.5 per cent of the vote and accordingly failed to win any seats in the Bundestag; and its leadership had been disintegrating since 1955. The DP, although enjoying a slight gain in 1957 (up from 15 to 17 Bundestag seats), had a future hardly more promising than that of the BHE. Prior to 1961 many of its leaders and members had moved into the CDU. The marriage of these two disparate groups was evidently one of convenience and had been formalized primarily for the purpose of avoiding the consequences of the "five-three" clause.

The other two parties entering the campaign in every state, and discussed in some detail below, were the DRP and the DFU, the former an extremist splinter of the right, and the latter a splinter of the extreme left. From the outset of the campaign they were not regarded seriously and need not be considered here. The SSW and DG also entered the campaign, but not on a national basis. We now turn to the electoral campaign itself.

### III

The parties sought to profit in the 1961 campaign from the strengths and weaknesses they revealed in 1957. The great success of the chancellor in securing an absolute majority of the seats left the CDU/CSU feeling confident, and it adopted the general theme of "more of

the same." The SPD, on the other hand, spent the intervening years attempting to reshape its public image; by 1961 its principal task was convincing the electorate that its new face was real, and not just assumed for the elections. The FDP sought to rebuild its organization and internal unity, and to project an image different from the other two major parties.

The campaign opened with little drama; few people expected much excitement or doubted that the final results would be similar to those of 1957. But intensive campaigning had barely begun when the Berlin crisis quickly came to dominate political discussion. Consequently, the following analysis will note first the original campaign strategy of the parties and then will examine the impact of that crisis.

The CDU/CSU campaign, repeating the 1957 pattern, emphasized prosperity and a continuation of present foreign and domestic policies. The slogans "No experiments" and "Let's keep our freedom" accurately expressed the mood it sought to convey. That new departures in policy would be necessary, was not even anticipated. As before, the party sought to be everything to everybody. If any particular effort was made to court new sources of support, it was the special attention devoted to regions of former DP and BHE strength. The importance of these areas was clearly recognized, and the CDU took special care in the selection of its candidates and in the scheduling of the speeches of the party notables in these districts.

A second CDU tactic of particular interest was its handling of the question of Adenauer's age and the succession in the party—it ignored the subject. Adenauer's age seemed not to be nearly the issue it had been in 1957, nor did his vigor seem to have weakened appreciably during the interval. The chancellor pointedly avoided the question of his successor numerous times during the campaign despite invitations to comment on it. He replied merely that the CDU/CSU government was a "team" affair, and that there were several capable men to succeed him. Erhard was one of these, said the chancellor, but he refused to single him out as being superior to the others. Different party notables shared posters with Adenauer in different parts of the country, depending upon their popularity in the locality, but none was built up as the heir apparent. Adenauer was criticized both inside and outside the party for this, and late in the campaign the portrait of Erhard looking hopefully over the shoulder of Adenauer was increasingly in evidence. But the chancellor never wavered in his domination of the party.

Another interesting aspect of the CDU/CSU

campaign was its treatment of the socialists. In general, the opposition was shrugged off with contempt or ignored; but occasionally CDU/CSU speakers were asked about the recent changes in the SPD party program and leadership. They questioned the sincerity of the changes; they called Herbert Wehner, a former communist and presently a member of the SPD executive, the real power within the party which was merely using Brandt and a platform of moderation to get into power. Alternatively, they accused the SPD of "me too-ism," of repudiating its past in an opportunistic attempt to win votes: "How bankrupt a party must be when it no longer believes in its title."<sup>9</sup>

The 1961 campaign began for the SPD with its determination to seek to secure the votes of the growing middle class in Germany. The Bad Godesberg program of 1959 removed the formal ideological barriers to the attempt; and its selection of Willy Brandt, the mayor of Berlin, as its candidate for chancellor gave it an attractive and skillful leader. The party's strategy in 1961 was based on his personality to an extraordinary extent. His youth, dynamism, moderation, and responsibility were emphasized as symbolic of a new SPD. The party accepted the economic miracle and the system which had achieved it, demanding only that the fruits be more equitably shared. The SPD accepted the principal elements of the Adenauer foreign policy, including European integration and NATO, but wished greater flexibility and increased efforts to overcome the division of Germany. It hammered away at these points, and when the Berlin crisis interrupted the campaign, the SPD was able to incorporate it into its preconceived line of attack, while the CDU/CSU was momentarily thrown off stride.

The FDP entered the campaign with more optimism than in many previous years. It had an attractive leader in Erich Mende, it was relatively united internally, and it hoped to benefit from the recent internal difficulties of the CDU/CSU. The FDP advocated fewer welfare measures and a strict *laissez-faire* in economic policy, along with greater independence for Germany and less emphasis on European unity. It differed with the CDU/CSU also in the sensitive cultural realm; the FDP acted subtly to gain from Protestant unrest within the CDU/CSU.

As the FDP could not hope to govern alone, it had to face the issue of what it would do following the elections. This was a sensitive

<sup>9</sup> Erhard, in a press conference reported in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 8, 1961.

question, as the FDP conceivably would hold the balance of power and so might determine the composition of the government. A statement of intent to support one party or the other could have damaged its electoral chances, as potential supporters might prefer to vote for the major party rather than a minority ally. Furthermore, the FDP had suffered greatly from its last experience in a coalition under Adenauer. Mende announced that it would not be possible to work with the socialists, but that the FDP might support Erhard, Gerstenmaier or Krone; more definite statements would have to wait, he said, until after the election.<sup>10</sup> The FDP generally took the "plague-on-both-your-houses" approach, although it obviously viewed the SPD as the more undesirable.

The minor parties entered the electoral contest with little to hope for, and their campaigns never got off the ground. Only the GDP, the DRP, and the DFU made any pretense at national coverage, and their campaigns seemed to be limited largely to their ubiquitous posters. The DFU was a new party which entered the campaign seemingly well financed—so it was hinted—by the East Zone. It capitalized also on the prestige of Albert Schweitzer, whose portrait appeared on its posters, and the pacifism of some Protestant ministers in southwest Germany. It appealed to the desire for peace and the fear of atomic warfare; after an initial publicity splash, it faded rapidly following the erection of the Berlin Wall. Most of its respectable followers abandoned it at that time, or even before; and it probably ended with only the support of the hard-core communists remaining in West Germany.

The DRP made an even smaller impact during the campaign. Featuring the looming shadow of Bismarck on its posters, it hinted that he would have responded differently to the Berlin Wall. The party did not run a very active campaign. Radicalism was of no significance in the election.

The GDP, formed of the union of the DP and the BHE, also failed to get its campaign off the ground. The merged parties were combining weaknesses, not strengths, and the absence of well known leaders and money was a severe handicap. Even the weather improved by mid-September so that agrarian discontent, traditionally a source of DP strength, was reduced; and the party did badly in the competition.

The erection of the wall separating East and West Berlin, on August 13, enlivened what had begun as a rather dull campaign. The Berlin crisis gave Brandt an unexpected amount of

publicity, and this advantage was compounded by Adenauer's reaction to it. The crisis focused not only German but world attention on the youthful mayor of the city, and he used the opportunity to stress the vitality, moderation, dynamism, and patriotism of the SPD. Brandt called for all-party unity on this issue; while Adenauer called the crisis a Khrushchev trick to help the SPD. In reply, Brandt said that "*Der alte Herr*" had lost contact with reality by his "politics as usual" attitude when the German people were threatened.<sup>11</sup> Brandt addressed a personal letter to Kennedy requesting that something be done for the morale of Berlin. This letter was followed by—although it was not necessarily the cause of—Vice President Johnson's trip to Berlin.<sup>12</sup> Adenauer did not go there immediately, ostensibly because of the press of business in Bonn, but he did find time to attend a CDU rally in Regensburg, almost as far from Bonn as Berlin. And at the Regensburg rally, Adenauer raised the issue of Brandt's illegitimate birth by referring to him as "Brandt alias Frahm." When Adenauer finally went to Berlin on August 22, he was greeted coldly by Brandt and subjected to unpleasant remarks from the crowd. The chancellor explained that Vice President Johnson had asked him not to come with him.

It seems likely that Adenauer badly gauged the political significance of the Berlin crisis and refused for over a week to heed his advisors. He has no strong attachment to Berlin, which is not only strongly SPD but was also the headquarters of Jacob Kaiser, long his chief competitor for the CDU leadership.<sup>13</sup> For Adenauer, Berlin is a "heathen city," and he sometimes lets a year pass without visiting it. Consequently, he refused at first to believe that the event could force him to alter his original campaign plans and fight on issues and terrain favorable to, if not chosen by, his opponent. His response contrasted unfavorably with Brandt's actions and call for an all-party government of national unity; and this seems to have cost Adenauer greatly in prestige in August.

In evaluating the campaign, August 13 is a significant date. Before then, the campaign was largely devoid of excitement. The CDU/CSU was concentrating on repeating the success of

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, August 30, 1961.

<sup>12</sup> We heard criticism of Johnson's trip from CDU sources in Germany who felt that his visit was a campaign aid to Brandt.

<sup>13</sup> On this latter point see Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), *passim*.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, August 25, 1961; September 4, 1961.

1957; with no prospects of a majority, the SPD sought to improve its national image by its moderation. While the FDP was hopeful of improving its position, the other minor parties never seemed of great importance. After August 13, the campaign took on a new vitality. The SPD took the initiative, aided by the events and Adenauer's reaction to them, and handled the opportunity presented them very skillfully. Brandt benefitted greatly from the limelight in which he stood as mayor of Berlin, as well as from his underdog role.

While the initial impact of the crisis favored the SPD greatly, it is not so easy to evaluate the importance of the incident in the campaign as a whole. Its capacity to dominate headlines had all but evaporated by election day. Adenauer's view that there was nothing pressing to be done made more sense a month later, too. It is doubtful that many votes were altered by the crisis, despite criticism of Adenauer's reaction to it; there are other acceptable explanations for the changes in voting between 1957 and 1961. And except for the Berlin crisis, the campaign was devoid of the unexpected.

#### IV

The law under which the election was held is unchanged in its essential features from that adopted for the 1953 elections.<sup>14</sup> The 494 regular seats in the *Bundestag* are distributed among the states on the basis of population. Half the seats are filled from single-member districts and half from state lists. Originally, each state filled half its seats each way; however, the districts have remained unaltered, so population shifts are reflected by altering the number of list candidates assigned.<sup>15</sup> Parties run candidates in the districts and also prepare a state list. Voters indicate their choices twice: once for the individual party candidate in the district and once for the list. The party which wins a plurality in the district takes that seat. On the state list, seats are distributed by proportional representation, with the seats won in the districts being subtracted from those elected from the state list. The net results are similar to those obtained by straight PR, while the presumed benefits of close contact between the delegate and his constituents are achieved by electing half of the members in single-member districts.

<sup>14</sup> See James K. Pollock, "The West German Electoral Law of 1953," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (March, 1955), pp. 107-130.

<sup>15</sup> See Table XI for the division of district-state seats in each state. This slightly aids the CDU/CSU because it encourages *Ueberhangsmandate*, explained below.

The system has in each election resulted in additional seats being assigned, as a party retains the extra seats it wins by taking more direct seats than its proportion of the state vote would give it (*Ueberhangsmandate*).<sup>16</sup>

The combination list-district system has several advantages not immediately apparent. Important candidates who risk being defeated in their districts can also be placed high on the list in order to insure their election, and the party can bring needed specialists into parliament in a similar fashion. Finally, in practice each district has a member of each of the two major parties to represent it, for the minor party in the district is still informally represented in parliament by someone elected from the state list, often the defeated constituency candidate himself.

An important element of the electoral law which cuts down on the number of parties in parliament is the "five-three" clause, under which a party may send representatives to parliament only if it gets 5 per cent of the popular vote in the entire Federal Republic or wins three direct seats. These provisions apply to all except parties of national minorities, of which only the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein are presently organized, and they have elected no one since their single success in 1949.

The only significant change between the 1953 and 1961 election laws was the provision for absentee balloting. In 1953, a citizen could use an election certificate (*Wahlschein*) to vote anywhere in the Federal Republic. In 1957, the certificate could be used to vote in person in any precinct of one's election district, or could be used as a postal ballot; this change was to prevent communists from concentrating their votes in one district. In 1961, one could vote only in one's own precinct or by post ballot, which was tabulated separately on election night.

A final provision of the electoral law which deserves special mention is the method of distributing seats following the election. Individ-

<sup>16</sup> As can be seen from Table XI below, the representation of Schleswig-Holstein, for instance, would have been 20 in 1961, due to the loss of population relative to the rest of the country, with 14 of these elected directly and from the list. But the CDU took 13 direct seats by plurality although it had but 41.8 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen* votes. The SPD with 36.4 per cent and the FDP with 13.8 per cent received 2 and 3 list seats, bringing the SPD total to 8. The CDU under proportional representation would have gotten 9, but it kept the additional four had won directly.

ual parties may, and the major ones do, combine their votes in all the states in determining the distribution of seats (*Listenverbindung*). Seats are distributed nationally to the *parties so combined*, not the states, on the basis of the parties' proportion of the votes for parties which surmounted the "five-three" clause. The seats are then assigned to individual states on the basis of the proportion the state's vote for the party bears to the party's total national vote. Hence the exact number of representatives from a state is not determined until after the election; and states with low participation and many invalid votes, as well as states with a high proportion of votes for parties which do not secure representation in the Bundestag, are penalized. This system of tabulating the results, of course, favors the larger parties. We turn now to the results of the 1961 election.

## V

The election was held on Sunday, September 17, 1961. Polls were open from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, and the day passed with no unusual incidents. Participation was high even by European standards. Whatever the optimum participation in democratic elections may be, the advocates of high turnout will be pleased to see that 87.7 per cent of the eligible electorate of the Federal Republic went to the polls.

Table I shows that a high turnout level was also the rule for the several states. From the lowest participation percentage, in Baden-Wuerttemberg (84.8), to the highest, in Hessen (89.2), there was only a 4.4 per cent spread. Looking at the turnout trend over the years,

TABLE II. PERCENT PARTICIPATION, BY STATES, 1949-1961\*

States	1949	1953	1957	1961
Schleswig-Holstein	82.7	88.5	88.3	88.0
Hamburg	81.2	87.4	89.2	88.6
Niedersachsen	77.7	88.7	89.0	88.5
Bremen	81.9	87.4	88.7	88.2
Nordrhein-Westfalen	79.6	86.0	88.0	88.4
Hessen	77.3	86.7	89.1	89.2
Rheinland-Pfalz	79.6	86.0	88.3	88.2
Baden-Wuerttemberg	70.6	81.8	84.4	84.8
Bayern	81.1	85.8	87.7	87.2
Saarland	—	—	89.3	87.7
Federal Republic	78.5	86.0	87.8	87.7

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

however, we can also observe a very interesting leveling off in popular participation: 1949: 78.5%; 1953: 86.0%; 1957: 87.8%; and 1961: 87.7%. With certain variations, this leveling off can also be found for each of the states in Table II. Apparently a plateau has been reached which constitutes the "appropriate" voting turnout for current West German politics. Apparently, only a major crisis could increase participation further. Without question, the 1961 election was more interesting and conducted with greater vigor and enthusiasm than the rather cut-and-dried affair of 1957, yet participation remained essentially the same.

The ratio of invalid ballots cast in 1961 does not appear to be excessively high, considering the relative complexity of voting in Germany (two votes per voter): 2.6 per cent of the *Erststimmen* and 4.0 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen* were invalid. The higher figure for the *Zweit-*

TABLE I. PARTICIPATION AND VALIDITY OF VOTES CAST, BY STATES, 1961 (*Zweitstimmen*)\*

States	Eligible voters	Particip. voters	% Part.	Valid votes	Invalid votes	% Inv.
Schleswig-Holstein	1,626,141	1,431,704	88.0	1,363,366	68,338	4.8
Hamburg	1,386,411	1,227,787	88.6	1,193,737	34,050	2.8
Niedersachsen	4,613,112	4,083,490	88.5	3,942,955	140,535	3.4
Bremen	507,760	447,936	88.2	428,241	19,695	4.4
Nordrhein-Westfalen	11,085,775	9,799,429	88.4	9,518,246	281,183	2.9
Hessen	3,395,285	3,028,241	89.2	2,878,689	149,552	4.9
Rheinland-Pfalz	2,348,108	2,069,927	88.2	1,969,933	99,994	4.8
Baden-Wuerttemberg	5,211,883	4,419,748	84.8	4,189,163	230,585	5.2
Bayern	6,551,728	5,714,545	87.2	5,486,962	227,583	4.0
Saarland	714,512	626,817	87.7	579,609	47,208	7.5
Federal Republic	37,440,715	32,849,624	87.7	31,550,901	1,298,723	4.0

\* Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden (hereafter referred to as "Bundesamt"): VIII/5/18. (Roman VIII refers to the electoral series of the Bundesamt; the other numbers refer to the particular document.)

*stimmen* appears to result from the failure of some to have understood the need for *two* checkmarks on their ballots.

The highest percentage of invalid votes, not surprisingly, was cast in the Saarland, 5.6 per cent of the *Erststimmen* and 7.5 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen*. This state has been part of the Federal Republic only since January 1, 1957, so voters there have had less experience than others with the German electoral system. The other states (with two exceptions) had less than 3 per cent of the *Erststimmen* invalid, and (with one exception) less than 5 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen* invalid. (See Table I.)

The trend figures exhibit an interesting counter-movement:

*Erststimme*: 1949: 3.1%; 1953: 3.4%; 1957: 3.0%; 1961: 2.6%

*Zweitstimme*: 1949: none; 1953: 3.3%; 1957: 3.8%; 1961: 4.0%

Since the two trends do not go in the same direction, the "natural" theory that the increase in participation over the years has brought to the polls less interested and less discerning people cannot readily be accepted. Indeed even for the *Zweitstimmen*, the correlation coefficient (Pearsonian *r*) for invalid votes and participation shows no relationship between the two factors. It amounts to minus 0.0001 when computed on a state basis (*N* = 10). A better explanation is that there are now more voters without a sufficient under-

standing of the function of the *Zweitstimme* vote. Here the (largest) increase of 0.5 per cent following the admission of the Saarland is significant. In any case, the low magnitude of invalid votes is as favorable a sign of the success of political education in postwar Germany as the high level of popular participation.

We turn now to the party vote in the election of 1961. For the first time the nationwide electoral trends favorable to the CDU/CSU met reverse. The CDU/CSU again emerged from the election as the strongest party, as can be seen from Table III. However, the slim popular majority of 1957 was lost; and furthermore, the margin by which it was lost—the difference between what the party received and 50% of the popular vote—was large enough also to result in a loss of the parliamentary majority. In both these respects, then, the CDU/CSU must be appraised as one of the losers of the election. This, however, need not at all mean a troubled future for the party. The CDU/CSU, as already noted, had to fight the campaign under far less than ideal conditions. Furthermore, the actual loss is not so very large; its significance lies in the margin involved.

For the SPD the election brought an important gain, even if it was not as large as the party had hoped. But for the first time the party did attract substantially more than its usual 30 per cent, more or less, of the popular vote in federal elections. This may well indicate an important "breakthrough" for the SPI

TABLE III. VOTES RECEIVED BY PARTIES (*Erststimmen* AND *Zweitstimmen*), IN PER CENT, 1949-1961\*

Party	Erststimmen				Zweitstimmen			
	1949	1953	1957	1961	1949	1953	1957	1961
CDU/CSU	—	43.7	50.3	46.0	31.0	45.2	49.8	45.4
SPD	—	29.5	32.0	36.5	29.2	28.8	31.8	36.2
FDP	—	10.8	7.5	12.1	11.9	9.5	7.7	12.8
DP	—	3.9	3.5	2.7 <sup>a</sup>	4.0	3.3	3.4	2.8 <sup>a</sup>
BHE	—	5.9	4.4	—	—	5.9	4.6	—
ZP	—	0.2	1.0 <sup>b</sup>	—	3.1	0.8	0.9 <sup>b</sup>	—
BP	—	1.5	—	—	4.2	1.7	—	—
DRP	—	0.7	1.0	0.8	1.8	1.1	1.0	0.8
KPD	—	2.2	—	—	5.7	2.2	—	—
DFU	—	—	—	1.8	—	—	—	1.9
Other	—	1.6	0.3	0.1	9.1	1.5	0.8	0.1

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18; VIII/100/1; VIII/200/1.

<sup>a</sup> GDP.

<sup>b</sup> FU.



indeed one for which the party has been working quite hard: it may have made the transition from a class-based organization to a *Volkspar-tei* (a party based on, and integrating, a variety of social groups).

However, a certain *guarded* optimism is called for on the part of the SPD. Only the future can tell whether the 4.4 percentage-point increase was produced by factors particular to the 1961 campaign or by long-range voter realignments. The first state election following the federal election of 1961 was held in Hamburg on November 12, 1961. In it, the SPD expanded its already impressive majority. Yet it must be kept in mind that over the years the results of federal and state elections have been highly independent of one another.

The great winner in the federal election was the FDP. While its actual gain of about 5 percentage points was not much greater than that of the SPD, it had started out with a far smaller base. Its success, therefore, was quite spectacular. Three factors seem to have been primarily responsible for this gain: a modern and ably conducted campaign; the events of August in Berlin; and a favorable popular response to the party's main theme: Adenauer's politics without Adenauer.

Now the party's problem is whether it will be able to hold the new voters to its colors. The probability of doing so will depend essentially on whether most of the new FDP voters were traditional CDU/CSU voters now dissatisfied with the person of Dr. Adenauer, but not necessarily also with his party or his politics; or whether these new voters were the old followers of the constituent organizations (DP and BHE) of the collapsing GDP? Most election commentators ascribed the greater part of the increase to former CDU/CSU voters. If this should be the case, the future does not look quite as bright for the FDP as it seemed immediately after the election.<sup>17</sup>

Indeed, the 1961 state election in Hamburg (Table IV) shows that the FDP could not hold on to most of its new voters there. However, several reasons warn that this should not be regarded as an important indication of things to come. First of all, participation was lower in the state election. Secondly, the combined DP and BHE vote of the federal election of 1957 constituted a smaller percentage in Hamburg than in the Federal Republic as a whole. This means that the FDP could draw on a proportionately larger non-CDU/CSU reservoir in

TABLE IV. FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTIONS  
IN HAMBURG, IN PER CENT\*

	SPD	CDU	FDP
1957 State election	53.9	32.2	8.6
1961 Federal election	46.9	31.9	15.7
1961 State election	57.4	29.1	9.6

\* Adapted from *Newsletter*. Hamburg: Atlantik-Bruecke, November 17, 1961.

other states. And finally, as noted above, state elections and federal elections move more or less independently of each other.

The case of the GDP is also interesting. It has been noted that this merger was a desperate attempt of two rather incompatible groups to escape the 5 per cent-3 direct seats clause by joining forces. It turned out that the dynamics of politics do not conform to mathematical conventions: 4.6 plus 3.4 summed to 2.8 per cent.<sup>18</sup> Table III shows that the fate of the GDP is not without precedent in German politics. In the election of 1957 the BP and the ZP merged to form the FU since neither alone could hope to hurdle the "five-three" clause. But in spite of help from a rather strange corner (the SPD did not run candidates for the direct seat in a number of districts, to increase the chances of the FU), the alliance did not succeed in its purpose. By 1961 the FU had disappeared from the scene. A similar fate can be predicted for the GDP.

As for the other small parties, the continuing decline of the DRP, which received a total of only 0.8 per cent of the popular vote, suggests the unpopularity of right wing extremism in today's Germany; and the 1.9 per cent of the DFU indicates a similar lack of support for left wing extremism. If the events in Berlin—bringing home with great force to the Germans the divided condition of their country—could not revive German nationalism, one might doubt that anything short of catastrophe could do it. For the DFU, of course, the effect of the Berlin wall was entirely negative. Yet, even without it, this party was never a serious contender in the election.

The Danish minority party (SSW) of Schleswig-Holstein—exempted from the "five-three" clause—failed again to gain a seat in parliament. Its share of the vote in Schleswig-Holstein fell to 1.9 per cent (1949: 5.4; 1953: 3.3; 1957: 2.5). The SSW's share of the federal

<sup>17</sup> A statistical analysis of voter re-alignments is under way currently which is expected to throw considerable light on this and related questions.

<sup>18</sup> Unless indicated otherwise, all percentages and figures given in the text refer to *Zweitstimmen*.

TABLE V. *Erststimmen* BY STATES AND PARTIES, IN PER CENT, 1961\*

Party	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad-W.	Bayern	Saarl.	Party Total <sup>c</sup>
CDU/CSU	43.5	32.4	40.1	27.6	48.1	35.8	49.4	45.8	55.7	49.3	46.0
SPD	36.5	47.2	38.9	50.1	37.6	43.2	33.8	32.4	30.3	33.6	36.5
FDP	12.5	15.1	11.9	14.6	11.1	14.4	12.8	16.3	8.1	12.7	12.1
GDP	3.6	0.9	6.3	3.9	0.8	3.9	0.4	2.6	3.8	0.3	2.7
DFU	1.2	3.5	1.2	2.8	1.9	2.1	1.5	2.1	1.5	3.1	1.8
DRP	0.8	0.8	1.5	1.1	0.4	0.5	2.1	0.6	0.4	0.9	0.8
DG	0.1	—	0.1	—	#	#	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
SSW	1.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1
Other	—	—	#	—	#	#	—	—	#	—	#
State Total <sup>b</sup>	4.4	3.8	12.5	1.4	29.9	9.2	6.2	13.4	17.4	1.8	100.0

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

<sup>a</sup> Total *Erststimmen* of the parties in the Federal Republic.<sup>b</sup> Total *Erststimmen* of the states in the Federal Republic. Except for rounding errors, the sums of the columns add up to 100.0%.

# Less than 0.1%.

vote was 0.1 per cent. The DG also received 0.1 per cent of the federal vote. Primarily a South German party, it did not run candidates in all the states. (See Tables V and VI.) The DG is essentially a nationalist-conservative group, and its failure to attract support underlines our observations on the weakness of the DRP.

In four states—Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-

Westfalen, Hessen, and Bayern—splinter group and non-party nominations were made for altogether six direct seats. None of them was successful. (See Table V.)

We shall now briefly examine the party vote in each of the states. In six of them—given in order of CDU/CSU strength: Bayern, Saarland, Rheinland-Pfalz, Nordrhein-Westfalen,

TABLE VI. *Zweitstimmen* BY STATES AND PARTIES, IN PER CENT, 1961\*

Party	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad-W.	Bayern	Saarl.	Party Total <sup>c</sup>
CDU/CSU	41.8	31.9	39.0	27.0	47.6	34.9	48.9	45.3	54.9	49.0	45.4
SPD	36.4	46.9	38.7	49.7	37.3	42.8	33.5	32.1	30.1	33.5	36.2
FDP	13.8	15.7	13.2	15.2	11.8	15.2	13.2	16.6	8.7	12.9	12.8
GDP	3.9	1.0	6.1	4.1	0.9	4.1	0.5	2.8	3.9	0.3	2.8
DFU	1.3	3.6	1.3	3.0	2.0	2.3	1.5	2.3	1.6	3.2	1.9
DRP	0.9	0.9	1.6	1.1	0.5	0.6	2.3	0.7	0.5	0.9	0.8
DG	0.1	—	0.1	—	#	—	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
SSW	1.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1
Other	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
State Total <sup>b</sup>	4.3	3.8	12.5	1.4	30.2	9.1	6.2	13.3	17.4	1.8	100.0

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

<sup>a</sup> Total *Zweitstimmen* of the parties in the Federal Republic.<sup>b</sup> Total *Zweitstimmen* of the states in the Federal Republic. Except for rounding errors, the sums of the columns add up to 100.0%.

# Less than 0.1%.

TABLE VII. VARIABILITY OF PARTY STRENGTH IN THE STATES, GIVEN AS PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM THE TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTES (*Zweitstimmen*) RECEIVED BY THE PARTIES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, 1961\*

Party	Fed. Rep.	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad.-W.	Bayern	Saar-land
CDU/CSU <sup>a</sup>	45.4	-3.6	-13.5	-6.4	-18.4	+2.2	-10.5	+3.5	-0.1	+9.5	+3.6
SPD	35.8	+0.6	+11.1	+2.9	+13.9	+1.5	+7.0	-2.3	-3.7	-5.7	-2.3
FDP	12.8	+1.0	+2.9	+0.4	+2.4	-1.0	+2.4	+0.4	+3.8	-4.1	+0.1
GDP	2.8	+1.1	-1.8	+3.3	+1.3	-1.9	+1.3	-2.3	0.0	+1.1	-2.5
DFU	1.9	-0.6	+1.7	-0.6	+1.1	+0.1	+0.4	-0.4	+0.4	-0.3	+1.3
DRP	0.8	+0.1	+0.1	+0.8	+0.3	-0.3	-0.2	+1.5	-0.1	-0.3	+0.1

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

<sup>a</sup> The +’s and -’s are unweighted (not adjusted for state size) and therefore do not average out across the states.

Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Schleswig-Holstein—the chancellor’s party (or parties) placed first. Correspondingly, the greatest margin over the second-running SPD was gained in Bayern, the smallest in Schleswig-Holstein. See Tables V and VI.

In three of the states—in order of SPD strength: Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen—the SPD was the strongest party. By the same token, its largest margin over the CDU/CSU was received in Bremen, its smallest in Hessen.

Only Niedersachsen failed to give one of the two leading parties a commanding advantage over the other. The CDU received only 1.2 per cent more *Erststimmen* and 0.3 per cent more *Zweitstimmen* than the SPD. This state was formerly more strongly CDU than SPD. In the 1961 election, however, the SPD increased its popular vote by about 6 percentage points, while the CDU barely managed to hold its own. In 1957, it is pertinent to note, Niedersachsen had the highest (19 per cent) combined DP and BHE vote of any state.

Table VII gives an idea of the variability of party strength. Each entry represents the difference between a party’s federal and state percentage of the popular vote. In absolute

terms we find greater variability in the larger parties, as might be expected. But when we examine the variations in *relative* terms (as per cent of the federal average), the greater variability is found in the smaller parties. In only two of the ten states did the three major parties deviate more than 25 percentage points from the federal average. Nine deviations of such magnitude were found for the GDP, six each for the DFU and DRP.

Some attention may be given to the difference in the voting for district candidates (*Erststimme*) and list candidates (*Zweitstimme*). Table VIII shows that in 1961, in all the states, the two large parties received fewer, and the smaller parties received more, *Zweitstimmen* than *Erststimmen*. In general, this has also been true in previous federal elections. The reason seems to be that at least some supporters of smaller parties view their direct candidates’ chances of election as negligible. (As will be seen below, at least in 1961, this appraisal was entirely correct: all direct seats were won by the CDU/CSU and the SPD.) To choose a small-party candidate, then, is to throw away one’s vote; however, to vote for the list of a small party is an entirely different matter, for

TABLE VIII. LOSS OR GAIN IN *Zweitstimmen* AS COMPARED TO *Erststimmen*, IN PER CENT, 1961\*

Party	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad.-W.	Bayern	Saar-land	Fed. Rep.
CDU/CSU	-1.7	-0.5	-1.1	-0.6	-0.5	-0.9	-0.5	-0.5	-0.8	-0.3	-0.6
SPD	-0.1	-0.3	-0.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1	-0.3
FDP	+1.3	+0.6	+1.3	+0.6	+0.7	+0.8	+0.4	+0.3	+0.6	+0.2	+0.7
GDP	+0.3	+0.1	-0.2	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+ <sup>#</sup>	+0.1
DFU	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+ <sup>#</sup>	+0.2	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1
DRP	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+ <sup>#</sup>	+0.1	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.1	+ <sup>#</sup>	+ <sup>#</sup>
DG	+ <sup>#</sup>	—	+ <sup>#</sup>	—	+ <sup>#</sup>	—	+ <sup>#</sup>	+0.1	+ <sup>#</sup>	+ <sup>#</sup>	+ <sup>#</sup>
SSW	+0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+ <sup>#</sup>

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

<sup>#</sup> Less than 0.1%.

all the votes in the state (or under *Listenverbindung*, in several, or all, states) are combined. Thus, every *Zweitstimme* counts.

One could argue, of course, that from the standpoint of strengthening the party of one's choice, even a wasted vote would be better than an effective vote for another party. Yet, since one's own party is deserted on the *Erststimme*, this is not quite true. For, as was seen above, with the exception of possible *Ueberhangsmandate*, it is the *Zweitstimme* that determines how many seats a party will receive in parliament. All this seems to indicate a rather sophisticated understanding of the electoral law on the part of some of the small-party followers. The habitual large-party voters, of course, are never bothered by this matter.

The phenomenon just noted might be attributed simply to the attractiveness of some candidate who by his personal appeal is able to win support among the followers of other parties, but for the great regularity of large-party *Zweitstimmen* loss, and small-party *Zweitstimmen* gain. It is hardly plausible that only the two larger parties ever have attractive candidates.

One more point may be observed on Table VIII: the SPD vote is more stable than that for other parties. This, of course, is to be expected, since all the smaller parties, with the exception

of the DFU, are essentially bourgeois in their orientation. Thus, their voters are much more likely to desert them on the *Erststimme* for the CDU/CSU, than for the SPD.

We consider next the distribution of seats in the Bundestag. Only three parties (four, if we count the CSU separately) were able to surmount the 5 per cent-3 direct seats hurdle and thus receive seats: CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP. Table IX lists the number and percentages of seats won by the various parties since 1949. The 1961 distribution follows the division of the popular vote quite closely, except, of course, for the dropping out of the smaller parties. The CDU/CSU received 2.7 per cent, the SPD 2.3 per cent, and the FDP 0.6 per cent more seats than votes. Another indication of the relative equity of the seat distribution among the successful parties is the votes-per-seat index. (See Table X.) The slight advantage of the CDU/CSU results from its winning five *Ueberhangsmandate*.

From Table IX we can also observe a constant reduction in the number of parties seated in the Bundestag. In 1949, ten parties plus three independents were represented; in 1953, six parties; in 1957, four parties. Now only three survive. A parallel reduction can be observed in the total number of parties in the Federal Republic. We shall return to this mat-

TABLE IX. NUMBER AND PER CENT OF BUNDESTAG SEATS WON BY PARTIES, 1949-1961\*

Party	Number				Per Cent			
	1949	1953	1957	1961	1949	1953	1957	1961
CDU/CSU	139	243	270	242	34.7	49.9	54.3	48.5
SPD	131	151	169	190	32.7	31.2	34.1	38.1
FDP	52	48	41	67	12.9	9.9	8.2	13.4
DP	17	15	17	0 <sup>a</sup>	4.2	3.2	3.4	0.0 <sup>a</sup>
BHE	—	27	0		—	5.1	0.0	
ZP	10	3	0 <sup>b</sup>	—	2.5	0.7	0.0 <sup>b</sup>	—
BP	17	0			4.2	0.0		
DRP	5	0	0	0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
SSW	1	0	0	0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
KPD	15	0	—	—	3.7	0.0	—	—
WAV	12	—	—	—	3.0	—	—	—
Other	3	0	0	0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total <sup>c</sup>	402	487	497	499	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

<sup>a</sup> GDP.

<sup>b</sup> FU.

<sup>c</sup> Does not include the members from Berlin.

TABLE X. AVERAGE NUMBER OF VOTES  
(*Zweitstimmen*) PER SEAT IN BUNDES-  
TAG, BY PARTIES, 1949-1961

Party <sup>a</sup>	1949*	1953	1957	1961
CDU/CSU	52,932	51,210	53,759	59,084
SPD	52,918	52,616	52,462	60,144
FDP	54,382	54,774	53,654	60,131
DP	55,299	59,742	59,252	
BHE <sup>b</sup>	318,418	59,887		
ZP	54,382	72,359		
BP	58,036			
DRP	85,790			
SSW	75,387			
KPD	90,667			
WAV	56,832			
Other	422,315			

\* James K. Pollock, "The Electoral System of the Federal Republic of Germany—A Study in Representative Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December 1952), pp. 1056-1068. Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18 for 1953-1961.

<sup>a</sup> Does not include the members from Berlin.

<sup>b</sup> Various refugee groups in 1949.

ter presently, in discussing the nature of the emerging party system.

An examination of the types of seats won by the parties in each of the states provides a further indication of their strengths. In particu-

lar, it should be noted that the FDP was not able to win a single direct seat in 1961.

Table XII provides information about the types of seats won by the parties in all four federal elections. It shows that in previous elections smaller parties were quite able to win direct seats. This, however, should not necessarily be taken to mean that certain parties were previously much stronger in certain districts. Rather, most of the previous successes were due to *Wahlabkommen*, usually among the bourgeois parties, whereby one party would refrain from nominating a direct candidate in the district and ask its supporters to give their *Erststimmen* to the candidate of the other party.

The German party system, it has been seen, has undergone considerable change since 1949. But if there are only three parties represented in the Bundestag today, it has certainly not been because of any *scarcity* of political groups in the Federal Republic since 1949. About 80 parties and splinter groups have at some time or other, at some place or other, run candidates for the Bundestag or for a state legislature. On the supply side, then, the situation is certainly similar to that of the Weimar Republic. That the demand side shows such a retrenchment seems attributable to at least these three factors: the electoral law, West Germany's economic stability, and the greater political maturity of the citizenry.

TABLE XI. NUMBER AND TYPE OF SEATS WON, BY STATES AND PARTIES, 1961\*

States	Direct Seats			List Seats			All Seats			Total
	CDU <sup>a</sup>	SPD	FDP	CDU <sup>a</sup>	SPD	FDP	CDU <sup>a</sup>	SPD	FDP	
Schleswig-Holstein	13	1	0	0	7	3	13	8	3	24
Hamburg	0	8	0	6	1	3	6	9	3	18
Niedersachsen	15	19	0	11	6	9	26	25	9	60
Bremen	0	3	0	1	0	1	1	3	1	5
Nordrhein-Westfalen	41	25	0	35	35	19	76	60	19	155
Hessen	3	19	0	14	2	7	17	21	7	45
Rheinland-Pfalz	10	5	0	6	6	4	16	11	4	31
Baden-Wuerttemberg	27	6	0	5	16	12	32	22	12	66
Bayern	42	5	0	8	23	8	50	28	8	86
Saarland	5	0	0	0	3	1	5	3	1	9
Federal Republic	156	91	0	86	99	67	242	190	67	499 <sup>b</sup>

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

<sup>a</sup> In Bayern: CSU.

<sup>b</sup> In principle, one-half of the seats should be Direct, and one-half List. It will be seen, however, that the total of 499 seats actually is comprised of 247 Direct seats and 252 List seats. The 5 additional List seats are the so-called *Ueberhangsmandate*, all of which were won by the CDU/CSU: 4 in Schleswig-Holstein and 1 in the Saarland.

TABLE XII. NUMBER AND TYPE OF SEATS WON BY PARTIES, 1949-1961\*

Party	1949			1953			1957			1961		
	Direct	List	Total	Direct	List	Total	Direct	List	Total	Direct	List	Total
CDU/CSU	115	24	139	172	71	243	194	76	270	156	86	242
SPD	96	35	131	45	106	151	46	123	169	91	99	190
FDP	12	40	52	14	34	48	1	40	41	0	67	67
DP	5	12	17	10	5	15	6	11	17	0	0	0 <sup>a</sup>
BHE	—	—	—	0	27	27	0	0	0	—	—	—
ZP	0	10	10	1	2	3	0	0	0 <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—
BP	11	6	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRP	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SSW	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KPD	0	15	15	0	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
WAV	0	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total <sup>c,d</sup>	242	160	402	242	245	487	247	250	497	247	252	499

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

<sup>a</sup> GDP.<sup>b</sup> FU.<sup>c</sup> Does not include the members from Berlin.<sup>d</sup> The intended divisions between Direct Seats and List Seats for the Federal Republic were 60/40 per cent in 1949 and 50/50 per cent in the other elections. List Seats beyond 40 per cent or 50 per cent constitute *Ueberhangsmandate*.

The great reduction in running and seated parties between 1949 and 1961 has already been noted. A multi-party system, similar to that of Weimar, or another one-party system, definitely do not appear as real possibilities at this point. The question is essentially whether a two- or a three-party system, will emerge; and the party in doubt is the FDP.

To test this question, Table XIII gives the

TABLE XIII. PERCENTAGES OF POPULAR VOTES (*Zweitstimmen*) AND SEATS IN THE BUNDESTAG, 1949-1961,\* COMBINED FOR TWO MAJOR PARTIES AND FOR THREE MAJOR PARTIES

Year	CDU/CSU+SPD		CDU/CSU+SPD+FDP	
	Popular Vote %	Seats in Bundestag %	Popular Vote %	Seats in Bundestag %
1949	60.2	67.2	72.1	80.1
1953	74.0	80.9	83.5	90.7
1957	81.6	88.3	89.3	96.5
1961	81.6	86.6	94.4	100.0

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18. Computations do not include the members from Berlin.

percentage of popular votes and seats alternatively for the CDU/CSU plus SPD and the CDU/CSU plus SPD plus FDP. We can see immediately that the percentages have increased steadily both in the two- and in the three-party category. On the federal level the two-party combination now holds 81.6 per cent of the popular vote and 86.6 per cent of the seats. The three-party combination, by contrast, now holds 94.4 per cent of the popular vote and, of course, all the seats. This leads us to classify the current situation as a three party system. It seems unwarranted to call it a two-party system when the two parties receive only 81.6 per cent of the vote, for the possibility of a clear majority and alternation in office seems remote with such a division of the vote.

Very similar conditions prevail in each of the states. (See Table XIV.) Selecting 90 per cent of the popular vote as an arbitrary dividing line between sufficient and insufficient ground for ascribing the whole domain to a certain number of parties, we find that *three* parties are required in each of them. We also find a reduction in the number of parties parallel to that at the federal level.

Whether the current three-party system has reached stability or instead will give way to a two-party system depends largely on the future of the FDP. And the future of the FDP would

TABLE XIV. THE PARTY SYSTEMS OF THE STATES:  
NUMBER OF PARTIES NECESSARY TO ACCU-  
MULATE 90 PER CENT OF THE POPULAR  
VOTE (*Zweitstimme*) IN BUNDESTAG  
ELECTIONS, 1949-1961\*

State	Number of parties necessary to accumulate 90% or more			
	1949	1953	1957	1961
Schleswig-Holstein	7	5	4	3
Hamburg	5	4	3	3
Niedersachsen	7	5	4	3
Bremen	6	5	3	3
Nordrhein-Westfalen	5	4	3	3
Hessen	5	4	4	3
Rheinland-Pfalz	3	3	3	3
Baden-Wuerttemberg	7	4	3	3
Bayern	5	5	3	3
Saarland	—	—	3	3

\* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

seem to depend on at least two things: the source of its 1961 increment and the reaction of the electorate to the FDP's post-election behavior. On this second score, to date, the most important and consequential political act of the FDP has been its entrance into a coalition with the CDU/CSU under Adenauer, discussed below. The source of the FDP's gains will be dealt with elsewhere.

The most significant phenomena of the German party system appear to be the de-emphasizing of ideology, noted above, and the widening of the support bases of the three major parties. The CDU/CSU, while by no means a complete cross-section of the German people, has nevertheless become a genuine *Volkspartei* drawing support from a great variety of social groups. The SPD, by contrast, has a long history as a class-party; yet in recent years it seems to have succeeded in widening its base. The party most narrowly based still is the FDP. While its support is not monolithic—it rather varies with region—it is predominantly middle class. Nevertheless, there is no evidence at present that the FDP will inevitably suffer the fate of the other small parties.<sup>19</sup> The German party system seems to have stabilized at its present equilibrium. Assertions concerning the emergence of a two-party system are at this time unwarranted.

#### POSTSCRIPT: AFTER THE ELECTION

It became readily apparent when the votes

<sup>19</sup> For a contrary view see Peter Merkl, "Equilibrium, Structure of Interests, and Leadership: Adenauer's Survival as Chancellor," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (September 1962), pp. 634-650.

were counted that the election had really decided nothing except that the CDU/CSU had lost its absolute majority in the Bundestag. If the election meant the end of the Adenauer era, the chancellor himself refused to depart: two days after the election he announced that he wished to remain as chancellor. Later, he agreed not to stay the entire four years. The next seven weeks were spent determining the terms under which the FDP would enter a coalition with the CDU/CSU, and once again the chancellor exhibited his political skill in a game of nerves which deserves brief attention.<sup>20</sup>

Prior to the vote, Mende had expressed his opposition to serving under Adenauer, and some of his statements were interpreted as indicating an unwillingness on the part of the FDP as a whole to serve under the old CDU/CSU leader. Mende had listed several CDU/CSU leaders who were acceptable, of whom Erhard was the favorite. The FDP faced difficult decisions. There was widespread feeling that to serve under Adenauer would be a betrayal of many of the party's supporters; yet, the alternatives of either joining with the SPD or seeing the CDU/CSU and SPD come to terms were equally repugnant. The FDP also risked destroying its newly found internal unity should an open struggle take place; on the other hand, it feared the results of a coalition with the CDU, which had swallowed up several previous coalition partners. Finally, a remaining solution, a minority CDU government existing by the sufferance of the FDP, was ruled out by Federal President Luebke, who announced that Germany must have a strong government during the crisis over Berlin.

The SPD continued with its pre-election plea for an all-party government during the emergency period. Talks were held between Brandt and Mende, but given the difference in clientele and outlook between the two parties, an SPD-FDP coalition would have been an unholy alliance. However, a CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, though unlikely, was not completely unthinkable; and when a CDU/CSU spokesman reminded the FDP that the CDU/CSU could sit down with the SPD and work out a satisfactory arrangement "in three hours," he was only saying publicly what the FDP already knew and feared. And the SPD did not allay this fear when its spokesmen stated that while an all-party coalition was preferable, an SPD-CDU/CSU government, even under Adenauer, was not beyond contemplation.

Attempts to alter Adenauer's decision to

<sup>20</sup> For a more extensive analysis of the process of forming the coalition see *ibid.*

remain in office were unrewarding. Several CDU/CSU backbenchers spoke out politely against his continuance. Party leaders such as Strauss, Erhard, and Gerstenmaier said nothing in public, although they were known to oppose his candidacy. An unconvincing plan, which appeared in an FDP journal, to elevate Adenauer to a new governing council separate from the present institutional structure was stillborn. In the face of Adenauer's determination and the absence of effective opposition from within the CDU/CSU, the FDP found itself without acceptable alternatives to serving in a coalition under Adenauer. This they accepted, but only after the impasse caused by their demand that Von Brentano be replaced as foreign minister had been broken by his supposedly self-willed resignation, for the chancellor had remained firm; indeed, the FDP charge against Von Brentano was that he was a yes-man, but his replacement, Gerhard Schröder, was even closer to Adenauer.

The FDP insisted upon a formal coalition agreement which stated the terms upon which the cooperation of the two parties would be based.<sup>21</sup> It provided for a coalition committee, composed of the two top parliamentary leaders of the partners plus the whips, to meet weekly to work out common parliamentary programs and so avoid conflict on the floor of the Bundes-

tag. The agreement also stated that Adenauer would not remain chancellor for the full four years.

Thus on November 7, 1961, after several weeks during which Adenauer exhibited little manipulative skill, the Bundestag elected him chancellor on the first ballot, giving him 258,499 Bundestag votes. There were 206 votes against him, 26 abstentions, and 9 members absent. Hence, Adenauer failed to receive 51 of the 309 votes of the coalition.

In the distribution of cabinet positions, the FDP received five of twenty—those of justice, finance, expellees and refugees, federal property, and economic cooperation. Mende did not take a position in the cabinet, nor did he receive the chairmanship of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee which he had desired. Moreover, the FDP plan for the appointment of a state-secretary in each ministry, from a party different from that of the minister, was rejected by the CDU/CSU.

The chief difference between the pre-election and post-election cabinets is that the FDP secured five ministries. Another significant change was the shift in the foreign ministry. In addition, a woman was brought in to the cabinet for the first time, as minister of public health, a new cabinet post. The major issue of the campaign—the nature of the post-Adenauer era in German politics—remains unsettled by the election and its aftermath.

<sup>21</sup> Reprinted in *Die Welt*, October 21, 1961.



## PRESIDENT SUKARNO AND THE COMMUNISTS: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICATION

DONALD HINDLEY  
*Brandeis University*

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is today the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc. In a country with a population of some 96 million, it claims today a membership of two million, and the communist mass organizations claim more than 11 million members. At the same time PKI is well represented in parliament and the several high-level councils appointed by Sukarno to render advice to the government. The deputy governors of three of the four provinces in Java are communists, and as of March 9, 1962 the two main Party leaders acquired quasi-cabinet status. Yet the possibility is remote that PKI may achieve power in Indonesia in the foreseeable future. My purpose here is an analysis of the Party's place in Indonesian politics that results in this forecast.

On March 14, 1957 Sukarno declared the whole of Indonesia to be under a state of war and siege. The army commanders in their capacity as war administrators thereby received wide powers over political activities and the administration, powers they have not relinquished. Three weeks later, on April 4, Sukarno appointed himself, "citizen Sukarno," as *formateur* of an "extra-parliamentary business cabinet," an action declared illegal by many Indonesian politicians but one which pointedly demonstrated the increasingly important political role the president had taken. His nomination of the Djuanda cabinet on April 9 marked the end of a line of cabinets chosen as the result of bargaining between the political parties in parliament. From about the middle of 1958 Sukarno and the central army leadership have clearly dominated the government, a domination formalized by the decreed restoration of the 1945 constitution on July 5, 1959. Sukarno took over the post of prime minister, and officers of the armed forces were brought into his cabinet. [Army officers had urged him to assume greater power—and thereby responsibility—in 1956–1957, and it was also a major proponent of the return to the 1945 constitution, erecting a system that ensured him a considerably enhanced share in the conduct of affairs.]

The government coalition between Sukarno and the army has been marked by both cooperation and conflict. Cooperation, because each needs the other in order to rule: Sukarno

has legitimate authority as the leader of the revolution, and the army has the naked power with which to maintain order. But because Sukarno lacks his own organized basis of support or power, he has sought allies to bolster his position in the governing coalition. His main ally is PKI.

### I. THE ALLIANCE IS ESTABLISHED

Sukarno first sought the friendship of PKI at the end of 1955, and his alliance with the communists was firmly cemented by early 1957. Two basic factors explain why Sukarno sought this alliance: his struggle to achieve and maintain a dominant political position, and his wish "to complete the revolution".

In 1956, after more than ten years of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia, the parliamentary regime was crumbling. Parliament and the political parties had notably failed to create political stability or an expanding economy. Dutch capital still controlled much of the economic activity, and the Dutch still occupied West New Guinea. Among the politically conscious Indonesians a widespread belief developed that the parliamentary system—or "free-fight liberalism" as Sukarno was to call it—had failed and must be replaced. Sukarno sought to become the dominant political force in the country, and needed allies to help counterbalance the other emerging power, the army. He viewed the army with suspicion because many of its officers would have been glad to establish either an army-led government or an army-backed government in which his political opponents, Dr. Hatta and the Masjumi party, would probably have played a major role. The nationalist party, PNI, despite rare floutings of his wishes, was so dependent upon Sukarno for its mass support and for his backing in political maneuvers that he could count on it. But his own popularity and political skill combined with PNI support were still not enough to counter the army, Masjumi, and other opponents. Therefore Sukarno sought the alliance of PKI, not only the largest but also the best organized party (at that time, in mid-1957, PKI claimed over one million members, and more than seven million members in a network of mass organizations). PKI organization could be used to demonstrate to the army Sukarno's apparent great popularity, his legiti-

mate position as father and leader of the revolution, by mobilizing enormous crowds for his speeches, by plastering the country with his slogans. Communist support would be of importance in parliament and the constituent assembly. And with PKI on his side, Sukarno could feel fairly certain that the army dare not attempt to oust him for fear of civil war.

Apart from seeking PKI's alliance for purely power reasons, Sukarno probably viewed PKI as the only party able and willing to assist him toward his major policy goal, "the completion of the revolution." What he means by this is somewhat nebulous, but it includes maintaining the people in a state of nationalist fervor through mass actions toward the elimination of all imperialist (that is, Western) political, economic and cultural power in Indonesia. PKI, combining a vociferous anti-colonialism with size and efficient organization, is the only Indonesian party that can be of much assistance in Sukarno's revolutionary task.

From PKI's viewpoint, it was preferable that parliamentary democracy continue and the extra-parliamentary forces remain relatively insignificant. For a time, during the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet of March 1956 to April 1957, the PKI leaders attempted to bolster the crumbling parliamentary system, but once it was obvious that the regime would be drastically overhauled anyway, they accepted Sukarno's proffered hand. Within the army, voices advocated the abolition of all parties, and prominent officers, both in the central command and in the regions, were outspokenly anti-communist. PKI was not yet strong enough to make its own bid for power, and the only person or political force capable of preventing an army-led or army-backed anti-communist government was Sukarno. Consequently the Sukarno-PKI alliance was established.

## II. COMMUNIST EXPECTATIONS AND GAINS

The main purpose of the alliance, for PKI, was the maintenance of Sukarno as the dominant force in or behind the government. In that position he was seen as likely to have protective and positive results of benefit to the Party. Dependent upon PKI, he could protect the Party from repression by the army—both the central army command and the regional commanders—and he could exert his influence to prevent PNI and the orthodox Moslem party (NU) from attacking the Party.

PKI probably hoped for four main positive results from the alliance. First, it expected to be able to exploit Sukarno's popularity, especially in Java, by closely identifying itself with

him. Dangers of course attended such a use of his popularity. If the identification became too rooted, and he were then to become unpopular, the Party would suffer likewise (and it is to be noted that, anyway, Sukarno is not so popular in several regions, especially outside Java). Another danger in the identification, if Sukarno was built up or maintained in the eyes of many Party members as the great leader and father of the revolution, lay in the corresponding degree of control he might gain over the Party members. Identification with and praise of Sukarno might increase PKI's mass support, but might also reduce the PKI leaders' control over their supporters.

The second positive result PKI hoped for was leverage to exert pressure upon the present government to preserve the widest democratic freedoms—that is, to permit PKI and its mass organizations to continue to expand, to maintain a degree of parliamentary democracy in which political parties would still have a considerable role, and to permit PKI to train its members to an increasing "class consciousness" or militancy in preparation for a forceful communist take-over. A third possible benefit of the alliance might arise if Sukarno, in a dominant position in the government, should emphasize fervent nationalism to the neglect and detriment of economic stability or development. If this happened, then, with the retention of democratic freedoms, PKI would be able to exploit simultaneously the anti-colonial agitation and the inevitable dissatisfaction with the economic situation. In preparation for this eventuality, PKI announced in April 1957, when the Sukarno-appointed Djuanda government took office, and again in July 1959, when Sukarno himself became prime minister, that it would continue its policy of support for the government's popular measures, and criticism of its unpopular acts. Finally, PKI leaders alternately hoped and feared that the alliance would bring communist participation in the cabinet, which had been Sukarno's declared goal since the end of 1955. Through the control of ministries, PKI might gain significant control of the administrative apparatus and so make electoral victory or revolution unnecessary.

In the event, under the alliance with Sukarno, PKI has gained much. It is impossible to measure how far PKI's support has enabled Sukarno to maintain his position as the leading power in Indonesia and to push through his ideas and aims against those of his partners in the government, but communist support has certainly been a considerable factor. Partly because of unwavering communist support, Sukarno has been able to thwart efforts in 19

to form a government led by Hatta; he has been able to prevent the formation of an army-led government (if that is what a majority of officers have wanted, which is doubtful) or an army-dominated government; he has been able to ban the two parties most opposed to himself and PKI and most oriented to efficient administration and economic development (Masjumi and PSI); and he has ensured the military defeat of the anti-Sukarno and anti-communist PRRI-Permesta rebellion that broke out in February 1958.

As to the protective expectations from the alliance, Sukarno has prevented the army from banning or severely repressing PKI and its mass organizations. Among his more public interventions on their behalf, he insisted against army opposition that the PKI sixth national congress of September 1959 be held (and he himself delivered a friendly speech to the congress); he frustrated army-inspired attempts in 1960 and 1961 to obtain the fusion of the communist trade union federation and youth association into tame, all-embracing organizations; and he insisted on the lifting of bans on PKI and its mass organizations imposed in August 1960 by army commanders in South Sumatra/Djambi, South Borneo, and South Celebes.

Sukarno, as expected, has ensured that PNI and NU pay at least lip service to the need for Nasakom (Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis, nationalist-religious-communist) unity in solving the nation's problems. During the second half of 1957, after local elections in Java had shown a rapid communist advance, particularly at the expense of PNI, several national and regional leaders of PNI and NU demanded an end to the alliance with PKI and proposed a new period of cooperation with Masjumi. Sukarno is reported to have exerted pressure on the national leaders of PNI and NU to stop such a move—which they did.<sup>1</sup>

PKI has been less successful in securing from the alliance what I have termed positive results. Certainly its close identification with Sukarno was a contributory factor in the increase in PKI's vote in Java from 5,477,707 to 7,514,197 between the parliamentary elections

of September 1955 and the local and regional elections held from June to November 1957. PKI thus emerged as the largest Indonesian party in terms of a direct electoral following as well as in membership and control of mass organizations. Under Sukarno's protection, PKI and its mass organizations have been permitted to hold regular conferences and congresses, and they claim a considerable increase in their organizational network and in membership. For example, between July 1959 and October 1962 PKI claims to have increased its membership from 1½ millions to 2 millions, while the four major communist mass organizations claim an increase from 7.8 to over 11.0 millions.

As expected, Sukarno has emphasized fervent nationalism, especially the campaign to liberate West Irian, to the detriment of the domestic economy.<sup>2</sup> But, as will be seen below, the nationalist agitation and economic decline have not brought PKI the great benefits that were hoped for because Sukarno, in conjunction with the army, has removed most of the opportunities for PKI to exploit either. And if, on March 9, 1962, Sukarno gave the two PKI leaders Aidit and Lukman quasi-cabinet status, this may have proved an unwanted embarrassment for the Party, not the political lever that had been expected.

### III. OBSTACLES TO COMMUNIST VICTORY

Today, after five years of the close alliance, PKI seems as far as, or further than, ever from winning power. Two basic and related reasons account for this: the strengthening and entrenchment of the army, and what I term the domestication of PKI.

The strengthening and entrenchment of the army has been a process that Sukarno has been unable to prevent, and one which his policies have indirectly encouraged. His insistence on the military defeat of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion improved the fighting ability of the army and strengthened the control of General Nasution, then army chief of staff, over what had been a loosely integrated national army. The West Irian campaign necessitated the enlargement and modernization of the armed

<sup>1</sup> Some leaders of PNI and NU, however, especially at the center, were and are ready to cooperate with PKI, and to keep criticism of PKI in check. This is because they see PKI as an ally in their struggle against Masjumi and PSI (until those parties were banned in August 1960), and also as an ally against the encroachments by both Sukarno and the army against the role and freedom of the parties and parliament.

<sup>2</sup> To give but two illustrations: in December 1957 all Dutch enterprises were seized, resulting in a drastic decline in production and efficiency so that they are now a financial liability; and since 1960 huge sums have been spent on modernizing and enlarging the armed forces in order to force the Dutch from West Irian. Inflation has accelerated, and severe shortages have occurred of basic commodities.

forces; large purchases of modern equipment have been made, especially from the USSR, and the army now contains over 300,000 troops. Sukarno's declaration of a state of war and siege in March 1957, at the time when he was preparing to instal the Djuanda cabinet, conferred wide powers on the army over administration and political life—powers which the army has not relinquished. The Sukarno-inspired workers' seizure of all Dutch enterprises in December 1957 enabled the army to take over the administration of those enterprises in the name of order and production.<sup>3</sup> And Sukarno's restoration of the 1945 constitution in July 1959 and his implementation of "guided democracy" gave the army a legitimate and formal part in the government, whereas previously it had exerted influence from behind the scenes. Seven army officers received posts in the presidential cabinet appointed in July 1959, army officers received seats in the appointed parliament announced in June 1960 and in the local and regional councils appointed at the end of that year, and army officers have been appointed as governors of several provinces.

Time has been another factor in the strengthening of the army. General Nasution, though he has lately given up the post of army chief of staff, has retained the Ministry of Defense, with a protégé as chief of staff. Counting both posts, he has been in command of the army continuously since October 1955. He has had the interval since then to weed out from important positions the officers he considers less than trustworthy.

As for the domestication of PKI, Sukarno has eradicated Masjumi and PSI, the only two parties that dared to oppose him openly and consistently, and he has successfully tamed the remaining political parties, including PKI. Within the other major partner in the government, the army, many officers apparently would like to be rid of all political parties, and especially PKI. In this, they have been thwarted by Sukarno, who needs the parties in his power struggle with the army. But the army has been Sukarno's eager partner in the policy of domesticating the parties, especially PKI, the greatest potential threat to the present ruling groups.

<sup>3</sup> The army officers placed in charge of the former Dutch enterprises were later required to relinquish formally their positions in the army. However they still retain their army titles and maintain close contact with the army.

#### IV. DOMESTICATION

Domestication in the context of Sukarno's policy towards PKI contains two main elements. One is the protection of PKI and its mass organizations from above-ground extinction; that is, the preservation of their legality and of at least a limited freedom of overt activities. The other is the creation of effective blocks to PKI's possible assumption of power, so that the Party provides Sukarno with support but cannot exploit the alliance towards its own major goal, which is governmental power. Such a policy is only possible if one of the two allies wields greater power or is considerably shrewder than the other. On the record so far, Sukarno is both; he is not only an extremely able politician, but as the leading force in a governmental coalition he can use the government's coercive powers to compel PKI to either accept the situation or break the alliance. It is not his interest to coerce PKI too far, for if the alliance were broken his own position *vis-à-vis* the army would be greatly weakened; therefore the process of domestication has been gradual, and PKI and its mass organizations have been allowed to expand. On the other hand, PKI has felt obliged to accept the risks of domestication because a break with Sukarno would bring down severe governmental repression, which PKI could hardly survive.

At the beginning of the alliance, there were broadly four ways by which PKI might conceivably have been able to achieve power. The first was infiltration of the armed forces and the bureaucracy. The second was by parliamentary means, by skilful use of the then existing parliamentary system in which the cabinet was responsible to parliament. Through electoral and therefore parliamentary strength, PKI might have aspired to form its own government, or might have secured communist inclusion in a coalition government as the first step towards the seizure of power. The third was the development of existing cadres and members into a force capable of seizing power. And the fourth was by acclamation; that is, the politically conscious Indonesians might have turned to PKI as the only group capable and worthy of ruling, after all other groups had demonstrated their inability to solve the major problems facing Indonesia. These alternative possibilities are worth examining in turn.

*Infiltration.* As a means of achieving power, infiltration could be ruled out as a practical possibility in 1957, and the same applies today. PKI has gained very little support among the officers of the armed forces, and it appears that

since 1956 General Nasution has gradually removed the few pro-communist army officers from positions of influence. It also appears that the officers retain the respect and obedience of the lower ranks. The Indonesian bureaucracy, too, like white-collar groups in general, has proved surprisingly resistant to PKI so that the Party commands little support among public servants in strategic positions. Since January 1948 no communist has had control of a ministry. The two PKI members of the cabinet, appointed on March 9, 1962, have been given positions without portfolio; they do not sit in the regular meetings of cabinet; and their status is that of advisers on economic matters and on measures for the liberation of West Irian.

*Parliamentary success.* In the September 1955 elections for parliament, PKI emerged as the fourth party, with 6.2 million votes or 16.4 per cent of the total. In the local and regional elections held in Java in the second half of 1957, PKI received 27.4 per cent of the votes. Communist leaders, perhaps purposely understating their strength lest alarm provoke counter-measures, estimated they would receive about 25 per cent of the votes in the second national parliamentary elections scheduled for September 1959. On such a showing, if these elections had been held and if the parliamentary system had been maintained, PKI would have emerged as the largest or second largest party in parliament and so would have been in a strong bargaining position in the formation of a cabinet, if it were settled by the usual processes of inter-party bargaining. However, this prospect has been completely removed. In September 1958 the government announced that the 1959 elections would be postponed for one year, and when that time was up they were postponed again. They were put off once more in 1962. Meanwhile, parliament is now appointed and its power destroyed.

On July 5, 1959, President Sukarno decreed the restoration of the 1945 constitution—an action that PKI very reluctantly accepted after the elected constituent assembly had failed to reach an agreement on a new constitution.<sup>4</sup> Under the 1945 constitution the cabinet is chosen by the president and is not responsible to parliament. Furthermore, Sukarno has taken advantage of the loose wording of that consti-

tution to rule largely by decree, and so bypass parliament. When parliament from December 1959 to March 1960 demanded at least control of the budget, Sukarno decreed its dissolution and in June 1960 appointed a new one. He has made quite clear that he will tolerate neither opposition nor major criticism from parliament, nor from the several advisory councils that he has appointed since July 1959. At the end of 1960, Sukarno also "re-tooled" the local and regional councils, and replaced them by appointed bodies. Their executive committees, too, are now nominated by the government, as are the regional and local district heads.

In short, it must have been fairly clear to the PKI leaders by 1955 at the latest that they had little hope of winning power through the infiltration of the army and the bureaucracy. The army's direct involvement in government from late 1956 onwards, followed by the re-enactment of the 1945 constitution, Sukarno's rapid removal of parliament's limited powers under that constitution and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime, all showed that the parliamentary road to power was also closed. Hence, shortly after Sukarno's assumption of the office of prime minister in July 1959, only two ways were left by which PKI might aspire to power: the development of the existing or enlarged support into a force capable of seizing power (by the use or threat of force), and the elevation of the Party by acclamation.

*Developing the cadres.* By the middle of 1957, as already noted, PKI claimed a membership of over 1 million, while the communist mass organizations claimed about 7½ millions.<sup>5</sup> If these members or even a small proportion of them could have been trained to a higher level of revolutionary discipline and class consciousness, then the PKI leaders might have had at their disposal a force capable of capturing power even against the forceful opposition of the non-communists. But the PKI leaders have been unable to develop such a force from their mass support for two basic reasons: one that may be called built-in obstacles, and the other, preventive government action.

*Built-in obstacles.* Few members of the Indonesian political elite, armed forces or bureauc-

<sup>4</sup> For PKI's public explanation of how it was forced by political circumstances to agree to the restoration of the 1945 constitution, see Sakirman, "Apa arti sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan Demokrasi terpimpin," Part II, *Bintang Merah*, July-August 1960, pp. 320-28.

<sup>5</sup> The membership claims of the main communist mass organizations in the latter half of 1957 were: Sobsi (trade union federation), 2.7 millions; BTI (peasants' association), 3.0 millions; Pemuda Rakjat (youth), 800,000; Gerwani (women), 671,000; and PPDI (village officials), 350,000.

racy, have been attracted to communism.<sup>6</sup> The PKI leaders have therefore been forced to seek and build support among the poorer segments of society: the peasants, the workers and the "petty bourgeoisie." In Indonesia, however, and especially in Java where for a complex of reasons PKI found the readiest support, the poorer people are essentially passive in face of the wealthier and ruling groups, and even in face of the problems which press most directly upon them. Partly as a result of this passive nature, and of the overwhelming superiority in power (that is, ability to coerce and repress) of the non-communist ruling groups, the Aidit leadership of PKI in late 1951 and early 1952 decided that large numerical support was essential if PKI was to win power from the incumbent ruling groups.<sup>7</sup> Consequently the leadership formulated a broad national united-front strategy capable of amassing the necessary support.<sup>8</sup> The two essential elements of this strategy were painstaking but "limit-conscious" work among the poorer social groups, and friendship toward the internal non-communist political groups. These two elements were mutually dependent. Without the image of PKI as patriotic, sympathetic to religion, opposed to the use of force in the achievement of its goals, attached to democracy, moderate in demands, friendly toward the non-communist

political forces, and generally responsible in the exercise of the role of non-governing party, the Party could have won neither the sympathy of the broad masses of poorer people, nor the toleration of ruling groups toward PKI's organizational activities.

Thus, since early in 1952 PKI has increased its membership from under 8,000 to about 2 millions, and has educated its new and old members in the strategy of the broad national united front. Typical slogans devised by the Aidit leadership for Party members have been "national interest above class and Party interests," "national unity above all else," and "the basic contradiction is between the people and imperialism." Alliance has been sought with the non-communist political groups, from Sukarno through PNI to the conservative Moslem NU, and with social groups ranging from the "national bourgeoisie" through the devout Moslems, even to the "patriotic landlords." That is, under the Aidit strategy, Party members and cadres have not been educated to militant action against internal enemies, with some exceptions such as the regionalist councils established in 1956 and 1957.

Despite the great change in the Indonesian political situation during and since 1956 and 1957, PKI has not altered its basic strategy; it has adapted the strategy to the new situation. To alter the strategy would have been very difficult. First, a switch to a policy of hostility to "class enemies" would have alienated a large part of the mass support which is unprepared for such hostility. Second, a radical switch would probably have caused a major division among Party *cadres* and members, where since 1951 there had been a unity unequalled in any other major communist party. And third, a switch could have brought down severe government repression, as it had in September 1948, repression for which the Party was unprepared after many years of the Aidit strategy. In other words, the PKI leaders were and are faced with a dilemma: their strategy has certainly achieved mass support, but at the same time it has created a party incapable of seizing power, apart from winning it by the parliamentary road, a road no other fraternal party has yet traversed successfully.

*Preventive measures.* The government has been careful to restrict the opportunity for PKI and its mass organizations to develop militancy among their members. Two broad categories of restrictions have been applied: general threats, and specific controls.

Two government laws enacted in 1960 posed a legal threat to PKI's above-ground existence. The first, adopted on January 12, 1960, is

<sup>6</sup> PKI, founded on May 23, 1920, is the oldest communist party in Asia. Dutch repression, which became severe after the communist rebellion of 1926-1927, prevented it from gaining wide support among the increasing group of politically conscious Indonesians. From 1927 to the end of World War II, PKI virtually ceased to exist. During the Indonesian revolution, which broke out in August 1945, PKI did succeed in attracting the support of a small section of the political elite and the revolutionary armed forces. But due to the mis-timed communist rebellion at Madiun in September 1948, many of the more prominent communists were shot, most of the pro-communist elements in the armed forces were weeded out, and PKI for several years suffered from an anti-patriotic stigma.

<sup>7</sup> Only through mass support could PKI build a large body of competent cadres, win a significant position in parliament (with the possibilities for political maneuver that this would bring), or develop a power basis capable of ousting the ruling groups if they opposed PKI by force.

<sup>8</sup> For a study of the formulation and implementation of this strategy see Donald Hindley, "The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1961: a decade of the Aidit leadership," Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1961.

called "Conditions and Simplification of the Party System." Under this law political parties must accept and defend the 1945 constitution and Pantjasila,<sup>9</sup> and must use peaceful and democratic methods to achieve their political goals; political parties may receive assistance from abroad only with the consent of the government; the president may order an investigation into the administration, finances and wealth of any party; and the president may dissolve any party if its program is aimed at undermining the principles and objectives of state policy, or if it has not officially condemned party members who have acted in support of a rebellion. By this law PKI could be banned at any time the government so decided, and a precedent for dissolution was set with the banning of Masjumi and PSI in August 1960. In order to stay within the law, PKI has altered its constitution to include adherence to Pantjasila and a *gotong-rojong* (mutual help) democracy; but a party could still be banned which aims at communism, instead of socialism-on-the-Indonesian-plan, and which contends that the communist Madiun rebellion of 1948 was a patriotic act of self-defence.

Later in 1960, all parties were required by law to present the government with a list of their branches and of all members. The address, date of entry to the party, and position in the party were required for every member. PKI handed in its list on February 4, 1961.

By these two laws, the government holds the threat of banning over PKI's head, while the government's possession of details of every Party member must discourage members from action in defiance of the authorities.

As has been seen, Sukarno has protected the legal existence of PKI, and has thwarted army-inspired efforts to obtain the merger of the communist-led trade union federation and youth organization into national, all-embracing, government-controlled organizations. PKI has lost, however, one very important constituent unit, Perbepsi, the para-military veterans' association which by December 1957 was claiming 300,000 members. Because Perbepsi had the makings of a formidable force at PKI's command, it is possible that Sukarno acquiesced in—and there is no evidence that he opposed—the army's efforts to fuse all veterans' organizations into an army-led veterans' legion. This process of fusion was begun in December

1956 and completed by August 1959, to PKI's considerable chagrin. But with this exception, PKI and its main mass organizations have been protected by Sukarno.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, with the ready assistance of the army, he has sought to prevent the development of the communist mass support into a militant force capable of disputing for power. The two ways by which the PKI leaders might heighten the revolutionary discipline and militancy of their followers are by the dissemination of news and ideas, and by practical training of *cadres* and members in militant actions. The government has fairly effectively blocked both these ways.

The main channels open to PKI for the dissemination of news and ideas are the schools and courses of the Party and its mass organizations, and publications. The schools and courses appear to have been developed since 1957, and now form a nation-wide network. They have suffered little interference from the government, except, of course, during the few months when all party activities have been banned and in the regions where local army commanders have placed temporary bans on all activities of PKI and its mass organizations.<sup>11</sup> However, the political content of the education given is set by the central Party leadership, and it consists of an enunciation and justification of the broad national united front. This means that it emphasizes the imperialist rather than the internal enemies, alliance with and moderation toward the "national bourgeoisie" (that is, ruling groups) and religion and rich peasants and "patriotic landlords," rather than hostility and militancy in face of them. Undoubtedly the authorities would take severe measures if the schools and courses were to teach class antagonisms.

In the realm of publication, PKI and its mass organizations have been dealt with severely. In October 1960, the central war

<sup>10</sup> In 1961, Sukarno also forced the merger of all scout and pioneer associations, including PKI's, into a national association with himself as chief scout.

<sup>11</sup> All political activity was banned from June 4 to August 1, 1959, and from September 13 to December 1, 1960. In the last ten days of August 1960, temporary bans on all activities of PKI and its mass organizations were imposed by the regional army commanders in South Borneo, South Sumatra/Djambi, and South Celebes. Due to direct intervention by Sukarno the bans in the last two regions were lifted on December 1, 1960, but that in South Borneo was lifted only on August 28, 1961.

<sup>9</sup> Pantjasila, or the five principles, are the guiding principles of the Indonesian nation enunciated by Sukarno in June 1945. They are humanism, nationalism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God the Almighty.



administration, of which Sukarno is supreme administrator, refused permits to all seven periodicals published under the auspices of the PKI central committee.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, the permit of the thrice-monthly periodical of Sobsi, the communist trade union federation, was indefinitely suspended. The only regular publication left to the central committee is the daily newspaper "Harian Rakjat," whose circulation was cut arbitrarily from 60,000 to 44,000 in June 1960 at a time when the government reduced newsprint to all newspapers. The only periodicals apparently left to the mass organizations are BTI's "Suara Tani" (circulation 5,000), BTI's "Pembangunan Desa" (5,000) Gerwani's "Api Kartini" (2,500), and the fortnightly "Zaman Baru" (5,000) of the communist cultural association Lekra. A few regional publications are permitted, but their circulation is very restricted.

Control of the contents of publications is, of course, far more important than the control of numbers. The decree of March 14, 1957, placing Indonesia under a state of war and siege, and making the army commanders war administrators, has since been modified, but in effect the army commanders retain wide powers of control and supervision over political activities. One power widely used is that of censorship. News and opinions disliked by the army and other sections of the government have been suppressed, and newspapers have suffered frequent suspension for arousing the displeasure of the ruling groups. For example, "Harian Rakjat" was suspended for a total of 65 days in the period from January to September 1960 inclusive. In the same year, the communist news agency, INPS, was suspended for several months. Also, temporary but lengthy bans on the circulation of "Harian Rakjat" have been imposed by some regional commanders, notably in South Sumatra and Nusatenggara.

Sukarno intervened to protect "Harian Rakjat" from complete closure, but as part of

his policy of taming the parties he has brought all newspapers under tight government control. On February 15, 1960 a decree stated that newsprint would be withheld from any newspaper or periodical which failed to develop public opinion or national culture along lines he laid down. On October 12 of that year, publishers were told that their newspapers and periodicals must support and defend the principles of state he enunciated, assist in the abolition of liberalism, imperialism and separatism, promote a free and independent foreign policy, remain aloof from the Cold War, and promote the Indonesian personality. Several non-communist newspapers have been closed. During 1961 all private printing shops were brought under direct government supervision, as were all duplicating machines, to prevent their clandestine political use.

In short, Sukarno and the army have successfully controlled the press in Indonesia, including the communist press, so that it supports the government on all major issues, and dares utter no more than the most minor criticisms. The communists have been even more cautious in their publications than some non-communists because they know that the army is ready to suspend their now limited publications on the slightest excuse.

*Practical training.* As we have noted, the Aidit leadership of PKI has been restrained in the encouragement and promotion of militant action by its mass support in part because the Indonesian poorer classes are unprepared for such action, and in part because the communists require the government's toleration of their organizational activities. However, PKI and its mass organizations attempt to increase the political consciousness and militancy of their supporters by stepping gradually from "small but successful" actions (such as a demand for the distribution of work clothes in a factory, or for payment for peasant sharecroppers who carry the landlords' share from the fields) to the point where workers dare openly oppose employers, peasants oppose landlords, and both oppose the authorities. This practical training in actions of increasing scope is of supreme importance in Indonesia, and especially in Java where most PKI support lies, because the lower social strata have no tradition of nor experience in such actions. The lower social strata are, in general, devoid of any belief in the short- or long-term efficacy of their own action in removing social and economic inequalities. It is even true that, in general, the Indonesian poor still need much convincing that inequalities are unjust and removable, and not predestined and unchangeable by man. The Indonesian ruling

<sup>12</sup> These seven were: *Bintang Merah* (the monthly ideological journal), *Kehidupan Partai* (a monthly with practical information for cadres), *Ilmu Marxis* (containing news of scientific and cultural developments in the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc), *Mimbar Komunis* (an Indonesian version of *World Marxist Review*), *PKI dan Perwakilan* (a quarterly containing news of PKI activities in parliament and the local and regional councils), *Ekonomi dan Masyarakat* (a quarterly with articles on economic and financial matters), and *Review of Indonesia* (an English-language monthly of news on the whole "progressive" movement in Indonesia).



groups, including Sukarno, the army, and the civil service, have been prompt to prevent their poorer compatriots from acquiring practical experience in the efficacy of united action in the general political, the labor and the peasant fields.

PKI had also hoped, as earlier noted, that the maintenance of Sukarno as the leading force in the government would lead to a government emphasis on anti-colonial agitation and to the neglect of the economy. This has happened, but PKI has been prevented from unduly exploiting either nationalist feeling or popular dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic situation. Whatever the legal powers held by the central war administration and the regional war administrators over the activities of the political parties, the mass organizations, and the populace in general, in practice the administrators take the power to deal more or less severely with activities deemed detrimental to the government as a whole, or to its various main components.

At the end of 1959 and in January 1960, the communists had a ready popular grievance to exploit in the economic situation. Inflation was intense and wages lagged far behind. Consequently demonstrations were held throughout Indonesia, and the government was inundated with delegations, petitions, letters and telegrams demanding (not requesting) price cuts and wage increases—until General Nasution ordered strict measures against them. Since then the communists have not used the public as a means of pressing the government, complaints being confined to requests by usually muted statements, telegrams and deputations.

Even on anti-colonial matters the government has exercised strict control over communist activities. On February 10, 1958 the army established the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, to channel and control all activities in this campaign, and so prevent PKI from gaining advantage from it. At present the recently formed National Front seems to be playing this role. And where the communists in a frenzy of anti-colonial zeal have acted independently, the authorities have not hesitated to react severely.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> A typical incident occurred in Malang on July 4, 1961, when communist-led workers seized control of the Belgian Faroka cigarette factory in protest against alleged Belgian intervention in the Congo. The army immediately arrested the ring-leaders, and put them on trial. In North Sumatra the army commander threatened severe action against anyone attempting to disrupt production on the Belgian-owned estates.

Labor agitation has been peremptorily eradicated. In August 1957 strikes were banned in all "vital" enterprises, the definition of "vital" being gradually widened to cover virtually all industries. Strikes have ceased, and many communist trade union *cadres* have been imprisoned for long terms for merely discussing with workers the possibility of strikes. Even May Day ceremonies have been controlled. As of May Day 1958, the authorities have organized joint rallies at which speeches are given by representatives of the army, the Department of Labor, and the various trade union federations. The speeches of the trade union representatives must be presented to the authorities for prior clearance.

In the rural areas, the only significant group of peasants still willing to take militant action in defense of their interests are the squatters who occupied estate and forestry lands during the Japanese occupation and the revolution. Since the demise of parliamentary democracy, the authorities have taken firm and often forceful action against squatters protesting eviction. The latest example occurred in Kediri, East Java, in November 1961 when several of them were shot down.<sup>14</sup> Official reprisals have greatly reduced the incidence of militant squatter actions which were, anyway, rare events in the broad sea of peasant passivity.

*Embourgeoisement.* Thus it appears that PKI is effectively obstructed in its efforts to create a militant force from its mass support. Firm action by the authorities to prevent the first steps in militant experience seem to have successfully prevented the step by step acquisition of experience hoped for by the Aidit leadership. Worse still for PKI, a decline in the revolutionary morale of some of the important *cadres* seems to have set in simultaneously. In fact, government policy, with Sukarno as its chief proponent, is aimed deliberately to reduce or remove it. There are two facets to this process, the one more obvious, the other more complex.

The more obvious aspect is the inevitable general discouragement among *cadres* because of the overall situation in which PKI finds itself. Despite its continued legal existence, there are severe restrictions on the activities of the Party and its mass organizations; there

<sup>14</sup> Typically, as a result of the incident in Kediri, the government suspended the activities of all major Communist mass organizations throughout the entire Residency of Kediri from November 21, 1961 to September 11, 1962. Prominent *cadres* were arrested and placed on trial, including the BTI secretary for East Java.

is enforced servile praise of Sukarno—who in private is heartily disliked by the *cadres*; the non-communist forces appear to be consolidating their hold on power and to be creating a “semi-fascist” regime; and the Party is at best marking time in its own march to power.

The other facet of the decline in revolutionary morale is the *embourgeoisement* of the *cadres*. A number of communist *cadres* apparently are finding sufficient satisfaction of their material and status ambitions so that they have lost or are losing the will to overthrow the existing socio-political order—and under present and foreseeable circumstances that order will have to be forcibly destroyed if PKI is to win power.

In the September 1955 general elections, PKI won 16.4 per cent of the total votes, as noted above, and 39 seats in the parliament that met for the first time in March 1956. Local and regional councils were established in 1956 on the basis of these election results.<sup>15</sup> Between June and November 1957, local elections were held throughout Java, PKI increasing its vote compared with September 1955 by 37.2 per cent and the number of communist councillors to almost 1,000. At lower levels, PKI has succeeded in placing its members and sympathizers into such positions as village head. Javanese society, particularly, is extremely status-conscious; the status (and income) deriving from membership in parliament, councils and the body of village officials may be for many a fully acceptable substitute for power.<sup>16</sup> Thus for many *cadres*, coming from the poorer segments of society, PKI and the mass organizations have provided them directly (through positions in the extensive communist organizational network) or indirectly with prestigious and materially secure positions—but within the framework of the existing order.

In March 1960, Sukarno dissolved the elected parliament and appointed a new one. Toward the end of the year, the local and regional

councils were also “re-tooled.” The heads of the various levels of “autonomous districts” became the appointees of the government. Communists were given about 65 seats in the new parliament, and PKI and its mass organizations have been well represented in the appointed local and regional councils. Communist-supported—though independent-minded—appointees now fill the positions of deputy-governor in Djakarta Raja, West Java and Central Java, and communist members have been appointed mayors in Semarang, Surakarta, Tjirebon, and Surabaya. In the new, appointed high councils to advise the government, such as the National Advisory Council, the National Planning Council and the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly, communists have received many positions.<sup>17</sup>

Some Western observers have been horrified by these appointments, and view them as evidence that Sukarno is either pro-Communist or blind to the danger of communism. In fact, they are further evidence that Sukarno is a shrewd political manipulator determined to maintain the present non-communist regime. The appointments help him in three ways. First, parliament, the Consultative Assembly, and the various councils, though shorn of any power, are still necessary for the president to legitimize his rule and to give an appearance that there is a democratic aspect of guided democracy. Second, by bringing PKI and other political parties into the various appointed bodies, but at the same time preventing those bodies from voicing criticism, he is forcing the parties to identify themselves with the government. This in turn makes it difficult for them to exploit popular discontent at the government’s inadequacies and failures, particularly in the economic field.<sup>18</sup> And third, he is giving communist *cadres* a vested interest in the regime. To have excluded communists from the appointed positions would have made many of them bitterly resentful of the loss of dignifying and materially rewarding positions; to include them, at the

<sup>15</sup> In Java alone there are 4 province-level councils, and 99 city and *kabupaten* councils. There are usually about 75 members in the provincial councils, and 35 in the lower councils.

<sup>16</sup> PKI requires that any member who receives a remunerated position because of his membership in the Party must give the Party his wages and in return receive an honorarium. But, in general, communist members of parliament and councils, as well as *cadres* holding important positions in the Party and the mass organizations, are readily distinguishable from their colleagues by the better quality of their clothes and the expensive brands of their cigarettes.

<sup>17</sup> On March 9, 1962, Sukarno even appointed the top two PKI leaders, Aidit and Lukman as cabinet ministers. However, they have been given positions not only without power, but ones which identify them with the government in the field of activity in which the government is least successful and least popular, namely, economic affairs.

<sup>18</sup> So long as the West Irian liberation campaign was the center of government and national attention, the government found a ready “cause” for economic disorganization, and criticism of the economic situation necessarily smacked of anti-patriotism.

same time making the positions virtually powerless, may well reduce or remove their ardor as communists for the overthrow of the regime. If their personal situation is quite good, it is doubtful that they will risk the gamble of revolutionary action.

In short, Sukarno and the other groups in the government have prevented the communist leaders from educating and training their mass following in militant and successful actions, and, worse still, the revolutionary spearhead of *cadres* appears to have been somewhat blunted.

*Power by acclamation.* The possibility that PKI might achieve power "by acclamation" has never loomed large in Indonesia, and has grown no larger during the period of the alliance with Sukarno.<sup>19</sup> Certainly inflation continues at a rapid pace, and there are often grave shortages of basic consumer commodities. But the situation is very different from that in Weimar Germany or the last years of Kuomintang China. In the economic field, the Indonesian government manages to ensure a minimum of basic goods and occasional luxuries to the politically important sections—the armed forces, the public servants, the leading politicians, and the white-collar groups in general—while in the villages the tendency to share available wealth not too unequally among all villagers prevents the appearance of a truly impoverished rural proletariat. The administrative apparatus in the towns and countryside is unimpaired and, with the final collapse of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in 1961 and of the Darul Islam in 1962, government control now reaches to all parts of Indonesia for the first time since independence. Of greatest importance, the non-communist ruling groups, and especially the army, are now more firmly entrenched in power, and more cohesive, than they were in 1956 or 1957. And the ruling groups are as sure of their ability to govern as they have ever been.

At the same time, PKI, unlike the Chinese Communist Party in the years before 1949, does not appear to be a strong alternative ruling group with a distinctive program. At present PKI submits to government control, and the obstacles to its victory (for example, the army, Islam, and the outer islands) are so great as to suggest that even if victory could be achieved it would be at the expense of a protracted civil war. Furthermore, the close

identification of PKI with Sukarno and the government, with at the most minor proposals for improvements in the implementation of the government's program, does not suggest that the Party has a clearly distinctive program capable of solving the country's main problems.

In other words, the present ruling groups, who have a considerable edge on PKI in terms of power, have given no indication of turning to PKI as the only group able to govern well, especially as their hold on power is being strengthened.

#### V. CONCLUSION

When the Aidit leadership won control of PKI in January 1951, it took over a small, poorly organized party still licking its wounds after the failure of the Madiun rebellion. The more politically conscious and politically influential sections of Indonesian society had proved and continued to prove resistant to the Party's search for support. Consequently the Aidit leadership was forced to seek support among the masses, the workers, peasants and poorer sections of the "petty bourgeoisie," who were still by and large outside the political process. In order to win mass support it was necessary to present an image of PKI that would be both attractive to the poorer, generally passive, sections of society, and acceptable to significant sections of the non-communist ruling groups who controlled the means of repression and who could have made communist organizational work extremely difficult if not impossible. This image was one of PKI as fervently patriotic, sympathetic to religion, peaceful in pursuit of its goals, painstakingly solicitous of the small problems consciously felt by its potential supporters, moderate in demands, and self-effacing in the friendliness shown towards most other Indonesian political forces. With this image plus organizational skill and tenacity, PKI has become the largest non-governing communist party in the world, and important non-communist political forces have worked in alliance with PKI.

When the possibility of a parliamentary road to power was firmly blocked after 1955, PKI was forced to seek the alliance of one of the two emerging dominant powers in the country. PKI had mass support, but after many years of the broad national united-front policy, and in face of the overwhelming power superiority of the extra-parliamentary political forces, the Party was in no position to challenge the new ruling groups. Certainly the Party could have survived severe government repression, but it would have survived as a mere underground shadow of its former self. In these circum-

<sup>19</sup> The proposition that PKI might come to power peacefully, "called to power, as it were, by acclamation," is argued in Guy J. Pauker, "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1 (May 1961), pp. 26-35.

stances the Aidit leadership preferred to seek alliance with Sukarno, who was primarily concerned with his power struggle with the army. Undoubtedly the communist leaders hoped that the alliance would provide at least the protection of legality and the opportunity to continue the necessarily slow process of developing their mass support into a force capable of acting in a disciplined and revolutionary manner.

Sukarno has understood and exploited the major dilemma faced by the PKI leaders. He knows that they can either earn his protection by rendering him support in his struggle with the army, but at the same time accept the risk of domestication; or they can break the alliance, which would very probably alienate much of the existing support, divide the *cadres*, and bring about a strongly anti-communist government. In the knowledge of this dilemma, Sukarno, with the willing assistance of the army, has implemented a policy of domestication. PKI and its mass organizations have been protected, but the foreseeable roads to power have been effectively blocked. Communists have been given no control of ministries or positions in the bureaucracy from which they could pad the administration with their own supporters; and the central army command has had a free hand to remove to powerless positions officers suspected of communist sympathies. Parliament and elections have been rendered ineffective as a means to power. At the same time the government has gradually applied restrictions, controls and supervision over communist activities with a view to preventing the PKI leaders from creating a disciplined, militant force capable of winning power against the opposition of the ruling groups. And the very process of domestication removes the possibility that PKI may be called to power by acclamation.

Because Sukarno would lose from a break in the alliance, government action at no time has been sufficient to force PKI to the point of making a break. The restrictions, controls and supervision have been applied piecemeal, the communist organizations have been permitted to expand, and communist *cadres* have been given prestigious and remunerative honors, so that the Aidit leadership and the majority of *cadres* can justify to themselves and their followers the continuation of the alliance. But nevertheless domestication has taken place.

Since 1951 PKI has been notably free of "heretics" largely because the broad national united-front strategy of the Aidit leadership appeared to be bringing the Party ever closer to power. Now, however, the alliance with the "national bourgeoisie" may be viewed as strengthening the ruling groups at the same time as blocking all possible roads to PKI's assumption of power. Unrest among the *cadres* over the continuation of the alliance is to be expected, and has been admitted by the Party leadership.<sup>20</sup> Now that the Chinese Communist Party, as one of the two competitors for leadership of the communist world, is also questioning the general usefulness of such an alliance, the dissenters within PKI can claim international authority in support of their dissent. In short, unless the internal and international situation alters radically to the advantage of PKI, the unity of the world's largest nongoverning communist party may soon be broken.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Sakirman, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-40, 348; for indication of unrest, see D. N. Aidit, political report to the third PKI central committee plenum, *Harian Rakjat*, January 2, 1962; and Muhammad Samikidin, "Diatas segala-galanya: Persatuan!", *Madjalah PKI Surabaya*, February 1962, p. 12.

## THE DIALECTICS OF SUPRANATIONAL UNIFICATION\*

AMITAI ETZIONI  
*Columbia University*

The application of several European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries for membership in the Common Market (EEC) is viewed in Washington with great pleasure: the development of a United States of Europe is widely anticipated. Many observers have already calculated the combined manpower, economic resources, military power, etc. of the new union, and have pointed to the decisive advantage the United States, in coalition with this "third power," will have over the Soviet Union. Even the fact that the EEC and EFTA, if completely merged, would have 13 members is not considered unlucky: after all, the United States itself evolved out of a union of 13. It may however, be premature to prepare a celebration for the birthday of the United States of Europe. The following theoretical excursion suggests that loading the EEC with new members may well reduce it to the level of a glorified customs union rather than forward it to a political federation. Moreover, I shall argue, political communities often unify not by increasing their membership, but in a dialectic fashion: two or more groups form; they appear to be moving in opposite directions until each is well integrated, then they are "synthesized" (not merged) in a superior union. That is, they form one encompassing union without dissolving the bonds that held together the units that composed a group before the larger unification. The earlier autonomous groups become sub-groups in one union, adjusting to the new over-riding bond without being fused into one group that knows no internal divisions.

### I. CONSENSUS FORMATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES

The political process is one in which groups of citizens who differ in belief and interest work out a shared policy. The larger the number of participants in a unit, the greater the differences of belief and interest among them, the more difficult such a consensus becomes, to

form or keep.<sup>1</sup> This holds for students in social relations laboratories, for executives in industrial conferences, and for politicians in national government. Increasing the number of participants in a group may cause it to become so heterogeneous that one of two things will happen: either the ability of the group to form consensus breaks down or a new structure for the formation of consensus is built. In this structure consensus is formed on two (or more) levels. On the first, participants are separated into sub-groups according to the relative affinity of their beliefs and interests. Each of these sub-groups forms consensus among its members, and sends a representative to the second level. The second level, composed of representatives only, establishes consensus for the whole unit. This differentiation can be extended to more than two levels.

Political systems differ in the way consensus formation is institutionalized. In some, the lower level is strictly informal, having no legal or organizational status, like the blocs in the United Nations. The recent Russian proposals, commonly referred to as the "troika" system, can be viewed as a suggestion to institutionalize a two-level structure in the UN. Three blocs would be recognized—a Communist, a Western, and a Neutral one. This would require each of the blocs to form consensus internally first, on a "lower" level.<sup>2</sup> In other systems, two or more levels are formally recognized. In the United States, for example, the state primaries serve as one level, national party conventions as another, and interaction between the parties and between the President and Congress (see below) as still another level.

In some systems, policies formulated on the top level, the most encompassing level, are

<sup>1</sup> Theoretically one can increase the number of participants without increasing heterogeneity by adding new participants who are just like the old ones; this is the common justification for immigration policies, *e.g.*, that discriminate in favor of readily assimilable applicants for entry. In practice, I assume for the purpose of this discussion that heterogeneity increases with size. Note, though, that no one-to-one relationship is assumed. Actually, the marginal heterogeneity produced by increases in size probably declines.

<sup>2</sup> The obvious disadvantages of this system for the UN are irrelevant to the present analysis.

\* This article was written while I was a Research Associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies. I am grateful to my colleagues at the 1962 Summer Institute of the American Academy of Art and Sciences, in particular to James A. Robinson, for comments on an earlier draft.

brought before all the participants for final approval (*e.g.*, the recent nomination of Burma's U Thant to be acting Secretary General of the UN was approved, but hardly worked out, by the plenum of the General Assembly). In other systems, approval by the representatives of the sub-groups is deemed satisfactory, as is the case in practically all bureaucratic structures.

## II. ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL

All heterogeneous polities that effectively attain consensus have a multi-level consensus formation structure. The major national political systems differ greatly, however, in their specific structures. In multi-party systems, as long as they work—a problem to which we will return—consensus is first formed in each faction; then the factions contained by each party reach a compromise (which all consensus formation involves). Inter-party consensus is then worked out among representatives of the parties, *not* the factions. The general outline of the consensus is worked out during the negotiations over the formation of a coalition, which follows the elections; more specific consensus is worked out daily in the parliament, expressed in legislation and motions supported by votes of confidence.

In some instances, the minority party or parties (the opposition) may be left out of the process; quite often, though, they affect the policies formed, by reason of the fact that the coalition parties take their positions into account, in bi-partisan policy (especially foreign policy), as well as through participation in other "governments." Often parties that are in opposition in the national government nevertheless participate in the national consensus formation process by joining a coalition with government-parties on the city or municipal level.<sup>3</sup> The effective operation of the multi-party system of consensus formation requires that the number of parties be limited, otherwise communication difficulties arise and the top level may become too heterogeneous for effective negotiations; it also requires that the parties be stable, at least to the degree that a consensus reached on the lower level will be maintained on higher levels. If members of par-

liament maintain only a limited loyalty to their party once the parliament is elected, party representatives cannot negotiate in the name of its factions, and we are back to the state of many participants on one level. The French parliaments of the Third and Fourth Republics were at various times confronted with this type of stalemate.<sup>4</sup>

In two-party countries, more consensus formation takes place on the lower levels than in multi-party countries, because only two positions can compete on the top level. So, for instance, there are only two presidential candidates for national elections, but often more than two for one party's nomination. The British system differs from the American in that the minority party tends to be excluded from the top consensus formation level, except in periods of national crises and infrequent instances of bi-partisan foreign policy. In the United States, such exclusion is rare because the Congress and the Presidency are frequently not held by the same party, and because party ties sit more lightly than in England: witness the conservative Republican southern Democratic coalition. Moreover, in the United States, instances of a bi-partisan foreign policy—*e.g.*, on Castro's Cuba—are common.

Totalitarian societies are not exempted from the need to form consensus, though they can rely to a greater degree on coercion and downward-produced consensus through the manipulation of the mass media, rituals, etc. The major upward consensus formation takes place within extra-political structures; first, in each major bureaucracy (*e.g.*, the military, the economic planning agency, the party); then, among the bureaucracies. One might even speak, with caution, about coalitions of some bureaucracies against others (*e.g.*, Army and Party against the NKVD). In sum, while political systems differ in their consensus-formation structure, it is multi-level wherever it is effective.

## III. IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

An examination of the international scene from this viewpoint shows first, that the hypothesis that the formation of consensus within and among heterogeneous units requires differentiation, holds here too, though several additional variables have to be taken into account.

The United Nations is probably best characterized by lack of consensus because of the deep cleavages in interests and beliefs among many of its members. But when we review

<sup>3</sup> In Israel, many opposition parties share the leadership with the government leader, *Mapai* (Labor party), by joining the executive board of the Jewish Agency and the *Histadrut*, often referred to as the two other governments of Israel. On their functions and their effect on Israeli politics see my "Kulturkampf or Coalition: The Case of Israel" *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 8 (June, 1958), pp. 311-331.

<sup>4</sup> See Constantin Melnik and Nathan Leites, *The House Without Windows* (Evanston: Rowe Peterson, 1958).

those infrequent decisions—limited in importance, to be sure—where an overall consensus was reached we see the same multi-level structure in operation. Representatives of various groups of nations “caucus” to work out their shared position; then, their unofficial spokesmen negotiate with those of the other caucuses or blocs, to work out a general compromise which in turn is brought, for discussion or approval by acclamation, to the UN floor.<sup>5</sup> Bloc decisions themselves are frequently reached in a two-level process of a similar sort. In this light one may wonder whether we do not exaggerate the monolithic nature of the Communist bloc. China seems to have “caucused” with Albanian, and evidently North Vietnamese and North Korean representatives also, before the Congress of Communist countries in Moscow, in October, 1961.<sup>6</sup> Khrushchev is reported to have conferred with East European Communist countries during his boat trip to New York in 1959. The 1961 conference of twenty-five unaligned nations in Belgrade is reported to have comprised three factions: neutral-neutrals, pro-Western neutrals, and pro-Communist neutrals. The African “bloc” seems to have at least two groupings—though their degree of cohesion is as yet hard to assess—that of the Casablanca group and that of the Brazzaville group.<sup>7</sup> Although the latter is reported to have taken a more moderate, pro-Western line on the Congo issue, the two groups frequently vote *en bloc* in the UN.<sup>8</sup>

While blocs in international organizations such as the UN, and in particular conferences such as the Belgrade Conference, are highly fluid, sub-groupings of potential supranational communities seem to have a somewhat higher degree of permanency. Thus, the Benelux countries constitute such a sub-grouping in the EEC, though by no means with regard to all or even most issues. Australia and New Zealand seem to constitute such a sub-group in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The EEC and the EFTA play such a part in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Private communication with UN officials, and participant-observation in a UNESCO Conference in Montreal, in 1959.

<sup>6</sup> Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York, 1962), pp. 150 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, “Background to Pagan-I,” *West Africa*, July 29, 1961, p. 819.

<sup>8</sup> See Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1958).

<sup>9</sup> The EEC is represented in certain GATT negotiations by the Economic Commission as one

So far, the process of forming consensus in international systems seems to be quite similar to the national one. Moreover, further examination of international consensus formation suggests that, there too, a multi-level structure is more effective than direct representation of all participants on the same level, and points to the process by which such a multi-level structure tends to emerge. First, the lower level of consensus is attained by grouping a few states at a time; once the union of such groups solidifies, a more encompassing union—and a higher level of consensus—is produced. In the initial stage of the formation of this multi-level structure, there are seldom harmonious relations between two groups of nations (or unions). In fact, intense rivalry among them is more frequent. Such rivalry seems to help the integration of each group, preparing it for the next step, *i.e.*, the formation of higher level, more encompassing unions. Finally, to push an analogy further, if one group is seen as the thesis, the other as the anti-thesis, the emerging synthesis tends to include both unions. The original units are now *permanent* elements (though changed in character) of the union, acting as lower-level consensus formation units; the new union is not built on the atomization of the groups, but on their inclusion as “individual” members. The development of several unions will illustrate this hypothesis about the dialectics of unification.

The history of Benelux is enlightening from this viewpoint. Any historical development is affected by many factors; the degree to which a multi-level consensus-formation structure is erected is, of course, just one of them. Still, it is noteworthy that after centuries of shared rule under dukes of Burgundy and kings of Spain, the Low Countries—integrated into two groups, the northern and the southern provinces—were not ready when they tried to form one republic (1795–1814), or a *United Kingdom* (1814–1830). The effort failed, among other reasons, because all provinces were thrown together. The two unions of provinces were not recognized in the new structure; efforts were made to form all consensus on one level. In 1830, the southern provinces rebelled, and formed Belgium. The ensuing war between the north (the Netherlands) and the south (Belgium) helped the integration of each, but did *not* hinder the eventual union of the two, in a structure that does recognize the distinctive-

polity rather than six national polities. See W. W. Kitzinger, *The Challenge of the Common Market* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 3d ed., p. 27.

ness of the two regions, *i.e.*, in Benelux. This analysis suggests that if Benelux should ever attain complete supranational integration, it would be functional to maintain some degree of local governmental structure in units that are the present Belgium and the Netherlands. The inclusion of small Luxemburg was also not simply a matter of adding a nation to an existing union; the way was prepared, as far back as 1921, by a customs union (BELU) with Belgium, which is maintained as a sub-union of the present, larger union, just as Benelux itself is a viable part of the EEC.<sup>10</sup>

The 13 colonies that formed the United States were more or less autonomous societal units, with internal consensus-formation mechanisms. These societal units were not abolished with the federation, but found expression in the states' governments. They still have an important influence on the Federal government, both by carrying out some functions on the state level and through representation in the Senate. Moreover, groups of states—the South, East, Midwest, and West (sometimes smaller groupings, *e.g.*, the New England States or the Southwest) are still an important middle level of consensus formation informally recognized in Congress and in party conventions. The union here, as in Benelux, was completed only after a war between the South and the North, which did *not* eliminate either the South or the North or the states, as meaningful intermediary units in American politics. A similar analysis could be applied to the various Swiss cantons, and possibly even to their German and French-Italian groupings. Here too, civil wars, one as late as the suppression of a rebellion of a Roman Catholic canton in 1847, preceded but did not prevent federation in 1848.<sup>11</sup> To return to the contemporary scene, the Organization of American States, which has 21 members, may well be too large for effective, one-level unification; recent efforts to form common markets have been made between five Central American countries and seven South American ones. The possibility of forming a more encompassing union later is explicitly recognized.<sup>12</sup> The strains that have re-asserted themselves in the last two years in the relations between the United States and western European powers,

especially over the question of national nuclear deterrents, advance rather than retard the political unification of France and West Germany, and will not necessarily as often claimed, undermine the proposed Atlantic Union.<sup>13</sup>

It would be hasty, however, to conclude from the preceding discussion that the only or the best way to form a European Community is to integrate the EEC and the EFTA—as they are—in some super-system. Before the validity of other approaches can be assessed, some additional factors that affect supranational unification need to be examined. First, there is the question of the degree of integration a union aims at and the scope desired.

#### IV. DEGREE OF INTEGRATION, AND SCOPE

Political communities of nations differ from other international systems—such as alliances, blocs, international organizations—in having a “supranational” structure and not just an inter-governmental one. By definition they have one center of government that legitimately decrees and enforces decisions within its jurisdiction on matters that affect the member nations and their citizens; this requires a higher degree of consensus than the inter-governmental structure of other international systems. Since the decisions of inter-governmental bodies are not binding and collective international actions are under national control, consensus can often be worked out in an *ad hoc* manner, and on specific issues, even when general consensus is lacking. In short, supranationalism is a politically more integrated structure which requires correspondingly more consensus formation than typical inter-governmental organizations.<sup>14</sup> This is, though, a question of degree, not a “yes” or “no” proposition. NATO, for instance, has a supranational SHAPE, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) its High Authority, and the European Economic Community, the Economic Commission; but all have also superior inter-governmental bodies, the various Councils of Ministers. They are, thus, part supranational, part inter-governmental.<sup>15</sup> Since the Council of Ministers has both formal and realistic superiority, these European bodies

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Walter Lippmann, *Western Unity and the Common Market* (Boston, 1962), ch. 3.

<sup>14</sup> For a keen analysis of the difference between inter-governmental and supranational structures, see Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 520 ff.

<sup>15</sup> This point is elaborated in my “A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification,” *World Politics*, Vol. XV (October 1962), pp. 44.

<sup>10</sup> See F. Gunther Eyck, *The Benelux Countries* (New York, 1959), Pt. I.

<sup>11</sup> Charlotte Muret, “The Swiss Pattern for a Federal Europe,” in E. M. Earle, ed., *Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York, 1950), pp. 261 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Emerging Common Markets in Latin America,” *Monthly Review*, September, 1960.



should be regarded as predominantly inter-governmental.

We would expect that the smaller a union is, all other things equal, the more homogeneous it could be, and the more integrated and "supranational."<sup>16</sup> This is in fact the case since, while many international organizations include almost all the states there are, from five continents and from all blocs (e.g., 109 members of the UN), most supranational communities have less than ten members and are, comparatively homogeneous in their cultural, educational, economic, and political backgrounds. Hence, the question, whether the EEC and the EFTA should be merged and if merged should be preserved as sub-units, is in part dependent upon the degree of integration sought. A highly integrated union—a United States of Europe—is least likely to be formed by a large expansion of the membership of the EEC,<sup>17</sup> while a customs union—directed by an inter-governmental body—can readily accommodate a membership larger than that of the EEC and the EFTA combined. This conclusion, reached on the basis of studying the relationship between integration, heterogeneity and size, is reinforced by an examination of the relationship between integration and scope.

International systems differ in the number of societal sectors they pervade. Some, especially international organizations, are strictly mono-sectorial; they deal only with labor issues, or health issues, or postal services, or aviation; and as a rule only with some activities in these sectors, and not necessarily the most central ones. Other international organizations penetrate into two or more sectors (as, for instance, the Nordic Council which serves political, economic, educational, and cultural needs of the member-nations). The larger the sectorial scope of a union, the more consensus is required; and hence the fewer the number of nations (or more precisely, the degree of hetero-

geneity) it can tolerate, and the more it will need two (or more) structural levels of consensus formation. Thus, it is not surprising that the typical mono-sectorial unions have many members, while typical multi-sectorial unions have only from 3 to 8 members: for instance, the Nordic Council has 5 members; the Eastern European Community (with two major organizations as tools, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid) has 8 members; the *Conseil de l'Entente* has 4, and Benelux has 3.

Even more important than the number of sectors encompassed is the nature of any particular sector to be integrated, in terms of its articulation with other sectors of the same society. Several authorities in the study of supranationalism have pointed out that integration in one sector tends to spill over into other sectors, i.e., tends to trigger integration in them as well. Haas' study of the ECSC, for instance, shows how it spilled over into Euratom and the EEC.<sup>18</sup> He has also suggested that various societal sectors differ in their spill-over function.<sup>19</sup> On the basis of various sociological considerations that cannot be elaborated here,<sup>20</sup> I would order international organizations in various sectors with respect to their spill-over tendencies—from low to high—as follows: (a) organizations that deal with services, such as postal services, allocation of radio frequencies, police cooperation, etc.; (b) organizations dealing with labor, health, and cultural exchange, i.e., services to which "human values" are attached; (c) tariff agreements and military organizations; (d) economic unions or common markets.

The spill-over phenomenon points to the fact that societal sectors differ in the degree to which they are inter-related. Integrating some of them triggers unification tendencies in many other sectors; while integrating some other sectors has comparatively small repercussions. The military sector, for instance, is highly segregated and autonomous, unless industrial mobilization is involved. Military units of two nations can be integrated, their war plans coordinated, their navies participate in combined maneuvers, military information extensively exchanged, etc., without this having much effect on other societal sectors. Only

<sup>16</sup> See note 1, above, on the relationship between size and heterogeneity.

<sup>17</sup> The union of the United States, well "prepared" by 1789, took a hundred years and a civil war before it solidified, and yet was one of a highly homogeneous group: "... Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs." John Jay, *The Federalist*, No. 2, cited by Gerard J. Mangone, *The Idea and Practice of World Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 26, fn. 10.

<sup>18</sup> *Uniting of Europe*, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> Ernest B. Haas, "International Integration," *International Organization*, Vol. 15 (1961), pp. 366–392.

<sup>20</sup> See my "The Epigenesis of Political Community at the International Level," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 68 (Jan. 1963).

when integration reaches the higher level of policy making is there a considerable spill-over into the political sector, and this because integration here requires some governmental integration, *e.g.*, of Defense Departments. Similarly, standardization of weapons and other equipment often has some repercussion on the economic sector. Economic integration, on the other hand, affects all societal groups—consumers, producers, management, labor, farmers, small business—and therefore tends to have extensive political repercussions. In contrast, tariff agreements, especially to the degree that they cover only some goods and concern only reduction but not abolition of tariffs, affect only some exporters and importers and a limited number of related industries. It is only as such unions become so broadly encompassing as to tend to affect the flow of capital, monetary policy, levels of employment, etc., in the countries involved, that they spill over into economic unions, *i.e.*, that they trigger integration of many other spheres.

In cases where the unification of a high spill-over sector has occurred and unification of other related sectors is blocked, an unbalanced state is created which generates pressures to "solve" the imbalance, either by removing the blocks or by reducing the degree of unification in the sector in which it was initiated. For instance, if furnishing nuclear weapons to NATO would require NATO to create a joint political authority to command their use (there would hardly be time to consult 15 governments if NATO is attacked nuclearly, and contingent decisions are unsatisfactory), and if for some reason the 15 nations are not "ready" for the required political integration, these would be two factors working against the acceptance of such weapons by NATO. The prospect that spill-over from the military into the political sector is blocked would work against military integration. [Integration, so to speak, proceeds in steps. There are several plateaus on which one can rest, but one cannot stand on two steps simultaneously; one has either to progress to more encompassing unification or retreat to a narrower one.]

What does the study of the scope of integration and spill-over add to our understanding of EFTA-EEC relations? The EEC is continuously growing closer to an economic union, above and beyond a mere tariff agreement. Such unions have high spill-over effects, as is evident in the EEC talks about federation and in the increased public and private support for a strong, political EEC.

In short, by 1962, the Europe of the Six was

on the verge of an increasing spill-over into the political sector. Britain, on the other hand, though consistently interested in a European tariff agreement, or even in an economic one, was ambivalent if not negatively disposed toward a political union. This was one of the major reasons why England did not join the EEC in the first place and instead joined the EFTA, a free trade association with limited spill-over potentialities. By 1961 Britain had changed its position. EFTA clearly failed. Some of its members traded more across the tariff wall with EEC countries than with each other. While customs reductions within the EEC seemed to trigger a rapid rate of economic growth—better than six per cent a year—economic stagnation in Britain continued. The prospect of a fully integrated Western Europe became more and more real. Hence Britain's resolution, in the middle of 1961, to abandon EFTA, to weaken its ties to the Commonwealth if necessary, and to join the EEC on any reasonable conditions. Britain's interest in the EEC is, though, almost completely economic. British feelings against political unification with the continent have deep roots which include a long history of hegemony; a self-image of a big power, or even more painful, of an ex-big power, jealous of its remaining privileges, sensitive about its status, anxious to preserve its strong ties to the Commonwealth and to the United States. Many of these roots will have to be considerably weakened before the United Kingdom can genuinely participate in a political integration of Western Europe.

Last but not least, is the question of hegemony in the EEC. International communities seem to function best when one nation has clear hegemony;<sup>21</sup> sometimes, two countries can share the leadership, especially when there is a third outside force against which they unite. This is the present situation in the EEC, where

<sup>21</sup> Cf., for instance, the period of hegemony in the British, Hapsburg, and German empires to the periods of dual or multi-leadership. See also Crane Brinton, *From Many One* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). And compare the Communist bloc in the days when the Soviet Union had a clear hegemony to the later period of the Soviet-Chinese rift. See T. M. Mills, "Power Relations in Three Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18 (1953), pp. 351-7; Georg Simmel, "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 8 (1902), pp. 45-6.

France and West Germany share the leadership. Systems with three leaders hardly ever stabilize.<sup>22</sup> There are too many latent and tempting benefits to be derived from the collusion or coalition of two against the third partner. On all these counts, Britain's entry into the EEC makes the completion of the spill-over from the economic to the political area quite unlikely. And this may mean that the EEC will not even remain an economic union, but instead will more likely regress to the level of a tariff agreement. This point requires some elaboration.

International unions of this type seem to have two stable stages: *low* integration with little or no spill-over, and *high* integration, where unification initiated in one sector spills over to many others, especially the political. Unions that try to maintain a medium-level integration, *e.g.*, economic only, or economic with a minimum of political integration, are unstable, not because they are likely to disintegrate but because their capacity to form consensus is out of balance with the need for it: they are likely to become more integrated or regress to a lower level of integration. The chances, in case England joins the EEC, favor regression rather than progression.

The fact that England and other EFTA members apply for membership in the EEC as individual countries, not *en bloc*, makes high integration of the EEC less, not more, likely, for it produces a merger rather than a synthesis on a higher level. One might therefore be inclined to favor the formation of a super-system, to include both the EFTA and the EEC as sub-units. But this will not do because the units of an effective union, one that can maintain an adequate level of consensus, have to be fairly cohesive, stable units. One cannot build a second floor structure of consensus formation unless the first one has a firm foundation. While the EEC is already quite cohesive, and becoming more so, the EFTA is not. EFTA was formed, not out of any genuine commitment to a union, but to countervail the EEC; it was viewed as a temporary union, to be used to bargain with the EEC, hardly a morale-building feature. Austria and Switzerland, *e.g.*, trade more with EEC countries than with EFTA countries. In addition, the EFTA membership is highly heterogeneous: it includes NATO and non-NATO members; democracies and Portugal; Protestant countries and Austria.

<sup>22</sup> See Miriam Camps, *Division in Europe*, Policy Memorandum No. 21, Center of International Studies (Princeton University, 1960).

The preceding discussion suggests that western Europe includes too many countries, is too heterogeneous, to form one union. It follows that two or more unions are needed, to form the units of a larger system. But it does not follow that the unification of any specific group of countries would be more conducive to European integration than any other, as long as cohesive unions serve as building blocs. One course toward unification is the expansion of the EEC to include a few more countries (though not all the members of the EFTA), such as some that are contiguous to the EEC and less competitive for its leadership than Britain. Austria and Switzerland are natural candidates. The fact that they are not NATO countries, and in the past have taken a neutral position in the inter-bloc strife, is not necessarily a barrier to their inclusion, probably first as associate members; and later as full members, to be included also in the political union. The neutrality of these nations is quite pro-Western and both France (since De Gaulle) and West Germany (since the inclusion of the Free Democrats in the government) move in the direction of a somewhat more "independent" foreign policy. [It is hard to see how the USSR could stop a gradual integration of Austria into the EEC.]

Another European union, the Scandinavian community, forms a core for a larger union. It has already grown from three to five members, adding Iceland and Finland to Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Once European trade problems are solved in a large framework, as discussed below, Britain might find this union—which is democratic, Protestant and welfare-oriented—more appealing for political unification than the continental one. Portugal and Spain have been reported to have considered an Iberian union of their own.<sup>23</sup> Once the major requirements of small size and cohesion are satisfied, other possible combinations might emerge; the major question that remains is the type of super-system to which these unions can belong.

#### V. KINDS OF SUPER-SYSTEMS

How encompassing could such a super-system be, in terms of the number of unions to be included? What could be the functions of the super-system, above and beyond those of the member unions? The major alternatives discussed seem to be a European super-system or an Atlantic one, the latter to include the United

<sup>23</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, October 28, 1957, p. 6.

States and Canada in addition to the European countries (including either all western Europe or only NATO members).<sup>24</sup>

The following analysis suggests that a European super-system<sup>25</sup> will be more integrated and stable than an Atlantic one, as long as it will itself be a part of a third-level organization. The main reason for this is that the United States, as the leading Western power, has many commitments and functions in other international communities than the European ones, especially in Latin America, but also in the Far East, South East Asia, the Middle East, and to an increasing degree in Africa. Strong integration of the United States in a European union would impose sharp strains on these other American ties.

The optimal participation for the United States is on the third level of consensus formation, a structural level where super-systems—of several European unions, of several African ones, and of several Latin American ones, etc.—are integrated in a single super-super-system, already vaguely recognized as the “Free World.” A three-level structure may perhaps seem too complicated to be attained; or if attained, to function effectively. It should therefore be pointed out that three-level structures are quite common. Most national governments and practically all large corporate enterprises have at least a three-level structure, and many of them are quite effective. Actually, the evolution of a third-level structure would not preclude active participation in the development of a fourth level, that of the United Nations.

The main problem is not the number of levels but the distribution of functions, powers and political loyalties among the various levels. The formal, legal and institutional differences between unions whose members are nations, and super-systems whose members are unions, is that representation in super-systems is in the hands of those who speak in the name of the unions (e.g., the EEC), either in addition to or instead of national representatives. For the division of functions, we can consider two major possibilities: one is that the super-sys-

tems will be a replica of member-unions on a more encompassing level. Such a super-system is approximated (in limited spheres to be sure) in the relations between the EEC and the EFTA in the OEEC and in GATT. Each group, for instance, introduced some internal reductions of tariffs, then met in the wider arena of GATT to consider mutual tariff cuts—as well as small cuts for “third” countries, not members of either union. According to this plan the control of one specific function, in this case setting tariff rates, is divided between two levels beyond the national one: that of the unions and that of the super-system.

The second way to integrate unions into super-systems is to introduce a functional division of labor among the levels instead of a differentiation of authority. One such arrangement might take the form of leaving to the small, cohesive unions the economic and political functions; to the super-systems, the role of military integration; and to the third-level system (or bloc), the coordination of foreign policy, monetary policy (e.g., through a revised International Monetary Fund), and tariff agreements.<sup>26</sup> This might also be the best level on which to coordinate aid to underdeveloped countries.

This specific division only illustrates the nature of inter-level division of functions; of course other arrangements can be worked out. It should, though, be emphasized that the division outlined above takes into account the need to reserve to smaller, lower-level units those functions that require a high degree of consensus formation and hence of relatively strong supranationalism. The actual structure of the West approaches such a division with the smaller economic-political EEC and Nordic Council, the larger NATO, and the still more encompassing GATT, IMF, and OECD. The third-level system is still highly informal, and centered around trips of premiers to Washington, foreign tours of American representatives, and regional meetings—but no Free World ministerial conferences.

Which of the two types of inter-level division is optimal has yet to be determined. It seems that they differ in effectiveness with regard to different goals: functional division of labor seems better for short-run stability, and an inter-level division of control over each function the better for long-run integration of second- and third-level super-systems. This

<sup>24</sup> Such a union has been advocated by Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York, 1960), pp. 165–8. See also Joseph Kraft, *The Grand Design* (New York, 1962). Some of the problems involved in its formation have been pointed out by Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton University Press, 1957).

<sup>25</sup> Not to be confused with a merger of nations as “individuals” in a European union, such as “revised” OEEC.

<sup>26</sup> See Robert Trillon, *Gold and the Dollar Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), ch. 4, and Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's* (London, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1959), ch. 4.

latter seems to be the case because here high spill-over functions are in part carried out by super-systems, and because the units which carry out high spill-over functions command more political loyalty than those which do not.

The long-run trend toward integration seems to be for functions, authority and loyalties to be transferred from smaller units to larger ones; from states to federations; from federations to supranational unions; and from these to super-systems. This transfer may progress without major upsets because a variety of processes tend to reduce the heterogeneity of the member-units—through industrialization, the spread of

education, democratization, and the unification process—to lower-level units.<sup>27</sup> Hence the transfer of additional powers of decision to higher levels—those encompassing more members—need not undermine stabilization as long as the pace of upgrading function or authority does not overtake that of decreasing heterogeneity. We close with the speculative, though not unimaginable possibility that eventually, in this way, the highest super-system, that of a global society, might develop.

<sup>27</sup> This point is elaborated in my *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), ch. 8.

## GAME THEORY AND CUMULATIVE VOTING IN ILLINOIS: 1902-1954\*

JACK SAWYER AND DUNCAN MACRAE, JR.  
*University of Chicago*

Since the theory of games was first made widely available, with application to economic behavior,<sup>1</sup> its use has been suggested in many other areas, from the global<sup>2</sup> to the individual.<sup>3</sup> Several correspondences between game theory and certain aspects of political process have been noted.<sup>4</sup>

The contribution of game theory to substantive knowledge in the empirical sciences, however, has been modest; Luce and Raiffa<sup>5</sup> judge that its impact has been greater in applied mathematics. The area of political behavior—despite the apparent applicability of the notion of conflict of interest—is similarly lacking in studies, although a few notable exceptions exist.<sup>6</sup>

\* Revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Statistical Association, Stanford, California, December, 1959. This research was conducted during the senior author's tenure as a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellow. Computations were supported by funds from the Social Science Research Council.

<sup>1</sup> J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton University Press, 1944).

<sup>2</sup> M. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (Wiley, 1957).

<sup>3</sup> H. A. Simon, "A Comparison of Game and Learning Theory," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 267-72.

<sup>4</sup> Richard C. Snyder outlines conceptual parallels and several potentially fruitful areas of application in "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," in Stephen K. Bailey, et al., *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (The Brookings Institution, 1955). See also the broad collection edited by Martin Shubik, *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior* (Doubleday, 1954).

<sup>5</sup> R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (Wiley, 1957).

<sup>6</sup> L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 787-792; R. D. Luce and A. A. Rogow, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Stable Two-Party System," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 1 (1956), pp. 83-95; and William H. Riker, "A Test of the Adequacy of

Many of the previous studies have taken the form of defining a situation in terms of game theory and prescribing the proper behavior for a given set of conditions. In the present study, however, it was possible not only to specify a simple game theory model, but to try it out in a large number of actual cases. The following sections describe a voting behavior being modeled, the game theory model employed, an empirical test of the model, and implications of the results.

### I. THE VOTING SITUATION

Voting for representatives for the Illinois General Assembly proceeds in a manner unique among state legislatures.<sup>7</sup> The system used, cumulative voting, is intended to secure minority representation and does so by providing multiple member constituencies and allowing individuals to "cumulate" their votes on fewer than the total number of candidates to be elected.<sup>8</sup>

the Power Index," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 120-131.

<sup>7</sup> Cumulative voting is, however, common in voting for corporate boards of directors; for an application of the theory of games in this area, see G. J. Glasser, "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," *Management Science*, Vol. 5 (1959), pp. 151-156. In England, cumulative voting for school boards of from five to fifteen members was instituted through the Education Act of 1870, and continued until school boards were abolished in 1902; see J. F. S. Ross, *Elections and Electors: Studies in Democratic Representation* (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), pp. 62-63.

<sup>8</sup> In 1870, when cumulative voting was adopted in Illinois by referendum as part of a new constitution, the General Assembly was sharply divided by region. In the Assembly of 1867, one could draw a line across the state about the latitude of Springfield such that districts north of the line returned 52 Republicans and no Democrats and those south of the line returned 8 Republicans and 24 Democrats. In the first election after the change to cumulative voting, however, all but one of the 51 newly created three-member districts returned members of both parties. North of the same line referred to above, the Democrats had increased their representation from zero to

As it is applied in Illinois, three representatives are elected from each district, and each voter has three votes, which he may distribute 3-0, 2-1,  $1\frac{1}{2}$ - $1\frac{1}{2}$ , or 1-1-1, among the candidates. Each party may nominate for the general election one, two, or three candidates, and the number to be nominated is decided upon and announced prior to the primary. This decision is made more or less independently by separate three-man committees elected by members of each party, with the voters in the primary election then determining *who* the candidates shall be.

The committee's decision is made under uncertainty as to the percentage of the vote that the party will receive, and often, though not always, the number of candidates that the other party will nominate. The behavior of this committee in arriving at a decision in the face of uncertainty is the object of the present study. In particular, the "rationality" of this decision in terms of its success in maximizing the number of the party elected is investigated by reference to the theory of games.

Previous studies of cumulative voting,<sup>9</sup> while giving major attention to other aspects, have noted that occasionally the majority party fails to nominate two candidates and thereby loses the second seat it could otherwise fill. (As it turns out, however, by far the most frequent occasion of loss comes when a party with a 75 per cent majority nominates only two rather than three candidates.) Hence, in order to examine systematically the behavior of the nominating committee, the present study postulates a model based upon the theory of games, for the process of deciding upon the number of candidates.

## II. THE GAME THEORY MODEL

The behavior of the two nominating committees—one for each party—may be viewed as a two-person game in which the payoff is the number of candidates elected. The game is

34%, and south of the line, the Republicans had increased their representation from 25% to 38%. For an account of the operation of cumulative voting in Illinois over the period 1872-1954, see George S. Blair, *Cumulative Voting: An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics* (University of Illinois Press, 1960).

<sup>9</sup> B. F. Moore, "The history of cumulative voting and minority representation in Illinois, 1870-1919," *University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1919); C. S. Hyne-man and J. D. Morgan, "Cumulative Voting in Illinois," *Illinois Law Review*, Vol. 32 (1937), pp. 12-31; and George S. Blair, *op. cit.*

essentially zero-sum, in that positions not filled by one party are filled by the other. Each party has three strategies, namely to nominate one, two, or three candidates.<sup>10</sup>

*Applicability of the Model.* The theory of games assumes that each player (1) knows all the rules of the game, *i.e.*, the payoff matrix; (2) has a preference ordering of the payoffs, and also knows that of his opponents; and (3) expresses his preference ordering in selecting strategies, *i.e.*, he acts to maximize expected utility. As Luce and Raiffa<sup>11</sup> point out, the third condition may perhaps best be taken as tautological, being simply a description of "preference ordering." The alternative is to determine preference orderings independently and use these to test the postulate.

In this application—unlike many experimental trials of the theory of games—the stakes are so considerable that there is good reason to assume a preference ordering. At the least, electing one candidate is not preferred to electing two candidates, and neither is preferred to electing three candidates. The assumption of a known payoff matrix is also met unusually well in this case, for both the available strategies and the outcomes for different combinations of strategies are completely prescribed and known to both parties. Hence, among situations involving actual political behavior, the case of cumulative voting appears particularly appropriate and specifically overcomes many of the problems raised by Deutsch<sup>12</sup> in the application of game theory to politics.

*Factors in the Committee's Decision.* In determining the number of candidates to nominate, the committee acts under uncertainty as to (1) the percentage of the vote its party will receive, (2) how the vote will be divided among its candidates, and (3) how many candidates the other party will nominate. The division of the vote among the various candidates of the same party, however, is in practice usually very even, reflecting perhaps a combination of voter indifference, party discipline, and the effect (in machine voting) of the party lever, which makes it relatively easier to divide one's votes equally among the party's candidates. In any event, given a rational opponent, an equal division of the votes among the candidates is

<sup>10</sup> The theoretical alternative of nominating none may be eliminated from consideration since it is never optimal and never employed.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>12</sup> K. W. Deutsch, "Game Theory and Politics: Some Problems of Application," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 20 (1954), pp. 76-83.

TABLE I. NUMBER ELECTED BY PARTY A, BY PERCENTAGE OF VOTE

0-25% A		B Nominates			25-40% A		B Nominates			40-50% A		B Nominates		
		1 2 3					1 2 3					1 2 3		
A Nominates	1	1	1	0	A Nominates	1	1	1	1	A Nominates	1	1	1	1
	2	2	1	0		2	2	1	0		2	2	1	2
	3	2	1	0		3	2	1	0		3	2	1	0
50-60% A		B Nominates			60-75% A		B Nominates			75-100% A		B Nominates		
		1 2 3					1 2 3					1 2 3		
A Nominates	1	1	1	1	A Nominates	1	1	1	1	A Nominates	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2		2	2	2	2		2	2	2	2
	3	2	1	3		3	2	3	3		3	3	3	3

always reasonable for a given party. Otherwise, as has happened in a small percentage of elections, a party barely in the majority may find its less preferred candidate running behind both the equally preferred minority party candidates. Consequently, the formulations which follow assume that each party's vote is divided equally among all candidates of that party.<sup>13</sup>

*The Payoff Matrices.* The two remaining uncertainties may be dealt with by considering, for any given distribution of the vote, what the payoffs are in terms of number of candidates elected for any particular combination of strategies. It turns out that, given a two-party situation, there are only six different payoff matrices, one for each of the following ranges of the vote for the first party: 0-25%; 25-40%; 40-50%; 50-60%; 60-75%; 75-100%. These six matrices are given in Table I, with the payoff the number of candidates elected by party A.

Take, for example, the matrix for the case in which A has 50-60 per cent of the vote. If each party nominates only one candidate, both are elected, and the payoff to A is one.<sup>14</sup> If A nomi-

nates one while B nominates two or three, A being in the majority, will elect that one, while B will elect the other two. If A nominates two he will elect both, regardless of how many B nominates. The third strategy of A presents an interesting inversion in outcomes: if B nominates one, he will elect that one and A will elect two; if B nominates two, he will elect both (despite his overall minority, each of his two will have more than 20 per cent of the vote while each of A's three candidates will have less than 20 per cent); but if B nominates three, he will elect none and A will elect all three. This latter case illustrates particularly how it is possible to nominate either too many or too few candidates.

*Solution of the Game.* In the same payoff matrix (50-60%) considered before, what is the optimal strategy for each party? Among A's strategies, it is apparent that by nominating two, he can guarantee electing that many which is more than can be guaranteed by any other choice of strategy. B, on the other hand by choosing to nominate two, can assure that A will elect at most two. The same assurance is

<sup>13</sup> Actually, as will be made apparent later, the most desirable situation—although difficult to attain—would be the ability to maintain a very small, but highly reliable, difference among the candidates.

<sup>14</sup> This is an extremely rare event, occurring only when there is a strong third party—a case

not covered by the present exposition. Technically, this feature makes the game non-zero-sum in that the gains of A plus the gains of B do not sum to the constant three for this case. In a two party situation, however, this combination of strategies is never optimal, and, in practice, never occurs.



given B if he chooses to nominate only one, but this strategy is dominated, since the outcome resulting from its selection is in no case better, and sometimes worse than that from nominating two. Thus the minimax loss solution for this game matrix calls for each party to nominate two, in which case the outcome is that A elects two.<sup>15</sup>

In the 60-75% matrix, B can, by nominating only one, guarantee himself electing that one, while for A, nominating either two or three guarantees his electing two. Nominating two, however, is consistent with A's minimax strategy in the 50-60% case, and provides for the event that the vote should actually fall below 60 per cent (which is much more likely, on the basis of past experience, than that it will exceed 75 per cent).

In the 75-100% matrix, A's best strategy clearly is to nominate three, which guarantees his electing all of them, while B can by no choice guarantee himself even one. It might seem that B's best choice is to nominate two or three, in the hope that A might grossly err by nominating only one. It seems more reasonable, to assume, however, that B in this case acts as if he knew the *a priori* distribution of A's choices to have zero probability for the strategy of nominating one.<sup>16</sup> With this assumption, B's three strategies give identical outcomes and leave no choice. However, given even the slightest positive probability (which always exists in practice) of the percentage of the vote to party A being not 75-100 but instead between 60 and 75, then B should nominate only one, as a hedge against this possibility. In addition, other considerations enter, such as the cost of candidacy, the discouraging effects of running redundant candidates in the face of certain defeat, etc., which might suggest that B should realistically choose to run no candidates. But the chance of A's vote falling below 75 per cent will practically always be large enough to justify the costs of a single candidacy; more-

over, there may be a positive benefit to party morale from running one candidate rather than none.<sup>17</sup>

Solutions for the three remaining matrices are symmetrical to the ones already obtained, and, in summary, the hypothesized behavior, based upon a combination of probability and game theory principles, is that the number of nominations by each party will conform to the table below:

Per Cent of the Vote to Party A	Expected Number Nominated	
	A	B
0- 25	1	3
25- 40	1	2
40- 50	2	2
50- 60	2	2
60- 75	2	1
75-100	3	1

*Rationale for a minimax solution.* The conservative minimax loss criterion—providing a sure minimum rather than a chance of greater gain or loss—appears particularly compatible with a stable political system. Using the minimax loss solution excludes the possibility that parties try to demolish the opposition completely, even at considerable risk to themselves. One would not expect, on the other hand, such a consensus-promoting model to apply to revolutionary parties, which might be more likely to risk all for total victory.

*Alternative Solutions.* One might consider the minimax regret criterion,<sup>18</sup> and ask, *given a particular choice of strategy by the opponent*, what the regret (in terms of a smaller number elected) would be at one's actual choice of strategy compared with one's best choice in the light of that particular strategy of the opponent. While much *post mortem* speculation is carried on over election results, it is not clear that this retrospective criterion is invoked before the choice is made. One can, however, compare the solutions obtained by minimizing loss with those obtained by minimizing regret. In the latter case, of course, a non-zero-sum game results, since A's regret for a particular outcome depends upon the other entries in that row of the matrix. In the case of these small matrices and limited range of payoffs, however,

<sup>15</sup> In general, the minimax loss criterion calls for an individual to determine, for each of his possible strategies, the maximum loss which he could suffer (depending upon the choice made by the other party); he then chooses that strategy which minimizes his maximum loss. Equivalently, this may be considered as maximizing one's minimum gain, referred to by Luce and Raiffa, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-219, as maximin.

<sup>16</sup> In the more than 1500 district elections since 1902, this has indeed been the case: with 75% of the vote, the majority party has never nominated less than two.

<sup>17</sup> The detrimental consequences of local atrophy of party organization are suggested in V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics* (Knopf, 1956), ch. 6.

<sup>18</sup> L. J. Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics* (Wiley, 1954), pp. 163-164.

it happens that precisely the same solutions result from minimaxing either regret or loss.

In general, solution of a game by the minimax principle assumes a rational opponent who will behave in the same conservative fashion, *i.e.*, to assure himself a guaranteed minimum. Such behavior may not be optimal against an opponent who behaves in some other fashion, although it will still guarantee one the stated minimum. It may be more profitable yet, though, to utilize some more risky strategy. In particular, if some *a priori* preference distribution can be ascribed to the strategies of the opponent (as was done in a limited sense in the 0-25% matrix), then a solution, given this particular distribution, can be found which maximizes the expected number elected. A party nominating committee could act on such a basis, of course; the problem is to specify the *a priori* distribution. The number of previous elections upon which to base experience is small, and in most districts the distribution of the vote has varied considerably, affecting the choice of strategy. It seems unreasonable, therefore, to assume constant probabilities, unchanging over time. Yet if separate distributions among strategies are posited for different distributions of the vote, the number of previous elections upon which to base any such distribution becomes very small. In addition, committee membership, and perhaps party philosophy, is continually changing. Considering all these contingencies, minimax loss seems the most appropriate model for this situation.

Since the proportion of the vote received by party A is a variable, imperfectly estimated, it is not entirely certain, of course, that the vote will be within the range applicable to a particular matrix. Hence, as a first approximation to a stochastic model, the solutions just described incorporate the following feature: in the case of a matrix for which a party has two possible minimax strategies, that strategy is preferred which is consistent with the minimax strategy of one of the adjacent matrices (the one closer to the middle of the distribution). A further step might involve specifying a probability that the vote is in each of the six ranges, and solving the composite game, based upon the relations among the six probabilities. However, the present examination of empirical data, described in the next section, is based upon the simpler model.

### III. ANALYSIS OF ELECTION DATA

To examine the fit of the model, data were obtained from official records<sup>19</sup> for the 1377

<sup>19</sup> Illinois Secretary of State, *Blue Book of the State of Illinois* (State of Illinois, 1902-1954).

biennial elections (27 in each of Illinois' 51 districts) for the years 1902-1954.<sup>20</sup> Of these 1377 elections, 187 resulted in one party receiving fewer seats than following a minimax strategy would have guaranteed it. (Of the non-minimax outcomes 29 were, however, the result of an uneven distribution of the party's vote among its candidates.) In 86 of the non-minimax outcome elections, the Democrats won fewer seats than guaranteed by minimax strategy; in 101 elections, the Republicans were the losers. The following sections examine further the factors involved in rationality of the choice of the number nominated.

*Number Nominated and Per Cent Democratic.* Table II displays, for each of the six ranges of the per cent of the vote which is Democratic (the same as for the six payoff matrices in Table I), the distribution of the number nominated: 1-3 (one Democrat; three Republicans), 1-2, 2-2, 2-1, 3-1. Columns add to one hundred per cent. The 24 elections (many of them involving strong third parties) which display a nomination pattern other than one of these five are omitted from the table.

From both sets of marginals, it is evident that Illinois General Assembly districts were more Republican than Democratic over this period. The table entries themselves, however, show, for the more than ninety per cent of the elections in which the Democratic vote fell between 25% and 75%, a remarkable symmetry between the two parties. The second (25-40% Dem) column (5, 81, 13, 1, 0) corresponds closely to the reverse of the fifth (25-40% Rep) column (1, 87, 10, 2, 0); likewise the third column (1, 26, 68, 5, 0) to the reverse of the fourth (0, 27, 67, 6, 0). Given a vote between 25% and 75%, the parties behave with remarkable similarity in respect to the number nominated.

As a test of the appropriateness of the particular game theory model in this situation, one may examine the distribution of the number nominated for each of the six ranges of the vote. The predicted cells (as specified in the preceding section entitled "Solution of the Game") contain 27%, 81%, 68%, 67%, 87%, and 9% of the elections in their range of the vote, the overall proportion in those cells being 69 per cent.

In over half of all elections, the vote was between 40% and 60% Democratic. In about two-thirds of these elections both parties employed the minimax strategy of nominating two

<sup>20</sup> Fortunately for research purposes—although in disregard of the constitution—the Illinois Assembly had failed to redistrict during this entire period.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1902-1954,  
BY NUMBER NOMINATED AND PER CENT DEMOCRATIC

Number Nominated		Per Cent Democratic for the Same Election						Total
Dem	Rep	0-25	25-40	40-50	50-60	60-75	75-100	
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1	3	27	5	1				3
1	2	69	81	26	6	2		36
2	2	4	13	68	67	10		40½
2	1		1	5	27	87	91	20
3	1					1	9	½
Total no. of elections		77	371	419	295	145	45	1353

candidates. In another quarter of these elections, only the majority party nominated two candidates, with the result that the election was uncontested, but its outcome was the same as that obtained by use of minimax strategy. For about five per cent of the elections, however, the majority party nominated only one candidate, thereby losing a seat it could have obtained.

The case in which one party had between 60 and 75 per cent of the vote resulted in an uncontested election about five-sixths of the time. Only rarely (2 per cent for Democrats; 1 per cent for Republicans) did the party with this distinct majority fail to nominate the two candidates which it could surely have elected.

With more than 75 per cent of the vote, however, both parties were considerably reluctant to nominate the three which that proportion enabled them to elect, although the Democrats were much less likely to nominate three than the Republicans (9 per cent compared with 27 per cent).

The foregoing results convey a strong implication of non-linear utility: parties *never* fail to run at least one candidate; 5 per cent of the time when they could elect two, they fail to run the second candidate; but 80 per cent of the time when they could elect three, they fail to nominate a third candidate. The third seat seems less valuable to the nominating committee than the first or the second, especially for the Democrats.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Such non-linear utility, of course, implies a non-zero-sum game, although the more complex model resulting would necessarily describe the data somewhat better. Another possible extension of the present model would formally incorporate stochastic properties; there could be determined an expected distribution of the variable, per cent Democratic, based upon past experience, and

*Insensitivity to Change.* In examining various aspects of the sensitivity of the behavior of the nominating committee to change, the most striking result is the basic conservatism of both parties. No matter what political changes occur from one election to the next, by far the most likely number of nominations for any given year is the same as that for the previous election. Changes in number nominated often represent changes in the vote that occurred several years before.

*Multiple Regression to Predict the Number Nominated.* To investigate the association of variables with the choice of the number of candidates, multiple regressions were performed separately for Democrats and Republicans, using as dependent variables the numbers of candidates chosen at the 1275 elections of 1906-1954. Independent variables were the number nominated at the previous election; the percentage of the vote at the present election, the previous election, and the next previous election; and the occurrence of a minimax (rather than a non-minimax) outcome at the previous election.

The same general pattern of partial regression coefficients was obtained for both parties (Table III); nearly all the weight is placed on the first two variables, the number nominated at the previous election and the percentage of the vote at the present election.<sup>22</sup> Note, though,

from this could be stated the probability of any given one of the six matrices obtaining in the next election. Choice of strategy would then be based upon a composite super-game, amalgamating the six matrices and their respective probabilities.

<sup>22</sup> The relevance of the latter variable may be taken as reflecting on the committee's use of estimates of the forthcoming vote—which correlates, however, .82 with the vote of the previous election.

TABLE III. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS  
FOR NUMBER NOMINATED AT TIME  $t$ 

Variable	Democrats	Republicans
Number nominated at time $t-1$	.462	.519
Per Cent Democratic* at time $t$	.470	.301
Per Cent Democratic* at time $t-1$	.012	.044
Per Cent Democratic* at time $t-2$	-.085	.027
Minimax outcome at time $t-1$	.041	-.022
Multiple Correlation	.767	.800

\* For the Republicans, the second, third, and fourth partial regression coefficients are for per cent *Republican*, at times  $t$ ,  $t-1$ , and  $t-2$ .

that while for Democrats, the two variables are weighted about equally, for the Republicans, the number nominated in the previous year has significantly ( $p < .01$ ) more weight, showing them to behave more conservatively. The correlations of the number nominated at the present election with the number nominated at the previous election, the percentage Democratic at the present election, the previous election, and the next previous election, are all between .60 and .75, and in decreasing order as named, for both Republicans and Democrats.

*Number Nominated vs. Change in Per Cent Democratic.* Examination of the behavior of each party in the face of a changing vote gives additional insight into the differential role of conservatism as a correlate of choice. The following implications are drawn from Table IV: (1) change (in the number of nominations from that of the previous election)—for all values of change in the vote—comes slowly for both parties, but more so for the Republicans; (2) between the small and large vote change situations, Democrats show a larger reduction in the proportion of elections showing no change in number nominated, than do Republicans; (3)

TABLE IV. CHANGE IN NUMBER NOMINATED VS.  
CHANGE IN PER CENT DEMOCRATIC

Change in Number Nominated	Change ( $\pm$ ) in Per Cent Democratic	
	0-10	10-50
	(%)	(%)
Democrats		
Same direction as (Dem) vote	9	26
No change in number nominated	87	72
Opposite direction from vote	4	2
Republicans		
Same direction as (Rep) vote	7	12
No change in number nominated	91	84
Opposite direction from vote	2	4
Number of elections	1080	246

when the vote changed over 10 per cent, and a party did change its number of nominations, the Democrats were more likely to change in the proper direction; (4) for the Democrats, the change in the number nominated is much more likely to be in the appropriate direction if the change in the vote is large; (5) for the Republicans, however, the change in the number nominated is no more likely to be in the appropriate direction for a large change of the vote than for a small change. (The differences of statements (1) to (4) above are all significant at  $p < .01$ .)

Examination of particular years of great change in the vote further documents the conservatism. Given below are the total number of changes in number nominated, over all 51 districts for the years 1920 (when the Republicans should have been increasing their number nominated) and 1932 (when the Democrats should have been doing the same):

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Up	Down	Same	Up	Down	Same
1920	1	8	42	5	1	45
1932	8	1	42	0	7	44

Some anticipation is shown, but far from adequate: in 1920, the Republicans failed to win 21 seats they could have gained by running more candidates; four years later they lost 14 seats in a similar fashion; in 1932, the Democrats lost 8 seats by failing to run enough candidates.

*Number Nominated vs. Non-minimax Outcome.* A similar reluctance to change the number nominated can be observed even in the case in which the previous election resulted in a lesser number of seats for a given party than the minimax strategy would have guaranteed. For the Democrats, loss of a seat by occurrence of a non-minimax outcome at the previous election increases the probability of change in the number nominated from .15 to .26; while for the Republicans, the corresponding probabilities are .10 and .20. Following a non-minimax outcome, the Democrats and Republicans each have a probability of changing the number of nominations which is only about ten per cent greater than that obtaining if the number elected were at least equal to the number guaranteed by following minimax strategy. Of the changes in the latter situation, two-thirds are in the direction of nominating more candidates; this is appropriate, since practically all of the non-minimax losses result from nominating too few, rather than too many candidates.

*Correlations Over Districts.* Table V presents correlations among 12 variables for the 51 districts. The variables represent the experi-

TABLE V. CORRELATIONS OVER 51 DISTRICTS

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Number of contested elections	—										
2. Number of non-minimax losses: Dem	-.43	—									
3. Number of non-minimax losses: Rep	-.40	-.17	—								
4. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Dem	.14	-.08	-.12	—							
5. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Rep	.01	.21	.05	-.03	—						
6. Mean % Democratic	-.04	.67	-.41	-.23	.19	—					
7. Absolute value of (mean % Dem-50%)	-.57	.24	.44	.11	-.07	-.28	—				
8. Variance (over years) in % Dem	-.27	.43	.15	.04	.23	.10	.11	—			
9. Change in % Democratic, 1902-1954	-.20	.62	-.06	-.11	.05	.42	.06	.70	—		
10. Var. of 2 yr change in % Democratic	-.42	.58	.20	.00	.19	.29	.17	.64	.59	—	
11. Var. of presidential yr change in % Dem	-.33	.41	-.02	.01	.17	.20	.03	.37	.34	.72	—
12. Var. of off-year change in % Dem	-.21	.31	.25	.18	.09	.09	.25	.59	.28	.54	.14

ence of each district over the period 1902-1954, and are as follows:

1. Number of elections in which there were a total of more than three candidates for the three seats.

2. Number of elections in which the Democrats elected fewer than guaranteed them by following the minimax strategy.

3. Number of elections in which the Republicans elected fewer than guaranteed them by following the minimax strategy.

4. Number of elections for which the number nominated by the Democrats represents a change from the previous election.

5. Number of elections for which the number nominated by the Republicans represents a change from the previous election.

6. Mean, over all years, of the variable, per cent Democratic.

7. Absolute value of the difference between 50% and variable (6) above.

8. Variance, over all years, of the variable, per cent Democratic.

9. Change in per cent Democratic from 1902 to 1954.

10. Variance of the change in per cent Democratic from the previous election.

11. Variance of the change in per cent Demo-

cratic from the second previous election, for the 12 presidential election years, 1908-1952.

12. Variance of the change in per cent Democratic from the second previous election, for the 13 non-presidential election years, 1906-1954.

The relation of non-minimax losses (variables 2 and 3) to the other variables is of particular interest. Districts having more contested elections had fewer non-minimax outcomes, although even in these districts, far from all of the elections are contested. Perhaps the *willingness* to contest is the critical element. Each party has the most non-minimax losses in those districts in which its mean proportion of the vote is highest. This may again reflect the decreasing utility of the third seat. For the Democrats, non-minimax losses are also greater in those districts where the mean vote has been increasing over time. The number of contested elections is much greater in those districts where the mean vote is close to 50 per cent.

*Correlation Over Years.* Correlations were also computed (Table VI) among 12 variables for the 25 election years, 1906-1954 (1902 and 1904 could not be used, since some of the variables involved changes from two or four years earlier). For each year, the variables in Table VI represent all 51 districts. Variables 2-7, and 10,

TABLE VI. CORRELATIONS OVER 25 BIENNIAL ELECTION YEARS, 1906-1954

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Year	—										
2. Number of contested elections	.42	—									
3. Number of non-minimax losses: Dem	.14	.38	—								
4. Number of non-minimax losses: Rep	-.25	-.07	-.26	—							
5. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Dem	-.36	-.58	-.36	.32	—						
6. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Rep	-.43	.24	.31	-.07	-.42	—					
7. Mean % Democratic	.45	.44	.71	-.69	-.54	.19	—				
8. Mean of 2 yr change in % Democratic	-.06	-.10	.27	-.67	-.34	.37	.44	—			
9. Mean of 4 yr change in % Democratic	-.06	.15	.35	-.40	-.44	.64	.44	.46	—		
10. Variance in % Democratic	.39	.20	-.03	.01	.10	-.17	-.08	.02	-.13	—	
11. Variance of 2 yr change in % Dem	-.74	-.05	-.12	.52	.38	.37	-.53	-.09	-.07	-.02	—
12. Variance of 4 yr change in % Dem	-.70	-.37	-.18	.04	.20	.30	-.31	.38	.00	-.18	.59

correspond to variables 1-6, and 8, respectively in the correlations over districts. The other variables are:

1. Year of the election: 1906, 1908, . . . , 1954.

8. Mean, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the previous election.

9. Mean, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the second previous election.

11. Variance, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the previous election.

12. Variance, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the second previous election.

The changes associated with time have been considerable in Illinois, and many significant relations emerge. Paralleling the previous finding concerning districts, non-minimax losses are highly related to the party strength that year, as well as to the increase in the party's vote from two and four years previous. This is true for both parties. Both parties are also more

likely to change the number of nominations from the previous year when their vote is dropping than when it is rising.

A number of variables change with time itself: an increase in the number of contested elections; decreases in the number of changes in the number nominated from the previous election (for both parties); an increase in the Democratic vote; an increase in the variance among districts; and sharp decreases in the variance of the change from the previous election or the second previous election. Changes over time are further examined in the next section.

*Changes in the Vote, 1902-1954.* Figure 1 gives the mean Democratic vote of the 51 counties for each of the 27 biennial elections, 1902-1954.

It can be seen that the variance among the means of the districts for presidential years is much greater than that among off-years—in fact, more than twice as great. However, the variance *among districts within years* is much less for presidential years than for off-years. Associated with presidential voting, then, is a




FIG. 1. Mean per cent Democratic of all 51 districts, 1902-1954.

unifying effect among districts. However, the unity among districts of the presidential years is less stable than the relative diversity among districts of the off-years. If the presidential election could be said to bring the districts together, then it tends to unite them at a *different* level from election to election, following which the districts return in the off-years to a more stable diversity.<sup>23</sup>

In general, the variance among districts is greater than the variance among years, and the greater variance among districts is associated particularly with the division between Cook county (Chicago and suburbs) and the rest of the state. Moreover, this division has been increasing over time. In 1960, the average Democratic vote in the Cook county districts was 57 per cent, compared to 46 per cent for the remaining districts.

#### IV. IMPLICATIONS

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the particular game theory model employed here provides a partial, though not a complete description of the behavior of the nominating committee in determining the number of candidates to run. This section examines some factors relevant to the agreement and disagreement of data and model.

*Rationality.* Game theory may be employed as a model of rational behavior, defined in terms of minimaxing a certain quantity. In this sense, a considerable amount of rationality was demonstrated by the nominating committees in their determination of the number of candidates: in 69 per cent of all elections, both parties employed the predicted strategy.

It is, however, for both parties, a rationality associated with a basic conservatism. A number of years often elapse between a change in the vote and the corresponding adjustment in the number nominated. There is some question whether the effective behavior which is shown results from a considered rationality, or simply from the conservatism of not changing the number nominated, which usually turns out to be the best thing to do. Or perhaps, more significantly, the general decision for conservatism

has been made on a rational basis, since this is generally effective.

*Utility and Job Security.* The principal departures from the model occur in the relatively rare cases in which one party has more than seventy-five per cent of the vote. In these cases, however, the departure is very considerable, with parties nominating three candidates only about 20 per cent of the time. As has been previously suggested, there is a strong implication of non-linear utility particularly with respect to the election of third candidates. Further investigation has revealed some possible bases for this non-linearity.

A relevant consideration seems to be the individual job security of incumbents (or less often of other candidates). Nominating committees may know that they can elect three candidates with 75 per cent of the vote, and that even if the vote falls somewhat below that, they will surely elect two. But the critical question to them is "Which two?" The nominating committee naturally seeks to control who is nominated, as well as the number nominated. Hence, coalitions may form between the two stronger forces within the party and militate against adding a third nomination which would reduce the certainty of the incumbents' reelection.<sup>24</sup>

In addition, there is evidence that in certain cases, again most likely to occur when one party has 75 per cent of the vote, bi-partisan agreements are reached to allow the minority a seat, in exchange for what in game theory would be termed an appropriate "side payment." The bi-partisan agreement is also seen to alleviate the job-security problem, and perhaps to satisfy both parties, inasmuch as, if the utilities are non-linear, the side payment can be larger than the utility of the majority's third member and less than the utility of the minority's first member.

*Minority Representation.* In terms of the intent of the law—to provide minority representation—the game theory solution is optimal. If both parties follow a minimax strategy, and divide their votes equally among all their candidates, the result will be to give the minority one seat whenever it has as much as 25 per cent of the vote. This end has been generally achieved, as Blair has noted.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, as we have seen, nearly all of the mal-representation that has

<sup>23</sup> A related theory, taking into account the differential composition of the electorate in Presidential and off-years, has been proposed in A. Campbell's "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (1960), pp. 397-418. See also V. O. Key, Jr., "Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio," this REVIEW, Vol. 47 (1953), p. 526; and Malcolm Moos, *Presidents, Politics, and Coattails* (Baltimore, 1952), pp. 13n, 110.

<sup>24</sup> The possibility of coalitions of two against one would seem to make job-security-initiated pressure against an additional nomination more likely against a third candidate when the vote is 75%, than against a second candidate when the vote is 50%.

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*

occurred has been in the direction of giving the minority *over*-representation.

In the earlier days of cumulative voting in Illinois, some "good government" groups protested the lack of choice available to the voter in the general election—with many elections having only three candidates, no more than the number of seats—and hence proposed that parties be required to run full slates. This would, of course, negate the basic purpose of this scheme of minority representation. In addition, several writers have implied that a non-contested election represented collusion, but this is not necessarily so. Such a case may indeed be the best strategy for each party, and may also represent the *only* way in which nearly proportional representation can be assured.

A modification might be proposed, however, to guarantee more proportional representation by removing the uncertainty which influences committees to limit the number of candidates unnecessarily (and unprofitably). Allow the primary elections to specify the *order* of election of candidates, and the number of votes for the party (without regard to candidates) in the general election to determine the *number* elected from each party, in the already-speci-

fied order. Better yet, let one election suffice for both functions, by allowing the votes within a party to determine the ordering of candidates within that party, and the total number of votes cast for each party to determine the number of candidates it elects.<sup>26</sup> Each voter would, as before, have a number of votes equal to the number of candidates to be elected, and would still be able to cross party lines if he desired. Thus proportional representation could be achieved to a much greater extent, unhampered by possibly non-optimal committee decisions.

<sup>26</sup> This system has some similarity to the French provision for *apparentements* in their legislative elections of 1951 and 1956. But in France it was only the order of candidates *among* parties in an alliance, and not (for practical purposes) within parties, that was determined by the votes. American party organizations, like the French, would undoubtedly prefer to retain control of the intraparty ordering; insofar as their assent is necessary to electoral reform, some compromise in the direction of a list system might be required, although this would, however, run contrary to the presumed intention of the present direct primary law.



## TWO FACES OF POWER<sup>1</sup>

PETER BACHRACH AND MORTON S. BARATZ

*Bryn Mawr College*

The concept of power remains elusive despite the recent and prolific outpourings of case studies on community power. Its elusiveness is dramatically demonstrated by the regularity of disagreement as to the locus of community power between the sociologists and the political scientists. Sociologically oriented researchers have consistently found that power is highly centralized, while scholars trained in political science have just as regularly concluded that in "their" communities power is widely diffused.<sup>2</sup> Presumably, this explains why the latter group styles itself "pluralist," its counterpart "elitist."

There seems no room for doubt that the sharply divergent findings of the two groups are the product, not of sheer coincidence, but of fundamental differences in both their underlying assumptions and research methodology. The political scientists have contended that these differences in findings can be explained by the faulty approach and presuppositions of the sociologists. We contend in this paper that the pluralists themselves have not grasped the whole truth of the matter; that while their criticisms of the elitists are sound, they, like the elitists, utilize an approach and assumptions

which predetermine their conclusions. Our argument is cast within the frame of our central thesis: that there are two faces of power, neither of which the sociologists see and only one of which the political scientists see.

### I

Against the elitist approach to power several criticisms may be, and have been levelled.<sup>3</sup> One has to do with its basic premise that in every human institution there is an ordered system of power, a "power structure" which is an integral part and the mirror image of the organization's stratification. This postulate the pluralists emphatically—and, to our mind, correctly—reject, on the ground that

nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community. . . . If anything, there seems to be an unspoken notion among pluralist researchers that at bottom *nobody* dominates in a town, so that their first question is not likely to be, "Who runs this community?" but rather, "Does anyone at all run this community?" The first query is somewhat like, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" in that virtually any response short of total unwillingness to answer will supply the researchers with a "power elite" along the lines presupposed by the stratification theory.<sup>4</sup>

Equally objectionable to the pluralists—and to us—is the sociologists' hypothesis that the power structure tends to be stable over time.

Pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent. . . . To presume that the set of coalitions which exists in the community at any given time is a timelessly stable aspect of social structure is to introduce systematic inaccuracies into one's description of social reality.<sup>5</sup>

A third criticism of the elitist model is that it wrongly equates reputed with actual power:

If a man's major life work is banking, the pluralist presumes he will spend his time at the bank, and not in manipulating community decisions. This presumption holds until the banker's activities and participations indicate otherwise. . . . If we

<sup>3</sup> See especially N. W. Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 475f.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 476.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 478–79.

<sup>1</sup> This paper is an outgrowth of a seminar in Problems of Power in Contemporary Society, conducted jointly by the authors for graduate students and undergraduate majors in political science and economics.

<sup>2</sup> Compare, for example, the sociological studies of Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, 1953); Roland Pellegrini and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 61 (March 1956), pp. 413–19; and Robert O. Schulze, "Economic Dominants and Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23 (February 1958), pp. 3–9; with political science studies of Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961); and Norton E. Long and George Belknap, "A Research Program on Leadership and Decision-Making in Metropolitan Areas" (New York, Governmental Affairs Institute, 1956). See also Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (August, 1960), pp. 474–84.

presume that the banker is "really" engaged in running the community, there is practically no way of disconfirming this notion, even if it is totally erroneous. On the other hand, it is easy to spot the banker who really *does* run community affairs when we presume he does not, because his activities will make this fact apparent.<sup>6</sup>

This is not an exhaustive bill of particulars; there are flaws other than these in the sociological model and methodology<sup>7</sup>—including some which the pluralists themselves have not noticed. But to go into this would not materially serve our current purposes. Suffice it simply to observe that whatever the merits of their own approach to power, the pluralists have effectively exposed the main weaknesses of the elitist model.

As the foregoing quotations make clear, the pluralists concentrate their attention, not upon the sources of power, but its exercise. Power to them means "participation in decision-making"<sup>8</sup> and can be analyzed only after "careful examination of a series of concrete decisions."<sup>9</sup> As a result, the pluralist researcher is uninterested in the reputedly powerful. His concerns instead are to (a) select for study a number of "key" as opposed to "routine" political decisions, (b) identify the people who took an active part in the decision-making process, (c) obtain a full account of their actual behavior while the policy conflict was being resolved, and (d) determine and analyze the specific outcome of the conflict.

The advantages of this approach, relative to the elitist alternative, need no further exposition. The same may not be said, however, about its defects—two of which seem to us to be of fundamental importance. One is that the model takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues. The other is that the model provides no *objective* criteria for distinguishing between "important" and "unimportant" issues arising in the political arena.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 480–81.

<sup>7</sup> See especially Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (June 1958), pp. 463–69; and Lawrence J. R. Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (December 1961), pp. 817–31.

<sup>8</sup> This definition originated with Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), p. 75.

<sup>9</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," *loc. cit.*, p. 466.

## II

There is no gainsaying that an analysis grounded entirely upon what is specific and visible to the outside observer is more "scientific" than one based upon pure speculation. To put it another way,

If we can get our social life stated in terms of activity, and of nothing else, we have not indeed succeeded in measuring it, but we have at least reached a foundation upon which a coherent system of measurements can be built up. . . . We shall cease to be blocked by the intervention of unmeasurable elements, which claim to be themselves the real causes of all that is happening, and which by their spook-like arbitrariness make impossible any progress toward dependable knowledge.<sup>10</sup>

The question is, however, how can one be certain in any given situation that the "unmeasurable elements" are inconsequential, are not of decisive importance? Cast in slightly different terms, can a sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that power is totally embodied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing directly upon their making?

We think not. Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908), p. 202, quoted in Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 481n.

<sup>11</sup> As is perhaps self-evident, there are similarities in both faces of power. In each, A participates in decisions and thereby adversely affects B. But there is an important difference between the two: in the one case, A openly participates; in the other, he participates only in the sense that he works to sustain those values and rules of procedure that help him keep certain issues out of the public domain. True enough, participation of the second kind may at times be overt; that is the case, for instance, in cloture fights in the Congress. But the point is that it need not be. In fact, when the maneuver is most successfully executed, it neither involves nor can be identified with decisions arrived at on specific issues.

Situations of this kind are common. Consider, for example, the case—surely not unfamiliar to this audience—of the discontented faculty member in an academic institution headed by a tradition-bound executive. Aggrieved about a long-standing policy around which a strong vested interest has developed, the professor resolves in the privacy of his office to launch an attack upon the policy at the next faculty meeting. But, when the moment of truth is at hand, he sits frozen in silence. Why? Among the many possible reasons, one or more of these could have been of crucial importance: (a) the professor was fearful that his intended action would be interpreted as an expression of his disloyalty to the institution; or (b) he decided that, given the beliefs and attitudes of his colleagues on the faculty, he would almost certainly constitute on this issue a minority of one; or (c) he concluded that, given the nature of the law-making process in the institution, his proposed remedies would be pigeonholed permanently. But whatever the case, the central point to be made is the same: to the extent that a person or group—consciously or unconsciously—creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power. Or, as Professor Schattschneider has so admirably put it:

All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because *organization is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.<sup>12</sup>

Is such bias not relevant to the study of power? Should not the student be continuously alert to its possible existence in the human institution that he studies, and be ever prepared to examine the forces which brought it into being and sustain it? Can he safely ignore the possibility, for instance, that an individual or group in a community participates more vigorously in supporting the *nondecision-making* process than in participating in actual decisions within the process? Stated differently, can the researcher overlook the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts?<sup>13</sup> To do so is, in our judgment,

to overlook the less apparent, but nonetheless extremely important, face of power.

### III

In his critique of the "ruling-elite model," Professor Dahl argues that "the hypothesis of the existence of a ruling elite can be strictly tested only if . . . [t] here is a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested."<sup>14</sup> With this assertion we have two complaints. One we have already discussed, viz., in erroneously assuming that power is solely reflected in concrete decisions, Dahl thereby excludes the possibility that in the community in question there is a group capable of preventing contests from arising on issues of importance to it. Beyond that, however, by ignoring the less apparent face of power Dahl and those who accept his pluralist approach are unable adequately to differentiate between a "key" and a "routine" political decision.

Nelson Polsby, for example, proposes that "by pre-selecting as issues for study those which are generally agreed to be significant, pluralist researchers can test stratification theory."<sup>15</sup> He is silent, however, on how the researcher is to determine *what* issues are "generally agreed to be significant," and on how the researcher is to appraise the reliability of the agreement. In fact, Polsby is guilty here of the same fault he himself has found with elitist methodology: by presupposing that in any community there are significant issues in the political arena, he takes for granted the very question which is in doubt. He accepts as issues what are reputed to be issues. As a result, his findings are fore-ordained. For even if there is no "truly" significant issue in the community

society like ours a ruling elite might be so influential over ideas, attitudes, and opinions that a kind of false consensus will exist—not the phony consensus of a terroristic totalitarian dictatorship but the manipulated and superficially self-imposed adherence to the norms and goals of the elite by broad sections of a community. . . . This objection points to the need to be circumspect in interpreting the evidence." But that he largely misses our point is clear from the succeeding sentence: "Yet here, too, it seems to me that the hypothesis cannot be satisfactorily confirmed without something equivalent to the test I have proposed," and that is "by an examination of a series of concrete cases where key decisions are made. . . ."

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 466.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 478.

<sup>12</sup> E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), p. 71.

<sup>13</sup> Dahl *partially* concedes this point when he observes ("A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," pp. 468-69) that "one could argue that even in a

under study, there is every likelihood that Polsby (or any like-minded researcher) will find one or some and, after careful study, reach the appropriate pluralistic conclusions.<sup>16</sup>

Dahl's definition of "key political issues" in his essay on the ruling-élite model is open to the same criticism. He states that it is "a necessary although possibly not a sufficient condition that the [key] issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups."<sup>17</sup> In our view, this is an inadequate characterization of a "key political issue," simply because groups can have disagreements in preferences on unimportant as well as on important issues. Elite preferences which border on the indifferent are certainly not significant in determining whether a monolithic or polythitic distribution of power prevails in a given community. Using Dahl's definition of "key political issues," the researcher would have little difficulty in finding such in practically any community; and it would not be surprising then if he ultimately concluded that power in the community was widely diffused.

The distinction between important and unimportant issues, we believe, cannot be made intelligently in the absence of an analysis of the "mobilization of bias" in the community; of the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others. Armed with this knowledge, one could conclude that any challenge to the predominant values or to the established "rules of the game" would constitute an "important" issue; all else, unimportant. To be sure, judgments of this kind cannot be entirely objective. But to avoid making them in a study of power is both to neglect a highly significant aspect of power and thereby to undermine the only sound basis for discriminating between "key" and "routine" decisions. In effect, we contend, the pluralists have made each of these mistakes; that is to say, they have done just that for which Kaufman and Jones so severely taxed Floyd Hunter: they have begun "their structure at the mezzanine without showing us a lobby or foundation,"<sup>18</sup> i.e., they have begun by studying the issues rather than the values and biases that are built into the political system and that, for the student of power, give real

meaning to those issues which do enter the political arena.

#### IV

There is no better fulcrum for our critique of the pluralist model than Dahl's recent study of power in New Haven.<sup>19</sup>

At the outset it may be observed that Dahl does not attempt in this work to define his concept, "key political decision." In asking whether the "Notables" of New Haven are "influential overtly or covertly in the making of government decisions," he simply states that he will examine "three different 'issue-areas' in which important public decisions are made: nominations by the two political parties, urban redevelopment, and public education." These choices are justified on the grounds that "nominations determine which persons will hold public office. The New Haven redevelopment program measured by its cost—present and potential—is the largest in the country. Public education, aside from its intrinsic importance, is the costliest item in the city's budget." Therefore, Dahl concludes, "It is reasonable to expect . . . that the relative influence over public officials wielded by the . . . Notables would be revealed by an examination of their participation in these three areas of activity."<sup>20</sup>

The difficulty with this latter statement is that it is evident from Dahl's own account that the Notables are in fact uninterested in two of the three "key" decisions he has chosen. In regard to the public school issue, for example, Dahl points out that many of the Notables live in the suburbs and that those who do live in New Haven choose in the main to send their children to private schools. "As a consequence," he writes, "their interest in the public schools is ordinarily rather slight."<sup>21</sup> Nominations by the two political parties as an important "issue-area," is somewhat analogous to the public schools, in that the apparent lack of interest among the Notables in this issue is partially accounted for by their suburban residence—because of which they are disqualified from holding public office in New Haven. Indeed, Dahl himself concedes that with respect to both these issues the Notables are largely indifferent: "Business leaders might ignore the public schools or the political parties without any sharp awareness that their indifference would hurt their pocketbooks . . ." He goes on, however, to say that

<sup>16</sup> As he points out, the expectations of the pluralist researchers "have seldom been disappointed." (*Ibid.*, p. 477).

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 467.

<sup>18</sup> Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 14 (Summer 1954), p. 207.

<sup>19</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

the prospect of profound changes [as a result of the urban-redevelopment program] in ownership, physical layout, and usage of property in the downtown area and the effects of these changes on the commercial and industrial prosperity of New Haven were all related in an obvious way to the daily concerns of businessmen.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, if one believes—as Professor Dahl did when he wrote his critique of the ruling-elite model—that an issue, to be considered as important, “should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups,”<sup>23</sup> then clearly he has now for all practical purposes written off public education and party nominations as key “issue-areas.” But this point aside, it appears somewhat dubious at best that “the relative influence over public officials wielded by the Social Notables” can be revealed by an examination of their nonparticipation in areas in which they were not interested.

Furthermore, we would not rule out the possibility that even on those issues to which they appear indifferent, the Notables may have a significant degree of *indirect* influence. We would suggest, for example, that although they send their children to private schools, the Notables do recognize that public school expenditures have a direct bearing upon their own tax liabilities. This being so, and given their strong representation on the New Haven Board of Finance,<sup>24</sup> the expectation must be that it is in their direct interest to play an active role in fiscal policy-making, in the establishment of the educational budget in particular. But as to this, Dahl is silent: he inquires not at all into either the decisions made by the Board of Finance with respect to education nor into their impact upon the public schools.<sup>25</sup> Let it be

understood clearly that in making these points we are not attempting to refute Dahl's contention that the Notables lack power in New Haven. What we *are* saying, however, is that this conclusion is not adequately supported by his analysis of the “issue-areas” of public education and party nominations.

The same may not be said of redevelopment. This issue is by any reasonable standard important for purposes of determining whether New Haven is ruled by “the hidden hand of an economic elite.”<sup>26</sup> For the Economic Notables have taken an active interest in the program and, beyond that, the socio-economic implications of it are not necessarily in harmony with the basic interests and values of businesses and businessmen.

In an effort to assure that the redevelopment program would be acceptable to what he dubbed “the biggest muscles” in New Haven, Mayor Lee created the Citizens Action Commission (CAC) and appointed to it primarily representatives of the economic elite. It was given the function of overseeing the work of the mayor and other officials involved in redevelopment, and, as well, the responsibility for organizing and encouraging citizens' participation in the program through an extensive committee system.

In order to weigh the relative influence of the mayor, other key officials, and the members of the CAC, Dahl reconstructs “all the *important* decisions on redevelopment and renewal between 1950–58 . . . [to] determine which individuals most often initiated the proposals that were finally adopted or most often successfully vetoed the proposals of the others.”<sup>27</sup> The results of this test indicate that the mayor and his development administrator were by far the most influential, and that the “muscles” on the Commission, excepting in a few trivial instances, “never directly initiated, opposed, vetoed, or altered any proposal brought before them. . . .”<sup>28</sup>

This finding is, in our view, unreliable, not so much because Dahl was compelled to make a

in past years, but not actual decisions of the Board of Finance or their effects on the public school system.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 467.

<sup>24</sup> *Who Governs?*, p. 82. Dahl points out that “the main policy thrust of the Economic Notables is to oppose tax increases; this leads them to oppose expenditures for anything more than minimal traditional city services. In this effort their two most effective weapons ordinarily are the mayor and the Board of Finance. The policies of the Notables are most easily achieved under a strong mayor if his policies coincide with theirs or under a weak mayor if they have the support of the Board of Finance. . . . New Haven mayors have continued to find it expedient to create confidence in their financial policies among businessmen by appointing them to the Board.” (pp. 81–2)

<sup>25</sup> Dahl does discuss in general terms (pp. 79–84) changes in the level of tax rates and assessments

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* “A rough test of a person's overt or covert influence,” Dahl states in the first section of the book, “is the frequency with which he successfully initiates an important policy over the opposition of others, or vetoes policies initiated by others, or initiates a policy where no opposition appears.” (*Ibid.*, p. 66)

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

subjective selection of what constituted *important* decisions within what he felt to be an *important* "issue-area," as because the finding was based upon an excessively narrow test of influence. To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation. How, that is to say, can a judgment be made as to the relative influence of Mayor Lee and the CAC without knowing (through prior study of the political and social views of all concerned) the proposals that Lee did *not* make because he anticipated that they would provoke strenuous opposition and, perhaps, sanctions on the part of the CAC?<sup>29</sup>

In sum, since he does not recognize *both* faces of power, Dahl is in no position to evaluate the relative influence or power of the initiator and decision-maker, on the one hand, and of those persons, on the other, who may have been indirectly instrumental in preventing potentially dangerous issues from being raised.<sup>30</sup> As a re-

<sup>29</sup> Dahl is, of course, aware of the "law of anticipated reactions." In the case of the mayor's relationship with the CAC, Dahl notes that Lee was "particularly skillful in estimating what the CAC could be expected to support or reject." (p. 137). However, Dahl was not interested in analyzing or appraising to what extent the CAC limited Lee's freedom of action. Because of his restricted concept of power, Dahl did not consider that the CAC might in this respect have exercised power. That the CAC did not initiate or veto actual proposals by the mayor was to Dahl evidence enough that the CAC was virtually powerless; it might as plausibly be evidence that the CAC was (in itself or in what it represented) so powerful that Lee ventured nothing it would find worth quarreling with.

<sup>30</sup> The fact that the initiator of decisions also refrains—because he anticipates adverse reactions—from initiating other proposals does not obviously lessen the power of the agent who limited his initiative powers. Dahl missed this point: "It is," he writes, "all the more improbable, then, that a secret cabal of Notables dominates the public life of New Haven through means so clandestine that not one of the fifty prominent citizens interviewed in the course of this study—citizens who had participated extensively in various decisions—hinted at the existence of such a cabal. . . ." (p. 185).

In conceiving of elite domination exclusively in the form of a conscious cabal exercising the power of decision-making and vetoing, he overlooks a more subtle form of domination; one in which those who actually dominate are not conscious of

sult, he unduly emphasizes the importance of initiating, deciding, and vetoing, and in the process casts the pluralist conclusions of his study into serious doubt.

## V

We have contended in this paper that a fresh approach to the study of power is called for, an approach based upon a recognition of the two faces of power. Under this approach the researcher would begin—not, as does the sociologist who asks, "Who rules?" nor as does the pluralist who asks, "Does anyone have power?"—but by investigating the particular "mobilization of bias" in the institution under scrutiny. Then, having analyzed the dominant values, the myths and the established political procedures and rules of the game, he would make a careful inquiry into which persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handicapped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of *nondecision-making*; that is, he would examine the extent to which and the manner in which the *status quo* oriented persons and groups influence those community values and those political institutions (as, e.g., the unanimity "rule" of New York City's Board of Estimate<sup>31</sup>) which tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to "safe" issues. Finally, using his knowledge of the restrictive face of power as a foundation for analysis and as a standard for distinguishing between "key" and "routine" political decisions, the researcher would, after the manner of the pluralists, analyze participation in decision-making of concrete issues.

We reject in advance as unimpressive the possible criticism that this approach to the study of power is likely to prove fruitless because it goes beyond an investigation of what is objectively measurable. In reacting against the subjective aspects of the sociological model of power, the pluralists have, we believe, made the mistake of discarding "unmeasurable elements" as unreal. It is ironical that, by so doing, they have exposed themselves to the same fundamental criticism they have so forcefully levelled against the elitists: their approach to and assumptions about power predetermine their findings and conclusions.

it themselves, simply because their position of dominance has never seriously been challenged.

<sup>31</sup> Sayre and Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 640. For perceptive study of the "mobilization of bias" in a rural American community, see Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton, 1958).

## INFLUENCE AND INTERACTION IN A STATE LEGISLATIVE BODY

WAYNE L. FRANCIS\*

*Syracuse University*

The purpose of this article is to investigate distributions of influence in a legislative body, to spell out the resulting hypotheses, to introduce a method for estimating the degree of interaction between legislators, and to demonstrate the relevance of specific indicators to the study of legislative behavior. The methodological task falls somewhere between the small group laboratory situation and the more complex arena of community decision-making. Intense observation, control, and precision are sacrificed in favor of a real and vital situation. The analysis of a relatively self-sufficient political entity is lost in favor of maintaining some of the advantages of laboratory research. The universe selected for this study consists of fifty people who must directly or indirectly, but not remotely, rely upon each other in order to satisfy their official purposes.

### I. DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE

Data classified here under the term "influence" are accumulated from responses to nine items included in a structured interview form. The items were administered to 47 of 50 members of the 1961 Indiana Senate while the 1961 session was in progress. The responses represent "attributed" influence; that is, each response is treated as a reflection of the degree of influence one senator attributes to another.

*Influence Data.* The reliability of attribution data is a function of experimental conditions. The writer judged that the conditions of this experiment were favorable. The respondents were members of a face-to-face group where knowledge about other members is likely to be relatively great, especially in view of the fact that the continuity of membership from session to session has been high. The respondents were encouraged to make only those choices about which they had information. The sample approached the total universe about which conclusions are drawn. And finally, pre-session

interviewing contacts and the usual assurance of anonymity aided in establishing the proper *rapport*. For reasons of convenience the term "attributed" will not be reiterated in the presentation of data. It should suffice to keep in mind that interview responses are classified under "influence" because the key word in the questions asked of legislators is the word "influential."

The first question asked was read as follows:

Generally speaking and regardless of the legislator's formal position, who would you say are the most influential members of your chamber when it comes to determining policy?

The second question was stated in the following way:

Regardless of the legislator's formal position, who would you say are the most influential members of your chamber in each of the following areas when it comes to determining policy?

Eight areas were then considered:

- |                     |                            |
|---------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Local Government | 5. Labor                   |
| 2. Agriculture      | 6. Business                |
| 3. Education        | 7. Taxation                |
| 4. Appropriations   | 8. Benevolent Institutions |

Legislators were invited to supply as many names as they wished for each item. Of the 25 Democrats and 22 Republicans interviewed for these items, no respondent named only his own party associates.<sup>1</sup> Approximately five names per respondent were obtained from the general influence question; the substantive area question elicited approximately two names per respondent for each item. Some respondents made no choice for certain items. Four of the substantive areas utilized reflect the names of Senate Committees (Agriculture, Education, Labor, Benevolent Institutions), the others do not. The distinction in design was made in order to avoid a group of responses that might adhere strictly to the formal structure of the legislature.

Senators were grouped and ranked according to the following distinctions:

1. *General Influence*—the number of times they

<sup>1</sup> The Democrats held 26 seats and the Republicans 24. The Democratic majority was the first in the Indiana Senate since 1939.

\* Financial support for my stay at the 1961 Indiana legislative session came from the Indiana Citizenship Clearing House. I am in debt to Charles S. Hyneman for access to materials he has gathered through a Social Science Research Council grant, and to David R. Derge for his aid in developing an earlier manuscript upon which this article is based.

were named in response to the question on general influence.

2. *Specific Area Influence*—the total number of times they were named in all substantive areas taken together.
3. The number of times they were named in each substantive area.
4. The number of substantive areas in which they were mentioned.

The distribution of responses for (1), (2) and (3) consistently characterizes a large majority of senators as having relatively little or no influence. The number of mentions tends to accelerate when moving from the least to the most frequently mentioned senator, in a graphic approximation of the "J" curve. In the substantive areas with designations that do not coincide with the names of Senate Committees, the responses tend to be spread among more members and are not so concentrated upon one or two members. The data reveal the same distributions for each political party, when political party is held constant.

*General Influence and Specific Area Influence.* The ten senators most frequently mentioned in the responses to the general influence question are named in a large number of substantive areas as well (Table I). Eight of the senators ranking highest in general influence make up eight of the top nine ranked by the number of areas in which senators were mentioned. Four of the top ten in general influence—numbers one, four, five, and ten—held Senate offices (excluding committee positions), and five of the ten were members of the minority party. Only two of the top ten general influencers were men-

TABLE I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL INFLUENCE AND THE NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE AREAS IN WHICH GENERAL INFLUENCERS ARE MENTIONED

(Question #1) Rank of Senators by General Influence	(Question #2, Items 1-8) Number of Areas Mentioned								
	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
1	1								
2			1						
3		1							
4		1							
5						1			
6		1							
7		1							
8			1						
9			1						
10						1			
11-50			1	3	7	9	11	6	3
Totals	1	4	4	3	7	11	11	6	3

TABLE II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL INFLUENCE AND SPECIFIC AREA INFLUENCE

	High Specific Area Influencers	Low Specific Area Influencers
High general influencers	21	4
Low general influencers	4	21

$$\chi^2 = 23.12, p < .001.$$

tioned in relatively few substantive areas. Both exceptions held the office of Conference Chairman, but in opposite parties.

The number of substantive areas in which legislators were named as influential, however, does not reveal the degree of influence they had in each substantive area. A handy way to gauge roughly the amount and scope of a legislator's influence is to total the number of times he is named in a variety of policy-making areas. The resulting total is described as the legislator's *specific area* influence score. In the Indiana Senate, senators who scored high in specific area influence tended also to score high in general influence. To illustrate, in Table II the median serves to distinguish between high influencers and low influencers. High general influencers tend to be high specific area influencers, and low general influencers low specific area influencers. General influence appears to be related to several sub-structures of influence which are based upon policy determination within certain substantive areas.

## II. EMERGENCE OF INFLUENCE

If influence or power relationships are vital to an understanding of political phenomena, then the emergence of influence or power is of special significance. Insight into the emergence of influence can be acquired by examining attribution data. While the data and categories are derived from responses to interview questions, the resulting generalizations need not be untenable if they are otherwise consistent with our present knowledge of human behavior.

Observers of legislative activity don't need to be told there is a direct relationship between length of service and degree of influence, *ceteris paribus*. The Indiana Senate conforms to that expectation. Both general influence and specific area influence are strongly associated with length of service. In the full spread of the data for general influence rankings, there is a clear break between senators serving in at least their



fourth session and those still in their first, second or third session. The former tend to be high general influencers, and the latter low.<sup>2</sup>

Specific area influence and length of service present a slightly different relationship. Of the six senators in their third session of service five rank high and one low in specific area influence; yet only two of these senators rank high in general influence. Senators in their first or second session of service tend to be low specific area influencers.<sup>3</sup> Although the number of senators involved in these correlations is fairly small, the evidence does suggest that specific area influence tends to precede general influence.

One cannot simply assume, however, that legislators always will first become influential in rather specific substantive areas and then broaden their scope of influence with time. Recall that the Conference Chairmen were named a large number of times in response to the question on general influence; yet they were named relatively few times for the more specific influence items. It is possible that their policy specialties were not included among the influence items; however, it was the writer's observation that they seldom attempted to argue the specific content of important legislation. Their roles were more attuned to the maintenance of party organization and discipline. One would need to search their earlier records to see if they once possessed an influence now lost in specific areas.

The evidence also indicates that some legislators become highly specialized without the reward of becoming generally influential in the legislature. Of the top ten specific area influencers, four do not fall among the top ten general influencers. The four exceptions have a fairly similar influence description (Table III). Their recognized influence fell primarily into one substantive area. They received respectively 93, 92, 93, and 57 per cent of their mentions in that single area. Among the top ten general influencers, only the minority party Conference Chairman received more than 60 per cent of his mentions in one substantive area, and only one other received more than 50 per cent in one area. Furthermore, the substantive areas listed in Table III are highly significant areas from the legislators' standpoint. When senators were asked to rate their preferences among committee assignments, Education ranked first, Finance fourth, Labor fifth, and Benevolent and Penal Institutions tenth in a listing of 29 committees.

<sup>2</sup>  $\chi^2 = 15.7$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .001$ .

<sup>3</sup>  $\chi^2 = 16.34$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .001$ .

TABLE III. SENATORS IDENTIFIED WITH ONE SUBSTANTIVE AREA

	Total No. of Mentions	No. of Mentions in One Area	Name of Area	No. of Areas Men- tioned	Specific Area Influence Ranking
1	44	41	Benevolent Institutions	3	5
2	39	36	Labor	3	6
3	30	28	Education	3	8
4	30	17	Appropriations	5	9

*Tentative Hypotheses.* The terms utilized to specify substantive areas of policy (taxation, labor, education, etc.) may perhaps more realistically be described as interviewing stimuli which represented different contexts of ideas; then legislators responded to these terms by naming those they regarded as influential within the context of ideas represented by each term. Alternatively, legislators responded by naming those they had heard of as influential within the same contexts.

The foregoing data then suggest that: (1) legislators generally become recognized as influential within certain policy-making areas before they achieve general influence; (2) organizational skills, falling outside the context of ideas relating to specific policy-making areas, give legislators recognition as having general influence; (3) in the terms utilized in the interviews, legislators become recognized as competent or influential in more than one context of ideas before becoming recognized as generally influential (*i.e.*, among the top ten general influencers).

Specialization in the Indiana Senate is not as complete as one might find in other legislative bodies, such as Congress. Members of the 1961 Indiana Senate served on a minimum of three and a maximum of eight committees. When the tasks are more complex, when the stakes are higher, and when the institutional arrangements enforce a greater division of work, the emergence of influence may change accordingly. A legislator may then find that the path of least resistance calls for a demonstration of competence in a single context of ideas relating to policy and a greater emphasis upon organizational skills.

### III. EXERCISE OF INFLUENCE

Influence is exercised through interaction, along patterns related to the proximity of issues, ideas and people, and via certain styles. These facets of influence are the concern of this section. More specifically, I have devised and applied an interaction scale, an index to influ-

ence transferability, and indices to bill success and formal position success, to analyze them.

*Influence and Interaction.* Influence is exercised through interaction in one form or another. Like "influence," "interaction" is an elusive concept. Ambiguity is reduced, it may be hoped, when such concepts are applied to specific sets of data. In this article "interaction" is described in a scale administered to 48 of 50 members of the Indiana Senate while the 1961 session was in progress. Every senator was asked to rate every other senator according to the following items and scale of weights:

- 0—Do not connect the name with the face
- 1—Recognize him, but have only a greeting acquaintance
- 2—Stop and talk with him regularly
- 3—Aid each other in common activities through actual personal contact
- 4—Visit or entertain in each other's house, apartment, or rooms, or eat meals together frequently, as well as aid each other in common activities

The total of scores that each senator received was calculated and utilized as a rough measure of his degree of interaction. For this immediate research senators were then grouped into quartiles by ranking their interaction scores.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The interaction scale is an adaptation from a scale presented by Theodore Caplow and Robert Forman, "Neighborhood Inter-action in a Homogeneous Community," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 40 (June, 1950), p. 358. An elaborate description of its reliability and usefulness can be found in a work by Theodore Caplow, Sheldon Stryker, and Samuel E. Wallace, *The Urban Microcosm: Neighborhood Structure in a Changing Metropolis*, manuscript in preparation. Establishing the reliability of the neighborhood interaction scale, of course, only indirectly supports the use of a similar scale in a legislative situation. In the adaptation of the scale it was feared that the seasonal nature of legislative activity would raise the interaction ratings during the latter part of the interviewing period. Consequently, three weeks were allowed to elapse before beginning the interviews, in the hope that the social patterns would stabilize by that time. The evidence indicates that this was the case. The first ten interviews were compared with the last ten and no rise occurred in the average scale value for the ratings made by the latter ten. By necessity, no interviews were conducted during the last week of the session; however, for each group of ten interviews the party distribution and experienced-inexperienced distribution reasonably approximated the distributions in the entire Senate and for all those interviewed.

TABLE IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL INFLUENCE AND LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION

	Interactors			
	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
High general influencers	11	10	3	1
Low general influencers	1	3	9	12

$$\chi^2 = 23.12, p < .001, \text{ when } df = 1.$$

Both influence and interaction scores are calculated from responses to interview items; however, the judgments necessitated by the two types of questions are quite different. The interaction scale called for a judgment applying only to the respondent when paired with each colleague in turn. The influence questions called for a judgment of each colleague's impact on the entire chamber. From these very different judgments comes the relationship between interaction scores and influence totals.

High legislative interactors (those falling above the median) tend to be high general influencers, and low legislative interactors tend to be low general influencers (Table IV). High legislative interactors also tend to be high specific area influencers and low legislative interactors tend to be low specific area influencers.<sup>5</sup> The distribution of Democrats and Republicans into high and low on these variables approximates the distribution in the chamber as a whole and can be ruled out as an explanatory factor.

In order to exert influence, senators must communicate either directly or indirectly with other senators. Those who are recognized as most influential interact at a higher rate than others; furthermore, the items of the scale indicate that the interaction is direct and face-to-face. Influence tends to be exerted or exercised through that type of interaction.

*Index of Influence Transferability.* The exercise of influence follows patterns partly determined by the nature of the tasks a group must perform. A task-diversified organization requires a number of skills, many of which the members of the organization can recognize. Over time skills build up priorities in relation to specific tasks. In a legislature the skills are not always easily identified, and their priorities in relation to policy-making follow no rigid standard. However, certain patterns are distinguishable through the use of attribution data. Sub-

<sup>5</sup>  $\chi^2 = 17.8, df = 1, p < .001.$

TABLE V. MATRIX OF AN INDEX OF INFLUENCE TRANSFERABILITY

	Gen. Infl.	Tax.	Appr.	Bus.	Educ.	Agr.	Ben.	Lab.	Loc.	Area $\bar{x}$	Area Rank	Gen. Infl. Rank
Gen. Infl.	X	.7	.6	.7	.4	.3	.3	.3	.5			
Tax.	.7	X	.7	.6	.4	.4	.3	.2	.2	.40	1	1.5
Appr.	.6	.7	X	.4	.5	.4	.2	.3	.2	.39	2	3
Bus.	.7	.6	.4	X	.3	.2	.1	.4	.4	.34	3	1.5
Educ.	.4	.4	.5	.3	X	.2	.3	.2	.2	.30	4	5
Agr.	.3	.4	.4	.2	.2	X	.1	.2	.1	.23	7	7
Ben.	.3	.3	.2	.1	.3	.1	X	.1	.1	.19	8	7
Lab.	.3	.2	.3	.4	.2	.2	.1	X	.5	.27	5	7
Loc.	.5	.2	.2	.4	.2	.1	.1	.5	X	.26	6	4

 $r' = .84^*$ 

\* Rank correlation coefficient computed from formula (10.19) appearing in Allen L. Edwards, *Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1960) p. 195.

stantive areas of policy can be identified. The top influencers in each area can be compared with the top influencers in every other area. Legislators with recognized skills in one area can influence other areas with varying degrees of difficulty. Certain types of influence, that is, are more transferable than others. For instance, influence in the area of taxation may be more transferable than influence in the area of agriculture.

The term "transferable" is employed in place of a lengthy explanation of assumptions concerning the reasons why legislators with influence in certain areas tend to have influence in certain other areas. The patterns along which influence is exercised are the major concern here. The immediate and central questions are: (1) from which substantive areas is a legislator most likely to transfer his influence to what other substantive areas; and (2) which areas appear to be characterized by high general influence? Rough answers to these questions can be calculated through a percentage matrix (Table V).

The top ten influencers from each influence category are compared with the top ten influencers of every other category.<sup>6</sup> In those substantive areas in which a greater percentage of top influencers overlap into other influence categories there is also a tendency to overlap more frequently into the general influence category. For example, of the ten members rated as

having the highest influence in the area of taxation, seven fall into the top ten in the general influence category, an overlap which is as high as, or higher than, the overlap between general influence and any other substantive area. Correspondingly, members of the taxation influence area also fall more frequently into other substantive areas ( $\bar{x} = .40$ ). The rank correlation coefficient of .84 demonstrates the more general nature of this tendency.

Several hypotheses can be drawn from the matrix analysis of the index of influence transferability, bearing in mind again that the matrix is composed from attribution data, while the discussion runs in terms of "influence." One underlying assumption concerning the matrix should be made clear. It is assumed that the substantive areas in the matrix do overlap, but that they nevertheless connote different meanings to respondents. No two substantive areas follow entirely consistent patterns when compared against other substantive areas and general influence, and no two substantive areas demonstrate a one-to-one correspondence when compared against each other. This assumption allows one to make tentative statements concerning the nature of influence transferability:

1. The higher the index of influence transferability between any two substantive areas, the easier it is for a legislator to transfer his influence from one area to the other area.
2. Conversely, the lower the index of influence transferability between any two substantive areas, the more difficult it is for a legislator to transfer his influence from one area to the other area.

Example: It is easier for a legislator with high influence in the area of taxation to transfer his influence to the area of

<sup>6</sup> Ties occurring at the lowest boundary of categories were broken randomly. For more precise purposes the index would not require equal groups of ten or any other number, but for the sake of clarity it is helpful to think of a .7 index value as an overlap of seven senators out of ten for two separate sets of data.

appropriations than to the area of labor.

3. At any given level of influence transferability between two substantive areas, a legislator with high influence in the area more closely associated with general influence can more easily transfer his influence to the other area than a legislator with high influence in the area less closely associated with general influence.

Example: It is easier for a legislator with high influence in the area of taxation to transfer his influence to the area of benevolent institutions than it is for a legislator with high influence in the area of benevolent institutions to transfer his influence to the area of taxation.

4. If two substantive areas A and B have the same index value in relation to area C, and if area A is more closely associated with general influence than area B, a legislator who is identified with area A will find it easier to transfer his influence to area C than will a legislator identified with area B.

Example: It is easier for a legislator with high influence in the area of taxation to transfer his influence to the area of labor than it is for a legislator with high influence in the area of agriculture, even though both taxation and agriculture demonstrate an index value of .2 in relation to the area of labor.

Certainly there are factors not fully taken into account when applying the index and stating the consequent hypotheses. For example, the index does not account for differences resulting from the influence rank of legislators within a given substantive area. Will a legislator with the highest rank in the area of taxation find it easier to transfer his influence to the area of education than the fifth ranking legislator in the area of taxation, assuming their ranks are equal in the area of education? Or if the answer is self-evident, then how much easier is it for him to transfer his influence to the area of education? The latter question opens up the old problem of how to measure the relative influence of individuals in a problem-solving situation, an answer for which this research will lay no claim to provide.

The index of influence transferability is further limited in the sense that it does not pinpoint the substantive and environmental complexities encountered in any specific piece of legislation, nor does it account for personality differences which might have an effect upon the

influence structure.<sup>7</sup> Such limitations, however, do not prevent more general probability statements. Although the index may not apply to a specific legislator in regard to a specific piece of legislation, it is not so unreasonable to apply it to a group of legislators in regard to a large number of bills that fall more or less within a certain substantive area. Or it might be reasonable to advise a legislator to become recognized as competent in the areas of taxation and appropriations rather than in the areas of agriculture, benevolent institutions, or labor if he wishes to have the best chance of influencing all areas of legislation at some date in the future. Finally, the index lends itself to a more precise way of stating common sense judgments concerning the associations between substantive areas of legislative activity as they relate to the influence structure.

*Styles of Influence.* The previous analysis, as explained, rests upon attribution data acquired through interviews. The data so gathered can be supported and supplemented by specific legislative facts, and, in turn, the arrangement of specific legislative facts can be supported by the judgments of qualified interview respondents. In this section two sets of facts are analyzed, bill sponsorship and passage data, and formal or official position data. The data are arranged into two indices: (1) the index to bill success; and (2) the index to formal position success.

The index to bill success for each legislator is defined as:

$$\frac{(\text{Number of his sponsored bills passing chamber})^2}{\text{Number of bills he sponsored}}$$

The index is the ratio of bills passed to bills sponsored, the numerator squared because of a J-distribution of bill sponsorship among senators.

The index to formal position success for the minority party member is defined as:

$$\frac{\text{Committee assignment total}}{\text{Number of assigned committees}}$$

The committee assignment total is calculated by assigning group weights to a list of all committees ranked on the basis of the questionnaire previously mentioned, and then determining the committees to which each minority party member belongs. The same calculation is made for the majority party members, except

<sup>7</sup> Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven, 1953). The authors emphasize the importance of personality in determining influence patterns.

that an allowance is made for those Senators with official chamber positions by totaling the *official position weight* of each (President Protem = 10; Conference Chairman = 5; Committee Chairman = 3; Ranking Majority Member = 1). Thus the index to formal position success for these *majority party* senators is defined as:

Official Position Weight

$$\frac{\text{Committee assignment total}}{\text{Number of assigned committees}}$$

Minority and majority party members are then ranked separately and distributed proportionally into four Senate quartiles.

Six classifications of legislators are relevant at this point. Legislators have been classified according to general influence, specific area influence, degree of interaction, the index to bill success, and the index to formal position success. The latter two are treated as indices to *styles* of influence. Some legislators exercise influence by actively and personally sponsoring legislation. Others seek and obtain strategic committee assignments and positions of authority, and exercise the sorts of influence that flow from these positions. Some legislators practice both styles effectively. To accommodate the third group, a sixth classification will be based upon a combination of the bill and formal position indices.<sup>8</sup>

Since the number of legislators involved in each classification is constant ( $N = 50$ ), though small, it is practical to employ the phi coefficient ( $r\phi$ ) to measure the observed degree of association between the various classifications.<sup>9</sup> Three relationships were considered earlier: (1) the significant relationship between general influence and specific area influence ( $r\phi = .68$ ); (2) the significant relationship between general

<sup>8</sup> This classification is based upon an accumulative quartile ranking. Let Q1 be the highest ranking and Q4 the lowest for both bill success and formal position success. A legislator's accumulative ranking can then range from the sum of 2 to the sum of 8. The line between high and low was drawn at that class boundary which most closely approaches the median (between the sums of 4 and 5).

<sup>9</sup>  $r\phi = \sqrt{\chi^2/N}$  The phi coefficient has more meaning when it is considered in conjunction with chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ). When  $N$  is constant  $r\phi$  varies directly with  $\chi^2$ ; therefore, certain values of  $r\phi$  reflect significant values of  $\chi^2$ . When  $N = 50$ , the probability of a distribution occurring by chance less than five times out of a hundred reflects a phi coefficient of at least .277. Thus when  $p < .05$ ,  $r\phi > .277$ ; when  $p < .02$ ,  $r\phi > .329$ ; when  $p < .01$ ,  $r\phi > .365$ ; when  $p < .001$ ,  $r\phi > .466$ .

TABLE VI. DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN VARIABLES

	General Influence	Specific Area Influence	Inter- action
Bill success	.20	.36	.44
Formal position success	.20	.44	.28
Bill and formal position success	.32	.64	.48

Phi Coefficients,  $N = 50$

influence and degree of interaction ( $r\phi = .68$ ); and (3) the significant relationship between specific area influence and degree of interaction ( $r\phi = .60$ ). These strongly related variables can be given greater meaning when they are compared with the remaining classifications.

The index to bill success is significantly related to specific area influence and degree of interaction, but not significantly related to general influence (Table VI). Senators who sponsor a substantial number of bills which pass the chamber tend to be senators who are high interactors. In the Indiana Senate sponsors are generally responsible for their own bills.<sup>10</sup> That they should of necessity interact with other senators at a high rate in order to have high bill success seems quite reasonable; however, there are certainly off-setting factors such as the aid of lobbyists or the governor's support, either of which might diminish the need for interaction by the sponsor.

Senators who have high bill success also tend to have high specific area influence. Their influence is felt within vital substantive areas of legislation. However, they are not necessarily recognized as *generally* influential in the chamber. The bills they sponsor may be narrow in scope, falling predominantly into one area of legislation. To be recognized as generally influential may require activities in addition to those required by bill sponsorship.

The index to bill success does not relate significantly to the index to formal position success.<sup>11</sup> Senators who sponsor a relatively large number of bills which pass the chamber do not necessarily achieve formal positions of authority or serve on the most sought-after committees. One type of activity neither precludes

<sup>10</sup> In the Indiana Senate no bill may have more than two named sponsors. The sponsors generally explain their own bills on the floor and quite often in committee.

<sup>11</sup>  $\chi^2 = 2.00$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p > .05$ .

nor necessitates the other; yet, like senators with high bill success, senators with high formal position success tend to be high specific area influencers, high interactors, but not necessarily recognized as high general influencers. High formal position success (as defined above) is not sufficient for high general influence.

Senators who have high bill and formal position success tend to be high interactors, high specific area influencers, and high general influencers. When the bill and formal position indices are combined the phi values rise in each case (Table VI). Bill and formal position success is most closely related to specific area influence ( $r\phi = .64$ ). Senators who serve on the most preferred committees, who hold such positions as committee chairman, and who sponsor a large number of bills which pass the chamber, are mentioned frequently as the most influential within substantive areas of legislation. Senators who practice both styles of influence effectively also tend to be recognized as generally influential ( $r\phi = .32$ ).

#### IV. ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTIONS

The brief analysis below attempts to explain exceptions to observed relationships, through the use of variables and relationships already considered, and with a minimum of recourse to other related variables.

In Table IV eight legislators did not fit the predominant pattern. Four were high general influencers but low interactors, and four were low general influencers and high interactors. Of the former, three were serving in at least their seventh session of the legislature and were members of the middle age group (born between 1900 and 1919) for members serving in the 1961 Senate. Experienced senators tend to be high general influencers, as previously noted. Senators born between 1900 and 1919 also tend to be high general influencers (Table VII). But why do a few highly experienced senators approaching the age norm of the chamber have a tendency to interact at a low rate?

Perhaps they have learned to communicate efficiently in order to fulfill their policy desires,

or possibly the mere fact that they do approach the age norm has an effect which reduces the need for high interaction. It should be stressed, however, that the interaction questionnaire was designed to test interaction for only the 1961 session. Past interaction in previous sessions may very well carry over into the influence structure of the session under study, yet this past interaction would not necessarily register for certain items on the questionnaire. Finally, there is the possibility that the senators had outside sources of influence which minimized the need for high interaction with other senators. All but the last of these suggestions prove too much: they are as applicable to the normal as to the deviant cases.

The fourth senator who was characterized as having high general influence and low interaction was a freshman senator who interacted at a higher rate, at least, than any other freshman senator—a borderline case.

Of the four senators who were characterized as having low general influence but high interaction rates, one fell into the oldest age group and was serving in his sixth session, one was a female legislator, and the remaining two were in their second and third sessions of service. The latter two were rated high in specific area influence and would conform to the previous hypothesis on the emergence of influence if they should become recognized as general influencers in future sessions of the legislature. The other two evidently were content to talk without action.

The exceptions to the direct relationship between specific area influence and degree of interaction can to a large extent be accounted for by the same reasoning, partly because many of the same legislators are involved. Four of the ten exceptions to this second relationship appear to be of a different character; however, all four were in either their second or third session of service which appears to be a transitional phase of interaction and influence in the Indiana Senate.

There are eight exceptions to the direct relationship between general influence and specific area influence. All but one were in their first, second, or third session of service, and six of them were in their second or third session. These exceptions did not support the hypothesis that specific area influence precedes general influence, nor did they support the contrary. On the other hand, the evidence did suggest that those classified as high specific area influencers but low general influencers were named significantly more frequently in one single substantive area than were those classified as low specific area influencers but high general influencers.

TABLE VII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE AND GENERAL INFLUENCE

Date of Birth	High General Influencers	Low General Influencers
1900-1919	17	9
Before 1900 or After 1919	8	16

$$\chi^2 = 5.12, p < .05.$$

## CIVIL SERVICE\* AND MANAGING WORK: SOME UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI

*University of Illinois*

Nature seldom allows us to get what we wish without paying her price. This truism is commonly illustrated by the delicate balance in animal life which often cannot be disturbed to satisfy man's wants (*e.g.*, for fox hunting) without demanding of man in return (*e.g.*, by increases in the rabbit population and in crop damage).

The several civil service systems in this country also illustrate this bittersweet combination of intended and unintended consequences. The argument here will not go to the extreme of one observer, in whose judgment the United States Civil Service Commission was the single greatest obstacle to the successful waging of World War II.<sup>1</sup> Rather, the focus here will be upon several characteristics of our civil service systems that have as presumably unintended consequences an increase in the burdens of managing work. For the most part, the analysis of management problems will derive from the research literature dealing with behavior in organizations, a field of study presently seething with activity.

### I. THE GOAL-MATRIX OF OUR CIVIL SERVICE MOVEMENT

The nature of these unintended consequences is suggested by the matrix of goals, or purposes, underlying our civil service movement. The primary goal, of course, was the separation of the management of public work from party patronage. Within this overriding goal, Sayre has noted three early subsidiary purposes of our public personnel systems:<sup>2</sup>

1. the guarantee of equal treatment of all employees and all applicants for employment;
2. the application of the logic (or theory) and methods of "scientific management"; and
3. the development of a public career service.

These goals define the field of my present effort. Detailed analysis later will demonstrate

<sup>1</sup> John Fisher, "Let's Go Back to the Spoils System," reproduced in part in Dwight Waldo, ed., *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration* (New York, 1953), pp. 200-1.

<sup>2</sup> Wallace Sayre, "The Triumph of Technique Over Purpose," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 8 (Spring, 1948), pp. 134-35.

the significance for the management of work of the unintended consequences which derive from the ways adopted to achieve these purposes. I take this opportunity to suggest the general nature of these consequences.

Consider first the general tethers on the management of work implicit in the historical pursuit of the three purposes listed. The guarantee of equal treatment, to begin with, has never quite made peace with the managerially convenient notion that unequal contributions demand unequal reward. To take a recent and characteristic example, the teachers' union in Illinois has lately expressed violent opposition to a proposal for merit pay increases based upon performance. This opposition goes deeper than the convenience of seniority or of hours of graduate study as objective criteria for pay increases and far deeper than the blatant protectionism of hacks. However lofty the motives, their effect is clear. In practice, the struggle toward the "equal treatment" goal virtually forced public personnel systems into a monumental preoccupation with technique and mechanics. As Sayre concluded:<sup>3</sup>

Its main effect has been to move personnel administration, in the words of Gordon Clapp, "into the cold objective atmosphere of tests, scores, weighted indices, and split-digit rankings" so completely that "these technical trappings have become symbols of the merit system."

The management of work pays a stiff price for such technical elegance. Work is notoriously insensitive to such easy capture, and the most subtly contrived managerial rewards and punishments might be frustrated by an awkward distribution of test scores. Moreover, these technical trappings put powerful weapons into the hands of "staff" people. That more than one "line" manager has been stymied by one of these "split-digit rankings" without accepting the results as divinely ordained, moreover, does nothing to lessen the often intense jurisdictional tugs-of-war encouraged by the traditional "line-staff" distinction. These tensions are apt to be increased by the time lag inherent in centralized administrative systems, and public personnel systems are usually operated centrally.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

The logic and methods of "scientific management," second, tended to condemn managers to a treadmill even as it aided them. Scientific management was imported from the "practical" world of business where its impact was enormous.<sup>4</sup> But the impact was not one-way. Thus there is no denying the useful revolution in viewing work that the methods of scientific management sparked. However, as recent research particularly demonstrates,<sup>5</sup> the assumptions in the logic (or theory) of scientific management concerning man and his work were mechanistic caricatures. Consequently, the manager tended to be less effective in direct relation to the degree that he patterned his behavior on the logic of the approach. That is, the reasonable methods of scientific management often were guided by an inadequate theory. Consequently, the usefulness of engineering a task with the methods of scientific management must be differentiated sharply from the usefulness of organizing a task's component sequential steps in terms of the theory of scientific management.<sup>6</sup>

The establishment of a public career service, third, also tended to have unintended and unfavorable consequences which counterbalanced the favorable and intended consequences. As Sayre put it,<sup>7</sup>

Stated in its most positive terms, this objective represents an effort to provide the conditions of work which will attract and hold a public service of optimum talents. In its negative aspects, the goal has been translated into an elaborate system of protectionism. In the area of methodology the negative connotations have slowly but surely won the dominant position. . . .

Such protectionism, of course, often would bind the manager severely even as it safeguarded him (and his subordinates) from arbitrary removal.

In sum, then, striving toward the purposes of the civil service movement had its general costs. Three more specific sets of restrictions that burden the management of work in our civil service systems will concern us presently.

These costs of our civil service systems, however, must be kept in perspective. Today we

can profit from hindsight and a sophisticated research literature. The efforts to achieve the separation of the civil service from patronage, in contrast, came before enough was known about the conceptual and operational problems of the description of organization, personality, or "position" to preclude an uncomplicated Tinker Toy approach to all three of these elements of personnel administration. That is, simple assumptions took the place of an understanding of empirical phenomena which were at least more complex and often essentially different from the assumptions.

Consequently, the early approach to public personnel administration is understandable, if inadequate. The compulsions of life could not wait on the scientific explanation of the universe. However, necessity should not be suffered to be a virtue, lest the original simplistic assumptions become too deeply buried under a specialized literature. Students of public personnel administration, fortunately, have done considerable self-critical work of late. The determined, if preliminary, efforts since World War II to outgrow its early biases are a leading feature of the reorientation currently underway in public administration.<sup>8</sup>

## II. SUPERVISORY POWER AND CIVIL SERVICE

Perhaps the most rewarding clue to supervisory effectiveness in recent research exploits the "power" concept. "Power" refers, in general, to the ability to control the job environment. Getting recommendations for promotion accepted, for example, indicates that a supervisor has relatively high power. "Power" thus conceptually complements "authority," which refers to the degree to which the formal organization legitimates a supervisor's control of the job environment. Typically, all supervisors at the same level monitoring similar operations have similar authority; and typically, these supervisors will differ in their power.

Power seems to be related to effective supervisory performance, whether it is exercised upwards, as influence with superiors, or downwards, as control of the specific job site. Pelz, for example, studied some fifty measures of supervisory practices and attitudes without finding any marked correlations with employee morale and attitudes. When the influence of a supervisor with his superior was specified, however, rather sharp differences were observed. High supervisory power was associated with

<sup>4</sup> Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York, 1948), pp. 47-64.

<sup>5</sup> See my *Behavior and Organization* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), esp. chs. 1-4.

<sup>6</sup> See my "Organizing Work: Techniques and Theories," *Advanced Management—Office Executive*, Vol. 1 (June, 1962), pp. 26-31.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 134-35.

<sup>8</sup> The outlines of this reorientation are drawn sharply in O. Glenn Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration* (New York, 1956), pp. 577-82.



effective performance.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, as Likert concluded, a supervisor must be an effective subordinate as well as an effective superior.<sup>10</sup> Otherwise, reasonably, a supervisor cannot be expected to influence his subordinates consistently.

Similarly, power expressed as control of the job site is associated with effective performance. Likert provides much supporting data. A comparison between the top third and the bottom third of departments (ranked in terms of productivity) is particularly relevant here. Personnel in the "top" departments, in contrast with the "bottom" departments, uniformly attributed greater influence over "what goes on in your department" to these four sources: higher management; plant management; department manager; and the workers themselves. Moreover, the "top" departments also desired that greater influence be exercised by all four sources than did the "bottom" departments. Significantly, the greatest differences between the "top" and "bottom" departments are in the power attributed to department managers (their primary supervisors) and in the power the men desired that department managers exercise.<sup>11</sup> These are reasonable results. A low-power supervisor has little leverage for motivating his men *via* his control over the job site. That is, the men have little reason to take him seriously.

If the reasons for the importance of supervisory power to effective performance seem clear enough, our civil service systems do little to ease the burdens of managing work *via* increases in supervisory power. This is particularly lamentable because much evidence suggests that the "power" variable may be influenced substantially by the design of the job, by the organization structure (of which more later), and by training. The supervisor's personality, in short, does not appear to be the crucial (or major) factor in determining power.

Although only empirical research can establish the point definitely, there seems ample evidence of this failure of civil service systems to respond to the need to facilitate the management of work by increasing supervisory power. On the broadest level, the first and third pri-

mary goals of the civil service movement certainly do not encourage supervisory power; and (as will be demonstrated) the application of the logic and methods of scientific management has the same effect.

To become more specific, these limitations on supervisory power have many practical impacts. For example, first-line supervisors seem to have less control over hiring and firing than their counterparts in business. The difficulty in business organizations of firing or reductions-in-force need not be underplayed, but the elaborate review procedures and the novel "bumping" arrangements<sup>12</sup> often found in our civil service systems probably admit of less flexibility in public agencies even on the part of officials at relatively high organizational levels. Raw turnover ratios seem to support this position.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the emphasis upon seniority in promotions and pay increases in the public service plus the failures of supervisory rating of employee performance<sup>14</sup>—both common in our civil service systems—suggest that the environment in public agencies has not been conducive to the general heightening of supervisory power.

Some counterforces are at work, although they do not promise imminent change in the present condition of limited encouragement of supervisory power. Thus the federal program for rewarding superior performance permits a modest increase in supervisory power. Even in this case, however, apparently many agencies have preferred to ride very close herd over the recommendations of lower-level supervisors or (in at least one case of which I have personal knowledge) to neglect the immediate supervisor altogether. Thus this program not only died aborning as an opportunity to increase supervisory power, but its administration may even further reduce that power.

All this, be it noted, is not by way of an argument for arbitrary managerial or supervisory action. Just such abuses, of course, supplied motivation for the restraints emphasized above. The stress here, rather, is upon ways of reinforcing formal authority so as to permit greater effectiveness consistent with the policies of an agency. Just as in the case of any delegation, that is, attempts to increase supervisory power imply training and the develop-

<sup>9</sup> Donald C. Pelz, "Interaction and Attitudes Between Scientists and Auxiliary Staff," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 4 (December, 1959), pp. 321-36, and Vol. 4 (March, 1960), pp. 410-25.

<sup>10</sup> Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York, 1961), p. 114.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>12</sup> James E. Drury, *The Displaced Career Executive Program* (Inter-University Case Program, University of Alabama Press, 1952).

<sup>13</sup> Stahl, *op. cit.*, p. 473.

<sup>14</sup> Felix Nigro, *Public Personnel Administration* (New York, 1959), p. 295.

ment of suitable overhead controls. Moreover, "power" in the relevant research does not imply heavy-handed coercive techniques, which most subjects interpret as lack of control of the environment. Evidence such as that reviewed below in the context surrounding footnotes 48-51 supports this point.

The task of inducing high supervisory power, then, is more delicate than a mere reversal of gears toward the "spoils system" or advocacy of an administrative law of the jungle.

### III. JOB DESIGN AND CIVIL SERVICE

Similarly, our civil service systems tend to limit the potential for increasing managerial effectiveness implicit in job design. The second primary goal noted above is the chief culprit, with strong support from the goal of "equal treatment." Their interaction in increasing managerial burdens can be illustrated in two ways, by considering specific job content, and by considering the place of the job in the broad organization-structure.

In its doctrine about simplifying job content, particularly, the logic of scientific management makes difficulties for managing work effectively. As in industry, at low organization levels, the process of routinization often has been carried too far in the public service. The effects of "job enlargement" on employee performance, at least in business concerns,<sup>15</sup> suggest the contribution to effective management that may be gained by adding content to a worker's responsibilities. This may be accomplished by increasing the scope of jobs or by rotating individuals through several jobs.<sup>16</sup> The crucial factor does not seem to be the number of task-elements given to an individual or the complexity of these elements. Patently, a job could become too complex. Rather, the significant point seems to be that various techniques of job enlargement, when they work, work because they increase the worker's control over his job environment.<sup>17</sup> Hence the success of plans for increasing the employee's control over factors which are not in his flow of work, such as that often called "bottom-up management."<sup>18</sup>

The effects of "job enlargement" may be explained in terms of the earlier analysis. In Likert's study, as already noted, employees in

high-producing units felt that they themselves exercised and desired more power over their work than did individuals in low-producing units. This is consistent with the favorable effects on output commonly reported in the "job enlargement" literature, while it suggests an apparent paradox. Note that Hi-Pro units ranked themselves *and* three levels of supervisors as higher on "power" than did Lo-Pro units. This might seem curious, but only if one assumes that there is only so much "power" to be had, so that what superiors gain subordinates must lose. The fact seems to be, on the contrary, that a high-power supervisor can afford to (and usually does) allow his subordinates to exercise greater power also.<sup>19</sup> A low-power supervisor is in such an insecure position that he can seldom bring himself to be so generous. The real paradox, then, is that the apparently most straightforward way of adding to one's power is often the most direct way of reducing it. The common mechanical conceptions of organized activity implicit in scientific management discourage such thinking.

The often marked consequences of job enlargement may be illustrated briefly. Machine operations in an industrial concern, for example, had been plagued by an array of difficulties: productivity and quality were falling; and tension between operators and inspectors was growing. The crucial factor was that the tool in this particular operation, when dulled to a certain point, would suddenly begin producing pieces which did not meet specifications. Inspectors were not always able to spot such sudden deteriorations in the product quickly, and operators (inspection not being *their* job) did not always cease work even when the quality was obviously unacceptable. Inspection reports helped little when they did come, the operators marking them down as "ancient history." The solution was easy. Simple gauges were given to operators to make periodic checks on their production, and the operators were allowed to decide when it was necessary to resharpen their cutting tools. The consequences: runs of defective products became shorter and less frequent; the nagging tension between inspectors and operators was reduced; and output zoomed.

Examples need not be confined to industrial operations. In a paperwork operation, similarly, a rather simple change increased output by 30

<sup>15</sup> Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (New York, 1957), pp. 177-87, summarizes many relevant studies.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>18</sup> William Givin, *Bottom-Up Management* (New York, 1949).

<sup>19</sup> The point has been amply demonstrated in experimental situations. See James G. March, "Influence Measurement in Experimental and Semi-Experimental Groups," *Sociometry*, Vol. 19 (March, 1956), pp. 26-71.




FIGURE 1A. Functional (Process) Organization with Narrow Span of Control.

percent and reduced employee turnover by 70 percent.<sup>20</sup>

Although the design of the job could be an important means of reducing the problems of managing work, however, our civil service systems do not encourage the exploitation of such techniques as job enlargement. Consider only one feature which has an inhibiting effect, the very detailed job descriptions common in the public service. That these are an important part of the mechanisms for guaranteeing equal treatment of employees and for developing a career service does little to encourage flexibility in job design. Employee unions and the civil service commission staff can make much of these job descriptions, even in cases in which employees solidly favor changes of a job-enlargement sort. The difficulty is not necessarily avoided by job descriptions which conclude: "or other duties the supervisor may designate." Custom, employee unions, and an overprotective civil service commission can void such open-end descriptions.

Perhaps, however, this leans too heavily on personal (and limited) experience. Some administrators no doubt pay little attention to detailed job descriptions, except for such purposes as convincing the civil service commission that an individual deserves a multi-step promotion. And it may be argued that the significant point is not whether detailed job descriptions exist, but whether strong employee unions exist. Even in such cases, however, the detailed job description is part of the institutional framework within which management and union must function.

In determining the place of the job in the

broad organizational pattern, our civil service systems also increase the problems of managing work. Consider two characteristics which tend to dominate patterns of organization in the public service, a limited span of control and organization by function or (at lower levels) by process. These characteristics largely derive from the impact of scientific management upon public personnel administration. Analysis of these two characteristics is particularly useful because it demonstrates, among other features, their tendency to reduce supervisory power.

The analysis of these two characteristics is facilitated by some simplified graphics.<sup>21</sup> Figure 1A presents the orthodox organization of functions (or processes) A, B, C—which may be taken to be any components whose integration is required to perform some administrative task—under the condition of a limited span of control. Figure 1B presents the more unorthodox organization by product (or discrete sub-assembly), which permits a far broader span of control.

The functional model, with modest reservations, can be considered the pattern for government organizing. This does not do full justice to the diversity of actual organizational arrangements, admittedly. Various factors—size, pressure of work, geography, and the like—have encouraged significant deviations from the functional model. Thus the Justice Department long ago surrendered the fancy of having every government lawyer in the department. The functional model, however, is commonly encountered in practice and it is certainly the most commonly prescribed model in the literature, as in the Hoover Commission's *Report*

<sup>20</sup> Peter F. Drucker, *The Practice of Management* (New York, 1954), pp. 291-92.

<sup>21</sup> The parent of this analysis may be found in James C. Worthy, *Big Business and Free Men* (New York, 1959), pp. 90-99.




FIGURE 1B. Product (Discrete Sub-Assembly) Organization with Broad Span of Control.

on the General Management of the Executive Branch.

The following contrast of the functional model with the product model, then, requires that two points be kept in mind. First, the functional model does not guide all public organizing, but it is nonetheless influential. Second, the product model will not always be a feasible alternative, although it often will be. The contrast, that is, has much to recommend it, although hardly everything. Thus, although the analysis may have an either-or flavor, many other factors would serve to soften the contrast in practice and would guide the choice in specific cases of the functional model, the product model, or combinations of the two.

These simple variations in the organization of jobs in larger structures can have profound consequences for the management of work. In general, the type of structure common in most public agencies (see Figure 1A) incurs substantial costs avoided by the less familiar structure in Figure 1B. These costs derive from three features associated with these two patterns of structure: job enlargement; the size of the "managerial entity"; and supervisory power.

First, to point up the obvious, Figure 1B is based upon job enlargement at all levels. Each employee at the work-level in Figure 1B performs all three components of the task, and each supervisor's responsibilities encompass all three. Figure 1A's emphasis upon routinization limits the scope, and perhaps thereby the effectiveness of the management of work. Of course, there are some limits on the functions or processes (A, B, C, . . .) that may be strung together. In general, however, the limits seem to be very broad indeed.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The point is supported by the example in Drucker, *op. cit.*, p. 291. See also Argyris, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-87.

Second, the "managerial entity" is vastly larger in Figure 1A than in Figure 1B. The size of the managerial entity can have profound consequences. It may appear, for instance, that the structure in Figure 1B puts too much strain on the capacities of management, because of the apparently greater demands it imposes upon the supervisors. In reality, however, structures such as that in Figure 1A often imply greater (and different) demands upon management talent. Figure 1B structures reduce in significant ways the management burden carried by  $M_{ABC}$  and the supervisors as well. The difficulties faced by  $M_{ABC}$  in structures like that in Figure 1A cause considerable problems for supervisors, for example, by tending to reduce their supervisory power. Many of the problems associated with sizeable organizations, more generally, derive not from the aggregate size of the organization, but from the size of its component managerial entities. Thus the manager in our hypothetical organization in Figure 1A directs the work of 99 employees and encounters the difficulties to be enumerated below; the manager in Figure 1B oversees the work of 195 employees, yet significant problems facing the management of work are reduced.

The "managerial entity" concept warrants further analysis. Worthy defines it in these terms:<sup>23</sup>

The administrative unit can be no smaller than that portion of the organization falling within the jurisdiction of an individual who controls enough elements of the total process to make effective decisions regarding the total process.

A high-level managerial entity might be organized around some total product, for example, water resource development in the Kings River Valley. The processing by each of several competing teams of all categories

<sup>23</sup> Worthy, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

of mail received by the Government Printing Office, with each team handling all correspondence from writers whose names begin with designated letters of the alphabet, illustrates the kind of discrete sub-assembly around which a low-level managerial entity might be organized.

At whatever level of organization, then, a "managerial entity" contains that parcel of process-components necessary for the performance of some discrete task. The areas enclosed by the heavy dotted lines in the two figures above symbolize "managerial entities." Interpretively, any  $S_{ABC}$  in Figure 1B can "get all the way around" our hypothetical administrative task. In Figure 1A, in contrast, only  $M_{ABC}$  can do this job.  $M_{ABC}$  in Figure 1A has a managerial entity which contains 100 individuals; that of  $S_{ABC}$  contains only 15.

Many of the problems in sizeable organizations derive from the failure to restrict the size of the organization's managerial entities. Haire's analogy seems apt in this connection. He suggested the mushrooming problems caused by the growth in the size of organizations *via* the "square-cube law" applied to the story of Jack and the Beanstalk:<sup>24</sup>

... Jack had nothing to fear from the Giant. If he were, as he is pictured, ten times as large as a man and proportioned like one, Jack was perfectly safe. The Giant's mass would be  $10^3$  or a thousand times a man's, because he was ten times as big in every dimension. However, the cross section of his leg bones would have increased in only two dimensions, and they would be  $10^2$  or a hundred times as big as a man's. A human bone simply will not support ten times its normal load, and the Giant, in walking, would break his legs and be helpless.

In a similar way, arithmetic increases in the size of the managerial entity seem to generate exponential increases in the problems of the management of work. Meeting these increases in size within the framework of the type of organization structure in Figure 1A does nothing to reduce these difficulties.

This general position can be elaborated. The size of the managerial entity, in sum, is likely to affect such significant features of administration as: the time lag between the perception of a problem and action on it, which influences supervisory power; the style of supervision; the measurement and the motivation of performance; and the training of subordinates.

Patently, first, decisions will tend to be

pushed upward in an organization such as that in Figure 1A; for only  $M_{ABC}$  oversees all of the components which require integration. As a result, delegation to supervisors is all but restricted to routine matters, that is, those which involve the single component supervised by any supervisor and only that component.

The separation of decision-making from the action level often has significant costs. Overloading upper levels may make time-pressure a very serious factor, the more so if the stakes are high. A shutdown in any of the sections in Figure 1A might cause output to drop as low as zero. The manager, then, is under great pressure to assure that A, B, and C are integrated, and he is likely to exert that pressure downward. This does not encourage upward communication, in turn, which is difficult enough in the "tall" organization described in Figure 1A. (Notice that Figure 1B, with 69 per cent more people, has one less organization level than Figure 1A.) The efforts of the manager to fight the daily battle of integration of the components of his operation and to get the information required for his job, finally, will tend to undercut any efforts by the supervisors to gain high power. The common development of large "staff" units complements this tendency.

In contrast, decisions in Figure 1B organizations would strongly tend to be forced down to the action level, and certainly at least to the level of  $S_{ABC}$ . Indeed,  $M_{ABC}$  may have no other reasonable alternative, given his broad span of control. Upward communication and supervisory power often will be affected favorably.  $M_{ABC}$ , consequently, should be freed from the unremitting pressure of integration implicit in a Figure 1A structure. Downtime at any work station, for example, will not cause difficulty throughout the managerial entity. Output would fall at most by  $1/N$ . The manager therefore could devote himself to motivating superior performance, to training and counseling, and the like, rather than attempting to eliminate the possibility of error.

These comments on decision-making, second, suggest that the two types of structures encourage different styles of supervision. The structure in Figure 1A encourages "close supervision," *i.e.*, detailed instructions, persistent attempts to direct and observe performance, and the like. The limited span of control, of course, permits this, and the pressure for the integration of the task components may force it. The structure in Figure 1B encourages "general supervision," *i.e.*, monitoring performance in terms of results with considerable freedom for the employee so long as he is performing up to standard. Close supervision of

<sup>24</sup> Mason Haire, ed., *Modern Organization Theory* (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 273-74.

janitors, for example, would require such directions as: "You will sweep from left to right, forty strokes per minute," and correspondingly close checks on performance. General supervision, in contrast, would assume competence and give such instructions as: "Sweep the floors in such time that you are able to get your other work done and so that the floor will reflect  $x$  units of light from a refractometer." The refractometer provides the check on performance. Acknowledgedly, this goes a little far. All of the components of general supervision are there, however, especially the measure of performance.

Structures of the type in Figure 1A pay a heavy cost to the degree that they in fact do encourage close supervision. In one study, for example, less than 30 percent of the work teams whose first- or second-level supervisors practiced close supervision had high output. Nearly 70 percent of the work units receiving only general supervision had high output.<sup>25</sup>

The reader may suppose, third, that the manager and supervisors in a Figure 1B organization would face an impossible task in motivating and measuring performance. For general supervision must be based upon performance standards, and what will keep standards high if the supervisor "gets off their backs?" But the several units headed by an  $S_{ABC}$ , each performing the same task, obviously set the stage for a relative measure of performance. They are in competition with each other, which tends to keep performance high. This would complement the added contributions to be expected because of the job enlargement practiced in 1B-type structures. At the same time, reduced "line-staff" conflict seems implied by this potential for motivation and measurement, "staff" development being in large part due to top-level management's difficulties in motivating and, especially, measuring performance.

Figure 1A organizations do not offer the same possibilities. One might try to encourage competition within, for example, some  $S_A$  unit, or between the  $S_A$  units and the  $S_B$  units. But competition of that sort, as experimental studies suggest, is not likely to aid performance on most tasks,<sup>26</sup> since the tasks themselves are not comparable, and may indeed be incommensurable. The point may be driven home by considering this proposition: Assembling all As (or Bs or Cs) in organizationally separate units

encourages the restriction of output and invites substantial jurisdictional conflict when the responsibility for an error must be assigned. Much evidence supports this proposition.<sup>27</sup> Responsibility is far more difficult to assign in a 1A-type structure, for at least three inspections would be required to permit accurate assignment of praise or blame, one after each of the component operations. Figure 1B organizations would require only one such inspection. Such considerations, and there are many others, attest to the difficulties of motivating and measuring performance in Figure 1A organizations.

These features of Figure 1B organizations suggest a way out of the objection that public agencies are not guided by "profit" and that therefore performance measurement is difficult. In Figure 1A organizations, in business, the measurement of macroscopic profit does little to determine the often crucial measurement of the effectiveness of constituent units. Hence many business enterprises have approached the type of organization sketched in Figure 1B by establishing "individual profit centers" within (for example) a plant. Their services are then "sold" internally, sometimes with the useful provision that outside purchase is possible if price or quality are not considered appropriate by the "buyer."<sup>28</sup> This encourages self-discipline of both "buyer" and "seller." Comptroller W. J. McNeil worked for years to install arrangements of this sort in the Department of Defense, for the provision of common procurement of goods and services, as a means of economy and of strengthening the Secretary's hand.

In any case, fourth, Figure 1B organizations seem to have a definite advantage in the training of subordinates. Patently,  $S_{ABC}$  faces training challenges not available to  $S_A$  (or  $S_B$  or  $S_C$ ) in the normal course of events. Reasonably, then, organization structures such as that in Figure 1B should tend toward the early elimination of those without management ability, while it would attract the more able. Reasonably, also, high satisfaction and output should characterize Figure 1B organizations. These expectations, indeed, are supported by some research in the Sears, Roebuck chain<sup>29</sup> and elsewhere.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Eliot D. Chapple and Leonard R. Sayles, *The Measure of Management* (New York, 1961), pp. 18-45.

<sup>28</sup> W. H. Mylander, "Management by Executive Committee," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 33 (May, 1950), pp. 51-58.

<sup>29</sup> See William F. Whyte, *Man and Organization* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1959), pp. 11-16.

<sup>30</sup> Ernest Dale, "Centralization versus De-

<sup>25</sup> Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics* (Evanston, 1953), esp. pp. 617-19.

<sup>26</sup> Robert T. Golembiewski, *The Small Group: An Analysis of Research Concepts and Operations* (University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 202-4.

Despite these (and other) advantages of 1B structures, our public personnel systems do not provide a congenial home for them. The dominant emphasis in these systems—and it is no doubt often a necessary emphasis—is negative rather than positive. As one observer with high-level experience in both government and industry noted:<sup>31</sup>

... no matter how well briefed on federal service peculiarities the private business executive may be, one of the first things he notices in public administration is this emphasis on procedure and routine. This emphasis is admittedly necessary and desirable provided it does not make method an end in itself. When it does, over-organized bewilderment results. The newcomer to top management positions in the federal service frequently feels that the organization and methods set up with the laudable idea of keeping him from doing wrong actually result in making it excessively difficult to do right.

This emphasis, despite its legitimacy, seems to have been overdone at all levels. Overdone or not, it is something to know what it costs to preserve the emphasis in Figure 1A structures.

Generations of organization theorists have labored hard to preserve the fiction of the unity of command in our public affairs, this being the very slender thread by which we demonstrate that the electorate really does control the administration through its election of the president. One may judge the impact of this theory upon supervisory practices from the longevity of the logically consistent but unrealistic notion that "politics" and "administration" are somehow separate. This notion, of course, is the keystone of our civil service systems. Their failure to respect the realities of delegation hardly augurs for better treatment of this matter at lower organization levels. Comfortable as the fiction of unity of command may be to many, multi-line relations exist. We may choose to neglect this datum for various reasons, as the Hoover Commission did in arguing for a structure such as that in Figure 1A.<sup>32</sup> But this neglect may prove embarrassing,<sup>33</sup> and it is very

likely that our theoretical simplicism has a high cost. Gaus long ago put the argument for a multi-line view in these convincing terms:<sup>34</sup>

Such a theory . . . is the only one which fits the facts of contemporary delegation of wide discretionary power by electorates, constitutions, and legislatures to the administrators [who] must, of necessity, determine some part of the purpose and a large part of the means whereby it will be achieved in the modern state.

Finally, the accepted pattern of organization in public agencies (as well as in business concerns) is functional. This reflects the historic strength of the model sketched in Figure 1A and suggests the barriers which will restrain attempts to approach the Figure 1B model in organizing.

#### IV. JOB DESCRIPTION AND CIVIL SERVICE

It says worlds, while it avoids an enormous complexity, to note that our civil service systems typically are based upon a duties classification, as opposed to a rank classification. Public personnel specialists have gone in for a duties classification with a sometimes uncritical zeal. As Nigro explains:<sup>35</sup>

In a duties classification, the beginning point is a detailed analysis of the tasks required in the individual position. In fact, the tendency in the United States has been to make fairly minute investigations of job content.

The emphasis need not be exaggerated, for the specialists have providently refrained from stressing the content of all jobs. The handling of secretarial positions—whose importance is usually measured by secretaries and bosses in terms of what the boss does rather than what the secretary does—is perhaps the most striking illustration of what has been called the "realistic" approach to classification.<sup>36</sup> But the bias of job description in this country has not moved very far from the classic expression it was given, for example, in the 1932 classification plan for Philadelphia. Nigro called this "one of the best books of specifications on record." It listed twenty individual classes of clerks, for each of which specifications had been developed. Specifications also were stated for thirty additional classes of principal and chief clerks in the various city departments.<sup>37</sup>

centralization," *Advanced Management*, Vol. 21 (June, 1956), p. 15.

<sup>31</sup> Marver Bernstein, *The Job of the Federal Executive* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 34–35.

<sup>32</sup> Hoover Commission, *Report on the General Management of the Executive Branch* (Washington, D. C., 1949), pp. 1, 3–4.

<sup>33</sup> As, e.g., in *Morgan vs. United States*, 298 U.S. 468, where the Secretary of Agriculture was rebuked for deciding a case he had not heard in person.

<sup>34</sup> In Gaus, Leonard D. White, and Marshall E. Dimock, *The Frontiers of Public Administration* (University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 91.

<sup>35</sup> Nigro, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

<sup>36</sup> Julius E. Eittington, "Injecting Realism into Classification," *Public Personnel Administration*, Vol. 15 (March, 1952), pp. 31–35.

<sup>37</sup> Nigro, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–99.

The inspirations for this emphasis on job description in our public personnel systems seem clear enough. The logic and methods of scientific management—which encouraged the view of organization as a “delicate mechanism” of gear-like “positions” whose driveshaft was the line of command—clearly had their influence. Moreover, position classification provides the bases for equal treatment, general formal policies and procedures regarding recruitment, salary, promotions, and the like. Finally, position classification encourages the attempt to group similar jobs into a reasonable number of classes, sub-classes, and so on. This provided a ladder-like framework upon which a permanent career service could be built.

Despite its contribution to achieving the goals of our civil service movement, the American approach to job description has its unintended costs. Some obvious costs will be considered immediately; subsequent analysis will consider one less obvious set of costs in some detail.

Since one product of position classification was to be a manageable number of classes, first, this required a procrustean neglect of distinguishing job characteristics. The position approach, second, became the victim of its own imprecise terms. Consider the common observation that the “position” is the “universal building block of all organizations.”<sup>38</sup> The observation has a certain validity, since all organizations contain positions. It tended to mislead the unwary, however, into supposing that “organization” is only a set of positions. The temptation to think of organization as some massive mechanical structure of positions linked by lines of authority was strong, since it apparently served to simplify the problems of personnel work.

The emphasis upon a duties classification, third, implies a substantial rigidity. Consider the difficulties of dealing with the many positions which have a kind of life cycle, with stages that impose varying demands on the incumbent. Developing an administrative role may be a very delicate task, while playing the role thereafter may be child’s play. This phenomenon is difficult to accommodate within the framework of most of our public personnel systems. Some adaptations may be made quickly enough. But often it is necessary to waste a “big” man on a job too small for him or to give a “small” man a job too big for him. Similarly, the emphasis upon a duties classification makes it difficult to utilize positions for training pur-

poses without the stretching of a point or two by the position analyst. The traditional question—What does the incumbent do?—is not appropriate for such positions, for he may, in fact, contribute little toward immediate task performance.

The abortive struggles toward a Senior Civil Service, and then a Career Executive Program, for the federal government, reflect the tenacity of the grip of these two types of inflexibilities.<sup>39</sup> For it was intended that the highly mobile and select corps of administrators in such programs would be used in both of the ways alluded to above, that is, as experienced “firefighters” and as trainees getting the “big picture.” The rank-in-job bias in our civil service systems played not a little part in the lack of action.

Fourth and finally, the approach *via* a duties classification taken in this country is not the only available one. Indeed, in public administration, it appears that only Canada and Brazil follow our example closely. Many personnel systems—public and business—emphasize broad and general classes rather than narrow and detailed ones. Some of the spirit claimed for the British civil service, for example, is suggested by this open-end description of the few grades of “scientific officer” in Her Majesty’s service:<sup>40</sup>

It is not possible to define with precision the duties of the various grades but, broadly speaking, the duties of the grades above principal scientific officer include responsibility for the administration and direction of scientific work while the principal scientific officer and lower grades concentrate on the scientific work itself.

But the posts of senior principal scientific officer and above may, with Treasury authority, be created for outstanding individual research workers.

Not infrequently, on the business side, executives will take the more extreme ground that they will not tolerate even an organization chart at their level, lest it force them into patterns of action which may become inappropriate, just as these patterns develop a vested interest in protecting personnel.

This general approach to job description has its virtues. For example, by all accounts, the

<sup>39</sup> Paul P. Van Riper, “The Senior Civil Service and the Career System,” *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 18 (Summer, 1958), pp. 189–200.

<sup>40</sup> Royal Commission on the Civil Service, *Introductory Factual Memorandum on the Civil Service* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953), p. 54.

<sup>38</sup> Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (New York, 1948), p. 28.



British achieve great flexibility, avoid the sometimes gross artificialities of more "precise" efforts, and (one supposes) increase the power of the supervisors whose discretion is obviously emphasized. Their approach also seems to avoid that situation which haunts position analysts and outside observers alike: that an Einstein would have the same grade as any other physicist doing "similar work."

These problems of the American approach are known well enough, although they do not prove the inferiority of a detailed approach to job description in the lower classifications. These problems may have profound consequences for the management of work. At its worst, taking the mechanical aspects of job description too seriously can disrupt the flow of work. Moderation on the part of both "line" and "staff" seems indicated. The decentralization of much personnel work in the federal service suggests that just such a mature moderation has set in.

Other factors encourage a diluted devotion to the methods and theory implicit in the duties classification in this country. Here let us consider only this feature: it is not obvious that the common attempts at precision are precise about all (or most) of the elements of work which are important. This should encourage a healthy skepticism in developing and administering duties classifications. For, first, the technology of duties classification cannot support great precision now, nor is it likely to do so in the immediate future. Second, if a duties classification purports to describe the behaviors required for the effective performance of an organization's work, existing efforts commonly miss many significant possibilities. If it merely codifies existing practices it may not be worthy of vigorous support, for duties classifications are at least implicitly prescriptive.

The specific dimensions which characterize tasks are but imprecisely known. The usual guidelines for classification—level in the hierarchy, formal authority and responsibility, funds administered, and the like—are not sufficient for doing the job tidily. For example, they do not take into account whether Supervisor X is the informal as well as formal leader of his work unit. It is impractical and unjust to treat Supervisor X's job as the same whatever the answer to this question. Moreover, if a job description is prescriptive, a supervisor's socio-emotional performance cannot be overlooked. We may fairly ask of an approach which preaches and seeks precision: Precision about what?

The question remains, what is significant in describing a task? It is a disarming question.

Existing research does not suggest that it has an obvious or an uncomplicated answer. Factor analysis, a sophisticated mathematical technique, perhaps offers the most hope of developing a set of dimensions which will permit us to describe jobs precisely. A technical discussion of factor analysis hardly can be attempted here. In general, however, the technique permits an initial judgment as to the number of independent dimensions necessary to account for the variation in some batch of scores (e.g., in rankings by several analysts of jobs in terms of the discretion they require incumbents to exercise). The technique has been utilized, for example, to isolate the various kinds of intellectual abilities measured by intelligence tests. There is no way to solve such problems *a priori*. Factor analysis, in sum, might well complement and direct the enormous amount of observation that normally goes into developing a duties classification and into keeping it current.

Applications of factor analysis to job description suggest the problems which must be met. The technique, for example, has been applied to the ratings of a very large number of characteristics of various jobs. Existing results do not suggest that a synthesis is imminent. A simple manual task, for example, required only a few factors to describe it in one study.<sup>41</sup> Another factor analysis of more complex tasks isolated twenty-three factors.<sup>42</sup> Yet only seven factors were considered necessary to describe the 4,000 jobs listed by the U. S. Employment Service.<sup>43</sup> Thus existing work does not suggest a clear pattern. To further complicate matters, there seem to be "families" of tasks for which individual sets of factor dimensions probably must be developed.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the inconclusiveness of such factor analytical work, two points seem clear. First, the dimensions isolated thus far do not closely resemble the guidelines implicit in much classifi-

<sup>41</sup> A. W. Melton, *Apparatus Tests*, AAF Aviation Psychological Program, Research Report No. 4 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947).

<sup>42</sup> L. L. McQuitty, C. Wrigley, and E. L. Gaier, "An Approach to Isolating Dimensions of Job Success," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 38 (1954), pp. 227-32.

<sup>43</sup> E. J. McCormick, R. H. Finn, and C. D. Scherps, "Patterns of Job Requirements," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 41 (1957), pp. 358-64.

<sup>44</sup> Launer F. Carter, William Haythorn, and Margaret Howell, "A Further Investigation of the Criteria of Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 45 (1950), pp. 350-58.

cation work. In fact, the factors need not have any obvious connection with "commonsense" notions.<sup>45</sup> Second, the isolation of such factors is only the initial step. Factor analysis provides a rough map of those things which are important descriptively. Successful prediction, however, is the crucial test. Such validity work might take such a form: If the task has dimensions *a* and *d*, individuals with such-and-such training, proficiency, attitudes, and personality will prove to be high producers.

Even this preliminary factorial work has clear implications for our public personnel systems. Duties classification will have limited usefulness to the degree that task dimensions are not developed and the validity work referred to above is not undertaken. The interim question of whether the pursuit of precision about characteristics—which may or may not be functionally important in describing the task—is worthwhile probably must remain open. The answer is not obviously in the affirmative. A fundamental reevaluation of the common approach to job description in this country seems required, while we await the scientific explanation which will permit great precision. It would seem useful to attempt to test whether general classification provides savings beyond the reach of the detailed classification.

If detail there must be in job description, many factors could fruitfully be included in the usual duties classification. One such is the style of supervision.

Different jobs seem compatible with different styles of supervision. On the available evidence, general statements under this head must be tentative, largely because we know so little about the dimensions along which tasks differ. An example, however, may be hazarded. Provisionally, jobs may be conceived as differing in the degrees to which their performance is programmed and to which their successful performance requires interpersonal cooperation. When a task is unprogrammed and requires high interpersonal cooperation, a permissive supervisory style has seemed most appropriate for those subjects tested. An authoritarian supervisory style will cause the least socio-emotional dislocation on tasks which are highly programmed and require little interpersonal cooperation.<sup>46</sup> These are general relations, in-

deed, and require much specification of intervening conditions. Similarly, individuals with differing personality characteristics tend to perform most effectively under different supervisory styles.<sup>47</sup> Meeting the needs of employees via an appropriate supervisory style probably would serve to increase the power of supervisors, or at least to provide supervisors with a favorable environment in which to seek high power.<sup>48</sup>

The specification of such factors as the supervisory style congenial to a job is particularly important because the logic of scientific management encourages the choice of a generally inappropriate style. Thus close supervision—which is consistent with this theory—seems to be associated with high output in only a minority of cases, as already noted. If one had to make a choice between the two types of supervision, then, it is not crystal clear that one would be well advised to obey the logic of scientific management.

This analysis can be extended. Close supervision, patently, is encouraged by a structure such as that in Figure 1A. Supervisory pressure would seem to be most directly applicable in this model, which in turn might suggest high supervisory power. Things, however, do not seem to happen this way often. Likert reports that the more "unreasonable pressure" reportedly exerted by a supervisor, the less the power attributed to that supervisor.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, evidence suggests that greater supervisory pressure serves to isolate the supervisor from his men by increasing the danger of communication.<sup>50</sup> In addition, pressure seems inversely related to output. For example, ten of eleven departments in Likert's study which reported little outside pressure to control the pace of work were above-average producers. Nine of ten departments reporting great pressure were below-average producers.<sup>51</sup> Reasonably, then, job descriptions might well profit from the specification of such job-relevant factors as the style of supervision.

This discussion of two approaches to job description—through those factors normally included, and through those factors which are often neglected—permits of simple summary. There seem to be very substantial costs of com-

<sup>45</sup> The naming of factors is not always an easy task, for any factor normally has "loadings" of several variables. Hence the sometimes exotic designations of factorial structures.

<sup>46</sup> Robert T. Golembiewski, "Three Styles of Leadership and Their Uses," *Personnel*, Vol. 38 (July-August, 1961), pp. 38-39.

<sup>47</sup> Allen D. Calvin, Frederick K. Hoffman, and Edgar L. Harden, "The Effect of Intelligence and Social Atmosphere on Group Problem-Solving Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 45 (February, 1957), pp. 61-74.

<sup>48</sup> Likert, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

<sup>49</sup> Likert, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

mission and omission in the job descriptions common in our civil service systems. These costs complicate the management of work, however nicely the systems fit the three core goals underlying the American approach to public personnel administration.

#### V. SUMMARY

Our federal Civil Service Commission has been accustomed to serve more than one master. As one commentator noted:<sup>52</sup>

"For whom does the Civil Service Commission work?" We used to reply, "Well, we think it

works first for its congressional committees, second for the status employees, third for the American Legion in support of veterans' preference laws, fourth for civil service employees' unions, and possibly fifth for the President." Since the end of World War II, the President has moved up in this list but it is difficult to tell just how far.

The analysis above, in essence, argues that yet another master requires service, the development of a work environment within which a professional manager can do his most effective job. Substantial revisions in traditional thinking and technique about our civil service systems will be required to that end.

<sup>52</sup> Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

## COMMUNICATIONS

### ON PARSONS ON FLORIDA POLITICS

TO THE EDITOR:

From my occasional browsing of articles on the history of science I judge that questions of "priority" of discovery and instances of "multiple" independent discoverers are both rather common happenings. With the steady growth in the size of the political science profession and the rapid proliferation of journals the difficulty of keeping up with the literature in any given specialty has increased markedly. Still, I think anyone even roughly familiar with the Florida political scene or with the not-so-extensive published literature on Florida politics would note some striking omissions, both substantive and bibliographic, from Malcolm Parsons' article on the Florida senate (September issue, pp. 605-615).

First, and to my mind most glaring, is Parsons' failure to make any reference at all to the various pieces by William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, who have previously pointed out virtually everything that Parsons has to say (and more—since they cover the lower house as well as the senate). Thus small-county control of the Florida senate presidency and of the major committees is discussed in their 1960 monograph, *Representative Government and Reapportionment: A Case Study of Florida* (Gainesville: Public Administration Clearing Service, 1960), pp. 61-67; and the deliberate "stacking" of committees is extensively analyzed in their article, "Committee Stacking and Political Power in Florida," *Journal of Politics* (February 1961), pp. 57-83. Although the Havard-Beth book on the Florida legislature, *The Politics of Misrepresentation* (Louisiana State University Press, 1962) has only recently become available, their previous pieces have been in print for almost two years. They seem more relevant than references to A. Lawrence Lowell.

Second, to write of tension and conflict in the Florida senate without some serious consideration of the disruptive impact of the reapportionment issue is surely to produce *Hamlet* without the prince. Parsons notes that *none* of the sessions from 1947-1953 are even roughly comparable in terms of sectionalism to the pattern evident in *all* of the sessions from 1955-1961. The obvious question then is, what happened in 1954-1955 to change the whole nature of legislative politics? Population growth and "creeping Republicanism" have been going on

for decades; what seemed to spark the conflict was the bitter duel between LeRoy Collins (governor from 1955-1961) and the dominant North Florida senate clique (generally referred to in the Florida press as "the pork-chop gang"). That reapportionment was the crucial issue and that the organization of the "pork-choppers" was the mechanism for achieving North Florida cohesion stand out clearly from such accounts as that by Virgil M. Newton, Jr., managing editor of the *Tampa Tribune*, in his *Crusade for Democracy* (Iowa State University Press, 1961). We should all guard against a sort of Gresham's Law which permits an enthusiasm for chi square tests to drive from political science the basic issues that "politics" is about.

Third, the pattern of sectionalism which Parsons presents in his map (p. 608, which unfortunately fails to show senate district boundaries) is a familiar one, used over the past ten years by virtually everybody writing on Florida electoral politics. Here I would cite only Herbert J. Doherty, "Liberal and Conservative Voting Patterns in Florida," *Journal of Politics* (August 1952); Donald S. Strong, "Presidential Election in the South," *ibid.* (August 1955), especially pp. 351-352; and my own book, *The Negro and Southern Politics* (New York University Press, 1957), pp. 93-102 (especially maps 4 and 5). On the substantive side I think a more sensitive index of change than Parsons' measure, which is two-thirds plain Republican vote, would point up some important distinctions *within* North Florida, especially between the generally stagnant area between the Suwannee and Apalachicola Rivers and the rapidly booming far Gulf coast. Since the state's overall rate of growth over the past decade was 78.7 per cent, counties which are below the state average are by no means all "stable" in population.

Fourth, the classification of districts as "urban," "mixed," or "rural" is made in a manner that results in some curious distortions. An "urban" district defined as containing at least *one* urban place with a population of 50,000 or over would be understandable. But how should we classify a multi-county district that has *several* smaller urban places, with an aggregate population of 50,000 or over? Parsons apparently calls it an urban district too. Thus footnote 16, page 611, notes the "urban"

Fort Myers district, although Fort Myers has a 1960 population of only 22,523. Since the existing legislative malapportionment gives North Florida more single-county districts than population warrants, but lumps numerous South Florida counties together into multi-county districts, the measure exaggerates the "urban-ness" of South Florida and of some South Florida districts. Consider the classification of four counties, each with a town of 14,000. These would make four "rural" districts if each were a single-county district. It is hard to see why the identical inhabitants should be converted into urbanites by lumping the same four towns into a single multi-county district (which thus would have a total urban population of 56,000). Fort Myers plus Key West indeed have other 50,000 residents, but only prophecy could justify putting either of these charming little places, or the two together, into the same category with Miami and Jacksonville. Is a

state senator representing several little county seat towns likely to be any more urban-oriented than one representing a single county?

Students familiar with the previously published literature on Florida politics will doubtless find some satisfaction in the additional confirmation of findings provided by Parsons' laborious check of senate roll-call votes. Teasing any conclusions out of such data is often a difficult task. It might be facilitated by making better use of the existing literature, and by picking up the analysis at a point calculated to build on what has already been done. Increasing sophistication in the study of legislatures is certainly to be applauded—at least with two cheers—but it should not be encouraged to proceed at the cost of divorcing the study of "legislative systems" entirely from the real-life world of politics.

HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE

*Syracuse University*

## INSTRUMENTAL VALUES AND ULTIMATE GOALS

TO THE EDITOR:

In his article on "Values and Interests" (this REVIEW, Vol. 56, pp. 567-576), Professor Van Dyke has provided a lucid and fruitful analysis of these concepts. Nevertheless, his interpretation leads to certain difficulties. I should like to point them out and to propose a solution.

According to the author, making a choice consists essentially of two successive steps: (1) selecting an "ultimate goal" (or "intrinsic value" or "independent interest"); and (2) determining the necessary means ("proximate goals" or "instrumental values" or "dependent interests"). Step 1 is logically and empirically arbitrary, since there is no objective way of determining what ought to be done for its own sake. On the other hand, the rationality of step 2 can be objectively ascertained by empirical science, since the relationship of means to end is one of cause to effect.

First of all, it is doubtful whether, as a matter of fact, actors in general and political decision makers in particular normally first "assume or postulate the goal values or independent interests that guide their behavior" (p. 569) and afterwards decide to use whatever means are necessary to such ultimate goals. Second, ultimate goals are usually too general and vague to allow for articulate disagreement. Nearly everyone is committed to the same intrinsic values, *e.g.*, mental health, the public good, the national interest. Yet, not everyone makes the same value judgments. Third, the more proximate the goal, the greater the

probability of disagreement as to whether it ought to be pursued. On the basis of the author's analysis, such disagreements about means to an agreed end could only be factual, never valuational. Finally, while the author realizes that "the same thing may be both goal value and an instrumental value," (p. 372) he does not take into account that the same thing may be considered intrinsically disvaluable—*e.g.*, the expected losses in an attack—and yet a necessary means to an end—*e.g.*, victory. Are we to say that these losses constitute a proximate goal, an instrumental value, a dependent interest?

These four objections indicate the need for a more realistic model of rational choice than the author's underlying two-step theory—a theory supposing that predictions precede evaluations. A rational actor does not simply determine the causal relationships that lead from his contemplated immediate action *via* his intermediate goals to his ultimate end, "like rungs on a ladder or links in a chain." (p. 567) Rather, he must predict, as far as possible, the total outcome of the action, which includes side-effects and after-effects as well as the ultimate goal itself. (The picture of a network of causal relationships would therefore be more appropriate.) The actor must also determine what alternative courses of action are open to him in the given situation, and their respective outcomes as well. If the same goal can be reached by different means, that goal will be included in several of these pos-

sible outcomes. The actor's evaluations pertain, not to "goal values" in isolation, but to means and total outcomes, which may include elements that are intrinsically disvaluable to him. Furthermore, he does not make absolute value-judgments, but appraises the relative over-all desirability of each alternative outcome. The question then becomes: What is on the whole more valuable to me, the (probable) loss of so and so many lives *and* victory *and* . . . etc.; or saving these lives *and* defeat *and* . . . etc.? I agree with the author's non-cognitivist value theory; there are no objective criteria for validating preferences among alternative outcomes. An actor's choice of a course of action is rational provided the expected outcome is, on the whole, more valuable to him than (or rather: at least as valuable as) the outcome

of any available alternative; *i.e.*, if its net expectable utility is maximal.

Doing away with the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values or goals, and interpreting choices as *comparative* evaluations of alternative *total* possible outcomes, eliminates all the above-mentioned difficulties. This approach is also in line with recent developments in analytic philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

FELIX E. OPPENHEIM

*University of Massachusetts*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Richard Brandt, *Ethical Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1959), ch. 15; Carl G. Hempel, "Rational Action," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 1961-62 (Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1962).

## BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### REVIEWS OF BOOKS

<i>Pye</i> , Politics, Personality and Nation Building. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD . . . . .	978
<i>Fiser</i> , Mastery of the Metropolis. JAMES G. COKE . . . . .	979
<i>Hodgkin</i> , African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide. FRANK UNTERMYER . .	980
<i>Huntington</i> , The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics. LAURENCE I. RADWAY . . . . .	982
<i>Manning</i> , The Nature of International Society. CHARLES A. McCLELLAND . . . .	983
<i>Robinson</i> , Congress and Foreign Policy-Making. DONALD E. STOKES . . . . .	984
<i>Wilson</i> , A Theory of Public Opinion. SAMUEL KRISLOV . . . . .	985
<i>Mackintosh</i> , The British Cabinet; <i>Lord Morrison of Lambeth</i> , British Parliamentary Democracy. ROLAND YOUNG . . . . .	986

### BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY . . . .	988
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS . . . . .	1000
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT . . . . .	1017
INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZATION . . . . .	1029
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	1037

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity.* BY LUCIAN W. PYE. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. 307. \$7.50.)

*Politics, Personality and Nation Building* is a striking new effort to explain why transitional societies have such difficulty in modernizing. The answer, says Lucian W. Pye, lies in the psychic dimension of change, not in the lack of resources or foreign aid. Specifically, it is the spirit and calculations of the political elite that are the main barrier to progress. Taking Burma as an example, the author probes sensitively into the anxieties and self-doubts of her political leaders that inhibit purposive, cooperative action. The result is a subtle and deeply pessimistic account of frustration in the building of a modern state.

Pye's thesis is skilfully elaborated with the tools of psychology, political science and sociology. It is amplified with a good deal of empirical data on Burma, including long personal interviews with politicians and administrators. In fact, two thirds of the book is devoted to the political culture of the Burmese elite, as it has developed out of socialization processes begun in childhood and carried on through career experiences in colonial and post-colonial times.

The themes are of wider significance, however. They are set forth as a model to which most transitional societies are believed to conform today. Thus the book is a general study of the politics of modernization, with the Burmese case detailed to give concreteness and color.

The crux of the difficulty, the author argues, lies in psychological insecurities created in the minds of politicians and administrators by the diffusion of modern culture. Government is all-important; but its achievements are stultified because its leading actors are confused in their values and unsure of their capacities. As transitional people, they lack any confident sense of identity either for themselves or their societies. This makes for unpredictability, a sense of isolation, and mutual distrust in interpersonal relations. It robs them particularly of "the spirit of associational life" which is the *sine qua non* of organization building. A politics of personal intrigue and public fantasy becomes therefore an almost insurmountable obstacle to nation building. Unhappily the difficulty is not a temporary carry-over from tradition. It is a psychic dilemma built into the very process of acculturation that makes modernizing elements unfit for creative leadership.

The author's delineation of these subjective,

irrational dimensions of Burmese politics is vigorously impressionistic. His argument is exemplified though hardly verified by the evidence assembled. It appears to illuminate many facets of elitist behavior in Burma and other transitional societies. And it offers plausible interpretations of the non-development, even retrogression, observable in many fields. The chapters on Burma give deft sketches, for example, of "backward-looking modernizers" in the bureaucracy, of rootless politicians who do not feel at home either with the peasant or the Westerner, of personal tensions growing out of religion and the family, of gentleness and violence in politics, of intentions valued above deeds, of the myth of omnipotence in the midst of incompetence, and so on. It is a pleasure to read a book so well designed and lucidly written.

Any thesis so selective in its facts, and so boldly presented, is bound to invite challenge. Sentiments about power in Burma are detailed, but not the actual power structure. There is much about public administrators, but little about administration. Public investment is mentioned as little more than a program for optimizing loyalty (p. 90), and development projects as virtually the private fiefs of politicians (p. 155). Questionnaire statistics are happily eschewed in favor of more subtle intuitions regarding personality and outlook. Yet this leads sometimes to judgments that seem rather strained. Can the political class of Burma be described as people highly tolerant of nonsense (p. 131) who see events as having neither antecedents or consequences (p. 167), and who believe that political action can neither greatly hasten nor retard economic development (p. 154)? Other observers, too, manage to construct for Burma a balance sheet of social progress not so negative as the one given here.

One suspects that the author may be trying to prove too much by giving an unqualified and inclusive priority to psychic tensions that are only one aspect of the Burmese scene. It is open to question, furthermore, how adequately the modernizing difficulties of China or Indonesia or Egypt can be summed up in the same formula. Yet no one familiar with such societies in transition can fail to be struck with the wide relevance and authenticity of Pye's insights from Burma.

Finally, profound doubts about foreign aid are implicit in this view of politics as the inhibitor of progress. Capital from abroad can hardly



cure conspiratorial factionalism or a "paralysis of will" growing out of psychological insecurity. In fact, says Pye, the aid-giving nations are caught in a dilemma. Assistance on rational terms invites suspicion of foreign control. On the other hand, its suspension leads to charges of abandonment and betrayal. We are damned if we do, and damned if we don't.

The only solutions suggested are (1) "a grand ideological breakthrough," inspired by some charismatic leader, or (2) the slow growth of "communities of modernizers" gaining self-confidence from their mastery of new skills. But the first is unlikely—Martin Luthers come rarely—and the second is a long, slow process.

One is left then with a rather gloomy prospect, and a conviction that governments in the aid-giving business should pay more attention to a nation's subjective capacity to utilize external assistance. The author joins others today who call for a more realistic appraisal of political needs and consequences in the realm of foreign aid. Particularly, a more imaginative effort is required to build confident leadership and organizational capacities.

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD

Princeton University

*Mastery of the Metropolis.* BY WEBB S. FISER. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, Pp. 168. \$1.95.)

In the literature of urban areas, we may identify two main streams among the metropolitan evangelists. The first, and older, tradition was that of the structural reformers, who sought governmental institutions that were both efficient and expressive of "area-wide" considerations. Their allies were the civic actionists, who found that sweet reasonableness emerged when all interests could be induced to sit down together.

The impotence of this social gospel in worldly affairs became so evident that neo-orthodoxy was bound to emerge. Writers like Wood and Banfield demonstrated that sin abounds. Using analytical concepts that cracked the bonds of a strictly structural approach, these writers were led to the conclusion that the Metropolitan Kingdom was not likely to be achieved in this generation, and certainly not through the simplistic strategies of governmental reform. Buttressed with such new views of political relationships, political scientists have begun to approach the older literature with the same analytical treatment that contemporary theologians would accord Walter Rauschenbusch and "Acres of Diamonds."

During the rise of neo-orthodoxy, certain professional groups, who could not be expected

to be *au courant* with the recent political science literature, began to be stimulated by the dramatic changes in American urban areas. Thus, a newer stream of metropolitan fervor became evident in other quarters. This might be called the good news according to *Architectural Forum*. The literature stemming from *Fortune* magazine has a similar tenor, but its emphasis on works is so strong that it occupies the same position with respect to much of the architecture-planning literature as *James* does in relation to the synoptic gospels.

From this standpoint, Professor Fiser's book is the first synthesis to appear; it is an interesting and not unsuccessful attempt to blend the old and the new evangelical traditions. Fiser is a man with a mission. As the title indicates, his major concern is with the conditions under which citizens of a metropolitan area can control growth and change for the "common good." The "basic proposition" is "the desirability of creating a base which will facilitate political and social adaptation."

The book is hortatory in character. Fiser builds his case on certain key evaluations of modern urban society: (1) Urban residents do not have available the wide range of choices in physical environment that modern technology has made possible; therefore, the quality of urban existence leaves much to be desired, (2) the nationalization of economic life has produced a crisis in local leadership, and (3) the central problems of urban life are so interrelated that an effective attack upon them cannot be mounted *seriatim*; the urban environment is a seamless web.

His suggested strategy contains three elements: governmental reorganization, citizens' organization, and public education. In his treatment of these three, Fiser implicitly acknowledges his debt to the older tradition of reform.

Specifically, Fiser most closely follows the structural reformers in his enthusiastic acceptance of that grand old term "area-wide-comprehensive-planning." Early in the first chapter he complains, "No one is responsible for making sure that all the federal programs which impinge upon the metropolitan regions make parts of a coherent whole. Nor is anyone responsible for making sure that all the state programs fit into a general scheme. Within the metropolitan region itself, no authority exists which has the power to harmonize local plans."

Now, in its original formulation, this sentiment usually referred to the need for area-wide capital programming, zoning, and other coordinative administrative mechanisms. For Fiser, however, the commitment to comprehensive

planning is important for another reason, which is where the *Architectural Forum* stream comes in. Quite rightly, Fiser asserts that our technology has created a new condition of life: that is, our range of alternatives is so great that we can have the kind of cities we want. To Fiser, this means meeting the varied needs of urban populations so that the metropolis can become "an exciting, vital, and pleasing human experience." In turn, this objective requires a combination of public and private actions, which become geared together only through comprehensive community planning.

Fiser recognizes a fundamental change in city government in the past thirty years. He sees that the management of growth and change, rather than the simple provision of services, has become the touchstone of municipal policy. This recognition gives particular force to his chapter on urban renewal, which is the best section of the book.

Nevertheless, the appreciation of the complementary roles of public and private agencies is not carried far enough. Potentially, Fiser's chapter entitled "The Intermingling of Public and Private" is seminal. He succinctly summarizes the general trend: "In general this movement can be seen as a pattern: arising in the use of regulation to prevent certain abuses, progressing to inducements to achieve minimum standards, and finally culminating in a kind of public-private partnership in order to get the most out of the system." But Fiser's illustrations of his point—large-scale private suburban developments like Oak Park, Levittown, and Sterling Forest, central city renewal, and new zoning techniques—suggest only situations in which public policy allows a wider scope for purely private initiatives. What seems more significant is the further extension of the public role from being simply instrumental to an active concern with goal-setting and goal-implementation. A good current example is the covey of non-profit corporations set in motion in Philadelphia. These constitute the nearest approach of American cities to the activation of a polity.

It is this turning aside from the full implications of the intermingling of public and private that produces, in this reviewer's judgment, an inadequate treatment of two most important points. In the first place, Fiser does not cover at all the role of the professionals as innovators of policy. He berates planners for trying to sell their plans through public relations techniques, but he does not mention the increasing instances of professionals (not all "planners," and not always employed by public agencies) who furnish political leaders with the agenda of alternatives.

Second, Fiser's relative myopia about the implications of professional roles produces a curious contradiction. After arguing most forcefully for a wide variety of programs that do not directly coincide with the economic interests of business and industry, such as housing for the aged, central city renewal at pedestrian scale, and mass transportation, he concludes that "in the end the market will decide what kinds of neighborhoods and specialized units are most congenial to human survival and development." Such a conclusion neglects the obvious: that is, almost all of the programs Fiser considers good have been possible only because of active public intervention in the market to achieve ends which the market was incapable of promoting.

Since the book does not come to grips with fundamental problems of this type, it does not contribute to an understanding of the reasons for shifts in governmental roles, nor to the differential impact of these reasons in cities of varying sizes and types. Nevertheless, it does furnish a relatively neat summary of the rehabilitated tradition of metropolitan reform, appropriately tempered by some of the gradualism called for by the neo-orthodox writers. Although Fiser communicates rather breathlessly at times ("Gruen is to be congratulated for insisting that these dreams are practical"; "Mr. Bartlett and State Senator John Hughes moved from room to room breaking log jams"; "James Rouse inspired the delegates . . ."; "It will not do to be a man of little faith even if the obstacles are enormous," etc.), his goals for the metropolis are decent ones. The level of the audience conditions the book's utility. A packet of materials including this book, the CED publications, and *The Exploding Metropolis* should do very nicely as background reading for intelligent laymen.

JAMES G. COKE

*University of Illinois*

*African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide.* BY THOMAS HODGKIN. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1961. Pp. 217. \$0.95.)

It is hardly necessary to argue today that Africa has a recorded and recordable past. For political scientists, the question is no longer the existence of that past, but its relevance to contemporary politics.

Africa not only has a history; it has a rich tradition of historical research, and the history of history in the Western Sudan alone has become a respectable and well-worked branch of African studies. Arab scholars a thousand years ago were speculating about this great region, and Sudanese studies have an almost continuous history from that day until this.

The practical concern of the Arabs with kings and rulers caused much of this early scholarship to emphasize African constitutions and governments. More recently, anthropologists have taken up this concern with political history, have learned to supplement the interview with the archive, and have added a further dimension to African political studies. But the study of political problems has always been important in African historical research.

Only the slightest shift in emphasis has been required in order to reach the radically new assumption that contemporary African politics can be comprehended only in the light of an ancient and continuous past. It is the distinction of Thomas Hodgkin that he not only embraced this assumption earlier and more enthusiastically than most Africanists, but also that he has superbly equipped himself for the double disciplines of pre-colonial historian and contemporary political analyst. Fluent in both French and Arabic (the two primary influences in the Sudan), almost ten years ago he was writing simultaneously about the medieval city-states of the savanna and political parties in contemporary Liberia, and now *African Political Parties* has appeared within a year of *Nigerian Perspectives*, a learned anthology of materials bearing on Nigerian history prior to 1900. The richness and excitement of Hodgkin's writing derive in large part from his ability to illustrate contemporary problems with incidents drawn from Africa's distant past; from his almost reckless enthusiasm, as he draws analogies between events fifteen hundred years apart; and from a relish for the problems of political style, sometimes at the expense of the hard questions of political power. Although Hodgkin states his intention, in the Introduction to the present book, to say little about political parties prior to about 1945 (and although he correctly emphasizes the recentness of African parties), he fortunately neglects to be bound too closely by his own rules. His mind is too filled with African history, and his approach is too eclectic, to be confined to any limitation in favor of the contemporary.

African historical research is now a thoroughly international discipline, and there are several distinguished African historians, but it was not long ago when the most important work (particularly on the Western Sudan) was being done by French scholars. The Arab historians, for example, were frequently translated into French, but not into English. The most important research on African politics, on the other hand, is now clearly American, and it has been interesting to observe the work of Hodgkin, once so obviously dependent upon the writings of the great French Africanists, fall

under the influence of American scholars, and then under their guidance return to France, and to the model set by Maurice Duverger for the comparative study of political parties.

Duverger was concerned with party as a special phenomenon, distinct from its membership and its ideology, and his remarkable book is in the narrow sense a "natural history" of political parties. Hodgkin now presents us with a parallel natural history of African parties, and in some cases he actually follows the chapter headings of Duverger, which means that significant portions of this book are on organization and the analysis of pure types—on party morphology. Yet even Duverger was unable to avoid such labels as "left," "conservative," "socialist," and "monarchist"; the vocabulary of 19th Century European politics. In the case of Hodgkin, one suspects that his real interest lies in ideology, while the model of Duverger points in exactly the opposite direction. This study is not nearly so systematic and rigorous as that of Duverger, the statistical apparatus of Duverger is entirely lacking, and the conclusions are sometimes suggestive rather than exhaustive. This is the necessary outcome of Hodgkin's indifference to reconciling structure with ideology, his concern with practical questions, and his historicism.

Yet the result is an intricate and lively essay; original, entertaining, and enormously instructive. The illustrations are drawn from the entire continent, including the Maghrib, which Hodgkin has studied so deeply, but correctly excluding the European parties of Southern and Eastern Africa. The illustrations, moreover, are chosen for their political rather than their geographic appropriateness, so that in one paragraph one encounters, in this order, Gambia, Ghana, Uganda, Upper Volta, Guinea, Mali, and Somalia. No doubt one of the purposes which Hodgkin had in mind in writing this book was to give Africans a continental overview from which to interpret the politics of their individual nations.

Although this book may be written in part for African politicians, Hodgkin is a Renaissance man, with a strong feeling for the unity of scholarship and politics. This is a scholar's book, too, and it is filled with suggestions for research, on some of which work is already in progress. Aristide Zolberg, for example, is now working on local party branches, and Immanuel Wallerstein is working on the political theory of African parties, thereby plugging two of the gaps of which Hodgkin complains.

The Table of Contents is by itself a fascinating document, and many of the subheadings ("Legality and Illegality," "The 'Party within the Party,'" "Constitutional Action and Vio-

lence") point up the utility of African studies for the specialist in Western political parties. Inevitably, Hodgkin commences with a chapter on "The Setting," and equally inevitably, the first two parts of this Setting are on pre-colonial society and the "colonial situation." (This Marxist touch, within an essentially non-Marxist book, although quoted from the French sociologist, Georges Balandier, is a typical Hodgkin ornamental flourish.) Always allowing for exceptions (indeed, underlining the exceptions), he conceives that pre-colonial society carries over into contemporary parties in three ways: through the highly stratified "chiefs' parties," through parties which incorporate an ethnic renaissance, and through appeals to pre-colonial segments for the support of modernist, nationalist political parties. All of this, richly illustrated, constitutes the first three pages of the chapter on the Setting.

What is a party? This question, academic in countries where there is a competitive party system, is central to an understanding of African parties. Hodgkin treats the question as if it were an exercise in linguistic definition, which it certainly is not. On the one hand, there is a proliferation of competing political groups within many territories. On the other, there is the single effective party in Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Tanganyika, for example, which has become so powerful that the struggle for control must take place within its upper reaches, rather than within the apparatus of the state. In some of the countries of Africa, the primacy of party over state has become an article of national faith, and the party has set up its welfare agencies, its propaganda machine, and its police system, which sometimes dominate the equivalent agencies within the state. Is this a political party in any meaningful sense?

Hodgkin is still less concerned with the other side of the problem: the tendency of African parties to break along barely concealed tribal lines. The complexity of Hodgkin's analysis serves a good purpose, for he avoids such over-worked categories as tribalism versus nationalism and unitary versus federal systems. When he does refer to such bald opposites, he makes clear that they are merely the extreme ends of a continuum. But this has the effect of obscuring the desperate seriousness of a struggle between modernist and tribal parties which would destroy most of the values for which both sides are contesting. It may be that this is the only alternative to single party rule.

FRANK UNTERMYER

*Roosevelt University*

*The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in*

*National Politics.* BY SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. 500. \$8.75.)

This important study is the product of sophisticated theory as well as prodigious research. Its purpose is not to propound defense policy but to dissect and ultimately to defend the pluralistic system that produces it. In pursuing this goal it provides a superb demonstration of how military data ought to be exploited by political science as a whole and by students of national government in particular. For this reason alone its audience should not and undoubtedly will not be limited to specialists in national security affairs.

At the heart of the book are five interrelated essays that analyze the foreign and domestic impacts on postwar defense policy, the relative influence of different participants in the policy process, the conflict between national security and other social values, the innovation of major strategic programs, and the competitive relationships among the partisans thereof.

One of Huntington's major theses is that decisions on defense *strategy* and *structure* are made in different ways. The formation of structural policy—and here he refers to military personnel, supply, organization, etc.—resembles the familiar processes of domestic legislation. The President takes the lead in developing an Administration position which is then reviewed closely by relatively concerned and informed Congressional committees. Decisions on strategy govern the nature and size of armed forces maintained for particular functions, for example deterrence or European defense. Here the attentive audience is smaller. Final power tends to rest with the executive branch, but the President, paradoxically, has relatively less influence over his subordinates. Why? Because the executive branch, as if some compensatory mechanism were at work, disposes of strategic issues by essentially legislative proceedings. At this point the President is only first among equals.

In the workings of both sub-systems of government Huntington finds evidence that should reassure those who fear an America dominated by militarists. The champions of national security have apparently been less influential than the champions of private consumption; on occasion they have even had to yield to claimants for domestic welfare expenditures. Civilians, not soldiers, usually initiated new departures in strategy. Military leaders tended to acquiesce in Presidential decisions about the total size of the defense effort, limiting themselves to debate over the sub-allocation of funds set aside for military purposes.

Conservatives may take comfort in the author's evident skepticism about sweeping institutional reform, in his temperate praise of the existing system, and in his positive affection for some of its complex or apparently illogical features. Strategic policy, he insists, must be acceptable as well as rational. Vague platforms unify joint chiefs as well as party chiefs. Log-rolling, buckpassing, and service rivalry are appropriate and inevitable. Those who demand greater purpose, unity, and direction may stand in a tradition of liberal reform that dates back at least to Woodrow Wilson. But one cannot impose a "symmetrical and immaculate model of executive decision-making" on a pluralistic polity. "Madison not Bagehot wrote the Constitution." As a parting shot Huntington implies that the liberal ethos may impede our advance from security to the nobler and costlier goal of "preeminence in world politics." Readers of *The Soldier and the State* (1957) will be reminded of his earlier argument that liberalism interferes with professionalism and objective control of the military. But Burke doesn't win every round this time. Note, for example, the devastating rebuttal of Lippmann's strictures on public opinion.

Huntington's argument is intricate, replete with paradox, sometimes dogmatic, often brilliant, and always provocative. He places a perhaps inordinate emphasis on the concept of deterrence. More important, he tends to press his case so vigorously that possible objections are discounted too lightly or passed over in silence. To be sure, rivalry and bargaining are inevitable and often productive in administration; indeed, they are perhaps less peculiar to the process of developing strategic programs than Huntington suggests. But are they really *that* desirable or inevitable? The case against service rivalry, let us remember, is not primarily economic or aesthetic. It rests on the suspicion that service rivalry may corrupt strategic judgment. It may delay innovation. (Why is change so often initiated by outsiders?) It certainly undermines public confidence in military professionalism. (When military leaders attack each others' expertise, why shouldn't laymen follow suit?)

Again, if a President can fix or alter the overall magnitude of the defense effort decisively enough to satisfy Bagehot, and if his economy drives can force the cancellation of a super-carrier or jeopardize commitments to NATO, is it not important to record a rather large qualification to the proposition that strategic programs are argued out by essentially legislative processes? Finally, did conciliar structures loom so large in the Eisenhower years only because consensus is indispensable and because

the President was by temperament addicted to compromise? Or did this also reflect a Whiggish readiness, rather marked in the Republican party since 1940, to put the presidency in commission? My guess is that Democratic Administrations will continue to find practical political reasons for relying more heavily on personal leadership even in the area of strategic decision-making.

LAURENCE I. RADWAY

*Dartmouth College*

*The Nature of International Society.* By C. A. W. MANNING. (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1962. Pp. xi, 220. 30 s.)

For more than a quarter-century, C. A. W. Manning has been arguing persistently against treating the study of international relations as a bundle of academic specialties or as a mere collection of certain historical and legal topics. He has urged that, in teaching and training, the subject be viewed as a whole—in effect, as a special sociology. His readers have not always gained a firm impression of his meaning. Now Professor Manning has taken sufficient space to write down what he had in mind. The result is a systematic conception of what international relations is all about. A theory of international relations is presented, conversationally and at considerable length, and then fitted to a broad array of subjects.

The professional student of international relations who is accustomed to American practices may readily become impatient or be thrown off the track of Manning's presentation because of several characteristics of the book. One of these is the style. Manning would be likely to describe it as a "natural-history, idiosyncratic, descriptive, ostensive, portrait-painting treatment . . ." (p. 208). A second quality is the sophisticated simplicity of a discussion that is intended to set forth what one should realize and appreciate *before* beginning a study of international politics. "It is not an XYZ book, but an ABC." (p. ix) and it is meant to be "An essay, then, for beginners" (p. x) on the subject of "Metadiplomacy." This is not an idea that is given much explicit pedagogical attention in the United States and, in any case, we are not accustomed to serious intellectual fare in such writing directed to undergraduate students.

*The Nature of International Society* is not really amenable to a summary statement of its contents. Much of its value lies in the clear illustrations and the wise side-comments. A few of the concepts in its basic theory will be given, however.

Manning puts heavy emphasis on the constructed nature of social reality. Under the

heading of the "social cosmos" there is described eloquently the "notional" character—as contrasted to the "factual" character—of the "realities" by which men live in all societies. Both the structures and dynamics of human behavior are guided by Sorelian myths, belief systems, and abstract notions that have grown up over long periods of experience and that receive social and cultural blessings. In a sentence, men act according to those socially reinforced and perpetuated images of how things are "out there" in the world. "The social cosmos is a multi-cultural world, a mosaic of belief systems, a jungle, after all—of luxuriant myths" (p. 174). This is Manning's fundamental and much-repeated point.

The study of one particular set of rules, myths, and conventions is the special business of international relations. "Diplomatics" is another name for the study of the society of sovereign states and of actions directed by norms and rules that arose historically as if sovereigns once decided, "Let's play the game of sovereign states." International relations, then, is conceived as resembling a game having its own unchanging rules, not entirely unlike cricket or chess.

Connoisseurship, focused on what the game is about and how its abstractions and myths govern the evaluations of the plays is what the non-specialized and beginning student should aspire toward in studying international relations. Manning believes in the teaching of social science analysis which will help to break unthinking belief in the mythology of the game. He welcomes the "sophisticated realist" who will understand the artificiality of the system, yet who will resist "adolescent" skepticism and cynicism.

Student, practitioner, and connoisseur, alike, have need to grasp at more than an understanding of the "quasi-game" of the sovereign states and its rules contained in international law, however. The international system is not open to change by planned reforming actions—this system compares to the lily pads on the surface of the pond and not to the muddy roots. Below the surface in the "ponddy depths" of particular cultures and sub-cultures are sources of influence in the game and, possibly, of long-term changes in the system. Thus, the man who would adjust his view to a Copernican outlook on the international system must take into account, as well as possible, the dazzling variety of the games concurrently being played inside national organizations and national cultures. Manning's discussion of the interplay of contemporary cross-national political influence provides a simple introduction to this particular complexity of international relations.

In a longer review, criticisms and objections to Manning's portrayal of the social cosmos and the international system might well be advanced but, in any case, it must be pointed out that his thinking is very much in tune with the "phenomenological approach" being espoused by a number of the new breed of American international relationists. This is so, despite the style and focus of the work and despite Manning's skepticism about American "Rocket-borne Researchers." The book seems to make the best for itself of both the old and the new. The question is whether or not this remarkable essay directed at the beginning student of international relations can be read and understood in American colleges and universities. The answer can come only by trying the assignment in the classroom.

CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND

*San Francisco State College*

*Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative.* By JAMES A. ROBINSON. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 262. \$5.50.)

This honest and gracefully written book opens several new windows to the subject of legislative-executive relations on foreign affairs. Robinson marshals an unusual range of materials to describe these relations in recent years and to offer some factual and evaluative conclusions, especially as to the significance of communication between Congress and the Executive. This work should be of great interest to the specialist and to anyone who wants a feel for what has been going on in a superlatively important sector of national government.

A sketch of the book may suggest the range of its evidence. The first chapter uses some concepts of recent discussions of power and influence to restate the problems of who influences foreign policy *within* Congress and *between* Congress and the Executive. The second and third chapters document the decline of Congress's foreign policy role in terms of twenty-two cases over the past quarter century, including one that Robinson regards as a mild exception, the passage of the resolution sponsored by Senator Monroney leading to the establishment of an International Development Association. The fourth chapter offers some generalizations about factors influencing foreign policy actions of the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee from the legislative history of several hundred bills and resolutions within the jurisdiction of the Committee in the 81st through 85th Congresses. The fifth and sixth chapters utilize survey interviews to describe the contacts between Congress and the

Department of State and to propose several generalizations about the impact of these contacts on foreign policy action by Congress. The seventh chapter states some broad conclusions about the foreign policy role of Congress, ending with an interesting argument about the real or potential influence that several major Senate figures have had on the relations of Congress and Executive.

The proper use of these various kinds of evidence is a major, if implicit, theme of the book. Much of the discussion is purely descriptive. The author is not afraid, for example, to describe a week in the life of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, and the cases that constitute a good deal of the book's matter are heavily exploited for descriptive purposes. But Robinson obviously believes that more is needed to reach generalized knowledge and that such knowledge is the appropriate goal of his work. The cases are carefully sifted for factors that ought to be included in general conceptualizations of foreign policy making. And generalizations evolved in this way are tested, by what must at times have been prodigious labor, against a wider set of facts. The book will therefore be suggestive to students of public administration and of other fields in which the problem of generalizing from individual cases has arisen. Robinson's focus of explanation remains on Congress. But his underlying belief is that explaining the recent history of legislative-executive relations and predicting their future course requires some decent verified theory.

The twin theses of the book—that the modern role of Congress is to legitimate or amend foreign policy rather than to initiate it and that this limited role is the result of the incomparably greater information available to the Executive—are not new, though I doubt that they have been so impressively supported before. One might wish that the book had dealt more intensively with the reasons Congress has *remained* so much the prisoner of the Executive's information in identifying policy alternatives and calculating their consequences. Robinson evidently believes that the relative unwillingness of Congress to bureaucratize its intelligence function is a decisive factor. But *why* so unwilling? What is it in the motivations of the legislator or the structure of the legislative system that discourages the growth of differentiated intelligence arms? Why has the foreign policy role of Congress been influenced so much by the Sol Blooms, who are content to be notified of a decision before it reaches the newspapers, and so little by the Lyndon Johnsons, who have sought to create a bureaucratic staff structure that could rival the Executive in

locating problems and proposing solutions. Robinson's interviews in Congress and the State Department presented a rare opportunity to explore the reasons for this contrast.

Quite new is the material linking the nature of communication between Congress and State Department to congressional support for Administration policy. Pursuing his broad interest in the role of information, Robinson uses interview data to show that adequate communication from the Department to Senators and Representatives enhances the likelihood of their supporting the Executive's policies, especially if they are of the opposite party. Robinson is cautious in stating this finding, and what emerges from his qualifications is a purely intra-psychic proposition—the more satisfied the legislator is with the Department's communication, the more satisfied he is likely to be with its policies—with all the pitfalls of causal inference to which such a relation is prey. Nonetheless, Robinson's finding is very suggestive and his discussion of the problem excellent. What he has done is certain to stimulate further work.

There is a good deal of respect, even affection, in Robinson's attitude toward Congress. A belief that proposals for expanding Congress's role ought to be taken seriously is implicit in much of the evaluative discussion of the final chapter. Robinson considers several proposals and endorses one for strengthening the majority party leadership of the House by transferring to the leadership the Rules Committee's present power to propose the terms under which a measure is to be debated. Although the discussion of reform is not closely integrated with the factual generalizations of earlier chapters, it reflects again the author's belief that verified general propositions are needed. "If the government of the United States is to master the future, it needs to know how to think about the future. It needs more explicit theory about the future . . . (p. 207)." Robinson might equally have written that the success of institutional change to expand the foreign policy role of Congress depends on our getting some better factual generalizations about legislative-executive relations. To this task the book is dedicated.

DONALD E. STOKES

*The University of Michigan*

*A Theory of Public Opinion.* BY FRANCIS GRAHAM WILSON. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. Pp. xii, 295. \$7.00.)

This volume reflects Francis Wilson's lifetime interest in public opinion and political philosophy. *A Theory of Public Opinion* is neither aptly nor happily named, and is princi-



pally a history of usage and thought on the theme of public opinion. In this aspect, it can best be characterized as a hybrid between the well-known essays of Palmer and Allport in that it also adumbrates difficulties that have developed in the use of the term. The final portion of the book gathers together several related essays by Wilson—many of them previously appearing elsewhere—on particular aspects of public opinion in democratic society.

Professor Wilson's philosophical commitments lead him to an implicit definition of public opinion which is broader than that of most current practitioners. And there is little, indeed, said in these pages about empirical tabulations and the quantification of anyone's actual opinions on anything. In dealing with the more speculative aspects of the topic, he quite soundly argues for the legitimacy of such a posture in view of a tradition of serious questions raised by thinkers in the past—some of them by the empiricists themselves—and currently left unexplored in the light of present-day fashions in the social sciences. He shrewdly observes that epistemological inquiries—I would say methodological quests often indistinguishable in practice, though different in intent—have regained respectability today. Wilson, however, wishes to range far beyond this to questions of values and judgments systematically considered.

Unfortunately, his framework is not well suited to his aim. His bold, broad questioning transforms the questions of "public opinion" into problems of majority rule, the ethical rights of minorities, the rationality of man and its limits, and other transcendental, though immediately pressing, moral issues.

To attempt to deal with these problems primarily through the vehicle of authors who have centered their thought upon the concept "public opinion" is extremely difficult. Many of the issues with which this volume deals have been treated with far greater precision and depth by writers other than those who have speculated on "public opinion." The author allows himself wide latitude in this respect, but there are limits. Plato, to be sure, can be readily treated—the images of the cave, for example—but Freud is introduced chiefly through a discussion of Edward Bernays. Similar examples could easily be multiplied. The result is an inevitable fuzziness and an impression of incomplete delvings into the discussion of the key issues. Even Professor Wilson's own strongly-held conservative views tend to be asserted more in passing than through systematic examination.

A word, too, seems to be in order about his

attitude toward the contemporary researchers who have taken over the term "public opinion," presumably to its detriment. On the whole, Professor Wilson seems to wish to avoid debate with them. Indeed, in the Introduction his disagreements are said to be only over details; yet throughout the volume he gives evidence of rather deeper disagreement, and even ventures occasional specific criticisms of such work as Stouffer's. In general, though, he, if anything, shows an exaggerated respect for work in the field: his criticisms tend to be tangential, or in some instances are unexceptionable. Nevertheless, this book makes a small beginning—it criticizes without stridency and irrationality—toward restoring the dialogue between theorists and practitioners in political science. If political theory is, as a recent committee of the Association again asserted, the core of our discipline, it deserves to be restored to relevance for the periphery.

SAMUEL KRISLOV

*Michigan State University*

*The British Cabinet.* By JOHN P. MACKINTOSH. (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1962. Pp. xi, 546.)

*British Parliamentary Democracy.* By LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH. (London: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pp. vii, 99.)

There are formidable difficulties facing a scholar who attempts to write an informed book about the operation and influence of the British Cabinet. In the first place, there are stylized ways of thinking about the Cabinet—to Bagehot, it was the "buckle that binds"—and even so astute a political practitioner as Lord Morrison has resorted to stereotypes when he characterizes the Prime Minister as *primus inter pares*, a coordinating minister whose position differs only in degree from any other non-departmental minister. Further difficulties arise because inquisitiveness in the operation of the Cabinet is not encouraged. The British Cabinet is a collegiate body which is expected to show a united front on policy, not the fissures of indecision and of opposition, and it carries on its activities behind a protective hedge of semisecrecy. One may occasionally get a peep at the maneuvers and procedures of the Cabinet when things go wrong and there is an official inquiry, or a minister reveals the schisms on policy in a speech of resignation, or political memoirs are published in a Sunday supplement, or when the Opposition forces the Government to make an indiscreet admission or disclosure, but all of these occasions are not normal proceedings; they are an extra bit of



frosting on the cake, a further revelation of the spiciness of British politics, but continuous, reliable material on the workings of the Cabinet is not information to which the British has a solid claim. Moreover, the law itself supports the confidential nature of Cabinet procedures, and the Official Secrets Act prohibits the publication of any Cabinet memorandum or the disclosure of information which officials or politicians have come by in the course of their duties.

In this lucid, well-informed, and original study of the Cabinet system, Professor Mackintosh has admirably circumvented the handicaps of traditional explanations and of protective secrecy. When did the cabinet develop? When did it acquire its present status? In the historical sections of the book (culled from printed sources, manuscript collections, and archival material) he attempts to show the development of the constitutional conventions which have given the Cabinet its unique position in the British political system. He is less interested in the organization of the Cabinet than in the question of the power and place of the Cabinet in each period of government.

The functions now exercised by the Cabinet have been acquired over an extended period of time, and the relationship between the Cabinet, Parliament, and Crown has constantly changed. In the early seventeenth century, for instance, there was a need for maintaining harmony between an increasingly independent Parliament and the Crown, and one sees the development of the convention that the King's ministers should include those members of the legislature who were most likely to command its confidence. In the modern period, the complex external relationship of his Cabinet extends also to the Civil Service, the Parties, the Electorate, the Press, and Interest groups.

The latter half of the book discusses the function of the Cabinet in the period since 1914. Much of the archival information for this period is not yet available for scholars, and relevant material has been supplied by letters, diaries, and interviews with ministers and officials who have had the opportunity to observe the Cabinet at work. Permission was given to use this material, providing the source was not acknowledged.

In the modern period, the functions of the Cabinet have changed so markedly that the traditional picture of the Cabinet system as it developed in the nineteenth century is no longer strictly accurate; some might find this section the most rewarding part of the book,

and the pages on the expanding role of the Prime Minister are especially well done. Political theory has not kept up with the changing times and has offered little guide to the operation of political institutions. Professor Mackintosh is critical of what he calls "the widespread retreat from the idea that public discussion and decisions made with some participation by those concerned are desirable." Professional and business sections, he says, "may be interested in certain reforms but it is generally accepted that they should come from within the organization." The electorate "does not want to be bothered" and pressure groups "prefer to pursue their interests without anyone asking them to justify their priorities and explain their methods." He blames the political theorists, in part, for this condition, and finds it surprising that academic thinkers have "encouraged the community to overlook this retreat from democracy."

Professor Mackintosh is now teaching at the University College, Ibadan, Nigeria, and it is to be hoped that he will find time to write a companion volume on the transference of the Cabinet system to Nigeria.

In India, the successful transfer of the parliamentary system is one of the proud achievements of the Commonwealth, and recently Lord Morrison was invited there to give a series of lectures under the Dorab Tata Foundation to explain in popular terms the operation of British political institutions. These lectures have now been published under the title, *British Parliamentary Democracy*.

The result is a personalized explanation of British history and politics by one of the most perspicacious leaders of the Labour Party, who after many years of dedicated public service (as Mr. Herbert Morrison) was recently translated to the House of Lords as a Life Peer. We are taken by the hand, as it were, and permitted to see the operation of local government in the London County Council; the expression of party conflict in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords (Lord Morrison recently told the Lords, "You know, it would not really be a bad thing if your Lordships would have a dust up now and again."); and the operation of the Cabinet system as observed by Lord Morrison as a minister in the Macdonald, Churchill, and Attlee governments. The lectures are reflective, light-hearted, good humored, and pleasantly opinionated.

ROLAND YOUNG

*Northwestern University*

## BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

### POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

*Tocqueville and the Old Regime.* BY RICHARD HERR. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. 142. \$3.50.)

Professor Herr has written a short but pithy account of the writing and arguments of Tocqueville's *Ancien Régime et la Révolution*. In the first part of his task, detailing the circumstances and evolution of the book, he has succeeded admirably; in the second part, analysing its import, his achievement is, if stimulating, yet more questionable. According to Herr, the work is not merely an attempt to trace the growing centralisation of French administration or the decline of the French aristocracy. Nor even is it limited to showing how these changes contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution. Its basic theme is the growth of democracy in France. In consequence, it marks a return to the concerns of *Democracy in America*. This root meaning, claims Herr, "has seldom been hinted at by critics." It is perhaps true that some commentators need this reminder; it is a frequent if gross misinterpretation of this work to see it as simply an essay in eighteenth century French history, just as *Democracy in America* is sometimes seen as simply a description of American government and society. But the mistake is by no means as universal as Herr supposes; and some commentators, Dicey and Laski for example, have warned us specifically against it. Nor are the generality and continuity of Tocqueville's purposes hidden, for he quoted at length from his earlier book in the introduction to the later.

Nevertheless, Herr argues, there were significant changes in Tocqueville's outlook. His earlier confidence in his own generation's responsibility for deciding between liberty and servitude was in the 1850s submerged under the gloomy certainty that their character and history rendered Frenchmen incapable of freedom. Political recommendations were replaced by the doctrine of historical inevitability, the politician by the historian. In Herr's words, "France could never long be free. This fatalism is the main ingredient of *Old Regime* that distinguishes it from his earlier works." If this were true, Tocqueville would be open to more serious charges than those Herr brings, inconsistency and ambiguity. The *Old Regime* would then mark the abandonment of the value he always claimed as supreme, for, rightly or wrongly, he insisted repeatedly that a belief in liberty could never be reconciled with fatalist doctrines. However, Herr does not prove his case. He produces little solid internal evidence for his view, and the

external evidence (such as Tocqueville's passionate attack on fatalism in his letters to Gobineau) is given only as proof of inconsistency. Tocqueville never believed that descriptions of social tendencies precluded political choices. They were useful, not in showing what was inevitably to be, but in sketching the environment in which decisions were to be made. Doubtless he was more pessimistic in the 1850s than earlier, for he thought that wrong decisions were being made. But a pessimism springing from a belief in the wrongness of present decisions is not the same as, is indeed incompatible with, fatalism. That the *Old Regime* was a tract for the times, as Herr realises, is a disproof of his main conclusion.

A number of subsidiary themes can also be criticised. According to Herr, Tocqueville moved from approval of royal centralisation as the means of assuring French territorial integrity (expressed in *Democracy in America*) to disapproval of it as the cancer of liberty (expressed in the *Old Regime*). To support the first branch of this argument, Herr uses Tocqueville's claim that a federal system would be harmful in France as a proof of his approval of royal centralisation. This, however, is to misunderstand what Tocqueville was saying. Federalism, or "governmental" decentralisation, was impractical in France, but "administrative" decentralisation was both possible and desirable. In *Democracy in America* as in *Old Regime*, administrative centralisation was taken to be the major trend of eighteenth century royal government; and Tocqueville disapproved of this trend in the first as much as in the second.

Again, Herr argues that Tocqueville adopted Montesquieu's notion of republican virtue, the idea that a democracy requires a greater willingness to subordinate private concerns to the public good than any other political form. In fact, Tocqueville implicitly rejected this view by preaching the necessity of accepting the notion of enlightened self-interest in a democracy.

It is clear that this reviewer would quarrel with many of Herr's conclusions. Nonetheless, this is a valuable book. If there is, as the dust-cover claims, a Tocqueville Cult, it has been a cult singularly free of systematic theology. Professor Herr has raised discussion of Tocqueville to a more rigorous and serious level.—JACK LIVELY, *University College of Swansea, Wales*.

*Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946–1969.* BY HAROLD SWATZ. (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. ix, 301. \$5.95.)

There was quiet satisfaction among lovers of literature in this country when Robert Frost was invited to read a few stanzas of his verse at the last Presidential inauguration. Russian poets cannot complain that the State takes no interest in their affairs. Most of them, in fact, would no doubt be happier if the State took *less* interest in poetry. But almost since the beginning of the Soviet regime, men of letters have been leading a politically precarious existence somewhat reminiscent of a crude caricature on the role assigned to them in Plato's *Republic*. The Communist regime treats the novelist, the dramatist, the poet and the critic as very important people. They are highly respected, very well paid—and closely supervised. Mr. Harold Swayze, a political scientist from the University of Michigan, has now brought out a most thoroughly documented study of political controls of Soviet Russian literature during the crucial years from 1946 to 1959, i.e., from the beginning of the "Zhdanov era," now chiefly remembered for its "anti-cosmopolitan" witch-hunts, through the period of relative freedom following Stalin's death, to the rather recent Third Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers. Mr. Swayze gathers impressive evidence to support the thesis that in the USSR literature is not allowed to be merely a neutral observer of life, that in the USSR, in the words of the versatile Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov, "the first and main criterion for evaluating literature is the contribution it makes to our Communist cause" (p. 18). Similarly, Mr. Swayze's view that without stringent political controls Soviet literature would become ideologically "subversive," and his pessimistic predictions of the *political* future of Soviet literature, are all convincingly argued.

The non-specialist reader of Mr. Swayze's book is likely to be overwhelmed by the hundreds of unfamiliar names and references to Russian sources, while the specialist is likely to question seriously a number of Mr. Swayze's basic assumptions. In the first place, he attempts to trace the origins of Soviet literary policies to Marx and Engels, and ignores completely their infinitely more important native Russian forefathers—the so-called "revolutionary democrats" of the nineteenth century, men like Chernyshevskii, Dobroliubov and Pisarev (for an excellent discussion of this problem see Rufus W. Mathewson, Jr., *The Positive Hero in Russian Literature*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958). Further, one is astonished by the fact that a book devoted to the problem of political controls over Soviet literature makes no mention of *Glavlit*, the Soviet censorship agency. "*Narodnost*" (literally, "popularity" or "folksi-

ness") is *not* synonymous with *partiinost* ("party-ness," or Communist partisanship), as some Soviet critics and Mr. Swayze would have us believe. *Narodnost* has serious esthetic connotations, some of which could be traced to Tolstoy's *What Is Art*; its requirement that the work of art be "popular" and "accessible" to the masses makes experimentation in Soviet literature and the arts all but impossible, since innovators rarely meet with immediate public acclaim. One may have the right *partiinost* but fail to be accepted by the Soviet pundits for deficiencies in *narodnost*. Picasso offers perhaps the best recent example: the only work of his known to broad strata of Soviet citizenry is the famous "dove of peace." Recent attempts by Ehrenburg to gain acceptance for those who sin against *narodnost* have, so far, produced no results.

Mr. Swayze's book also suffers from poor editing. Certain words are italicized on one page and not on another; the transliteration is both unsatisfactory and inconsistent; a number of names—including this reviewer's—is misspelled.

There can be no questioning, however, the book's value as a thorough chronicle of Soviet political polemics clad as literary criticism. Fortunately, some Soviet literary critics occasionally succeed in producing scholarship of a higher order than that which Mr. Swayze had to quote because of the specific nature of his project. —MAURICE FRIEDBERG, *Hunter College*.

*Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets*. By MAURICE FRIEDBERG. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. xiv, 228. \$4.75.)

Much attention has been given in recent years to the Soviet regime's efforts to regiment the thoughts and emotions of its citizens by controls on the literary output of authors. This depressing tale, once told, inevitably provokes tantalizing and difficult questions about the place of the classics of prerevolutionary Russian literature in Soviet society. What is the attitude of Soviet authorities toward this rich and diverse literary heritage? What is the role of a body of works which convey ideas and values that are indifferent and even alien to the claims of Soviet ideology? These are among the questions examined in this balanced and informative study.

The bulk of Mr. Friedberg's study is devoted to an analysis of the methods by which the Soviet regime attempts to make political use of the greater and lesser classics of Russian literature. In the early chapters of the book, Mr. Friedberg describes in detail how the Soviet government has attempted to harness prerevolutionary belles-lettres to the changing political demands of the moment through the selection of authors and titles for publication and the size of individual edi-

tions. While Mr. Friedberg believes that "on the whole" the Soviet reader has been "well supplied with a wide variety of the better-known works of prerevolutionary Russian fiction," he also offers evidence which indicates that selective publishing and limited editions have still left a large unsatisfied demand for pre-Soviet literary works.

Especially revealing with respect to the political uses of prerevolutionary fiction is Mr. Friedberg's lengthy analysis of the treatment of nineteenth-century literature in Soviet literary scholarship. In tracing the changing interpretations of Russian nineteenth-century writers, Mr. Friedberg demonstrates how closely Soviet literary criticism—particularly that intended for the broader reading public rather than the more scholarly studies appealing to the smaller group of intellectuals—is tied to the shifting internal and external political needs of the Soviet government. Mr. Friedberg's treatment of this subject is replete with examples, at once depressing and amusing, of reversals in Soviet evaluations of particular authors, re-writing of history, and crude distortion. It is somewhat disappointing that this section of the study, which focuses primarily on changing Soviet assessments of writers' general ideological positions, was not broadened to include illustrations of Soviet exegeses of specific literary works; for such exegeses—particularly in textbooks intended for use in schools and universities—are surely an important aspect of the regime's effort to limit and direct Soviet readers' responses to the content of prerevolutionary literary works.

The two final chapters of the book are the most suggestive with respect to the broader implications of the Soviet government's policy of publishing the classics. After demonstrating convincingly that the preference of the Soviet reading public is for prerevolutionary, as against Soviet, fiction, Mr. Friedberg speculates on the reasons for this and on its implications. Although much that the author says on these points must, owing to the very nature of his subject, remain hypothetical, the evidence that he adduces strongly suggests that the Russian classics continue to exercise a "subversive" influence—in the peculiar sense that imaginative writing may be said to be subversive—with respect to the tenets of official Soviet ideology.

This is a careful and useful study of an intrinsically interesting topic, and it is regrettable that its occasional redundancies and rather uninspired language bear witness to its origins as a dissertation.—HAROLD SWAYZE, *University of Michigan*.

*Groups in Theory and Practice.* By PETER LOVEDAY AND IAN CAMPBELL. (Melbourne C-1: F. W. Cheshire, 1962. Pp. 98. 15 shillings.)

With this monograph the Department of Government and Public Administration of the University of Sydney inaugurates the Sydney Studies in Politics. Three other volumes are announced and others are to come. This one contains two essays: one by Peter Loveday entitled "Group Theory and Its Critics" and a second by Ian Campbell entitled "Groups, Parties and Federation." Both are evidence that Australian political science has accomplished its "take-off." As these studies demonstrate, the mixture of British and U. S. skills produces excellent results.

Loveday's essay is a contribution to the fray that has developed about the group theory of politics. He writes incisively, demonstrates a massive knowledge of the literature and, what is better, wends his way through it with intelligence. He shows that the critics have not usually faced the questions raised by Bentley, and that some who criticize Bentley have not understood his position. He also points out that the supporters of the group view have not adequately dealt with these critics. Loveday clarifies some of the ambiguities that Bentley incorporated into his delineation of the political process; ambiguities that have confused his followers and have also provided a basis for his critics. As a result Loveday leaves the group theory in a better intellectual position than it has been heretofore, and the critics in the future will need to be better than they have had to be in the past. Group theory survives as the sound approach to the study of politics, and Bentley's contribution is more adequately assessed.

Mr. Campbell's essay accomplishes two results: 1) it shows how the Australian parties developed into organizations independent of pressure groups, and 2) how governmental structure influences the organization and activities of pressure groups. Both parts of the study trace the relations between parties and the pressure groups of particular interests. Conclusions of a general character are formulated and the study should stimulate other essays applying the hypotheses in different political systems and under different circumstances.—CHARLES B. HAGAN, *University of Illinois*.

*The Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ranade to Bhave.* By D. MACKENZIE BROWN. (Berkeley: University of California, 1961. \$1.50, paper)

This useful volume presents a collection of polemic writing by key Indian political activists. It serves as counterpoint rather than as a sequel to the earlier, more philosophically-oriented group of selections of Indian thought edited by Mr. Brown under the title, *The White Umbrella*.

To provide a setting for his excerpts, Mr. Brown

briefly outlines the Indian nationalist ferment as it moved from an emphasis upon social and religious reform to the all-consuming desire for political independence. Yet so intertwined are these two impulses that all of the Indian leaders presented reflect them. It is precisely this dual nature of Indian nationalism which has fascinated and beguiled foreigners. Western ideas did not merely engender a demand for political freedom; by then they had already penetrated deeply into the conglomerate of Hindu thought. Thus the familiar pattern of a Westernized elite contending with cultural traditionalists so often met in newly independent countries is recast in the Indian context to include Westernized religious leaders and cultural reformers. No wonder, then, that much of Indian political thought deals with the role of religion and morality in politics. No wonder also that such doctrines as *satyagraha* and *sarvodaya* have received world-wide notice, often at the expense of other detailed knowledge concerning contemporary India.

Mr. Brown's new book provides a good introduction to a greater understanding of Indian political thought in its own milieu. It is a pity that the author persists in referring to Muslims, incorrectly and unacceptably, as Mohammadans. Nonetheless this volume, like its predecessor, is certain to be widely used as collateral reading in introductory area courses and should be of interest to non-specialists as well.—IRENE TINKER, *Howard University, Washington, D. C.*

*Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs.* By PERCY W. BIDWELL. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. vi, 215. \$5.00.)

Those who cultivate the sacred soil of the policy sciences frequently see their interest in foreign affairs reflected in the eyes of their students. They may also associate the concerns of departmental majors in international problems with those of students *en masse*. Hence it is both instructive and compelling to be reminded of the casual role education in foreign affairs plays in most colleges, and the ease with which the average student can run the academic hurdles without being exposed to a serious course in international problems.

For three years under a grant from Carnegie Corporation, Percy W. Bidwell studied the state of undergraduate education in foreign affairs in American colleges. The results of his study hardly call for any great rejoicing. In fact, when a representative group of college seniors can barely answer half of the questions (55%) of a carefully constructed test on foreign affairs, it is a cause for alarm if not a motion toward the panic button. Moreover, excluding the better liberal arts schools and the high-grade tax-supported institutions, it

is generally conceded that the mood of college students toward foreign affairs is one of apathy or, at best, sufferance.

The reasons behind the lack of student interest are multiple—inadequate background, stemming from the home or the high school, or both; the orientation of the college campus along other lines; and the curriculum itself. The specialized courses in international relations attract few students, and, more grievous still, virtually all of the survey courses in Economics, American Government, American History and Social Science Survey give foreign affairs only a lick and a pat. In addition language teachers generally do not regard the teaching of cultural empathy as a basic part of the course. Literature which should undergird international understanding seldom serves as a gateway to foreign cultures. Knowledge and understanding of international relations should be an integral part of a college education. To this end, the author recommends: (1) expanding the knowledge base of international affairs in the survey courses and lower division courses; (2) opening broad, conceptual courses in foreign affairs to lower division students; (3) staffing R. O. T. C. courses dealing with American history and international relations with civilian teachers appointed by academic authorities; (4) improving instruction in the introductory courses and enlarging the scope of language and literature courses; (5) supplementing the academic program with significant extracurricular activities; and (6) appointing a campus coordinator for studies and activities in international affairs. Above all, however, is the need to create a college atmosphere which stimulates and encourages interest in foreign affairs.

*Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs* is not only a good report, it is the only comprehensive study of this subject which has been made so far. A copy of this book should be on the shelves of every political scientist interested in pedagogy or concerned about the American future. For unless we now develop widespread understanding and intelligent dialogue on problems in foreign affairs, it may not matter what we teach later on.—JAMES A. BURKHART, *Stephens College.*

*Local Political Surveys.* By E. E. SCHATT-SCHNEIDER AND VICTOR JONES. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962. Pp. v, 229, appendix. \$3.75.)

*Local Political Surveys* is intended "for use by students, teachers, businessmen, civic groups, politicians, labor leaders, [and] public officials" (p. 1). Its main objective is to inform a reader about "the great wealth of raw materials" that are available in seeking a better understanding of his own community.

The volume is essentially a limited-focus sequel to the author's earlier *Guide to the Study of Public Affairs* (1952 with Stephen Bailey). The illustration-packed pages of the paper-bound volume present tables, maps, charts, graphs, and sample pages from widely distributed sources, e.g., Bureau of the Census publications, Democratic (and Republican) party manuals, *The Municipal Yearbook*. The catholicity of sources and the types of data presented succeed in showing the mines of raw materials that aid in understanding the economic, social, demographic, and geographic characteristics underlying governmental structure, functions, and political behavior in the local community. The reader is assisted in mining the resources through textual discussions and bold-faced hand-written comments in the margins and/or across the illustrative materials.

Two additional descriptive points bear mention. The local community focus may be on a city, county, metropolitan area, or congressional district in a metropolitan area. Survey denotes an approach broader than, although not excluding, sample surveys; it aims at documenting and interpreting the community "as an economic enterprise and social structure." What John Gaus has called "the study of political ecology" aptly summarizes the point of view which guided the selection of materials. Furthermore, a local political survey extends to local manifestations of state and national politics which, based on the materials presented, appear to influence local decisions largely through the structure and activities of the political parties.

The volume will not be very valuable to the reasonably sophisticated political researcher; the authors acknowledge it is for the "non-specialist." But because the volume is most likely to be used by novice and non-professional researchers a caveat mentioned by the authors needs double

emphasis. Any amount of "raw material" readily available and easily marshalled, will be limited and perhaps meaningless or misleading unless some prior research requirements are met, e.g., precise operational statement of a significant problem, rigorous methodology, and careful interpretation of findings. For gold-rush miners with a political bent who consult the many out-croppings of ore presented in *Local Political Surveys*, a sign emblazoned "Miner Beware!" needs to be posted lest the diggers mistake a thin vein for the mother lode.—DEIL S. WRIGHT, *State University of Iowa*.

*Studies on the Civilization of Islam.* By SIR HAMILTON A. R. GIBB. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. iii, 344. \$7.50.)

Scholars in many fields will appreciate this volume, for it collects articles by this eminent author written over a span of nearly 40 years. The first of three parts focuses upon the expansion of mediaeval Islam. Here we find not only the author's fundamental interpretation of the growth of the Islamic empire, but also more specialized articles on Arab-Byzantine relations, Saladin's army, and Arabic historiography. Part two collects Gibb's views on various theories of the caliphate, on Arabic literature, and his article on "The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam." The final section, "Contemporary Intellectual Currents," includes his work on the impact of western culture and machine civilization upon Moslem literature and institutions. The writer says of his four literary studies that "... written about 1930 they reflect something of the optimism and assurance of that period"; while the "Reaction against Western Culture in the Near East," published some 20 years later, demonstrates "the rapidity of changing moods and phases in modern Arab society."

#### SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

#### POLITICAL THEORY

CECELIA M. KENYON

*Smith College*

Accame, Giano. Contradictions d'un romantisme de droite (fin). *Defense de l'Occident*. July-August, 1962.

Akzin, Benjamin. Politische Probleme polyethnischer Gemeinwesen. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. June, 1962.

Alquié, F. Les philosophes du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle devant l'homme. *XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle*. No. 54-55, 1962.

Arfé, Gaetano. La Rivoluzione Liberale di Piero Gobetti. *Revista Storica Italiana*. II/LXXIV/1962.

Arfé, Gaetano, Thomas, Norman, et. al.

Stalinism and Destalinisation. *The Review*. 2-3/IV/1962.

Bachrach, Peter. Elite Consensus and Democracy. *Journal of Politics*. August, 1962.

Bahne, S. "Die Deutsche Ideologie" von Marx und Engels. *International Review of Social History*. 1/VII/1962.

Barnes, Thomas G. Due Process and Slow Process in the Late Elizabethan-Early Stuart Star Chamber. *American Journal of Legal History*. July, 1962.

Belaval, Y. Les philosophes du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle

devant la nature. XVIIe Siècle Nos. 54-55, 1962.

Besson, Waldemar. Regierung und Opposition in der Deutschen Politik. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. September, 1962.

Burns, J. H., and Cobban, A. Rousseau's *Du Contrat Social*: Some Problems of Translation. *Political Studies*. June, 1962.

Camilleri, Andrea. Una storia del pensiero cattolico sullo Stato. *Civitas*. April-May, 1962.

Chroust, Anton-Hermann. The Lawyers of New Jersey and the Stamp Act. *American Journal of Legal History*. July, 1962.

Chroust, Anton-Herman. Plato's Detractors in Antiquity. *Review of Metaphysics*. September, 1962.

Collotti, E. Il "secondo libro" di Hitler. *Studi Storici*. 1/iii/1962.

Colwell, James L. The Populist Image of Vernon Louis Parrington. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. June, 1962.

Cowie, H. T. Liberalism's New Deal. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. Ausbildung einer Elite. *Der Monat*. July, 1962.

Davis, David Brion. The Emergence of Immediatism in British and American Anti-slavery Thought. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. September, 1962.

Della Peruta, F. Un capitolo di storia del socialismo risorgimentale: Proudhon e Ferrari. *Studi Storici*. 2/iii/1962.

Ebeling, Hermann. Lassalle oder Die List der Unvernunft. *Der Monat*. August, 1962.

Echeverria, Rafael. El valor político del consentimiento popular. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1962.

Engel, S. Morris. Language and the Structure of Locke's "Essay." *Indian Journal of Philosophy*. December, 1961.

Epstein, Klaus. Essay-Review of Richard W. Sterling's *Ethics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke*. *History and Theory*. 1/II/1962.

Fizer, John. La erupción ideológica de la USSR. *Foro Internacional*. April-June, 1962.

Fougeyrollas, Pierre. L'azione politica e il futuro delle società contemporanee. *Civitas*. January-February, 1962.

Fourier, Charles. Several Articles in *Revue internationale Philosophie*, No. 2, Vol. 60 (1962), are devoted to Fourier.

Frisch, Alfred. Le mythe libéral et la réalité allemande. *Documents*. March-April, 1962.

Gallo, Jorge Iván Hubner. El conservatismo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1962.

de Gandia, Enrique. As idéias políticas de Bernado O'Higgins. *Revista de História*. No. 49, Vol. XXIV, 1962.

Gerstenmaier, Eugen; Zehrer, Hans; Dürren-

matt, Peter. Was heisst heute konservativ? *Der Monat*. July, 1962.

Gini, Corrado. Las manías del mundo contemporáneo. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1962.

Giorgetti, G. Su alcuni "falsi problemi" nell'interpretazione di Marx. *Studi Storici*. 1/iii/1962.

Goerdts, Wilhelm. Widerspruch und Welt-politik: Über eine Tendenz der Sowjetdialektik Heute. *Ost. Europa*. July, 1962.

Goguel, François. Réflexions sur le régime présidentiel. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. June, 1962.

Gossman, Norbert J. Republicanism in Nineteenth Century England. *International Review of Social History*. 1/VII/1962.

Guardia, Sol Ferrer. Las concepciones político-sociales de F. Ferrer Guardia. *Cuadernos Americanos*. May-June, 1962.

Guillaume, Françoise. La doctrine sociétiqué du sous-développement. *Politique Étrangère*. 4/27/1962.

van den Haag, Ernest. Quia Ineptum. *Ethics*. July, 1962.

Heróles, Jesús Reyes. Rousseau y el liberalismo mexicano. *Cuadernos Americanos*. September-October, 1962.

Huthmacher, J. Joseph. Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. September, 1962.

Iribarne, Manuel Fraga. Carl Schmidt: el hombre y la obra. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1962.

Jones, William J. Due Process and Slow Press in the Elizabethan Chancery. *American Journal of Legal History*. April, 1962.

Kemp, Tom. The Epigones of Lenin and the Theory of Imperialism. *The Review* 2-3/IV/1962.

Kendall, Walter. Stalinist Socialism—Myth of the XXth Century. *The Review*. 2-3/IV/1962.

Kerr, Malcolm. The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt. *Middle East*. Spring, 1962.

Lavergne, Bernard. La civilisation chrétienne, les sociétés occidentales et l'ordre communiste, heresie inconsciente du christianisme. *L'année Politique et Économique*. May, 1962.

Lehouck, Emile. Psychologie et morale dans l'oeuvre de Charles Fourier (1772-1837). *Revue des Sciences Humaines*. July-September, 1962.

Leuschner, Joachim. Der Nationalsozialismus, I. *Neue Politische Literatur*. October, 1961.

Lloyd, A. C. Natural Justice. *The Philosophical Quarterly*. July, 1962.

Maier, Hans. Zur Lage der Politischen Wissenschaft in Deutschland. *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. July, 1962.

Mayo, Henry B. How Can We Justify Democracy? *American Political Science Review*. September, 1962.

Miranda, Torcuato Fernandez. Existencia y

justificación, como conceptos metódicos de la ciencia política. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1962.

Mookerjee, S. Political Wisdom of Ancient India. *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*. January-December, 1959.

Moulin, Leo. La tecnocracia, tentación y espantajo del mundo moderno. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1962.

Oakley, Francis. On the Road from Constance to 1688: The Political Thought of John Major and George Buchanan. *Journal of British Studies*. May, 1962.

Olea, Victor Flores. La crisis del stalinismo. *Cuadernos Americanos*. May-June, 1962.

Paloczi-Horvath, George. The Theoretical and Legal Origins of "Stalinist Terrorism." *The Review*. 2-3/IV/1962.

Pampaloni, Guido. Fermenti di riforme democratiche nella Firenze medicea del Quattrocento. *Archivio Storico Italiano*. CXIX, 429, 1961.

Pauker, Guy. Political Doctrines and Practical Politics in Southeast Asia. *Pacific Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Perticone, Giacomo. I partiti di massa fra la strategia e la tattica. *Civitas*. January-February, 1962.

Petrovic, Gajo. El concepto del hombre en Marx. *Cuadernos Americanos*. July-August, 1962.

Quaroni, Pietro. Cultura occidentale ed etica moderna. *Civitas*. March, 1962.

Radabaugh, John. Spencer Roane and the Genesis of Virginia Judicial Review. *American Journal of Legal History*. January, 1962.

Riedel, Manfred. Tradition und Revolution in Hegels "Philosophie des Rechts." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*. April-June, 1962.

Roberts, Warren, Jr. Behavioral Factors in Bentham's Conception of Political Change. *Political Studies*, June, 1962.

Rogger, Hans. Nationalism and the State: a Russian Dilemma. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 3/IV/1962.

Rottcher, Feodor. Theorie und Praxis in den Frühschriften von Karl Marx. *Archiv für Philosophie*. 3-4/11/1962.

Sanakoyev, Sh. Foreign Policy and the Battle of Ideas. *International Affairs*. August, 1962.

Saurin de la Iglesia, Maria Rosa. Momentos y problemas del liberalismo ochocentista alemán. *Hispania*. No. LXXV, Vol. XXII, 1962.

Saville, Max. Nationalism and Other Loyalties in the American Revolution. *American Historical Review*. July, 1962.

Schmitt, Carl. El orden del mundo despues de la segunda guerra mundial. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. March-April, 1962.

Shneidman, J. Lee. Political Theory and Reality in Thirteenth Century Aragon. *Hispania*. No. LXXXVI, Vol. XXII, 1962.

Sigmund, Paul, Jr. Cusannus' Concordantia: A Reinterpretation. *Political Studies*. June, 1962.

Sontheimer, Kurt. Nationalismus und Konservative Revolution. *Der Monat*. September, 1962.

Steffani, Winfried. Gewaltenteilung im Demokratisch-Pluralistischen Rechtsstaat. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. September, 1962.

Stoetzer, Otto Carlos. La influencia del pensamiento político europeo en la América española: el escolasticismo y el período de la ilustración, 1789-1815. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1962.

Stoppino, Mario. Il liberalismo politico. *Il Federalista*. March, 1961.

Sulzbach, Walter. Zur Definition und Psychologie von "Nation" und Nationalbewusstsein. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. June, 1962.

Toesca, Pietro Maria. Cristianesimo e politica nella storia. *Civitas*. April-May, 1962.

Toesca, Pietro Maria. L'impegno politico del cattolico tra interiorità e socialità. *Civitas*. June, 1962.

Toumanov, V. A. "Le Welfare State" est-il un mythe ou une réalité? *Journal of World History*. 1/VII/1962.

Utz, A. F. Gerechtigkeit, Recht und Moral. *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*. 1/9/1962.

Van Bever, P. J. J. Rousseau. *Dialog*. Summer, 1962.

Van Dyke, Vernon. Values and Interests. *American Political Science Review*. September, 1962.

Vejarano, Juan Javier Trias. La autonomía local y las asociaciones en el pensamiento de Tocqueville. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. May-June, 1962.

Vernant, Jacques. Une interprétation rationnelle du monde contemporain. *Politique Etrangere*. 3/27/1962.

Walcott, Robert. The Idea of Party in the Writing of Later Stuart History. *The Journal of British Studies*. May, 1962.

Walsh, W. H. Plato and the Philosophy of History: History and Theory in the Republic. *History and Theory*. 1/ii/1962.



SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON  
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

JULIAN FELDMAN

*University of California, Berkeley*

Philosophy of Social Science

Burt, C. Francis Galton and his contributions to psychology. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1962, 15, 1, May.

Helm, J. The ecological approach in anthropology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 630, May.

Horowitz, I. L., The sociological imagination of C. Wright Mills: in memoriam. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 105, July.

Schneider, L. The role of the category of ignorance in sociological theory: an exploratory statement. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 492, August.

Research Methods

Ake, J. N. A rapid machine procedure for determining scalability of any number of questions. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 121, Spring.

Axelrod, M., Matthews, D. R. and Prothro, J. W. Recruitment for survey research on race problems in the South. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 254, Summer.

Birnbaum, A. On the foundations of statistical inference. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 269, June.

Blalock, H. M., Jr., Spuriousness versus intervening variables: the problem of temporal sequences. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 330, May.

Brunner, E. deS. Social research dollars and sense. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 97, Spring.

Carter, R. E., Jr. and Troidahl, V. C. Use of a recall criterion in measuring the educational television audience. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 114, Spring.

Chapanis, A. An exact multinomial one-sample test of significance. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 306, July.

Coale, A. J. and Stephan, F. F. The case of the Indians and the teen-age widows. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 338, June.

Cramer, E. M. A comparison of three methods of fitting the normal ogive. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 183, June.

Cureton, E. E. A note on simultaneous equations and matrix inversion. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1962, 15, 51, May.

Dhrymes, P. J. On devising unbiased estimators for the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas

production function. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 297, April.

Fan, C. T., Muller, M. E. and Rezucha, I. Development of sampling plans by using sequential (item by item) selection techniques and digital computers. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 387, June.

Fields, R. I., Kramer, C. Y. and Clunies-Ross, C. W. Joint estimation of the parameters of two normal populations. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 446, June.

Gibson, W. A. On the least-squares orthogonalization of an oblique transformation. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 193, June.

Goldberger, A. S. Best linear unbiased prediction in the generalized linear regression model. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 369, June.

Goodman, L. A. Statistical methods for analyzing processes of change. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 57, July.

Grant, D. A. Testing the null hypothesis and the strategy and tactics of investigating theoretical models. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 54, January.

Hooper, J. W. Partial trace correlations. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 324, April.

Horst, P. Matrix reduction and approximation to principal axes. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 169, June.

Jones, C. O. A suggested scheme for classifying congressional campaigns. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 126, Spring.

Kaiser, H. F. Scaling a simplex. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 155, June.

Kaiser, H. F. and Dickman, K. Sample and population score matrices and sample correlation matrices from an arbitrary population correlation matrix. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 179, June.

Kugel, P. Computers and political strategy. *Computers and Automation*, 1962, 11, 17, May.

Li, C. H. A sequential method for screening experimental variables. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 455, June.

McDonald, R. P. A note on the derivation of the general latent class model. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 203, June.

Magid, F. N., Fotion, N. G. and Gold, D. A mail-questionnaire adjunct to the interview. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 111, Spring.

Marks, E. S. The fetish of sample size. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 92, Spring.

Michael, W. B., Jones, R. A., Gaddis, L. W. and Kaiser, H. F. Abacs for determination of a correlation coefficient corrected for restriction of range. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 197, June.

Miller, C. R., Sabagh, G. and Dingman, H. F. Latent class analysis and differential mortality. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 430, June.

Osborne, M. F. M. Periodic structure in the Brownian motion of stock prices. *Operations Research*, 1962, 10, 345, May-June.

Perry, P. Gallup poll election survey experience, 1950-1960. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 272, Summer.

Polk, K. A note on asymmetric causal models. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 539, August.

Rider, P. R. Expected values and standard deviations of the reciprocal of a variable from a decapitated negative binominal distribution. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 439, June.

Rungiman, W. G. A method for cross-national comparison of political consensus. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 13, 151, June.

Ryan, T. A. The experiment as the unit for computing ratio of error. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 301, July.

Sandon, F. An alternative table for determining means of sections from a normal distribution. *British Journal of Statistical Psychology*, 1962, 15, 71, May.

Shepard, R. N. The analysis of proximities: multidimensional scaling with an unknown distance function. I. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 125, June.

Stekler, H. O. A simulation of the forecasting performance of the diffusion index. *Journal of Business*, 1962, 35, 196, April.

Suchman, E. A. An analysis of "bias" in survey research. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 102, Spring.

Wilson, W. A note on the inconsistency inherent in the necessity to perform multiple comparisons. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1962, 59, 296, July.

Wynar, B. Current Russian bibliographies in the field of economics. *Western Business Review*, 1962, 6, 41, May.

Zellner, A. An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for aggregation bias. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1962, 57, 348, June.

#### Motivation and Personality

Becker, J., Spielberger, C. D. and Parker, J. B. On the relationship between manic-depressive psychosis and inner-directed character. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 57, 149, June.

Bennis, W. G. and Peabody, D. The conceptualization of two personality orientations and sociometric choice. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 57, 203, June.

Davidson, H. H., Riessman, F. and Meyers, E. Personality characteristics attributed to the worker. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 57, 155, June.

Gibson, H. B. The lie scale of the Maudsley personality inventory. *Acta Psychologica*, 1962, 20, 18.

Jackson, E. F. Status consistency and symptoms of stress. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 469, August.

Lefton, M., Angrist, S., Dimitz, S. and Pasa-manick, B. Social class, expectations, and performance of mental patients. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 79, July.

McClelland, D. C. Business drive and national achievement. *Harvard Business Review*, 1962, 40, 99, July-August.

Rosenbaum, M. E., Horne, W. C. and Chalmers, D. K. Level of self-esteem and the learning of imitation and nonimitation. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 147, June.

Rosenberg, M. Self-esteem and concern with public affairs. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 201, Summer.

Rychlak, J. F. and Eacker, J. N. The effects of anxiety, delay, and reinforcement on generalized expectancies. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 123, June.

Sampson, H., Messinger, S. L. and Towne, R. D. Family processes and becoming a mental patient. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 88, July.

Sheppard, J. L. A theory of hypothesis conflict in anxiety. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 1961, 13, 234, December.

Weitman, M. More than one kind of authoritarian. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 193, June.

Zigler, E. and Kanzer, P. The effectiveness of two classes of verbal reinforcers on the performance of middle- and lower-class children. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 157, June.

#### Opinions and Attitudes

Adams, J. S. and Rosenbaum, W. B. The relationship of worker productivity to cognitive dissonance about wage inequities. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1962, 46, 161, June.

Aronson, E. and Golden, B. W. The effect of relevant and irrelevant aspects of communicator credibility on opinion change. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 135, June.

Baur, E. J. Opinion change in a public controversy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 212, Summer.

- Byrne, D. Response to attitude similarity-dis-similarity as a function of affiliation need. *Journal of Personality*, 1962, 30, 164, June.
- Campbell, E. Q. Scale and intensity analysis in the study of attitude change. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 227, Summer.
- Carter, R. F. Stereotyping as a process. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 77, Spring.
- Converse, P. E. and Dupeux, G. Politicization of the electorate in France and the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 1, Spring.
- Dotson, L. An empirical study of attitude-component theory. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 64, Spring.
- Feather, N. T. Cigarette smoking and lung cancer: a study of cognitive dissonance. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 14, 55, April.
- Johnson, B. Ascetic Protestantism and political preference. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 35, Spring.
- McGuire, W. J. and Papageorgis, D. Effectiveness of forewarning in developing resistance to persuasion. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 24, Spring.
- Smith, R. J. and Ramsey, C. E. Attitudes of Japanese high school seniors toward the military. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 249, Summer.
- Weinberger, M. Do people know how susceptible they are to television advertising? *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 262, Summer.
- Cognitive Processes and Individual Decision Making
- Ackoff, R. L. Some unsolved problems in problem solving. *Operational Research Quarterly*, 1962, 13, 1, March.
- Aronoff, J. Freud's conception of the origin of curiosity. *Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 54, 39, July.
- Asch, S. E. and Ebenholtz, S. M. The process of free recall: evidence for non-associative factors in acquisition and retention. *Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 54, 3, July.
- Blackman, S. Some factors affecting the perception of events as chance determined. *Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 54, 197, July.
- Bower, G. H. An association model for response and training variables in paired-associate learning. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 34, January.
- Deese, J. On the structure of associative meaning. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 161, May.
- Deutsch, M. and Krauss, R. M. Studies of interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 52, March.
- Doob, L. W. The effect upon recall of syntactical construction in German. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 57, 133, June.
- Duffy, N. F. and Taylor, P. M. The implementation of a decision. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 7, 110, June.
- Edwards, W. Utility, subjective probability, their interaction, and variance preferences. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 42, March.
- Edwards, W. D. Dynamic decision theory and probabilistic information processing. *Human Factors*, 1962, 4, 59, April.
- Fox, D. J. and Lorge, I. The relative quality of decisions written by individuals and by groups as the available time for problem solving is increased. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 57, 227, June.
- Froman, L. A. Jr. and Skipper, J. K., Jr. Factors related to misperceiving party stands on issues. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 265, Summer.
- Good, I. J. How rational should a manager be? *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 383, July.
- Harsanyi, J. C. Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 29, March.
- Homer, E. D. A generalized model for analyzing management information systems. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 500, July.
- Hood, W. R. and Sherif, M. Verbal report and judgment of an unstructured stimulus. *Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 54, 121, July.
- Ikle, F. C. and Leites, N. Political negotiation as a process of modifying utilities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 19, March.
- Johnson, R. C. Reanalysis of "meaningfulness and verbal learning," *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 233, May.
- Kendler, H. H. and Kendler, T. S. Vertical and horizontal processes in problem solving. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 1, January.
- Kilbridge, M. A model for industrial learning costs. *Management Science*, 1962, 8, 516, July.
- Kuhn, H. W. Game theory and models of negotiation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 1, March.
- Lewis, L. S. and Lopreato, J. A rationality, ignorance, and perceived danger in medical practices. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 508, August.
- Little, K. B., Brackbill, Y. and Kassel, S. H. A test of a general utility theory model for probability learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 404, April.
- Luce, R. D. An observable property equivalent to a choice model for discrimination experiments. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 163, June.
- Maier, N. R. F. and Solem, A. R. Improving solutions by turning choice situations into problems. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 151, Summer.
- Massell, B. F. Investment, innovation, and growth. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 239, April.
- Mednick, S. A. The associative basis of the

creative process. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 220, May.

Moglewer, S. A game theory model for agricultural crop selection. *Econometrica*, 1962, 30, 253, April.

Pruitt, D. G. An analysis of responsiveness between nations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 5, March.

Pruitt, D. G. Pattern and level of risk in gambling decisions. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 187, May.

Pubols, B. H., Jr. An application of Levine's model for hypothesis behavior to serial reversal learning. *Psychological Review*, 1962, 69, 241, May.

Rapier, J. L. Measured intelligence and the ability to learn. *Acta Psychologica*, 1962, 20, 1.

Shepard, H. R. and Blake, R. R. Changing behavior through cognitive change. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 88, Summer.

Siegel, S. and Andrews, J. M. Magnitude of reinforcement and choice behavior in children. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 337, April.

Uhr, L., Vossler, C. and Uleman, J. Pattern recognition over distortions, by human subjects and a computer simulation of a model for human form perception. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 227, March.

Waugh, N. C. and Smith, J. E. K. A stochastic model for free recall. *Psychometrika*, 1962, 27, 141, June.

Williamson, R. C. Social class determinants of perception and adjustment in an adolescent and adult sample: El Salvador. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 57, 11, June.

Young, R. K. Tests of three hypotheses about the effective stimulus in serial learning. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1962, 63, 307, March.

Zellner, A. War and peace: a fantasy in game theory? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 39, March.

#### Interpersonal Influence

Miner, J. B. Conformity among university professors and business executives. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 7, 96, June.

Mouton, J. S. and Blake, R. R. The influence of competitively vested interests on judgments. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 149, June.

Schein, E. H. and Ott, J. S. The legitimacy of organizational influence. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 67, 682, May.

#### Group Behavior

Bach, R. E., Jr., Dolansky, L. and Stubbs, H. L. Some recent Contributions to the Lancaster theory of combat. *Operations Research*, 1962, 10, 314, May-June.

Coleman, J. Comment on Harrison White,

"Chance models of systems of casual groups." *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 172, June.

Dinoff, M., Kew, J. K., Rickard, H. C. and Timmons, E. O. The stability of group verbal behavior. *Psychological Record*, 1962, 12, 323, July.

Taietz, P. Conflicting group norms and the "third" person in the interview. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 97, July.

Turk, H. and Lefcowitz, M. J. Towards a theory of representation between groups. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 337, May.

Ulrich, R. E. Conversation control. *Psychological Record*, 1962, 12, 327, July.

White, H. Chance models of systems of casual groups. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 153, June.

#### Organizational Behavior

Alger, C. F. The external bureaucracy in United States foreign affairs. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 7, 50, June.

Allen, P. J. Growth of strata in early organizational development. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 34, July.

Balderston, F. E. Models of multiple branch organization. *California Management Review*, 1962, 4, 40, Spring.

Chapple, E. D. Quantitative analysis of complex organizational systems. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 67, Summer.

Cohen, A. M., Bennis, W. G. and Wolkon, G. H. The effects of changes in communication networks on the behaviors of problem-solving groups. *Sociometry*, 1962, 25, 177, June.

Cumming, E. and J. The organization of the large mental hospital. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 97, Summer.

Fleishman, E. A. and Peters, D. R. Interpersonal values, leadership attitudes, and managerial "success." *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 127, Summer.

Golembiewski, R. T. Organization as a moral problem. *Public Administration Review*, 1962, 22, 51, Spring.

Grusky, O. Authoritarianism and effective indoctrination: a case study. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 7, 79, June.

Guest, R. H. Managerial succession in complex organizations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 47, July.

Hilton, T. L. and Dill, W. R. Salary growth as a criterion of career progress. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1962, 46, 153, June.

Huse, E. F. and Taylor, E. K. Reliability of absence measures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1962, 46, 159, June.

Koontz, H. Making sense of management theory. *Harvard Business Review*, 1962, 40, 24, July-August.

McNulty, J. E. Organizational change in grow-

ing enterprises. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 7, 1, June.

Mann, F. C. and Williams, L. K. Some effects of the changing work environment in the office. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1962, 18, 90, July.

Meltzer, L. and Salter, J. Organizational structure and the performance and job satisfaction of physiologists. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 351, June.

Porter, A. Diagnostics of administration: Hawthornitis. *Public Administration Review*, 1962, 22, 82, Spring.

Porter, E. H. The parable of the spindle. *Harvard Business Review*, 1962, 40, 58, May-June.

Rabe, W. F. Managerial power. *California Management Review*, 1962, 4, 31, Spring.

Sayles, L. The change process in organizations. *Human Organization*, 1962, 21, 62, Summer.

Simon, H. A. New developments in the theory of the firm. *American Economic Review*, 1962, 52, 1, May.

Simpson, R. L. and Gulley, W. H. Goals, environmental pressures, and organizational characteristics. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 344, June.

Vroom, V. H. Ego-involvement, job satisfaction, and job performance. *Personnel Psychology*, 1962, 15, 159, Summer.

Wall, R. G., and Hawkins, H. Requisites of effective leadership. *Personnel*, 1962, 39, 21, May-June.

Yoder, D. Management theories as managers see them. *Personnel*, 1962, 39, 25, July-August.

Zald, M. N. Power balance and staff conflict in correctional institutions. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1962, 7, 22, June.

#### Voting Behavior

Levin, M. B. and Eden, M. Political strategy for the alienated voter. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 47, Spring.

Patterson, S. C. Dimensions of voting behavior in a one-party state legislature. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 185, Summer.

Remmers, H. H. Social distance in voting behavior in two presidential elections. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 280, Summer.

#### Culture and Institutions

Babchuk, N. and Bates, A. P. Professor or producer: the two faces of academic man. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 341, May.

Bharucha-Reid, R. P. Appearance and reality

in culture. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1962, 57, 169, June.

Blanchard, W. H. National myth, national character, and national policy: a psychological study of the U-2 incident. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1962, 6, 143, June.

Dohrenwend, B. P. Some aspects of the appraisal of abnormal behavior by leaders in an urban area. *American Psychologist*, 1962, 17, 190, April.

Doob, L. W. South Tyrol: an introduction to the psychological syndrome of nationalism. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 172, Summer.

Downs, A. The public interest: its meaning in a democracy. *Social Research*, 1962, 29, 1, Spring.

Granick, D. On patterns of technological choice in Soviet industry. *American Economic Review*, 1962, 52, 149, May.

Grether, E. T. Competition as a dynamic process. *California Management Review*, 1962, 4, 72, Summer.

Kennedy, R. E., Jr. The Protestant ethic and the Parsis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 11, July.

Kilby, P. Organization and productivity in backward economies. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1962, 76, 303, May.

Powell, E. H. The evolution of the American city and the emergence of anomie. *British Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 13, 156, June.

Putney, S. and Putney, G. J. Radical innovation and prestige. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 548, August.

Robins, L. N., Gyman, H. and O'Neal, P. The interaction of social class and deviant behavior. *American Sociological Review*, 1962, 27, 480, August.

Schmookler, J. and Brownlee, O. Determinants of inventive activity. *American Economic Review*, 1962, 52, 165, May.

Sebald, H. Studying national character through comparative content analysis. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 318, May.

Shuval, J. T. Emerging patterns of ethnic strain in Israel. *Social Forces*, 1962, 40, 323, May.

Stokes, D. E. and Iversen, G. R. On the existence of forces restoring party competition. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1962, 26, 159, Summer.

Vallier, I. Church, society, and labor resources: an intradenominational comparison. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1962, 68, 21, July.

Wolfe, J. B. and Horn, P. Racial friction in the deep south. *Journal of Psychology*, 1962, 54, 139, July.

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Urban Social Structure.* By JAMES M. BESHES. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. 207, \$5.50.)

This study seeks to explore whether or not there is an urban social structure and an overall network of social relationships among urban inhabitants. The author's theoretical orientation comes from the works of Max Weber, Radcliffe-Brown, Lewin and Asch. Beshers' main points emphasize: (1) that extension of present social theory is needed to cope with urban facts; (2) that social classes, ethnic groups, and racial groups are integral parts of American urban social structure that cannot be meaningfully treated in isolation to each other; (3) that historical research, census tract research, survey research, and observational research must be integrated into an effective analysis of urban social structure; and (4) that rigorous development of theory, specifically mathematical formulation, can clarify issues presently confused.

Professor Beshers limits his analysis to the correlation of residential proximity and marriage, social class/caste structures and occupational status using census tract data, official registrations of residence on marriage licences to corroborate sociological hypothesis. The most interesting aspect of the study is the construction of a theoretical model for urban social structure which stresses the relationship among marriage, symbols and power in the community. An appendix of mathematical aspects is added at the end of the study and the probability formulas serve as illustrations for testing.

The book should be of interest especially to those interested in community power structure as it provides a good summary of recent sociological works in this area. The author concludes that power structure may tend to be "authoritarian" and under other conditions may be "democratic" or even "anarchistic." The actual power structure prevailing in a particular community, the author feels, must be regarded as a result of such conditions, "not as a distinctive and permanent feature of the community."—MAURICE E. O'DONNELL, *University of Maryland*.

*The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas.* By LUTHER HALSEY GULICK. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Pp. 167.)

Anything Luther Gulick writes about public administration is worth reading. From the time he left Oberlin in 1915 with a master's degree and spent the next two years as a student in the Training School for Public Service of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, he has been teaching, studying, practicing the art—or sci-

ence—of public administration (if one wants to get into the argument) that he—as much as anyone—started. He has consistently striven to understand how government executives get their work done and how they might do it more efficiently. Always he has tried to frame observation in the light of theory.

Here, in five lectures delivered at the University of Michigan he sees the metropolitan problem within the framework of American theory. As usual, he pricks some conventional solutions to the problem. Such answers have failed, he says. "In every big city the slums are spreading faster than they are being cleared up. Circulation of people and goods is becoming less and less satisfactory and more and more costly. Even the delightful expansion of suburban life is beginning to run into difficulties as the suburbs 'fill in'; and the service and control jobs are so big that the local governmental units involved are unequal to the tasks they face."

Two of the chief elements of the traditional approach have failed to cope with metropolitanism. One is the "market mechanism," or private enterprise checked, when necessary, by government. The other is "local municipal action."

The first change needed in a new theory of metropolitan government, Dr. Gulick says, is to discard the notion that the problem is the city. "We are not dealing with a 'city' at all! We are dealing with people, industries, shops, offices, community institutions, recreations, methods of transport and easy communication, and a maze of urban services, both public and private, which focus on many centers. . . ." The next change is to decide that all the historic elements of government, federal, state, and local, must be involved in the solution of the metropolitan problem, and no one government can solve it alone. Then new assignments can be made to the various governments.

Dr. Gulick develops his analysis and solution in more detail than can or should be revealed in a review. Each topic gets bold, inventive treatment. As one example, he says it is too late for city governments to take the lead in reaching their own salvation. Only the President, who leads the most comprehensive constituency in metropolis and who is now elected by urban voters, can start the change.

This is a readable, provocative, disturbing book. Readers will be jolted. If they are devoted to the failing solutions, they will be upset, perhaps angered. But if they are seeking new ways, they will find good sense. The dean is going as strong as ever.—JAMES L. McCAMY, *University of Wisconsin*.

*Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership.* BY ALEX GOTTFRIED. (University of Washington Press, 1962. Pp. xiii, 459. \$7.50.)

Anton J. Cermak is in one respect a unique figure in American politics. For a period of thirty years he held both elective public office and party office in the nation's second major city, emerging in 1932 as Mayor of Chicago and Democratic boss of the city, of Cook County and of the State of Illinois. Few political bosses have ever ventured to expose themselves to the hazards of election campaigns except perhaps in comfortably one-sided areas. Here is a man who ran for election successively (and in all but two cases successfully) as state representative (4 terms), alderman (4 terms), bailiff, sheriff, county commissioner, U. S. Senator and Mayor. Yet he never relinquished his party position as boss, first of his ward, then of a cluster of wards, then of the city organization and finally of the state in the crucial year 1932 when the Democrats finally returned to power in the nation.

In other respects Cermak's career is by no means unique. As a son of poor immigrant parents who could afford him scant education, he may be compared to Al Smith or Fiorello LaGuardia. Cermak became the leader and symbol of the Czechs as Smith was of the Irish and LaGuardia of the Italians. Like them, Cermak voiced for all minority groups the opposition to prohibition as an imposition of the rural nativists and a threat to the liberties and cultural habits of the urban immigrants. For Cermak, as for Smith and LaGuardia, the prohibition issue provided a powerful and unifying rallying cry. All three became protagonists not only of their own people but generally of the newer immigrants in their aspirations for recognition and power.

But here the similarity abruptly ends. Cermak was singularly lacking in the wit and warmth that made Smith and LaGuardia legends in their own lifetimes. Cermak, as Dr. Gottfried's careful examination reveals, was a tough, taciturn figure. Where Smith accepted the party machine and used his knowledge and influence to improve its public image or LaGuardia fashioned his own image fighting the dominant machine and rejecting and out-manuevering the party leaders who supported him, Cermak alone sought to both create and dominate party organization. Both as party leader and as office-holder, he was autarchic, if not autocratic.

Even as Mayor, the image of Party Boss was dominant. Gottfried suggests that "Cermak's performance in the complex roles of this office has been ignored or dismissed by otherwise competent observers, chiefly owing to their belief that he was

'the biggest crook of the lot,' or 'the most ruthless and acquisitive man in Chicago politics' or 'a spoils politician' or simply that he came under that wonderfully all-inclusive anathema 'Boss.' These descriptions are fairly accurate."

But are they, by Dr. Gottfried's evidence, either "fair" or "accurate"? *Boss*, "A. J." certainly was. He held, and held tautly, the reins of official and party power. *Acquisitive*, Cermak was, of power. But if acquisitiveness suggests, as with many political bosses it surely does, that he used his political power to acquire personal wealth, Dr. Gottfried's own painstaking research demonstrates that the suggestion is false. Certainly it would be neither *fair* nor *accurate* to call Cermak a "crook" or "the biggest crook of the lot."

In the first place, Cermak had parlayed a kindling wood business into a real estate operation and had become a successful small businessman before he first ran for public office in 1902. Politics, to be sure, never hurt his business but politics with "A. J." always came first. In the rough and tumble of Chicago in the thirty years that saw such figures as the Carter Harrisons, father and son, Roger Sullivan, George Brennan, Al Capone and Big Bill Thompson, Cermak was not above political or patronage deals that would enhance his political fortunes. But whether it was caution or because he was comfortably circumstanced, he never used his political opportunities to build up a private fortune. His dominant urge—and as Dr. Gottfried demonstrates, he could be ruthless about it—was the quest for political power. Gottfried quite properly calls him "a power seeker"; no other needs or desires competed with the demand for political power and prestige.

Great as was his skill as "a peerless party organizer" he was no less competent as a public executive. Gottfried stresses "Cermak's habit of giving a minimum of effective administration in every elective office." He seems rather to have given a *maximum* of effective administration. He was as aggressive and dominant, as tireless and indefatigable as a public officer as he was as a party organizer. He was, says Gottfried, of the "bull whip" school of administration. His cabinet officials, Gottfried tells us, admired him but had no affection for him; the rank and file employees "feared and hated him." "No Chicago Mayor surpassed him in detailed knowledge of the intricacies of administration, including operation at the lowest ministerial level." This last, of course, was true of Al Smith in respect to New York State and F. H. LaGuardia in regard to the City of New York. Unlike them, Cermak, however, had "the social philosophy of the businessman," particularly that of the small, self-made businessman. He was the "rugged individualistic, laissez-faire

entrepreneur." Gottfried is, therefore, surprised to find him an early champion of great government programs of assistance. But what "depression" mayor who had known poverty in childhood and had himself emerged as the spokesman and champion of the urban immigrant masses, or, for that matter, what politician in intimate touch with the needs of these people, could, in 1931 and 1932, have clung stubbornly to the tradition of *laissez-faire*?

It might be interesting—but hardly fruitful—to speculate how Cermak five years later might have reacted to the New Deal. In 1932 he rejected Roosevelt as not "wet" enough and went down fighting for Al Smith, who was. But an assassin's bullet intended for Roosevelt brought martyrdom and an abrupt end to Cermak's career at his moment of maximum power.

Here then, is a career full of fascination for the student of politics and government. Dr. Gottfried has combed the newspapers of the period and sought out the dwindling group of Cermak contemporaries. But "A. J." was a man of few words and fewer records. The 20th Century politician commits little to paper. His most important arrangements are oral, with few witnesses and fewer still who are likely to talk. This was no less true of Al Smith or F. H. LaGuardia. But they at least were lively personalities. Tony Cermak, despite the power he wielded, was not.

The scant records of our political figures make the task of the historian of the 20th Century a difficult one. Dr. Gottfried has tried to write more than a history of A. J. Cermak. He seeks to discover the kind of power "A. J." sought, how he used it and the sources of his power. He has provided one Appendix on the Chicago in which Cermak lived, and even another devoted to Psychosomatic Analysis. He has tried, at least, to bring the insights of the sociologist and even of the psychoanalyst to answer the questions which the political scientist must raise about this potent, enigmatic man.

There are no amusing anecdotes to liven Dr. Gottfried's narrative. "A. J." was always in deadly earnest, concentrated and close-mouthed. He had few friends; no intimates. It would be hard, I dare say impossible, to penetrate his deep reserve, to bring him to life as an engaging personality.—JOSEPH D. MCGOLDRICK, *Professor of Political Science, Queens College.*

*The Economics of the Political Parties.* By SEYMOUR L. HARRIS. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp. 349. \$7.00.)

The distinguished Littauer Professor of Political Economy at Harvard has given us a partisan testament in crisp, hard hitting prose, hopefully directed to a wide audience. Professor Harris de-

scribes the differences between the Democrats and the Republicans on every major economic issue of the day and the GOP fares badly at every turn.

In a nub, the Republicans have failed to grasp the basic tenets of modern (i.e., Keynesian) fiscal policy. They have made a fetish of the balanced budget, refused to relate debt to G. N. P., revere the stable dollar at the expense of growth, and generally regard government expenditures as non-productive.

Republicans are also guilty of deprecating the role of academics in government and of appointing to key posts officials whose previous records reveal downright hostility to the programs they are to administer. The historical attempts of Republicans to emphasize the role of state and local governments gloss over their regressive tax systems.

The Democratic party, or at least its center of gravity, stands for the obverse of these. Dedicated to full employment and growth, Democrats seek a balanced economy, rather than the balanced budget. While many Democrats still have much to learn, Harris holds that the leadership of the party is fully conversant with the necessary economic tools to meet its responsibilities. When it fails to act, or acts improperly, the reason is political reality, i.e., the lack of popular understanding of elementary economics.

Harris' great fear is that the Republican position will not permit the nation to solve "the central issue" of establishing national priorities in the allocation of resources. If our resources are dissipated in self-indulgence and only what is left over is directed to our needs, we cannot win the Cold War. The historical Republican equation of consumer sovereignty with democracy is, then, a threat to our survival.

Political scientists, while probably in agreement with most of what Harris says, would probably point out the difficulties posed by the "language of politics." For example, GOP orthodoxy did not prevent the use of Keynesian measures in 1953-54, yet in August, 1962, the chairman of the Republican National Committee, as well as the Republican congressional leadership, stated its opposition to any tax cut which was not accompanied by a cut in non-defense spending. Would Republicans in power be equally vehement?

President Kennedy may be a sophisticated economist, but did candidate Kennedy help the cause by his frequent campaign parry, "Never before in the history of the United States did any administration in peacetime have a larger deficit than this administration in 1958, \$12 billion. They would have had an increase in the debt of more than \$10 billion except a Democratic Congress in the last six years cut the budget requests . . . by \$10



billion."? And so, on to a Yale commencement, clutching a copy of Samuelson.

While Harris notes that a Democratic congress is still conservative and that a Javits outlook is hardly a Halleck approach, not enough attention is given to the economics of the congressional parties and the pressures which fall on individual members.

When a majority of Republican congressmen describe a \$900 million public works bill as a boondoggle and two of them, one a candidate for governor, the other a candidate for U. S. senator, cross the aisle, the problem of congressional voting behavior is obviously more complex than Professor Harris suggests. Neither ignorance nor cupidity is the sole answer.

Harris' thesis is sometimes dulled by overzealous assertions such as "... a reduction in the appropriations for the Weather Bureau in fiscal 1955 was followed by a hurricane that probably cost the nation more than a billion dollars." And one must also wonder if Professor Harris feels the Communications Satellite Bill was part of the New Frontier or a latter-day example of Eisenhower orthodoxy.

But as long as most Americans, college students included, feel that balancing the Federal budget is like dealing with a personal checking account writ large, Professor Harris' labor of partisan love deserves the widest circulation.—SIDNEY WISE, *Franklin and Marshall College*.

*Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning.* BY ARTHUR MAASS, MAYNARD M. HUFSCMIDT, ROBERT DORFMAN, HAROLD A. THOMAS, JR., STEPHEN A. MARGLIN, GORDON MASKEW FAIR, AND OTHERS, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962, Pp. xviii, 620, \$12.50.)

On the first page of the book the senior author, Arthur Maass, declares his independence of a conventional approach; *Design of Water-Resource Systems* "differs basically from the many volumes on water resources published in the last decade, which have been concerned mainly with governmental organization for development of resources, the economics of project evaluation, and the collection and evaluation of basic data." (p. 1) The purpose of this study, the product of the joint researches of the Harvard Water Program, is quite different. Put boldly, but simply, it is to devise techniques of water-resource system design sufficiently sophisticated to permit identification of the one best design for any physical environment on the basis of specified objectives. With such a goal the book is aimed at an audience of "engineers, economists, and administrators," named

in that order by the authors. (p. 10) The details of the techniques examined and explained will be of interest to some political scientists, specialists in the resource field; for a larger number, however, far more interest will attend the implications that the findings carry for the more traditional study of administrative organization, both within resource development and in other program areas.

Put differently, the purpose of the book is to provide a mechanism for the automatic conversion of social objectives through engineering techniques to detailed plans and implementation. Maass distinguishes four steps in system design, "identifying the objectives of design; translating these objectives into design criteria; using the criteria to devise plans . . . that fulfill the criteria in the highest degree; and evaluating the consequences of the plans that have been developed." (p. 2) From the first step, the rest follow. "Once the objective has been determined, our methodology leads to the selection of that combination of structures, levels of development for different water uses, and operating procedures that will best achieve the objective." (p. 3) The scope of this claim is suggested by another: "We have undertaken to translate into a design criterion any reasonable objective." (p. 9) Although the process of system design is easier when the single goal is economic efficiency, the same procedures can be employed to plan for a combination of objectives including efficiency, income redistribution, or even non-economic goals.

All this carries overtones of the classic dichotomy between policy and administration, but the authors are too experienced to fall into such simplification. Recognizing the necessity of interplay between policy-makers and planners, they see three types of situations within which planning may take place. 1) In the absence of objectives clear enough to lead to the identification of a single best design, the project planners have sought to maximize physical development, using economic data only to justify rejection of excessively costly projects. Individual projects have then been subjected to spasmodic review, strongly influenced by the local interests most directly involved. This has in practice been the most common procedure within the federal government. 2) The planners have designed their systems around the single goal of economic efficiency, seeking to maximize the contribution to economic development. Other objectives, if desired, have been incorporated into the design by *ad hoc* modification. 3) With sufficiently detailed design criteria, elaborate techniques can be employed that will determine the best plan to maximize all objectives, in the internal priority rank assigned in advance. If modifications in objectives are made after the preparation of the plan, they can

be made under circumstances in which the cost of each change is known in terms of reduced capacity to accomplish other goals.

Not surprisingly, the authors offer their own work as a vehicle to reach the third type of relationship. The advantages would be twofold: by incorporating the multiple objectives in the original criteria, consideration of sufficient alternatives to ensure an optimal combination of benefits would be guaranteed; such a procedure would discourage the setting of policy objectives within a parochial atmosphere focused on specific projects, and would encourage the establishment and maintenance of national standards for resource development. Consistent with this emphasis on the rational resolution of problems, Maass develops in the last chapter a model of constitutional democratic government that rejects interest group theories of politics in favor of an emphasis upon community consensus.

Two obstacles would appear to stand in the way of the full accomplishment of this method of planning. As the authors modestly acknowledge, their procedures do not as yet permit the incorporation of all potential variables. In the design of a system for an artificial river-basin, created for research purposes, the planners were forced to exclude consideration of alternative means of accomplishing objectives other than control of water in the channel, e.g., flood plain zoning, pollution controls, etc. The design procedure likewise excludes ground water sources. Further work by economists and engineers will be necessary to elaborate and extend the techniques here developed.

The second difficulty, most directly of concern to political scientists, concerns the problems involved in reducing many development objectives to the form of design criteria. These difficulties are set aside by the authors; for any specified objective, gross benefits equal "the willingness of beneficiaries to pay" or "how much the beneficiaries of a system output would purchase at successive prices if the output were sold in a market." These concepts are difficult to apply, however, to willingness to pay for continued opportunity to enjoy a scenic view, for relief from the stench caused by pollution, for protection against loss of life by flood, or for the sense of honor that comes from the knowledge that treaty obligations to Indian tribes—whether or not enforceable in the courts—are still being observed. These problems of measuring benefits are not ignored by the authors; they are defined out of the scope of a study concerned with other matters. They remain for continued exploration. This volume is a distinguished beginning toward the development of procedures that may serve to further rationalize policy formation in resource development and

may, by analogy, lead to the application of comparable techniques in other program areas.—FRANK MUNGER, *Syracuse University*.

*Render Unto Caesar. The Flag-Salute Controversy.*  
By DAVID R. MANWARING. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. viii, 321. \$5.50.)

A particular decision of the Supreme Court of the United States often brings renewed interest in previous decisions which set the stage or broke the ground for the new one. In light of the present controversy over prayers in the public schools, Manwaring has, through the coincidences of history and the docket of the Supreme Court, produced a particularly timely study of the long legal struggle of the Jehovah's Witnesses against the compulsory flag salute in public schools. Last year such a study of events of twenty years ago might have been tardy rather than timely.

The book is concerned with the flag-salute controversy during the 1930's and 40's, when the Supreme Court in *Gobitis* first ruled for a compulsory salute and three years later, in *Barnette*, ruled against the compulsory salute. The Jehovah's Witnesses are the stars of this drama; the Supreme Court of the United States is the arena; and various groups such as the American Legion, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Bar Association, and the United States Department of Justice are the supporting actors. This setting has the makings of judicial-political drama at its finest, but in some respects the script falls short.

The book jacket describes the flag-salute controversy as "a classic example of interest-group involvement in constitutional litigation" and credits the author with tracing "the strategies of the various interest groups through every step in the proceedings of both *Gobitis* and *Barnette*." That is what this reviewer had hoped Manwaring would do. But while there is a tiringly detailed account of the legal briefs presented by the various interest groups there is an almost complete absence of any consideration of the extra-judicial activities of these participants. The stuff of interest-group representation includes far more than the presentation of legal briefs in judicial tribunals, yet a careful reading of this account of the Jehovah's Witnesses' troubles before the courts fails to reveal the non-judicial, political, processes of interest-group representation. While the author is not guilty of suggesting that the filing of legal briefs is the sum-total of interest-group strategy, his overly extensive consideration of the courtroom gymnastics engaged in by the various groups, while serving perhaps to demonstrate to an introductory student the process whereby litigation is carried on, at the same time over-

emphasizes the judicial as opposed to the political activities of these interest groups.

Perhaps more annoying than important are several mechanical shortcomings of the book for which the reviewer is inclined to blame the publisher rather than the author. The book, which began as a doctoral dissertation and still bears the unmistakable earmarks of its origin, is written in outline form complete with A's, B's, 1's, and 2's, a form which this reviewer finds distracting. It is, as most dissertations tend to be, profusely annotated and referenced to the point of absurdity. In eleven chapters with a total of 253 pages of text there is a grand total of 1,403 notes, which, however, do not occur at the bottom of the page but are grouped together in 59 pages at the end of the volume. The mere number of notes, their atrocious location at the end of the volume, and the indiscriminate mixing of references with annotations and explanatory material were enough to make this reviewer marvel at the publisher's skill in interfering so handsomely with the enjoyment of an otherwise well-done commentary. This admixture of notes and references was particularly bothersome in Chapter 2, for instance, when a neophyte in religious orders finds to his dismay that some of the most interesting and pertinent parts of the Witnesses' theology are discussed not in the text but in notes over 240 pages removed (see notes 10, 16, and 23, pp. 260-61). The extremely detailed accounting in Chapter 7 of the number of favorable and unfavorable articles in magazines, journals and newspapers in reaction to the *Gobitis* decision and the inclusion of three graphs and one table relative to the incidences of persecution of the Witnesses are rather labored efforts at systematization and appear both unnecessary and insufficient in themselves to establish any critical point. They detract seriously from the readability of the study.

These annoyances are minor, however, and this is a thoroughly worthwhile volume. It will serve as an excellent case study for undergraduate students with which to illustrate the trial procedures of major constitutional questions. It likewise demonstrates effectively the process—often engaged in but rarely quite so openly admitted—whereby the Court changes its mind within a very short period of time. But perhaps the greatest value of this volume is that it will serve as excellent food-for-thought on the past treatment of children—including forceable separation from their parents and commitment to correctional institutions—just because they refused to salute the flag. Also, the violence against the Witnesses, here vividly portrayed, frightened this reviewer. That such treatment of a minority is possible in this country underscores the need for a re-evaluation of the real meaning of freedom and toler-

ance, not from the standpoint of constitutional right but from the more important standpoint of the potentiality of mob action and mass deprivation of rights through passion and irrationality. Manwaring has here, then, caused at least one person to reflect on the provocative question of the relationship of legal rights to the social and individual behavior of others with whom we differ. —GERALD RIGBY, *University of Southern California*.

*The Contours of American History.* By WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS. (World Publishing Co. 513 pp. \$7.50.)

Surveying the American past, William Appleman Williams finds a single dominant motif—the dollar sign. The pursuit of private gain, he laments, has seduced Americans away from the noble ideals of their beginnings and brought them to their present unhappy state. Fragmentation, alienation, and purposelessness reigns within; nuclear destruction looms without. But his purpose is more than simply to trace the path by which the republic has come to this pass. *The Contours of American History* is a jeremiad warning the American people to repent before Armageddon. Accompanying this warning is a message of hope. A saving alternative remains, Mr. Williams proclaims. Socialism will build a humane world in which all men can live freely and happily as brothers.

The story presented by Mr. Williams is a tale of decline. The founding fathers of the republic had a glimpse, partial and limited to be sure, but a glimpse nonetheless, of the meaning of a true community. All, even Jefferson, remained within the mercantilist *Weltanschauung*, with its sense of social responsibility, its belief in state action to promote the general welfare, its goal of a diversified and balanced economy, and its vision of a Christian corporate commonwealth. This American mercantilism came of age during the presidency of the younger Adams. Yet its very success in fostering economic growth whetted men's appetites to exploit the new opportunities without restraint. The new spirit, Mr. Williams believes, triumphed with Jacksonian democracy, and with this triumph came the ascendancy of the new *Weltanschauung* of laissez nous faire.

Laissez faire retained its spell over the public mind until the end of the century. By the 1880's, however, the giant corporation had become the dominant force in American life. With the advent of the age of corporate capitalism, Americans came increasingly to see their society as composed of different groups—farmers, workers, and businessmen—and to look to achieve the good life by balancing these groups one against the other. Twentieth-century reformers from T. R. to

F. D. R., Mr. Williams declares, have not challenged this "functionalist-syndicalist system," but have merely sought to remove its worst abuses and promote a fairer balancing of forces—all without undermining private property.

Their ability to do so, Mr. Williams holds, has depended—and continues to depend—upon the continuing expansion of the market. In response to the depression of the 1890's, American leaders concluded "that overseas economic expansion provided the *sine qua non* of domestic prosperity and social peace" and "consciously initiated a broad program of sophisticated imperialism." The United States began the Spanish-American War to "establish firm control of the Caribbean; and proceed with expansion into Asia." Wilson led the United States into World War One because he feared that Germany was this country's "main competitor for economic empire." F. D. R. fought the Second World War to safeguard "America's recovery-and-prosperity-through-expansion campaign" from the Axis challenge. Coming to the present, Mr. Williams warns that the continued acceptance in the postwar years of this "frontier-expansionist outlook" has led to the impasse of the cold war with its threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The job of the historian, Mr. Williams avers in his introduction, is to clear away myths about the past so that men can better understand the present. Unfortunately, he himself has merely replaced one set of myths with another—those arising from his attempt to force the whole of the American experience into the straitjacket of an economic interpretation of history. Take, for instance, the quotes Mr. Williams features from American business and political leaders bemoaning the "spectacular gains" made by Hitler Germany in the markets of the world. Was the Third Reich no more than a trade rival of the United States? Simply to ask the question is to reveal the shallowness of Mr. Williams's approach.

Or let us examine Mr. Williams's account of the background of Pearl Harbor. He starts by showing the importance of American trade with Asia. This trade, he goes on to say, revived "the old idea that *China* (italics mine) was the next American frontier." To protect that frontier, "Japan had to be forced to withdraw from China." The weapon was the embargo on oil, steel, and other war materials. But this strategy backfired when Japan refused to retreat and war followed. Now let us look at the facts. While trade with Asia was important, American trade with Japan was four times that with China—a fact not mentioned by Mr. Williams. The available evidence indicates that most American businessmen active in China sympathized with the Japanese, while most American business journals echoed the plaint of the *Magazine of Wall Street*, "It would take more than the

Orient appears to offer us in economic advantages to induce the United States to risk war." The Roosevelt administration acted in China more from a stubborn adherence to principle than from any master plan to save the Chinese market for American business. The truth is that American policy in the Far East may be more justly assailed as Quixotic than as Machiavellian.

Perhaps we should judge Mr. Williams not as a historian but as a prophet leading the American people to salvation. Unhappily, Mr. Williams is no sounder a prophet than he is a historian. He exults that the Bolshevik Revolution reasserted the ideal of a true commonwealth. But what do we find in the Soviet Union of today? A ruthless, self-seeking dictatorship. The melancholy record of human frailty should warn us against the seductive appeal of his millennial faith. Given the imperfections of mankind, the most we can hope for is a rough approximation to justice from the balancing of rival self-interests—and this the present "functionalist-syndicalist system" in the United States performs to the satisfaction of the overwhelming majority of the American people.

Even more naive and wrongheaded is Mr. Williams's faith that this country's embracing socialism would end world tensions and prevent nuclear war. This faith rests upon two premises—both patently false. First, that economic rivalries are the prime cause of wars. Second, that the drive for overseas markets by American corporations backed by the State Department is responsible for the cold war. The cold war is, for Mr. Williams, "very largely the result of the conflict between the expansion of those corporations and the opposition to them manifested by vigorous and militant rivals." The conflict between East and West involves, in short, no more than a struggle for the world's markets. Such thinking at this date can only reflect willful blindness not simply fuzzy-mindedness.—JOHN BRAEMAN, *Brooklyn College*.

*Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker.* BY NIGEL WALKER, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 302.)

It has been said that a major function of statistics is to strengthen what one already knows. To a considerable extent that comment characterizes the contribution made by Nigel Walker's *Morale in the Civil Service*. At the outset of this brief review, it should be noted that although the study is concerned with English civil service clerical grades including administrative officers and some technical personnel, much of the data and conclusions are applicable to their American counterparts.

The author examines in some depth the concept of morale and its "effect" upon the individual and group, using two government agencies, and two

private firms for this purpose. The methods employed are the questionnaire (a sample of which is supplied in the Appendix) and followed up by interviews wherever necessary. Both the questionnaires and the interviews were directed to a carefully selected sample. The questionnaires were returned in 70% of the cases.

The reader is given to understand quite early that the term morale has little operational use, and is not quantifiable as a concept and is of little use in studying efficiency, which the author takes to be the goal of morale. Considerable emphasis is given to American studies of the industrial worker which disclosed that while productivity of workers could be increased by greater mechanization, better working conditions, time study and incentive payments of various kinds, it also depended on the worker's attitudes towards their management and to their immediate supervisors, on the values which people seem to attach to their work and on other such psychological factors.

This legacy from the contributions of scientific management and the more recent insights which the industrial psychologists and sociologists have given us as to motivation and group behavior, currently vie for attention and application both in industry and the government service.

Since Leonard D. White's ground-breaking studies of prestige, and to some extent, morale in the public service appeared in 1929 and 1932, much has been written about the importance of morale and how to improve it. Actually, little has been produced of substantive value about this elusive factor in employee relations. The usual cause-and-effect reasoning has run as follows: A given personnel technique pleases employees; the result is improved morale; and improved morale will lead to better personnel relations and greater efficiency. Mr. Walker has, in effect, subjected this plausible chain of reasoning to analysis using careful methods of inquiry to substantiate or reject the myths which have developed.

To summarize: As the author was unable to find a useful and measurable element to morale as such, he found through his analysis that a composite definition would lend itself much more adequately to this technique. He indicated the following factors as important and quantifiable to a significant extent: 1. Productivity or efficiency. 2. Job satisfaction. 3. Pride in the working group. 4. Cohesiveness.

Data secured from questionnaires and interviews amply reproduced in the text seemed to bear out the author's contentions in the main that the factors noted could be measured. Other questions examined by the study involved a wide variety of subjects such as absenteeism, turnover rates, leave, promotion policies, pensions, wage rates, job security and the like.

Efficiency and job-satisfaction are the components which the author found the most significant as an indication of "high morale." One of the fallacies, he points out is that of diagnosing "low morale" in an organization without comparing its symptoms with those of other organizations. Quite apart from the doubtful utility of the whole concept of "morale," comparison of this kind might well show that what seemed to be pathological symptoms were in fact equally frequent in all offices of the same kind.

In the final analysis, this book is a description of a problem, not the prescription for a remedy, as Nigel Walker notes. There is thus no grounds for arguing that increasing the enjoyment of the work for the employee will help in increasing production. The author does cautiously admit, however; that increasing job-satisfaction is linked with efficiency.—LOUIS L. FRIEDLAND, *Wayne State University*.

*City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination.* BY GLADYS M. KAMMERER, CHARLES D. FARRIS, JOHN M. DE-GROVE, ALFRED B. CLUBOK. (University of Florida Monographs, No. 13, Winter, 1962, U. of Florida Press, Gainesville. \$2.50, 93 pp.)

The purpose of this study is two-fold: to catalogue the discrepancies between the "classical" doctrine of council manager plans and the "reality" of manager behavior, and to make some recommendations, consistent with the authors' commitment to programmatic democracy, regarding institutional improvements in city manager plans. In their comparison of seventy-six manager cities in Florida, the authors focused on two dependent variables: at the community level, the average tenure per city of managers since 1945; and, at the personal level, variations in tenure of individual managers. Employing a pluralistic framework they tested hypotheses about tenure in the light of institutional-structural differences in councils, especially the manager's authority over personnel; political factors in the community such as its political style (monopolistic, oligopolistic or competitive); nonpolitical factors such as the size and rate of growth of the city; and individual factors of managers such as their career patterns and degree of professionalization.

It should come as no surprise to the political scientist that hypotheses with political factors as independent variables are the more accurate predictors of tenure. As was expected, the city manager is a more politicized animal than the International City Managers' Association (and most local government textbook writers) would have us believe. The degree of politicalization (e.g., the extent to which the manager initiates

policy) of this "administrative" position is directly related to its vulnerability to the effective political forces of the community. At the community level of analysis a hypothesis tested and confirmed was that tenure tends to average longer in stable than in unstable communities. In assessing the reasons given for involuntary terminations, the authors found that electoral or public opinion considerations predominated in cities with a competitive political style, while "palace" considerations, trouble with the boss or mayor, predominated in monopolistic situations.

Though the many hypotheses were subjected to rigorous testing, and the study reports useful findings, this reader felt that an unduly narrow theoretical scheme prevented full exploitation of the data. For example, in handling the personal tenure data, had the authors been more explicit about their latent role-theory, the material could well have led to generalizations about role-types and degree of vulnerability in differing political situations. At the community level, an implicit theoretical assumption that local politics are to be explained primarily in terms of conflict situations prevents what might have been useful statements regarding consensus patterns.

Nevertheless, the study carefully accomplishes its stated purpose in demonstrating that the behavior of city managers is not consistent with council-manager doctrine, and, in the process, turns up data and reports findings which should be welcomed by the student of local politics. The well-argued prescriptive addendum does not interfere with the study and merits the attention of the practitioner.—KENNETH PREWITT, *Stanford University*.

*The Government of Missouri*, 7th ed. By ROBERT F. KARSCH. (Columbia, Missouri: Lucas Brothers Publishers, 1961. Pp. 199.)

The present text started out more than 10 years ago as a brief exposition of Missouri's government. It was prompted at that time by the need for a handbook to assist in fulfilling a statutory requirement that the Missouri constitution

be taught in state colleges and universities. Now, six editions later, the work has been enlarged into a substantial text and has become a standard reference guide to the structure and organization of Missouri state government.

A large number of treatises on the governments of individual states have appeared in recent years. The American Commonwealths Series inaugurated by the Crowell publishing firm a decade or so ago optimistically envisioned a text for each state. Other publishers have selected areas, such as Texas and California, where legal requirements or custom result in widespread teaching of courses on the government of particular states. Most works which have appeared in this genre are legally and institutionally oriented. They describe comprehensively the formal structure of the state's government, review the wide range of functions it performs, and set forth many of the legal provisions pertaining to political parties, voting, reapportionment, powers of the governor and legislature, and similar matters. Seldom does one find more than passing reference to the informal structure and operations of the governmental and administrative machinery or to the political realities that permeate the system from top to bottom.

The *Government of Missouri* conforms to the traditional pattern. It is excellent on description but short on the informal functioning of the state's administrative and legislative organs. The student who masters it will have broad knowledge of the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of Missouri government but little feel for its politics or the manner in which the public business of running the commonwealth is actually carried out. However, a text must be judged by its purpose; and Professor Karsch's objective is to supply college students in Missouri with a carefully written and documented handbook outlining the state's executive, legislative, and judicial structure, and the legal basis for its operations. Knowledge of this kind must obviously precede a more sophisticated approach to state government.—HENRY J. SCHMANDT, *University of Wisconsin*.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE  
*University of Maryland*

### ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

#### National Government

Bilder, Richard B. The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs. *American Journal of International Law*. July, 1962.

Vardys, V. Stanley. Select Committees of the House of Representatives. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. August, 1962.

#### State Government

Barrett, Charles A. Reapportionment and the

Courts. *State Government*. Summer, 1962.

Bartlett, Roy R. State Taxation Powers in Federal Areas. *Washburn Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Boyd, William J. D. Patterns of Apportionment. National Municipal League. 1962.

Goodman, William I. Urban Planning and the Role of the State. *State Government*. Summer, 1962.

Greaney, Walter T., Jr. The Massachusetts Budget Process. Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachusetts. 1962.

Hatchett, John T., and T. Noel Stern. Revenue Estimating in Indiana. Bureau of Government Research, Indiana University. 1962.

Heller, Francis H., and Don R. Bowen. Uniform State Laws in Kansas. Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas. 1962.

Larson, Robert W. Statehood for New Mexico, 1888-1912. *New Mexico Historical Review*. July, 1962.

Martin, James W. The States Must Plan. *National Civic Review*. July, 1962.

McKay, Robert B. Reapportionment and the Federal Analogy. National Municipal League. 1962.

McKinney, David, et al. Money for [Highway] Miles in Mississippi. Bureau of Business and Economic Research and Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Mississippi. 1962.

Palmer, Dwight R. G. State Government and Transportation. *State Government*. Summer, 1962.

Pray, Joseph C., and George J. Mauer. The New Perspective of Legislative Apportionment in Oklahoma. Bureau of Government Research, University of Oklahoma. 1962.

Zimmerman, Joseph F. The Executive Veto in Massachusetts, 1947-1960. *Social Science*. June, 1962.

#### Local Government

Agnew, John W. The Economics of Urban Redevelopment. *Municipal Finance*. August, 1962.

Bartley, Ernest R. Urban Planning: An Introduction for the Citizen. Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida. 1962.

Bird, Frederick L. Local Special Districts and Authorities in Rhode Island. Bureau of Government Research, University of Rhode Island. 1962.

Briley, Beverly. The Davidson County Story [Consolidation with Nashville]. *County Officer*. September, 1962.

Browning, Beverly L. North Kingstown Selects Two Managers—A Case Study. Bureau of Government Research, University of Rhode Island. 1962.

Constitutional Provision for Streamlining County Government Needs Enabling Statutes. Missouri Public Expenditure Survey. 1962.

Crosswhite, William M., and Gerald F. Vaughn.

Land Use in the Rural-Urban Fringe: A Case Study of New Castle County, Delaware. Agricultural Experiment Station and Division of Urban Affairs, University of Delaware. 1962.

Despain, I. Dale. Excessive Land Subdivision. *County Officer*. September, 1962.

Duggar, George S. Urban Renewal: Current Criticism and the Search for a Rationale. *Public Management*. September, 1962.

Dukeminier, Jesse, Jr., and Clyde L. Stapleton. The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule. *Kentucky Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Hein, Clarence J. Rural Fears Allayed [on Local Services]. *National Civic Review*. September, 1962.

Kolb, William L. The City and Its Planners. [Symposium]. *Carleton Miscellany*. Summer, 1962.

MacCorkle, Stuart A. Council-Administrative Relationships. *Public Management*. August, 1962.

———. Tenure of City Managers. *Ibid.* July, 1962.

Reynolds, William J. Is Economy in Local Government Popular? *Municipal Finance*. August, 1962.

Saville, Lloyd. Regional Contrasts in the Development of Local Public Finance. *National Tax Journal*. June, 1962.

Schaller, Lyle E. The Changing Face of Urban Renewal. *Mayor and Manager*. June, 1962.

Scheffer, Walter F. Problems in Municipal Finance. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Scheuer, James H., Eli Goldston, and Wilton S. Sogg. Disposition of Urban Renewal Land—A Fundamental Problem in the Rebuilding of Our Cities. *Columbia Law Review*. June, 1962.

Schriever, Paul. Municipal In-Service Training—Performance and Prospects. *Public Management*. August, 1962.

Taylor, Milton C. Local Income Taxes after Twenty-one Years. *National Tax Journal*. June, 1962.

Twichey, Robert H. Zoning and the Expanding Public Utility. *Syracuse Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

Weaver, Robert C. The Future of the American City. Walter J. Shepard Foundation, Ohio State University. 1962.

Whittier, Jeannette S. Administrative Problems in a Small Community. *Municipal Finance*. August, 1962.

Winters, John M. Classification of Municipalities. *Northwestern University Law Review*. July-August, 1962.

#### Intergovernmental Relations

Conroy, Harold A. Municipal Sharing in State Revenues. *Municipal Finance*. August, 1962.

Kohl, John C. Urban Transportation—A National Problem. *Ibid.*

Loeks, C. David. Taming Urban Giant [by Coordinated Planning]. *National Civic Review*. July, 1962.

Walker, W. Paul. Taxation in Maryland with Special Reference to State-County Fiscal Relations. Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Maryland. 1962.

#### Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Bonfield, Arthur Earl. *Baker v. Carr*: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government. *California Law Review*. May, 1962.

Cairns, Robert B., James C. N. Paul, and Julius Wishner. Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obsecenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence. *Minnesota Law Review*. May, 1962.

Collings, Rex A., Jr. Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure—An Amicus Curiae Brief. *California Law Review*. August, 1962.

Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. May, 1962.

Cox, Archibald. Current Constitutional Issues. *American Bar Association Journal*. August, 1962.

Dillard, Hardy Cross. Freedom of Choice and Democratic Values. *Virginia Quarterly Review*. Summer, 1962.

Dure, Leon. Individual Freedom versus "State Action." *Ibid.*

Employment Discrimination and Interstate Carriers. *Indiana Law Journal*. Summer, 1962.

Frantz, Laurent B. The First Amendment in the Balance. *Yale Law Journal*. July, 1962.

Hink, Heinz R. The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Judicial Review: Its Role in Intergovernmental Relations: A Symposium. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Summer, 1962.

Justice Black and First Amendment "Abso-lutes": A Public Interview. *New York University Law Review*. June, 1962.

Levy, Leonard W. School Prayers and the Founding Fathers. *Commentary*. September, 1962.

Lynch, John A., Jr., and G. Robert Wileman. Remand to State Courts and Its Effect on the Dual-Sovereign System. *Georgetown Law Journal*. Summer, 1962.

McKeever, Patrick C., and Billy Dwight Perry. The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary. *Ibid.*

Nelson, Randall H. The Subject-Matter Limitation upon the Treaty-Making Power. *Journal of Public Law*. Spring, 1962.

Resnick, Edward H. Prior Restraint—The Constitutional Question. *Boston University Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

Sentell, R. Perry, Jr. The Opinions of Hughes and Sutherland and the Rights of the Individual. *Vanderbilt Law Review*. March, 1962.

Shapiro, Martin. Judicial Review: Political Reality and Legislative Purpose: The Supreme Court's Supervision of Congressional Investigations. *Ibid.*

Tresolini, Rocco J. Justice Rutledge and the Yamashita Case. *Social Science*. June, 1962.

#### Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

Abrams, Norman. Conspiracy and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The Crime Committed Formula. *University of California, Los Angeles, Law Review*. July, 1962.

Armstrong, Walter P., Jr. Uniform State Laws and the National Conference. *State Government*. Summer, 1962.

Chappell, Richard A. The Lawyer's Role in the Administration of Probation and Parole. *American Bar Association Journal*. August, 1962.

Crosse, Murray L. Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country. *Arizona Law Review*. Fall, 1962.

Diamond, Bernard L. From *M'Naghten* to *Currens*, and Beyond [re Criminal Responsibility]. *California Law Review*. May, 1962.

The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts. *Columbia Law Review*. June, 1962.

Federal Rule 43(a): The Scope of Admissibility of Evidence and the Implications of the *Erie* Doctrine. *Ibid.*

Fundamental Concepts of Public Law—A Symposium: Part II. *Journal of Public Law*. Spring, 1962.

Garwood, W. St. John. Democracy and the Popular Election of Judges: An Argument. *Southwestern Law Journal*. July, 1962.

George, B. J., Jr. Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerations in the Control of Prostitution. *Michigan Law Review*. April, 1962.

Goldstein, Abraham S., and Edith W. Fine. The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. June, 1962.

Griswold, Erwin N. The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35 Should Not Be Surrendered. *American Bar Association Journal*. July, 1962.

Hall, Jerome. The Scientific and Humane Study of Criminal Law. *Boston University Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

Karlen, Delmar. Appeals in England and the United States. *Law Quarterly Review*. July, 1962.

Kuh, Richard H. The Insanity Defense—An Effort to Combine Law and Reason. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. April, 1962.

LaFave, Wayne R. Detention for Investigation



by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices. *Washington University Law Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Lane, Morton. The Contempt Power v. the Concept of a Fair Trial. *Kentucky Law Journal*. Spring, 1962.

McCabe, Francis V. Rhode Island Family Court. *Boston University Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

Nagel, Stuart S. Sociometric Relations among American Courts. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1962.

———. Testing Relations between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Newspaper Libel: Barriers to Expanding Personal Jurisdiction. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Salzman, Leon. Psychiatric Interviews as Evidence: The Role of the Psychiatrist in Court—Some Suggestions and Case Histories. *George Washington Law Review*. June, 1962.

Shears, Curtis C. Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts. *American Bar Association Journal*. August, 1962.

Stimson, Edward S. Omnibus Statutes Designed to Secure Jurisdiction over Out-of-State Defendants. *Ibid.*

Summers, Marvin R. Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases. *Iowa Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting Ambiguous Grounds of Decision. *Columbia Law Review*. May, 1962.

Symposium: Louisiana and the Civil Law. *Louisiana Law Review*. June, 1962.

Warren, Earl. Developments in Federal Judicial Administration. *Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly*. October, 1962.

Wessel, Milton R. Procedural Safeguards for the Mass Conspiracy Trial. *American Bar Association Journal*. July, 1962.

Zeisel, Hans. Delay by the Parties and Delay by the Courts. *Journal of Legal Education*. Vol. 15, No. 1. 1962.

#### Public Administration and Administrative Law

Bell, David E. Management in the Federal Government. *Civil Service Journal*. July–September, 1962.

Briggs, John F. A Refined Program Budget for State Governments. School of Government and Public Administration, American University. 1962.

Davis, Kenneth Culp. Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Dillon, Conley H. Government Purchases and Depressed Areas. *Challenge*. July, 1962.

Dionisopoulos, P. Allan. Procedural Safeguards

in Administrative Rule Making in Indiana. *Indiana Law Journal*. Summer, 1962.

Elias, Erwin A. Administrative Discretion—No Solution in Sight. *Baylor Law Review*. Winter, 1962.

Evan, William M. Due Process of Law in Military and Industrial Organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Fisher, John E. Do Federal Managers Manage? *Public Administration Review*. Spring, 1962.

Garwood, John D. When Should Government Agency Operations Remain Secret? *Public Utilities Fortnightly*. August 30, 1962.

Golembiewski, Robert T. Organization as a Moral Problem. *Public Administration Review*. Spring, 1962.

Gordon, Oakley, Reed Richardson, and J. D. Williams. Personnel Management in Utah State Government. Institute of Government, University of Utah. 1962.

Hart, Wilson R. Government Labor's New Frontiers through Presidential Directive. *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1962.

Hicks, Herbert G. The Meaning of Line and Staff. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Iverson, Paul E. Endorsement and Negotiation of Government Warrants. *Utah Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

Killian, James R., Jr. Can Government Maintain Vital Scientific Leadership? National Civil Service League. [1962].

Klepak, Daniel. Organizing for Effective Centralized Services. *State Government*. Summer, 1962.

Koontz, Harold. Making Sense of Management Theory. *Harvard Business Review*. July–August, 1962.

Krislov, Joseph. The Independent Public Employee Association: Characteristics and Functions. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. July, 1962.

Lehman, William P. Federal Pay Reform: Some Facets of Comparability. *Public Personnel Review*. July, 1962.

Luepke, Clement J. Safeguarding the Public Employee. *Public Management*. July, 1962.

Mainzer, Lewis C. Injustice and Bureaucracy. *Yale Review*. Summer, 1962.

Newland, Chester A. Public Employee Unionization in Texas. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. 1962.

Patterson, L. Ray. Hearsay and the Substantial Evidence Rule in the Federal Administrative Process. *Mercer Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Quinn, Thomas A. Government Subcontractors' Remedies in Rem. *George Washington Law Review*. June, 1962.

Riggs, Fred W. Convergences in the Study of

Comparative Public Administration and Local Government. Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida. 1962.

Stodola, Edward T. Problems in Expedition and Disposition of Large Administrative Proceedings at the Civil Aeronautics Board. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*. Summer, 1961-62.

Sullivan, John Paul. Federal Power Commission Jurisdiction over Commingled Sales of Natural Gas: A Problem in Judicial and Administrative Legislation. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1962.

Tannenbaum, Arnold S. Control in Organizations: Individual Adjustment and Organizational Performance. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. September, 1962.

vom Baur, F. Trowbridge. Administrative Agencies and Unauthorized Practice of Law. *American Bar Association Journal*. August, 1962.

Voorhees, William F., Jr. Administering Investment of Public Funds. *Municipal Finance*. August, 1962.

Washnis, George J. Polygraphic Tests for City Employees. *Public Personnel Review*. July, 1962.

Witherspoon, Joseph P. Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Middle Road": I. *Texas Law Review*. June, 1962.

Woll, Peter. Administrative Law Reform: Proposals and Prospects. *Nebraska Law Review*. June, 1962.

#### Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Baur, E. Jackson. Opinion Change in a Public Controversy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Bement, Reed H. Congressional Authority to Restrict the Use of Literacy Tests. *California Law Review*. May, 1962.

Blackorby, Edward C. William Lemke: Agrarian Radical and Union Party Presidential Candidate. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. June, 1962.

Booth, David A., and Charles R. Adrian. Power Structure and Community Change. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. August, 1962.

Clark, David G. Radio in Presidential Campaigns: The Early Years (1924-1932). *Journal of Broadcasting*. Summer, 1962.

The Constitutionality of Federal Anti-Literacy Test Legislation. *Minnesota Law Review*. May, 1962.

Cornwell, Elmer E., Jr. The Press Conferences of Woodrow Wilson. *Journalism Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

David, Paul T., and Ralph Eisenberg. Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote. Vol. II. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia. 1962.

Derthick, Martha. City Politics in Washington, D. C. Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, and Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies. 1962.

Dodge, Richard W., and Eugene S. Uyeki. Political Affiliation and Imagery Across Two Related Generations. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. August, 1962.

Donoghue, James R. How Wisconsin Voted, 1848-1960. Bureau of Government, University of Wisconsin. 1962.

Easton, David, and Robert D. Hess. The Child's Political World. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. August, 1962.

Eulau, Heinz, and David Koff. Occupational Mobility and Political Career. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Ewing, Cortez A. M. Constitutional Crisis in the American Party System. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Goldberg, Morton David. Promoting the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: A Commentary on the Copyright Office Report on General Revision of the United States Copyright Law. *Cornell Law Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Goldstein, Richard, and Arthur Kessler. The Twilight Zone: Meanderings in the Area of Performers' Rights. *University of California, Los Angeles, Law Review*. July, 1962.

Haller, Mark H. The Rise of the Jackson Party in Maryland, 1820-1829. *Journal of Southern History*. August, 1962.

Hennings, Robert E. California Democratic Politics in the Period of Republican Ascendancy. *Pacific Historical Review*. August, 1962.

Hirschfield, Robert S., Bert E. Swanson, and Blanche D. Blank. A Profile of Political Activists in Manhattan. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Janosik, Edward G. Report on Political Activity of Philadelphia Businessmen. Committee for Economic Development and Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania [n.d.]

Johannsen, Robert W. Stephen A. Douglas' New England Campaign, 1860. *New England Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Kammeyer, Kenneth. A Comparative Study of Decision Making in Rural Communities. *Rural Sociology*. September, 1962.

King, Donald B. Corporate Political Spending and the First Amendment. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*. June, 1962.

Kurtz, Robert S. The Right to Privacy: A Legal Guidepost to Television Programming. *Journal of Broadcasting*. Summer, 1962.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Michels' Theory of Political Parties. Institute of Industrial Rela-

tions, University of California, Berkeley. Reprint No. 185. 1962.

Lowry, Ritchie P. The Functions of Alienation in Leadership. *Sociology and Social Research*. July, 1962.

McConaughy, John B., and John E. Gauntlett. A Survey of Urban Negro Voting Behavior in South Carolina. *South Carolina Law Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

McGrath, Joseph E., and Marion F. McGrath. Effects of Partisanship on Perceptions of Political Figures. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Miller, Helen Hill. The City Vote and the Rural Monopoly. *Atlantic*. October, 1962.

Mitgang, Herbert. The Downfall of Jimmy Walker. *Ibid.*

Netterville, Victor S. Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary. *Southern California Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Patterson, Samuel C. Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party State Legislature. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Perry, Paul. Gallup Poll Election Survey Experience, 1950 to 1960. *Ibid.*

Pfantz, Harold W. The Power Structure of the Negro Sub-Community: A Case Study and a Comparative View. *Phylon*. Summer, 1962.

Poulshock, S. Walter. Pennsylvania and the Politics of the Tariff, 1880-1888. *Pennsylvania History*. July, 1962.

Reid, Thomas R. Businessmen in Politics. *National Civic Review*. September, 1962.

Rogin, Michael. Voluntarism: The Political Functions of an Antipolitical Doctrine. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. July, 1962.

Rosenberg, Marvin and Dorothy. The Dirtiest Election [1884]. *American Heritage*. August, 1962.

Rosenberg, Morris. Self-Esteem and Concern with Public Affairs. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Ross, Hugh. Was the Nomination of Wendell Willkie a Political Miracle? *Indiana Magazine of History*. June, 1962.

Ross, William R. An Introduction to the Electoral Process in West Virginia. Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University. [1962.]

Runciman, W. G. A Method for Cross-National Comparison of Political Consensus. *British Journal of Sociology*. June, 1962.

Stokes, Donald E., and Gudmund R. Iversen. On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Walker, David B. The Presidential Politics of the Franco-Americans. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. August, 1962.

Werdegarr, Kathryn Mickle. The Constitutionality of Federal Legislation to Abolish

Literacy Tests: Civil Rights Commission's 1961 Report on Voting. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1962.

Wildavsky, Aaron B. On the Superiority of National Conventions. *Review of Politics*. July, 1962.

Yates, W. Ross. The Functions of Residence Requirements for Voting. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1962.

#### Economic and Social Functions

##### National Economy

Bazon, David T. The Paper Economy. *Commentary*. September, 1962.

Brandt, Karl. The Public Sector and Price Fixing. *Modern Age*. Summer 1962.

Breimyer, Harold F. The Three Economies of Agriculture. *Journal of Farm Economics*. August, 1962.

Dickinson, William B., Jr. Fiscal and Budget Policy. *Editorial Research Reports*. August 1, 1962.

Galloway, Lowell E. An Economic Analysis of Public Policy for the Depressed Areas. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. July, 1962.

Growth of Federal Domestic Spending Programs, 1947-1963. Tax Foundation. 1962.

McClelland, David C. Business Drive and National Achievement. *Harvard Business Review*. July-August, 1962.

Price, Don K. Control of the Monetary System. *Ibid.*

United States Trade Policy, 1962. [Symposium.] *Current History*. August, 1962.

von Nardoff, Ellen. The American Frontier as a Safety Valve—The Life, Death, Reincarnation, and Justification of a Theory. *Agricultural History*. July, 1962.

Worsnop, Richard L. Government Stockpiling. *Editorial Research Reports*. August 22, 1962.

##### Natural Resources

Milliman, J. W. Can People Be Trusted with Natural Resources? *Land Economics*. August, 1962.

Reich, Charles A. The Public and the Nation's Forests. *California Law Review*. August, 1962.

Shannonhouse, Royal G. Some Principles of Water Law in the Southeast. *Mercer Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Waite, G. Graham. Public Rights in Indiana Waters. *Indiana Law Journal*. Summer, 1962.

Zobler, Leonard. An Economic-Historical View of Natural Resources. *Economic Geography*. July, 1962.

##### Agriculture

An Adaptive Program for Agriculture. Committee for Economic Development. 1962.

*Business and Labor*

Ablard, Charles D., and Marion Edwyn Harrison. The Post Office and Publishers' Pursestrings: A Study of the Second-Class Mailing Permit. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1962.

Anderson, Donald R. Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio. *Yale Law Journal*. July, 1962.

Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry. *Minnesota Law Review*. May, 1962.

Barber, Richard J. Airline Mergers, Monopoly, and the CAB. *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*. Summer, 1961-62.

Barkin, Solomon. Differentiated National Labor Policies to Meet Present Problems. *Labor Law Journal*. September, 1962.

Bernhardt, Herbert N. The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies [in Labor Antitrust Actions]. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*. June, 1962.

Brandwen, Maxwell. Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Burstein, Herbert. Subcontracting and Plant Removals. *Labor Law Journal*. June, 1962.

Cummings, Frank. Individual Enforcement of Rights under Collective Bargaining Agreements. *Ibid.* August, 1962.

Dakin, Melvin G. The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation: Just Compensation, Due Process, and Equal Protection. Part II. *Tulane Law Review*. June, 1962.

Denbo, Milton C. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Award Back Pay in Injunction Suits under Fair Labor Standards Act. *Labor Law Journal*. June, 1962.

———. Taft-Hartley Act and Newspaper Publishers. *Ibid.* September, 1962.

Dubin, Gary V., and Anthony C. Gooch. Unilateral Action as a Legitimate Economic Weapon: Power Bargaining by the Employer upon Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. *New York University Law Review*. June, 1962.

Gellhorn, Walter, and Louis Lauer. Administration of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law. Part III. *Ibid.*

Gregory, Charles O. Enforcement of Collective Agreements by Arbitration. *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1962.

Handler, Milton. Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust. *Columbia Law Review*. June, 1962.

Jacobs, Paul. Dead Horse and the Featherbed. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif. 1962.

Johnson, David B. The New Frontier Collective Bargaining Policy. *Labor Law Journal*. July, 1962.

Labor Arbitration—A Symposium. *New York University Law Review*. May, 1962.

Merger and Monopoly in Domestic Aviation. *Columbia Law Review*. May, 1962.

Miller, Arthur S., ed. The Ethics of Business Enterprise. [Symposium.] *Annals*. September, 1962.

Mueller, Stephen J. The Current Legal Status of Peaceful and Truthful Picketing. *American Bar Association Journal*. July, 1962.

Rothman, Stuart. The Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining to Hiring Hall Arrangements. *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1962.

Suss, Fredric T. Small Business and Government Procurement, 1961. *Mercer Law Review*. Spring, 1962.

Symposium on Price Competition and Antitrust Policy. *Northwestern University Law Review*. May-June, 1962.

Symposium on Securities Regulation. Part I. *New York Law Forum*. March, 1962. Part II. *Ibid.* May, 1962.

Van de Water, John R. Labor Law and National Defense. *Labor Law Journal*. August, 1962.

von Kalinowski, Julian O. Section 7 and Competitive Effects. *Virginia Law Review*. June, 1962.

*Health, Education, and Welfare*

Abato, Anthony A., Jr. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act—Its History, Operation, and Amendment. *George Washington Law Review*. April, 1962.

Burns, Eveline M. What's Wrong with Public Welfare? *Social Service Review*. June, 1962.

Cacciapaglia, Frank, Jr., and Howard B. Rockman. The Proposed Drug Industry Antitrust Act—Patents, Pricing, and the Public. *George Washington Law Review*. June, 1962.

Cohen, Elias S. An Aging Population and State Government. *State Government*. Summer, 1962.

D'Amours, Ernest R. State Supervision of Charities: Present Status. *Ibid.*

Fraese, Ronald W. Teacher-Employer Relations: An Annotated Bibliography. Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California, Los Angeles. 1962.

Hayes, John Cornelius. The Constitutional Permissibility of the Participation of Church-Related Schools in the Administration's Proposed Program of Massive Federal Aid to Education. *DePaul Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

Markel, Michael F. Federal Pre-emption [in Food and Drug Laws]. *Food-Drug-Cosmetic Law Journal*. August, 1962.

McKenna, William J. The Transportation of Private and Parochial School Children at Public Expense. *Temple Law Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Problems of the Aging. [Symposium.] *Law and Contemporary Problems*. Winter, 1962.

Vail, David J. Administration of Mental Health Research in a State Program. *State Government*. Summer, 1962.

Webb, James E. Education and the National Space Program. *Higher Education*. July, 1962.

#### *Military Affairs and National Security*

Avins, Alfred. The Execution of Private Slovik and Punishment for Short Desertion. *George Washington Law Review*. June, 1962.

Fliess, Peter J. The Legality of Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. *University of Florida Law Review*. Summer, 1962.

McLaughlin, John J. Organization of the Air Force. *Air University Quarterly Review*. Spring, 1962.

Meadows, Martin. Eugene Hale and the American Navy. *American Neptune*. July, 1962.

New Hope for Disarmament. [Symposium.] *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. September, 1962.

Piel, Gerard. Can Our Economy Stand Disarmament? *Atlantic*. September, 1962.

Reis, John C., and Owen S. Nibley. Justice, Juries, and Military Dependents. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Rundell, Walter, Jr. Invasion Currency: A U. S. Army Fiscal Problem in World War II. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Russell, Kendall. Strategic Missiles and Basing Concepts. *Air University Quarterly Review*. Spring, 1962.

Schrader, George D. National Sovereignty in Space. *Military Law Review*. July, 1962.

Singer, J. David. Stable Deterrence and Its Limits. *Western Political Quarterly*. September, 1962.

Worsnop, Richard L. Peaceful Use of Outer Space. *Editorial Research Reports*. June 27, 1962.

#### Government Documents

##### *Congress*

House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings before Special Subcommittee on Defense Agencies. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Military Reserve Posture Hearings. Also Report of Subcommittee No. 3 [Committee Print]. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Authority over the Trust Powers of National Banks and National Bank Branches. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Higher Interest Rates on Time Deposits of Foreign Governments. Hearings. Also House Report No. 2162. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. The Senior Citizens Housing Act of 1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also

House Report No. 2052. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962. House Report No. 1961. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Education and Labor. Education of Migrant Agricultural Employees and Their Children. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 1962. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Purchase of United Nations Bonds. Hearings. Also House Report No. 2176. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. United States Contributions to International Organizations. House Doc. No. 460. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Administration of Grants by the National Institutes of Health. House Report No. 1958. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Defense Supply Agency. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Disposition of Reserved Minerals. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Withdrawal, Reservation, and Restriction of Public Lands. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Air Pollution. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 2265. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Quality and Price Stabilization. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 2352. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. SEC Reorganization. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Drug Industry Antitrust Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Sales and Use Taxes. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Review of Merchant Marine Policy, 1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Confidentiality of Census Reports. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Duties of Census Enumerators and Advancing Economic Censuses. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Hazardous Duty Pay. Hearing. Also House Report No. 2269. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

- . Retirement Credit for Federal-State Service; Employee Organization Health Plans; Survivor's Annuities. Hearings. Also House Report No. 2295. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Revision of Major Federal Statutory Salary Systems. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Science and Astronautics. Amending the Organic Act of the National Bureau of Standards. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Limitation on Indirect Costs in Research Grants. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . National Science Foundation Briefing. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Qualifications for Astronauts. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Un-American Activities. Communist Activities in the Cleveland, Ohio, Area. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Structure and Organization of the Communist Party of the United States. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Select Committee on Small Business. Advertising Opportunities for Small Business in Television and Radio. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1962.
- House and Senate. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. AEC Regulatory Problems. Hearing before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1677. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Indemnity and Reactor Safety. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Joint Economic Committee. Inventory Fluctuations and Economic Stabilization. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Measures of Productive Capacity. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Authorizing the President to Order Units and Members in the Ready Reserve to Active Duty for Not More than 12 Months. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Inquiry into the Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles of the United States. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Nonjudicial Punishment. Hearing before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1911. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Banking and Currency. Construction Set-Aside Amendments. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Miscellaneous Bank Bills. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Truth in Lending—1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1962. Senate Report No. 1852. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Commerce. Control of Illegal Interstate Motor Carrier Transportation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Problems of the Softwood Lumber Industry. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Proposed Amendments to Federal Transportation Laws. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Quality Stabilization. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Finance. Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Foreign Relations. Communications Satellite Act of 1962. Hearings. Also Senate Report No. 1873. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Government Operations. American Guild of Variety Artists. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Gold and Silver Production Incentives. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on the Judiciary. Conflicts of Interest. Hearing. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Drug Industry Act of 1962. Senate Report No. 1744. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . National Penitentiaries. Senate Report No. 1704. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Nomination of Thurgood Marshall. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Refusal of Certain Steel Companies to Respond to Subpenas Issued April 12, 1962. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.
- . Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Equal Pay Act of 1962. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Federal Assistance to General University Extension Education Programs. Hearing before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Reform in Statutory Pay Provisions. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Committee on Public Works. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1997. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Select Committee on Small Business. Government Patent Policies in Meteorology and Weather Modification—1962. Hearings before Subcommittee. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Operations of Small Business Investment Companies. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

———. Small Business Failures. Hearings. 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1962.

#### *Other Federal*

Administrative Conference of the United States. Statistics Relating to Administrative Proceedings Conducted by Federal Agencies during Fiscal Year 1961. 1962.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Factors Affecting Voter Reactions to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas. 1962.

Commission on Civil Rights. Housing in Washington. Hearings. 1962.

Department of the Army. Military Justice Evidence. Pamphlet 27-172. 1962.

Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Property Tax Assessments in the United States. 1962.

———. Public School Systems in the United States, 1961-62. 1962.

———. Governments Division. Compendium of City Government Finances in 1961. 1962.

———. State Tax Collections in 1962. 1962.

———. Summary of City Government Finances in 1961. 1962.

———. Summary of Governmental Finances in 1961. 1962.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Social Security Administration. Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance. Annual Paid Man-Hours of Employment and Annual Wages, 1946-54. By David J. Farber. 1962.

Department of the Interior. Bureau of Land Management. Public Lands Bibliography. 1962.

Executive Office of the President. Bureau of the Budget. Progress in Measuring Work. 1962.

Housing and Home Finance Agency. Workable Program for Community Improvement. 1962.

Presidential Railroad Commission. Report [with separate appendices]. 1962.

## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*La IVe République et sa Politique Extérieure.* By ALFRED GROSSER. (Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1961. Pp. 438.)

With the present publication Alfred Grosser, favorably known by his work on Germany, enters a field which is both important and not yet well charted. *The 4th Republic and its Foreign Policy* deals primarily with the domestic political factors influencing the making of foreign policy decisions. In the first of two parts of almost equal length he presents the network of official and unofficial institutions, groups, and persons contributing to the end products of French foreign policy. The second part narrates, in a chronological fashion, how the various decisions were arrived at in the most important issues facing the IVth Republic. To the great delight of his readers the author sticks to the pattern of his previous books: the work carries an immensely valuable *bibliographie raisonnée*, providing short but judicious characterisations of the labyrinth of source material in the field.

Among the countless insights provided in the

first part of the book we find a subtle and well documented analysis of the manifold elements entering into the relations between foreign office personnel and politically responsible ministers. Grosser also elaborates upon the techniques tried by parliament to keep some influence on the shaping of foreign policy; he gives interesting explanations on how the impreciseness of coalition contracts constantly militate against the maintenance of effective parliamentary control. Very rarely has the influence of the French clergy's permissive-attitudes on the emergence of pluralistic political behavior patterns have been as clearly recognized as in the present study.

In the second part the reader will find a forceful elaboration of the tortuous course of decolonization and its foreign policy repercussions including the (by now) classic pattern of how the 1954 Indo-Chinese crisis situation led to Mendès France's temporary leadership. While the author shuns the elaboration of a formalised thesis about the relative importance of institutional, situational and personal factors, he leaves the reader in

no doubt as to the varying effectiveness of Bidault, R. Schumann and Mendès-France in various phases of their careers.—O. H. KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University*.

*The States in West German Federalism: A Study in Federal-State Relations.* By ROGER HEWES WELLS. (New York: Bookmann Associates, 1961. Pp. 148. \$4.00.)

Professor Wells, whose earlier studies of German state and local government are well known, here presents within an institutional framework a short and pithy description of the functioning of German federalism. He builds not only on the studies he edited for the US High Commission, but on a good acquaintance with recent German and English-language literature and discussion. In touching on territorial organization, state elections and legislatures, Federal-Land relationships, Land administration and the *Länder's* role in cultural affairs, he covers quite a bit of ground, and hence he had little opportunity to develop subtle details or to add local color. But extremely ample references to relevant materials are given in thirty pages of notes, and the main text includes enough illustrative data and examples to enlighten, and not so much as to confuse. It is hence very suitable for assignment for students, even under-graduates, who will find it an excellent tool for developing a comparative perspective on American federalism.

There is little doubt that the *Länder* have been able to remain more significant centers of power than many observers had thought likely. Responsible for this development in recent years have been the decisions of the Constitutional Court (though the "Television" decision came down too late for its repercussions to be examined in this book), the SPD's interest in protecting its power position in the Land capitals, and the strong financial position of the *Länder* as against the *Bund*. The relative increase in the power position of the interest groups vis-a-vis the parties has probably also indirectly served to shore up the *Länder's* general bargaining position as against Bonn.

But how do the Land politicians and bureaucrats participate in the decision-making process on the Federal level, which to such a very great degree sets the framework for what can be done on the Land level. Mainly through the Bundesrat, suggests Professor Wells, and he claims that the Bundesrat "has become a more powerful second chamber than the constitutional fathers had envisioned." But only ten percent of West Germans know what the Bundesrat is, and a two-year public relations campaign over the radio failed to spread knowledge of its role. So the Bundesrat remains a sort of hydra-headed

*eminence, grise* which exercises power and influence through administrative channels and the network of links between civil servants in Bonn and the *Länder*. But quite aside from the German voters, what do political scientists know about how the German administrative process really functions? Precious little, for books such as that of Professor Wells are able to build on few substantial investigations in this area. The German discussion has largely centered on the relationships between interest groups and civil servants, but very little attempt has been made to investigate the decision-making process within the administration. It is to be hoped that German political scientists, now that they are ensconced in some three dozen political science chairs, will feel sufficiently established to undertake some initiatives in this direction.—ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, *University of Florida*.

*Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain.* By WILLIAM B. GWYN. (London: The Athlone Press, 1962. Pp. 256. 35 s net.)

Winning consent to govern is the core of political democracy. The process operates at the crossroads where capitalism and popular government meet. The tangled networks of economic and political factors crisscross so closely it is difficult to isolate the separate threads into intricate patterns. Since political democracy evolved in Great Britain, a genetic study of the rise and growth of the interactions is very important. Professor Gwyn has here made a penetrating and illuminating investigation of the interrelation between wealth and politics in the development of the much admired British party system.

Politics, like sin, proliferates in an infinite variety of ways. The electoral franchise in England originated as a species of feudal property. Mr. Gwyn observes (Page 4): "During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, public office once achieved took on the aspect of private property, and at no time was the latter more hallowed." As property it could be bought and sold. It is little wonder that as capitalism evolved commercialism at first placed a price upon the vote as a kind of incorporeal legacy connected with the land. The great landowners who inherited their peerages exercised indirect ownership in the House of Commons. Elections to Parliament took on many of the characteristics of a pseudo-free market. Candidates paid the costs of holding elections, including the salaries of returning officers who took advantage of their monopoly to charge what the traffic would bear.

It sears democratic souls to read that the newly enfranchised voters under the Reform Act of 1832 (many of them fairly well-to-do middle class people) sold their new franchise at the highest



possible price. The urge for participation in citizenship was less strong than the cash motive, or "treating," the civic incentive which came from the pubs at candidates' expense. Alcohol frequently incites enthusiasm but nowhere more effectively than in politics. It is comforting to know that the good citizens of Eastern Kentucky who corrupt political leadership by taking advantage of free enterprise competition to raise the price of votes on election day are following in the tradition of their Anglo-Saxon ancestors. The freshly emancipated and enfranchised ex-slaves in the South during and after Reconstruction who were willing to sell their votes for a consideration had ample precedent in England among the founders of representative government.

"Nursing a constituency" became an expensive pastime, more costly even than maintaining several mistresses, setting up a large stable of horses and hounds, or owning a yacht. In fact, the costs became so great that reform, in the shape of indirect governmental price control, was brought about by Tories joining Whigs to cut down the expense of this luxury. Gradually, as the state intervened, the legislature assumed the costs of holding elections and paid returning officers. As the electorate increased, and its processing became more costly, the state regulated competition by setting up expenditures limits for candidates and by providing that the better corporate managerial accounting techniques should apply. Each candidate had to have an agent who was responsible for keeping an account of the income and outgo. This was evidence of the existence of a new ethos, and the British wisely placed enforcement of the new rules in the hands of judges with independent tenure instead of leaving the decision to a partisan legislature. The national party organizations as such are free to spend without interference but must account for grants-in-aid to candidates.

*Democracy and the Cost of Politics* is an analytical and historical study little troubled by the statistics and graphs which are the stock in trade of current American publications. Probably more illumination of the electoral process has been produced here than could have been gotten from a larger display of what people say when questioned by interviewers.

A heartening note for believers in democracy is that electoral results have come to be more revealing of opinion and less a measure of candidates' expenditures. That a new ethic grew up—important for political science—is perhaps Gwyn's most significant finding, notwithstanding the view of some political scientists that ethics should be outlawed from the discipline as too "un-scientific." More studies in the twilight zone between politics and economics would contribute very valuable information to a viable political science, a discipline

which is more than a pale collection of facts put together by electronics and financially underwritten by tax-evading foundations in the name of scholarship.

There is much in the Gwyn volume to confirm the findings of Graham Wallas a half-century ago, namely, that politics is cultural and not biological. Democracy must be learned, its processes acquired, not inherited. Gwyn's valuable study, adds greatly to our detailed knowledge of money and politics while at the same time throwing a revealing light upon the whole nature of government. In perspective, *Democracy and the Costs of Politics in Britain* illuminates the way toward a more effective democracy. The volume deserves serious attention.—JASPER B. SHANNON, *The University of Nebraska*.

*The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. BY JOHN J. JOHNSON (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.)

Several years ago, when the headlong rush into independence had not yet engulfed much of Asia and Africa, a number of nationalist leaders at a Mediterranean conference discussed the problems of training and equipping the armed forces in their countries. One observer listened patiently for some time and then put the question: "Why do these nations need armies, anyway?" After an awkward silence and an exchange of uncertain glances, one delegate responded with a rhetorical question of his own: "Why do gentlemen wear neckties?" His logic was compelling; just as the absence of a necktie might shed doubt on the social quality of the human male, the absence of an army would reflect on the claims to sovereign independence of the ex-colonial societies. In addition to serving as the badge of political virility, what is the role of the military establishment in the newly emerging societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America? In the conference sponsored by the Rand Corporation, which led to this collection of essays, we get an excellent idea of that role.

As must all brief reviews of anthologies, this one will suffer seriously from incompleteness. Therefore, rather than attempt a superficial summary of the chapters, this reviewer will merely note them and then dwell at some length on the two more theoretical and general opening chapters, and then terminate with a note on methodology. There are three papers on Latin America: John Johnson, the volume's editor, examines the military as a politically competing group in that region; Edwin Lieuwen and Victor Alba each provide us with historically oriented papers, and in the process remind us how different is the role of the military in Latin America as contrasted to its role in Asia and Africa. Next, three papers focus on South Asia: Guy Pauker on Indonesia, Lucian

Pye on Burma, and David Wilson on Thailand. Then Manfred Halpern examines the behavior of Middle Eastern armies in general, while Ben Halpern looks at Israel in particular. The volume is closed by James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice in an appraisal of the military in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To this reviewer, the separate regional papers were a constant source of fascinating information and provocative ideas, and in that respect they fulfilled one of the major functions of such a symposium. Further, there is for no need for the standard reference to "uneven quality." As political, social, and historical essays, all were of excellent quality: coherent, organized, literary, and as far as discernible, accurate. Turning then to the more general papers, there are first the two prefatory essays on the general nature of political development, by sociologist Edward Shils and political scientist Lucian Pye.

The opening essay by Shils is a wide ranging and comprehensive *tour de force*, constituting a happy choice for the stage-setting role. Though more of a check list than a formal model, Shils' essay is by no means theoretically unsophisticated, and while almost devoid of hard empirical data, it is full of information. His emphasis is on the struggle for modernization and the role of the elites within the changing social structure. For Shils, modernization implies egalitarian democracy, representative government, technological progress, economic planning, efficient and honest administration, and perhaps most important, national autonomy and status in the international system. Modernization also implies Westernization without dependence upon, or subservience to, Western nations. If these are the characteristics of the society to be built, the society that now exists tends to be traditional, rigidly hierarchical, technologically backward, inefficiently and dishonestly administered, and often independent in name only.

Whether or not those who strive for modernity will prevail against the *ancien régime* depends, according to Shils, on closing the gap between the rich few and the poor masses, the educated and the uneducated, the city dweller and the villager, the cosmopolitan and the provincial—the gap between the ruler and the ruled. As civilian elites falter in closing that gap, the military will tend to move in and assume that function. Among the possible outcomes of the effort to close this gap, Shils sees six different political forms, ranging from *bona fide* to tutelary democracy through modernizing, traditional, or totalitarian civil oligarchies, to modernizing military oligarchies. As to the assets and liabilities of each form, Shils offers a number of cogent and telling epigrams, and concludes that the totalitarian oligarchy

would have the best chance of remaining in power once there, but that some form of tutelary democracy "offers a more realistic settlement with the slowly tractable realities. . . ."

Just as Shils is markedly influenced by his familiarity with (one might even say affection for) the Indian post-independence élites, Lucian Pye in the second general paper reflects his special concern with Southeast Asia in general and Burma in particular. As a student of comparative politics, however, he carries us further into our discussion of the military's role than does the opening paper. Pye begins by reminding us that the prevailing prediction, until quite recently, was that "the future of the newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing Communist parties." The key role of the military was largely unanticipated.

Pye seems to feel that certain shortcomings in traditional Western thought account not only for our failure to anticipate this role, but for our attitude toward military regimes *per se*. Among these shortcomings, two come in for critical comment. First, we have—in contrast to Communist theoreticians—no appropriate doctrine which, "in lieu of tested knowledge," indicate the socio-political requirements for the transition from traditional and authoritarian to democratic and representative society. This leads to an overemphasis on the utopian goal rather than the complex process, producing in turn a premature and unjustified sense of failure on the part of the would-be modernizers. Secondly, Pye observes that we are essentially Sumnerians (my phrase) and hence prone to view political institutions (stateways) primarily as the *consequence* of social forces (folkways) rather than as levers by which fundamental societal change may be brought about. This model, he argues, is inappropriate for nations whose "indigenous values" have been far less instrumental than externally-imposed institutions in the shaping of their society.

He then turns to two central queries: (a) what are the major characteristics of armies in the underdeveloped countries? and (b) what is their modernizing role? As to the first, Pye concludes that these armies are *not* organized or staffed to wage war, and that their officers and men are even further apart than in most military organizations. On the other hand, they do reflect the tendency of all armies to apply international and non-parochial standards to their own societies, they are "relatively immune to pragmatic tests of efficiency on a day-to-day basis." Because of their remoteness from their societies they tend to minimize its central problems and assume that

these can be overcome "if the right orders are given." The army's modernizing role, the author emphasizes, depends upon the degree to which it provides an acculturation process for its recruits which is very different than that experienced by the civilian villager. Not only does the process enhance the psychic and material security of the inductee, and provide for social mobility, but it provides considerable training in both technology and citizenship; all of these are seen as assets. The chapter concludes with a very relevant warning against stereotyping the military. On the one hand, we must recognize that *military* aid may well be indirect *economic* aid, and on the other we had better be careful not to assume that military rule is any guarantee of either political stability or resistance to the internal or external Communist threat.

Having praised both the introductory and the detailed papers, I must register a serious reservation. First, Hans Speier's preface might have led one to expect a "serious and sustained effort to study the role of the military in the underdeveloped countries on a comparative basis." This study is comparative in only the most casual sense of the word. Secondly, and in the same vein, my appraisal of the papers—because it is essentially personal and intuitive—may be readily challenged by another reader, and there will be no way to decide the issue. This is the price we pay as long as our data are anecdotal, our selection and classification implicit, and our theory invisible.

In other words, until political science and history "go operational" (as have much of sociology, psychology and economics) there will be no visible and objective criteria by which our research may be evaluated. Admittedly, the early stages of operationalization in any given field are painful, awkward and only partially productive. But without it, we will never get any empirical generalizations which are susceptible to disproof, and in the absence of such data-based propositions, our "theories" will remain merely models. Given the talent that went into this symposium, and the fascination—not to mention the importance—of its subject matter, it is too bad that all we have to show for it is a collection of first-class essays.—J. DAVID SINGER, *Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan*.

*Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941–1945.* By EDMOND PARIS. (Chicago, American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1961. Pp. 306. Price \$5.00.)

Between Nazi Germany's conquest of Yugoslavia, in April, 1941, and the end of the war more than 700,000 men, women and children were massacred in one area of the partitioned land, Axis-sponsored "Independent State of Croatia." They were killed by their Croat countrymen in the

cause of a Croatian nationalism which demanded racial and religious uniformity in the new state. Croatian death-squads also murdered about 60,000 Jews and 20,000 Gypsies; the ratio of victims to the total population of "Independent Croatia" makes this perhaps the worst example of genocide in the Second World War.

The post-war establishment of a unified Yugoslavia, dominated by its Serbian plurality, threw the Croat nationalists, who had hoped for a state of their own, into opposition. This opposition found expression in an underground organization of "Ustashi" (Rebels), headed by Ante Pavelich and patronized by Fascist Italy and Hungary. The complicity of Pavelich and the Ustashi in the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseilles, in 1934, was established by a French court; Pavelich was sentenced to death *in absentia* after Mussolini refused a request for his extradition to France. On the day that Hitler attacked Yugoslavia, Pavelich broadcast to Croatia: "Croatian soldiers, take up arms against the Serbian officers and soldiers! From now on we shall fight side by side with our new allies, the Germans and Italians." A week later he entered Zagreb with an escort of Italian tanks. After Yugoslavia's surrender the country was partitioned by the Axis powers and on Easter Day, in Zagreb Cathedral, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Stepinac proclaimed the "Independent State of Croatia" with Pavelich as its "Poglavnik" (Führer). The Pavelich government declared war on Hitler's enemies. The Poglavnik himself appeared with Mussolini before cheering crowds and was received in private audience by Pius XII; a papal representative in Zagreb was treated as dean of the diplomatic corps; Stepinac sat in the Croatian Diet as one of eleven representatives of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and was later appointed "Head of Military Chaplains" *sine titulo* to the Ustashi army.

Soon the massacres began, perpetrated by the Ustashi with the collaboration of certain Franciscan priests and monks. The intentions of the regime were clarified by the Minister of Education: "We shall kill one part of the Serbs, we shall transport another, and the rest of them will be forced to embrace the Roman Catholic religion." Fascist Croatia extended the policy of genocide to the Croatian Jews; the journal *Katolicki Tyednik* declared on June 15, 1941, that "the Serbs are the greatest enemies of the Croats, while the Jews and Masons are the greatest enemies of all Europe." During the four years of Axis Croatia about 240,000 Serbs were "converted," whole villages at a time. The Serb who clung to his Orthodoxy had to wear an armband like the Jew; the latter, being "non-Aryan," was not allowed to save himself by conversion. The

Orthodox cathedral at Bihach was dynamited; about 300 Serbian churches were destroyed. On October 31, 1943, Stepinac stated: "the [Roman Catholic] Church does not agree with the injustices committed against the Jews and the Serbs"; he added that "we cannot be responsible for some of the dare-devil fanatics in the ecclesiastical ranks." After the war a Yugoslav Communist court found Stepinac guilty of treason and responsibility for the massacres and forced conversions. Sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment, he served five. The Vatican promoted him to Cardinal.

As Nazi Germany collapsed, its Croatian allies ran for their lives. Pavelich, after being caught by the British and released under obscure circumstances, fled to Rome disguised as a priest; he then moved to Argentina and ultimately to Spain, where he died in 1959, having received the personal benediction of John XXIII. Pavelich's Minister of the Interior escaped to Los Angeles, via Switzerland and Ireland; his name cropped up at the trial of Adolf Eichmann when a witness testified it was "common knowledge" that the official had carried out "anti-Jewish measures on orders from Germany"; his extradition to Yugoslavia was refused by the United States. Former Ustashi officials and sympathizers have organized many propaganda centers in the United States and elsewhere which appear to enjoy lavish financial support. They continue to preach hatred of the Serbs and Yugoslavia; completely distorting the history of Pavelich's Croatia, they portray it as a crusade for independence and against Communism.

This tragic story is thoroughly supported by source material drawn largely from Ustasha and clerical publications appearing during the four years of the "Independent State of Croatia," and by a large bibliography in numerous languages. An appendix lists the names of 171 Serbian Orthodox priests and 47 rabbis who were murdered by the Ustashi; a collection of photographs shows the Ustashi leaders, their Nazi-Fascist allies, and their victims. The author of this book, a French anti-clerical, writes with sympathy and anger; the translation is often awkward and sometimes ungrammatical, while Serbo-Croatian words are neither transliterated nor supplied with diacritical marks. These flaws do not detract from a stark portrayal of what can happen when nationalist ferocity and religious intolerance conclude an unholy alliance.—JOHN CLINTON ADAMS, *Dartmouth College*.

*The British Parliament.* By ROLAND YOUNG. (London: Faber and Faber, 1962. Pp. 259. \$4.20.)

A new book on parliament has been needed for

some time as Sir Ivor Jennings' classic work *Parliament* (1939) has become outmoded. Studies of such special aspects as question time, private bill procedure, delegated legislation, the role of the House of Lords, control of public expenditure, and detailed accounts of the passage of individual items of legislation have appeared in recent years and would help to provide the background. Professor Young is to be congratulated on attempting a new synthesis, but the result is disappointing.

It is not quite clear what this book is trying to do. It might have simply set out to describe parliament, and it does contain long accounts of personalities and debates. For most students of politics the key questions are evident. How much power does parliament exercise over the government? What other functions does it perform? And how is power distributed within parliament? Professor Young touches on these points without making a resolute attempt to answer any of them and his conclusions are blurred into mere suggestions by a constant use of the conditional "it can be said that" or "it might be argued that. . . ."

The general impression left is of an over-emphasis on the importance of parliament but the imprecision of the book has the same effect on any attempt at assessment. For instance it asserts that "parliament is sovereign in the sense that if its consent is required and there is a conflict of wills, the will of Parliament prevails. Parliament has the final word." Legally this is true but how often in the last fifty years has there been a "conflict of wills"? And how far can Parliament be said to have a will of its own apart from that of the Government? There is, for instance, no attempt to draw a distinction between the influence of government and of opposition back-benchers. Professor Young says the opposition can insist "on accountability and full discussion" but as his own later examples show, the government often flatly refuses to disclose or discuss large areas of defence, foreign and colonial policy. The reader is told that "some Conservative members have remarked that since the development of the committee system there has been a trend towards debating and deciding controversial matters within the confines of the party and off the floor of Parliament." Yet is hard to reconcile this statement with one six pages later that "the great political drama is unfolded on the floor of parliament. This is where the game is played." As an example of Commons' control over legislation the Bill to Repeal Restrictions on the Use of Cars in Elections (1958) is chosen but it is not in any way typical. The point at issue was small, understood by every M. P., and the object of intense partisan passion. A more accurate picture would have been derived by studying one of the highly complex

bills involving many changes in administrative practice where only a handful of members even understand the provisions. On the power of the purse Professor Young says "we would miss the main impact of parliamentary control if we limited our observations to the formal procedures only" but there is no account of any informal methods whereby MPs might control taxation or expenditure.

It is a pity that an American study of parliament does not employ any of the techniques that have only recently begun to be imported into the U.K. One would like to have a systematic survey of the reasons for the withdrawal of many able MPs from parliament, and for the decline in the prestige of politics as a profession—which makes it so difficult to offer MPs anything like a reasonable salary. Too little is known about attitudes to parliament though the decline in reports of debates (almost a cessation in the case of the popular press) is a pointer. It is becoming accepted in Britain that Parliament is no longer the forum of the nation but why and how this has happened still requires investigation.—JOHN P. MAC-KINTOSH, *University College, Ibadan, Nigeria*.

*South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity.* By NICHOLAS MANSERGH. (New York: Praeger, 1962. Pp. 104. \$3.50.)

"Radicalism was a more potent force than humanitarianism in early twentieth century liberalism," writes History Professor Mansergh (Cambridge) in this analysis of the establishment of the Union of South Africa. "... It is not the English way to govern white men as a subject race ..." said Liberal Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman during the Boer War, and more than anyone he was responsible for the evolution of a united South Africa. The unification of the two defeated republics and two British colonies in 1910 was an act of generosity toward the vanquished Boers.

In some ways, the title of this slim volume is misleading, for it concentrates heavily upon the period 1906 until 1910, while there are frequent references to the period between 1899 and 1905 as well as the years of Union in South Africa. The author deals with two major topics: first, what considerations led to the South Africa Act, and second, the effects of this magnanimous gesture upon the well-being of the non-white and English-speaking sectors of the South African population, sectors that later came to be ruled by a fanatically supremacist Afrikaner nationalist minority. Both subjects are covered extremely well, the first perhaps somewhat more effectively than the second.

Professor Mansergh writes objectively, fairly and in an impeccably scholarly fashion about issues which all too often become shrouded in

emotionalism. Tracing the decision-making processes that led to the South Africa Act, he shows that Liberal policy was neither one of blind and sudden impulse nor one without precedent. Quoting extensively and absorbingly from correspondence files, the Colonial Office Records and the Public Record Office, he proves that Union in South Africa was carefully considered, and that the price to be paid was forecast by several eminent critics (Milner, Schreiner, Graham and others).

In considering the price of Liberal generosity to non-Afrikaner South Africans, the author faced difficult obstacles. It is easy, for instance, to create the impression that in pre-Union days (as well as during Union) the English-speaking resident of South Africa was the real liberal, with the interests of the non-white at heart. Professor Mansergh reminds the reader that the decision not to adopt the Cape native franchise throughout united South Africa was arrived at by English-speaking as well as Afrikaner whites. To quote Botha: "... a great number of people in the Transvaal, English as well as Dutch, are quite prepared to wreck the Union on this question. ..." On these and other, similar matters, the author proves his intimate knowledge of South African affairs while avoiding all bias in his writing. In dealing with so vast a subject as the woes of South Africa, there is obviously a need for selectivity, and the author appears to assume some knowledge on the part of the reader of the nature of *apartheid* and its architects. Throughout, the work retains its high-level, academically sound approach.

*South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity* is an important contribution, which will retain its value long after the current storm of writing on Africa has abated—and has been largely forgotten.—HARM JAN DE BLIJ, *Michigan State University*.

*Portugal's Stand in Africa.* By ADRIANO MOREIRA. (New York: University Publishers. 265 pp. \$3.95.)

Portugal is in deep trouble in Africa. Nationalists of Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Moçambique have established headquarters at Conakry, Leopoldville, and Dar es Salaam to pursue their common goal of freedom from Portuguese rule. Border incidents in Portuguese Guinea and the uprising in northern Angola are visible evidences of this resistance.

*Portugal's Stand in Africa* is an attempt of the Salazar regime to defend her position in these countries. The book is a collection of eleven addresses delivered in the years from 1958 to 1961 by Adriano Moreira, a lawyer, professor of law at the Lisbon Center for Political and Social

Studies, and since 1961, Portugal's Overseas Minister. All of the addresses were delivered in Portugal and cover a wide range of subjects, from a report on the conferences at Bandung and Cairo to a treatise on Portugal's contribution to the progress of man in its overseas regions. The book also contains a preface addressed to the American people and the text of three decrees of 1961: the repeal of the Native Statute in Portuguese Africa; the decree setting up Provincial Settlement Boards to aid in the European colonization program for Angola and Moçambique; and the decree to review existing legislation to give a new impulse to create municipal institutions in Portugal's African empire.

In the addresses the author attacks the neutralist ideology of the Afro-Asian group, laments the ignorance of her western allies of the basic issues involved in Africa, defends her policy of cultural assimilation, and confirms the mission of Portugal in Africa from the days of Vasco da Gama to the present. Throughout the addresses one dominant theme prevails: the distinctiveness of the Portuguese way of life, the fundamental code of which is the equality of the human race. Applying this principle to Africa, Mr. Moreira states that "between the North of Africa, which discriminates against the white man, and the South, which discriminates against the black man, the Portuguese way of life assures a zone in which prevail the universal values from which all benefit and to which many may eventually have to resort in order to remedy the errors which are presently accumulating."

Unfortunately, the history of Angola and Moçambique give very little substance to Mr. Moreira's exposition of Portugal's philosophic, political and juridical doctrines of peaceful assimilation in her overseas colonies. Portuguese occupation of her African territories was violent, evidenced by the Angolan wars of the Dembos in the north, Bailundu in the central area, and Cuamato in the south. Moreover the parent-child relationship inherent in the Portuguese colonial policy makes a mockery of its pronouncements regarding the equality of all races. Under this concept, equality is applied within a fraternal relationship between the master and all of his dependents, the Portuguese assuming the role of the master. As long as Mr. Moreira and his government hold to the position that "our politics of today are the politics of yesterday," there will be continued resistance against Portuguese rule in Angola, Moçambique, Portuguese Guinea, and the Islands of Cape Verde, São Tomé, and Príncipe.—THOMAS OKUMA, *Boston University*.

*Africa South*. By HARM J. DE BLIJ. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962. Pp. vii, 399. \$5.95.)

*Africa South* can be recommended highly to the general reader. Professor de Blij's purpose to provide the basic social and economic data as well as historical background for understanding those political entities under substantial white rule has been fulfilled. A major portion of this book is devoted to the Republic of South Africa; however, the descriptions of Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland, Angola and Moçambique are also of high quality, and only a slight reservation is noted below regarding the treatment of the Central African Federation.

The "Wind of Change," as Prime Minister Macmillan called the urge to African independence, provides the theme of this book. During the ten years that geographer de Blij lived in South Africa he taught, worked for a newspaper, participated in civic organizations, and became acquainted with all shades of African opinion and life. He explains that his expectation of tragedy will not be agreeable to many of his acquaintances. He emphasizes the importance to the Republic of continued white domination of the buffer dependencies under Portuguese and British control; however, even the lack of rigidity of the assimilation and partnership policies are viewed as threats to apartheid, not to speak of the growing African nationalism beginning to bear fruit in the High Commission Territories. Apartheid also faces grave domestic economic and political obstacles; apparently, the Africaner is not willing to pay the price for carrying through this policy. On the other hand, the author warns that the ability of the political leaders of the Republic should not be underestimated.

Specialists may find controversial de Blij's judgment on the assimilation policy, that "Portuguese Africa can present a semblance of real harmony, progress, and good will." However, this view is very much qualified. "Portugal's African provinces have one or two show cases . . . but they are rare instances in an ocean of isolation and deprivation." The discussion of the Central African Federation can be criticized because it underemphasizes the role of Christians and missions, especially in Nyasaland. Not only have missions been important in developments here, but church groups in Britain have helped prevent this white dominated federation from becoming independent.

The author is to be commended for his short and useful bibliographies following each chapter, for his helpful maps, and for his beautiful descriptions of the land and the people who live on it. This is the best general treatment of this area presently available.—RICHARD W. TAYLOR, *Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa*.

*The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research*. By SIR HARRY MELVILLE. (London:

George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 200. \$4.00.)

*Her Majesty's Customs and Excise.* BY SIR JAMES CROMBIE. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 224. \$4.80.)

These are the latest volumes in the New Whitehall Series published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of Public Administration. The stated purpose of this series is to provide authoritative descriptions of the present work of the major departments of British central government. Among the eight volumes previously published are those on the Home Office, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office. Four volumes now in preparation include those on the Treasury and the Ministry of Agriculture.

*Modern Swedish government.* BY NILE ANDRÉN. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961. Pp. 252. Sw.kr. 19.50.)

The aim is to present a comprehensive introduction to modern Swedish government, mainly on the national level. The Swedish Constitution of 1809, which sets the pattern, is the oldest European constitution still in force. The author has had ten years experience in teaching Swedish government at the International Graduate School for English Speaking Students at the University of Stockholm. The work has been published with a grant from the Swedish Council for Social Science Research.—J. B. C.

*Wir sind die stärkste der Partei'N! Eine Bibliographie zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands.* BY THE INSTITUT FÜR MARXISMUS-LENINISMUS BEIM ZK DER SED. (Leipzig, Verlag für Buch und Bibliothekswesen, 1961. Pp. 67.)

The annotated and classified bibliography of some three hundred titles was prepared for the 15th anniversary of the SED by that party's chief

scientific institute. The selection is of course limited to publications which have appeared in German in the German Democratic Republic. Most of the publications included appeared through the Dietz Verlag in Berlin. There are some references to periodicals and newspapers. Understanding and analysis of the material collected here might furnish a key to the present party development in the DDR, and the aims it is trying to hammer home on that jurisdiction in the present unsettled world.—J. B. C.

*European elections by direct suffrage, a comparative study of the electoral systems used in Western Europe and their utility for the direct election of a European parliament.* BY WOLFGANG BIRKE. (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1961. Pp. 124. European aspects, series C. Studies on politics, no. 5.)

The study was prepared at the College of Europe at Bruges under a grant from the Council of Europe at Strassbourg to assist in the consideration and determination of a uniform electoral system for the common European Assembly. It contains a brief treatment of the electoral system of each of the countries as well as a comparison of the different features. There is a draft of articles for a European electoral law.—J. B. C.

*Senegal, A Study in French Assimilation Policy.* BY MICHAEL CROWDER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 104. \$1.25.)

The author, editor of *Nigeria* magazine, has presented an excellent case study of the growth, application, and consequences of one aspect of French colonial policy. He traces the idea and practice of assimilation in Senegal from its earliest manifestations at the turn of the nineteenth century to Senegal's independence in 1960; his study concludes with an examination of the impact of assimilationist doctrine on contemporary Senegalese politics and policies. Mr. Crowder is also the author of *The Story of Nigeria*, London: Faber, 1962, probably the first comprehensive history of Nigeria.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

HIRAM M. STOUT

*The George Washington University*

### General

Avakumovic, Ivan. World Communism in Figures. *International Journal*. Spring, 1962.

Avineri, Shlomo. Afro-Asia and the Western Political Tradition. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Winter, 1962-62.

Baly, Denis. The Sanction of Religion in the New Societies. *Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2, 1962.

Long, Erven J. Agriculture and Political Destiny. *Foreign Agriculture*. August, 1962.

Bivkin, Arnold. The Politics of Nation-Build-

ing: Problems and Preconditions. *Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2, 1962.

Sondermann, Fred A. Political Implications of Population Growth in Underdeveloped Countries. *Colorado College Studies*. No. 5, Fall, 1961.

#### United Kingdom and Commonwealth

Banwell, Sir Harold. The Different British Basis. *European Review*. July-August, 1962.

Bonham, John. The Middle Class Revolt. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Cowie, H. T. Liberalism's New Deal. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Epstein, Leon D. Who Makes Party Policy: British Labour, 1960-61. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. May, 1962.

Goldblatt, David. Beyond Orpington—Hysteria Toryensis. *Contemporary Review*. May, 1962.

Harman, Nicholas. Minor Political Parties in Britain. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Hindell, Keith and Williams, Philip. Scarborough and Blackpool: An Analysis of Some Votes of the Labour Party Conferences of 1960 and 1961. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Holmes, John. The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa. *International Organization*. Spring, 1962.

Lewis, Paul. Party System in the "New Commonwealth." *New Commonwealth*, June, 1962.

Liberal Revival: A New Trend in Great Britain. *Round Table*. June, 1962.

Marquand, David. The Liberal Revival. *Encounter*. July, 1962.

Monroe, Ann D. The British Dilemma: Commonwealth or Common Market? *Current History*. July, 1962.

New Vintage Liberalism. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Opposition Parties and Policies. *Notes on Current Politics*. No. 14, July 9, 1962.

Pear, Richard H. The Liberal Vote. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Sainsbury, Keith. The Constitution—Some Disputed Points. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Shaw, Malcolm. An American Looks at the Party Conferences. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Shearman, Hugh. Northern Ireland; Its People, Resources, History, and Government. rev. ed. Belfast, H. M. S.O., 1962.

Soskice, Frank. Rome Treaty's Impact on Law and Sovereignty. *European Review*. July-August, 1962.

The Government Crisis. *The Economist*. July 21, 1962.

Waller, Ian. Pressure Politics. *Encounter*. August, 1962.

#### Western Europe

Anghelatos, A. G. Greece: Political and Economic Developments 1944-1962. *British Survey*. June, 1962.

Aron, Raymond. The General and the Tragedy. *Encounter*. August, 1962.

Atlantic Report on Rome. *Atlantic Monthly*. September, 1962.

Barzini, Luigi. The Difference in the South. *Encounter*. June, 1962.

Brutto, Frank. In Italy: The Word is Complicated. *Journalism Review*. Spring, 1962.

Converse, Philip E. and Dupeux, Georges. Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Spring, 1962.

Crane, Wilder, Jr. The Errand-Running Function of Austrian Legislators. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Doob, Leonard W. South Tyrol: An Introduction to the Psychological Syndrome of Nationalism. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Summer, 1962.

Feld, Werner. The German Administrative Courts. *Tulane Law Review*. April, 1962.

Girbau-León, Vincente. General Franco's Opponents. *World Today*. August, 1962.

Graff, Donald F. In Austria: The Press Walks a Tightrope. *Journalism Review*, Spring, 1962.

Ireland: Requiem for Sinn Féin. *The Round Table*. June, 1962.

Les Domaines respectifs de la Loi et du Règlement d'après la Constitution de 1958; Essai d'établissement d'un Bilan de la Pratique suivie depuis trois ans. Paris, Documentation Française, 1962. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2908).

Lichtheim, George. West Germany Today. *Commentary*. July, 1962.

Miller, Robert W. Recent Efforts Toward Legal Regulation of Political Parties in Western Germany. *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters*. Vol. XLVII, 1962.

Pedersen, A. E., Jr. Kekkonen and the Finnish Press. *Journalism Review*. Spring, 1962.

Pinney, Edward L. Latent and Manifest Bureaucracy in the West German Parliament: The Case of the Bundesrat. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. May, 1962.

Presidency of the Council of Ministers Information Service. *Italian Affairs*, January-February, 1962.

The Referendums in France Since World War II. Ambassade U. S. Service de Presse et d'Information. New York, 1962. (French Affairs No. 135).

Welles, Benjamin. Salazar in Trouble. *Atlantic Monthly*. August, 1962.



*Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

Bromke, Adam. Nationalism and Communism in Poland. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1962.

Kastrati, Qazim E. Liberalism Behind the Iron Curtain. *Contemporary Review*. July, 1962.

Kind, Christian. Rumania Today. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. July, 1962.

Pierre, André. Le nouveau Soviet suprême de l'U.R.S.S. *Revue de défense nationale*. May, 1962.

Reform of Civil Law in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union. *American Journal of Comparative Law*. Summer, 1961.

Some Aspects of the Social-psychological and Political Climate in Poland; an Attitude Survey. Audience Research Section, Radio Free Europe. Munich, 1961.

Szczepanski, Jan. The Polish Intelligentsia: Past and Present. *World Politics*. April, 1962.

*Middle East and Arab North Africa*

Aries. The Sudan and Democracy. *African Affairs*. July, 1962.

Binder, Leonard. The Cabinet of Iran: a Case Study in Institutional Adaptation. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1962.

Constitution de la République Turque (9 juillet 1961). Paris, Documentation Française, 1962. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2900).

Furlonge, Geoffrey. The Lebanon. *Quarterly Review*. July, 1962.

Giritli, Ismet. Some aspects of the New Turkish Constitution. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1962.

Hahn, Lorna. Tunisia: Pragmatism and Progress. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1962.

Horton, Alan W. The Central Social and Political Problem of the UAR. Part III: The Search for Popular Support. New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1962. (American Universities Field Staff. Reports service. Northeast Africa Series, v. 9, No. 4, United Arab Republic).

Horton, Alan W. The Charter for National Action of the UAR. New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1962. (American Universities Field Staff Reports Service. Northeast Africa Series, V. 9, No. 5, United Arab Republic).

Kapani, Münici. Outlines of the new Turkish Constitution. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Winter, 1961-62.

Karpat, Kemal H. Recent Political Developments in Turkey and their Social Background. *International Affairs*. July, 1962.

Kelly, George A. Prospects of an Algerian Algeria. *Orbis*. Summer, 1962.

Le Maroc en 1962. Paris, Documentation Française, 1962. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2907).

L'Iraq. Paris, Documentation Française, 1962. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2896).

Moore, Clement Henry. The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia; a Structure for Democracy? *World Politics*. April, 1962.

Salem, Elie. Emerging Government in the Arab World. *Orbis*. Spring, 1962.

Siegmán, Henry. Arab Unity and Disunity. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1962.

The Shah's Proclamation on Reform. *Middle East Journal*. Winter, 1962.

*Africa*

Amme, Carl H. Political Trends in Former French Territories of Black Africa. *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. August, 1962.

Ardenner, Edwin. The Political History of Cameroon. *World Today*. August, 1962.

Ballinger, Margaret. The Outlook for the South African Republic. *International Affairs*. July, 1962.

Bascom, William R. Tribalism, Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism. *The Annals*. July, 1962.

Bull, Theodore. Politics and Power in the Rhodesias. *World Today*. July, 1962.

Emerson, Rupert. Pan-Africanism. *International Organization*. Spring, 1962.

Halberstam, David. Mystery—and Tragedy—of Tshombe. *New York Times Magazine*. August 12, 1962.

Heerden, W. Van. Why Bantu States? *Optima*. June, 1962.

La Constitution de la Fédération du Nigéria (1er Octobre 1960). Paris, Documentation Française, 1962. (Notes et études documentaires, No. 2891).

Latham-Koenig, A. L. Ruanda-Urundi on the Threshold of Independence. *World Today*. July, 1962.

Leys, Colin. Tanganyika: The Realities of Independence. *International Journal*. Summer, 1962.

Lowenkopf, Martin. Uganda: Prelude to Independence. *Parliamentary Affairs*. Winter, 1961-62.

Milcent, Ernest, and Meisler, Stanley. Two Views of Senegal. *Africa Report*. August, 1962.

Nigeria Works it Out. *The Economist*. July 7, 1962.

Nigeria's Quietness is her Strength. *New Commonwealth*. June, 1962.

Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962. London, H.M.S.O., 1962. Cmd. 1700.

Report of the Zanzibar Constitutional Conference Held in London, March and April, 1962. London, H.M.S.O., 1962. Cmd. 1699.

Robertson, Sir James. Notes on the Viability of Emerging African States. *Journal of International Affairs*. No. 2, 1962.

Sheehan, Edward R. F. East Africa. . . . The Birth Pangs of Independence. *Harper's Magazine*. September, 1962.

Spence, J. E. The Political Implications of the Bantustan Policy. *Race*. May, 1962.

Tatz, C. M. Dr. Verwoerd's "Bantustan" Policy. *Australian Journal of Politics and History*. May, 1962.

Tribe and Nation in East Africa. *The Round Table*. June, 1962.

Udochi, Julius Momo. The Conflict Involving Communism in Mid-Africa. *The Annals*. July, 1962.

Uganda. British Information Services. New York, 1962.

United States Information Agency Library Resources on Africa; an annotated selection of 400 books from the Agency Library's holdings on Africa, indexed according to region and country and coded as to principal subjects, together with a description of newspapers, periodicals, and documentary and other materials available in or through the Agency Library, compiled and edited by Joseph L. Dees. Washington, 1962.

Williams, G. Mennen. Aids and Obstacles to Political Stability in Mid-Africa. *The Annals*. July, 1962.

#### *South and Southeast Africa*

A Constitution for Pakistan. *The Round Table*. June, 1962.

Banerji, S. C. Burma: Coup and Aftermath. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. April 12, 1962.

Bernheim, Roger. Pakistan in Transition. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. July, 1962.

Chaudhury, N. C. B. Ray. India's Third General Election. *Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Crozier, Brian. Indonesia: Retrospect and Prospect. *World Today*. July, 1962.

Dupree, Louis. The "Good" Dictator: President Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan. New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1962. (American Universities Field Staff. Reports Service. South Asia Series, V. 6, No. 4, Pakistan).

Fitzgerald, C. P. Overseas Chinese in South East Asia. *Australian Journal of Politics and History*. May, 1962.

Floris, George A. India After the Elections. *Contemporary Review*. May, 1962.

Friedrich, Paul. Language and Politics in India. *Daedalus*. Summer, 1962.

Gangal, S. C. An Approach to Indian Federalism. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Ginsburgs, George. Local Government and Administration in North Vietnam, 1945-1954. *China Quarterly*. April-June, 1962.

Grandchamp, René. Les elections de l'avenir

de l'Inde. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. May, 1962.

Hammer, Ellen J. South Viet Nam: The Limits of Political Action. *Pacific Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Johnstone, William C. The Appeals of Communism in Asia. *The Annals*. July, 1962.

Leifer, Michael. The Cambodian Opposition. *Asian Survey*. April, 1962.

Newman, K. J. The Constitutional Evolution of Pakistan. *International Affairs*. July, 1962.

Pauker, Guy J. Political Doctrines and Practical Politics in Southeast Asia. *Pacific Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Pylee, M. V. Free Speech and Parliamentary Privileges in India. *Pacific Affairs*. Spring, 1962.

Rolnick, Phyllis J. Charity, Trusteeship, and Social Change in India; a Study of a Political Ideology. *World Politics*. April, 1962.

Rossiter, Clinton. The Paradox of India's Democracy. *New York Times Magazine*. June 3, 1962.

Rothermund, Dietmar. Constitutional Reforms Versus National Agitation in India, 1900-1950. *Journal of Asian Studies*. August, 1962.

Sheridan, L. A. Equal Opportunity of Public Employment (Non-discrimination in Public Services in India). *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. July, 1962.

Signal, D. P. Nationalism and Communism in South-East Asia. *Journal of Southeast Asian History*. March, 1962.

Weiner, Myron. India's Third General Elections. *Asian Survey*. May, 1962.

Weiner, Myron. The Struggle for Equality in India. *Foreign Affairs*. July, 1962.

Welty, Paul S. Islam and the Constitution of Pakistan. *World Affairs*. Summer, 1962.

#### *Far East*

Bibliography of Korean Studies; a bibliographical guide to Korean publications on Korean studies appearing from 1945 to 1958. Seoul, Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1961.

Buxbaum, David C. Preliminary Trends in the Development of the Legal Institutions of Communist China and the Nature of the Criminal Law. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. January, 1962.

Focus on Japan. *Intercom*. July, 1962.

Hucker, Charles O. China; a Critical Bibliography. Tuscon, University of Arizona Press, 1962.

Ishida, Takeshi. Popular Attitudes Toward the Japanese Emperor. *Asian Survey*. April, 1962.

Jan, George P. Minor Parties in Communist China. *Current History*. September, 1962.

Langer, Paul F. The Japanese Communists and the Struggle for Power. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1962. (P-2571).

Scalapino, Robert A. The Left Wing in Japan. *Survey*. August, 1962.

Silberman, Bernard S. Japan and Korea; a Critical Bibliography. Tuscon, University of Arizona Press, 1962.

Soukup, James R. Japanese Labor: Goals and Political Tactics. *Orient West*. March, 1962.

Wurfel, David. The Philippine Elections: Support for Democracy. *Asian Survey*. May, 1962.

Zinn, Howard. Another Look at the Chinese Communists. *Antioch Review*. Spring, 1962.

#### *Australia and New Zealand*

Castles, Alex C. Limitations on the Autonomy of the Australian States. *Public Law*. Summer, 1962.

Chateaufvieux, Pierre. La Politique Générale de l'Australie. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. May, 1962.

New Zealand: An Abortive Industrial Venture. *The Round Table*. June, 1962.

#### *Latin America and West Indies*

Belaunde, Victor Andrés. The Economic Basis of Politics in Latin America. Trans. by Ruth Lundelius. *The Annals*. July, 1962.

Blakely, Judith. Press and Politics in Argentina. *Journalism Review*. Spring, 1962.

Botsford, Keith. Brazil's New Language. *New Leader*. September 3, 1962.

Brown, Lyle C. Latin America, a Bibliography. Kingsville, Texas College of Arts and Industries, 1962.

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Ministers of the American Republics. Rev. Washington, Pan American Union, 1962.

Dell, Edmund. Brazil's Partly United States. *The Political Quarterly*. July-September, 1962.

Failure of a Federation: Causes of Breakdown in the West Indies. *The Round Table*. June, 1962.

Gil, Frederico Guillermo. Genesis and Modernization of Political Parties in Chile. Gainesville,

University of Florida Press, 1962. (The Latin American Monograph Series 18).

Hafter, Rudolph P. Report from Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. August, 1962.

Hafter, Rudolph P. The New Mexico. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. June, 1962.

Patch, Richard W. Personalities and Politics in Bolivia. New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1962. (American Universities Field Staff. Reports Service. West Coast South America Series, v. 9, No. 5, Bolivia).

Pereira, L. C. Bresser. The Rise of Middle Class and Middle Management in Brazil. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*. July, 1962.

Rodrigues, José Honório. The Foundations of Brazil's Foreign Policy. *International Affairs*. July, 1962.

Szulc, Tad. Trujillo's Legacy: a Democratic Vacuum. *New York Times Magazine*. September 2, 1962.

Tannenbaum, Frank. Castro and Social Change. *Political Science Quarterly*. June, 1962.

Wallace, Elisabeth. The West Indies Federation: Decline and Fall. *International Journal*. Summer, 1962.

Wilgus, A. Curtis. The Chemistry of Political Change in Latin America. *The Annals*. July, 1962.

#### *Canada*

A Turning-Point in Quebec: The Situation in French Canada. *The Round Table*. June, 1962.

Dickinson, William B., Jr. Canadian Election. Washington, Editorial Research Reports, 1962.

Gordon, Donald R. Canada at the Polls. *World Today*. July, 1962.

Story, Christopher. Canadians in Difficulty. *Contemporary Review*. May, 1962.

Sutherland, R. J. Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation. *International Journal*. Summer, 1962.

## INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZATION

*What Price Coexistence? A Policy for the Western Alliance.* By SIR JOHN SLESSOR. (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961. 153 Pp. \$4.50.)

If political knots could be untied by the logic of military analysis, Sir John Slessor would have made a significant contribution to the reduction of East-West tensions. A Marshall of the Royal Air Force, the author was Chief of the Air Staff, Commandant of the Imperial Defense College, and Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, during the Battle of Britain. He has written extensively on military strategy and political policy.

Many of the ideas in the present volume are taken from his earlier works.

Sir John seeks an acceptable way out of the present stalemate which would combine Western toughness and strength with greater flexibility, based on mutual and balanced concessions. He desires to decrease the present terrible risks and wasteful costs by approaches which will increase confidence on both sides in peaceful coexistence. He believes the Russians still hold fast to their goal of world communism and to their strategy of nibbling away at the non-communist world by

subversion and Pavlovian psychological warfare. Sir John is convinced, however, that the Soviet leaders are unwilling to risk nuclear war to achieve their objectives, and that they are as aware as are our Western leaders of the danger of the process of escalation in limited war. His long-range object is a world government with limited responsibilities to enforce disarmament and insure world order through some form of an international police. However, this work is concerned primarily with first steps, and he believes these should be taken in Europe on Western initiative.

No possibility of a rapid or spectacular change in the communist system is deemed feasible. Thus, the West must not overtly try to destroy the communist camp if it wishes to establish a *modus vivendi* under which increased contacts and the slow influence of various internal and external factors may change Soviet practice. On the side of toughness, Sir John warns against expecting too much from negotiations with the communists, although the West should always stand ready to negotiate. He advocates pacts with the communists whose validity should not, as far as possible, depend upon communist good faith. He proposes a hard policy to counter the nibbling processes of subversion and intervention.

On the side of flexibility, Sir John advances the policy of disengagement in Europe, starting with Germany. Eventually, a cordon of buffer states should be erected from Sweden to the Black Sea. The immediate objective is to get the Red Army back within the present Soviet borders. It is assumed that the Soviet Union will not start a war over Berlin but will use the situation in that city for bargaining purposes. Sir John hopes for the eventual reunification of Germany and by this process the solution of the Berlin problem, but he offers no support for the recovery of Germany's former territories in the East. The first step in his program is to be an agreement for Russian and Allied withdrawal from Germany. German arms will remain, and while Germany might then withdraw from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it would continue its ties with the West. The military forces of the United States would remain in some strength in Western Europe and in Britain.

There is a long discussion of the possibilities for making the military arrangements of NATO more effective. Sir John advocates the abolition of tactical nuclear weapons and warns that military plans must not aggravate fear. He is opposed to having NATO become a fourth nuclear power.

Sir John casts about in all directions in his discussion. He calls for aid to the developing countries but regards them with obvious contempt. Regarding disarmament he makes the point that nuclear weapons should be the last weapons to be abolished, since it is they that make war obsolete.

Immediate admission of Communist China to the United Nations is urged, but so is a United Nations trusteeship for Formosa, a proposal unacceptable to Communist China. A chapter is devoted to "the American obsession" with anti-colonialism, which Sir John believes to be the most disruptive force in the Atlantic Alliance.

There is much bluff and superficiality in this book. Such aspects of the main subject as the ability of the present Soviet leadership to make concessions, the position of De Gaulle, and the acceptability of disengagement to both the Russians and the Germans are not examined. Despite such pronounced flaws, the book has the merit of presenting a provocative, if not wholly original, plan for Western initiative in easing cold war tensions.—ALFRED FERNBACH, *University of Virginia*.

*The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations.* By SHELDON APPLETON. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 1961. xiv, 274 pp. \$5.95.)

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on December 1, 1961, Adlai E. Stevenson presented with new eloquence U. S. arguments against the seating of Communist China in the world body. Many people, who had expected Ambassador Stevenson, in light of earlier statements before joining the Kennedy Administration, to be rather luke-warm in his presentation, were surprised at the force with which he expressed his views. But it was, after all, merely a reflection of the emphasis on security considerations which holding responsible office had brought, as well as his access to classified material and awareness of interrelationships that cannot be talked about openly by Administration spokesmen.

Such considerations are generally missing from Professor Sheldon Appleton's study of the United States and the question of the admission of Communist China to the U. N. He has researched the literature diligently, carried out some enterprising interviewing, and attempted to isolate the important components of the problem. His major research is summarized in six chapters sandwiched between a summary history of the question and a final "Summing Up." In these chapters he examines the legal and procedural aspects of the question, backgrounds of the two Chinese governments, significance of the representation issue, voting record of the U. N., U. S., policy, and the relation of American public opinion to that policy.

Appleton finds that "the history of the question in the United Nations to date makes it clear enough that political rather than legal factors have been, and will continue to be, decisive in de-

termining U. N. action in the matter." (32-33) Nevertheless in a weighing of political factors and with only a cursory glance at the international security and power considerations, he concludes "the seating of Peking in the U. N. would probably yield more advantages than disadvantages to the United States." (103) His position in support of seating Communist China is buttressed by an imposing array of statistical analysis of past U. N. voting records, public opinion surveys, and projection of trends. On the basis of public opinion surveys, for example, he finds that "there is much greater support for seating Peking among American elite and leadership groups than in the population generally." (217) The same could, of course, have been said with regard to the rationalization of the policies of Stalin in the 1930s.

The title of this study is an accurate reflection of its major shortcoming. By concentrating attention on the United Nations representation issue Appleton tends to ignore some of the political and military power realities of the problem. The China representation issue has become a highly-charged political issue and one which simply cannot be isolated from other international problems in the manner attempted by Professor Appleton. Although he does present many of the complexities of the China problem, his concentration on the United Nations as the center of world attention and concern leads him to overplay the extent to which various governments consider the U. N. or the China question as an issue to which other questions are subordinate. It also leads him to overlook many aspects of U. S. foreign policy. In discussing the importance of seating Peking to the overseas Chinese communities, for instance, he comments that the U. S. might "attempt . . . to utilize the influence available to it in Southeast Asia to persuade local governments there to pursue policies which would encourage the gradual re-orientation of overseas Chinese toward their country of residence." (119) This has long been a major U. S. policy on which able diplomats have already spent many agonizing years.

Events have dated Appleton's efforts. The explosion in U. N. membership, budgetary problems, and such issues as the Congo operation have provoked responsible U. S. and NATO leaders to raise reservations which throw the whole China representation problem into different focus. Again, as long as Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek are firmly committed that only one China will be represented at the U. N., the diligence and effort behind much of the statistical analysis and detached projections are hardly likely to be of lasting certainly not "eternal" significance. The book can serve as a handy reference work on the past history of the China problem at the U. N., but unfortunately its use for reference purposes is

marred by the fact that the author has not seen fit to provide an index.—RICHARD L. WALKER, *University of South Carolina.*

*Southeast Asia Today—And Tomorrow. A Political Analysis.* BY RICHARD BUTWELL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. x, 176. \$4.25 cloth, \$1.75 paper.)

Political developments in Southeast Asia have covered so much ground in the last fifteen years or more that it is nearly impossible to follow them with any semblance of precision. In recent years research in Burma, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, and less so in Cambodia and Laos, has begun to produce fragments of an understanding of what is happening in the area. But we are obviously still very far away from confidence in discussing the politics of any one of these states. To discuss them all together in one brief book is quite a task, and one that only a few scholars have tried so far.

Mr. Butwell's book is a recent attempt to throw some light on all of Southeast Asia. Having spent several years studying this area, sometimes in the field, he sets out in this book "to describe and assess the record of the lands of Southeast Asia in governing themselves after a decade of independence; to offer some suggestions, based on this examination, concerning the nature of government in this part of the world; and to chart the probable course of future development." He devotes a chapter each to pre-independence background, the governmental system each state began with after independence, later adjustment of the political systems, the political process, development of government policies, changing policy patterns and directions, Communism (The Communist Challenge), foreign policy; and he concludes with a very brief comment on some problems of the future.

A few of Mr. Butwell's observations are debatable—among them his reasoning that neutralism must necessarily benefit the Communists. But a majority of knowledgeable readers will not disagree with most of his conclusions.

The primarily descriptive and comparative approach of this book seems at first glance to be promising, but its content is not satisfying. Covering as much as he does, the author necessarily sketches and over-simplifies most of his descriptive material. This certainly reduces the value of the book for area experts, who require rather meatier detail. And there is not sufficient depth and precision of analysis to compensate for this. On the other hand, the beginning student, who is not likely to have more than an odd bit of information about Southeast Asia at his disposal, may find it hard to weather the apparent flood of countries, systems, and leaders that comes at him

as he goes from section to section in the book.

However, Mr. Butwell has provided the reader with some information of more recent date—into 1961—than other books available at this time. It may therefore have limited value as supplementary reading, especially the chapter on “the search for the appropriate political system.” A short selected bibliography will be useful to the general reader.—DANIEL S. LEV, *Cornell University*.

*Latin America between the Eagle and the Bear.* By SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiv, 192. \$4.50.)

In conception and intent, this is a good book. In execution, it is at best mediocre. Sketching the dangers which hem Latin America in its position between the American eagle and the Soviet bear, Sr. de Madariaga considers the various pertinent influences: Spanish, American, and Soviet-Chinese. The obvious intent is to enhance the reader's comprehension of Latin America and its Communist threat, and with such a goal no one can quarrel:

But with execution one cannot be as well satisfied. The Table of Contents expounds a neat organization, but the text is often rambling and diffuse. One learns some things with which he was not previously familiar: that Spain's rule over the Latin American countries was not really “colonial,” and that Spain did not, as so often thought, practice a selfish, extractive, gold-hungry policy. Other matters are only too familiar. North American students of hemispheric relations hardly need to be told of the evils of dollar diplomacy, economic imperialism, fraternization with Batista- and Trujillo-type dictators, and similar shortcomings of our Latin American policies; this tale has been told many times, and often far better than in the present volume.

Questions of balance are not answered to the satisfaction of this reviewer. No one could cover this subject matter intensively in the fewer than two hundred pages used here, but one can look askance at the judgment exercised when the author spends fourteen pages discussing details of party organization and program in various countries, while agrarian reform, by his own statement one of Latin America's very most pressing problems, is dismissed in one superficial twenty-line paragraph. Sr. de Madariaga sensibly maintains that international non-intervention is indeed practically impossible, but nevertheless repeats the stock Latin criticisms of United States intervention. The United States is advised, among a great many other things, to improve its image in Latin America—and surely most of us will agree with this suggestion despite the fact that the bloom of youth has long since faded from its

cheeks—but this perennial admonition is offered in such a fashion as to cause at least one North American to wonder whether Latins have ever considered improving their image in North America. This one American has grown weary of this warmed-over diet, even when served by so distinguished an author.—HOLLIS W. BARBER, *The University of Illinois, Chicago*.

*The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960.* By J. LLOYD MECHAM. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 514. \$7.50.)

In this lengthy and extensively documented study of hemisphere relations Professor Mecham has examined so many questions of inter-American interest within so broad a range of history that it is difficult to do justice to his work in a short review. He has produced a useful and informative book to which the reader, once exposed, will in all probability return again and again.

As the title suggests, the author's basic approach to inter-American relations is historical, but his treatment actually goes beyond the dates specified. An early chapter deals with the “old” Pan Americanism, the phase of limited cooperative efforts among Spanish-American nations between 1826 and 1888. Later chapters bring the story of continental politics down through 1960. Synthesis, or at any rate skillful management, of the vast historical detail of a century and a quarter seems to be achieved largely through four key concepts which dominate the book.

The first of these is *security*, which is generally assessed as the preservation of national independence through cooperation among the several nations. At various points in his narrative Mecham dwells on the recurrent problem faced by the small Latin American state: is national independence generally favored or hindered by the type of regional security arrangement that has evolved in the Western Hemisphere? Recognizing the validity of the question, the author makes a convincing case for the regional organization as a guarantor of national independence in Latin America, and he cites distinguished and discriminating Latin American sources in support of his case, (for example, Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo).

A concept that is immediately related is, of course, the special power of the United States in the inter-American system. “Twenty mice and a cat” has been a glib and cynical description of the twenty-one member OAS. There is nothing cynical in Mecham's more thoughtful appraisal: “Although nominally a regional arrangement of twenty-one juridically equal and sovereign states, the Organization of American States is actually an association of one Great Power with twenty small

weak member nations in which evidences of United States predominance are readily apparent." The realities of United States power, its hazards and benefits, are constantly acknowledged throughout the work.

No comprehensive treatment of the Inter-American scene can avoid involvement with those two perennial ideas of *regionalism* and *universalism*. As everyone knows there have been "regionalists," ready to wall off the American hemisphere from contagion with a wicked world, who have been opposed by champions of a universalism which denies any validity to the hemispheric concept. Mecham's contention is that "there is no inherent contradiction between universalism and regionalism, for neither is an exclusive principle." In the chapters dealing with World War II and the integration of inter-American security into UN he makes an excellent case for the compatibility of the two principles.

This reviewer would have welcomed a somewhat more extended treatment of a fifth concept, namely, nationalism in Latin America. The relevance of nationalist sentiments to specific questions of hemispheric security is suggested in various sections including those which pertain to challenges from international communism. Yet, in other important parts of the story, at the eve of World War II for example, the full force of nationalism as an element in the security equation appears to be underrated.

Mecham's direct concern, however, is not with the *isms* and other abstractions. The concrete acts of specific governments, managed and controlled by beings of flesh and blood, absorb his interest and stimulate his appreciation of the steps by which the Western Hemisphere nations have moved, whether clumsily or adroitly, toward a regional security system which, he believes, can contribute to the peace and well-being of the world at large. A vital and important book is the result of this appreciation.—JOHN J. KENNEDY, *University of Virginia*.

*Urbanization in Latin America: A UNESCO Survey*. PHILIP M. HAUSER, ed., (New York: International Documents Service. 1961. Pp. 331. \$4.50.)

The growth of the social sciences in Latin America has been slow not only because of the centuries-long emphasis given to professional training at the university level, but also because of widespread political, religious, and ideological impediments. Until very recently the serious consideration of social matters was a labor only of humanistic essayists—some of high quality indeed, but still "scientists of the spirit," a phrase which many of them continue to use to defend themselves against the onslaught of the

"operationalists" and "nose counters." The present slow but persistent spread of empirical sociology, following a quite rapid expansion of modern economics dating in some countries from the mid-thirties, still has not been accompanied by more than an isolated vocation here and there for the ministry of political science. As a result Latin American political sociologists and political economists, joined by a few daring denizens of law schools, are doing the only relatively disciplined work on the political process other than the sporadic efforts of visiting foreign scholars. An important role in the encouragement of sociological and economic studies has been taken by the United Nations through such of its agencies as UNESCO, UNESCO-Western Hemisphere, and the Economic Commission for Latin America. These institutions have engaged in such formally promotional activities as the underwriting of research and interchange, training, and the calling of many international meetings which have served to establish communications and create a certain feeling of community among scholars from different countries. An unanticipated result has been to clothe certain Latin American professors with an international repute which has cushioned them from a measure of discomfort at home. In this context, it is ironic and unfortunate, although probably necessary, that the international agencies should so cautiously skirt both political issues and political science in the work they choose to sponsor in Latin America.

*Urbanization in Latin America* is a competently condensed collection of the proceedings of a seminar sponsored by four U. N. agencies and the Organization of American States in 1959 in Santiago de Chile, Latin America's Geneva. The volume, another in the Technology and Science Series of UNESCO, can profitably be paired with a preceding volume, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, to reveal some of the special characteristics of Latin America's problems of development. Some of these contrasts are pointed out in the *rapporteur's* presentation which opens the book, a section implicitly containing some well considered theoretical ideas with exciting research implications. The general conclusions of the seminar following the opening summary hardly even mention the problems of decision and power involved in public action to grapple with the difficulties and promises of rapid urbanization. Indeed, the conclusions list demographic, economic, employment, educational, and administrative aspects of urbanization, as well as a few others, but nowhere is city government as such discussed, let alone pressure groups, parties, political values, styles, ideologies, or the leadership-followership relation. The last chapter, entitled "Some Policy Implications of Urbaniza-

tion," belies its generous title in its first sentence by restricting itself only to the "socio-economic policy implications of the rapid growth of cities in Latin America." One would think that a U. N. with Korea behind it and the Congo all around it could muster the courage to face political research with a little more determination, especially when dealing with Latin American cities, the incubators of the region's nationalistic politics of development.

The eleven selected seminar papers presented in the book are by and large interesting and sometimes even piquing, and will serve to introduce the American reader to some of the more important Latin American social scientists. While common sense precludes accepting certain of the statistical material as being rigorously and meticulously reliable (a pretense no contributor to this book makes), the general outlines indicated are often of a high level of sophistication, and the analysis sometimes subtle and richly suggestive. These comments are especially true of the studies of slum and working class sections of Buenos Aires, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. It should also be emphasized again that some of these studies were written by persons quite new to this kind of research; even since this quite recent effort, most of them have demonstrated their continuing intellectual and technical growth. Even though this review, then, has voiced the discontent of a political scientist, it would be unjust not to end on the happier note that this book is not only "useful"—pallid word!—but is informative on several planes about both Latin America and Latin American scholars, and constitutes a prod to further research despite the officialese in which the summary and conclusions are couched. This volume suggests that the day will yet come when we shall be able to judge a book about Latin America on its intrinsic merits, and not shade our remarks with considerations of the weakness of data, the insufficiency of researchers, and the lack of intellectual company. The international agencies warrant our thanks for their encouragement, despite their belief that the entire discipline of political science is composed of experts in public administration.—K. H. SILVERT, *Dartmouth College*.

*Yugoslavia and The New Communism.* BY GEORGE W. HOFFMAN AND FRED WARNER NEAL. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. Pp. xvi, 546. \$8.00.)

This book, which seeks to present a sympathetic treatment of the Titoist system, is difficult to evaluate. It attempts too much; in addition to history, politics and economics, the authors also devote some space to geography, anthropology, demography and linguistics, with uneven results.

Much of their work covers old ground, already gone over by others (including a previous book by one of the authors), adding little that is new. The chapters on the economy, however, particularly those on Industrial Growth and Resources Base and Foreign Economic Relations, are good, although the unquestioning reliance on official Yugoslav statistics is open to criticism. Perhaps the book's main contribution is to be found in its recounting of the various forms of experimentation that the Yugoslav Communists have undertaken in their attempt to create a workable state-directed economy. Since the publication of the book, however, certain of their actions demonstrate that they are still seeking an answer to the question of how to decentralize an essentially centralist system.

The authors engage in a prodigious effort to "prove" that the theoretical foundations of Titoism are radically different from those of the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. Yet they admit that "there is an essential core of theory which is the same . . . both ideologies have their roots in the theories advanced by Lenin" (p. 156). Elsewhere they assert that the "concept of the state under socialism is one of the most significant points of theoretical difference. . . . The Yugoslavs [hold that] the state must begin to 'wither away.' " (One wonders if the authors have read *State and Revolution*). Moreover, the "concept of 'independent paths to socialism' is the main theoretical pillar" in Yugoslav theory, which "is to claim for Yugoslavia and all other states what Stalin and his successors have claimed for the Soviet Union." (How is all this radically new?) In talking about the Titoist system, the authors use a plethora of words such as "novel," "new," "unique," but have not the Russians too reorganized their party apparatus any number of times, and are they not still experimenting with different techniques in their search for a workable state-directed economy?

Time after time, it is evident that the authors want to present the Tito regime in as good a light as possible, often at the expense of historical accuracy. The chapter entitled "The Climb to Statehood" is incredibly poor, vague, and full of historical errors and questionable assertions. Its burden, seemingly, is to prove, that the Yugoslavs have had no experience with democracy. No scholar with even a rudimentary knowledge of this area could so contend. In the brief treatment of the Mihailovich-Tito struggle and the Communist seizure of power, the Mihailovich side does not get a fair hearing, although the authors unintentionally pay Mihailovich a compliment by citing information that he was right all along about Communist intentions. Moreover, the authors say nothing about Tito's admissions that



he had no intention of living up to the Tito-Shubashich Agreement. Further, the assertion that the Partisans "liberated most of the country themselves" is questionable. Even if one discounts the not insignificant actions of Soviet forces in Yugoslavia in 1944, and if one forgets about Western aid to Tito (also not insignificant), there is still the fact that *even when Berlin was falling*, large areas of Yugoslavia were still not in Tito's grasp. Also, the assertion that Western foreign offices were "befuddled" by the Cominform Resolution is simply not correct. To the best of this reviewer's knowledge, there is no proof of a Yugoslav Politburo decision not to bear down on the peasants (prior to 1948) and a great deal of evidence to the contrary.

Along with their desire to present the Tito regime in a favorable light, the authors seemingly have a compulsion to hedge. This often creates the impression that they cannot make up their minds. For example: "The voting [in 1945] took place without obvious intimidation" (p. 80), but "Communist strong-arm tactics, already tried out in the 1945 election. . . ." (p. 91). Also: "Almost from the first [there was] a sort of collective leadership," but "the only really top Communists who ever seriously challenged Tito . . . went to prison." (p. 499). Frequently they talk of new democratic forms in Yugoslavia, but at one point conclude that "although there may be more parliamentary 'debate' in Poland than in Yugoslavia, the result is the same: what the Communist Party proposes is enacted." (p. 461)

In a final section, the authors find that the influence of Titoism abroad is nil except perhaps in the new underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa, but they do not examine the implications of the latter statement. In the final chapter, the authors do some speculating about what will happen after Tito, without reaching any firm conclusions. This speculation is preceded by a return to some dubious assertions to support their position that the present regime is a significant improvement over the past, and is accompanied by other declarations that demonstrate that the authors have not really penetrated the thinking of the average Yugoslav citizen.—ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University*.

*International Protection of Human Rights*. By MANOUCHEHR GANJI, (Geneva: Droz, 1962, pp. xvi, 317.)

Manouchehr Ganji's survey of the international protection of human rights is divided into seven chapters dealing respectively with (1) humanitarian intervention (2) the post world war II minorities treaties (3) slavery (4) the U. N. Charter (5) the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (6) the draft Covenants on Human Rights (7) the European Convention on Human Rights. A little more than half the work is devoted to the last two chapters; rightly so since the historical evolution of the protection of individual human rights and of minority rights is already well covered by the literature. The book is completed by useful appendices.

The author gives unity to his analysis by adhering to the thesis that world wide international instruments should codify only those human rights already recognized as universally acceptable and applicable. For the present, Manouchehr Ganji proposes the following list of basic rights: "freedom from deprivation of life save in the execution of a court sentence; freedom from subjection to torture, physical mutilation, cruel or inhuman punishments; freedom from being held in slavery or subjected to the performance of compulsory labour unless provided as punishment duly imposed by a competent judicial tribunal, or required as a temporary public service equally incumbent upon all; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile; the right of "habeas corpus"; the right to compensation in case of unlawful arrest or deprivation of liberty; freedom from the application of *ex post facto* laws; freedom from being restricted in the exercise of civil rights or deprived of judicial personality (except in the case of: (a) minors; (b) persons convicted of crime for which this penalty is provided by law); the right to emigrate; the right to freedom of religion, conscience and belief, and the right to practice and to propagate one's religious belief, the exercise of this right being qualified only by the provisions of laws passed in the interest of humanity, of morals and public order, and to protect the rights and freedoms of others; the right to constitute associations for the promotion and protection of legitimate interests and of any other lawful object." He also proposes to include the right of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture and to use their own language, but he excludes the so called socioeconomic rights and in particular the right to own property.

To supplement a basic universal instrument the author puts his hope in regional agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, made by countries of similar culture and politics which may, consequently, offer wider and more specific protection.

The author decided, and such a decision is perfectly legitimate, to exclude from his study the examination of political or sociological factors which underlie the attitude of states on the question of the international codification of human rights. He tends to give at times, however, what this reviewer considers is undue importance to

official reasoning presented by governments wanting to justify their own positions.

There are minor mistakes such as the date of the treaty of Oliva (p. 16) or the equating of "national origin" with "nationality" (p. 209) but they detract from what is a careful and well organized analysis. More regrettable are certain omissions. The Genocide Convention receives only passing reference and the Trieste Settlement of 1954, one of the more interesting of the post World War II minorities treaties, has been left out of the study. Considering that the work originated in a Swiss University one may also be surprised by the lack of German language material in the bibliography. —JEAN A. LAPONCE, *Univ. of British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C.*

*Foreign Affairs and You!* BY ANDREW BERDING  
(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company,  
1962. Pp. 264. \$4.50.)

President Eisenhower's assumption of blame for the U-2 flights "ended in disaster" for the United States, cancelling one of the "greatest opportunities in our diplomatic history"—Eisenhower's scheduled trip to Moscow. A staff meeting of the Secretary of State resembles "a king holding court of his feudal lords," each zealous to prevent any trespassing within his private dominion. "To some White House advisers there is something irresistibly fascinating about foreign affairs," a lamentable fact placing still another hazard in the way of State Department efforts to steer a true course in foreign affairs. The State Department, however, has been too addicted to "negative reciprocity" in dealing with the USSR—that is, in invoking a tit-for-tat policy of restrictions upon Russians in America whenever prohibitions are placed on Americans in Russia.

These are but a few random judgments advanced by Andrew Berding, whose concern with foreign affairs began over thirty years ago as a newspaper reporter. Subsequently, he accepted a State Department appointment under Truman and became Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs under Eisenhower. In the light of his experience, concern for the role of public opinion in foreign policy is therefore natural. His book is intended for the layman. Its description of the machinery and substance of foreign policy seldom rises above the elementary, on the theory perhaps that even on this level public understanding of the foreign policy process remains rudimentary. The specialist is thus likely to find the analysis commonplace, not to say in some instances (when the author ventures outside his own area of expertise) naive.

Consider his evaluation of summit conferences and other techniques associated with "open diplomacy." The liabilities of such diplomacy are

too well-known to require repetition here, yet Berding advances two principal conclusions. One is that summit conferences are probably inevitable. The other is that they may have more value than critics suppose. Citing Eisenhower's trips abroad, he reasons that such appearances often make a lasting impression upon foreign officials: "If they believe the President has won the hearts of their public they are likely to be more amenable. . . ." If there exists any creditable evidence for such reassuring verdicts, the author does not supply it.

In the realm he knows best—propaganda and the "public relations" of foreign policy—the treatment is more convincing and illuminating. The author points out, for example, that *revolution* remains a popular concept throughout Latin America. How much more effective, therefore, for propagandists in America to talk about the revolutionary movement *against* Castro than about *counter-revolutionary* activities in Cuba! Similarly, he dwells upon the unnecessary problems the United States sometimes creates for itself by citing the history of foreign aid. How can citizens at home and abroad generate enthusiasm and support for the agency administering such aid, much less understand its complex administrative structure, when *five* different agencies have administered foreign aid within the last thirteen years?

Commendable as it may be to focus public attention on such problems, politically literate readers are likely to question a number of Berding's simplistic judgments. What informed student of Asian affairs, for example, would agree that the *major* difficulty with America's recent policies toward Quemoy and Matsu was the way they were explained to the American public? Or, after reading the author's plea for greater American understanding of the "neutralist" mentality, what competent observer would accept the assertion that when Washington also advocates "peaceful co-existence" it automatically does Khrushchev "a favor"? Again, after deploring the dominant anti-communist theme in much of contemporary American policy, does it really help to suggest that as a substitute "our output" ought to be more "pro-American"?

Highlighted as it is with the author's first-hand experiences, *Foreign Affairs and You!* can serve as a useful introduction to an increasingly complex subject. If it arouses further interest and a desire to probe deeper—if only to examine critically some of Berding's own assertions—then it will have achieved one of the author's primary objectives.—CECIL V. CRABB, JR., *Vassar College.*

*The Imperialism Reader.* EDITED BY LOUIS L. SYNDER. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962. Pp. xvii, 619. \$8.50.)

Professor Synder's editorial efforts have produced the first anthology of materials related to the subject of imperialism. The 178 readings include eyewitness reports, travel accounts, historical disquisitions, contemporary essays and arguments, treaties, historical commentary, and excerpts from newspapers and magazines. The volume is divided into ten sections; the most useful are those (parts 5 through 9) collecting representative materials dealing with the context and

content of imperialism in Africa, the Far East and Southern Asia, the Near and Middle East, American imperialism, and with the "Twilight of Western Imperialism." Of doubtful polemic value are items collected under the rubric "The Emergence of Communist Imperialism." The pointed inclusion of the latter group of readings do not, however, detract from the usefulness of the rest.

The bibliographical section that has customarily appeared at this point, covering articles and documents on international relations, law and organization, will be resumed in the March 1963 number.

### OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

- AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. *International Legal Matters*, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Washington, D. C.: American Society of International Law, 1962. Pp. 196.)
- ANDREWS, WILLIAM G. *American National Political Institutions*. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1962. Pp. 200, \$1.50.)
- ANDREWS, WILLIAM G. *European Political Institutions, A Comparative Government Reader*. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1962. Pp. xii, 380, \$3.95.)
- BAGBY, WESLEY M. *The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. 167, \$5.50.)
- BALDWIN, HANSON W. *World War I, an Outline History*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Pp. ix, 181, \$3.95.)
- BANERJEE, D. N. *Some Aspects of the Indian Constitution*. (Calcutta: The World Press Private, Ltd., 1962. Pp. x, 287, 25/-.)
- BARBOUR, K. M. AND PROTHERO, R. M., editors. *Essays on American Population*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. x, 336, \$7.50.)
- BARNETT, A. DOAK. *Communist China in Perspective* (Oreon E. Scott Foundation Lectures, Washington University, 1961). (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. vi, 88, \$2.95.)
- BELOFF, MAX. *New Dimensions in Foreign Policy*. (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1961. Pp. 208.)
- BETTELMHEIM, CHARLES. *L'inde Indépendante*. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962. Pp. 528, 3N.F.)
- BIRRENBACH, KURT. *The Future of the Atlantic Community*. (Freiberg: Verlag Rombach, 1962. Pp. 92, 7.80 D.M.)
- BLACK, MAX, editor. *The Importance of Language*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. viii, 172, \$1.95 Spectrum paperback.)
- BOCK, EDWIN A. AND CAMPBELL, ALAN K., editors. *Case Studies in American Government*. Inter-University Case Program. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x, 368, \$3.95.)
- BOTZARIS, NOTIS. *Visions balkaniques dans la Revolution Grecque: 1789-1821*. (Geneva, Librairie E. Droz, 1962. Pp. vii, 280, 20.—F.)
- BOUSCAREN, ANTHONY TRAWICK. *Soviet Foreign Policy: A Pattern of Persistence*. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962. Pp. 160, \$5.00.)
- BRIMMER, BRENDA; WALL, LINWOOD R.; HOVET, JR., THOMAS; CHAMBERLIN, WALDO. *A Guide to use of United Nations Documents*. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1962. Pp. xv, 272, \$6.00.)
- BROOKS, JOHN. *The One and the Many: The Individual in the Modern World*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Pp. xvi, 331, \$6.00.)
- BUSEY, JAMES L. *Notes on Costa Rican Democracy*. (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1962. Pp. vi, 84, \$2.00 paperback.)
- CARPER, EDITH T. *Illinois Goes to Congress for Army Land*. (University: University of Alabama Press, 1962. Inter-University Case Program No. 71. Pp. 32, \$.50 paperback.)
- CARPER, EDITH T. *Lobbying and the Natural Gas Bill*. (University: University of Alabama Press, 1962. Inter-University Case Program No. 72. Pp. 39, \$.50 paperback.)

- CARR, J. C. AND WRIGHT, A. E. G. *History of the British Steel Industry*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 632, \$11.00.)
- CARRELL, JEPHTHA J. *The Role of the City Manager*. (Kansas City: Community Studies, Inc., 1962. Public Affairs Monograph Series No. 2. Pp. iii, 47, \$2.00 paperback.)
- CHAGLA, M. C. *An Ambassador Speaks*. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1962. Pp. vi, 152, \$5.75.)
- CHERINGTON, PAUL W. AND GILLEN, RALPH L. *The Business Representative in Washington*. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1962. Pp. x, 124.)
- CHIPMAN, WILLIAM K. *Non-Military Defense for the United States*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961 (Ph.D. Thesis). Pp. 613)
- CH'U, T'UNG-TSU. *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xiv, 342, \$9.50.)
- CLEM, ALAN L. *South Dakota Political Almanac*. (Vermillion: State University of South Dakota, 1962. Report No. 47. Pp. 85, paperback.)
- CONANT, MELVIN. *The Long Polar Watch*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962. Pp. xii, 197, \$5.00.)
- DAVISON, R. B. *West Indian Migrants*. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xix, 87, \$1.75 paperback.)
- DEGLER, CARL N. *Out of Our Past*. (New York: Harper, Row, and Peterson, 1962. Pp. xvi, 484.)
- DOUGLAS, ANN. *Industrial Peacemaking: A Report on Union-Management Negotiations*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. viii, 668, \$13.50.)
- DOZER, DONALD MARQUAND. *Latin America: An Interpretative History*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962. Pp. xiii, 618, \$7.95.)
- DREIER, JOHN C., editor. *The Alliance for Progress: Problems and Perspectives*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. xviii, 146, \$3.95.)
- DUFFY, JAMES. *Portugal Africa*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. 240, \$3.95.)
- DUNLOP, JOHN Q. *Automation and Technological Change*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. vi, 184, \$1.95 paperback.)
- DURDEN, ROBERT F. *Reconstruction Bonds and Twentieth Century Politics*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962. Pp. xi, 260, \$6.00.)
- DYER, RICHARD MACCANN. *Hollywood in Transition*. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962. Pp. xv, 208, \$6.00.)
- DVORNICK, FRANCIS. *The Slavs in European History and Civilization*. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962. Pp. xxviii, 688, \$15.00.)
- EMDEN, CECIL S. *The People and the Constitution*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Reprint from 1933. Pp. vi, 316, \$1.85.)
- FATOUROS, A. A. *Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. xvii, 411, \$12.00.)
- FOSTER, MARGERY SOMERS. "Out of Smaller Beginnings . . ." *An Economic history of Harvard College*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xvi, 232, \$6.25.)
- FRIEDMANN, W. *An Introduction to World Politics*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 4th edition, 1960. Reprint from 1951. Pp. xiv, 384, \$2.95 paperback.)
- FRYE, ALTON. *The Hazards of Atomic Wastes*. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962. Pp. iv, 45, \$1.00.)
- GAVSHON, ARTHUR L. *The Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjöld*. (New York: Walker and Company, 1962. Pp. 243, \$4.50.)
- GERHARD, DIETRICH. *Alle und Neue Welt in Vergleichender Geschichtsbetrachtung*. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962. Pp. 249, D.M. 23,—paperback.)
- GORDIS, ROBERT. *The Root and the Branch: Judaism and the Free Society*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xv, 254, \$3.95.)
- HABERMAS, JURGEN. *Politica*. (Neuweid, Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962. Pp. 283, 28 D.M.)
- HARTMANN, FREDERICK H. *The Relations of Nations*. (New York: Macmillan, 2nd edition, 1962; 1st edition, 1957. Pp. xx, 648, \$7.50.)
- HEILBRONER, ROBERT L. *The Making of Economic Society*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiii, 241, \$4.95.)
- HEMPSTONE, SMITH. *Rebels, Mercenaries, and Dividends: The Katanga Story*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. 250, \$4.95.)
- HEREDORO, MANUEL HIGUERAS. *Standards of Position Classification in the Public Service*. Madrid: Office of the Technical Secretary—General of the Ministry of Government, 1961. Pp. 202, 70 pesetas.
- HERTZ, FREDERICK. *The Development of the German Public Mind, Vol. II*. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp. 482, \$7.75.)
- HERZBERG, DONALD G. AND TILLET, PAUL. *A Budget for New York State, 1956-1957*. Inter-University Case Program No. 69. (University: University of Alabama Press, 1957. Pp. 33.)
- HINDERAKER, IVAN. *American Government Annual, 1962-1963*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1962. Pp. 110.)
- HOCHFELD, GEORGE. *Henry Adams: an Introduction and Interpretation*. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962. Pp. x, 150, \$2.95 cloth, \$1.25 paperback.)
- HOMO, LÉON. *Roman Political Institutions: From City to State*. (New York: Barnes and Noble,

- 2nd edition, 1962; 1st edition, 1929. Pp. xviii, 426, \$8.50.)
- HUNT, ERLING M. *et al.* *High School Social Studies in Perspective*. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1962. Pp. ix, 344, \$3.75.)
- INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. *Proceedings of the Third Institute for Tax Assessors, December 3-5, 1961*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. Pp. 159.
- INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. *Fifty-Seventh Texas Legislature: A Review of Its Work*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962. Pp. 61, \$1.00.)
- INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. *Fourth County Auditors' Institute*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962. Pp. v, 61.)
- INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. *Eighth Governmental Accounting and Financing Institute*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962. Pp. v, 108.)
- INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES DOCUMENTATION. *International Bibliography of Political Science*. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 333, \$10.00.)
- IRISH, MARIAN D. AND PROTHRO, JAMES W. *The Politics of American Democracy*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2nd Edition, 1962. Pp. xii, 658, \$7.50.)
- JACOBINI, H. B. *International Law, A Test*. (Homewood: Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 304, \$6.95.)
- JOYCE, JAMES AVERY. *Capital Punishment: A World View*. (New York: Grove Press, 1961. Pp. 288, \$1.95 Evergreen paperback (1962).)
- JUVIGNY, PIERRE. *Towards Equality in Education: The Fight Against Discrimination*. (Paris: UNESCO, 1962. Pp. 65.)
- KAZNACHEEV, ALEKSANDR. *Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma*. (Edited by Simon Wolin. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1962. Pp. 250, \$4.95.)
- KENNEDY, ROBERT F. *Just Friends and Brave Enemies...* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Pp. xi, 206, \$3.95.)
- KOHN, HANS. *The Age of Nationalism*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962. Pp. xvi, 172, \$4.50.)
- KRAFT, JOSEPH. *The Grand Design: From Common Market to Atlantic Partnership*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962. Pp. 120, \$2.95.)
- KREUZER, JAMES R. AND COGAN, LEE, editors. *The Bobbs-Merrill Reader*. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962. Pp. ix, 440, paperback.)
- LANE, ROBERT E.; BARBER, JAMES D.; GREENSTEIN, FRED I. *An Introduction to Political Analysis*, 3rd Edition. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. 1st and 2nd editions, 1952 and 1957. Pp. v, 385, \$4.95 paper workbook.)
- LAWRENCE, SAMUEL A. *The Battery Additive Controversy*. Inter-University Case Program, No. 68. (University: University of Alabama Press, 1962. Pp. 33.)
- LEE, RICHARD HENRY. *Additional Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican*. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1962. Pp. numbered according to letters, \$5.00.)
- LEPAWSKY, ALBERT, editor. *Agenda for International Training*. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1962. Pp. 44, \$1.50 paperback.)
- LINDSAY, A. D. *The Modern Democratic State*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 286, \$1.75 paperback.)
- LIPSKY, GEORGE A. *Ethiopia*. (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1962. Pp. 376, \$8.75.)
- LONDON INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS. *Year Book of World Affairs, 1962*, Vol. 16. (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1962. Pp. xv, 344, £3 3s.)
- LOWENSTEIN, ALLARD K. *Brutal Mandate: A Journey to South West Africa*. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp. vi, 257, \$5.00.)
- MARQUARD, LEO. *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa*, 3rd Edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. vii, 284, \$2.25.)
- MAY, GEORGE S. *Michigan Civil War History: An Annotated Bibliography*. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961. Pp. 141, \$1.75 paperback.)
- MCCARDELL, LEE. *Ill-Starred General: Braddock of the Coldstream Guards*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958.)
- MELMAN, SEYMOUR, editor. *No Place to Hide*. (New York: Grove Press, 1962. Pp. 206, \$.75.)
- MENEGAZZI, GUIDO. *I Fondamenti Dell'ordine Vitale dei Popoli*. (Milano: Dott A. Giuffrè, editore, 1961. Pp. (II) 465; (III) 457; (IV) 545. Lire 2500; Vol. IV, Lire 3000.)
- MEYER, KARL E. AND SZULE, TAD. *The Cuban Invasion, Chronicle of Disaster*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. 156, \$3.95.)
- MOSSE, GEORGE L. *The Culture of Western Europe*. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961. Pp. 439, \$6.50.)
- MULLEY, F. W. *The Politics of Western Defense*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. viii, 272, \$6.75.)
- NEALE, WALTER C. *Economic Change in Rural India*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 325, \$7.50.)
- NEVINS, ALLEN. *The State Universities and Democracy*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. Pp. vii, 171, \$2.95.)
- NISBET, ROBERT A. *Community and Power*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Reprint)

- from 1953 title *QUEST FOR COMMUNITY*. \$1.75 Galaxy paperback.)
- O'CONNOR, HARVEY. *World Crisis in Oil*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962. Pp. xiii, 423, \$7.50.)
- O'CONNOR, RAYMOND G. *Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930*. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1962. Pp. 180, \$5.00.)
- O'MEARA, FRANCIS E. *The New Age: Essays on the Future of the Western World*. (New York: Exposition Press, 1962. Pp. 85, \$3.00.)
- PAIKERT, G. C. *The German Exodus: A Selective Study on the Post World War II Expulsion of German Populations and Its Effect*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962. Pp. x, 97, guilders 8.50.)
- PANIKKAR, K. M. *In Defence of Liberalism*. (New York: Taplinger Publications, Inc., 1962. Pp. vi, 136, \$4.50.)
- PARRIS, JOHN. *The Lion of Caprera: A Biography of Giuseppe Garibaldi*. (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1962. Pp. 347, \$5.00.)
- PERKINS, DEXTER. *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Revised edition; 1st edition, 1951. Pp. vii, 247, \$4.95.)
- PLAINE, HENRY L. *Darwin, Marx, and Wagner: A Symposium*. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962. Pp. viii, 165, \$3.50.)
- PORTER, EUGENE O. *Fallacies of Karl Marx*. (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1962. Pp. viii, 96, \$5.00.)
- POWELL, THEODORE. *Democracy in Action*. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp. 438, \$3.25.)
- PLYEE, M. V. *India's Constitution*. (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pp. vii, 380, \$6.00.)
- RAMSEY, PAUL. *Nine Modern Moralists*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. 271, \$2.95 Spectrum paperback.)
- RAY, PHILIP ALEXANDER. *South Wind Red: Our Hemispheric Crisis*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962. Pp. viii, 242, \$5.00.)
- RIDDELL, WALTER A. *Documents of Canadian Foreign Policy, 1917-1939*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xxi, 806, \$13.50.)
- ROBBINS, ROY M. *Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962. Reprint from 1942 (Princeton University Press). Pp. vii, 423, \$1.95 paperback.)
- ROCKEFELLER, NELSON A. *The Future of Federalism*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1962. Pp. 83, \$2.75.)
- SCHATTSHNEIDER, E. E. AND JONES, VICTOR. *Local Political Surveys*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962. Pp. v, 229, \$3.75.)
- SCHIEDER, THEODOR, editor. *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Central Europe*, Vols. II and III. (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1962. Pp. viii, 355.)
- SCHIFF, ASHLEY L. *Fire and Water: Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. ix, 225, \$5.00.)
- SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L. *The Cold War Retrospect and Prospect*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. Pp. xv, 104, \$3.50.)
- SHAPIRO, HENRY D. *Confiscation of Confederate Property in the North*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. Pp. v, 58, \$1.50.)
- SHARMA, INDRA D. *Modern Constitutions at Work*. (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pp. v, 541, \$8.50.)
- SHEPHERD, GEORGE W., JR. *The Politics of African Nationalism: Challenge to American Policy*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. x, 216.)
- SHERWOOD, FRANK. *United States City Planners in Iran*. (Inter-University Case Program No. 70. University: University of Alabama Press, 1962. Pp. 25, \$40.)
- SMITH, HENRY. *The Economics of Socialism Reconsidered*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 225, \$4.80.)
- SMOTHERS, FRANK, editor. *The Book of the States*. (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1962. Pp. 616.)
- STEBBINS, RICHARD P., editor. *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1961*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Pp. xxi, 555, \$6.95.)
- STEEFEL, LAWRENCE D. *Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xi, 281, \$6.50.)
- STERN, CLARENCE A. *Republican Heyday: Republicanism through the McKinley Years*. (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 1962. Pp. vi, 45.)
- STUEBER, FRITZ A. *The Contribution of Switzerland to the Economic and Social Development of Low-Income Countries*. (Winterthur: P. G. Keller, 1962. Pp. 59 (pamphlet).)
- STILLMAN, EDMOND AND PFAFF, WILLIAM. *The New Politics: America and the End of the Post-war World*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Pp. 191, \$1.35 Harper Colophon paperback.)
- STRAUSS, LEWIS L. *Men and Decisions*. (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962. Pp. viii, 430, \$6.95.)
- SYRETT, HAROLD C. AND COOK, JACOB H., editors. *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. III. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. xii, 745, \$12.50.)
- TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. *A Study of History*, Vols. V and VI. (London: Oxford University Press,

1962. Reprints. Pp. Vol. V, 712; Vol. VI, 633; Vol. V, \$2.75; Vol. VI, \$2.45 Galaxy paperbacks.)
- TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. *America and the World Revolution*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 231, \$4.75.)
- TURNER, LYNN W. *William Plumer of New Hampshire*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. 366, \$7.50.)
- UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 83rd Edition. (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1962. Pp. 1036.)
- VANEK, JAROSLAV. *The Balance of Payments, Level of Economic Activity, and the Value of Currency*. (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1962. Pp. 36.)
- VEICHOPOULOS, NICOLAS. *Traité des Territoires Dependants*. (Athens: French Institute of Athens, 1960. Pp. 455.)
- VERNON, RAYMOND. *Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems*. (Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1962. Pp. 84.)
- WALDO, DWIGHT. *Organization Theory: An Elephantine Problem*. Reprint No. 3. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. 210-225, \$.25 paperback.)
- WALDO, DWIGHT. *Bureaucracy*. Reprint No. 5. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. 732-739, \$.25 paperback.)
- WALKER, WARREN S. *James Fenimore Cooper, an Introduction and Interpretation*. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962. Pp. xv, 142, \$2.95 cloth; \$1.25 paperback.)
- WARD, HARRY M. *The Department of War: 1781-1795*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962. Pp. xi, 287, \$4.95.)
- WARNER, W. LLOYD. *The Corporation in the Emergent American Society*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Pp. 64, \$3.00.)
- WEBER, MAX. *Basic Concepts in Sociology*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. 123, \$3.75.)
- WHITING, KENNETH R. *The Soviet Union Today: A Concise Handbook*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. ix, 405, \$7.50.)
- WRIGHT, DAVID McCORD. *The Keynesian System*. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962. Pp. vii, 90, \$3.00.)
- WRIGHT, EDMOND T. *Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury*. (New York: Exposition Press, 1962. Pp. 166, \$3.50.)
- WRIGHT, RICHARD. *Elements of Government in California*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962. Pp. ix, 131, \$1.96.)
- ZIMMERMAN, JOSEPH F. *State and Local Government*. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962. Pp. xiii, 352, \$1.85 paperback.)
- ZINK, HAROLD. *Modern Governments*. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Co., Inc., 1962. 1st edition. 1958. Pp. xv, 804, \$6.95.)

## NEWS AND NOTES

### NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President-elect, three Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight members for two-year terms on the Council. Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Jack Peltason, University of Illinois, Chairman; Weldon Cooper, University of Virginia; John Lewis, Oberlin College; Rupert Emerson, Harvard University; J. Austin Ranney, University of Illinois (after February 1, University of Wisconsin); Robert Scalapino, University of California (Berkeley). The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1963.

### 1963 PROGRAM

Since the notice in the June issue, John D. Montgomery, Boston University has been appointed Chairman for the Special Topic sessions on Problems of the Developing Countries; and Allen S. Whiting, Department of State, has succeeded Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is on leave, as Chairman for Politics of the Soviet Bloc.

The 1963 Program, as in 1962, will include sessions for brief contributed papers, to be selected on a competitive basis of merit from those offered. Typescripts of papers for consideration should be submitted by May 1, 1963. Accepted papers will be read by their authors, either in special sessions or in regular panels, as the Program Committee determines. Prospective authors are invited to correspond with the Chairman for Selected Papers, Professor J. David Singer, Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

## PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

### *Fifty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Minutes of the Council Meeting*

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:00 A.M., September 4, 1962, in the Virginia Room of the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C. with President Charles S. Hyneman presiding. The following members of the Council, nominees for election in 1962, and former presidents of the Association were present: William Anderson, Franklin L. Burdette, Byrum E. Carter, Lawrence Durisch, William O. Farber, Carl J. Friedrich, Alfred de Grazia, John Hallowell, H. Field Haviland, Jr., Alexander Heard, Pendleton Herring, V. O. Key, Jr., Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Joseph La Palombara, Robert E. Lane, Ruth Lawson, John D. Lewis, Harvey C. Mansfield, Ithiel de Sola Pool,

C. Herman Pritchett, Emmette S. Redford, Leo C. Riethmayer, Lester G. Seligman, Richard C. Snyder, Harold H. Sprout, Kenneth W. Thompson, Vernon Van Dyke, Dwight Waldo, Robert E. Ward, John D. Williams, Bryce Wood.

Prior to the meeting the Executive Director had mailed to each Council member reports from the Executive Director, Editor of the APSR, Representative to ACLS, Representative to AAAS, Treasurer, Auditor, Committee on Standards of Instruction. These reports were the basis of Council discussion in the morning session.

The Executive Director reported continuing cooperation with other social science organizations and improvement in the status of political science with the National Science Foundation. In response to questioning, the Director noted that the National Science Foundation has made several



grants for political science projects in the past year: to Karl Deutsch and Harold Lasswell for a data assembly and analysis program and to Duncan MacRae for a study of the use of computers in election analyses. The Director's Report stressed the extension of working relations with Congress: the expansion of the Congressional Fellowship Program to include federal career executives ("the first planned attempt to create mutual understanding among employees of the legislative and executive branches"); the establishment of the Senate Youth Program, financed by the William Randolph Hearst Foundation, which will bring two outstanding high school students from each state to Washington in January, 1963, "for an intensive introduction to the Federal Government"; the promotion of an in-service training program for staff members of congressional committees. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council accept the Report of the Executive Director.

Carl Friedrich reported on the recent agreement between the APSA and the Atherton Press. This agreement is on an annual renewal basis and can be terminated at any time by the APSA. Under the contract, the Atherton Press now has priority in the publication in book form of papers presented at the annual meetings of the Association. The Program Committee this year was acquainted with the agreement. In response to questions, Mr. Friedrich indicated that the new publication arrangement does not cover all, but only a selected number of papers. It is anticipated that the professional journals and reviews will continue to publish some of the best papers. The APSA is not subsidizing publication. As to royalties, the Atherton Press will offer the usual contractual relationship to authors but APSA may expect some monetary returns for its editorial services in selection of manuscripts. In connection with the program, the Atherton Press is establishing a prize for outstanding scholarly monographs.

The Managing Editor of the *REVIEW*, Harvey Mansfield, reported that, due to personnel problems, the September and December issues of the *REVIEW* will not carry the international relations bibliography, and that a decision on its resumption is in abeyance pending expressions of demand. On recommendation of the Editor, Rowland Egger and Andrew Hacker will replace Alexander Heard and Wallace Sayre, retiring members of the Editorial Board. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council accept the Report of the Managing Editor.

Max Kampelman, summarizing the Treasurer's Report, noted that "the financial picture of APSA is a healthy one." The endowment fund has grown to \$100,000, an increase of \$25,000

over last year. During the past five or six years \$2,000,000 in grants has been received for special projects administered by the Association. The Council requested that letters of appreciation be sent to those who gave gifts or grants to the Association during the past year. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the budget be approved as it appears in the Treasurer's Report.

Under general announcements, the Executive Director noted a good response to the new group accident insurance plan for members, which becomes effective October 1, 1962; also that the World Tour Seminar is growing, with eighty-seven people already signed up for the tour, scheduled August 1 to September 10, 1963.

Mr. Friedrich reported that the IPSA would meet September 8 in Freudenstadt, Germany, with several members of APSA attending. Topics for discussion at this meeting would include "Political Role of the Courts" and "The Theory of Constitutionalism." A meeting of IPSA has been proposed at Oxford in 1963 and at Geneva in 1964.

The APSA members on the Board of Directors for SSRC this year were David Truman, James Coleman, and Roland Pennock. President Hyne- man appointed David Truman for a second term on the Board.

Byrum Carter, reporting on the status of political science in elementary and secondary schools, pointed out that a number of states have enacted statutes that require courses about communism to be taught in the public schools. He announced the preparation of a study guide with an annotated bibliography by Carter and Alfred Diamant under APSA auspices. The guide discusses "the Soviet Union as a going system."

The afternoon session was given over to general discussion of three interrelated topics: relationship with the elementary and secondary schools, the status and prospects of the profession of political science, and the concern of APSA for "the democratic process." The continuation of discussion on Byrum Carter's report led to a motion, seconded and passed:

that the Association undertake a major review of the framework of inquiry and the teaching methods in respect to political and civic topics in elementary and secondary schools (comparable to those undertaken in mathematics, physics, and economics) and take appropriate steps to modify and improve inquiry and teaching in these fields. As measures to this end, the Council urges continuing attention by the Executive Committee to the recommendations of the Fellman Committee as well as consideration of the following specific actions: (a) developing and encouraging pamphlets to supplement textbook materials; (b) preparing lists of suggested reading materials, audio-visual, and other teaching aids; (c) encouraging establishment of summer programs for teachers in this field; (d) enlisting the cooperation of regional political science associations; (e) consulting directly with the appropriate groups and agencies; (f) promoting professional interest and concern in selection and adoption of textbooks in government; and (g) making a systematic survey

of legal requirements, administrative regulations, and political practices in the choice of social studies materials.

On the status and prospects of the profession, President Hyneman reported that "the Lasswell Document" now in preparation will be ready in November. Ithiel de Sola Pool reported that the Committee on Science has been exploring "the politics of science" with a view to securing greater recognition for the science of politics. Mr. Kirkpatrick commented on the status of the Millett Report, a statement by the Committee on Standards of Instruction which appears in the June, 1962, issue of the *REVIEW*.

Discussion of the third topic, APSA concern with the effective functioning of the democratic process, focused on a resolution brought to the Council in person by James M. Burns, preliminary to its introduction at the general Business Meeting. This resolution proposes the establishment of a commission to assess the election and organization of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and the relation between the two branches, with power to make recommendations. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council approve in principle the resolution submitted by Mr. Burns and recommend it for consideration by the Association at its Business Meeting.

It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council send Sigmund Neumann, a member of the Council, a telegram expressing concern for his illness.

The Council adjourned at 5:00 P.M.

MARIAN D. IRISH, *Secretary*

### *Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting*

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President Charles Hyneman in the Grand Ballroom of the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 4:30 P.M., September 5, 1962.

The minutes of the Council meeting of September 4, 1962, were read by Secretary Marian Irish and upon her motion, the minutes were approved as read.

Harvey Mansfield, Editor of the *REVIEW*, commented briefly on his report which had been distributed to the members prior to the meeting. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Editor's report be accepted.

Evron Kirkpatrick, the Executive Director, made a brief report on Association activities. In particular, the Director called attention to the new Atherton Press Agreement. The main provisions of this agreement call for the publication of selected papers presented at the Annual Meeting, a monograph series, and the establishment of a

\$1000 prize to be given each year for the best original manuscript in the field of political science. The prize was awarded for the first time at this year's Annual Meeting. A letter giving the details of this agreement with Atherton Press will be sent to the members by the Director. The Director mentioned that the new group accident insurance program and Senate Youth Program showed promise of being highly successful during the coming year. In conclusion, the Director expressed his appreciation to the officers of the Association and particularly to the President for their generous and cooperative efforts. Written reports of the activities of the Office of the Executive Director were distributed at the meeting. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Executive Director's report be accepted.

Max Kampelman, Treasurer, discussed his report which had been distributed to the members prior to the meeting. He reported that the financial affairs of the Association are in healthy condition, reviewed briefly the income and expenses for the past year, called attention to the numerous foundation grants, and reviewed the proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Treasurer's report be accepted.

J. Roland Pennock, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, recommended the following slate of officers and council members for 1962-1963:

*President-elect:* C. Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago)

*Vice Presidents:* Alexander Heard (University of North Carolina); John D. Lewis (Oberlin College); and Wallace S. Sayre (Columbia University)

*Secretary:* Ruth Lawson (Mt. Holyoke College)

*Treasurer:* Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D. C.).

*Members of the Council for two years:* Franklin Burdette (University of Maryland); Charles B. Hagan (University of Illinois); H. Field Haviland, Jr. (Brookings Institution); Joseph La Palombara (Michigan State University); Robert E. Lane (Yale University); Ithiel de Sola Pool (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Harold H. Sprout (Princeton University); and Sheldon S. Wolin (University of California).

Mr. Pennock moved approval of the slate. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

James Titus appeared briefly before the meeting to express appreciation to the Senate and the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information for preparing and publishing the materials on the 1960 presidential campaign.

Charles D. Hounshell, National Representative, Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship

Foundation, presented the following statement to the meeting:

The Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation attracts men and women to the profession of college teaching by annually awarding fellowships to 1000 prospective first-year graduate students. We have just received \$27.5 million from the Ford Foundation to carry on our work through 1968.

It has been estimated that the number of full-time teachers of political science needed annually will rise during this decade from 450 to 600, while the present annual production of Ph.D.'s in political science is approximately 200, a large percentage of whom do not go into college teaching.

You will be interested in knowing that 558 of the seven thousand Wilson Fellows have been political scientists. In the early years of the program 19 per cent of the Wilson Fellows were political scientists, but in recent years this figure has dropped to about 7 per cent.

There are two new aspects of the Wilson program designed in part to reduce the time span between entering graduate school and earning the Ph.D. First, the Regional Selection Committees will give preference to candidates who are fully prepared for graduate study, including the possession of competence in foreign language.

Second, the Wilson Foundation has launched a Dissertation-Year Fellowship Program which seeks to demonstrate that all Ph.D. requirements can be met within a four year period. Deans of graduate schools may nominate former Wilson Fellows for the 200 dissertation-year awards. Selections will be made by committees in each of the disciplines. I am pleased to announce that Professor Edgar S. Furniss of Princeton University has agreed to serve as chairman of the committee to select political scientists for the dissertation-year awards.

The specific task of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation involves the general problem of the effective allocation and utilization of intellectual talent in a free society.

We would be glad to hear from any of you who have a research interest in this area.

James Burns appeared before the members to present the following resolution:

Be it resolved that:

This Association recommend to the President and Congress the establishment of a commission to examine and evaluate the election and organization of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, and the relations between the two branches with power to make recommendations;

Be it further resolved that:

This Association proffer its full cooperation in the work of such a commission.

It was moved and seconded that the Association adopt this resolution. After some discussion, a motion was made to table the motion but this was later withdrawn. The motion to adopt the resolution was then put to a vote and passed.

President Hyneman expressed his appreciation to the officers and council members for their generous cooperation and excellent assistance during the past year.

President Carl Friedrich took the chair as the new president. He expressed the Association's gratitude to President Hyneman for his fine work during the past year.

The meeting was adjourned at 6:00 P.M.

MARIAN D. IRISH, *Secretary*

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

The XIIth International Congress of Administrative Sciences, held in Vienna 16-20 July, 1962, attracted over 500 participants from 75 countries and 15 international organizations. New Officers elected for three years are: Herbert Emmerich (USA), President; Henri Matton (Belgium), Gustavo Martinez-Cabanas (Mexico), Raymond Nottage (U.K.), and Nikola Stjepanovic (Yugoslavia), Vice-Presidents.

Seats on the Executive Committee are held *ex officio* by chairmen of standing committees, elected as follows: Administrative Practices, Erik Pers Lassen (Denmark); Scientific, Henry Puget (France); Contracts, Andre Molitor (Belgium); Editorial Board, Laureano Lopez Rodo (Spain); Comparative Administrative Cases, G. A. van Poelje (Netherlands). Six alternate members of the Executive Committee were elected: T. B. Balta (Turkey); Hans Krauthausen (West Germany); Edwin Loebenstein (Australia); Tahar Mekouar (Morocco); V. K. Menon (India); Ten That Trach (Vietnam).

Under the revised statutes, confirmed by the General Assembly at Vienna, the next Congress will take place in 1965. There will be a smaller Round Table in 1964, but 1963 is left free for re-

gional conferences. (The representatives of Mexico reported they were considering a hemispheric conference for the Americas in 1963.)

A leading element in the Vienna Congress was a series of sessions, attended by nearly 150 persons representing schools and institutions concerned with training for public administration. An *ad hoc* steering committee, chaired by Donald C. Stone (USA), presented for consideration by the Executive Committee a program whereby IIAS could meet the felt needs of some 80 such national institutions by serving as a clearing house, to promote the provision of more effective teaching materials, etc.

The themes selected for study and debate at the next Congress are: participation of the citizen in the conduct of public administration; new techniques of budget preparation and management; the internal administration of public economic enterprises.

There were over thirty participants from USA, many on mission in countries as diverse as Nigeria, Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Philippines, Italy, Thailand. The leaders of the U. S. group were Elmer B. Staats and Stephen B. Sweeney, past president and president

of ASPA. G. W. Lawson, Jr., was U. S. member of the Committee on Administrative Practices; Walter Gellhorn, U. S. member of the Committee on Comparative Cases; Charles S. Ascher, U. S. member of the Contracts Committee.

The new officers of the American Society of International Law are: Dean Rusk, honorary president; Hardy C. Dillard, president; James N. Hyde, Brunson MacChesney, Marjorie Whiteman, vice-presidents; Edward Dumbauld, Secretary; Monroe Leight, treasurer.

The International Studies Association, a group of teachers, researchers and others devoted to the interdisciplinary approach to the study of international relations, recently held its third annual meeting at Portland State College, Portland, Oregon. The topic of the meeting was "The Developed Nations of the Free World: Problems and Prospects."

The following new officers of the organization were elected: Fred A. Sondermann, The Colorado College, president; Charles McClelland, San Francisco State College, first vice president; Karlin Capper Johnson, Lewis and Clark College, second vice president; Charles LaCugna, University of Seattle, treasurer; Mark Cannon, Brigham Young University, secretary; John Pustay, U. S. Air Force Academy, assistant secretary. Josef Korbel of the University of Denver, and Minos Generales, San Diego State College were elected to the executive board of the group. Colonel Wesley Posvar of the U. S. Air Force Academy joins the executive board as the out-going president.

The ISA plans next year to expand its membership and coverage on a nation-wide basis, to publish a journal devoted to recent trends in interdisciplinary research in the international field, and to sponsor professional meetings for members of various disciplines. Inquiries and other communications are invited. Please address these to Dr. Fred A. Sondermann, The Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The 20th Congress of the Institut International de Sociologie, originally scheduled for September 1962 at Cordoba, Argentina, has been postponed to 1963, to coincide with the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the founding of the National University of Cordoba. The date and program will be announced later.

The United States Department of State and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University are publishing jointly: "A catalogue of files and microfilms of the German foreign ministry archives, 1920-1945." This catalogue, consisting of three

volumes, will list for the period 1920 to 1945 all files from the political archives of the German foreign ministry that were seized by the American and British armies at the end of World War II. It will continue and complete the work of the catalog of German foreign ministry files and microfilms, 1867-1920 which was published by the American Historical Association in 1959. The catalog will include the title, number and date of all files contained in the archives, and the corresponding serial and frame numbers of those files that were microfilmed. It was compiled and prepared for printing by Dr. George O. Kent of the historical office of the department of state and its publication and distribution will be financed by the Hoover Institution. Volume I is scheduled to be published in the summer of 1962. The remaining volumes are scheduled to appear, respectively, late in 1962 and in 1963.

GORDON E. BAKER, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has been awarded a faculty research fellowship by the Social Science Research Council.

RICHARD D. BAKER, instructor in government at the University of Oklahoma, has been granted a two year leave of absence to accept an assignment with the University of Tennessee under grants from AID to set up a political science program at the University of Panama.

SAMUEL H. BARNES, political science department, University of Michigan, will be on leave in 1962-63 on Fulbright grant to lecture at the University of Florence, Italy.

CHESTER L. BARROWES retired as professor and chairman of history and government at Adelphi College, effective July, 1962.

OLIVER E. BENSON, professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, will become the director of the bureau of government research, in September, 1962.

EDWARD M. BERSHTEIN of Purdue University has been granted leave of absence in order to permit him to serve as Counsel on the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women in Washington, D. C.

GUTHRIE S. BIRKHEAD, professor of political science at Syracuse University, has accepted an assignment to serve as Syracuse representative at the Administrative Staff College, Lahore, Pakistan, for the coming year.

WILLIAM W. BOYER, associate professor of political science, University of Pittsburgh has been granted a leave of absence for two years to

become advisor to the University of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan to develop a doctoral program in public administration.

R. WALLACE BREWSTER, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University, will serve as visiting professor of political science at Haverford College during the academic year 1962-63.

HERBERT W. BRIGGS of Cornell was elected a member of the International Law Commission by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

GEORGE BRINKLEY of Notre Dame is spending a year in Russia.

FRED G. BURKE, assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University, will be on leave of absence for the coming year for research in East Africa.

FRANKLIN M. BRIDGE has resigned the position of assistant director of research projects of the bureau of governmental research and associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado, to become chief of local government research in the office of local government services of the state of New York.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI of the department of public law and government and director of the research institute on communist affairs, Columbia University, will be on leave during the academic year, 1962-63.

PHILIP H. BURCH, JR. has been appointed as assistant research specialist in the bureau of government research at Rutgers University.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, University of Maryland, has been appointed by the governor to the chairmanship of a state commission on legislative reapportionment in Maryland.

PAUL CASTLEBERRY, Washington State University, has been awarded a research scholar's grant under the Fulbright Act and will spend the 1962-63 academic year in Turkey.

GEORGE ANDREWS CONDON, acting instructor in political science at Washington State University has been awarded a Congressional Fellowship for 1962-63 by the American Political Science Association.

ALFREDO PAREJA DIEZCONSECCO has been appointed in political science at the University of Florida to work with the University of Florida Portuguese-Spanish Area Studies Institute, which has been established under the federal national defense program funds.

BEATRICE DINERMAN, formerly public administration analyst, bureau of governmental research, University of California at Los Angeles, has been appointed director of a three-year Ford Foundation project to be conducted under the auspices of the Welfare Planning Council of Los Angeles.

ROBERT B. DOVE will serve as assistant professor of political science at The Citadel for 1962-63, as a replacement for Donald Fairchild who will be on leave.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH will be on an overseas assignment to Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey for 1962-63 under the auspices of Vanderbilt University.

WILLIAM B. EDDY, Michigan State University, has joined the faculty of the University of Missouri, working with the graduate program in public administration.

HARRIS I. EFFROSS has been promoted to assistant research specialist in the bureau of government research at Rutgers University.

RAYMOND ENGLISH will spend 1962-63 year on sabbatical in England. During his absence S. R. McGowan will serve as acting chairman of the department of political science at Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio.

VERNON L. FERWERDA will be on leave during the 1962-63 academic year from his position as chairman of the department of government, Trinity College, to serve as director, U. S.-U. N. Interpretation, for the department of international affairs of the national council of churches.

EDWIN FOGELMAN, associate professor at the University of Oklahoma, and presently visiting associate professor at the University of Minnesota, will be at the institute for behavioral sciences, Palo Alto, during 1962-63.

RUSSELL O. FUDGE, who for the past three years was course director at the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for international relations and United States foreign policy, has retired from the regular army to become an associate professor of political science at Howard Payne College, Brownwood, Texas.

BERNARD K. GORDON has been given a leave of absence from Vanderbilt University during 1962-63 to join the staff of the institute for defense analysis.

DONALD J. GRADY will serve as instructor in the department of political science at the University of Washington during 1962-63.

MALBONE WATSON GRAHAM retired June 30, 1962 after forty-two years. Speaking to his career and retirement at a farewell sendoff on May 25 were Homer Durham, president, Arizona State University; Malcolm C. Moss, Rockefeller Foundation; and H. Arthur Steiner, professor of political science, UCLA.

DAVID H. GURBBS, assistant professor of political science at the University of Tennessee is on loan to the Tennessee state planning commission for a two year period beginning September 1962 where he will serve as director of research.

VINCENT W. HAUGE has been given a one-year appointment as instructor of government at Purdue, effective June, 1962.

RUTH R. HAWKINS, formerly assistant professor at West Liberty State College, has been given a one-year appointment as assistant professor of government, effective September, 1962 at Purdue University.

SAMUEL P. HAYES has been appointed as president of the foreign policy association as of September, 1962.

CLINTON S. HERRICK will serve as assistant professor of political science at the Citadel for 1962-63 as a replacement for Paul J. Kingston who will be on leave.

JOSEPH JIANG and YUNG-MIN KIM of Indiana University have been appointed research assistants in the institute of advanced projects at the University of Hawaii's east-west center for the year 1962-63.

ROY JUMPER, associate professor of political science at Wake Forest College, spent the spring semester, 1962, in South Viet Nam as a consultant with the agency for international development. He will continue on leave during 1962-63 to serve as consultant in public administration for the Ford Foundation in Beirut, Lebanon.

GEORGE McT. KAHIN of Cornell University, department of government, will be on leave 1962-63 at the University of London.

BOYD R. KEENAN, assistant professor of government at Marshall University, has accepted the associate directorship of the committee on institutional cooperation with headquarters at Purdue University. In addition, he will teach in the government department.

YOUNG C. KIM, Hobart and Smith College, is serving as visiting assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University during 1962-63.

HANS KOHN is serving as John Hay Whitney

visiting professor emeritus for the academic year 1962-63 with the department of international relations and the department of history, University of Denver.

ENVER M. KOURY, formerly lecturer in government and politics program of the University of Maryland, has been transferred to the European program of the University of Maryland.

MORTON KROLL, University of Washington, will be on leave 1962-63 to serve under a Smith-Mundt award as visiting professor of political science at the University College at the University of British West Indies.

RUTH C. LAWSON, professor of political science and chairman of the department at Mount Holyoke College has been granted an American society of international law research fellowship.

AVERY LEISERSON is taking a year's research leave (1962-63) from Vanderbilt University to spend as senior fellow of the social science research council.

WERNER LEVI, of the University of Minnesota, is visiting professor at the University of Hawaii during the 1962-63 school year.

CHARLES E. MARTIN, University of Washington, retired in June 1962 after having served the political science department since 1924. He has accepted appointment as professor of American studies at the University of Philippines, effective in July.

GEORGE MAUER has been appointed on a full-time basis as assistant director of the bureau of government research at the University of Oklahoma.

VERNON MCKAY, professor of African Studies, the Johns Hopkins University school of advanced international studies, has been elected chairman of the State Department's Advisory Council on African affairs.

EDWARD W. MILL, department of political science, Long Island University, has accepted a new position as chevalier professor of diplomacy and world affairs at Occidental College in Los Angeles.

GERHART NIEMEYER, Notre Dame, is spending a year at Munich on a Fulbright Scholarship.

STANLEY PERRY, C.S.C. of Notre Dame, is spending a year at Munich.

O. WILLIAM PERLMUTTER will be visiting professor of political science at the University of Minnesota during the academic year 1962-63.

RICHARD H. PFAFF, assistant professor of political science, University of Colorado, is spending the 1962-63 year in Iran and other countries of the middle East, under a Fulbright research award.

LAURENCE I. RADWAY, chairman of the government department at Dartmouth College, is on leave for 1961-63 to serve on the faculty of the National War College.

ERNEST C. REOCK, JR. has been promoted to associate research specialist and director of the bureau of government research at Rutgers University.

ROSS R. RICE of Arizona State University is visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, for 1962-63.

JOHN P. ROCHE, of Brandeis University, has been appointed visiting professor of political science and of the social sciences in the college at the University of Chicago for the academic year 1962-63.

GEORGE K. ROMOSER of the University of New Hampshire, has been appointed Fulbright professor at the University of Mainz, Germany, for the academic year 1962-63.

VICTORIA SCHUCK, professor of political science, Mount Holyoke, has been appointed a member of the state advisory committee for Massachusetts, to the United States commission on civil rights.

WALTER R. SHARP has been appointed Ford research professor in public affairs at Yale University for the year 1962-63.

MULFORD Q. SIBLEY of the University of Minnesota will be visiting professor in the department of government during the 1962-63 academic year at Cornell.

FRANKLIN SMALLWOOD of the government department at Dartmouth College is on leave for 1962-63.

HERMAN M. SOMERS, professor of political science at Haverford College, will be serving as counsellor to the international labour office in Geneva during the academic year, 1962-63.

JOHN W. SPANIER, assistant professor of

political science at the University of Florida, will be visiting assistant professor of political science at Haverford College, 1962-63.

DAVID SPITZ, professor of political science at the Ohio State University, is serving as visiting Fulbright professor at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University in Bologna, Italy, 1962-63.

WILLIAM S. STOKES, senior professor of comparative political institutions, Claremont Men's College, is spending the year 1962-63 as professor of foreign affairs at the National War College.

ROBERT S. SULLIVANT of DePauw University has been appointed visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago for the academic year 1962-63.

THOMAS LANDON THORSON, assistant professor of political science, received the William H. Kiekhof Award of \$1000 for distinguished teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He will be on leave in Europe during 1962-63 on a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship.

PIO ULIASSI of the United States State Department has been appointed a senior fellow of the research institute on communist affairs, Columbia University.

S. P. VARMA, university professor of political science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, India, has accepted an appointment as visiting professor of political science in the University of Oregon for the academic year 1962-63.

KENNETH N. VINES of Tulane University is serving as visiting associate professor of political science at Vanderbilt University.

NICHOLAS WAHL, assistant professor of government, Harvard University, is on leave in 1962-63 as a visiting research fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford University.

LOUIS WASSERMAN, professor of government and philosophy, San Francisco State College, is in Denmark for the 1962-63 academic year.

DONALD ZAGORIA of the Rand Corporation has been appointed a senior fellow of the research institute on communist affairs, Columbia University.

## APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

THOMAS R. ADAM will be acting head of the all-university department of government and international relations at New York University for the academic year 1962-63.

MINOO ADENWALLA of Lawrence College has been promoted to associate professor and is spending the academic year of 1962-63 in London under a grant from the Lawrence College Asian studies

program and from the Howard Foundation.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment for 1962-63 as instructor in social sciences at Southwest Texas State College, San Marcos, Texas.

ALAN A. ALTSHULER, formerly of the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of government, beginning in the fall term of 1962, at Cornell.

STEPHEN ANDERSON has been appointed instructor in the government department at Boston University.

MORLEY AYEARTS has been promoted to professor and will be chairman of the department of government and international relations, Washington Square College, New York University.

JOHN H. BADGLEY, who has just returned from Burma, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Miami University.

HOYT B. BALLARD, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at Texas College of Arts and Industries, Kingsville, Texas.

WILLIAM F. BARBER, retired foreign service and department of state officer has been appointed lecturer in international affairs in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

RICHARD W. BARRON, who has been lecturer in political science at the University of Virginia, has been appointed professor of political science at Longwood College.

JAMES BARROS of Columbia University has been appointed assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

PHILIP BEACH has been appointed instructor of political science at Washington State University.

GEORGE D. BEAM has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at University of Michigan.

THOMAS J. BENNETT, has been appointed instructor of political science at Marquette University.

HERMAN G. BERKMAN, formerly professor of land economics at the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed professor of planning, graduate school of public administration, New York University.

HOWARD J. BIDDULPH has been appointed instructor in political science at Rutgers University.

ALLAN D. BLOOM, formerly of Cornell, has been appointed visiting assistant professor at Yale University.

VIRGIL C. BLUM, S.J. has been named chairman of the department of political science at Marquette University.

SHARON BOEN has been appointed instructor in political science at Northern Michigan College.

LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN has been appointed assistant professor of government at Denison University.

J. CUDD BROWN has become professor of political science and chairman of the social science division, Sonoma State College, Cotati, California.

D. MACKENZIE BROWN, professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has been appointed acting chairman of the department for 1962-63.

DONALD J. BROWNETT has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the Atlantic Program of the University of Maryland.

CLAUDE BURTENSHAW has been appointed dean of students at Utah State University in Logan, and professor of political science.

ELEANORE BUSHNESS has become full professor in the department of history and political science at University of Nevada.

ROBERT S. CAHILL of the University of Oregon has been appointed assistant professor of political science at University of Hawaii.

DAVID P. CALLEO of Yale University has been promoted to assistant professor of political science. He is also director of undergraduate studies in political science.

WESLEY D. CAMP has been named professor and chairman of the history and government department at Adelphi College, effective July, 1962.

PHILIP CHAPMAN of University of California, has been appointed instructor of government at Lawrence College.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH has been promoted to associate professor at Ohio State University.

CHARLTON F. CHUTE, formerly director, institute of public administration, has been appointed professor of public administration, graduate school of public administration, New York University.



TADEUSZ CIEPLAK, formerly of McGill University, has been appointed an assistant professor at San Francisco State College.

WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR. has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

OLIVER E. CLUBB, JR., has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University and executive officer of the South Asia committee of the Maxwell center for overseas operations.

JOYOTPAUL CHAUDHURI has been appointed an instructor in government at the University of Oklahoma.

WILDER W. CRANE, JR., has resigned at Vanderbilt University to accept a position as associate professor at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

DON M. CREGIER has accepted an appointment as assistant professor to the history and political science department at Keuka College.

RICHARD DALE, Princeton University, has been appointed instructor at the University of New Hampshire.

VINCENT DAVIS, Dartmouth College, has been appointed as assistant professor of international relations and staff member of the social science foundation, University of Denver, beginning September, 1962.

VERA MICHELES DEAN, formerly director of research, foreign policy association and professor of international relations at University of Rochester, has been appointed professor of international development, graduate school of public administration, New York University.

CLARE DENTON, formerly of the University of California at Berkeley, has been appointed an instructor at San Francisco State College.

MARTHA DERTHICK of the MIT-Harvard Center for urban studies has been appointed visiting lecturer in the government department at Dartmouth College.

BRUCE B. DEXTER has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the Atlantic Program of the University of Maryland.

ROBERT H. DIX has been appointed instructor in political science at Yale University.

JOHN D. DONNELL of the institute of international studies of the University of California at Berkeley has been appointed assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

MARION DORO has been appointed visiting lecturer for 1962-63 at Connecticut College.

JOSEPH C. DOUGHERTY has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the European program of the University of Maryland.

THOMAS R. DYE, has joined the University of Wisconsin, department of political science, University extension division as an assistant professor.

EDGAR SHLOMO EFRAT, formerly at the University of Texas Middle East Institute, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Victoria, College, Victoria, British Columbia.

ROWLAND A. EGGER has been appointed acting dean of faculty at the University of Virginia.

JEDON A. EMERHISER has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Utah State University.

FREDERICK C. ENGELMANN, formerly of Alfred University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Alberta, Calgary, effective September, 1962.

JOHN ERIKSEN has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at the University of Oklahoma.

RICHARD A. FALK has been appointed associate professor of international law at Princeton University.

ROBERT A. FAULKNER has been appointed instructor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

JAMES W. FESLER has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Yale University.

WILLIAM S. FLASH has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont.

JOSEPH P. FORD, Harvard University, has accepted an appointment as an instructor at the University of New Hampshire.

WAYNE L. FRANCIS, formerly of Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University.

ROBERT C. FRIED has been appointed assistant professor at Connecticut College.

HARRY J. FRIEDMAN has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Hawaii.

CHARLES G. GATI has been appointed resident

lecturer in government at the Kokomo campus of Indiana University.

ROBERT S. GETZ has been appointed an instructor in political science at Rutgers.

ROBERT GILPIN, JR., formerly associate director of the council for atomic age studies at Columbia University, has been appointed as assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University.

HARVEY GLICKMAN, assistant professor of political science at Haverford College will be on leave 1962-63.

RALPH M. GOLDMAN, formerly of Michigan State University and the University of Chicago, has accepted a full professorship at San Francisco State College.

STEPHEN GOROVE, college of law, University of Akron, has been appointed professor of international relations and law and member of the staff of the social science foundation, University of Denver. He is on a joint appointment with the College of law.

DEON C. GREER has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the European program of the University of Maryland.

BRENT GUBLER, formerly of Syracuse University, has been named instructor in political science at Harpur College.

HORACE V. HARRISON has been appointed director of graduate studies in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

ROBERT W. HATTERY, resigned as assistant professor of political science in the extension division of the University of Wisconsin to become director of the bureau of public education in the extension division and assistant professor in the department of government at Indiana University.

HARRY A. HOLLOWAY, assistant professor at the University of Texas has been appointed as an associated professor of government in the field of political theory at the University of Oklahoma.

JACK HOLMES has become associate professor and acting director of the bureau of governmental research at the University of Nevada.

JAMES E. HOLTON, Washington State University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

ABRAHAM HOLTZMAN has been promoted to professor of history and political science at North Carolina State College.

J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., has joined the department of political science at Duke University as assistant professor.

JOHN M. HUNGER has joined the University of Wisconsin, department of political science, university extension division as an assistant professor.

DAN N. JACOBS has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of government at Miami University (Ohio).

WALTER DARNELL JACOBS, former lecturer in the Atlantic program of the University of Maryland has been appointed assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

JAMES D. JOHNSON has been appointed instructor in the department of government at the University of Oklahoma.

ROBERT S. JORDAN was appointed assistant to the President of the George Washington University, effective July 1, 1962. He was appointed associate professor of international affairs in 1961.

RICHARD E. JOHNSTON, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Louisiana State University.

ELLIS KATZ has accepted an appointment as instructor at Temple University.

STANLEY KELLEY, JR., has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

YOUNG WHAN KIHIL, formerly of New York University, has become instructor in political science and history at Juniata College.

DAVID C. KNAPP has been promoted from associate professor to professor at the University of New Hampshire.

KENNETH K. KOFMEHL has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Purdue University.

RICHARD J. KOZICKI, formerly of Mansfield State College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

HARVEY IRA LEIFERT, formerly of Columbia University, has been appointed an instructor at San Francisco State College.

NATHAN LEITES, of Rand Corporation, has been appointed professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

LEON N. LINDBERG, instructor at University of Wisconsin, has been appointed an assistant professor.

DUNCAN MACRAE, JR., of the University of Chicago, has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

VASYL MARKUS has joined the department of political science at Loyola University, Chicago, as assistant professor.

ARTHUR MARLOW, formerly of St. Louis University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

REX MARTIN has been appointed assistant professor of government at Purdue University.

ROGER D. MASTERS of Yale University has been promoted to assistant professor of political science.

W. J. MATTHEWS has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Vermont.

THEODORE H. McNELLY has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at the University of Maryland.

RICHARD L. MERRITT has been appointed instructor in political science at Yale University.

HENRY L. MERRY, who was visiting associate professor at Northwestern University, has been given a one-year appointment as assistant professor of government at Purdue University.

CHARLES MICAUD, University of Virginia, has been appointed professor of international relations and member of the staff of the social science foundation, University of Denver, beginning September, 1962.

KENNETH MILLER has been promoted to associate professor of political science and appointed as department chairman at the Newark College of arts and sciences of Rutgers. He will be on leave during 1962-63 while he is in Denmark as a Fulbright research scholar.

ANDREW MILNOR has been appointed instructor in the government department at Boston University.

JOHN D. MONTGOMERY has been named research professor of government and associate director of the African studies program at Boston University.

JOHN A. MORGAN has joined the department of political science of Duke University as an instructor.

DONALD C. MUNDINGER, associate professor of government, Valparaiso University, has been appointed assistant dean of the college of arts and sciences. He will continue on the staff of the department of government.

FRANK MUNGER has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Syracuse University. He succeeds Guthrie S. Birkhead, who is on a university assignment in Pakistan.

LARRY D. NACHMAN has been appointed instructor in political science at Newark College of arts and sciences of Rutgers University.

WLADIMIR NALEZÈKIEWICZ has been appointed assistant professor at Marquette University.

DICK NETZER, formerly vice president, Federal reserve bank, Chicago, and economic consultant to the regional plan association, has been appointed associate professor of metropolitan finance, graduate school of public administration, New York University.

LOUIS E. NEWMAN, former Assistant Director has been appointed Executive Director of the Bureau of Governmental Research, Inc. of New Orleans.

R. J. NOVOGROD, Ph.D. candidate at New York University, has been appointed acting chairman of the Long Island University political science department.

EDWIN E. OLSON, recently a research assistant at the Brookings institution center for advanced study, has been appointed an instructor in political science at the University of Southern California.

ARTHUR M. OSTEEN has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University, and will also serve as executive director of the Africa-Asia program of the Maxwell overseas center. He succeeds Robert Heussler who has gone with the Ford Foundation on a project concerned with Latin American relations.

DENNIS PALUMBO has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Hawaii.

KIRK R. PETSHEK, urban development and economic coordinator, Mayor's office, Philadelphia, has resigned to join the University of Wisconsin as professor of commerce and coordinator of its urban research-action program in Milwaukee.

LARRY PIPPIN has become instructor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

JOSEPH PLANINSIC is now a member of the department of political science at Duquesne with the rank of assistant professor.

GERALD M. POMPER, formerly of City College, New York, has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at Rutgers University.

MOJMIH POVOLNY of Lawrence College has been promoted to associate professor and elected chairman of the department of government.

H. DOUGLAS PRICE, formerly of Columbia University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Syracuse University.

ROBERT E. REORDAN has been appointed assistant professor of government at Stonehill College.

GERALD RIGBY, formerly of the University of Wyoming, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California.

CHARLES M. REHMUS has been appointed associate professor of political science and co-director of institute of labor and industrial relations, department of political science, University of Michigan.

YOSAL ROGAT of the center for the study of democratic institutions of the Fund for the Republic, has been appointed assistant professor of political science and of the social sciences in the college at the University of Chicago.

RICHARD N. ROSECRANCE has been promoted to associate professor at UCLA. He is currently serving as coordinator of the national security studies program at UCLA.

WALTER ROSENBAUM has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Florida.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT, formerly at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Yale University, and is also serving as director of the political data program at Yale.

JOHN W. RYAN resigned as associate professor at the University of Wisconsin to become secretary to the president, University of Massachusetts.

ELIE A. SALEM, formerly of Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed associate professor in the department of political science and public administration at the American university of Beirut.

LEON SALAMON has been made instructor of government at Trinity College.

WALTER F. SCHEFFER, associate professor of government, has been appointed chairman of the department of government at the University of Oklahoma.

EDWARD V. SHTEN is serving as acting chairman of the University of Wisconsin department of political science, university extension division, while James R. Donoghue is on leave in Nigeria.

VALERIE SHINAVAR has become instructor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

OTIS H. SHAO, formerly of Moravian College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Florida Presbyterian College.

PAUL E. SIGMUND, JR. formerly of Harvard University, has been appointed associate professor of politics, Princeton University.

J. DAVID SINGER has been promoted to research political scientist in the mental health research institute at the University of Michigan.

JAY B. SORENSON has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

CHARLES S. SPENCER has been promoted assistant professor of political science at the Citadel.

ROBERT J. STEAMER, formerly of Louisiana State University, has been appointed professor of government and chairman of the department at Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Illinois.

E. W. STEELE, JR. has resigned from the staff of the department of political science at the University of Vermont, as of September 1, 1962.

ALBERT STILLSON, formerly of Montana State University, has accepted appointment as assistant professor of political science at Wake Forest College for 1962-63 academic year.

HERBERT J. STORING, of the University of Chicago, has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

CARL F. STOVER has been appointed senior political scientist in the economic development division of Stanford research Institute.

ALBERT L. STURM, formerly of West Virginia University, assumed his new duties as director of the institute of governmental research and professor of government at Florida State University in September.

RICHARD N. SWIFT of New York University has been promoted to full professor and is serving as

a visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University during 1962-63.

JIVIAN R. TABIBIAN of Princeton University has accepted appointment as instructor in political science at Wake Forest College.

THOMAS F. THOMPSON resigned as assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin Fox Valley extension center, to go to Western Michigan University.

VICTOR A. THOMPSON, formerly of the Illinois institute of technology has been appointed professor of political science at Syracuse University for the coming year. He will serve as director of the East Africa program of the Maxwell overseas center.

EMORY T. TROSPER has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the Atlantic program of the University of Maryland.

DAVID B. TRUMAN becomes Dean of Columbia College in January, 1963, succeeding John G. Palfrey, who resigned to become a member of the Atomic Energy Commission.

TANG TSOU of the University of Chicago has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

WARREN M. TSUNEISKH, curator of the Far Eastern collections and research associate at the Yale University library, has been appointed lecturer in political science for the year 1962-63.

ROBERT C. TUCKER, formerly of Indiana University, has been appointed professor of politics at Princeton University.

HENRY A. TURNER has been advanced to the rank of professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is on leave for the academic year 1962-63 to serve as a visiting professor at the University of Khartoum in the Republic of Sudan under a program sponsored by the department of State and by the African studies center of the University of California, Los Angeles.

SIDNEY VERBA has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

WILLIAM R. VIZZARD, assistant professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, resigned to accept a position as command historian with the Fifth Air Force, Tokyo.

ERIC WALDMAN, who spent the academic year 1961-62 at the University of Munich on a Fulbright research fellowship, has been promoted to professor of political science at Marquette University.

MICHAEL WALZER, formerly instructor in government at Harvard University, has been appointed assistant professor of politics at Princeton University.

WALTER WEIKER, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Newark College of arts and sciences of Rutgers University.

EUGENE WEINSTEIN, formerly with the department of interdisciplinary studies at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed an instructor at San Francisco State College.

DAVID WELBORN, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at Texas Technological College, Lubbock, Texas.

W. HARDY WICKWAR has been appointed to the staff of the graduate school of public administration at New York University.

ANN R. WILLNER of the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor at Harpur College.

FRED H. WILLHOITE has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Florida Presbyterian College.

H. H. WILSON has been promoted to the rank of professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

JOHN W. WOOD has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at the University of Oklahoma.

TAKEHIKO YOSHIHASHI of the American University has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of international relations and to a newly created post of associate dean of the school of international service.

The 1963 meetings of the Western Political Science Association will be held in San Diego, March 21-23, at Vacation Village Hotel. Albert Lepawsky (University of California, Berkeley), Vice President of the Association, is in charge of the program; and W. Richard Bigger (San Diego State College), in charge of local arrangements.

# INDEX to VOLUME LVI

## HOW TO USE THIS INDEX

This index is divided into two sections:

(a) *Classified Section*..... 1056

Here entries concerning the same or related topics are grouped together, or near to each other, to encourage "suggestive browsing" and refer you to the *subject matter* of Articles, Reviews, Notes, and Bibliographies.

Each entry may appear more than once in the Classified Section. Thus, for example, the article "*The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession*," by René Lemarchand, which appeared in the June, 1962 issue of the REVIEW appears in the following classifications:

- AA1 Methodology—Case Studies
- B436 Comparative Government—Africa—Katanga
- D211 International Law—Secession
- D613 International Law—United Nations
- F806 Election Returns

(b) *Alphabetical Section*..... 1071

Material is listed here by title, authors' last names, and topic. Many topic entries refer you to the Classified Section where you may be able to find related items by glancing at neighboring classes.

## SECTION ONE:

### A CLASSIFIED INDEX TO THE *Review*

#### AA METHODOLOGY

- Bibliography on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences..... 165, 448, 709, 995
- Formal Operations: A Comparative Approach*. Blau, Peter M. and Scott, Richard W. Book reviewed by Guetzkow, H..... 428
- Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance*, ed. Marvick, Dwaine. Book noted by Verba, S..... 440
- Selected Articles and Documents on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences*. Feldman, Julian... 450

#### AA1 CASE STUDIES

- The Italian Socialist Party: A Case Study in Factional Conflict*. Zariski, Raphael..... 372
- The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession*. Lemarchand, René..... 404
- The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives*. Niemi, Donald and Riker, William

- H..... 58
- Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*. Robinson, James A. Book noted by Patterson, S.C..... 719
- Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics*. Wildavsky, Aaron. Book noted by Stratton, O..... 721
- The Development of the Social Security Act*. Witte, Edwin E. Book noted by Leiserson, A..... 723
- Decisions in Syracuse*. Martin, Roscoe C., Munger, Frank J. and others. Book noted by Monat, W. R..... 466
- Political Influence*. Banfield, Edward C. Book reviewed by Scoble, H. M. 151
- Cases in State and Local Government*. Frost, Richard T. (ed.) Book noted by Altschuler, A..... 178
- The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration*. Richard F. Fenno, Jr. 310
- Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*, by James A. Robinson, reviewed by Donald E. Stokes.... 984

#### AA2 STATISTICAL METHODS

- Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961*. Parsons, Malcolm B. 605

\* The classification scheme is adapted from *A Library Classification for Public Administration Materials*, by Sophia Hall Glidden, Chicago, Public Administration Service and American Library Association, 1942.

- Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960.* Baggaley, Andrew R. . . . . 66
- Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note About American Cities.* Kessel, John H. . . . . 615
- Experimental Approaches to Vote-Counting Theory in Nominating Choice.* David, Paul. . . . . 673
- Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body.* Francis, Wayne L. . . . . 953
- Local Political Surveys.* Schattschneider, E. E. and Jones, Victor. Book noted by Wright, S. S. . . . . 991
- Communications on The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis.* Schubert, Glendon . . . . . 422
- The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis.* Schubert, Glendon . . . . . 90
- Two Theorems on Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems.* Fisher, Franklin M. and Ando, Albert. . . . . 108
- The Religious Factor.* Lenski, Gerhard. Book noted by Davis, H. R. . . . . 159
- Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities.* Kessel, John H. . . . . 615
- Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker.* Walker, Nigel. Book noted by Friedland, Louis L. 1006
- AA3 MODELS**
- Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach.* Spiro, Herbert J. . . . . 577
- Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902-1954.* Sawyer, Jack and MacRae, Duncan Jr. . . . . 936
- Two Faces of Power.* Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. . . . . 947
- B SOCIETY—THE STATE—GOVERNMENT**
- Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach.* Spiro, Herbert J. . . . . 577
- Modern Government.* Hitchner, Dell G. and Harbold, William H. Book noted by Steinbicker, P. B. . . . . 704
- B1 SOCIOLOGY**
- The Progress of a Decade.* Lipset, Seymour, Martin and Smelser, Neil J. Book noted by Cottrell, F. . . . . 446
- Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development,* eds. Braibanti, Ralph and Spengler, Joseph J. Book noted by Friedman, J. R. . . . . 157
- The Political Context of Sociology.* Bramson, Leon. Book noted by Scher, S. . 161
- B12 POPULATION**
- B123 ECONOMIC ASPECTS: INCOME LEVELS, DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**
- Problems of American Economic Growth.* Morris, Bruce R. Book noted by Reagan, Michael D. . . . . 174
- B124 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS**
- National Character in Action.* Platt, Washington. Book noted by Rosecrance, R. N. . . . . 508
- American Perspectives,* eds. Spiller, Robert E. and Larrabee, Eric. Book noted by Backstrom, C. H. . . 179
- Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy.* Birnbaum, Martin. Book noted by Pinner, F. A. . . . . 703
- B1243 Religious Groups**
- Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960.* Baggaley, Andrew A. . . . . 66
- B12431 Church & State**
- Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages.* Ullmann, Walter. Book noted by Riesenberg, P. . . . . 447
- Religion, Government, and Education.* (ed.) Brickman, William W. and Lehrer, Stanley. Book noted by LaNoue, G. R. . . . . 468
- Render Unto Caesar. The Flag-Salute Controversy.* Manwaring, David R. Book noted by Rigby, Gerald. . . . . 1004
- B12439 Religious Organizations**
- The Robe and the Sword: The Methodist Church and the Rise of American Imperialism.* MacKenzie, Kenneth M. Book noted by Morrow, R. E. . . . . 470
- Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict.* Brzezinski, Zbigniew. . . . . 5, 676
- B13 THE COMMUNITY**
- B131 URBAN SOCIOLOGY**
- Urbanization in Latin America: A UNESCO Survey.* Philip M. Hauser (ed.). Book noted by K. H. Silvert. 1033
- B15 URBAN POPULATION—COMPOSITION & CHARACTER**
- Urban Social Structure,* by James M. Beshers, noted by Maurice E. O'Donnell. . . . . 1000
- B151 NATIONAL GROUPS**
- London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants,* by Ruth Glass assisted by H. Pollins, noted by James Q. Dealey. . . . . 195

- B2 THE STATE—POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL THEORY**  
 Bibliography on Political Theory . . . . . 163, 448, 707  
*Positive Liberty, 1880–1914.* Nicholls, David. . . . . 114  
*Our Fundamental Rights: Their Nature and Extent (As Judicially Determined).* Banerjee, D. N. Book noted by McWhinney, E. . . . . 490  
*Political Ideas in the Modern World.* Heater, D. B. Book noted by Ritchie, W. A. . . . . 706  
*Studies on the Civilization of Islam.* Hamilton, Sir, A. R. Book noted. . . . . 992  
*Reinhold Niebuhr: New Orthodoxy for Old Liberalism.* Wilson Carey McWilliams. . . . . 874
- B21 THEORIES OF ORIGIN**  
*The Threat of Violence and Social Change.* Niebuhr, H. L. . . . . 865
- B23 THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT**  
*Kant, Liberalism, and War.* Waltz, Kenneth N. . . . . 331  
*The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A Critique.* Rothman, Stanley. . . . . 341  
*A Reply to Rothman,* Cropsey, Joseph. . . . . 353  
*Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx.* Tucker, Robert C. Book noted by McCallum, D. . . . . 442  
*Positive Liberty, 1880–1914.* Nicholls, David. . . . . 114  
*Genesis and Structure of Society.* Gentile, Giovanni. Book review by LaPalombara, J. . . . . 698  
*Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion.* Rossiter, Clinton. Book noted by McGiffert, M. . . . . 724  
*Marxism, An Historical and Critical Study.* Lichtheim, George. Book reviewed by Catlin, G. E. G. . . . . 158
- B26 TYPES OF STATES**  
**B262 NATIONAL STATES—NATIONALISM**  
*Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations After World War II.* Shoup, Paul. . . . . 886
- B263 FEDERATED STATES: FEDERALISM**  
 See also D67.  
*The Papers of Alexander Hamilton.* Vol. I 1768–1778. Vol. II., 1779–1781, ed. Syrett, Harold C., assoc. ed. Cooke, Jacob E. Book reviewed by Barrett, P. . . . . 432  
*The Structure of American Federalism.* Vile, M. J. C. Book noted by Farrelly, D. G. . . . . 465  
*The States in West German Federation: A Study in Federal-State Relations.* Wells, Roger Hewes. Book noted by Heidenheimer, Arnold J. . . . . 1018
- B264 EMPIRES & IMPERIALISM**  
*Portugal's Stand in Africa,* by Adriano Moreire. Book noted by Thomas Okuma. . . . . 1023  
*The Imperialism Reader.* Louis L. Snyder (ed.). Book noted. . . . . 1036  
 See also D222.
- B4 COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT**  
 Bibliography on Foreign and Comparative Government. . . . . 203, 491, 756, 1025  
*The Edge of Freedom.* Oakes, John B. Book noted by Wallerstein, Immanuel. . . . . 487  
*Food, Land, and Manpower in Western Europe.* Yates, P. L. Book noted by Rothman, S. . . . . 506  
*Parliaments and Electoral Systems.* Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . . 491  
*Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings.* Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. Book noted by Lanyi, G. A. . . . . 749  
*Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion.* Giovanni Sartori. . . . . 853
- B41 EUROPE**  
*European Elections by Direct Suffrage, a Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems Used in Western Europe and their Utility for the Direct Election of a European Parliament,* by Wolfgang Birke. Book noted. . . . . 1025  
 See also T191
- B410 ITALY**  
*The Italian Socialist Party: A Case Study in Factional Conflict.* Raphael Zariski. . . . . 372
- B411 GREAT BRITAIN**  
 See also alphabetical index under "London"  
*British Broadcasting in Transition.* Paulu, Burton. Book noted by Alperin, R. J. . . . . 755  
*Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning in Action.* Mandelker, Daniel R. Book noted by Stephens, G. R. . . . . 751  
*Questions in Parliament.* Chester, D. N. and Bowring, N. Book noted by Millett, J. H. . . . . 753  
*The Administration of British Foreign Relations.* Bishop, Donald G. Book noted by Harris, J. S. . . . . 755



- The Political Ideas of English Party Activists.* Rose, Richard. . . . . 360
- Parliamentary Reform 1933-1960.* The Hansard Society. Book noted by Marquis, L. C. . . . . 479
- "Responsible Government," Separated Powers, and Special Interests: Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America.* Pennock, J. Roland. . . . 621
- Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom.* Alan T. Peacock, Jack Wiseman, assisted by J. Veverka. . . . . 194
- The British Cabinet,* by J. P. Mackintosh, and *British Parliamentary Democracy,* by Lord Morrison of Lambeth—reviewed by Roland Young. . . . . 986
- Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain.* Gwyn, William B. Book noted by Shannon, Jasper B. . . . 1018
- The British Parliament,* by Roland Young, book noted by John P. Mackintosh. . . . . 1022
- Department of Scientific & Industrial Research* by Sir Harry Melville; and *Her Majesty's Customs and Excise* by Sir James Crombie. Books noted. . . . . 1024
- B412 SPAIN**
- Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism.* Payne, Stanley G. Book noted by Wilson, Larman C. . . . . 483
- B413 SCANDINAVIA**
- Modern Swedish Government,* by Nils Andrén; *Danmarks Folketing,* by Svend Thorsen; & *Stortinget på naert hold,* by Per Øisang—noted by Anderson, S. V. . . . . 203
- B4131 Sweden**
- Modern Swedish Government* by Nils Andrén. Book noted. . . . . 1025
- B414 SOVIET UNION**
- See also B55
- Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets.* Friedberg, Maurice. Book noted by Swayze, H. . . . . 989
- Red Phoenix, The: Russia Since World War II.* Harry Schwartz. Noted by Hazard, J. N. . . . . 192
- Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Study of Soviet Dynasties,* by R. Conquest, noted by Bursey, L. G. . 192
- The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961.* Zagoria, Donald S. Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . . 688
- Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era.* Hsieh, Alice Langley. Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . 688
- The Sino-Soviet Dispute.* Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . . 688
- Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations After World War II.* Shoup, Paul. . . . . 886
- Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin.* Kennan, George F. Book reviewed by Gyorgy, A. . . . . 148
- A Report on Social Security Programs in the Soviet Union.* U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare. Book reviewed by Somers, H. M. . 149
- Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959,* by Harold Swayze, noted by Maurice Friedberg. . . . . 988
- B4141 Czechoslovakia**
- Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960* by Edward Taborsky, noted by Feierabend, I. K. . . . . 193
- B4142 Hungary**
- Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism.* Vali, Ferenc A. Noted by Gyorgy, A. . . 489
- B4143 German Democratic Republic**
- Wir sind die stärkste der Partei'N! Eine Bibliographie zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands,* by the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED. Book noted. . . . . 1025
- B415 GERMANY**
- For German Democratic Republic, see B4143.
- Equilibrium, Structure of Interests and Leadership: Adenauer's Survival as Chancellor.* Merkl, Peter H. . 634
- The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election.* Barnes, Samuel H.; Grace, Frank; Pollock, James K.; and Sperlich, Peter W. . . . . 899
- The States in West German Federalism: A Study in Federal-State Relations.* Wells, Roger Hewes. Book noted by Heidenheimer, Arnold J. 1018
- B416 AUSTRIA**
- Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959.* Engelmann, Frederick C. . . . . 651
- B417 FRANCE**
- For French-connected States in Africa, see B435.

- La IV<sup>e</sup> République et sa Politique Extérieure.* Grosser, Alfred. Book noted by Kirchheimer, O. H. . . . . 1017
- Tocqueville and the Old Regime.* Herr, Richard. Book noted by Lively, J. . . . . 988
- B418 YUGOSLAVIA
- Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941-1945,* by Edmond Paris, noted by John Clinton Adams. . . . . 1021
- Yugoslavia and the New Communism.* Hoffman & Neale. Book noted by Alex N. Dragnich. . . . . 1034
- B419 PORTUGAL
- Portugal's Stand in Africa,* by Adriano Moreire. Book noted by Thomas Okuma. . . . . 1023
- B42 ASIA
- Southeast Asia Today—and Tomorrow. A Political Analysis,* by Richard Butwell. Book noted by Daniel S. Lev. . . . . 1031
- B421 INDIA
- The Pedagogy of Democracy: Coercive Public Protest in India.* Bayley, David H. . . . . 663
- The Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ranade to Bhave.* Brown, D. Mackenzie. Book noted by Tinker, I. . . . . 990
- A Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution. Volume One: General Principles of Organization.* By Sirdar D. K. Sen, noted by Retzlaff, R. H. . . . . 202
- B422 CHINA
- See also D2111.
- The Chinese Anarchist Movement.* Scalapino, Robert A. and Yu, George T. Book noted by Lindsay, M. . . . . 742
- Sun Yat-sen and Communism,* by Shao Chuan Leng & Norman D. Palmer, noted by Mao, J. Y. . . . . 197
- The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961.* Zagoria, Donald S. Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . . 688
- Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era.* Hsieh, Alice Langley. Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . . 688
- The Sino-Soviet Dispute.* Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . . 688
- B423 JAPAN
- The Sources of Protest in Japan.* Passin, Herbert. . . . . 391
- Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan.* Scalapino, Robert A. and Masumi, Junnosuke. Book noted by Kawai, K. . . . . 742
- The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan.* Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. . . . . 743
- B424 ISRAEL
- The Herzl Paradox: Political, Social and Economic Theories of a Realist.* Adler, Joseph. Book noted by Lucatz, N. . . . . 701
- The Political World of American Zionism.* Halperin, Samuel. Book noted by Rubin, B. . . . . 721
- B425 MUSLIM ASIA
- Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History,* by George E. Kirk, noted by Lenczowski, G. . . . . 199
- History of the Islamic Peoples,* by Carl Brockelmann, noted by Fitzgerald, J. . . . . 201
- Middle Eastern Affairs: Number Two (St. Anthony's Papers No. 11)* Hourani, Albert. Book noted by Salem, E. . . . . 761
- Studies on the Civilization of Islam.* Hamilton, Sir A. R. Book noted . . . 992
- The Changing Patterns of the Middle East.* Rondot, Pierre. Book noted by Lucatz, N. . . . . 488
- B4251 Indonesia
- Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960.* Legge, J. D. Book noted by Mill, E. W. . . . . 745
- B426 LAOS
- Storm over Laos,* by Prince Sisouk na Champassak, noted by Fall, B. B. . . . 201
- B427 BURMA
- Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity.* Pye, Lucian W. Book review by Lockwood, W. W. . . . . 978
- B43 AFRICA
- African Affairs: Number One. St. Anthony's Papers: Number 10 (ed.)* Kirkwood, Kenneth. Book noted by Davies, J. C. . . . . 486
- Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara.* Spiro, Herbert J. Book noted by Adam, T. R. . . . . 747
- African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide.* Hodgkin, Thomas. Book review by Untermyer, F. . . . . 980
- Portugal's Stand in Africa,* by Adriano Moreire. Book noted by Thomas Okuma. . . . . 1023
- Africa South,* by Harm J. de Blij. Book noted by Richard W. Taylor. . . . . 1024

- B4311 Kenya**  
*The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961.* Bennett, George and Rosenberg, Carl. Book noted by McConnell, G. . . . . 484
- B432 GHANA**  
*I Speak of Freedom.* Nkrumah, Kwame. Book noted by Bates, M. L. . . . . 485
- B433 SOUTH AFRICA**  
*South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid.* Spooner, F. P. Book noted by Richardson, C. B. . . . . 487  
*South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity,* by Nicholas Mansergh. Book noted by Harm Jan de Blij. . . . . 1023
- B435 FRENCH-CONNECTED STATES**  
*The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa.* Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Earl. Book noted by Le Vine, T. . . . . 486
- B4351 Senegal**  
*Senegal, A Study in French Assimilation Policy,* by Michael Crowder. Book noted. . . . . 1025
- B436 KATANGA**  
*The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession.* Lemarchand, Rene. . . . . 404
- B437 MUSLIM AFRICA**  
*Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History,* by George E. Kirk, noted by Lenczowski, G. . . . . 199  
*History of the Islamic Peoples,* by Carl Brockelmann, noted by Fitzgerald, J. A. . . . . 201  
 See also B425.
- B4371 Morocco**  
*Political Change in Morocco,* by Douglas E. Ashford, noted by Khadduri, M. . . . . 198
- B4372 Egypt**  
*Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952.* Safran, Nadav. Book noted by Gerteiny, A. G. . . . . 749
- B438 CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (LEOPOLDVILLE)**  
*Congo Disaster,* by Colin Legum, noted by Hanna, W. . . . . 199  
 See also B436.
- B44 LATIN AMERICA & WEST INDIES**  
 See also D612 (O.A.S.).  
 Bibliography. . . . . 759  
*Social and Economic Frontiers in Latin America.* Stark, Harry. Noted by Plank, J. N. . . . . 482
- Pan America in Crisis.* Manger, William. Book noted by Fitzgibbon, R. . . . . 760  
*A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America,* by F. Benham and H. A. Holley, noted by Lewis, F. M. . . . . 196  
*The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960.* Karnes, Thomas L. Book noted by Moses, C. C. . . . . 480  
*Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders.* Alexander, Robert J. Book noted by Burnett, B. G. . . . . 481  
*The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America.* Silvert, Kalman H. Book noted by Taylor, P. B. Jr. . . . . 482  
 Davis, Harold Eugene. *Latin American Social Thought.* Book noted by Barber, W. F. . . . . 705  
*Urbanization in Latin America: A UNESCO Survey.* Philip M. Hauser (ed.). Book noted by K. H. Silvert. . . . . 1033
- B441 CUBA**  
*The Cuban Story.* Matthews, Herbert L. Book reviewed by Busey, J. L. . . . . 146
- B442 VENEZUELA**  
*Venezuela.* Lieuwen, Edwin. Book noted by Baker, R. D. . . . . 746
- B443 URUGUAY**  
*The Pedagogy of Democracy: Coercive Public Protest in India.* Bayley, David H. . . . . 663  
*Government and Politics of Uruguay.* Taylor, Philip B. Jr. Book noted by Padgett, L. V. . . . . 747
- B46 NORTH AMERICA**
- B451 CANADA**  
*The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada.* Eayrs, James. Book noted by Williams, J. R. . . . . 750
- B46 AUSTRALASIA & OCEANIA**
- B461 AUSTRALIA**  
*Groups in Theory and Practice.* Loveday, Peter and Campbell, Ian. Book noted by Tinker, I. . . . . 990
- B5 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**
- B52 ARISTOCRACY-OLIGARCHY**  
*Tocqueville and the Old Regime.* Herr, Richard. Book noted by Lively, J. . . . . 988
- B53 DEMOCRACY**  
*How Can We Justify Democracy?* Mayo, H. B. . . . . 555  
*Free Minds: A Venture in the Philosophy of Democracy.* Nelson, Ralph W. Book noted by Zucker, F. D. . . . . 447  
*The Predicament of Democratic Man.* Cahn, Edmond. Book noted by McKee, D. K. . . . . 156

- Tocqueville and the Old Regime.* Herr, Richard. Book noted by Lively, J. . . . . 988
- The Contours of American History.* Williams, William Appleman. Book noted by Braeman, John. . . . . 1005
- B531 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
- B5311 Department of Commerce
- A History of the United States Weather Bureau* by Donald R. Whitnah. Book noted by Harvey, L. G. . . . . 182
- B54 SOCIALISM
- Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel: with a translation of his essay on Decomposition of Marxism.* Horowitz, Irving Louis. Book noted by Witte, W. D. S. . . . . 439
- B55 COMMUNISM
- See also B414, B422, and B418.
- The Russian Revolution.* Berdyaev, Nicholas. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- Terrorism and Communism.* Trotsky, Leon. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?* Luxemburg, Rosa. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- Russia and The West Under Lenin and Stalin.* Kennan, George F. Book reviewed by Gyorgy, A. . . . . 148
- Geschichte der Internationale.* Brauntal, Julius. Book noted by Sturmtal, A. . . . . 766
- Sun Yat-Sen and Communism,* by Shao Chuan Leng & Norman D. Palmer, noted by Mao, J. Y. . . . . 197
- Yugoslavia and the New Communism.* George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal. Book noted by Alex N. Dragnich. . . . . 1034
- Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855.* Malia, Martin. Book noted by Hammer, D. P. . . . . 443
- Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict,* Brzezinski, Zbigniew. . . . . 5
- The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy.* Bolloten, Burnett. Book noted by Nagle, T. W. . . . . 503
- Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations After World War II,* Shoup, Paul. . . . . 886
- Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959.* Swayze, Harold. Book noted by Friedberg, M. . . . . 988
- Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets.* Friedberg, M. Book noted by Swayze, H. . . . . 989
- B58 TOTALITARIAN STATES
- See also D48
- Politics of Cultural Despair.* Stern, Fritz. Book noted by Kirchheimer, O. . . . . 444
- Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism.* Payne, Stanley G. Book noted by Wilson, L. C. . . . . 483
- B59 CHANGES IN THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
- The Russian Revolution.* Berdyaev, Nicholas. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?* Luxemburg, Rosa. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders.* Alexander, Robert J. Book noted by Burnett, B. G. . . . . 481
- The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America.* Silvert, Kalman H. Book noted by Taylor, P. B. Jr. . . . . 482
- The Threat of Violence and Social Change.* Neiburg, H. L. . . . . 865
- B6 STATE GOVERNMENT—DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCT
- Cases in State and Local Government.* Frost, Richard T. ed. Book noted by Altschuler, A. . . . . 178
- B65 GOVERNMENT OF PARTICULAR STATES
- The Government of Kansas.* Drury, James W. and Associates. Book noted by Dishman, R. B. . . . . 465
- Hawaii Pono: A Social History.* Fuchs, Lawrence H. Book noted by Horowitz, R. . . . . 727
- Quasi Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961.* Parsons, Malcolm B. . . . . 605
- Communication on Parsons.* Price, H. D. . . . . 974
- Texas: Its Government and Politics.* Benton, Wilbourn E. Book noted by Ransone, C. B. Jr. . . . . 466
- Preprimary Endorsements in California Politics.* Rowe, Leonard. Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . . 179
- Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body.* Francis, Wayne L. . . . . 953
- The Government of Missouri, 7th ed.* Karsch, Robert F. Book noted by Schmandt, H. J. . . . . 1008
- B7 LOCAL GOVERNMENT—FORM AND CONDUCT
- The Structure of Local Government throughout the World.* Humes, Samuel and Martin Eileen M. Book reviewed

- by Burke, F. . . . . 434  
*Cases in State and Local Government.*  
 Frost, Richard T. ed. Book noted by  
 Altschuler, A. . . . . 178
- B71 COUNTY GOVERNMENT**  
*Thirty Explosive Years in Los Angeles*  
 County. Ford, John Anson. Book  
 noted by Rice, R. R. . . . . 726
- B73 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT**  
*Mastery of the Metropolis.* Fiser, Webb  
 S. Book review by Coke, J. G. . . . . 970  
*Decisions in Syracuse.* Martin, Roscoe  
 C. Munger, Frank J. and others.  
 Book noted by Monat, W. R. . . . . 466  
*Who Governs? Democracy and Power in*  
*an American City.* Dahl, Robert A.  
 Book noted by Eulau, Heinz. . . . . 144  
*Political Influence.* Bansfield, Edward  
 C. Book reviewed by Scoble, H. M. 151  
*Megalopolis: The Urbanized North-*  
*eastern Seaboard of the United States.*  
 Gottman, Jean. Book review by  
 Connery, R. H. . . . . 696  
*Exploring the Metropolitan Community,*  
 (ed.). Bollens, John C. Book re-  
 viewed by Greene, L. S. . . . . 152  
*Governmental Structure and Political En-*  
*vironment: A Statistical Note about*  
*American Cities,* Kessel, John H. . . . 615  
*The LaGuardia Years: Machine and*  
*Reform Politics in New York City.*  
 Garrett, Charles. Book noted by  
 Rice, R. R. . . . . 726  
*Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of*  
*Political Leadership,* by Alex Gott-  
 fried, noted by James D. McGold-  
 rick. . . . . 1001  
*Urban Social Structure,* by James M.  
 Beshers, noted by Maurice E.  
 O'Donnell. . . . . 1000  
*The Metropolitan Problem and Amer-*  
*ican Ideas,* by Luther H. Gulick,  
 noted by James L. McCamy. . . . . 1000
- B734 CITY MANAGER PLAN**  
*City Managers in Politics: An Analy-*  
*sis of Manager Tenure and Term-*  
*ination.* Kammerer, Gladys M.;  
 Farris, Charles D.; DeGrove, John  
 M.; and Clubok, Alfred B. Book  
 noted by Prewitt, Kenneth. . . . . 1007
- B8 GOVERNMENT COOPERATION**  
*Design of Regional Accounts: Papers*  
*presented at the Conference on Regional*  
*Accounts, 1960.* Hochwald, Werner,  
 (ed.). Book noted by Wengert, N. . . 730
- C CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW**  
*The Antifederalists: Critics of the Con-*  
*stitution, 1781-1788.* Main, Jackson  
 Turner. Book noted by Abbott, F. C. . 731  
*Free Speech: At What Price?* Hyneman,  
 Charles S. . . . . 847  
*Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Dis-*  
*cussion.* Giovanni Sartori. . . . . 853
- C4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW**  
*Montesquieu: A Critical Biography.*  
 Shackleton, Robert. Book noted by  
 Pennock, J. R. . . . . 445
- C41 CIVIL RIGHTS—DUE PROCESS**  
*Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Ex-*  
*clusion Cases: 1935-1960.* Ulmer,  
 Sidney S. . . . . 325  
*Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the*  
*Mail.* Paul, James C. N. and  
 Schwartz, Murray L. Book noted by  
 Longaker, R. P. . . . . 464  
*Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties.*  
 Jacobs, Clyde E. Book noted by\*  
 Kallenbach, J. E. . . . . 172  
*Civil Liberties and the Constitution.*  
 Kauper, Paul G. Book review by  
 Steamer, R. J. . . . . 694  
*Deeds Without Doctrines: Civil Rights*  
*in the 1960 Term of the Supreme*  
*Court.* McCloskey, Robert G. . . . . 71  
*Freedom and Protection: The Bill of*  
*Rights.* Weinberger, Andrew D.  
 Book reviewed by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 460  
*Courts and Rights: The American Ju-*  
*diciary in Action.* Roche, John P.  
 Book reviewed by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 460  
*A Century of Civil Rights.* Konvitz,  
 Milton R. With a study of *State Law*  
*Against Discrimination.* Leskes,  
 Theodore. Book noted by Wiltsey,  
 G. G. . . . . 718  
*Free Speech: At What Price?* Hyneman,  
 Charles S. . . . . 847  
*Render Unto Caesar. The Flag-Salute*  
*Controversy.* Manwaring, David R.  
 Book noted by Rigby, Gerald. . . . . 1004  
*International Protection of Human*  
*Rights.* Manouchehr Ganji. Book  
 noted by Jean A. Laponce. . . . . 1035
- D INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—  
FOREIGN POLICY**  
 Bibliography. . . . . 219, 510  
*Values and Interests.* Van Dyke, Vernon. 567  
*International Politics and Foreign Policy:*  
*A Reader in Research and Theory,*  
 Rosenau, James N. (ed.). Book review  
 by Platig, E. R. . . . . 431  
*America in Britain's Place: The Leader-*  
*ship of the West and Anglo-American*  
*Unity.* Gleber, Lionel. Book noted by  
 Joynt, C. B. . . . . 496  
*Strategy for the 60's,* Cerf, Jay H. and

- Pozen, Walter (ed.). Book noted by  
Alger, C. F. . . . . 507
- Bibliography on International Law and  
Relations. . . . . 510
- The Administration of British Foreign  
Relations*. Bishop, Donald G. Book  
noted by Harris, J. S. . . . . 754
- A Theory of Foreign Policy*. Modelski,  
George. Book noted by Almond, G. A. 700
- Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A  
Study in Legislative Influence and  
Initiative*. Robinson, James A. Book  
noted by Patterson, S. C. . . . . 719
- Undergraduate Education in Foreign Af-  
fairs*. Bidwell, Percy W. Book noted by  
Burkhart, J. A. . . . . 991
- The Nature of International Society*. Man-  
ning, C. A. W. Book review by Mc-  
Clelland, C. A. . . . . 983
- Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A  
Study in Legislative Influence and  
Initiative*. Robinson, James A. Book  
review by Stokes, D. E. . . . . 719
- D1 DIPLOMACY—NEGOTIATION
- Professional Diplomacy in the United  
States: 1779–1939*. Ilchman, Warren  
Frederick. Book noted by Crabb,  
C. V. Jr. . . . . 177
- Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordi-  
nary*. Spaulding, E. Wilder. Book  
noted by Gibbs, H. S. . . . . 762
- D21 SOVEREIGNTY
- D211 FORMATION, DISSOLUTION AND PAR-  
TITION OF STATES
- The Backward Society*. Frost, Ray-  
mond. Book noted by Rothchild,  
D. S. . . . . 504
- The Limits of Self-Determination: The  
Case of the Katanga Secession*. Le-  
marchand, René. . . . . 404
- Africa: The Politics of Independence*.  
Wallerstein, Immanuel. Book re-  
viewed by Hanna, W. . . . . 429
- The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960–  
1961*. Bennett, George and Ros-  
berg, Carl. Book noted by Mc-  
Connell, G. . . . . 484
- The Herzl Paradox: Political, Social  
and Economic Theories of a Realist*.  
Adler, Joseph. Book noted by  
Lucatz, N. . . . . 701
- The Role of the Military in Underde-  
veloped Countries*. Johnson, John J.  
Book noted by Singer, J. D. . . . . 1019
- I Speak of Freedom*. Nkrumah,  
Kwame. Book noted by Bates,  
M. L. . . . . 485
- The Emerging States of French Equa-  
torial Africa*. Thompson, Virginia  
and Adloff, Earl. Book noted by  
Le Vine, V. T. . . . . 486
- African Affairs: Number One. St. An-  
thony's Papers: Number 10* (ed.)  
Kirkwood, Kenneth. Book noted  
by Davies, J. C. . . . . 486
- D2111 Recognition
- Recognition of Communist China?*  
Newman, Robert P. Book re-  
viewed by Stauffer, R. B. . . . . 145
- The Eternal Triangle? Communist  
China, the United States, and the  
United Nations*, by Sheldon Ap-  
pleton. Book noted by Richard  
L. Walker. . . . . 1030
- D213 PUPPET STATES
- Deviation Control: A Study in the  
Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict*.  
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. . . . . 5
- Communism, Nationalism and the  
Growth of the Communist Commu-  
nity of Nations After World War II*.  
Shoup, Paul. . . . . 886
- See also D48 and sub-heads under  
B414.
- D2 INTERNATIONAL LAW
- When Nations Disagree: A Handbook on  
Peace through Law*. Larson, Arthur.  
Book noted by Yalem, R. J. . . . . 498
- International Immunities*. Jenks, Wil-  
fred. Book noted by Remec, P. P. . . 502
- World Policy II. A Yearbook of Studies  
in International Law and Organiza-  
tion*. Book noted by Tamko, M. . . . 765
- D22 GENERAL RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS OF  
STATES
- D222 RIGHT OF DOMAIN—RIGHT OF  
ACQUISITION
- The Robe and the Sword: The Meth-  
odist Church and the Rise of Ameri-  
can Imperialism*. MacKenzie, Ken-  
neth M. Book noted by Morrow,  
R. E. . . . . 470
- See also B264.
- D225 JURISDICTION OVER THE SEAS
- The United States and the Treaty Law  
of the Sea*. Reiff, Henry. Book  
noted by Mander, L. A. . . . . 505
- D227 OBLIGATION TO RESPECT HUMAN  
RIGHTS
- International Protection of Human  
Rights*. Manouchehr Ganji. Book  
noted by Jean A. Laponce. . . . . 1035
- See also D48 (Genocide).

- D25 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW**  
*The Position of the Individual in International Law according to Grotius and Vattel.* Remec, Peter P. Book noted by Engel, S. . . . . 767
- D3 COLD WAR**  
 See also D711.  
*The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The "Sandys Era."* Martin, Laurence W. . . . . 23  
*Communications on A History of the Cold War.* Lukacs, John. Reviewed by Armstrong, J. A. . . . . 141  
*A Political Theory of Foreign Aid.* Morgenthau, Hans. . . . . 301  
*Scientists, Foreign Policy and Politics.* Schilling, Warner R. . . . . 287  
*The Cold War and Its Origins: The Eloquent and Indelible Record of The Great Conflict of Our Time.* Fleming, D. F. Book review by Wright, T. P. . 437  
*The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U. S. Information Service.* Dizard, Wilson P. Book noted by McLellan, D. S. . . . . 181  
*Storm over Laos,* by Prince Sisouk na Champassak, noted by Fall, B. B. . . 201  
*Communications on books reviewed: A History of the Cold War.* Lukas, John (Rev. by Armstrong, J. A.) . . . . 141  
*Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism.* Váli, Ferenc A. Book noted by Gyorgy, A. . . . . 489  
*Around the Edge of War.* Amory, John Forth. Book noted by Darling, F. C. . 497  
*Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military,* Coles, Harry L. (ed.). Book review by Edinger, L. J. . . . . 692  
*What Price Co-Existence? A Policy for the Western Alliance,* by Sir John Slessor. Book noted by Alfred Fernbach. . . . . 1029  
*The Common Defense: Strategic Program in National Politics.* Huntington, Samuel P. Book review by Radway, L. I. . . . . 982
- D4 WAR**  
*Kant, Liberalism, and War.* Waltz, Kenneth N. . . . . 331  
*Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime.* Grundstein, Nathan D. Book noted by Rackow, F. . . . . 462
- D44 PERSONS IN WAR: PRISONERS—PACIFIC INTERCOURSE OF BELLIGERENTS, NONCOMBATANTS**  
*The Manipulation of Human Behavior,* Biderman, A. D. and Zimmer, H. (eds.). Book reviewed by Rogow, A. 424
- D48 GENOCIDE**  
*Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941–1945,* by Edmond Paris, noted by John Clinton Adams. . . . . 1021
- D49 SPECIFIC WARS**  
*The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War.* Bolloten, Burnett. Book noted by Nagle, T. W. . . . . 503
- D6 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION**  
*Legal Problems of the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association.* . . . . 499
- D61 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC UNIONS**  
 See also D67.
- D612 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES**  
*The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960.* J. Lloyd Mecham. Book noted by Kennedy, J. J. . . . . 1032
- D613 UNITED NATIONS**  
*The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession.* Lemarchand, René. . . . . 404  
*The United States and the United Nations* (ed.). Wilcox, Francis O. and Haviland, Jr. H. Field. Book noted by Stoessinger, J. G. . . . . 500  
*The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities.* Cohen, Benjamin V. Book noted by Sandifer, D. W. . . . . 501
- D67 INTERNATIONAL UNIONS OF STATES**  
*The Dialectics of Supranational Unification.* Amitai Etzioni. . . . . 927  
 See also D74.
- D7 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION—INTERNATIONALISM**  
*Legal Problems of the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association.* . . . . 499  
*H. G. Wells and the World State.* Wagar, W. Warren. Book noted by Schaar, J. H. . . . . 160  
*Perspectives on Peace, 1910–1960.* Published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Book noted by Fried, J. H. E. 763  
*Studies in World Public Order.* McDougal, Myres S. and associates. Book noted by Piper, D. C. . . . . 764
- D71 WORLD PEACE MOVEMENTS**  
**D711 CONTROL AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS—DISARMAMENT**  
*Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control.* Bechhoefer, Bernard G. Book

- reviewed by Gange, J. . . . . 427  
*The Control of Arms Race*. Bull, Hedley. Book reviewed by Gange, J. . . 427  
*Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties*. Warburg, James P. Book reviewed by Gange, J. . . 425  
*Soviet Policy towards International Control of Atomic Energy*. Nogee, Joseph L. Book noted by Reshetar, J. S. Jr. . . . . 506
- D74 PAN-MOVEMENTS  
*European Elections by Direct Suffrage, a Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems Used in Western Europe and their Utility for the Direct Election of a European Parliament*, by Wolfgang Birke. Book noted. . . . . 1025  
 See also D67.
- D79 FOREIGN AID  
*A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*. Morgenthau, Hans. . . . . 301
- D8 IMMIGRATION & EMIGRATION  
*London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants*, by Ruth Glass assisted by H. Pollins. Book noted by Dealey, J. Q. . . . . 195
- F CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT—POLITICS—ELECTIONS  
 Bibliography compiled by Franklin L. Burdette. . . . . 183, 471, 733, 1008  
*The New America: Politics and Society in the Age of the Smooth Deal*. Meyer, Karl E. Book noted by Chambers, W. N. . . 180  
*Groups in Theory and Practice*. Loveday, Peter and Campbell, Ian. Book noted by Tinker, I. . . . . 990
- F1 PUBLIC OPINION—SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY  
*Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*. Rosenau, James N. Book reviewed by Smith, B. L. . . . . 441  
*The Pedagogy of Democracy: Coercive Public Protest in India*. Bayley, David H. . . . . 663  
*The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan*. Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. 743  
*A Theory of Public Opinion*. Wilson, Francis Graham. Book review by Krislov, S. . . . . 985  
*Foreign Affairs and You!* Andrew Berding. Book noted by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. 1036
- F15 PROPAGANDA  
*Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets*. Friedberg, Maurice. Book noted by Swayze, H. . . . . 989
- F5 POLITICS—POLITICAL ETHICS  
*The Presidential Election and Transition 1960–1961*, David, Paul T. (ed.). Book noted by Chamberlain, L. H. . . . . 459  
*Conscience in Politics: Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1950's*. Brown, Stuart Gerry. Book noted by Mallan, J.-P. . 469  
*Groups in Theory and Practice*. Loveday, Peter and Campbell, Ian. Book noted by Tinker, I. . . . . 990
- F51 POLITICAL PARTIES—PARTY PARTICIPATION  
*The Italian Socialist Party: A Case Study in Factional Conflict*. Zariski, Raphael. . . . . 372  
*The Political Ideas of English Party Activists*. Rose, Richard. . . . . 360  
*The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives*, Riker, William H. and Niemi, Donald. . . . . 58  
*Equilibrium, Structure of Interests and Leadership: Adenauer's Survival as Chancellor*. Merkl, Peter H. . . . . 634  
*Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959*. Engelmann, Frederick C. . . . 651  
*Questions in Parliament*. Chester, D. N. and Bowring, Nona. Book noted by Millett, J. H. . . . . 753  
*Party Politics (Volume III): The Stuff of Politics*. Jennings, Sir Ivor. Book noted by Rose, R. . . . . 753  
*The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election*. Barnes, Samuel H.; Grace, Frank; Pollock, James K.; and Sperlich, Peter W. . . . . 899  
*African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide*. Hodgkin, Thomas. Book review by Untermeyer, F. . . . . 980  
*The Economics of the Political Parties*, by Seymour L. Harris, noted by Sidney Wise. . . . . 1002
- F53 PRESSURE GROUPS  
*"Responsible Government," Separated Powers, and Special Interests: Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America*. Pennock, J. Roland. . . . 621  
*The Political World of American Zionism*. Halperin, Samuel. Book noted by Rubin B. . . . . 721
- F55 BIOGRAPHIES OF POLITICIANS  
*Six Crises*. Nixon, Richard M. Book noted by Kelley, S. Jr. . . . . 725  
*Mr. Europe, A Political Biography of Henri Spaak*. Huizinga, J. H. Book noted by Mayer, A. J. . . . . 216
- F6 BASES OF REPRESENTATION—APPORTIONMENT  
*Parliamentary and Electoral Systems: A*



- World Handbook*. Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . . 491
- F7 NOMINATIONS  
*Preprimary Endorsements in California Politics*. Rowe, Leonard. Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . . 179
- F8 ELECTIONS  
*Parliamentary and Electoral Systems: A World Handbook*. Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . . 491  
*European Elections by Direct Suffrage, a Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems Used in Western Europe and their Utility for the Direct Election of a European Parliament*, by Wolfgang Birke. Book noted. . . . . 1025
- F804 EXPENSE OF ELECTIONS  
*Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain*. Gwyn, William B. Book noted by Shannon, Jasper B. . . . . 1018
- F805 CAMPAIGNS AND PLATFORMS  
*Six Crises*. Nixon, Richard M. Book noted by Kelley, Stanley Jr. . . . . 725  
*National Party Platforms: 1840-1960*, compilers Porter, Kirk and Johnson, Donald Bruce. . . . . 729
- F806 ELECTION RETURNS  
*The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession*. Lemarchand, René. . . . . 404  
*Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960*. Baggaley, Andrew R. . . . . 66  
*Two Theorems on Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems*, Ando, Albert and Fisher, Franklin M. . . . . 108  
*The Religious Factor*. Lenski, Gerhard. Book noted by Davis, H. R. . . . . 159  
*Experimental Approaches to Vote-Counting Theory in Nominating Choice*. David, Paul. . . . . 673  
*The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election*. Barnes, Samuel H.; Grace, Frank; Pollock, James K.; and Sperlich, Peter W. . . . . 899  
*Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902-1964*. Jack Sawyer and Duncan MacRae, Jr. . . . . 936
- G THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH  
*Parliamentary Reform 1933-1960*. The Hansard Society. Book noted by Marquis, L. C. . . . . 479  
*Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body*. Francis, Wayne L. . . . . 953  
*The British Parliament* by Roland Young. Book noted by John P. Mackintosh. 936
- G1 LEGISLATORS  
*Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance*, Marvick, Dwaine (ed.). Book noted by Verba, S. . . . . 440  
*Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1961*. . . . . 470
- G2 LEGISLATIVE BODIES  
G21 UPPER HOUSE  
*Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961*. Parsons, Malcolm B. . . . . 605  
*Communication on Norms, Roles and Folkways*. Huitt, Ralph. . . . . 142  
*The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*. Farnsworth, David N. Book noted by Elder, R. E. . . . . 461
- G22 LOWER HOUSE  
*History of the House of Representatives*. Galloway, George B. Book noted by Moreland, L. B. . . . . 720  
*The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration*. Fenno, Richard F. Jr. . . . . 310
- G255 SUBCOMMITTEES  
*Subcommittees: The Miniature Legislatures of Congress*. Goodwin, George Jr. . . . . 596
- G3 LEGISLATIVE POWERS & FUNCTIONS  
*Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems*. Dawson, Raymond H. . . . . 42
- G39 PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY  
*Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*. Robinson, James A. Book review by Stokes, D. D. . . . . 984  
Book note by Patterson, S. C. . . . . 719
- G5 PROCEDURE—LEGISLATIVE VOTING  
*Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961*. Parsons, Malcolm B. . . . . 605  
*The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives*. Riker, William H. and Niemi, Donald. . . . . 58  
*Questions in Parliament*. Chester, D. N. and Bowring, Nona. Book noted by Millett, J. H. . . . . 753
- G9 LAW  
G91 JURISPRUDENCE  
*Justice and Social Policy*, ed. Olafson, Frederick A. Book noted by Paul, J. . . . . 438  
*Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends*. Kirchheimer, Otto. Book noted by Duncan, J. P. . . . . 438

## H THE JUDICIARY-COURTS-LEGAL PROFESSION

- Freedom and Protection: The Bill of Rights.* Weinberger, Andrew D. Book reviewed by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 460
- Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action.* Roche, John P. Book reviewed by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 460
- Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process.* Murphy, Walter F. and Pritchett, C. Herman. (eds.). Book noted by Vose, C. E. . . . . 717

### H2 COURT SYSTEMS

#### H21 FEDERAL COURTS

##### H211 SUPREME COURT

- Deeds Without Doctrines: Civil Rights in the 1960 Term of the Supreme Court.* McCloskey, Robert G. . . . . 71
- Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960.* Ulmer, Sidney S. . . . . 325
- The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis.* Schubert, Glendon. . . . . 90
- Communications on same. . . . . 422
- The Supreme Court Review.* Kurland, Philip B. (ed.). Book reviewed by Chase, H. W. . . . . 427

### H3 JUDICIAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

#### H31 JUDICIAL REVIEW

- Our Fundamental Rights: Their Nature and Extent (As Judicially Determined).* Banerjee, D. N. Book noted by McWhinney, E. . . . . 490

### H5 JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

#### H57 JURY

##### H573 SELECTION OF JURY

- Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960.* Ulmer, Sidney S. . . . . 325

## I EXECUTIVE-ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT—ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

- Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime.* Grundstein, Nathan D. Book noted by Rackow, F. . . . . 461

### I2 THE EXECUTIVE AND EXECUTIVE BODIES

#### I21 CHIEF EXECUTIVE

##### I210 TRANSITION PERIODS

- Presidential Transitions.* Henry, Laurin L. Book noted by Longaker, R. P. . . . . 173

##### I213 RELATION TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

- Congressional Innovation and Inter-*

*vention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems.*

Dawson, Raymond H. . . . . 42

### I27 CABINET SYSTEM—MINISTERIAL

#### RESPONSIBILITY

*The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The "Sandys Era."* Martin, Laurence W. . . . . 23

*An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century.* ed. Graebner, Norman A.

Book noted by Cohen, B. C. . . . . 176

*The British Cabinet.* Mackintosh, John P. Book review by Young, R. . . . . 986

*British Parliamentary Democracy.* Morrison of Lambeth, Lord. Book review by Young, R. . . . . 986

### I28 BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

*Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics.*

Wildavsky, Aaron. Book noted by Stratton, O. . . . . 721

### I5 ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

#### I54 PUBLIC RELATIONS

#### I549 INFORMATION BUREAUS

*The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U. S. Information Service.* Dizard, Wilson P. Book noted by McLellan, D. S. . . . . 181

## J PLANNING

### J2 RESOURCES PLANNING

#### J22 NATURAL RESOURCES

(Water) See V43.

### J7 CITY PLANNING

*Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning in Action.*

Mandelker, Daniel R. Book noted by Stephens, G. R. . . . . 752

## K PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

### K1 THE PUBLIC SERVICE

#### K12 MERIT SYSTEMS—CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE

*Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service: A Study of Labor-*

*Management Relations in United States Government.* Hart, Wilson R.

Book noted by McNeill, R. J. . . . . 180

*Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker.* Walker, Nigel.

Book noted by Friedland, Louis L. . . . . 1006

*Civil Service and Managing Work: Some Unintended Consequences.*

Robert T. Golembiewski. . . . . 961

#### K18 BUREAUCRACY

*Formal Operations: A Comparative Ap-*

- proach*. Blau, Peter M. and Scott, Richard W. Book reviewed by Guetzkow, H. . . . . 428
- L PUBLIC FINANCE**
- United States Fiscal Policy 1945-1959*. Holmans, A. E. Book noted by Poland, O. F. . . . . 463
- The Economics of the Political Parties*, by Seymour L. Harris, noted by Sidney Wise. . . . . 1002
- L6 EXPENDITURES**
- Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom*, by Peacock, Wiseman & Veverta, noted by Buck, P. W. 194
- N NATIONAL DEFENSE—LAW ENFORCEMENT—POLICE—FIRE PROTECTION—SAFETY**
- N1 NATIONAL DEFENSE**
- The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Johnson, John J. Book noted by Singer, J. David. . . . 1019
- N100 DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING**
- Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems*. Dawson, Raymond H. . . . . 42
- Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics*. Schilling, Warner R. . . . . 287
- A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*. Morgenthau, Hans. . . . . 301
- The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The "Sandys Era."* Martin, Laurence W. . . . . 23
- The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*. Huntington, Samuel P. Book review by Radway, L. I. . . . . 982
- N104 DEFENSE FINANCING AND COSTS**
- Two Theorems on Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems*. Fisher, Franklin M. and Ando, Albert. . . . . 108
- N11 MILITARY POLICIES**
- N119 CIVILIAN CONTROL OF MILITARY POLICY**
- Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems*. Dawson, Raymond H. . . . . 42
- Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics*. Schilling, Warner R. . . . . 287
- A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*. Morgenthau, Hans. . . . . 301
- The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The "Sandys Era."* Martin, Laurence W. . . . . 23
- Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, ed. Huntington, Samuel P. Book review by Edinger, L. J. . . . . 926
- Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military*, ed. Coles, Harry L. Book review by Edinger, L. J. . . . . 692
- N6 PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER**
- N63 CENSORSHIP**
- Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail*. Paul, James C. N. and Schwartz, Murray L. Book noted by Longaker, R. P. . . . . 464
- Secrecy and Publicity Dilemmas of Democracy*. Rourke, Francis E. Book noted by Penniman, H. . . . . 175
- Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959*. Swayze, Harold. Book noted by Friedberg, M. . . . . 988
- P EDUCATION—LIBRARIES**
- P04 FINANCE**
- The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher Education*. Rivlin, Alice M. Book noted by Abbott, F. C. . . . . 731
- P3 EDUCATION AND STATE**
- Religion, Government, and Education*, (ed.) Brickman, William W. and Lehrer, Stanley. Book noted by Lanoue, G. R. . . . . 468
- P5 COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES**
- P54 CURRICULA**
- P544 SOCIAL SCIENCES**
- Political Science as a Discipline. A Statement by the Committee on Standards of Instruction on the American Political Science Association*. . . . . 417
- Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs*. Bidwell, Percy W. Book noted by Buckhart, J. A. . . . . 991
- P7 PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION—THE PROFESSIONS**
- Graduate Education in the United States*. Berelson, B. Book reviewed by Caldwell, L. K. . . . . 153
- P709 PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS—AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION**
- Political Science as a Discipline. A Statement by the Committee on Standards of Instruction on the American Political Science Association*. . . . . 417

- Toward a Definition of Editorial Policy.* Mansfield, Harvey C..... 129
- Toward a Definition of Book Review Policy.* Leiserson, Avery..... 139
- P7091 Appointments and Staff Changes
- March 1962..... 238
- June 1962..... 524
- September 1962..... 797
- December 1962..... 1049
- P7092 News and Notes
- March 1962..... 233
- June 1962..... 520
- September 1962..... 792
- December 1962..... 1042
- P7093 In Memoriam
- Lowrie, Selden Gale..... 241
- Margalith, Aaron M..... 526
- Lancaster, Lane W..... 526
- MacDonald, Austin F..... 526
- Lambie, Morris B..... 803
- Zink, Harold..... 803
- P7094 Dissertations
- on Political Science, Seyler, William C. compiler..... 774
- Q PUBLIC WELFARE**
- A Report on Social Security Programs in the Soviet Union.* U. S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare. Book reviewed by Somers, H. M..... 149
- The Measurement of Social Welfare.* Rothenberg, Jerome. Book noted by Lindblom, C. E..... 702
- Q5 SOCIAL INSURANCE**
- Q68 OLD AGE INSURANCE**
- The Development of the Social Security Act.* Witte, Edwin E. Book noted by Leiserson, A..... 723
- R LABOR**
- R7 LABOR RELATIONS**
- The Man in the Middle—The Inside Story of the Hot and Cold Wars Between Labor and Management.* Shaffer, Nathan W. with Dramer, Dale. Book noted by Gilmour, C. E.. 467
- Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service: A Study of Labor-Management Relations in United States Government.* Hart, Wilson R. Book noted by McNeill, R. J..... 180
- T KOMING**
- T1 KOMING**
- T19 KOMING**
- T191 EUROPE**
- Europe's Needs and Resources.* Dewhurst, J. Frederic, et al., book noted by Ritchie, W. A..... 208
- T194 LATIN AMERICA**
- A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America.* Benham, F., & Holley, H. A., book noted by Lewis, F. M..... 196
- U GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS**
- U2 REGULATION AND PROTECTION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE**
- Pricing Power and the Public Interest, A Study Based on Steel.* Means, Gardiner C. Book review by Latham, E.. 690
- The Politics of Oil.* Engler, Robert. Book review by Turner, H. A..... 695
- U24 PATENTS—COPYRIGHTS—TRADEMARKS**
- Constraint by Copyright.* Schnapper, M. B. Book noted by Dilliard, I... 732
- U5 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP**
- Parliament and Public Ownership.* Hanson, A. H. Book noted by Dugan, A. B..... 752
- V PUBLIC UTILITIES**
- V4 WATER—WATER UTILITIES**
- V43 WATER SUPPLY**
- Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning,* by Maass, Huffschildt, Dorfman, Thomas, Marglin & Fair—noted by Frank Munger..... 1003
- W TRANSPORTATION—TRAFFIC—COMMUNICATION**
- W7 COMMUNICATION**
- W71 POSTAL SERVICE**
- Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail.* Paul, James C. N. and Schwartz, Murray L. Book noted by Longaker, R. P..... 464
- W9 RADIO—RADIO BROADCASTING**
- British Broadcasting in Transition.* Paulu, Burton. Book noted by Alperin, R. J..... 755
- Z AGRICULTURE**
- Z4 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF AGRICULTURE**
- "Responsible Government," Separated Powers, and Special Interests: Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America.* Pennock, J. Roland..... 621
- The Farmer's Dilemma.* Andrews, Stanley. Book noted by Talbot, R. B.... 722

## SECTION TWO:

## ALPHABETICAL SECTION

- Abbott, F. C. Notes on *The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher Education*. Rivlin, Alice M. . . . . 731
- Adam, T. R. Notes on *Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara*. Spiro, Herbert. . . . . 747
- Adams, John Clinton. Book note on *Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941-1945*, by Paris, Edmond. . . . . 1021
- Adenauer, Konrad. see F51.
- Adler, Joseph. *The Herzl Paradox: Political, Social and Economic Theories of a Realist*. Book noted by Lucatz, N. . . . . 701
- Adloff, Earl (and Thompson, Virginia). *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa*. Book noted by Le Vine, V. T. . . . 486
- The Administration of British Foreign Relations*. Bishop, Donald G. Book noted by Harris, J. S. . . . . 755
- AFRICA. See D211; B43.
- Africa: The Politics of Independence*. Wallerstein, Immanuel. Book reviewed by Hanna, W. . . . . 429
- Africa South*. de Blij, Harm Jan. Book noted by Richard W. Taylor. . . . . 1024
- African Affairs: Number One*. *St. Anthony's Papers: Number 10* (ed.) Kirkwood, Kenneth. Book noted by Davies, J. C. . . . . 486
- African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide*. Hodgkin, Thomas. Book review by Untermeyer, F. . . . . 980
- AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES. See Z4
- Albrecht-Carrié, René. *France, Europe, and the Two World Wars*. Book notes by Neumann, R. . . . . 215
- Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855*. Malia, Martin. Book noted by Hammer, D. P. . . . . 443
- Alexander, Robert J. *Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders*. Book noted by Burnett, B. G. . . . . 481
- Alger, C. F. Notes on *Strategy for the 60's*. Cerf, Jay H. and Pozen, Walter (eds.). . . 507
- Almond, G. A. Notes on *A Theory of Foreign Policy*. Modelski, George. . . . . 700
- Alperin, R. J. Notes on *British Broadcasting in Transition*. Paulu, Burton. . . . . 755
- Altschuler, A. Notes on *Cases in State and Local Government*. Frost, Richard T. (ed.) 178
- Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary*. Spaulding, E. Wilder. Book noted by Gibbs, H. S. . . . . 762
- America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity*. Gleher, Lionel. Book noted by Joynt, C. B. . . . . 496
- AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. See D, B26, B4.
- AMERICAN GOVERNMENT & POLITICS. See B5, B6, B7, B8, F, G, and H.
- American Perspectives*, Spiller, Robert E. and Larrabee, Eric (eds.). Book noted by Backstroin, Charles H. . . . . 179
- American Political Science Association, see P709.
- American Political Science Association, Committee on Standards of Instruction. *Political Science as a Discipline*. . . . . 417
- AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. See B21 and B23.
- Amory, John Forth. *Around the Edge of War*. Book noted by Darling, F. C. . . . . 497
- Anderson, S. V. Book notes on *Modern Swedish Government*. Andrén, Nils. . . . 203
- on *Danmarks Folketing: om dets hus og historie*. Thorsen, Svend. . . . . 203
- on *Stortinget på nært hold*. Øisang, Per. . 203
- Ando, Albert & Fisher, Franklin M. *Two Theorems on Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems*. . . . . 108
- Andrén, Nils. *Modern Swedish Government*. Book noted by Anderson, S. V. . . . . 203
- Noted again. . . . . 1024
- Andrews, Stanley. *The Farmer's Dilemma*. Book noted by Talbot, R. B. . . . . 722
- The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788*. Main, Jackson Turner. Book noted by Bowman, E. . . . . 729
- Appleton, Sheldon. *The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations*. Book noted by Walker, R. L. . . . . 1030
- APPORTIONMENT. See F6.
- APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, HOUSE. See HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
- Apter, David. *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*. Book noted by Dvorin, E. P. . . . 199
- ARABS. See B425 and B437.
- ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEES. See G3.
- Armstrong, John A. See D3.
- Around the Edge of War*: Amory, John Forth. Book noted by Darling, F. C. . . . 497
- The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada*. Eayrs, James. Book noted by Williams, J. R. . . . . 750
- Asher, Robert E. *Grants, Loans, and Local Currencies: Their Role in Foreign Aid*. Book notes by Buehrig, E. H. . . . . 213
- Ashford, Douglas. *Political Change in Morocco*. Book noted by Khadduri, M. . . . 198
- ASIA. See B42.
- ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, See N119; also see I28.

- ATOMIC ENERGY, CONTROL OF. See D711.  
 AUSTRALIAN POLITICS. See B461.  
 AUSTRIAN POLITICS. See B416.
- Bachrach, Peter & Baratz, Morton S. *Two Faces of Power*. . . . . 947  
 Backstrom, Charles H. Notes on *American Perspectives*, Spiller, Robert E. and Larabee, Eric (eds.). . . . . 179  
*The Backward Society*. Frost, Raymond. Book noted by Rothchild, D. S. . . . . 504  
 Baggaley, Andrew R. *Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960*. . . . . 66  
 Baker, R. D. Notes on *Venezuela*. Lieuwen, Edwin. . . . . 746  
 Banerjee, D. N. *Our Fundamental Rights: Their Nature and Extent (As Judicially Determined)*. Book noted by McWhinney, E. . . . . 490  
 Banfield, Edward C. *Political Influence*. Book reviewed by Scoble, H. M. . . . . 151  
 Barber, H. W. Notes on *Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear*. deMadariaga, Salvadore. . . . . 1032  
 Barber, W. F. Notes on *Latin American Social Thought*. Davis, Harold Eugene. . . . . 705  
 Baratz, Morton S. & Bachrach, Peter. *Two Faces of Power*. . . . . 947  
 Barnes, Samuel H. (with Grace, Frank, Pollock, James K. and Sperlich, Peter W.) *The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election*. . . . . 899  
 Barrett, P. Reviews *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*. Vol. I., 1768-1778. Vol. II., 1779-1781. . . . . 432  
 Bates, M. L. Notes on *I Speak of Freedom*. Nkrumah, Kwame. . . . . 485  
 Bayley, David H. *The Pedagogy of Democracy: Coercive Public Protest in India*. . . . . 663  
 Bechhoefer, B. G. *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*. Book reviewed by Gange, J. . . . . 425  
 BELGIAN COLONIES. See *Limits of Self-Determination*; See also D211 and B4171.  
 Benham, F., with Holley, H. A. *A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America*. Book noted by Lewis, F. M. . . . . 196  
 Bennett, George (and Rosberg, Carl). *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961*. Book noted by McConnell, G. . . . . 484  
 Benton, Wilbourn E. *Texas: Its Government and Politics*. Book noted by Ransone, C. B., Jr. . . . . 466  
 Berdyaev, Nicholas. *The Russian Revolution*. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162  
 Berding, Andrew. *Foreign Affairs and You!* Book noted by Crabb, C. V. Jr. . . . . 1036  
 Berelson, Bernard. *Graduate Education in the United States*. Book reviewed by Caldwell, L. K. . . . . 153  
 Beshers, James M. *Urban Social Structure*. Book noted by O'Donnell, M. E. . . . . 1000
- BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 on *International Law and Relations*, Roberts, William H., compiler. . . . . 219, 510  
 on *Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences*, Feldman, Julian, compiler. . . . . 165, 450, 709, 995  
 on *Foreign and Comparative Government*, Stout, Hiram M., compiler. . . . . 203, 491, 756, 1025  
 on *American Government and Politics*, Burdette, Franklin L., compiler. . . . . 183, 471, 733, 1008  
 on *Political Theory*, Kenyon, Cecilia M., compiler. . . . . 163, 448, 707  
*Select list of publications issued by Senate and House committees. Committee prints, staff studies, reports, and documents, 80th-86th Congress (1947-60, inclusive)* (Prepared by) The Senate Committee on Government Operations. Book noted by Childs, J. B. . . . . 471  
 Biderman, A. D. (ed.) (with H. Zimmer). *The Manipulation of Human Behavior*. Book reviewed by Rogow, A. . . . . 424  
 Bidwell, Percy W. *Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs*. Book noted by Burkhart, J. A. . . . . 991
- BILL OF RIGHTS. See C; also H.  
 Birke, Wolfgang. *European elections by direct suffrage, a comparative study of the electoral systems used in Western Europe and their utility for the direct election of a European parliament*. Book noted. . . . . 1025  
*Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961*. Book noted by Childs, J. B. . . . . 470  
 Birnbach, Martin. *Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy*. Book noted by Pinner, F. A. . . . . 703  
 Bishop, Donald G. *The Administration of British Foreign Relations*. Book noted by Harris, J. S. . . . . 755  
 Blau, Peter M. (with Richard W. Scott). *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach*. Book reviewed by Guetzkow, H. . . . . 428  
 Blij, Harm Jan de. *Africa South*. Book noted by Richard W. Taylor. . . . . 1024  
 Blij, Harm Jan de. Book note on *South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity* by Mansergh, Nicholas. . . . . 1023  
 Bollens, John C. (ed.) *Exploring the Metropolitan Community*. Book reviewed by Green, L. S. . . . . 152  
 Bolloten, Burnett. *The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War*. Book noted by Nagle, T. W. . . . . 503
- BOOK REVIEW POLICY. See P709.  
 Booth, D. A. Book notes on *The Relation*

- Between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and in the United States.* Erades, L. and Gould, W. L. . . . . 218
- Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership.* Gottfried, Alex. Book noted by McGoldrick, J. D. . . . . 1001
- Bowman, E. Notes on *The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788.* Main, Jackson Turner. . . . . 729
- Bowring, Nona (with Chester, D. N.). *Questions in Parliament.* Book noted by Millett, J. H. . . . . 753
- Braeman, J. Notes on *Contours of American History.* Williams, William Appleman. . . 1005
- Braibanti, Ralph (ed.) (and Spengler, Joseph J.). *Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development.* Book noted by Friedman, J. R. . . . . 157
- Bramson, Leon. *The Political Context of Sociology.* Book noted by Scher, S. . . . . 161
- Braunthal, Julius. *Geschichte der Internationale.* Book noted by Sturmthal, A. . . . 766
- BRAZZAVILLE BLOC. See B435
- Brickman, William W. (ed.) (with Lehrer, Stanley). *Religion, Government, and Education.* Book noted by LaNoue, G. R. . . 468
- British Broadcasting in Transition.* Paulu, Burton. Book noted by Alperin, R. J. . . . 755
- The British Cabinet.* Mackintosh, John P. Book review by Young, R. . . . . 986
- BRITISH COMMONWEALTH  
In Europe. See B41.  
In Asia. See B42.  
In Africa. See B43.  
In Latin America & West Indies. See B44.  
In North America. See B45.  
In Australasia & Oceania. See B46.
- British Parliament, The.* Young, Roland. Book noted by Mackintosh, John P. . . . 1022
- British Parliamentary Democracy.* Morrison of Lambeth, Lord. Book Review by Young, R. . . . . 986
- Brockelmann, Carl. *History of the Islamic Peoples.* Book noted by Fitzgerald, J. A. . 200
- Brown, Bernard E. (with Macridis, Roy C.). *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings.* Book noted by Lanyi, G. A. . . . . 749
- Brown, D. Mackenzie. *The Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ronade to Bhawe.* Book noted by Tinker, I. 990
- Brown, Stuart Gerry. *Conscience in Politics: Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1950's.* Book noted by Mallan, J. P. . . . . 469
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict.* . . . . . 5
- Buck, Philip W. Note on Wiseman & Peacock, *Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom.* . . . . . 194
- Buehrig, E. G. Book notes on *Grants, Loans and Local Currencies: Their Role in Foreign Aid.* Asher, R. E. . . . . 213
- BUGANDA. See *Political Kingdom in Uganda.*
- Bull, Hedley. *The Control of the Arms Race.* Book reviewed by Gange, J. . . . . 425
- Burdette, Franklin L., compiler of *Bibliography on American Government and Politics.* . . . . . 183, 471, 733, 1008
- Burke, F. G. Reviews *The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World.* . . . . 434
- Burkhart, J. A. Notes on *Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs.* Bidwell, Percy W. . . . . 991
- Burse, L. Gerald. Note on R. Conquest's *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* . . . . 192
- BURMA. See B426.
- Burnett, B. G. Notes on *Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders.* Alexander, Robert J. . . . . 481
- Busey, J. L. Reviews *The Cuban Story.* Matthews, Herbert L. . . . . 146
- Butwell, Richard. *Southeast Asia Today—And Tomorrow. A Political Analysis.* Book noted by Lev, D. S. . . . . 1031
- Cahn, Edmond. *The Predicament of Democratic Man.* Book noted by McKee, D. K. 156
- Caldwell, L. K. Reviews *Graduate Education in the United States.* Berelson, Bernard . 153
- CALIFORNIA POLITICS. See B65.
- Campbell, Ian, & Loveday, Peter. *Groups in Theory and Practice.* Book noted by Hagan, C. B. . . . . 990
- CARIBBEAN. See B44.
- CASE STUDIES, see AA1.
- Cases in State and Local Government.* Frost, Richard T. (ed.). Book noted by Altschuler, A. . . . . 178
- CENSORSHIP. See C41.
- CENTRAL AMERICA. See B44.
- Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960.* Legge, J. D. Book noted by Mill, E. W. . . . . 745
- A Century of Civil Rights.* Konvitz, Milton R. With *A Study of State Law Against Discrimination.* Leskes, Theodore. Book noted by Wiltsey, G. G. . . . . 718
- Cerf, Jay H. (ed.) (with Pozen, Walter). *Strategy for the 60's.* Book noted by Alger, C. F. . . . . 507
- CERMAK, ANTON J. See *Boss Cermak.*
- Chambers, W. N. Notes on *National Party Platforms: 1840-1960.* Porter, Kirk and Johnson, Donald Bruce, compilers. . . . 729
- Chambers, W. N. Notes on *The New America: Politics and Society in the Age of the Smooth Deal.* Meyer, Karl E. . . . . 180
- Champassak, Prince Sisouk Na. *Storm Over*

- Laos—A Contemporary History*. Book noted by Fall, B. B. . . . . 201
- The Changing Patterns of the Middle East*. Rondot, Pierre. Book noted by Lucatz, N. 488
- Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.). Book review by Edinger, L. J. . . . . 692
- Chase, H. W. Reviews *The Supreme Court Review*. . . . . 427
- Chester, D. N. (with Bowring, Nona). *Questions in Parliament*. Book noted by Millett, J. H. . . . . 753
- CHICAGO. See B73.
- Childs, J. B. Notes on *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*. . . . . 470
- Select List of Publications Issued by Senate and House Committees. Committee Prints, Staff Studies, Reports, and Documents, 80th–86th Congress (1947–60, Inclusive)*. . . . . 471
- CHINA, COMMUNIST. See *Deviation Control*.
- CHINA. See B422.
- CHURCH & STATE. See B12431.
- CITIES. See B131, B15, and B73.
- CITY GOVERNMENT. See B73.
- CITY MANAGER. See B734.
- City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination*. Kammerer, Gladys M., Farris, Charles D., DeGrove, John M., Chubok, Alfred B. Book noted by Kenneth Prewitt. . . . . 1007
- Civil Liberties and the Constitution*. Kauper, Paul G. Book review by Steamer, R. J. . . . 694
- CIVIL RIGHTS. See C41.
- CIVIL SERVICE. See K.
- Civil Service and Managing Work: Some Unintended Consequences*. Golembiewski, Robert T. . . . . 961
- CIVIL WAR, SPANISH. See D49.
- CLASSICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, see *Revival of Classical Political Philosophy* . . . ; see also *Reply to Rothman*. . . . .
- Claude, I. L. Book notes on *The International Status of the United Nations*. Weissberg, Guenter. . . . . 209
- Chubok, Alfred B., with Kammerer, Farris & DeGrove. *City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination*. Book noted by Prewitt, Kenneth. . . . . 1007
- COALITION GOVERNMENT. See *Haggling for the Equilibrium*.
- Cohen, Benjamin V. *The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities*. Book noted by Sandifer, D. V. . . . . 501
- Cohen, B. D. Notes on *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century*. Graebner, Norman A. . . . . 176
- Coke, J. G. Reviews *Mastery of the Metropolis*. Fiser, Webb S. . . . . 979
- COLD WAR. See D3.
- The Cold War and Its Origins: The Eloquent and Indelible Record of The Great Conflict of Our Time*. Fleming, D. F. Book reviewed by Wright, T. P. . . . . 435
- Coles, Harry L. (ed.). *Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military*. Book review by Edinger, L. J. . 692
- Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service: A Study of Labor-Management Relations in United States Government*. Hart, Wilson R. Book noted by McNeill, R. J. . . . . 180
- COLONIALISM. See D211.
- COMMISSION PLAN. See B733.
- The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*. Huntington, Samuel P. Book review by Radway, Lawrence I. 982
- COMMON MARKET. See D6.
- COMMUNIST PARTY. See C41, F51, and B55.
- Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1960*, by Edward Taborsky, noted by Ivo K. Feieraband. . . . . 193
- Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations After World War II*. Shoup, Paul. . . . . 886
- Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*. Hsieh, Alice Langley. Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . . 688
- COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT. See B4, see also B7, F51, G1, N100, N119 and Bibliography.
- Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach*. Spiro, Herbert J. . . . . 577
- Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*. Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. Book noted by Lanyi, G. A. . . . . 749
- A Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution, Vol. 1: General Principles of Organization*. Sen, Sirdar D. K. Book noted by Retzlaff, R. H. . . . . 202
- The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America*. Silvert, Kalman H. Book noted by Taylor, P. B., Jr. . . . . 482
- CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (LEOPOLDVILLE). See B438.
- Congo Disaster*. Legum, Colin. Book noted by Hanna, W. . . . . 198
- CONGRESS. See G.
- CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. See G25.
- CONGRESS, U. S., INVESTIGATIONS. See C41.
- Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*. Robinson, James A. Book noted by Patterson, S. C. . . . . 719
- Ibid.* Reviewed by Stokes, D. E. . . . . 984
- Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization*



- of *Weapons Systems*. Raymond H. Dawson..... 42
- Connery, R. H. Reviews *Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States*. Gottmann, Jean..... 696
- Conquest, R. *Power & Policy in the U.S.S.R.*, Book notes by L. Gerald Bursey 193
- Conscience in Politics: Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1950's*. Brown, Stuart Gerry. Book noted by Mallan, J. P..... 469
- CONSENSUS. See B21.
- CONSERVATIVE PARTY, ENGLAND. See *Political Ideas of English Party Activists*; also see F51 and B411.
- Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion*. Rossiter, Clinton. Book noted by McGiffert, Michael..... 724
- CONSTITUENCY RESOLUTIONS, see *Political Ideas of English Party Activists*
- CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW. See C.
- Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion*. Sarfori, Giovanni..... 853
- Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History*. Kirk, George. Book noted by Lenczowski, G..... 199
- Contours of American History*. Williams, William Appleman. Book noted by Braeman, J..... 1005
- The Control of the Arms Race*. Bull, Hedley. Book reviewed by Gange, J..... 425
- Cooke, Jacob E. (associate ed.) (with Syrett, Harold C., ed.). *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*. Vol. I, 1768-1778. Vol. II, 1779-1781. Book reviewed by Barrett, P..... 432
- Coppock, J. O., with Dewhurst, J. F.; Yates, P. L.; and associates. *Europe's Needs and Resources*. Book noted by Ritchie, W. A..... 208
- Cottrell, F. Notes on *Sociology: The Progress of a Decade*. Lipset, Seymour Martin. 446
- Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action*. Roche, John P. Book noted by Ulmer, S. S..... 460
- Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process*, Murphy, Walter F. and Pritchett, C. Herman. (eds.). Book noted by Vose, C. E..... 717
- Crabb, C. V. Jr. Notes on *Professional Diplomacy in the United States: 1779-1939*. Ilchman, Warren Frederick..... 177
- Crabb, C. V. Jr. Notes on *Foreign Affairs and You!* Berding, Andrew..... 1035
- Crombie, Sir James. *Her Majesty's Customs and Excise*. Book noted..... 1024
- Cropsey, Joseph. *A Reply to Rothman*..... 353, 682 et seq.
- Crowder, Michael. *Senegal, A Study in French Assimilation Policy*. Book noted. 1025
- CUBA. See B441.
- The Cuban Story*. Matthews, Herbert L. Book reviewed by Busey, J. L..... 146
- CZECHOSLOVAKIA. See B4141.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. Book reviewed by Eulau, H..... 144
- Danmarks Folketing: om dets hus og historie*. Thorsen, Svend. Book noted by Anderson, S. V..... 203
- Darling, F. C. Notes on *Around the Edge of War*. Amory, John Forth..... 497
- DAVID, PAUL. See AA2.
- David, Paul T. (ed.). *The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961*. Book noted by Ulmer, S. S..... 459
- Davies, J. C. Notes on *African Affairs: Number One. St. Anthony's Papers: Number 10*. Kirkwood, Kenneth..... 486
- Davis, Harold Eugene. *Latin American Social Thought*. Book noted by Barber, W. F..... 705
- Davis, H. R. Notes on *The Religious Factor*. Lenski, Gerhard..... 159
- Dawson, Raymond H. *Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems*..... 42
- Dealey, James Q. Book notes on *London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants*. Glass, Ruth..... 195
- de Blij. See Blij.
- DECISION MAKING. See N119; see also AA1, H211 and Z4.
- Decisions in Syracuse*. Martin, Roscoe C., Munger, Frank G. and others. Book noted by Monat, W. R..... 466
- DEFENSE POLICY. See N100.
- DEFENSE PLANNING, BRITAIN. See *Market for Strategic Ideas*...; see also N100.
- DeGrove, John M., with Kammerer, Farris, & Clubok. *City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination*. Book noted by Prewitt, Kenneth 1007
- DeMadariaga. See Madariaga.
- DEMOCRACY. See B53.
- Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain*. Gwyn, William B. Book noted by Shannon, Jasper B..... 1018
- DENMARK. See B413.
- The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research*. Melville, Sir Harry. Book noted..... 1024
- Design of Regional Accounts: Papers presented at the Conference on Regional Accounts, 1960*, Hochwald, Werner (ed.). Book noted by Wengert, N..... 730
- Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Gov-*

- ernmental Planning*. Maass, Arthur, Hufschmidt, Maynard M., Dorfman, Robert, Thomas, Harold A., Jr., Marglin, Stephen A., Fair, Gordon Maskew and others. Book noted by Munger, F. . . . . 1003
- The Development of the Social Security Act*. Witte, Edwin E. Book noted by Leiser-son, A. . . . . 723
- Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict*. Zbigniew Brzezinski 5
- Dewhurst, J. F., with Coppock, J. O.; Yates, P. L.; and associates. *Europe's Needs and Resources*. Book noted by Ritchie, W. A. . . . . 208
- Dialectics of Supranational Unification, The*. Amitai Etzioni. . . . . 927
- DIPLOMACY. See D1.
- DISARMAMENT. See D711.
- Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties*. Warburg, James P. Book reviewed by Gange, J. . . . . 425
- Dishman, R. B. Notes on *The Government of Kansas*. Drury, James W. (with associates) . . . . . 465
- DIXON-YATES. See I28.
- Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics*. Wildavsky, Aaron. Book noted by Strat-ton, O. . . . . 721
- Dizard, Wilson P. *The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U. S. Information Service*. Book noted by McLellan, D. S. . . . . 181
- Dorfman, Robert (with Maas, Arthur, Hufschmidt, Robert, Thomas, Harold A., Jr., Marglin, Stephen A., Fair, Gordon Maskew and others). *Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning*. Book noted by Munger, F. . . . . 1003
- Dragnich, A. N. Notes on *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*. Hoffman & Neal . . 1034
- Drury, James W. (with associates). *The Government of Kansas*. Book noted by Dishman, R. B. . . . . 465
- DUE PROCESS. See C41.
- Dugan, A. B. Notes on *Parliament and Public Ownership*. Hanson, A. H. . . . . 752
- Duncan, J. P. Notes *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends*. Kirchheimer, Otto. . . . . 438
- Dvorin, E. P. Book notes on *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*. Apter, David. . . . 199
- Dyke, Vernon Van. *Values and Interests*. . . 567
- Communication from Oppenheim, Felix E. . . . . 975
- EAST GERMANY. See B4143.
- Eayrs, James. *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada*. Book noted by Williams, J. R. . . . . 750
- ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY. See B123.
- Economics of the Political Parties, The*. Harris, S. L. Book noted by S. Wise. . . . 1002
- The Edge of Freedom*. Oakes, John B. Book noted by Wallerstein, I. . . . . 487
- Edinger, L. J. Reviews *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*. Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.) . . . . . 692
- Reviews *Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military*. Coles, Harry L. (ed.) . . . . . 692
- EGYPT. See B4372.
- Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952*. Safran, Nadav. Book noted by Gerteiny, A. G. . . 748
- Elder, R. E. Notes on *The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*. Farnsworth, David N. . . . . 461
- ELECTIONS. See F8.
- ELECTION ANALYSES. See F806 and AA2.
- EMERGING NATIONS. See D211.
- The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa*. Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Earl. Book noted by Le Vine, V. T. . . . . 486
- Engel, S. Notes on *The Position of the Individual in International Law According to Grotius and Vattel*. Remec, Peter M. . . . 767
- Engelmann, Frederick C. *Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959*. . . . . 651
- ENGLAND & WALES. See B411.
- Engler, Robert. *The Politics of Oil*. Book review by Turner, H. A. . . . . 695
- ENGLISH POLITICS. See *Political Ideas of English Party Activists*: see also B4 and F51.
- Equilibrium, Structure of Interests, and Leadership: Adenauer's Survival as a Chancellor*. Merkl, Peter H. . . . . 634
- Erades, L. and Gould, W. L. *The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and in the United States*. Book notes by Booth, D. A. . . . . 218
- The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations*. Appleton, Sheldon. Book noted by Walker, R. L. . . . . 1030
- ETHNIC FACTORS IN VOTING. See F806.
- Etzioni, Amitai. *The Dialectics of Supranational Unification*. . . . . 927
- Eulau, H. Reviews *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. Dahl, Robert A. . . . . 144
- EUROPE. See B41 and T191.
- European elections by direct suffrage, a comparative study of the electoral systems used in Western Europe and their utility for the direct election of a European parliament*. Birke, Wolfgang. Book noted. . . . 1025

- EUROPEAN UNION. See D74.  
*Europe's Needs and Resources*. Dewhurst, J. F.; Coppock, J. O.; Yates, P. L.; and associates. Book noted by Ritchie, W. A. . . . . 208
- EXECUTIVE—LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS. See I213.
- EXPENSES, ELECTION. See F804.  
*Exploring the Metropolitan Community*, Bollens, John C. (ed.). Book reviewed by Greene, L. S. . . . . 152
- The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960*. Karnes, Thomas L. Book noted by Moses, C. C. . . . . 480
- Fair, Gordon Maskew (with Maass, Arthur, Hufschmidt, Maynard M., Dorfman, Robert, Thomas, Harold A., Jr., Maglin, Stephen A.). *Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning*. Book noted by Munger, F. . . . . 1003
- Falange: *A History of Spanish Fascism*. Payne, Stanley G. Book noted by Wilson, L. C. . . . . 483
- Fall, B. B. Book notes on *Storm Over Laos—A Contemporary History*. Champassak, Prince Sisouk Na. . . . . 201
- FAR EAST. See B42.
- FARM SUBSIDIES. See Z4.  
*The Farmer's Dilemma*. Andrews, Stanley. Book noted by Talbot, R. B. . . . . 722
- Farnsworth, David N. *The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*. Book noted by Elder, R. E. . . . . 461
- Farrelly, D. G. Notes on *The Structure of American Federalism*. Vile, M. J. C. . . . . 465
- Farris, Charles D., with Kammerer, DeGrove, & Clubok. *City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination*. Book noted by Prewitt, Kenneth. . . . . 1007
- FASCISM. See B58.  
*Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail*. Paul, James C. N. and Schwartz, Murray L. Book noted by Longaker, R. P. . . . . 173
- FEDERALISM. See B263.
- Feierabend, Ivo K., note on Edward Taborsky's *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960*. . . . . 193
- Feldman, Julian, compiler of Bibliography on Methodology and Research in the Social Sciences. . . . . 165, 450, 709, 995
- Fenno, Richard F., Jr. *The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration*. . . . . 310
- Fernbach, A. Notes on *What Price Coexistence? A Policy for the western Alliance*. Slessor, Sir John. . . . . 1029
- Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process*. Singer, J. David. Book noted by Kimball, C. . . . 209
- Fiser, Webb S. *Mastery of the Metropolis*. Book review by Coke, J. G. . . . . 979
- Fisher, Franklin M. & Ando, Albert. *Two Theorems on Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems*. . . . . 108
- Fitzgerald, J. A. Book notes on *History of the Islamic Peoples*. Brockelmann, Carl. . 200
- Fitzgibbon, R. H. Notes on *Pan America in Crisis*. Manger, William. . . . . 760
- Fleming, D. F. *The Cold War and Its Origins: The Eloquent and Indelible Record of The Great Conflict of Our Time*. Book reviewed by Wright, T. P. . . . . 435
- FLORIDA POLITICS. See *Quasi-Partisan Conflict* . . . ; also see B65.
- Food, Land, and Manpower in Western Europe*. Yates, P. Lamartine. Book noted by Rothman, S. . . . . 506
- Ford, John Anson. *Thirty Explosive Years in Los Angeles County*. Book noted by Rice, R. R. . . . . 726
- Foreign Affairs and You!* Berding, Andrew. Book noted by Crabb, C. V. Jr. . . . . 1036
- FOREIGN AID. See D79.
- FOREIGN POLICY. See *Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics*; also see F1, N100, N119, and D3.
- Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach*. Blau, Peter M. and Scott, Richard W. Book reviewed by Guetzkow, H. . 428
- A Forward Strategy for America*. Strausz-Hupe, R.; Kintner, W. R.; and Possony, S. T. Book noted by Ludden, H. R. . . . . 210
- FRANCE. See B417.  
*France, Europe, and the Two World Wars*. Albrecht-Carrié, René. Book notes by Neumann, R. . . . . 215
- Francis, Wayne L. *Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body*. . . . . 953
- Free Minds: A Venture in the Philosophy of Democracy*. Nelson, Ralph W. Book noted by Zucker, F. D. . . . . 447
- Free Speech: At What Price?* Charles S. Hyneman. . . . . 847
- FREEDOM. See B2.  
*Freedom and Protection: The Bill of Rights*. Weinberger, Andrew D. Book noted by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 460
- FRENCH COMMUNITY. See each Continent under B4.
- Fried, J. H. E. Book noted on *Prospectives on Peace, 1910-1960. Published under the Auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. . . . . 763
- Friedberg, Maurice. *Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets*. Book noted by Swayze, H. 989
- Friedberg, M. Notes on *Political Control of* -

- Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959.* Swayze, Harold. . . . . 988
- Friedman, J. R. Notes on *Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development*. Braibanti, Ralph and Spengler, Joseph J. (ed.) . . . . . 157
- Friedland, Louis L. Notes on *Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker*. Walker, Nigel. . . . . 1006
- Frost, Raymond. *The Backward Society*. Book noted by Rothchild, D. S. . . . . 504
- Frost, Richard T. (ed.). *Cases in State and Local Government*. Book noted by Altschuler, A. . . . . 178
- Fuchs, Lawrence H. *Hawaii Pono: A Social History*. Book noted by Horwitz, R. . . . . 727
- GALLICAN CONTROVERSY. See *Deviation Control*.
- Galloway, George B. *History of the House of Representatives*. Book noted by Moreland, L. B. . . . . 720
- Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902-1954*. Sawyer, Jack; McRae, Duncan Jr. . . . . 936
- GAMES THEORY. See AA3.
- Gange, J. Reviews *Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties*; also see *The Control of the Arms Race*; also see *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*. . . . . 425
- Ganji, Manouchehr. *International Protection of Human Rights*. Book noted by J. A. Laponce. . . . . 1035
- Garrett, Charles. *The LaGuardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City*. Book noted by Rice, R. R. . . . . 726
- Genesis and Structure of Society*. Gentile, Giovanni. Book review by LaPalombara, J. . . . . 698
- GENOCIDE. See D48.
- \**Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941-1945*. Paris, Edmond. Book noted by Adams, John Clinton. . . . . 1021
- Gentile, Giovanni. *Genesis and Structure of Society*. Book review by LaPalombara, J. . . . . 698
- GERMANY. See B415.
- The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election*. Barnes, Samuel H.; Grace, Frank; Pollock, James K.; and Sperlich, Peter W. . . . . 899
- Gerteiny, A. G. Notes on *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952*. Safran, Nadav. . . . . 748
- Geschichte der Internationale*. Braunthal, Julius. Book noted by Sturmthal, A. . . . . 766
- GHANA. See B432.
- Gibb, Sir Hamilton A. R. *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*. Book noted. . . . . 992
- Gibbs, H. S. Notes on *Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary*. Spaulding, E. Wilder. . . . . 762
- Gilmour, C. E. Notes on *The Man in the Middle—The Inside Story of the Hot and Cold Wars Between Labor and Management*. Shefferman, Nathan W., with Kramer Dale. . . . . 467
- Glass, Ruth. *London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants*. Book noted by Dealey, J. Q. . . . . 195
- Gleber, Lionel. *America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity*. Book noted by Joynt, C. B. . . . . 496
- Golembiewski, Robert T. *Civil Service and Managing Work: Some Unintended Consequences*. . . . . 961
- Goodwin, George Jr. *Subcommittees: The Miniature Legislatures of Congress*. . . . . 596
- Gottfried, Alex. *Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership*. Book noted by McGoldrick, J. D. . . . . 1001
- Gottmann, Jean. *Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States*. Book review by Connery, R. H. . . . . 696
- Gould, W. L. and Erades, L. *The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and in the United States*. Book notes by Booth, D. A. . . . . 218
- The Government of Kansas*. Drury, James W. and associates. Book noted by Dishman, R. B. . . . . 465
- Government of Missouri, The*, 7th. Edition, Karsch, Robert F., Book noted by Schmandt, Henry J. . . . . 1008
- Government and Politics of Uruguay*. Taylor, Philip B., Jr. Book noted by Padgett, L. V. . . . . 747
- Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities*. Kessel, John H. . . . . 615
- Grace, Frank (with Barnes, Samuel H.; Pollock, James K.; and Sperlich, Peter W.) *The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election*. . . . . 899
- Graduate Education in the United States*. Berelson, Bernard. Book reviewed by Caldwell, L. K. . . . . 153
- Graebner, Norman A. (ed.). *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century*. Book noted by Cohen, B. D. . . . . 176
- The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War*. Bolloten, Burnett. Book noted by Nagle, T. W. . . . . 503
- Grants, Loans, and Local Currencies: Their*

- Role in Foreign Aid.* Asher, Robert E. Book notes by Buehrig, E. H. . . . . 213
- GREAT BRITAIN. See B411.
- Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning in Action.* Mandelker, D. R. Book noted by Stephens, G. R. . . . . 751
- Green, T. H. *POSITIVE LIBERTY, 1880-1914.* David Nicholls. . . . . 114
- Greene, L. S. Reviews *Exploring the Metropolitan Community.* Bollens, John C. (ed.) 152
- Grosser, Alfred. *La IVème République et sa Politique Extérieure.* Book noted by Kirchheimer, O. H. . . . . 1017
- GROUPS. See F.
- Groups in Theory and Practice.* Peter Loveday and Ian Campbell. Book noted by C. B. Hagan. . . . . 990
- Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom,* by Peacock & Wiseman assisted by Veverka, noted by Philip W. Buck. . . . . 194
- Grundstein, Nathan D. *Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime.* Book noted by Rackow, F. . . . . 462
- Guetzkow, H. Reviews *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach.* Blau, P. and Scott, R. . . . . 428
- Gulick, Luther Halsey. *Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas.* Book noted by McCamy, J. L. . . . . 1000
- Gwyn, William B. *Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain.* Book noted by Shannon, Jasper B. . . . . 1018
- Gyorgy, A. Reviews *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin.* Kennan, George F. . . . . 148
- Gyorgy, A. Notes on *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism.* Váli, Ferenc C. . . . . 489
- Hagan, C. B. Note on *Groups in Theory and Practice* by Loveday & Campbell. . . . . 990
- Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959.* Engelmann, Frederick C. . . . . 651
- Halperin, Samuel. *The Political World of American Zionism.* Book noted by Rubin, B. . . . . 722
- HAMILTON, ALEXANDER. See B263.
- Hammer, D. P. Notes *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855* Malia, M. . . . . 443
- Hanna, W. Reviews *Africa: The Politics of Independence.* . . . . 429
- Hanna, W. Book notes on *Congo Disaster.* Legum, C. . . . . 198
- The Hansard Society. *Parliamentary Reform 1933-1960.* Book noted by Marquis, L. C. 479
- Hanson, A. H. *Parliament and Public Ownership.* Book noted by Dugan, A. B. . . . . 752
- Harbold, William H. (with Hitchner, Dell C.). *Modern Government.* Book noted by Steinbicker, P. B. . . . . 704
- Harris, J. S. Notes on *The Administration of British Foreign Relations.* Bishop, Donald G. . . . . 755
- Harris, Seymour L. *The Economics of the Political Parties.* Book noted by Wise, S. 1002
- Hart, Wilson R. *Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service: A Study of Labor-Management Relations in United States Government.* Book noted by McNeill, R. J. . . . . 180
- Harvey, Donald G. Note on Donald R. Whitnah's *A History of the U. S. Weather Bureau.* . . . . 182
- Hauser, Philip M. *Urbanization in Latin America.* Book noted by K. H. Silvert. . 1033
- Haviland, H. Field, Jr. (ed.) (and Wilcox, Francis O.). *The United States and the United Nations.* Book noted by Stoessinger, J. G. . . . . 500
- Hazard, John N. Note on Harry Schwartz's *The Red Phoenix: Russia Since World War II.* . . . . 191
- HAWAII. See B65.
- Hawaii Pono: A Social History.* Fuchs, Lawrence H. Book noted by Horwitz, R. 727
- Heater, D. B. *Political Ideas in the Modern World.* Book noted by Ritchie, W. A. . . . 706
- Hegel, George W. F. *Positive Liberty, 1880-1914.* David Nicholls. . . . . 114
- Heidenheimer, Arnold J. Book note on *The States in West German Federalism: A Study in Federal-State Relations* by Wells, Roger Hewes. . . . . 1018
- Henry, Laurin L. *Presidential Transitions.* Book noted by Longaker, R. P. . . . . 173
- Her Majesty's Customs and Excise.* Crombie, Sir James. Book noted. . . . . 1024
- Herr, Richard. *Tocqueville and the Old Regime.* Book noted by Lively, J. . . . . 988
- The Herzl Paradox: Political, Social and Economic Theories of a Realist.* Adler, Joseph. Book noted by Lucatz, N. . . . . 701
- Hindley, Donald. *President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication* 915
- HISTORICISM. See *Revival of Classical Philosophy and Reply to Rothman.*
- History of the House of Representatives.* Galoway, George B. Book noted by Moreland, L. B. . . . . 720
- History of the Islamic Peoples.* Brockelmann, Carl. Book noted by Fitzgerald, J. A. . . . 200
- History of the United States Weather Bureau,* by Donald R. Whitnah, noted by Lashley G. Harvey. . . . . 182

- Hitchner, Dell G. (with Harbold, William H.). *Modern Government*. Book noted by Steinbicker, P. B. . . . . 704
- Hobhouse, Thomas. *POSITIVE LIBERTY, 1880-1914*. David Nicholls. . . . . 114
- Hochwald, Werner (ed.). *Design of Regional Accounts: Papers presented at the Conference on Regional Accounts, 1960*. Book noted by Wengert, N. . . . . 730
- Hodgetts, J. E. Book notes on *The St. Lawrence Waterway*. Willoughby, Wm. R. . . . 215
- Hodgkin, Thomas. *African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide*. Book review by Untermyer, F. . . . . 980
- Hoffman, George W. (with Neal, Fred Warner). *Yugoslavia and The New Communism*. Book noted by Dragnich, A. N. 1034
- Holley, H. A., with Benham, F. *A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America*. Book noted by Lewis, F. M. . . . . 196
- Holman, A. E. *United States Fiscal Policy 1945-1959*. Book noted by Poland, Orville F. . . . . 463
- Horowitz, Irving Louis. *Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel: with a translation of his essay on The Decomposition of Marxism*. Book noted by Witte, W. D. S. . . . . 439
- Horwitz, R. Notes on *Hawaii Pono: A Social History*. Fuchs, Lawrence H. . . . . 727
- Hourani, Albert (ed.). *Middle Eastern Affairs: Number Two* (St. Antony's Papers No. 11). Book noted by Salem, E. 761
- HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. See G22.
- House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: *The Problem of Integration*. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. . . . . 310
- HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE. See G3.
- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. See G22.
- How Can We Justify Democracy? Mayo, H. B. . . . . 555
- Hsieh, Alice Langley. *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*. Book review by Steiner, H. A. . . . . 688
- Hufschmidt, Maynard M. (with Maass, Arthur, Dorfman, Robert, Thomas, Harold A. Jr., Marglin, Stephen A., Fair, Gordon Maskew and others). *Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning*. Book noted by Munger, F. . . . 1003
- HUMAN RIGHTS. See D227.
- Huizinga, J. H. *Mr. Europe, A Political Biography of Henri Spaak*. Book notes by Mayer, A. J. . . . . 216
- Humes, Samuel (with Martin, Eileen M.). *The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World*. Book reviewed by Burke, F. G. . . . . 434
- HUNGARY. See B4142; see also D213 and D3.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.). *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*. Book review by Edinger, L. J. . . . . 692
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*. Book review by Radway, Lawrence I. . . . . 982
- Hyneman, Charles S. *Free Speech: At What Price?* . . . . . 847
- I Speak of Freedom. Nkrumah, Kwame. Book noted by Bates, M. L. . . . . 485
- ILLINOIS. See B65; also see AA3.
- Ilchman, Warren Frederick. *Professional Diplomacy in the United States: 1779-1939*. Book noted by Crabb, C. V., Jr. . . . 177
- Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body*. Francis, Wayne . . . . . 953
- Institut für Marxismus Leninismus beim ZK der SED. *Wir sind die stärkste der Partei'N! Eine Bibliographie zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands*. Book noted. 1025
- IMAGE, NATIONAL. See B124.
- IMMIGRATION. See D8.
- The Imperialism Reader*. Snyder, Louis L. (ed.). Book noted. . . . . 1036
- INDIA. See B421.
- INDIANA. See B65; also see G1.
- INDO-CHINA. See under each State.
- INDONESIA. See B4251.
- INTEGRATION. See *Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960*; see also C41.
- International Immunities*. Jenks, Wilfred. Book noted by Remec, P. P. . . . . 502
- International Protection of Human Rights*. Ganji, Manouchehr. Book noted by Laponce, J. A. . . . . 1035
- ISRAEL. See B424.
- International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (ed.) Rosenau, James N. Book reviewed by Platig, E. R. . . . . 431
- INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. See D.
- The International Status of the United Nations*. Weissberg, Guenter. Book noted by Claude, I. L. . . . . 209
- Italian Socialist Party, The: A Case Study in Factional Conflict*. Raphael Zariski. . . . 372
- ITALY. See B410.
- ITALY, POLITICAL PARTIES. See F51.
- Jacobs, Clyde E. *Justice Frankfurter and*

- Civil Liberties*. Book noted by Kallenbach, J. E. . . . . 172
- JAPAN. See B423.
- JAPAN, POLITICAL PARTIES. See F51.
- The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan*. Mendel, Douglas H., Jr. Book noted by McNelly, Theodore. . . . . 743
- Jenks, Wilfred. *International Immunities*. Book noted by Remece, P. P. . . . . 502
- Jennings, Sir Ivor. *Party Politics (Volume III): The Stuff of Politics*. Book noted by Rose, R. . . . . 753
- Johnson, Donald Bruce, compiler (with Porter, Kirk). *National Party Platforms: 1840-1960*. Book noted by Chambers, W. N. . . . . 729
- Johnson, John J. (ed.). *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Book noted by Singer, J. David. . . . . 1019
- Jones, Victor (with Schattschneider, E. E.). *Local Political Surveys*. Book noted by Wright, D. S. . . . . 991
- Joynt, C. B. Notes on *America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity*. Gleber, Lionel. . . 496
- JUDICIARY. See H.
- JURISPRUDENCE. See G91.
- JURY SELECTION. See H573.
- Justice and Social Policy*, ed. Olafson, Frederick A. Book noted by Paul, J. . . . . 438
- Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties*. Jacobs, Clyde E. Book noted by Kallenbach, J. E. . . . . 172
- Kagan, S. Book notes on *Population Control—The Imminent World Crisis*. Schimm, Melvin G. (ed.). . . . . 217
- Kallenbach, J. E. Notes on *Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties*. Jacobs, Clyde E. . . . . 172
- Kammerer, Gladys M., with Farris, DeGrove, & Clubok. *City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination*. Book noted by Prewitt, Kenneth. . . . . 1007
- KANSAS GOVERNMENT. See B65.
- Kant, Liberalism, and War*. Waltz, Kenneth N. . . . . 331
- Karnes, Thomas L. *The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960*. Book noted by Moses, C. C. . . . . 480
- Karsch, Robert F. *The Government of Missouri*, 7th Edition. Book noted by Schmandt, Henry J. . . . . 1008
- KATANGA. See B436.
- Kauper, Paul G. *Civil Liberties and the Constitution*. Book review by Steamer, R. J. . 694
- KAUTSKY, J. H. Notes on *The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism? Luxemburg, Rosa*. . . . . 162
- Notes on *Terrorism and Communism*. Trotsky, Leon. . . . . 162
- Notes on *The Russian Revolution*. Berdy-aeu, Nicholas. . . . . 162
- Kawai, K. Notes on *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. Scalapino, Robert A. and Masumi, Junnosuke. . . . . 724
- Kelley, Stanley Jr. Notes on *Six Crises*. Nixon, Richard M. . . . . 725
- Kennan, George F. *Russia and The West Under Lenin and Stalin*. Book reviewed by Gyorgy, A. . . . . 148
- Kennedy, J. J. Notes on *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*. Wood, Bryce. . . . 759
- Kennedy, J. J. Notes on *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960*. Mecham, J. Lloyd. . . . . 1032
- KENYA. See B4311.
- The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961*. Bennett, George and Rosberg, Carl. Book noted by McConnell, G. . . . . 484
- Kenyon, Cecilia. *Bibliography on Political Theory*. . . . . 448
- Kessel, John H. *Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities*. . . . . 615
- Khadduri, M. Book notes on *Political Change in Morocco*. Ashford, Douglas E. . 198
- Kimball, C. Book notes on *Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process*. Singer, J. David. . . . . 209
- Kintner, W. R., with Strausz-Hupe, R. and Possony, S. T. *A Forward Strategy for America*. Book notes by Ludden, H. R. . . . 210
- Kirchheimer, Otto. *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends*. Book noted by Duncan, J. P. . . . . 438
- Kirchheimer, O. Notes *Politics of Cultural Despair*. Stern, Fritz. . . . . 444
- Kirchheimer, O. H. Book note on *La IVème République et sa Politique Extérieure*, by Grosser, Alfred. . . . . 1017
- Kirk, George. *Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History*. Book noted by Lenczowski, G. . . . . 199
- Kirkwood, Kenneth (ed.). *African Affairs: Number One. St. Anthony's Papers: Number 10*. Book noted by Davies, J. C. . . . . 486
- Konvitz, Milton R. *A Century of Civil Rights*. With a study of *State Law Against Discrimination*. Leskes, Theodore. Book noted by Wiltsey, G. G. . . . . 718
- Kurland, Philip B. (ed.). *The Supreme Court Review*. Book reviewed by Chase, H. W. . . 427
- Kramer, Dale (with Shefferman, Nathan W.). *The Man in the Middle—The Ins de Story of the Hot and Cold Wars Between*

- Labor and Management*. Book noted by Gilmour, C. E. . . . . 467
- Krislov, Samuel. Reviews *A Theory of Public Opinion*. Wilson, Francis Graham. . . . 985
- Labour party, England*. See POLITICAL IDEAS OF ENGLISH PARTY ACTIVISTS; see also B411 and F51.
- LA GUARDIA, FIORELLLO. See B73.
- The LaGuardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City*. Garrett, Charles. Book noted by Rice, R. R. . . . 726
- Lamarchand, René. *The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession*. . . . . 404
- LANCASTER, LANE W. See P7093.
- LaNoüe, G. R. Notes on *Religion, Government, and Education*. Lehrer, Stanley and Brickman, William, W. (ed.). . . . . 468
- Lanyi, G. A. Notes on *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*. Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. . . . . 749
- LAOS. See B426; see also D3.
- LaPalombara, J. Reviews *Genesis and Structure of Society*. Gentile, Giovanni. . . . . 698
- Laponce, J. A. Notes on *International Protection of Human Rights*. Ganji, M. . . . . 1035
- Larrabee, Eric (ed.) (with Spiller, Robert E.), *American Perspectives*. Book noted by Backstrom, Charles H. . . . . 179
- Larson, Arthur. *When Nations Disagree: A Handbook on Peace through Law*. Book noted by Yalem, R. J. . . . . 498
- Latham, E. Reviews *Pricing Power and the Public Interest, A Study Based on Steel*. Means, G. C. . . . . 690
- LATIN AMERICA. See B44.
- Latin America between the Eagle and the Bear*. de Madariaga, Salvadore. Book noted by Barber, H. W. . . . . 1032
- Latin American Social Thought*. Davis, Harold Eugene. Book noted by Barber, W. F. 705
- LAW. See G9.
- LAW OF THE SEA. See D225.
- LEADERSHIP, PARTY. See *Political Ideas of English Party Activists*; also see F51.
- Legal Problems of the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association*. . . . . 499
- LEGAL THEORY & INSTITUTIONS. See G9 and H.
- Legge, J. D. *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960*. Book noted by Mill, E. W. . . . . 745
- LEGISLATURES. See G.
- Legum, Colin. *Congo Disaster*. Book noted by Hanna W. . . . . 198
- Lehrer, Stanley (ed.) (with Brickman, William W.). *Religion, Government, and Education*. Book noted by LaNoüe, G. R. . . . 468
- Leiserson, Avery. Notes on *The Development of the Social Security Act*. Witte, Edwin E. 723
- Leiserson, Avery. Notes on *Parliaments and Electoral Systems: A World Handbook*. . . . 491
- Leiserson, Avery. Notes on *Preprimary Endorsements in California Politics*. Rowe, Leonard. . . . . 179
- Leiserson, Avery. *Toward a Definition of Book Review Policy*. . . . . 139
- Lenczowski, G. Book notes on *Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History*. Kirk, George E. . . . . 199
- Lenski, Gerhard. *The Religious Factor*. Book noted by Davis, H. R. . . . . 159
- Lev, D. S. Notes on *Southeast Asia Today—and Tomorrow. A Political Analysis*. Butwell, Richard. . . . . 1031
- Le Vine, V. T. Notes on *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa*. Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Earl. . . . . 486
- Lewis, F. M. Book notes on *A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America*. Benham, F. with Holley, H. A. . . . . 196
- LIBERAL PARTY, ENGLAND. See *The Political Ideas of English Party Activists*; see also B411 and F51.
- Liberalism*. See B23.
- Lieuwen, Edwin. *Venezuela*. Book noted by Baker, R. D. . . . . 746
- Limits of Self-Determination, The: The Case of the Katanga Secession*. René Lamarchand. . . . . 404
- Lindblom, C. E. Notes on *The Measurement of Social Welfare*. Rothenberg, Jerome. . . 702
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Sociology: The Progress of a Decade*. Book noted by Cottrell, F. . . . . 446
- LITERATURE, SOVIET. See B55.
- Lively, J. Notes on *Tocqueville and the Old Regime*. Herr, Richard. . . . . 988
- Local Political Surveys*. Schattschneider, E. E. and Jones, Victor. Book noted by Wright, D. S. . . . . 991
- Lockwood, W. W. Reviews *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity*. Pye, Lucian. . . . . 978
- London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants*. Glass, Ruth. Book noted by Dealey, J. Q. . . . . 195
- Longaker, R. P. Notes on *Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail*. Schwartz, Murray L. and Paul, James C. N. . . . . 173
- Presidential Transitions*. Henry, Laurin L. . . . . 173



- LOS ANGELES. See B71.
- Loveday, Peter, with Campbell, Ian. *Groups in Theory and Practice*. Noted by Hagan, C. B. . . . . 990
- Lucatz, N. Notes on *The Changing Patterns of the Middle East*. Rondot, Pierre. . . . . 488
- Lucatz, N. Notes on *The Herzl Paradox: Political Social and Economic Theories of a Realist*. Adler, Joseph. . . . . 701
- Ludden, H. R. Book notes on *A Forward Strategy for America*. Strausz-Hupe, R.; Kintner, W. R.; and Possony, S. T. . . . . 210
- LUKAS, JOHN. See D3.
- LUTHER, MARTIN. See *Deviation Control*.
- Luxemburg, Rosa. *The Russia Revolution and Leninism or Marxism?* Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- Lyons, Gene M. *Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953*. Book notes by Paige, G. D. . . . . 212
- Maass, Arthur (with Hufschmidt, Maynard M., Dorfman, Robert, Thomas, Harold A. Jr., Marglin, Stephen A., Fair, Gordon Maskew and others). *Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning*. Book noted by Munger, Frank. . . . . 1003
- MacKenzie, Kenneth M. *The Robe and the Sword: The Methodist Church and the Rise of American Imperialism*. Book noted by Morrow, R. E. . . . . 470
- Mackintosh, John P. *The British Cabinet*. Book review by Young, R. . . . . 986
- Ibid.* Book note on *The British Parliament* by Young, Roland. . . . . 1022
- Macridis, Roy C. (with Brown, Bernard E.). *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*. Book noted by Lanyi, G. A. . . . . 749
- Madariaga, Salvadore de. *Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear*. Book noted by H. W. Barber. . . . . 1032
- MAHOMMEDANS. See B425, and B437.
- Main, Jackson Turner. *The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788*. Book noted by Bowman, E. . . . . 729
- The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*. Wood, Bryce. Book noted by Kennedy, J. J. . . . . 759
- Malia, Martin. *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855*. Book noted by Hammer, D. P. . . . . 443
- Mallan, J. P. Notes on *Conscience in Politics: Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1950's*. Brown, Stuart Gerry. . . . . 469
- The Man in the Middle—The Inside Story of the Hot and Cold Wars Between Labor and Management*. Shefferman, Nathan W. with Kramer, Dale. Book noted by Gilmour, C. E. . . . . 467
- Mandelker, D. R. *Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning in Action*. Book noted by Stephens, G. R. . . . . 751
- Mander, L. A. Notes on *The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea*. Reiff, Henry. . . . . 505
- Manger, William. *Pan America in Crisis*. Book noted by Fitzgibbon, R. H. . . . . 760
- The Manipulation of Human Behavior*, (eds.). Biederman, Albert D. and Zimmer, Herbert. Book reviewed by Rogow, A. . . . 424
- Manning, C. A. W. *The Nature of International Society*. Book review by McClelland, Charles A. . . . . 983
- Mansergh, Nicholas. *South Africa, 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity*. Book noted by de Blij, Harm Jan. . . . . 1023
- Mansfield, Harvey C., Managing Editor. *Toward a Definition of Editorial Policy for the REVIEW* . . . . . 129
- Manwaring, David R. *Render Unto Caesar. The Flag-Salute Controversy*. Book noted by Rigby, G. . . . . 1004
- Mao, J. Y. Book notes on *Sun Yat-sen and Communism*. Shao Chuan Leng and Palmer, Norman D. . . . . 197
- MARGALITH, AARON M. See P7093.
- Marglin, Stephen A. (with Maass, Arthur, Hufschmidt, Maynard M., Dorfman, Robert, Thomas, Harold A., Fair, Gordon Maskew and others). *Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning*. Book noted by Munger, F. . . . . 1003
- Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain, The: The "Sandys Era."* Martin, Laurence W. . . . . 23
- Marquis, L. C. Notes on *Parliamentary Reform 1933-1960*. The Hansard Society. . . . 479
- Martin, Eileen M. (with Humes, Samuel). *The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World*. Book reviewed by Burke, F. G. . . . . 434
- Martin, Laurence W. *The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The "Sandys Era."* . . . . . 23
- Martin, Roscoe C. (with Munger, Frank J. and others). *Decisions in Syracuse*. Book noted by Monat, W. R. . . . . 466
- Marvick, Dwaine (ed.). *Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance*. Book noted by Verba, S. . . . . 440
- MARX, KARL. See Communism.
- Mastery of the Metropolis*. Fiser, Webb S. Book review by Coke, J. G. . . . . 970

- Masumi, Junnosuke (and Scalapino, Robert A.). *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. Book noted by Kawai, K. . . . . 742
- Matthews, Herbert L. *The Cuban Story*. Book reviewed by Busey, J. L. . . . . 146
- Mayer, A. J. Book notes on *Mr. Europe, A Political Biography of Henri Spaak*. Huizinga, J. H. . . . . 216
- Mayo, H. B. *How Can We Justify Democracy?* . . . . . 555
- MAYOR-COUNCIL PLAN. See B731.
- McCallum, D. Notes on *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*. Tucker, R. C. . . . . 442
- McCamy, J. L. Notes on *Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas*. Gulick, Luther Halsey. . . . . 1000
- McClelland, C. A. Reviews *The Nature of International Society*. Manning, C. A. W. . . . . 983
- McCloskey, Robert G. *Deeds Without Doctrine: Civil Rights in the 1960 Term of the Supreme Court*. . . . . 71
- McConnell, G. Notes on *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961*. Rosberg, Carl and Bennett, George. . . . . 484
- McDougal, Myres S. (with Associates). *Studies in World Public Order*. Book noted by Piper, D. C. . . . . 764
- McGiffert, M. Notes on *Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion*. Rossiter, Clinton. . . . . 724
- McGoldrick, J. D. Notes on *Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership*. Gottfried, Alex. . . . . 1001
- McGovern, William M. *Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow*. Book notes by Shull, Gordon. . . . . 211
- McKee, D. K. Notes on *The Predicament of Democratic Man*. Cahn, Edmond. . . . . 156
- McLellan, D. S. Notes on *The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U. S. Information Service*. Dizard, Wilson P. . . . . 181
- McNeill, R. J. Notes on *Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service: A Study of Labor Management Relations in United States Government*. Hart, Wilson R. . . . . 180
- McNelly, T. Notes on *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan*. Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. . . . . 743
- McRae, Duncan Jr. (with Sawyer, Jack). *Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 1902-1954*. . . . . 936
- McWhinney, E. Notes on *Our Fundamental Rights: Their Nature and Extent (as Judicially Determined)*. Banerjee, D. N. . . . . 490
- McWilliams, Wilson Carey. *New Orthodoxy for Old Liberalism*. . . . . 874
- Means, Gardiner C. *Pricing Power and the Public Interest, A Study Based on Steel*. Book review by Latham, E. . . . . 690
- The Measurement of Social Welfare*. Rothenberg, Jerome. Book noted by Lindblom, C. E. . . . . 702
- Mecham, J. Lloyd. *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960*. Book noted by Kennedy, J. J. . . . . 1032
- Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States*. Gottmann, Jean. Book review by Connery, R. H. . . . . 696
- Melville, Sir Harry. *The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research*. Book noted. . . . . 1024
- Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan*. Book noted by McNelly, Theodore. . . . . 743
- Merkel, Peter H. *Equilibrium, Structure of Interests and Leadership: Adenauer's Survival as Chancellor*. . . . . 634
- METHODIST CHURCH. See B12439.
- METHODOLOGY. See AA.
- METROPOLITAN AFFAIRS. See B131, B15 and B73.
- Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas*. Gulick, Luther Halsey. Book noted by McCamy, J. L. . . . . 1000
- Meyer, Karl E. *The New America: Politics and Society in the Age of the Smooth Deal*. Book noted by Chambers, W. N. . . . . 180
- MIDDLE AGES. See *Principles of Government and Politics*.
- Middle Eastern Affairs: Number Two (St. Antony's Papers No. 11)* Hourani, Albert. (ed.). Book noted by Salem, E. . . . . 761
- MILITARY AFFAIRS. See D3 and N1.
- Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953*. Lyons, Gene M. Book notes by Paige, G. D. . . . . 212
- Mill, E. W. Notes on *Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960*. Legge, J. D. . . . . 745
- Millett, J. H. Notes on *Questions in Parliament*. Chester, D. N. and Bowring, Nona . . . . . 753
- Mr. Europe, A Political Biography of Henri Spaak*. Huizinga, J. H. Book notes by Mayer, A. J. . . . . 216
- MODELS. See AA3.
- Modelski, George. *A Theory of Foreign Policy*. Book noted by Almond, G. A. . . . . 700
- Modern Government*. Hitchner, Dell G. and Harbold, William H. Book noted by Steinbicker, P. G. . . . . 704
- Modern Swedish Government*. Andrén, Nils. Book noted by Anderson, S. V. . . . . 203
- Ibid*. Noted. . . . . 1025
- Monat, W. R. Notes on *Decisions in Syracuse*. Munger, Frank J. with Martin,

- Roscoe C. and others. . . . . 466
- Montesquieu: A Critical Biography*. Shackleton, Robert. Book noted by Pennock, J. R. . . . . 445
- Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker*. Walker, Nigel. Book noted by Louis L. Friedland. . . . . 1006
- Moreire, Adriano. *Portugal's Stand in Africa*. Book noted by Okuma, Thomas. 1023
- Moreland, L. B. Notes on *History of the House of Representatives*. Galloway, George B. . . . . 720
- Morgenthau, Hans. *A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*. . . . . 287
- Morris, Bruce R. *Problems of American Economic Growth*. Book noted by Reagan, M. D. . . . . 174
- Morrison of Lambeth, Lord. *British Parliamentary Democracy*. Book review by Young, R. . . . . 986
- Morocco. See B4371.
- Morrow, R. E. Notes on *The Robe and the Sword: The Methodist Church and the Rise of American Imperialism*. MacKenzie, Kenneth M. . . . . 470
- Moses, C. C. Notes on *The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960*. Karnes, Thomas L. . . . . 480
- Munger, Frank J. (with Martin, Roscoe C. and others). *Decisions in Syracuse*. Book noted by Monat, W. R. . . . . 466
- Munger, F. Notes on *Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating, Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning*. Maass, Arthur, Hufschmidt, Maynard M., Dorfman, Robert, Thomas, Harold A. Jr., Marglin, Stephen A., Fair, Gordon Maskew and others. . . . . 1003
- Murphy, Walter F. (ed.) (with Pritchett, C. Herman). *Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process*. Book noted by Vose, C. E. . . . . 717
- National Character in Action*. Platt, Washington. Book noted by Rosecrance, R. N. 508
- National Party Platforms: 1840-1960*. Porter, Kirk and Johnson, Donald Bruce, compilers. Book noted by Chambers, W. N. . . . . 729
- NATIONALISM. See B262.
- The Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ranade to Bhave*. Brown, D. Mackenzie. Book noted by Tinker, I. 990
- The Nature of International Society*. Manning, C. A. W. Book review by McClelland, Charles A. . . . . 983
- NAZISM. See B58.
- Neal, Fred Warner (with Hoffman, George W.). *Yugoslavia and The New Communism*. Book noted by Dragnich, A. N. . . 1034
- Nelson, Ralph W. *Free Minds: A Venture in the Philosophy of Democracy*. Book noted by Zucker, F. D. . . . . 448
- NENNI, PIETRO. See *The Italian Socialist Party*.
- Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy*. Birnbach, Martin. Book noted by Pinner, F. A. . . . 703
- Neumann, R. Book notes on *France, Europe and the Two World Wars*. Albrecht-Carrié, René. . . . . 215
- The New America: Politics and Society in the Age of the Smooth Deal*. Meyer, Karl E. Book noted by Chambers, W. N. . . . . 180
- NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT. See *Two Faces of Power*; See also B73.
- NEW YORK POLITICS. See B73.
- Newman, Robert P. *Recognition of Communist China?* Book reviewed by Stauffer, R. B. . . . . 145
- Nicholls, David. *Positive Liberty, 1880-1914*. . . . . 114
- Nieburg, H. L. *The Threat of Violence and Social Change*. . . . . 865
- Niemi, Donald, & Riker, William H. *The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives*. . . . . 58
- Niebuhr, Reinhold: New Orthodoxy for Old Liberalism*. Wilson Carey McWilliams. . 874
- 1960 Term of the Supreme Court, The: A Psychological Analysis*. Glendon Schubert. . . . . 90
- Nixon, Richard M. *Six Crises*. Book noted by Kelley, Stanley Jr. . . . . 725
- Nkruma, Kwame. *I Speak of Freedom*. Book noted by Bates, M. L. . . . . 485
- Nogee, Joseph L. *Soviet Policy towards International Control of Atomic Energy*. Book noted by Reshetar, Jr. J. S. . . . . 506
- NOMINATION. See F7.
- NORTH AFRICA. See B437.
- NORWAY. See B413.
- NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTROL. See D711.
- Oakes, John B. *The Edge of Freedom*. Book noted by Wallerstein, I. . . . . 487
- O'Donnell, M. E. Notes on *Urban Social Structure*. Beshers, James M. . . . . 1000
- OIL INDUSTRY. See U2.
- Øisang, Per. *Stortinget på naert hold*. Book noted by Anderson, S. V. . . . . 203
- Okuma, Thomas. Notes *Portugal's Stand in Africa*. Moreire, A. . . . . 1023
- Olafson, Frederick A. (ed.). *Justice and Social Policy*. Book noted by Paul, J. . . 438
- ONE-PARTY STATES. See *Quasi-Partisan Conflict . . .*; see also B65.

- Oppenheim, Felix E. *Communication on Values and Interests*. . . . . 975
- ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. See D612.
- Our Fundamental Rights: Their Nature and Extent (As Judicially Determined)*. Banerjee, D. N. Book noted by McWhinney, E. 490
- OXFORD MOVEMENT. See B23.
- Padgett, L. V. *Notes on Government and Politics of Uruguay*. Taylor, Philip B., Jr. . . . 747
- Paige, G. D. *Book notes on Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953*. Lyons, Gene M. . . . . 212
- Palmer, Norman D. and Shao, Chuan Leng. *Sun Yat-sen and Communism*. Book noted by Mao, J. Y. . . . . 197
- Pan America in Crisis*. Manger, William. Book noted by Fitzgibbon, R. H. . . . . 760
- PAN-EUROPEANISM. See D74.
- The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*. Vol. I., 1768-1778. Vol. II., 1779-1781, ed. Syrett, Harold C., associate ed. Cooke, Jacob E. Book reviewed by Barrett, P. . . . 432
- Paris, Edmond. *Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941-1945*. Book noted by Adams, John Clinton. . . . . 1021
- Parliament and Public Ownership*. Hanson, A. H. Book noted by Dugan, A. B. . . . . 752
- PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. See G.
- Parliamentary Reform 1933-1960*. The Hansard Society. Book noted by Marquis, L. C. . . . . 479
- PARLIAMENTS. See G.
- Parliaments and Electoral Systems: A World Handbook*. Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . 491
- Parsons, Malcolm B. *Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961*. . . . . 605
- Communication from H. D. Price. . . . . 974
- Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. Scalapino, Robert A. and Masumi, Junnosuke. Book noted by Kawai, K. . . . 724
- PARTY COHESION. See F51.
- PARTY PLATFORMS. See F805.
- Party Politics (Volume III): The Stuff of Politics*. Jennings, Sir Ivor. Book noted by Rose, R. . . . . 753
- PARTY RESOLUTIONS. See *Political Ideas Of English Party Activists*; see also F51.
- Passin, Herbert. *The Sources of Protest in Japan*. . . . . 391
- Patterson, S. C. *Notes on Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*. Robinson, James A. . . . . 719
- Paul, J. *Notes Justice and Social Policy*, Olafson, Frederick A. (ed.) . . . . . 438
- Paul, James C. N. (with Schwartz, Murray L.). *Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail*. Book noted by Longaker, R. P. . . . 173
- Paulu, Burton. *British Broadcasting in Transition*. Book noted by Alperin, R. J. . . . 755
- Payne, Stanley G. *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism*. Book noted by Wilson, L. C. . . . . 483
- PEACE. See D7.
- Peacock, Alan T., with Jack Wiseman, assisted by Jindrich Veverka, *Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom*. Noted by Philip W. Buck. . . . . 194
- Pedagogy of Democracy, The: Coercive Public Protest in India*. David H. Bayley. . . . . 663
- Penniman, H. *Notes on Secrecy and Publicity Dilemmas of Democracy*. Rourke, Francis E. . . . . 175
- Pennock, J. Roland. "Responsible Government," *Separated Powers, and Special Interests: Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America*. . . . . 621
- Pennock, J. R. *Notes Montesquieu: A Critical Biography*. Shackleton, R. . . . . 445
- PEOPLES' DEMOCRACIES. See under B414.
- PHILOSOPHY, CLASSICAL POLITICAL. See *Revival of Classical Political Philosophy* . . . ; also see *Reply to Rothman*.
- Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*. Tucker, Robert C. Book noted by McCallum, D. . . . 442
- Pinner, F. A. *Notes on Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy*. Birnbach, Martin. . . . . 703
- Piper, D. C. *Notes on Studies in World Public Order*. McDougal, Myres S. and Associates. . . . . 764
- Plank, J. N. *Notes on Social and Economic Frontiers in Latin America*. Stark, Harry . . . . 482
- PLATFORMS, PARTY. See F805.
- Platig, E. R. *Reviews International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*. Rosenau, J. (ed.) . . . . . 431
- Platt, Washington. *National Character in Action*. Book noted by Rosecrance, R. N. . . . 508
- Poland, O. F. *Notes United States Fiscal Policy*. Holsman, A. E. . . . . 473
- Political Change in Morocco*. Ashford, Douglas E. Book noted by Khadduri, M. . . . 198
- Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959*. Swayze, Harold. Book noted by Friedberg, M. . . . . 988
- The Political Context of Sociology*. Bramson, Leon. Book noted by Scher, S. . . . . 161
- Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance*, ed. Marvick, Dwaine. Book noted by Verba, S. . . . . 440
- Political Ideas of English Party Activists, The*. Richard Rose. . . . . 360
- Political Ideas in the Modern World*. Heater, D. B. Book noted by Ritchie, W. A. . . . . 706
- Political Influence*. Banfield, Edward C.

- Book reviewed by Scoble, H. M. . . . . 151
- Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends.* Kirchheimer, Otto. Book noted by Duncan, J. P. . . . . 438
- The Political Kingdom in Uganda.* Apter, David. Book noted by Dvorin, E. P. . . . 199
- POLITICAL PARTIES. See F51.
- Political Theory of Foreign Aid.* A. Morgenthau, Hans. . . . . 301
- The Political World of American Zionism.* Halperin, Samuel. Book noted by Rubin, B. . . . . 722
- Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara.* Spiro, Herbert J. Book noted by Adam, T. R. . . . . 747
- Politics of Cultural Despair.* Stern, Fritz. Book noted by Kirchheimer, O. . . . . 444
- The Politics of Oil.* Engler, Robert. Book review by Turner, H. A. . . . . 695
- Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity.* Pye, Lucian W. Book review by Lockwood, W. W. . . 978
- Pollock, James K. (with Barnes, Samuel H.; Grace, Frank; Sperlich, Peter W.) *The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election.* . . . . . 899
- Population Control—The Imminent World Crisis.* Schimm, Melvin G. (ed.). Book notes by Kagan, S. . . . . 217
- Porter, Kirk, compiler (with Johnson, Donald Bruce) *National Party Platforms: 1840-1960.* Book noted by Chambers, W. N. . . . . 729
- PORTUGAL. See B419.
- Portugal's Stand in Africa.* Moreire, Adriano. Book noted by Okuma, T. . . . . 1023
- Possony, S. T., with Strausz-Hupe, R. and Kintner, W. R. *A Forward Strategy for America.* Book notes by Ludden, H. R. . . 210
- The Position of the Individual in International Law according to Grotius and Vattel.* Remec, Peter M. Book noted by Engel, S. . . . . 747
- POSITIONISM. See *Revival of Classical Political Philosophy.*
- Positive Liberty, 1880-1914.* David Nicholls 114
- POSITIVISM. See *Reply to Rothman.*
- Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control.* Bechhoefer, B. G. Book reviewed by Gange, J. . . . . 425
- Power & Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Study of Soviet Dynasties,* by R. Conquest, noted by L. Gerald Bursey . . . . . 193
- Pozen, Walter (ed.) (with Cerf, Jay H.). *Strategy for the 60's.* Book noted by Alger, C. F. . . . . 507
- The Predicament of Democratic Man.* Cahn, Edmond. Book noted by McKee, D. K. . 156
- Preprimary Endorsements in California Politics.* Rowe, Leonard. Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . . 179
- President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication.* Donald Hindley 915
- Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime.* Grundstein, Nathan D. Book noted by Rackow, F. . . . . 462
- The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961,* ed. David, Paul T. Book noted by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 459
- Presidential Transitions.* Henry, Laurin L. Book noted by Longaker, R. P. . . . . 173
- PRESSURE GROUPS. See F53.
- Prewitt, Kenneth. Book note on *City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination,* by Kammerer, Farris, DeGrove & Clubok. . . . . 1007
- Price, Hugh Douglas. *Communication on Quasi-Partisan Conflict.* . . . . . 974
- Pricing Power and the Public Interest, A Study Based on Steel.* Means, Gardiner C. Book review by Latham, E. . . . . 690
- PRIMARIES. See F8.
- Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages.* Ullmann, Walter. Book noted by Riesenber, P. . . . . 447
- Pritchett, C. Herman (ed.) (with Murphy, Walter F.) *Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process.* Book noted by Vose, C. E. . . . . 717
- Problems of American Economic Growth.* Morris, Bruce R. Book noted by Reagan, M. D. . . . . 174
- Professional Diplomacy in the United States: 1779-1939.* Ilchman, Warren Frederick. Book noted by Crabb Jr. C. V. . . . . 177
- PROPAGANDA. See F15.
- Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders.* Alexander, Robert J. Book noted by Burnett, B. G. . . . . 481
- Prospectives on Peace, 1910-1960.* Published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Book noted by Fried, J. H. E. . . . . 763
- PROTEST. See B21.
- PSI. See *The Italian Socialist Party.*
- PSYCHOLOGY. See AA2 and F1.
- PUBLIC OPINION. See F1.
- Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.* Rosenau, James N. Book noted by Smith, B. L. . . . . 441
- Pye, Lucian W. *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity.* Book review by Lockwood, W. W. . . . . 978
- Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961.* Malcolm B. Parsons. . . . . 695

- Communication from H. D. Price . . . . . 974
- Quatrième République et sa Politique Extérieure*, La. Grosser, Alfred. Book noted by Kirchheimer, O. H. . . . . 1017
- Questions in Parliament*; Chester, D. N. and Bowring, Nona. Book noted by Millett, J. H. . . . . 753
- RACE RELATIONS & PROBLEMS. See B151, C41 and H211.
- RACE DISCRIMINATION. See *London's New-comers*; see also C41, B151 and H211.
- Rackow, F. Notes *Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime* . . . . . 462
- Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel; with a translation of his essay on The Decomposition of Marxism*. Horowitz, Irving Louis, Book noted by Witte, W. D. S. . . . 439
- Radway, Lawrence I. Reviews *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*. Huntington, Samuel P. . . . . 982
- Ransone, Jr., C. B. Notes on *Texas: Its Government and Politics*. Benton, Wilbourn E. . . . . 466
- Reagan, M. D. Notes on *Problems of American Economic Growth*. Morris, Bruce R. . 174
- Recognition of Communist China?* Newman, Robert P. Book review by Stauffer, R. B. . 145
- Red Phoenix, The: Russia Since World War II*, by Harry Schwartz, noted by John N. Hazard. . . . . 191
- Reiff, Henry. *The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea*. Book noted by Mander, L. A. . . . . 505
- Reinhold Niebuhr: New Orthodoxy for Old Liberalism*. McWilliams, Wilson Carey . . 874
- The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law in the Netherlands and in the United States*. Erades, L. and Gould, W. L. Book notes by Booth, D. A. . . . . 218
- Religion, Government, and Education* (ed.). Brickman, William W. and Lehrer, Stanley. Book noted by LaNoue, G. R. . . . . 468
- The Religious Factor*. Lenski, Gerhard. Book noted by Davis, H. R. . . . . 159
- Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960*. Andrew R. Baggaley . . . . . 66
- Remec, P. P. Notes on *International Immunities*. Jenks, Wilfred . . . . . 502
- Remec, Peter M. *The Position of the Individual in International Law according to Grotius and Vattel*. Book noted by Engel, S. . . . . 767
- Render Unto Caesar. The Flag-Salute Controversy*. Manwaring, David R. Book noted by Rigby, G. . . . . 1004
- Reply to Rothman*, A. Joseph Cropsey . . . 353
- A Report on Social Security Programs in the Soviet Union*. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Book reviewed by Somers, H. M. . . . . 149
- Reshetar, J. S. Jr. Notes on *Soviet Policy Towards International Control of Atomic Energy*. Nogee, Joseph L. . . . . 506
- RESOLUTIONS, CONSTITUENCY. See *The Political Ideas of English Party Activists. "Responsible Government," Separated Powers, and Special Interests: Agricultural Subsidies in Britain and America*. J. Roland Pennock . . . . . 621
- Retzlaff, R. H. Book notes on *A Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution, Vol. 1: General Principles of Organization*. Sen, Sirdar D. K. . . . . 202
- Revival of Classical Political Philosophy, The: A Critique*. Stanley Rothman . . . . 341; 682 et seq.
- REVOLUTION. See B59.
- Rice, R. R. Notes on *The La Guardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City*. Garrett, Charles . . . . . 726
- Notes on *Thirty Explosive Years in Los Angeles County*. Ford, John Anson . . . 726
- Richardson, C. B. Notes on *South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid*. Spooner, F. P. . . . . 487
- Riesenberg, P. Notes *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*. Ullman, W. . . . . 447
- Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism*. Váli, Ferenc C. Book noted by Gyorgy, A. . . . . 489
- Rigby, G. Notes on *Render unto Caesar. The Flag-Salute Controversy*. Manwaring, David R. . . . . 1004
- RIKER, WILLIAM H. See AA2.
- Riker, William H., & Niemi, Donald. *The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives* . . . . . 58
- RIO PACT. See D612.
- Ritchie, D. G. See *Positive Liberty*.
- Ritchie, W. A. Book notes on *Europe's Needs and Resources*. Dewhurst, J. F.; Coppock, J. O.; Yates, P. L.; and associates . . . . . 208
- Ritchie, W. A. Notes on *Political Ideas in the Modern World*. Heater, D. B. . . . . 706
- Rivlin, Alice M. *The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher Education*. Book noted by Abbott, F. C. . . . . 731
- The Robe and the Sword: The Methodist Church and the Rise of American Imperialism*. MacKenzie, Kenneth M. Book noted by Morrow, R. E. . . . . 470
- Roberts, William H. *Bibliography on International Law and Relations* . . . . . 219, 510
- Robinson, James A. *Congress and Foreign*

- Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative.* Book noted by Patterson, S. C. . . . . 719
- Ibid.* Reviewed by Stokes, D. E. . . . . 984
- Roche, John P. *Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action.* Book noted by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 460
- Rogow, A. Reviews *The Manipulation of Human Behavior.* Biderman, A. D. and Zimmer, H. (eds.) . . . . . 424
- The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher Education.* Rivlin, Alice M. Book noted by Abbott, F. C. . . . . 731
- Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, The.* Johnson, John J. (ed.). Book noted by Singer, J. David. . . . . 1019
- ROLL CALLS. See *The Stability of Coalitions.*
- ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. *Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict.* Zbigniew Brzezinski. . . . . 5
- See also B12439.
- Rondot, Pierre. *The Changing Patterns of the Middle East.* Book noted by Lucatz, N. . . . . 488
- Rosberg, Carl (and Bennett, George). *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961.* Book noted by McConnell, G. . . . . 484
- Rose, R. Notes on *Party Politics (Volume III): The Stuff of Politics.* Jennings, Sir Ivor. . . . . 753
- Rose, Richard. *The Political Ideas of English Party Activists.* . . . . 360
- Rosecrance, R. N. Notes on *National Character in Action.* Platt, Washington. . . . . 508
- Rosenau, James N. (ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory.* Book reviewed by Platig, E. R. . . . . 431
- Rosenau, James N. *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.* Book noted by Smith, B. L. . . . . 441
- Rossiter, Clinton. *Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion.* Book noted by McGiffert, Michael. . . . . 724
- Rothchild, D. S. Notes on *The Backward Society.* Frost, Raymond. . . . . 504
- Rothenberg, Jerone. *The Measurement of Social Welfare.* Book noted by Lindblom, C. E. . . . . 702
- Rothman, S. Notes on *Food, Land, and Manpower in Western Europe.* Yates, P. Lamartine. . . . . 506
- Rothman, A. Reply to. See *A Reply to Rothman*; also see *Rejoinder to Cropsey*.
- Rothman, Stanley. *The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A Critique.* 341; 682 et seq. Rubin, B. Notes on *The Political World of American Zionism.* Halperin, Samuel. . . . . 722
- Rourke, Francis E. *Secrecy and Publicity Dilemmas of Democracy.* Book noted by Penniman, H. . . . . 175
- Rowe, Leonard. *Preprimary Endorsements in California Politics.* Book noted by Leiserson, A. . . . . 179
- RUSSIA. See B414.
- Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin.* Kennan, George F. Book reviewed by Gyorgy, A. . . . . 148
- Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets.* Friedberg, Maurice. Book noted by Swayze, H. . . . . 989
- The Russian Revolution.* Berdyaev, Nicholas. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- The Russian Revolution and Lenninism or Marxism?* Luxemburg, Rosa. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162
- Safran, Nadav. *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952.* Book noted by Gerteiny, A. G. . . . . 748
- Sawyer, Jack (with McRae, Duncan Jr.) *Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902-1954.* . . . . 936
- The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study in Politics and Diplomacy.* Willoughby, Wm. R. Book notes by Hodgetts, J. E. . . . . 215
- Salem, E. Notes on *Middle Eastern Affairs: Number Two (St. Antony's Papers No. 11).* Hourani, Albert (ed.) . . . . . 761
- Sandifer, D. V. Notes on *The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities.* Cohen, Benjamin B. . . . . 501
- SANDYS, DUNCAN. See *Market for Strategic Ideas.*
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion.* . . . . 853
- Scalapino, Robert A. (and Masumi, Junnosuke). *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan.* Book noted by Kawai, K. . . . . 742
- SCANDINAVIA. See B413.
- Schaar, J. H. Note on *H. G. Wells and the World State* by W. W. Wagar. . . . . 160
- Schattschneider, E. E. (with Jones, Victor). *Local Political Surveys.* Book noted by Wright, D. S. . . . . 991
- Scher, S. Notes on *The Political Context of Sociology.* Bramson, Leon. . . . . 161
- Schimm, Melvin G. (ed.). *Population Control—The Imminent World Crisis.* Book notes by Kagan, S. . . . . 217
- Schilling, Warner R. *Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics.* . . . . 287
- Schmandt, Henry J. Book note on *The Government of Missouri*, 7th Edition, by Karsch, Robert F. . . . . 1008

- Schwartz, Harry. *The Red Phoenix: Russia Since World War II*. Book noted by John N. Hazard. . . . . 191
- Schwartz, Murray L. (with Paul, James C. N.). *Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail*. Book noted by Longaker, R. P. 173
- Scientists, *Foreign Policy, and Politics*. Schilling, Warner R. . . . . 287
- Scoble, H. M. *Reviews Political Influence*. Banfield, Edward C. . . . . 151
- SCOTLAND. See B411.
- Scott, Richard W. (with Peter M. Blau). *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach*. Book reviewed by Guetzkow, H. . . . . 428
- Secrecy and Publicity Dilemmas of Democracy*. Rourke, Francis E. Book noted by Penniman, H. . . . . 175
- SEGREGATION. See *Supreme Court. Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960*; also see C41.
- Select list of publications issued by Senate and House Committees. Committee prints, staff studies, reports, and documents, 80th-86th Congress (1947-60, inclusive)*. Book noted by Childs, J. B. . . . . 471
- Sen, Sirdar D. K. *A Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution: Vol. 1: General Principles of Organization*. Book noted by Retzlaff, R. H. . . . . 202
- SENATE. See G21.
- Senegal, *A Study in French Assimilation Policy*. Crowder, Michael. Book noted. . . 1025
- The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*. Farnsworth, David N. Book noted by Elder, R. E. . . . . 461
- Shackleton, Robert. *Montesquieu: a Critical Biography*. Book noted by Pennock, J. R. 445
- Shannon, Jasper B. Book note on *Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain* by Gwyn, William B. . . . . 1018
- Shefferman, Nathan W. (with Kramer, Dale). *The Man in the Middle—The Inside Story of the Hot and Cold Wars Between Labor and Management*. Book noted by Gilmour, C. E. . . . . 467
- A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America*. Benham, F. and Holley, H. A. Book noted by Lewis, F. M. . . . . 196
- Shoup, Paul. *Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations After World War II*. . . . . 886
- Shull, Gordon. Book notes on *Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow*. McGovern, William M. . . . . 211
- Silverman, Corinne. Index to Volume LVI of the REVIEW. . . . . 1056
- Silvert, Kalman H. *The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America*. Book noted by Taylor, P. B., Jr. . . . . 482
- Notes, *Urbanization in Latin America*. Hauser, P. M. . . . . 1033
- Singer, J. David. *Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process*. Book noted by Kimball, C. . . . . 209
- Book note on *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* edited by Johnson, John J. . . . . 1019
- SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. See B414; see also B422.
- The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*. Zagoria, Donald S. Book review by Steiner, H. A. 688
- Six Crises*. Nixon, Richard M. Book noted by Kelley, Stanley Jr. . . . . 725
- Slessor, Sir John. *What Price Coexistence? A Policy for Western Alliance*. Book noted by Fernbach, A. . . . . 1029
- Smith, B. L. *Notes Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*. . . . . 441
- Snyder, Louis L. (ed.). *The Imperialism Reader*. Book noted. . . . . 1036
- Social and Economic Frontiers in Latin America*. Stark, Harry. Book noted by Plank, J. N. . . . . 482
- SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. See F1.
- SOCIALISM. See B54.
- SOCIALIST PARTY, ITALY. See F51 and B410.
- SOCIOLOGY. See B1.
- Sociology: The Progress of a Decade*. Lipset, Seymour Martin. Book noted by Cottrell, F. . . . . 446
- SOCIOMETRICS. See G1.
- Somers, H. M. *Reviews A Report on Social Security Programs in the Soviet Union*. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. . . . . 149
- Sorel, Georges. See B54.
- SOUTH AMERICA. See B44.
- South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity*. Mansergh, Nicholas. Book noted by de Blij, Harm Jan. . . . . 1023
- South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid*. Spooner, F. P. Book noted by Richardson, C. B. . . . . 487
- Southeast Asia Today—And Tomorrow. A Political Analysis*. Butwell, Richard. Book noted by Lev, D. S. . . . . 1031
- Soviet Policy towards International Control of Atomic Energy*. Nogee, Joseph L. Book noted by Reshetar, J. S. Jr. . . . . 506
- SOVIET UNION. See B414.
- SPAIN. See B412.
- SPANISH CIVIL WAR. See D49.
- Spaulding, E. Wilder. *Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary*. Book noted by Gibbs, H. S. . . . . 762
- Spencer, Herbert. See *Positive Liberty*.
- Spengler, Joseph J. (ed.). (and Braibanti,



- Ralph) *Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development*. Book noted by Friedman, J. R. . . . . 157
- Sperlich, Peter W. (with Barnes, Samuel H.; Grace, Frank; and Pollock, James K.) *The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election*. . . . . 899
- Spiller, Rober E. (ed.). (with Larrabee, Eric) *American Perspectives*. Book noted by Backstrom, Charles H. . . . . 179
- Spinoza, See *Positive Liberty*.
- Spiro, Herbert J. *Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach*. . . . . 577
- Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara*. Book noted by Adam, T. R. . . 747
- Spooner, F. P. *South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid*. Book noted by Richardson, C. B. . . . . 487
- Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives*, The. Riker, William H. & Neimi, Donald. . . . . 58
- Stark, Harry. *Social and Economic Frontiers in Latin America*. Book noted by Plank, J. N. . . . . 482
- STATE DEPARTMENT. See I17.
- STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. See B6 and B7.
- States in West German Federalism, The: A Study in Federal-State Relations*. Wells, Roger Hewes. Book noted by Heidenheimer, A. J. . . . . 1018
- STEVENSON, ADLAI E. See F5.
- STATISTICAL METHODS. See AA2.
- Stauffer, R. B. Reviews *Recognition of Communist China?* Newman, Robert P. . . . 145
- Steamer, R. J. Reviews *Civil Liberties and the Constitution*. Kauper, Paul G. . . . . 694
- STEEL INDUSTRY. See U2.
- Steinbicker, P. B. Notes on *Modern Government*. Hitchner, Dell G. and Harbold, William H. . . . . 704
- Steiner, H. A. Reviews *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*. Hsieh, Alice Langley . . . . . 688
- Reviews *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*. Zagoria, Donald S. . . . . 688
- Reviews *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*. . . . 688
- Stephens, G. R. Notes on *Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning in Action*. Mandelker, D. R. . . . . 751
- Stern Fritz. *Politics of Cultural Despair*. Book noted by Kirchheimer, O. . . . . 444
- STEVENSON, ADLAI E. See F5.
- Stoessinger, J. G. Notes on *The United States and The United Nations*. Wilcox Francis O. (ed.). and Haviland, H. Field, Jr. . . . . 500
- Stokes, D. D. Reviews *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*. Robinson, James A. . . . . 984
- Storm Over Laos—A Contemporary History*. Champassak, Prince Sisouk Na. Book noted by Fall, B. B. . . . . 201
- Stortinget på naert hold*. Øisang, Per. Book noted by Anderson S. V. . . . . 203
- Stout, Hiram M., compiler of *Bibliography on Foreign and Comparative Government*. . . . . 203, 491, 756, 1025
- STRATEGIC IDEAS, BRITAIN. See *Market for Strategic Ideas*
- Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow*. McGovern, William M. Book notes by Shull, Gordon. . . . . 211
- Strategy for the 60's*, Cerf, Jay H., (ed.). and Pozen, Walter. Book noted by Alger, C. F. . . . . 507
- The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U. S. Information Service*. Dizard, Wilson P. Book noted by McLellan, D. S. . . . . 181
- Stratton, O. Notes on *Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics*. Wildavsky, Aaron. . . . 721
- Strauss, Leo. See *The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy*
- Strausz-Hupe, R., with Kintner, W. R. and Possony, S. T. *A Forward Strategy for America*. Book notes by Ludden H. R. . . 210
- The Structure of American Federalism*. Vile, M. J. C. Book noted by Farrelly, D. G. . 465
- The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World*. Humes, Samuel and Martin, Eileen M. Book reviewed by Burke, F. G. . . . . 434
- Studies on the Civilization of Islam*. Gibb, Sir H. A. R. Book noted. . . . . 992
- Studies in World Public Order*. McDougal, Myres S. and associates. Book noted by Piper, D. C. . . . . 764
- Sturmthal, A. Notes on *Geschichte der Internationale*. Braunthal, Julius. . . . . 766
- Subcommittees: The Miniature Legislatures of Congress*. George Goodwin, Jr. . . . . 596
- SUBSIDIES, FARM. See Z4.
- SUBVERSION. See C41.
- Sun Yat-sen and Communism*. Shao, Chuan Leng and Palmer, Norman D. Book noted by Mao, J. Y. . . . . 197
- Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960*, Ulmer, Sidney S. . . . . 325
- SUPREME COURT OF U. S. See H211.
- The Supreme Court Review*. (ed.). Kurland, Philip B. Book reviewed by Chase, H. W. 427
- Swayze, H. Notes on *Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets*. Friedberg, Maurice. . . . 989
- Swayze, Harold. *Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959*. Book noted by Friedberg, M. . . . . 988

SWEDEN. See B413.

SYRACUSE POLITICS. See B73.

Syrett, Harold C. (ed.). (with Cooke, Jacob E., associate ed.). *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*. Vol. I., 1768-1778. Vol. II., 1779-1781. Book reviewed by Barrett, P. . . . . 432  
Systems, political. See B.

Taborsky, Edward, *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960*. noted by Ivo K. Feierabend. . . . . 193

Tagle, T. W. Notes on *The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War*. Bolloten, Burnett. . . . . 503

Talbot, R. B. Notes on *The Farmer's Dilemma*. Andrews, Stanley. . . . . 722

Tamko, M. Notes on *World Policy II. A Yearbook of Studies in International Law and Organization*. . . . . 765

Taylor, Philip B. Jr. *Government and Politics of Uruguay*. Book noted by Padgett, L. V. 747

Taylor, P. B. Jr. Notes on *The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America*. Silvert, Kalman H. . . . . 482

Taylor, Richard W. Book note on *Africa South by de Blij*, Harm Jan. . . . . 1024

*Terrorism and Communism*. Trotsky, Leon. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162

TEXAS GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. See B65.

*Texas: Its Government and Politics*. Benton, Wilbourn E. Book noted by Ransone, J. C. B. . . . . 466

THEORY. See B21 and B23.

*A Theory of Foreign Policy*. Modelski, George. Book noted by Almond, G. A. . . . 700

*A Theory of Public Opinion*. Wilson, Francis Graham. Book review by Krislov, Samuel. 985

*Thirty Explosive Years in Los Angeles County*. Ford, John Anson. Book noted by Rice, R. R. . . . . 726

Thomas, Harold A., Jr. (with Maass, Arthur, Hufschmidt, Maynard M., Dorfman, Robert, Marglin, Stephen A., Fair, Gordon Maskew and others). *Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning*. Book noted by Munger, F. . . . . 1003

Thompson, Virginia (and Adloff, Earl). *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa*. Book noted by Le Vine, V. T. . . . . 486

Thorsen, Svend. *Danmarks Folketing: on dets hus og historie*. Book noted by Anderson, S. V. . . . . 203

*Threat of Violence and Social Change, The*. Nieburg, H. L. . . . . 865

Tinker, I. Notes on *The Nationalist Move-*

*ment: Indian Political Thought from Ronade to Bhawe*. Brown, D. Mackenzie. . . 990

TITO, J. B. See *Deviation Control* See also B418.

*Tocqueville and the Old Regime*. Herr, Richard. Book noted by Lively, J. . . . . 998

*Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military*, ed. Coles, Harry L. Book review by Edinger, L. J. . . 692

TOTALITARIANISM See. B585 also B55.

*Toward a Definition of Book Review Policy*. Avery Leiserson. . . . . 139

*Toward a Definition of Editorial Policy for the Review*. Harvey C. Mansfield, Managing Editor. . . . . 129

*Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development*, eds. Braibanti, Ralph and Spengler, Joseph J. Book noted by Friedman, J. R. . . . . 157

Trotsky, Leon. *Terrorism and Communism*. Book noted by Kautsky, J. H. . . . . 162

Turner, H. A. Reviews *The Politics of Oil*. Engler, Robert. . . . . 695

*Two Faces of Power*. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz. . . . . 947

*Two Theorems on Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems*. Franklin M. Fisher and Albert Ando. . . . . 108

Tucker, Robert C. *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*. Book noted by McCallum, D. 442

UGANDA. See B4312.

Ullmann, Walter. *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*. Book noted by Riesenbergs, P. . . . . 447

Ulmer, S. S. Book notes on A. D. Weinberger's *Freedom and Protection: The Bill of Rights* and J. P. Roche's *Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action*. . . . . 460

*An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Graebner, Norman A. Book noted by Cohen, B. D. . . . . 176

UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS. See D211.

*Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs*. Bidwell, Percy W. Book noted by Burkhart, J. A. . . . . 991

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. B414.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. See B4372.

UNITED KINGDOM. See B411.

UNITED NATIONS. See D613.

*The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities*. Cohen, Benjamin V. Book noted by Sandifer, D. V. . . . . 501

U. S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare. *A Report on Social Security Programs*

- in the Soviet Union.* Book reviewed by Somers, H. M. . . . . 149
- United States Fiscal Policy 1945-1959.* Holsman, A. E. Book noted by Poland O. F. . . . . 463
- U. S. INFORMATION SERVICE. See I549.
- The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960.* Mecham, J. Lloyd. Book noted by Kennedy, J. J. . . . . 1032
- The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea.* Reiff, Henry. Book noted by Mander, L. A. . . . . 505
- The United States and the United Nations,* (ed.) Wilcox, Francis O. and Haviland, Jr. H. Field. Book noted by Stoessinger, J. G. 500
- Untermeyer, F. Reviews *African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide.* Hodgkin, Thomas. . . . . 980
- URBAN PROBLEMS See B131, B15 and B73.
- Urban Social Structure.* Beshers, James M. Book noted by O'Donnell, M. E. . . . . 1000
- Urbanization in Latin America.* Hauser, Philip M. Book noted by Silvert, K. H. . . 1033
- URUGUAY. See B443.
- Váli, Ferenc C. *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism.* Book noted by Gyorgy, A. . . . . 489
- Values and Interests.* Vernon Van Dyke. . 567
- Communication from Oppenheim, Felix E. . . . . 975
- VENEZUELA. See B442.
- Venezuela.* Lieuwen, Edwin. Book noted by Baker, R. D. . . . . 746
- Verba, S. Notes on *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance.* Marvick, Duane, (ed.) . . . . . 440
- Vile, M. J. C. *The Structure of American Federalism.* Book noted by Farrelly, D. G. 465
- Vose, C. E. Notes on *Courts, Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process.* Murphy, Walter F. and Pritchett, C. Herman, (eds). . . . . 717
- VOTING BEHAVIOR. *Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960.* Andrew R. Baggaley See also F806. . . . . 66
- Wagar, W. Warren. *H. G. Wells and the World State.* Book noted by Schaar, J. H. 160
- Wallerstein, I. Notes on *The Edge of Freedom.* Oakes, John B. . . . . 487
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Africa: The Politics of Independence.* Book reviewed by Hanna, W. . . . . 429
- Walker, Nigel. *Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker.* Book noted by Friedland, Louis L. . . . . 1006
- Walker, R. L. Notes on *The Eternal Triangle? Communist China. The United States and The United Nations.* Appleton, Sheldon. . . . . 1030
- Waltz, Kenneth M. *Kant, Liberalism, and War.* . . . . . 331
- WAR. See D4.
- Warburg, James P. *Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties.* Book reviewed by Gange, J. . . . . 425
- Weinberger, Andrew D. *Freedom and Protection: The Bill of Rights.* Book noted by Ulmer, S. S. . . . . 460
- Weissberg, Guenter. *The International Status of the United Nations.* Book noted by Claude, I. L. . . . . 209
- H. G. Wells and the World State.* Wagar, W. Warren, Book noted by Schaar, J. H. . . 160
- Wells, Roger Hewes. *States in West German Federalism: A Study in Federal-State Relations.* Book noted by Heidenheimer, Arnold J. . . . . 1018
- Wengert, N. Notes on *Design of Regional Accounts: Papers Presented at the Conference on Regional Accounts, 1960.* Hochwald, Werner, (ed.) . . . . . 730
- WEST INDIES. See B44; see also D8.
- What Price Coexistence? A Policy for the Western Alliance.* Slessor, Sir John. Book noted by Fernbach, A. . . . . 1029
- When Nations Disagree: A Handbook on Peace through Law.* Larson, Arthur. Book noted by Yalem, R. J. . . . . 498
- Whitnah, Donald R. *A History of the United States Weather Bureau,* noted by Lashley G. Harvey. . . . . 182
- Wilcox, Francis O. (ed.) (and Haviland, Jr. H. Field). *The United States and the United Nations.* Book noted by Stoessinger, J. G. 500
- Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City.* Dahl, Robert A. Book reviewed by Eulau, H. . . . . 144
- Wildavsky, Aaron. *Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics.* Book noted by Stratton, O. . . . . 721
- Williams, William Appleman. *Contours of American History.* Book noted by Braeman, J. . . . . 1005
- Willoughby, Wm. R. *The St. Lawrence Waterway.* Book notes by Hodgetts, J. E. 215
- Wilson, Francis Graham. *Theory of Public Opinion.* Book reviewed by Krislov, S. . . 985
- Wilson, L. C. Notes on *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism.* Payne, Stanley C. . . 483
- Wiltsey, G. G. Notes on *A Century of Civil Rights.* With a Study of *State Law Against Discrimination.* Leskes, Theodore. 718
- Wir sind die stärkste der Parteien! Eine Bibliographie zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands.* Institut für Marxismus-

- Leninismus beim ZK der SED. Book noted..... 1025  
 Wise, Sidney. Notes *The Economics of the Political Parties*..... 1002  
 Wiseman, Jack, with Alan T. Peacock, assisted by Jindrich Veverka, *Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom*. Noted by Philip W. Buck..... 194  
 Witte, Edwin E. *The Development of the Social Security Act*. Book noted by Leiserson, A..... 723  
 Witte, W. D. S. Notes *Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel; With a Translation of His Essay on the Decomposition of Marxism*. Horowitz, I. L..... 439  
 Wood Bryce. *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*. Book noted by Kennedy, J. J.. 759  
*World Policy II. A Yearbook of Studies in International Law and Organization*. Book noted by Tamko, M..... 765  
 Wright, Deil S. Notes on *Local Political Surveys*. Schattschneider, E. E. and Jones, Victor..... 991  
 Wright, T. P. *The Cold War and Its Origins: The Eloquent and Indelible Record of the Great Conflict of Our Time*. Fleming, D. F..... 435  
 Yalem, R. J. Notes on *When Nations Disagree: A Handbook on Peace Through Law*. Larson, Arthur..... 498  
 Yates, P. L., with Dewhurst, J. F.; Coppock, J. O., and associates. *Europe's Needs and Resources*. Book noted by Ritchie, W. A..... 208  
 Yates, P. Lamartine. *Food, Land and Manpower in Western Europe*. Book noted by Rothman, S..... 506  
 Young, Roland. *The British Parliament*. Book noted by Mackintosh, John P..... 1022  
 Reviews *The British Cabinet*. Mackintosh, John P..... 986  
 Reviews *British Parliamentary Democracy*. Morrison of Lambeth, Lord..... 986  
 YUGOSLAVIA. See B418.  
*Yugoslavia and The New Communism*. Hoffman, George W. and Neal, Fred Warner. Book noted by Dragnich, A. N..... 1034  
 Zagoria, Donald S. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*. Book review by Steiner, H. A. 688  
 Zimmer, H. (ed.) (with Biderman, A. D.). *The Manipulation of Human Behavior*. Book reviewed by Rogow, A..... 424  
 ZIONISM. See F53.

# The American Political Science Review

## BOARD OF EDITORS

Harvey C. Mansfield, Managing Editor, Ohio State University	Dwight Waldo, University of California, Berkeley .
Samuel H. Beer, Associate Editor, Harvard University	Harold Stein, Princeton University
Otto Kirchheimer, Columbia University	John D. Lewis, Oberlin University
Andrew Hacker, Cornell University	Hiram M. Stout, George Washington University

VOLUME LVI  
1962



391.605

Copyright, 1963, by  
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

GEORGE BANTA COMPANY, INC.  
MENASHA, WISCONSIN

# CONTENTS

## NUMBER 1—MARCH, 1962

Deviation Control. <i>Zbigniew Brzezinski</i> .....	5
<i>Politics and Strategy</i>	
The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain. <i>Laurence W. Martin</i> .....	23
Congressional Innovation and Intervention. <i>Raymond H. Dawson</i> .....	42
Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives. <i>William H. Riker and Donald Niemi</i> .....	58
Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1928-1960. <i>Andrew R. Baggaley</i> .....	66
<i>Two Views of the Supreme Court</i>	
Deeds Without Doctrines: Civil Rights in the 1960 Term of the Supreme Court. <i>Robert G. McCloskey</i> .....	71
The 1960 Term: A Psychological Analysis. <i>Glendon Schubert</i> .....	90
Two Theorems on <i>Ceteris Paribus</i> . <i>Franklin M. Fisher and Albert Ando</i> .....	108
Positive Liberty, 1880-1914. <i>David Nicholls</i> .....	114
<i>Editorial Notes</i>	
Toward a Definition of Editorial Policy for the Review. <i>Harvey C. Mansfield</i> .....	129
Toward a Definition of Book Review Policy. <i>Avery Leiserson</i> .....	139
Communications to the Editor.....	141
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. <i>Thomas H. Eliot (ed.)</i> .....	143
News and Notes. <i>Ralph A. Straetz (ed.)</i> .....	233

## NUMBER 2—JUNE, 1962

Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics. <i>Warner R. Schilling</i> .....	287
A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. <i>Hans Morgenthau</i> .....	301
The House Appropriations Committee. <i>Richard F. Fenno, Jr.</i> .....	310
Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960. <i>S. Sidney Ulmer</i> .....	325
Kant, Liberalism, and War. <i>Kenneth N. Waltz</i> .....	331
The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy. <i>Stanley Rothman</i> .....	341
Reply to Rothman. <i>Joseph Cropsey</i> .....	353
The Political Ideas of English Party Activists. <i>Richard Rose</i> .....	360
<i>Socialist Parties in Readjustment</i>	
The Italian Socialist Party. <i>Raphael Zariski</i> .....	372
The Sources of Protest in Japan. <i>Herbert Passin</i> .....	391
The Limits of Self-determination: Katanga. <i>René Lemarchand</i> .....	404
Political Science as a Discipline. <i>APSA Committee on Standards of Instruction</i> .....	417
Communications to the Editor.....	422
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. <i>Thomas H. Eliot (ed.)</i> .....	423
News and Notes. <i>Ralph A. Straetz (ed.)</i> .....	520

## NUMBER 3—SEPTEMBER, 1962

How Can We Justify Democracy? <i>Henry B. Mayo</i> .....	555
Values and Interests. <i>Vernon Van Dyke</i> .....	567
Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive Approach. <i>Herbert J. Spiro</i> .....	577
Subcommittees: The Miniature Legislatures of Congress. <i>George Goodwin, Jr.</i> .....	596
Tension and Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System. <i>Malcolm B. Parsons</i> .....	605
Governmental Structure and Political Environment. <i>John H. Kessel</i> .....	615
Agricultural Subsidies in England and the United States. <i>J. Roland Pennock</i> .....	621
Equilibrium, Structure of Interests and Leadership: Adenauer's Survival as Chancellor. <i>Peter H. Merkl</i> .....	634
Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959. <i>Frederick C. Engelmann</i> .....	651
The Pedagogy of Democracy: Coercive Public Protest in India. <i>David H. Bayley</i> .....	663
Communications to the Editor.....	673
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. <i>Victor T. Le Vine (ed.)</i> .....	687
Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science. <i>William C. Seyler (comp.)</i> .....	774
News and Notes. <i>Ralph A. Straetz (ed.)</i> .....	792

NUMBER 4—DECEMBER, 1962

Free Speech: At What Price. <i>Charles S. Hyneman</i> .....	847
Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion. <i>Giovanni Sartori</i> .....	853
The Threat of Violence and Social Change. <i>H. L. Nieburg</i> .....	865
Reinhold Niebuhr: New Orthodoxy for Old Liberalism. <i>Wilson Carey McWilliams</i> .....	874
Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations After World War II. <i>Paul Shoup</i> .....	886
The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election. <i>Samuel H. Barnes, Frank Grace, James K. Pollock, and Peter W. Sperlich</i> .....	899
President Sukarno and the Communists: the Politics of Domestication. <i>Donald Hindley</i> .....	915
The Dialectics of Supranational Unification. <i>Amitai Etzioni</i> .....	927
Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902-1954. <i>Jack Sawyer and Duncan Mac- Rae, Jr.</i> .....	936
Two Faces of Power. <i>Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz</i> .....	947
Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body. <i>Wayne L. Francis</i> .....	953
Civil Service and Managing Work. <i>Robert T. Golembiewski</i> .....	961
Communications to the Editor.....	974
Book Reviews, Notes and Bibliography. <i>Victor T. Le Vine (ed.)</i> .....	977
News and Notes. <i>Ralph A. Straetz (ed.)</i> .....	1042
Index to Volume LVI. <i>Corinne Silverman</i> .....	1056

## OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

### *President*

CARL J. FRIEDRICH  
Harvard University

### *President-Elect*

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT  
University of Chicago

### *Vice Presidents*

ALEXANDER HEARD  
University of North Carolina

JOHN D. LEWIS  
Oberlin College

WALLACE S. SAYRE  
Columbia University

### *Secretary*

RUTH LAWSON  
Mt. Holyoke College

### *Treasurer*

MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
Washington, D. C.

### *Executive Director*

EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK  
1726 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.  
Washington 6, D. C.

### *Assistant Director*

DON TACHERON

### *Managing Editor, APSR*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD  
The Ohio State University

## COUNCIL

### Above-named Officers *ex officio*

ALFRED DEGRAZIA  
New York University

JOHN HALLOWELL  
Duke University

SIGMUND NEUMANN  
Wesleyan University

LEO C. RIETHMAYER  
University of Colorado

LESTER G. SELIGMAN  
University of Oregon

VERNON VAN DYKE  
State University of Iowa

ROBERT E. WARD  
University of Michigan

BRYCE WOOD  
Social Science Research Council

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE  
University of Maryland

CHARLES B. HAGAN  
University of Illinois

H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR.  
The Brookings Institution

ROBERT E. LANE  
Yale University

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA  
Michigan State University

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

HAROLD H. SPROUT  
Princeton University

SHELDON S. WOLIN  
University of California

## FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW  
ALBERT SHAW  
FREDERIC N. JUDSON  
JAMES BRYCE  
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL  
WOODROW WILSON  
SIMON E. BALDWIN  
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART  
W. W. WILLOUGHBY  
JOHN BASSETT MOORE  
ERNST FREUND  
JESSE MACY  
MUNROE SMITH  
HENRY JONES FORD  
PAUL S. REINSCH  
LEO S. ROWE  
WILLIAM A. DUNNING  
HARRY A. GARFIELD  
JAMES W. GARNER

CHARLES E. MERRIAM  
CHARLES A. BEARD  
WILLIAM B. MUNRO  
JESSE S. REEVES  
JOHN A. FAIRLIE  
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH  
EDWARD S. CORWIN  
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY  
ISIDOR LOEB  
WALTER J. SHEPARD  
FRANCIS W. COKER  
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE  
THOMAS REED POWELL  
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA  
CHARLES GROVE HAINES  
ROBERT C. BROOKS  
FREDERIC A. OGG  
WILLIAM ANDERSON  
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

LEONARD D. WHITE  
JOHN M. GAUS  
WALTER F. DODD  
ARTHUR W. MACMAHON  
HENRY R. SPENCER  
QUINCY WRIGHT  
JAMES POLLOCK  
PETER H. ODEGARD  
LUTHER H. GULICK  
PENDLETON HERRING  
RALPH J. BUNCHE  
CHARLES MCKINLEY  
HAROLD D. LASSWELL  
E. E. SCHATTSCHEIDER  
V. O. KEY, JR.  
R. TAYLOR COLE  
CARL B. SWISHER  
EMMETTE S. REDFORD  
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN



# THE 1963 ATHERTON PRESS POLITICAL SCIENCE PRIZE

Atherton Press, a Division of Prentice-Hall, Inc., in collaboration with the American Political Science Association, is pleased to announce the terms of the competition for the 1963 Atherton Press Political Science Prize.

## **TERMS OF THE PRIZE**

The Atherton Prize of \$1,000 will be awarded at the 1963 Annual A.P.S.A. Meeting to the author of the unpublished, book-length manuscript that in the opinion of the Prize Committee makes the most distinguished contribution to research and theory on a contemporary political science topic. A doctoral dissertation of superior quality will be eligible only if properly revised and prepared for book publication. If the Prize Committee considers no manuscript worthy of the prize in 1963, none will be awarded.

## **SELECTION BY PRIZE COMMITTEE**

Each manuscript submitted in the 1963 competition will be carefully reviewed by the Prize Committee appointed by President Carl J. Friedrich and the other officers of A.P.S.A. The members of the 1963 Committee are: Professor Frederick M. Watkins, Chairman, Professor William H. Riker, and Professor Richard Newton Rosecrance.

## **PUBLICATION PLANS**

Atherton Press will guarantee publication, with royalties, of the prize-winning manuscript in The American Political Science Association Monograph Series. The author's acceptance of the prize will convey to Atherton Press all publication rights to the manuscript. The prize-winning manuscript will be published simultaneously in Great Britain by Prentice-Hall International, London. Atherton and A.P.S.A. may accept for publication in the Monograph Series other outstanding manuscripts submitted in the competition, but only one award of \$1,000 will be made in 1963.

## **MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION**

Manuscripts to be reviewed for the 1963 prize must be submitted by April 1, 1963, to the American Political Science Association. The manuscript must be accompanied by the application form on the reverse, an abstract of the manuscript, and a complete table of contents. Manuscripts should be adequately insured against loss. Please notify A.P.S.A. of any change of address.

## **MANUSCRIPT PREPARATION**

Manuscripts should not ordinarily contain fewer than 75,000 nor more than 150,000 words. All charts, tables, and illustrations must be complete and prepared in the best possible form. Only a clearly legible copy will be acceptable for review. A second copy will be required for manuscripts accepted for publication. The author should retain a complete copy at all times.

ALLEN JOSSEY-BASS  
*Executive Director and Editor*  
Atherton Press  
70 Fifth Avenue  
New York 11

---

---

Complete, sign, date, and mail this application form with the manuscript to:

Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director  
American Political Science Association  
Attn: 1963 Atherton Prize Committee  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

DEGREES (years and institutions) \_\_\_\_\_

PRESENT POSITION AND TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE OF MANUSCRIPT \_\_\_\_\_

NUMBER OF PAGES \_\_\_\_\_ ESTIMATED NUMBER OF WORDS \_\_\_\_\_

NUMBER AND TYPE OF ILLUSTRATIONS \_\_\_\_\_

IF DISSERTATION, IDENTIFY SPONSOR OR CHAIRMAN \_\_\_\_\_

ARE ABSTRACT AND TABLE OF CONTENTS INCLUDED? \_\_\_\_\_

I herewith submit the manuscript described above for consideration for the 1963 Atherton Press Political Science Prize. I understand that acceptance of the \$1,000 prize will convey to Atherton Press exclusive publication rights to the manuscript and that it will be published, with royalties payable to me, in The American Political Science Association Monograph Series, with simultaneous publication in Great Britain by Prentice-Hall International, London.

SIGNED: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

# AVAILABILITY of 1962 ANNUAL MEETING PANEL PAPERS

The following panel papers which were delivered at the Association's 1962 annual meeting in Washington, D.C., September 5-8, may be purchased through the national office in Washington. All 1962 panel papers are not available. If a paper you want is not listed below, the Association suggests that you contact the author or authors to determine how copies may be obtained. Please see below for the price list.

ALFORD, Robert	"Stratification and Politics in the Anglo-American Countries"
BRUCE, William	"The Administration and Operational Role of the Secretariat"
DONOGHUE, John D. & USEEMS, John and Ruth	"Men in The Middle of The Third Culture"
DOWNING, Rondal	"The Courts, Congress and Labor Relations"
ELAZAR, Daniel	"Federal-State Collaboration in the 19th Century United States"
EMERSON, Rupert	"Nation-Building in Africa"
FENTON, John	"Two-Party Competition and Governmental Expenditure"
FICK, Winston	"The Regulatory Community and Its Judicial Function"
FINER, Herman	"The Study of Communism in the High Schools"
GATLIN, Douglas	"Socio-Economic Basis of Party Competition in North Carolina"
GOVE, Samuel	"Local Politics: The Illinois Experience"
GRAY, Kenneth	"Congressional Interference in Administration"
HAMILTON, Charles	"County Complexions: Constant or Changing"
HIRSCHFIELD, Robert	"Citizens in Politics"
HOLDEN, Matthew	"The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem in Diplomacy"
JEWELL, Malcolm	"Competition and Factionalism in Southern Legislative Primaries and Elections"
JOHNSON, Byron L.	"Congress and the Executive—Perspectives Gained from an Interchange of Roles"
JOHNSTON, Whittle	"A Short Critique of the Theories of World Politics of Woodrow Wilson and Frank Tannenbaum"
KELLEY, Stanley, Jr.	"Presidential Legislative Leadership: The Use of Patronage"
KESSEL, John	"A Game Theory Analysis of Campaign Decisions"
MacRAE, Duncan, Jr.	"Immobilisme and the National Assembly in the Fourth French Republic"
MANSFIELD, Harvey	"The Coordination of National Economic Policy"
MARQUIS, Lucian	"Fiction and the Teaching of Comparative Politics"
MARVICK, Dwaine	"The Middlemen of Politics"
MASOTTI, Louis	"Illinois 1961 Special Legislative Session: Some Tentative Conclusions Concerning the Effect of Process on Policy"
McKEAN, Dayton	"Lawyers and the Integrated Bar: Lathrop v. Donohue"
McLEERY, Richard	"Correctional Administration and Political Change"
MERKL, Peter	"Formational Cohesion of Supranational Parties"
MOREY, Roy D.	"Developing a Legislative Program in Arizona"
MOSHER, Frederick	"Factors and Considerations in the Reorganization Process"
MULLER, Steven	"The Philosophers of 'Cultural Decadence' and Their Contemporary Significance"
NAGEL, Stuart	"Judicial Attitudes and Those of Legislators and Administrators"
PALUMBO, Dennis	"The States and the Conduct of American Foreign Relations"
PATTERSON, Samuel	"The Role of the Labor Lobbyist"
PIERCE, Roy	"Opinion and Constitutionalism in Western Europe"
PLANK, John	"The Inter-American Economic and Social Council"
RIGGS, Fred	"Cabinet Politicians in Thailand: A Bureaucratic Elite"
ROSE, Richard	"Faction and Party: The British Example"
ROSECRANCE, R. N.	"Interrelations of Comparative and International Politics: The Concept of the Fragment"
SALOMON, Leon	"The Government's Law Business: The Solicitor General and His Client"
SANDOZ, Ellis	"Political Anthropology and Some Aspects of the Problem of Good and Evil in Dostoevsky's 'Legend of the Grand Inquisitor'"
SCHMIDHAUSER, John	"Legal Professionalism: Its Political Implications"
SELIGMAN, Lester	"Elite Recruitment, Groups and Political Development in Israel"
SHEPHERD, George	"Ghana and Casablanca: A Perspective on the Emerging Regional Systems of Africa"
SIGEL, Roberta	"Presidential Leadership Images: With Some Reflections on the Political Outlook of Negro Voters"
STOKES, Donald	"Spatial Model of Party Competition"
STONER, John	"Local Governmental Relations"
SULLIVAN, Denis	"Towards Theory of Political Attitudes in the Prediction of Voting Behavior"
TEUNE, Henry	"Occupational Affiliation and Attitudes Toward Interest Groups"
WARREN, Robert	"A Municipal Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organization"
WILLIAMS, Oliver	"Urban Differentiation and Political Integration"
YATES, W. Ross	"Residence Requirements for Voting: Ten Years of Change"

## PRICE LIST OF 1962 PANEL PAPERS

1 paper —\$ .75	5 Papers—\$3.00	8 papers—\$4.75
2 papers— 1.50	6 papers— 3.75	9 papers— 5.00
3 papers— 2.00	7 papers— 4.00	10 papers— 5.50
4 papers— 2.75		

(Checks or money orders should be made payable to The American Political Science Association.)

# FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

by Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout

This book offers a fresh approach designed to help one to think more realistically about the rapidly changing international scene of today, and to anticipate more creatively the possibilities of tomorrow. The emphasis throughout is on the features of our changing world. Against this background, the book views the historic international system, its successive transformations, and its current transition through bipolarism towards new patterns. The authors' own original writing (well over half of the total) is integrated with carefully chosen selections from a wide variety of sources. 734 pages, text ed. \$8.75.

## SEARCHLIGHTS *original paperbacks*

George W. Hoffman and G. Etzel Percy, General Editors

### NEW

#### TITLES IN THE SERIES

- |    |  |        |
|----|--|--------|
| #1 | <i>Divided Germany and Berlin</i> by Norman J. G. Pounds   | \$1.45 |
| #2 | <i>The Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict?</i> by W. A. Douglas | \$1.45 |
| #3 | <i>Spain in the World</i> by Sax Bradford  | \$1.45 |
| #4 | <i>Pacific Island Bastions of the United States</i> by Herold J. Wiens                                 | \$1.45 |

**THE COMMON MARKET: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN ACTION** concerns the movement toward European unity as a major force for change in the world today. By J. Warren Nystrom and Peter Malof.

**CENTRAL AMERICA—LAND OF LORDS AND LIZARDS** gives a clear picture of Central America as a single region and as individual nations. By Thorsten V. Kalijarvi.

**PUERTO RICO—ALLY FOR PROGRESS** shows through the Puerto Rican experience "that 'determination' has a very definite place in the thinking of all who strive to understand man's life within its geographic setting." By Earl Parker Hanson.

**SPACE: FRONTIER UNLIMITED** summarizes the geography of space, its practical applications, political and military effects, the impact of space on society and the future possibilities of space exploration. By Harold Leland Goodwin.

**COMING IN THE SPRING—IDEOLOGY IN CONFLICT: COMMUNIST POLITICAL THEORY** focuses on the nature of recent tensions within the Communist camp as they are reflected in key speeches, reports, declarations, and editorials. By Dieter Dux. Paperbound.

**READY THIS MONTH—THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS** explains the major aspects of the process, analyzing in detail the nomination and election processes. By Howard R. Penniman. Paperbound.

**D. VAN NOSTRAND COMPANY, INC.**

120 Alexander Street  
Princeton, New Jersey

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers


This man is building a car. Not alone, of course. He's an employe in a General Motors plant . . . just one important producer in a team of more than six hundred thousand employes. He's energetic, progressive, reliable . . . knows his job and does it right.

# PRODUCER

It's people like this producer, far more than anything else, who are the key to General Motors. It's production people, supervisors, draftsmen, stylists, salesmen, engineers . . . people who design, decide, direct, DO!

More than a million shareholders, men and women, young and old, have invested in the efforts and productiveness of General Motors people. Every one of them has a stake in General Motors . . . and GM's biggest stake is in its *people*.

**GENERAL MOTORS**  
**IS PEOPLE**  
Making Better  
Things For You



*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## ***Action Française***

***Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France***

**EUGEN WEBER**

Here is the complete story of this complex movement and its leaders from the end of the nineteenth century to the fall of the Vichy government. Much of the material in the book is derived from a study of private papers never before opened to anyone. \$10.00

## ***Moscow and Chinese Communists***

***Second Edition***

**ROBERT C. NORTH**

First published in 1953, this work has been acclaimed as "the best short history of Chinese Communism yet published." The new edition now covers the first decade of Communist power in China from the point of view of Sino-Soviet relations. \$7.50

## ***The Political Development of Tanganyika***

**J. CLAGETT TAYLOR**

This first political history of Tanganyika traces its development from the beginning of German colonization in the 1880's to the attainment of independence. The major emphasis is on the British administration of Tanganyika as a mandated territory of the League of Nations and again as a trust territory of the United Nations. February. About \$6.00

## ***A History of Argentine Political Thought***

**JOSÉ LUIS ROMERO**

*Introduction and Translation by Thomas F. McGann.* Now in its third Spanish edition, this widely acclaimed book by one of Argentina's leading scholars gives the full sweep of the political development of Argentina. The author emphasizes equally the ideological shape and significance of social and economic events. \$7.50

*Order from your bookstore, please*

**STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

*Coming in February!*

**THE ELEMENTS  
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
A Casebook**

By Gerard J. Mangone, *Syracuse University*

This is a collection of introductory essays, cases, and documents on international law, mainly seen from the viewpoint of the United States. The work is divided into twelve sections or topics of international law, each of which contains an introduction to the subject by the author. These are followed by illustrative cases or documents highlighting issues involved and offering the student an opportunity to analyze the source materials of cases and documents. The problems chosen focus on matters of contemporary interest in international affairs.

The book contains a sufficient number of leading cases to give the student a thorough experience with the logic of law and the international judicial process and its supporting documents.

While there are no cases available, there is an adequate discussion presented in the text involving the bonding problem of the United Nations from an international point of view.

*Available Now*

**COMPARATIVE POLITICS: Notes and Readings**

Edited by Roy C. Macridis, *Washington University*, and Bernard E. Brown, *Vanderbilt University*

**THE DE GAULLE REPUBLIC: Quest for Unity**

By Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown

**CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING**

By James A. Robinson, *Northwestern University*

**INTERNATIONAL LAW: A Text**

By H. B. Jacobini, *Southern Illinois University*

**MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS**

By Alex N. Dragnich, *Vanderbilt University*

**WRITE FOR 90-DAY EXAMINATION COPIES**



**THE DORSEY PRESS, INC. HOMewood, ILLINOIS**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



---

## PAPERBACKS

---

### **INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Constitutional Foundations**

**Edited by Ruth C. Lawson**

An illuminating survey of the development of regional groupings with a critical summary and constitutional text for each organization. \$2.50

### **NEUTRALISM AND NONALIGNMENT The New States in World Affairs**

**Edited by Laurence W. Martin**

Analyses of the phenomenon of nonalignment and its effect on American interests and goals, examining the behavior of the neutralist nations as well as the policies pursued by both the United States and the Soviet Union. \$2.25

### **THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship**

**By John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Noguee**

A provocative analysis of the objectives sought by the United States and the Soviet Union and the means used to realize them. \$1.95

### **THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC Institutions and Politics (Revised Edition)**

**By Dorothy Pickles**

A basic text on French government, now extensively revised with four additional chapters assessing the evolution of "De Gaulle's Republic" and the political climate it has produced. \$1.95

### **NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE The Struggle for Power in the Postwar World (Revised Edition)**

**By Hugh Seton-Watson**

A classic study of the Cold War with a new Epilogue covering the events of the last two years. \$2.95

### **THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS**

**Edited by Paul E. Sigmund, Jr.**

An anthology of the views of the political leaders in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, with an Introduction and critical notes. \$2.25

### **THE COMMON MARKET TODAY—AND TOMORROW**

**By Michael Shanks and John Lambert**

An introduction to the structure, operations, and future prospects of the Common Market. \$2.25

---

## **FREDERICK A. PRAEGER PUBLISHER**

**64 University Place, New York 3, N.Y.**

---

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers





**PERCEPTIVE,  
THOUGHTFUL,  
PROVOCATIVE . . .**

**THE GENESIS OF THE COMMON MARKET** by W. O. Henderson

"Henderson's book, written in a fluent and captivating style, traces back the longing for a larger economic community in Europe to the 18th century. It discusses the forces which opposed economic integration and describes the ingenious stratagem used by those who believed in greater European economic unity, in combating this opposition until ultimately the goal of a united Europe came into the purview in the next decade."—BERT F. HOSELITZ, *University of Chicago* \$5.50

. . . And remember Prof. Henderson's other recent and important books:

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN EUROPE (\$6.00)  
STUDIES IN GERMAN COLONIAL HISTORY (\$5.50)

**THE LIBERAL PAPERS** edited by James Roosevelt

The book that has been debated on the floor of Congress and across the nation. Wide-ranging essays by representatives of the 46 intellectuals, scientists and scholars who participated in the illuminating discussions of "The Liberal Project." The contributors: David Riesman, Michael Maccoby, James Warburg, Walter Millis, Arthur Waskow, Charles E. Osgood, Emile Benoit, Vera Micheles Dean, Frank Tannenbaum, Allen S. Whiting, Stuart Hughes, Quincy Wright and Kingsley Davis. \$5.00

**THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS** by Raul Hilberg

"I hardly thought, on taking it up, that I should be unable to put it down . . . For this is not merely a compilation or a recapitulation of the now documented facts. It is not yet another chronicle of horrors. It is a careful, analytic, three-dimensional study of a social and political experience unique in history . . ."—H. R. TREVOR-ROPER

"A staggering and invaluable book . . . Frankly, I do not see how anyone can read this book without recognizing how vulnerable everyone is today to this kind of assault."—ALFRED KAZIN \$9.95

**QUADRANGLE BOOKS, Inc.**

119 West Lake Street / Chicago 1

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



*recently published titles—*

**MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS: Fourth Edition.**

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER, *Smith College*; JOHN M. HERZ, *The City College, New York*. ■ A full revision of the classic text in comparative government which presents a thorough, highly readable survey of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and France. Following the parallel organization used in previous editions, the authors assess these governments not as isolated units but as institutions reflecting the historical, economic, and social influences of the past. With new maps and charts and an extensive bibliography. 692 pages, \$8.95

**WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY: The Modern Age.**

LEE C. McDONALD, *Pomona College*. This new text combines a thorough command of the materials with a vivid prose style, offering a study in depth of modern political thought from the 17th century to the present. 557 pages, \$6.95. ■ "I can imagine an undergraduate reading it in preference to other texts in this field; as an introduction it would sustain his interest and give him a reliable general picture, lighted neither capriciously nor by any single over-all interpretation."—Michael Oakshott, London School of Economics

**THE USES OF POWER: 7 Cases in American Politics.**

ALAN F. WESTIN, General Editor, *Columbia University*. Eight distinguished political scientists examine the major areas of governmental power in this paperbound book of original case studies. Each case presents a sharp conflict of the past decade and sheds new light on complex political issues and on the roles played by leading political figures. 376 pages, \$2.95. ■ "An excellent supplement to any major text for use in the introductory course. Through these essays, the student can get a feeling for politics in a way which few readers provide. I favor the use of a few extended selections, rather than a large number of fragmentary excerpts. This format permits one to give adequate class consideration to each, rather than frantically trying to cover and unify a large number of diverse readings."—Charles W. Anderson, University of Wisconsin

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## for Courses in Political Science and Government

---

*new paperbacks—*

**THE THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT: 8 Cases in Constitutional Politics.** Volume Eds.: C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, *University of Chicago*; ALAN F. WESTIN, *Columbia University*. ■ For February publication. In this new paperback for the American government course, eight lively, informative cases concerning the U.S. Supreme Court give the student a firm grasp of this country's constitutional processes. The cases span the twenty-five year period following the Court Packing dispute, and deal not only with the Federal government (as in *The Loyalty-Security Case*), but with State-Federal relations (*The Flag Salute Case*, and the *Offshore Oil Cases*), and State-State relations (*The Sunday Closing Cases*). With introductions, headnotes, and analytical summaries. A Harbrace Casebook in Political Science. Prob. 352 pages, \$2.95

**POLITICAL PARTIES IN TODAY'S WORLD.** D. W. BROGAN, *Cambridge University, England*; DOUGLAS V. VERNEY, *York University, Toronto*. ■ For February publication. A new text-supplement for introductory courses and courses in comparative government which offers a fresh, thoroughly practical appraisal of the political processes of democracy and totalitarianism as they operate in selected countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and the USSR. Prob. 288 pages, \$2.95

**THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT.** THURMAN ARNOLD. Available now. A newly published reissue of the noted survey of the ceremonies and theories of social institutions, and especially of law and economics, "not as collections of truths, but as symbolic thinking and conduct which condition the behavior of men in groups." With a new Introduction and Epilogue. A Harbinger Book. 278 pages, \$1.95. ■ "... a keen and lucid analysis of the fictions, myths, and rationalizations that dominate our political and legal thinking."—Harry Elmer Barnes



**HARCOURT, BRACE & WORLD, INC.**  
750 Third Avenue, New York 17, New York  
1855 Rollins Road, Burlingame, California

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

# New and recent OXFORD texts



## THE SUPREME COURT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

edited by Joseph Tussman, Wesleyan University  
Spring 1963 416 pages paperbound prob. \$1.95

## THE CONCEPT OF LAW

by H. L. A. Hart, Oxford University  
1962 263 pages \$4.25

## MATERIALS ON AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Second Edition, Revised and Reset  
edited by John M. Swarthout, Portland State College, and Ernest R. Bartley, University of Florida  
1962 608 pages paperbound \$4.50

## THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France

by Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania  
1962 384 pages paperbound \$2.25

## THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE

edited by Joseph Tussman, Wesleyan University  
1962 329 pages paperbound \$1.95

## READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

edited by H. C. Harlan  
1961 704 pages paperbound \$2.75

## READINGS IN WORLD POLITICS

edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with Ralph Lerner and Gerald Stourzh  
1959 590 pages paperbound \$2.25

## READINGS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with Ralph Lerner and Gerald Stourzh  
1959 712 pages paperbound \$2.75

## READINGS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

edited by Gerald Stourzh and Ralph Lerner  
1959 496 pages paperbound \$2.25

## READINGS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

edited by Robert A. Goldwin, with Gerald Stourzh and Marvin Zetterbaum  
1959 792 pages paperbound \$2.75

## OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC


by Joseph Tussman, Wesleyan University  
1961 152 pages paperbound \$2.25

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**  
417 Fifth Avenue, New York 16

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

Announcing the first volume in a significant new series

## NELSON'S STUDIES IN MODERN HISTORY



### General Editors

C. S. R. KITSON CLARK, Reader in Constitutional History in the University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Trinity College

F. H. HINSLEY, Lecturer in History in the University of Cambridge, and Fellow of St. John's College

Recent research on topics in nineteenth and twentieth century history has produced a wealth of material highly relevant to contemporary developments and events. It is the aim of this series to make this background material available to that larger audience, the intelligent but non-specialist public.

### THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN OUR TIMES

by Theodor Schieder

First published in Germany in 1958, this volume is a permanent assembly of a number of articles by one of the most eminent modern historians.

Its central theme is the two-fold process by which such terms as *the state, society, party* and *revolution* have changed their meanings in modern times—first in response to the change of men's ideas, and second because the concepts behind the terms change character.

The result is a highly original

probe into the central realities of modern historical developments. 168 pages, index \$4.50

#### ***Titles in preparation:***

THE END OF ISOLATION: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907  
by G. Monger

THE AMERICAN REVIVALIST IN ENGLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY  
by J. Kent

THE POLITICS OF DEFERENCE  
by D. C. Moore

THE ORIGINS OF COLONIAL NATIONALISM  
by J. Gallagher

THOMAS NELSON & SONS

18 East 41st Street



New York 17, N.Y.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

# IMPORTANT NEW TEXTBOOKS FROM MACMILLAN

## **IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:**

### **THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED**

*By John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson, both of Sacramento State College*

This American government text provides students with some basic understanding of the theoretical questions and alternatives which make descriptive materials meaningful. The framework is an analysis of the three leading models of American democracy: the traditional liberal and conservative theories and the newer theory of "broker" or "minorities" rule. History, structure, and process are then discussed in terms of the central issues raised by these divergent theories.

*Coming in the Spring*

## **IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:**

### **THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

*By Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and George A. Lincoln, United States Military Academy*

The authors provide an analytic framework for examining the problems that beset today's world. Emphasis is placed on the central fact that today's vital decisions must be made in an international context that is constantly being modified by dynamic and swiftly moving forces. The problems of economic assistance, foreign trade, mutual aid, defense policy, collective security, and world organization are given full treatment.

*634 pages, \$7.50*

## **DOCUMENTS ON EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT**

*By Steven Muller, Cornell University*

This collection of documents provides detailed reference support to standard textbooks in comparative government. The book has three major divisions. The first presents the national constitutions of France, the U.S.S.R., and Germany. The second part contains detailed information on political parties in these three countries and Britain. The final section contains significant extracts from the electoral laws of the four countries.

*288 pages, paper, \$2.25*

## **IN AMERICAN HISTORY:**

### **RECENT AMERICA: Conflicting Interpretations of the Great Issues**

*By Sidney Fine, University of Michigan*

This collection of readings examines fourteen basic issues of twentieth century American history. From the Spanish American War to the Korean War, conflicting interpretations of each issue by prominent American historians are juxtaposed. Each pair of self-contained selections is preceded by a brief introduction that places the interpretations in their historical setting and illustrates the nature of the conflict between them.

*470 pages, paper, \$3.25*

**THE MACMILLAN COMPANY    60 Fifth Avenue    New York 11, N.Y.**


*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

## ***Political Science Publications . . .***

### **PEOPLE AND POLITICS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM**

*Lewis A. Froman, Jr., University of Wisconsin.* Attempts to set forth a general theory of politics based on the notion that political decisions involve the distribution of advantages and disadvantages among people with different resources. Features the integration of numerous political, social, and psychological hypotheses into a consistent theory.  
1962 128 pp. paperback Text price: \$1.75

### **CULTURAL AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS**

*Edited by Robert Blum, Council on Foreign Relations.* For the first time in book form, an up-to-date description and analysis of the international cultural activities of the United States. *An American Assembly Book. S-AA-8 (Orig.)*  
February 1963 192 pp. Spectrum  Paperback: \$1.95


### **CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY**

*Charles W. Joiner, The University of Michigan.* Provides a critical analysis of the civil jury, including its importance to just decisions and to democracy. Compares the deliberation of a judge and a jury in making decisions. Offers a collection of the opinions of thought leaders of the last century about the civil jury.  
1962 238 pp. Text price: \$6.95


### **SIMULATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE— READINGS**

*Harold Guetzkow, Northwestern University.* Discusses a new research technique, the use of simulation, as a tool for research and education in social science.  
1962 approx. 176 pp. Text price: \$3.95

### **DISCRIMINATION**

*Wallace Mendelson, University of Texas.* Based on the Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights. Examines, in local and national contexts, the total impact of discrimination.  
1962 S-45 (orig.) 179 pp. Spectrum  Paperback: \$1.95  
Cloth: \$4.25

### **GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST**

*Maurice Harari, Dartmouth College.* Links the current political institutions of this tumultuous region to their historical origins and examines their effect on the cold war.  
1962 S-41 (orig.) 179 pp. Spectrum  Paperback: \$1.95  
Cloth: \$3.95

For copies, write: Box 903  
Or for a complete Spectrum catalogue, write: Dept. CAC

**PRENTICE-HALL INC., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## *Coming and Recent Texts*

READY IN FEBRUARY

7th EDITION

### DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

By Henry Steele Commager, Amherst College

Dr. Commager's distinguished collection of basic source material of American history now contains 664 documents covering the period from *Privileges and Prerogatives Granted to Columbus in 1492* to the *Statements on the Resumption of Nuclear Tests by the U.S. in 1962*. The new book will be available in a one-volume clothbound and a two-volume paperbound edition.

*One-volume clothbound edition*                      about 1312 pages, \$6.50 (tent.)

*Two-volume paperbound edition*                      \$3.25 each (tent.)

READY IN MARCH

### MASTERS OF RUSSIAN MARXISM

By Thornton Anderson, University of Maryland

The only paperbound edition on Russian Marxism, this new book presents an historic account of the intellectual development of Soviet communism. Professor Anderson traces with lucid exposition the growth of political trends among the Russian Marxists from about 1800 to the present. Each chapter contains a detailed essay on the thought of the individual theorist plus selections from his writings that best express his major ideas. Men not currently regarded as orthodox, such as Martov, Trotsky, Bukharin and Kolontai, who were influential in the formation of Russian Marxism, are included. Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev are covered in great detail.

*About 320 pages, paperbound, \$1.95 (tent.)*

# APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## *from Appleton-Century-Crofts*

### FRENCH POLITICS AND ALGERIA

By William G. Andrews, Tufts University

This book provides a comparative case study in the functioning of French governmental systems. From a wealth of documentary material and statistical data, the writer has woven a lucid account of policy in the making. His study demonstrates how the governmental and political institutions of the Fourth and Fifth French republics have functioned in dealing with the rebellion in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. '

*224 pages, paperbound, \$2.35*

### THE REVIVAL OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY

By Neal Riemer, The Pennsylvania State University

In this original work of scholarship, the author analyzes the decline of democratic theory and presents a strong case for its revival. After giving the reasons for the decline, he outlines a scheme for American democracy and provides a framework within which it may operate. Throughout, the underlying definition of political theory is that of the critical study concerned with harmoniously relating the normative, empirical, and prudential components of political science.

*190 pages, paperbound, \$1.95*

### 4th EDITION

### BASIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

By Hillman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel,  
both of The City College of New York

Extensively revised, the fourth edition of this collection of readings on American democracy has been expanded to include such current topics as the lawfulness of the desegregation decisions, the fundamental premises and applications of the Loyalty-Security Program, the demand for a more responsible two-party system, the political implications of the development of atomic weapons and the question of co-existence.

*528 pages, paperbound, \$2.95*

**34 West 33rd Street, New York 1, New York**  
**Division of Meredith Publishing Company**



*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

~~~~~

**The Galleon Series in Economics, History, Philosophy and  
Political Science**

~~~~~

*Just Out*

**CANADA VOTES: Howard A. Scarrow**

A handbook of Federal and Provincial Election data.

**\$12.00**  
LC 62-14822

**THE CONFLICT SOCIETY: Reaction and Revolution in  
Latin America**

By **KALMAN H. SILVERT, Tulane University**

*The Conflict Society* attempts to breathe order into the complex events  
of social change in today's Latin America.

**\$7.50**  
LC 61-12686

**THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS, A British View:**

**The Journal of Major C. R. FORREST**

Hugh F. Rankin, Editor

**\$2.00**  
LC 61-13685

*Recent Publications*

**EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA, By G. V. LA FOREST**

A comprehensive treatment of Canadian law and practice in interna-  
tional and inter-Commonwealth extradition.

**\$6.50**  
LC 61-7029

**THE CATHOLIC VOTE, By JOHN H. FENTON**

"This competent study is written without bias, and constitutes a reliable  
exposition of a problem of great topicality at the present time."  
*The Book Exchange* (London)

**\$4.75**  
LC 60-12512

**U. S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND**

**INTERNATIONAL LAW, By ROBERT R. WILSON**

". . . an authoritative contribution to the literature on treaty law . . ."  
*American Political Science Review*

**\$6.50**  
LC 60-11021

**CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS, By CARL BECK**

"A masterful organization of material . . . essential for any law library  
with pretention to adequacy." *Law Library Journal*

**\$4.50**  
LC 59-15941

Wartime Origins of the East-West

**DILEMMA OVER GERMANY, By JOHN L. SNELL**

"His account of the development of United States policy is the fullest  
and most painstaking currently available." *Journal of Politics*

**\$7.00**  
LC 59-12404

**POLITICS IN THE BORDER STATES, By JOHN H. FENTON**

". . . excellent example of the combination of historical, statistical, and  
interviewing techniques in the study of state politics." *Public Admin-  
istration Review*

**\$5.50**  
LC 58-16327

*Once Again Available*

*A Distinguished Text*

**AN INTRODUCTION TO**

**PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY, By JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN**

**\$7.00**

**THE HAUSER PRESS**

720 POYDRAS ST.  
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# **NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FIRST NAME IN QUALITY PAPERBACK PUBLISHING DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS**

## **AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS TODAY:**

### **Studies of the Problems Beyond Segregation**

*Edited by Earl Raab.* Ten timely essays and case studies probing the "new frontiers" of race relations—dealing with factors *other than discrimination*. Contributors include S. M. Lipset, Morton Grodzins, Nathan Glazer, Joseph Himes, James B. Conant. A318. 95¢

## **DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE**

*By Herman M. Somers & Anne R. Somers.* An objective study of current developments in private medical care in the U.S.—the changing character of medical practice, new patterns of illness, the problem of insurance plans, and the doctor-patient relationship. A309

\$1.95 *Index, charts, tables*

## **A HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR (Revised Edition)**

*By John Lukacs.* Professor Lukacs traces the development of the social, political, and national conflicts between Russia and the U.S., and in this light, examines the major events of the Cold War—now updated to 1962. "This book is brilliant."—C. L. Sulzberger. A322 \$1.45

## **THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA:**

### **From Independence to the Civil War**

*Edited by Perry Miller.* The distinguished editor of *The American Puritans* (A80) and *The American Transcendentalists* (A119) has anthologized the documents and speeches that reveal the shaping of American legal thought from post-Revolutionary chaos to democratic order. An Anchor Original. A313 \$1.45

## **THE QUEST FOR UTOPIA**

*Edited by Glenn Negley and J. Max Patrick.* The major portions of more than 25 Utopias, many now inaccessible, but all important and influential. This history emphasizes the importance of Utopian thought as a mirror of social development from 900 B.C. to the present. A326 \$1.95

## **TODAY'S LATIN AMERICA**

*By Robert J. Alexander.* A broad and sober view of Latin America's current problems and future potentialities in terms of government, politics, society, education, culture, the military, the Church, and world relations. An Anchor Original. A327 95¢

## **FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES**

*As recorded in talks with Dr. Harlan B. Phillips.* The eminent jurist presents the raw material of history itself. From his youth as an immigrant in New York City to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter registers vivid impressions of pivotal events and personalities from TR to FDR. A310 \$1.45

## **SOCIETY IN AMERICA**

*By Harriet Martineau; edited, abridged, with an introductory essay by Seymour Martin Lipset.* One of the most famous—and perceptive—of the 19th century foreign-traveler accounts of America, which has been out of print for many years. In abridging the 800-page original, Lipset has concentrated on the sections most pertinent today, notably Martineau's shrewd analysis of the factors that make up the "American character." A302 \$1.25

**AT ALL  
BOOKSELLERS**



**DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS**

Garden City, New York

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



## THE STATE UNIVERSITIES AND DEMOCRACY

By ALLAN NEVINS

The distinguished historian traces the history of the state universities and land-grant colleges and analyzes their current status and problems in terms of the needs, demands, and aspirations of democracy in this timely and important book. ". . . will fascinate and cheer those to whom today's challenges seem insurmountable."—*Washington Post*. 171 pages. \$2.95.

## THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

By DAVID N. FARNSWORTH

The committee's powerful role in Congress is clearly illustrated in this analysis of its membership, procedures, and staff. Examples disclose how the committee handles nominations, treaties, foreign aid, investigations, and policy debates. Particularly revealing is the role of hearings in these matters. 189 pages. \$4.00.

## OUTLAWING THE SPOILS

A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883

By ARI HOOGENBOOM

Here is a new evaluation and interpretation of the civil service reform movement and its leaders. ". . . provides us with the basis for a better understanding of the antecedents of the bureaucracy in our governmental system today."—*The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. "This book will easily be the standard work on the subject."—*Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. 306 pages. \$6.50.

## THE EARLY DRAFT OF JOHN STUART MILL'S "AUTOBIOGRAPHY"

Edited by JACK STILLINGER

Published here in full for the first time is the early or original draft of Mill's *Autobiography*, revealing new facts about Mill's life and providing additional insight into his complex personality. It contains a complete and publishable account, as Mill then would have given it, of his life up to his marriage in 1851. 218 pages. \$5.50.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS, URBANA, ILLINOIS


Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

# SMUTS

## THE SANGUINE YEARS

1870-1919

BY W. K. HANCOCK



Smuts stands with his friends Churchill and Gandhi in the front rank of world statesmen. Until the late 1940's the Union of South Africa bore his stamp; the British Commonwealth still bears it. International relations, first in the League and later in the United Nations, are saturated with his ideas. His view of the universe and man's place in it is shared by many. To understand Smuts, then, is to understand much about the hopes, fears, and facts of the modern world.

This first book of a two-part biography deals with the first fifty years of Smuts's life. It shows him as a student, a young attorney, a general, a rising statesman, and

finally as Prime Minister of South Africa. Smuts's position and problems at Vereeniging; his determined quest for answers to the Briton-Boer feud; the private and public turmoils of his struggle with Gandhi; his growing despair as he saw the Treaty of Versailles take shape, 'not as a peace treaty but a war treaty': all these are acutely portrayed.

Sir Keith Hancock knows his subject. Since Smuts's death in 1950 he has directed the assembly of the *Smuts Archive*, a vast store of letters, diaries, papers and manuscripts. Here he uses this material to draw a remarkable portrait of a remarkable man.

*At all booksellers \$10.00*

*Cambridge University Press, 32 East 57th St., New York 22, N. Y.*

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

---

## Chandler Studies in International and Intercultural Relations

THREE NEW STUDIES of Communist foreign policy and a revision of *Propaganda and International Relations* have just been published in this series.

**SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN WORLD AFFAIRS**, compiled and edited by DeVere E. Pentony, San Francisco State College, presents 10 documents and 20 articles chosen to illuminate trends in Communist theory relevant to international conduct, different methods of analyzing Soviet behavior in world affairs, and reports and analyses of recent strategies in diplomacy, economic affairs, military activities, and psychological offensives. 320 pages, paper, \$2.75

**CHINA, THE EMERGING RED GIANT**, compiled and edited by DeVere E. Pentony, contains 11 documents and 15 articles organized under three main headings. Part I provides a brief survey of the ideological, geographical, and historical bases of Chinese foreign policy. Part II offers several different styles of analysis of Chinese behavior by leading Western experts. The concluding section presents ranges of strategy in diplomacy, conventional and unconventional warfare, foreign aid and trade, and psychological tactics. 272 pages, paper, \$2.75

**RED WORLD IN TUMULT**, compiled and edited by DeVere E. Pentony, provides the reader with 9 documents and 18 articles dealing with problems of internal relationships within the Communist Bloc. The main section of the book consists of examinations of Sino-Soviet relations and their significance for the West. Another substantial section presents analyses of the program of international communism in the uncommitted and underdeveloped areas. The conclusion contains speculative articles about the kind of world the Communists hope to shape. 311 pages, paper, \$2.75

**PROPAGANDA AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Revised and Enlarged**, compiled and edited by Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., San Francisco State College, has almost doubled in size, primarily because of the use of two case studies. Major sections are: Nature and Role of Propaganda in International Relations; Propaganda Agencies of the Superpowers; Propaganda Activities of the Superpowers; Proposals for Government Action on the Psychological Front; Cessation of Nuclear Testing—A Case Study in Propaganda of the *Word*; The Peace Corps—A Case Study in Propaganda of the *Deed*. 256 pages, paper, \$2.25

*Other titles in this series:*

<b>NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS: Revised—Whitaker</b>	\$1.95
<b>NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MISSILES, AND FUTURE WARS—McClelland</b>	\$1.75
<b>THE UNDERDEVELOPED LANDS—Pentony</b>	\$1.50
<b>UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID—Pentony</b>	\$1.25
<b>THE UNITED NATIONS—McClelland</b>	\$1.50
<b>DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—Whitaker</b>	\$1.75

---

**FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A Comparative Approach**, By Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott. Please see Professor Guetzkow's review elsewhere in this issue. 324 pages, cloth, \$6.00

*Orders totaling less than \$10.00 must be accompanied by payment. Teachers are invited to write for examination copies. Please include 15¢ per book to help defray costs of shipping and handling.*



**CHANDLER PUBLISHING COMPANY**

604 Mission Street, San Francisco 5

---

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

---

## Leading Decisions of the United States Supreme Court

Editorial Consultant: CHARLES AIKIN

Editor for Political Science: VICTOR JONES

TEACHERS IN MORE than 200 institutions are using this new series in their courses this year. Pertinent decisions, individually bound, enrich a wide variety of courses in the social sciences. The following decisions are available at a cost of 25¢ each.

<b>Baker v. Carr*</b>	<b>Marbury v. Madison</b>
<b>Barenblatt v. U.S.</b>	<b>Mo. v. Holland</b>
<b>Brown v. Bd. of Educ.</b>	<b>Myers v. U.S.*</b>
<b>Chambers v. Fla.</b>	<b>Near v. Minn.</b>
<b>Dennis v. U.S.*</b>	<b>NLRB v. Jones &amp; Laughlin</b>
<b>Everson v. Bd. of Ed.</b>	<b>Pa. v. Nelson</b>
<b>Gallagher v. Crown Kosh Market*</b>	<b>Plessy v. Ferguson</b>
<b>Gibbons v. Ogden</b>	<b>Schenck v. U.S.</b>
<b>Gitlow v. N.Y.</b>	<b>Smith v. Allwright</b>
<b>Henry v. U.S.</b>	<b>Times Film Corp. v. Chicago</b>
<b>Humphrey's Exec. v. U.S.</b>	<b>U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright</b>
<b>Jencks v. U.S.</b>	<b>U.S. v. Darby Lumber</b>
<b>Lochner v. N.Y.</b>	<b>Watkins v. U.S.</b>
<b>McCullum v. Bd. of Ed.</b>	<b>W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette</b>
<b>McCulloch v. Md.</b>	<b>Yates v. U.S.</b>
<b>Mapp v. Ohio</b>	<b>Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube v. Sawyer*</b>

\* Abridged.

*Examination copies are not available. Orders totaling less than \$10.00 must be accompanied by payment. Chandler will collate sets ordered for your courses through your bookstore.*

**THE NEGRO VOTES**, edited by Charles Aikin, University of California, Berkeley. The right to vote is the most precious of all rights. This book presents 11 major determinations by the Supreme Court concerning the Negro's constitutional right to vote with full texts of the following decisions: *Guinn v. U.S.*, *Lane v. Wilson*, *Nixon v. Herndon*, *Nixon v. Condon*, *Grovey v. Townsend*, *Smith v. Allwright*, *U.S. v. Classic*, *Colegrove v. Green*, *South v. Peters*, *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, *Baker v. Carr*.

384 pages, paper, \$2.50



**CHANDLER PUBLISHING COMPANY**

604 Mission Street, San Francisco 5

---

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



# Politics Among Nations

*The Struggle for Power and Peace*

*Third Edition, Revised*

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *The University of Chicago*

... the one indispensable work for the student of virtually any area of international relations and organization and on any level of scholarship. As always, Morgenthau's style is a pleasure to read.

—Gordon J. Schochet, *University of Minnesota*

660 pages; 5 maps; \$7.50 text

# Peace Theory

*Preconditions of Disarmament*

by JOHN W. BURTON, *Australian National University*

In this exciting new book the former Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs makes an important contribution to the study of international relations. Accepting the principle of conflict as an inevitable component in world politics, he proceeds in behaviorist terms to analyze the S/R relationship and to delineate those policies by which peace can be maintained. Illustrating his argument from the rich background of his own career as practical diplomat and statesman, he has given us an excellent text for advanced courses in international politics.

1962; 225 pages; \$4.00 text

# Introduction to Government

*Third Edition, Revised*

by ROBERT RIENOW, *State University of New York, Albany*

A clear, up-to-date introduction to American government approached through a comparative analysis of the major world powers.

Spring 1963

ALFRED A. KNOFF, *Publisher*

College Department

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers





# Public Opinion and American Democracy

by V. O. KEY, JR., *Harvard University*

An excellent analysis of the implications for political theory of public opinion poll findings. A most penetrating study. —Harwood L. Childs, *Princeton University*

599 pages; graphs & charts; \$7.50 *text*

# Public Administration

by HERBERT A. SIMON, *Carnegie Institute of Technology*  
and DONALD W. SMITHBURG and VICTOR A. THOMPSON  
*both of the Illinois Institute of Technology*

Specifically designed to present the realities of administration, this text stresses the interplay between the formal organizational structure and the informal human relationships so important in the functioning of an administrative organization.

616 pages; \$6.00 *text*

## VINTAGE CARAVELLE EDITIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

*Paperbacks*

DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW by Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence C. Ferguson, Jr., \$1.95

THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET, *An Analysis in the Period from Wilson to Eisenhower* by Richard F. Fenno, Jr., \$1.95

THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, *A Study of a Crisis in American Power Politics* by Robert H. Jackson, \$1.95

SOUTHERN POLITICS *In State and Nation* by V. O. Key, Jr., \$2.95

U. S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD by Donald R. Matthews, \$1.95

ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW *Edited by Robert G. McClosky*, \$1.95

ALFRED A. KNOPE, *Publisher*

College Department

501 Madison Avenue

New York 22

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

**THE SICKLE UNDER THE HAMMER: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule**

**By Oliver Henry Radkey**

Bringing to a conclusion a definitive study of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, this work goes far to explain the paradox of the seizure and retention of power in a primarily peasant, rural land by the Bolsheviks, a proletarian, urban party. Written in a vigorous style, this authoritatively documented volume rounds out a major contribution to modern Russian history.

*January 21*

*544 pages*

*\$9.75*

**UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, Second Edition**

**By John A. Armstrong**

First published in 1955, this revised edition of Professor Armstrong's greatly respected work analytically examines the Ukrainian nationalist movement from World War II through the postwar years to the present. The author has brought up-to-date a story dramatic in its own right and one which affords the reader a unique view into the Soviet Union.

*January 21*

*336 pages*

*\$7.50*

**THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND**

**By Herbert H. Kaplan**

The first book-length study of the first partition of Poland to appear in a century, this work is a fascinating assessment of the complex and subtle diplomacy of eighteenth-century Europe. An extensive bibliography draws heavily upon archival and primary material, much of which has been unavailable in English until now.

*240 pages*

*\$5.00*

**POPULAR EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT IN AMERICA**

**By Rush Welter**

In this challenging reappraisal of our traditional belief in universal education Professor Welter traces the political aspects of American educational theory. He argues that the campaign for education at public expense eventuated in a social theory that equated democracy with minimal government and maximal education, and that writers of every political persuasion have relied upon forms of education to serve their political and social purposes.

*488 pages*

*\$8.50*



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS / 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## Politics in the 20th Century

Volume I: The Decline of Democratic Politics

Volume II: The Impasse of American Foreign Policy

Volume III: The Restoration of American Politics

*By Hans J. Morgenthau.* In this collection of outstanding essays, the author, one of the leading creative political thinkers of our day, discusses the major problems which have beset us in modern times. Set \$25.00

## Ignatius Donnelly

THE PORTRAIT OF A POLITICIAN

*By Martin Ridge.* The functions and maladies of the American body politic in the latter half of the nineteenth century are woven into this biography of one of the Midwest's most important political and intellectual leaders. In presenting the definitive portrait of the "Sage of Nininger," Mr. Ridge rescues Donnelly from bizarre legend. *Illus.* \$7.95

## The Politics of Scarcity

PUBLIC PRESSURE AND POLITICAL RESPONSE IN INDIA

*By Myron Weiner.* "... a significant and central contribution to political science studies concerning India, balanced, lucid, and addressed to issues of relevance in the study of all transitional societies."—Selig S. Harrison. "... one of the most systematic and careful examinations of the evolving structure of interest groups and their methods of applying political pressure that has yet been produced for an developing country."—Howard Wriggins. \$5.00

## Capital Punishment and British Politics

*By James B. Christoph.* The inflammatory issue of capital punishment and the events leading up to the Homicide Act of 1957 are here used to examine the workings of British political decision-making. Mr. Christoph evaluates the nature of leadership in government, parliamentary tactics, party responsibility, the role of the backbencher, and the place of pressure groups. \$4.00

through your bookseller, or

**UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS**

Chicago 37, Illinois

In Canada: The University of Toronto Press

## American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty and Other Essays

by Samuel Flagg Bemis

Gathered together in this volume are seventeen essays on American foreign policy and diplomacy selected from the many written by Samuel Flagg Bemis over the last fifty years. In all of the essays, which range over the whole span of American history, Mr. Bemis displays the careful research, imaginative reconstruction of events, and shrewd interpretation of individual and national motives that have made him one of America's foremost historians:

\$10.00

## The Sovereign Prerogative

•*The Supreme Court and the Quest for Law*

by Eugene V. Rostow

This group of essays by the Dean of the Yale Law School states a theory of law and a policy for judicial action, and applies them to the work of the Supreme Court, criticizing some of its decisions, upholding others. Dean Rostow's point of view is that of American legal realism, oriented toward a jurisprudence of ethical values—an approach to law vigorously developed at the Yale Law School in recent years. *"With grace and power, and from high ground, Dean Rostow illuminates the role of the judiciary in maintaining a constitutional democracy. The book brings a much-needed philosophic perspective to the current and recurring controversies over the performance of our Supreme Court."*—Paul A. Freund, Harvard Law School.

\$6.00

## The Theory of Political Coalitions

by William H. Riker

*"I am convinced,"* this author writes, *"that political science, lacking any sort of positive theory, is in a dead end of describing institutions, collecting isolated facts, and occasionally verifying a descriptive hypothesis. My hope is that this book and others like it will gradually provide political science with a body of theory comparable to that of economics, and thus impart a more disciplined tone to the whole field."* In what will no doubt be a controversial book, Mr. Riker uses a mathematical formulation—the theory of *n*-person games—to develop a theory of coalitions that can be applied to politics. He works out a dynamic model of coalition-formation and—in a bold and fascinating, though sobering final chapter—applies it to world politics to predict the future course of Soviet-American relations.

\$6.00



Yale University Press  
New Haven and London

An important new casebook in the area of Church-State relations  
with features that make it perfect as a text or reference

## CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN LAW

### Cases and Materials

Edited by John J. McGrath, LL.B., J.C.D.

*Member of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court and Associate Professor of Civil and Comparative Law at The Catholic University of America*

- Contains all the precedent-setting cases on Church-State relations of the various courts from the early days of our nation through the most recent decisions of the last term of court.
  - Cited cases cover the entire field of Church-State relations including: acts of churches as such; the public purpose activities of churches; use of public school facilities for religious purposes; religious education in a pluralistic society.
  - Notes are given following each reported case which cite other cases and pertinent law review articles—over two hundred cases and two hundred articles are cited.
  - Includes a section of historical documents: the earliest constitutions of the thirteen founding states, the "Remonstrance" of Madison, Jefferson's "Bill for Religious Freedom"—27 such documents in all.
  - Final case is the recent Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional the prayer approved by the New York State Board of Regents.
- Not just a one-time project, this unique volume comes with a special pocket suitable for inserting additional pertinent cases as they are made available: \$7.00

At your bookstore

**THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY**

1512 Bruce Bldg., Milwaukee 1, Wisconsin

## THE WINDS OF FREEDOM

*Selections from the Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State*

**DEAN RUSK**

Edited and with an introduction by Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary and distinguished writer on foreign affairs. Secretary Rusk's speeches and statements (January 1961-August 1962) are here expertly organized to present the attitudes, goals and strategy of the State Department in specific areas of foreign policy; foreign aid, Cuba, Berlin, world trade, NATO, SEATO, and many issues of crucial importance are discussed. This book is indispensable for understanding the position of the Kennedy administration on intricate world problems and for its perceptive, carefully articulated analysis of the nature of the world struggle.

Hardbound, \$4.95; Paper, \$2.45; at all bookstores

**BEACON PRESS**

25 Beacon Street Boston 8, Mass.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

Princeton

UNIVERSITY PRESS



## Research on Family Planning

Edited by Clyde V. Kiser

This volume describes and evaluates the current state of research and examines the likelihood of future progress in family planning. It discusses programs investigating attitudes toward family planning, effectiveness of specific birth control devices and techniques, and efficiency of areawide education and action. Particular attention is given to the problems of the developing areas and the difficulties of motivating the peoples of these countries to learn about, accept, and practice family planning. 700 pages. Charts, tables. \$12.50

## The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States

By Fritz Machlup

Investigating education, research and development, communications media, information machines, and information services, the author describes the allocation of human, fiscal, and natural resources in knowledge-production. The output of each field is evaluated in terms of its productivity and growth, and its contribution to the over-all body of knowledge.

400 pages. \$7.50

## The National Wealth of the United States in the Postwar Period

By Raymond W. Goldsmith

This report contains the only comprehensive, detailed estimates of U.S. national wealth and its components since World War II, showing that our national wealth nearly tripled between 1945 and 1958. The figures expand the author's 1900-1945 estimates, published in his *A Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. III*. This present book also investigates the structure of our national wealth, how it has changed during the postwar period, and how it compares with that of other countries for which similar estimates exist. Published for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 448 pages. Tables, charts, \$12.50

Order from your bookstore, or  
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS  
Princeton, New Jersey

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

**The new POLICY BOOK series  
issued by the  
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**

POLICY BOOKS are planned as essential, compact and authoritative policy analyses of major foreign policy problems, written by leading statesmen and specialists.

**LATIN AMERICA: Diplomacy and Reality**

*By Adolf A. Berle.* The former Assistant Secretary of State, Ambassador to Brazil and Special Assistant to the President brings his own vigorous views to this frank discussion of the problems facing the American Hemisphere: a Communist offensive that already imperils security, and the need for a long term program for the future.

**THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES  
AND THE HEMISPHERE CRISIS**

*By John C. Dreier.* A trenchant clarification of the Inter-American System and its active agent, the O.A.S.—what it is, what it is not, and what its future may be. Mr. Dreier, for ten years U.S. Ambassador to the O.A.S., makes specific proposals for strengthening the organization to meet its new responsibilities under the Punta del Este agreements.

**THE UNITED NATIONS: Structure for Peace**

*By Ernest A. Gross.* "An important book . . . The conclusions of a jurist and the vision of a statesman . . . The advantage that Mr. Gross has enjoyed as United States Representative to the United Nations . . . is reflected in the clarity with which he describes the varied activities of its organs . . . weaving a new pattern of history."—JAMES T. SHOTWELL, *Saturday Review*

POLICY BOOKS are available in hardcover at \$2.95 — in paperback at \$1.25

*Also —*

**THE LONG POLAR WATCH: Canada  
and the Defense of North America**

*By Melvin Conant.* The interweaving of Canadian and U.S. defense facilities against the Soviet threat—an evaluation of Canada's contribution, her new burdens, and possible steps that could make a more effective defense partnership.

\$5.00


**SPEARHEADS OF DEMOCRACY  
Labor in the Developing Countries**

*By George C. Lodge, former Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs.* Labor unions are at once a prime target for Communist penetration and a bulwark against it. A frank criticism of the past performance of the U.S. government, American labor, and American business abroad in this important area, with concrete proposals for improvement.

\$4.50

*Published by Harper & Row for the*

**COUNCIL ON**  
58 EAST 68TH



**FOREIGN RELATIONS**  
STREET NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

# **POLITICAL SCIENCE BOOKS**

## **BASED ON THE LATEST RESEARCH**

### **THE AMERICAN POLITY: A Social and Cultural Interpretation**

*By William C. Mitchell, University of Oregon*

In this revolutionary approach to introductory American government, the author combines structural-functional analysis with up-to-date empirical data to paint an accurate portrait of our political system in *all* its dimensions.

His examination of the organic relationship of politics to American life covers the nature of national life and political culture, the major phases of the political process, and the historical evolution of political structure and power patterns.

**\$10.00**

### **PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS**

*Edited by William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser, both of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University*

The data on which this collection of pages is based are the results of five regional studies of the midterm Congressional elections of 1950. Twelve papers are organized according to three central problems in the study of public opinion and attitude formation: analytic reduction, synthetic aggregation, and substantive prediction.

Among the articles: "A Reformulation of the 'Coattails' Problem," "The Independent Voter," "A Model for Analyzing Voting Systems," and "The Prediction of Turnout."

**\$6.00**

### **TO CHANGE A NATION: Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China**

*By Franklin W. Houn, University of Nebraska*

"Relying almost entirely on Chinese news reports and other official sources, Dr. Houn has produced a most comprehensive survey and estimate of Chinese Communist operations in the field of mass propaganda and indoctrination. . . . The result is a well-organized, well-documented volume . . . useful conclusions concerning the role of the intellectual class in Communist China and the effects of Chinese Communist policies on the present capabilities of that class."—*The Western Political Quarterly*

**\$6.50**

### **INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL WELFARE: An Analysis of the System of Social Security and Social Welfare in France**

*By Walter A. Friedlander, University of California (Berkeley)*

The problem of balancing the democratic principle of individual freedom and the economic needs of industrial society is illuminated in this book. In particular, the author scrutinizes the interrelationships among social welfare programs, political structure, and ideological development. This work is a valuable addition to the study of comparative government and international relations.

**\$6.75**



**THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE**

A Division of The Macmillan Company  
60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



## MASTERS OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

Volume I:

**PLATO TO MACHIAVELLI** Edited by Michael B. Foster  
302 pages 1941 \$4.50

Volume II:

**MACHIAVELLI TO BENTHAM** Edited by William T. Jones  
388 pages 1946 \$5.25

Volume III:

**HEGEL TO DEWEY** Edited by Lane W. Lancaster  
372 pages 1959 \$4.75

*The three volumes of Masters of Political Thought  
will be available in paper covers during 1963.*

## POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Readings in Political Science

**Edited by Howard D. Hamilton**

Contains 117 journal articles, documents, and essays spanning the time from Aristotle to the nuclear tests and selected for their intrinsic merit as well as for their illumination of the basic institutions, processes, and functions of government. A chart correlates the readings with major basic texts.

359 pages paperbound 1962 \$3.75

## THE BALANCE OF POWER AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

A Book of Readings

**Edited by Frederick H. Gareau**

Fourteen excerpts on the balance of power and eight selections on the newer doctrine range from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to J. B. Priestley. Includes a 20-page Introduction, bibliography, and short index.

216 pages paperbound 1962 \$1.95



# Houghton Mifflin Company

BOSTON · NEW YORK · ATLANTA · GENEVA, ILL. · DALLAS · PALO ALTO

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

# *current*

A monthly magazine for the concerned citizen bringing together in one place the significant new material from all sources on the frontier problems of today

Leo Cherne, Executive Director

John W. Gardner, President

Chester Bowles

Paul G. Hoffman, Managing Director  
United Nations Special Fund

"Current is indispensable to a busy man who is interested in the very newest writing about society and its problems."

**current** 905 Madison Avenue, New York 21, N. Y.

Please enter my subscription to Current at the special rate for students and faculty of \$5. (Regular subscription \$8.) I shall receive a full year of Current (12 issues). My payment (\$5.) is enclosed.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ Zone \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_

School Affiliation \_\_\_\_\_

I am not eligible for the Educational Rate; please enter my subscription at the Introductory Rate of \$7. for one year. (Regular Rate \$8.) My payment is enclosed.

P-2

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

## OXFORD BOOKS

### OF EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST

---

#### PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA

*A Contemporary Survey*

By BRIAN ESSAI. This descriptive and interpretive account of the Australian-administered half of New Guinea is of timely significance in view of recent newspaper headlines on the ending of Dutch rule in the other half of the island. Written to fill a gap caused by the absence of a modern, unified, and complete book on the subject, this is the first one-volume survey of the territory, its people, and its present and future development. *16 half-tone plates.* \$4.90

#### CASE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION

By J. E. MEADE, H. H. LIESNER, and S. J. WELLS. Based on a study of the three long-established European economic unions—Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, Benelux, and the European Coal and Steel Community—this book tries to answer such questions as: can commercial unions be built without a unification of national tax policies and wage rates? can a partial union covering only some commodities work effectively if it does not cover other closely related activities? (*Royal Institute of International Affairs*) \$6.10

#### THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM, HOBBS TO LOCKE

By C. B. MACPHERSON. This volume examines the social assumptions contained in the seventeenth-century political theories of Hobbes, the Levellers, Harrington, Locke, and others. The author shows that seventeenth-century social assumptions (which he calls "possessive individualism") are indispensable for a liberal market society but unsuited to a liberal democratic state. \$6.75

#### THE TANGANYIKA WAY

By SOPHIA MUSTAFA. Foreword by JULIUS NYERERE. Mrs. Sophia Mustafa is an Indian married to an African. She is a member of the Tanganyikan Legislative Assembly. This is her personal account of how Tanganyika achieved independence. \$1.70

*At all bookstores*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

**New York 16**

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

*from* RANDOM

PATTERNS *of* GOVERNMENT

*The Major Political Systems of Europe*

REVISED EDITION

by SAMUEL BEER, ADAM B. ULAM, and NICHOLAS WAHL  
all of *Harvard University*

HARRY ECKSTEIN  
*Princeton University*

HERBERT J. SPIRO  
*Amherst College*

This distinguished text, used in comparative government courses throughout the country since first published in 1958, examines the governments and politics of four major world powers—Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union—against the general background of their respective political cultures. The authors, each a well-known authority in his field, have incorporated the latest significant developments in this second, revised and expanded, edition.

1962; 832 pages; 18 tables and figures; \$7.95 text

PEOPLE, POWER, *and* POLITICS

*An Introductory Reader*

by LYMAN G. GOULD and E. WILLIAM STEELE  
*both of the University of Vermont*

Excellentlly conceived; well executed . . .

—J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*

725 pages; paperbound; \$3.95 text

POWER, FREEDOM, *and* DIPLOMACY

*The Foreign Policy of the United States of America*

by PAUL SEABURY  
*University of California*

This important new textbook explores thoroughly the nature and meaning of contemporary foreign policy, its purposes, processes, and prospects, and considers the implications for foreign policy of an influential free society such as our own, set against the background of a dangerous, hostile international environment.

Spring 1963; about 450 pages; about \$6.00 text

RANDOM HOUSE • *The College Department* •

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers



# HOUSE

## STATE *and* LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

REVISED EDITION

by ROBERT S. BABCOCK

*University of Vermont*

... highly recommended as a textbook for students in State and Local Government.

—JOSEPH PLANINSIC, *Duquesne University*

1962; 500 pages; \$5.75 text

## POWER *and* INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

*University of Michigan*

In this decisive, systematic examination, an eminent political scientist presents a comparative analysis and evaluation of the three foremost theoretical approaches—balance of power, collective security, and world government—to the creation and control of a stable world order.

Winter 1962; 320 pages; \$4.50 text

## ELEMENTS *of* GOVERNMENT

*An Introduction to Political Science*

by THOMAS R. ADAM

*New York University*

... A judicious synthesis of the descriptive, historical, philosophical, and comparative approaches, it meets a variety of needs and meets them better than competing texts. A splendid piece of scholarship.

—FRANCIS WILHOIT, *University of Miami*

478 pages; \$6.75 text

## COURTS, JUDGES, *and* POLITICS

*An Introduction to the Judicial Process*

by WALTER F. MURPHY and C. HERMAN PRITCHETT

*Princeton University*

*University of Chicago*

... an excellent introduction to the complex but absorbing role of courts and especially of the Supreme Court in our system of government.

—LEO WEINSTEIN, *Smith College*

740 pages; \$6.75 text

501 Madison Avenue • New York 22 • New York

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

Eyck, Caves, Sylos-Labini, Schmidt

## ***A History of the Weimar Republic***

**VOLUME I: FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE EMPIRE  
TO HINDENBURG'S ELECTION**

*By Erich Eyck.* This is the first English translation of Eyck's famous history of the Weimar Republic. Men who supported the Republic—Ebert, Rathenau, Stresemann—and their opponents, advocates of nationalistic totalitarianism—Papen, Hugenberg, Schleicher, Hindenburg, Hitler—are discussed and evaluated. German history in domestic and international contexts is analyzed—to the death of President Ebert, with which the first volume ends.

\$10.00

## ***Air Transporters and Its Regulators***

**AN INDUSTRY STUDY**

*By Richard E. Caves.* Mr. Caves analyzes the market structure, conduct and performance of the United States domestic passenger lines and shows that the airline industry has structural characteristics that would ensure market results of reasonable quality with less extensive economic regulations.

\$10.00

## ***The Law of Labour Relations in Sweden***

*By Folke Schmidt.* Sweden's "middle way" in labor relations has meant a balance between employer and union in a context of free enterprise. Mr. Schmidt examines the history of the Swedish development and analyzes its basic implementation—as in the role of the Labour Court.

\$4.25

## ***Oligopoly and Technical Progress***

*By Paolo Sylos-Labini.* The author believes that mainly as a consequence of industrial concentration the modern structure of production in advanced countries differs significantly from that of the past century. In industrial markets concentrated and differentiated oligopoly has taken the place of quasi-competitive conditions. *Harvard Economic Studies.*

\$4.75

**H**ARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

**William C. Havard**  
**Loren P. Beth**

**THE POLITICS  
OF MIS-REPRESENTATION**

*Rural-Urban Conflict in the Florida Legislature.* The most comprehensive book yet published on the power structure of a state legislature. A scholarly analysis of formal institutions is brilliantly combined with a practical analysis of actual political relationships, based on numerous interviews and on-the-scene observation. \$5.00

**Burl Noggle**

**TEAPOT DOME**

*Oil and Politics in the 1920's.* The first comprehensive scholarly account of the greatest political scandal in American history. "A judicious and objective study—a splendid piece of work in every way."—FRANK FREIDEL \$6.00

**Hans A. Schmitt**

**THE PATH TO  
EUROPEAN UNION**

*From the Marshall Plan to the Common Market.* The complete story of the fast-moving economic and political developments in Western Europe since World War II, based on first-hand research and extended interviews with the major protagonists. \$6.00

**Frederick Schuman**

**THE COLD WAR  
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT**

"Dr. Schuman has shown his habitual courage by analyzing a desperately difficult problem instead of offering to eat a Russian alive . . . it will, I hope and pray, be widely read."—STRINGFELLOW BARR, *Saturday Review* \$3.50

**Richard F. Staar**

**POLAND, 1944-1962**

*The Sovietization of a Captive People.* This profile of contemporary Poland presents a grim contrast to the image of a rebellious, pro-Western nation which generally prevails in the United States. \$7.50

*From your bookseller, or*

**LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS      Baton Rouge**

**BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY**  
of  
**THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION**

FOURTH EDITION, 1961

Edited by FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE  
*University of Maryland*

- The latest biographical material on all individual members of the Association, including degrees, academic and non-academic careers, publications and fields of interest.
- Two listings of members—one alphabetically, one geographically.
- Members classified into fields of primary interest.
- Concise format for easy reference.
- Descriptive and background material about the Association.

\*Clothbound: \$12.50

Paperbound: \$10.00

Orders should be sent to:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington 6, D.C.

**THE ANNALS** of The American Academy of  
Political and Social Science

---

**A** BI-MONTHLY journal devoted to the discussion of political, social, and economic problems. Presents a symposium on the development of conservatism and liberalism in relation to American contemporary political issues as the *November 1962* issue.

***Conservatism, Liberalism, and National Issues***

Edited by DR. LEE S. GREENE, Professor of Political Science,  
University of Tennessee

- Nature and Origin of Development
- Relationship to National Issues
- International Affairs

For full information write to:  
3937 Chestnut St.  
Philadelphia 4, Pa.

Single Copies  
Nonmembers \$2.00  
Members \$1.50

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*



**Stephen T. Early, Jr.**  
**AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

Written by Professor Stephen T. Early, Jr., of DePauw University, this basic text will be suitable for a full semester's course in American government or political science. In addition to presenting a full treatment of the events which led to the adoption of the Constitution, *American National Government* considers modern applications of constitutional powers.

A concise, factual style; abundant use of primary sources; and excellent, annotated bibliographical material are outstanding features of the forthcoming text. The scheduled publication date is January, 1964.

**Carl J. Friedrich**  
**CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT**  
**AND DEMOCRACY**  
**THIRD EDITION**

Planned for publication in January, 1964, the Third Edition of this well-known and widely used text will bring completely up to date its comparative study of American and European experiences in democratic government.

Both new texts will be available from

**GINN AND COMPANY**

College Department  
Back Bay P.O. Box 191  
Boston 17, Massachusetts

New York 11   Chicago 6   Atlanta 5   Dallas 1   Palo Alto   Toronto 16

## MAJOR ASPECTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By **NORMAN J. POWELL** and **DANIEL P. PARKER**, City College of New York. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science*. 442 pages, \$3.95 (paper), \$5.95 (cloth).

A collection of readings covering all major topics in American government, arranged according to the logical and psychological utility of the subject matter. The readings have been taken from many sources, such as periodicals, classic writings, speeches, hearings, reports, polls, Congressional debates, presidential press conferences, television scripts, and speeches and articles published in Britain, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Editorial comments preface each chapter as well as each selection within the chapter. These comments are designed to explain main ideas, to stimulate the reader's interest, and to supplement the readings. Selections have not been chosen to cover both sides of an issue since most issues have many aspects, and citing only two sides would be simplistic. Intended for use in American government and introductory political science courses.

## GOVERNMENTAL MANPOWER FOR TOMORROW'S CITIES

By the **Municipal Manpower Commission**. 201 pages, \$6.95.

This significant study of metropolitan areas in the United States was conducted by the Municipal Manpower Commission, an independent study group sponsored by the Ford Foundation. Its purpose was to study both the specialized personnel needs created by rapid urban growth, and the training of personnel systems necessary to attract and hold adequate numbers of competent people in managerial, technical, scientific and other specialized positions. It is a factual, up-to-date presentation of information vital to city officials, civic leaders, and students of municipal administration.

## TOWARD WORLD ORDER

By **AMRY VANDENBOSCH**, University of Kentucky, and **WILLARD N. HOGAN**, State University College, New Paltz, New York. Available January, 1963.

This complete revision of *THE UNITED NATIONS* provides an explanation of international organization in the context of the modern world political system. A synthesis of descriptive and analytical approaches, book presents both factual information and a critical analysis of problems and issues. It was written for introductory college courses, but is highly recommended for anyone interested in a serious study of the United Nations and other contemporary international organizations.

## CASES ON PARTY ORGANIZATION

By **THE EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS** at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. Edited by **PAUL TILLET**. Available in January, 1963.

This is the first series of Eagleton Cases to be published in collected form. Its seven cases provide a sound beginning for the study of party organization . . . a particularly important, but often neglected, aspect of our political system. Other cases will follow, drawing in part from cases published since the program began in 1958. They provide excellent supplementary material for courses ranging from undergraduate to graduate level.

## POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

By **NORMAN J. G. POUNDS**, Indiana University. *McGraw-Hill Series in Geography*. Available March, 1963.

An analysis and explanation of how and why the earth's surface is divided politically. Using a functional approach, this advanced text examines the state and its function and discusses the bases of political power, internal and external. The last chapter discusses the alleged geographical control on political events. Contains a unique discussion on international rivers, transit rights, straits and sea canals of international significance.

## McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

330 West 42nd Street • New York 36, N.Y.

5  
books  
of  
special  
interest  
to  
you

send  
for  
your  
on-approval  
copies  
now

# Official Approval

This Group Plan of Accidental Death and Specific Loss Insurance is recommended to members of The American Political Science Association after careful study. It was selected as the best of the many plans submitted for this desirable coverage—drawn up and tailored by Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company to our special requirements to meet the indicated needs of our present and future members.

EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK

*Executive Director*

**Turn Page for Details of Plan**



**GROUP ACCIDENT INSURANCE FOR MEMBERS OF  
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION  
AND THEIR FAMILIES**

**YOU CHOOSE THE PLAN  
THAT FITS YOUR NEEDS**

*Available in the following amounts*

	Maximum	Minimum
Member .....	\$200,000	\$10,000
Wife .....	50% of husband's benefit but no more than \$50,000	\$10,000
Each Child .....	\$10,000	(sold in this amount only)

This plan provides cash lump sum benefits for accidental loss of life, limb or sight.

Loss of Life .....	Full Face Amount
Loss of Both Eyes, Both Hands, or Both Feet .....	Full Face Amount
Loss of One Hand and One Foot, One Eye and One Foot or One Eye and One Hand .....	Full Face Amount
Loss of One Hand or One Foot or One Eye .....	One-half Face Amount

**LOW COST—** ONLY **84c** ANNUALLY PER THOUSAND  
FOR EACH INSURED PERSON

**YOU ARE  
ELIGIBLE**

If you are a member of the American Political Science Association and less than 69 years of age.

**DEPENDENT  
ELIGIBILITY**

Eligible dependents shall include the spouse of the member unless legally separated, and any unmarried children *over the age of 13 days and under the age of 19 years.*

**FULL TIME  
STUDENTS**

If an unmarried dependent child has passed his 19th birthday and is a *FULL TIME* student at an accredited college or university, such a child will continue to be an eligible dependent up to his 23rd birthday or the date he ceases to be such a student, whichever date occurs first.

*Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers*

**POLICY  
SURETIES**

24 hour coverage against accidental bodily injuries sustained anywhere in the world while your insurance is in force, except the few listed in the exclusions.

**PERMANENT  
TOTAL  
DISABILITY**

Includes a Permanent Total Disability Benefit, but only for the principal insured to age 65 and provided he is engaged in a gainful occupation on a full-time basis. When injuries do not result in loss of life, limb or sight, but do result in total disability within 100 days of the accident, preventing any gainful work or service for which you are fitted by education, training, or experience for 12 consecutive months, the Full Face Amount will be paid at that time if such disability is determined to be permanent.

**NONSELECTIVE**

Policy will be issued regardless of *Past* or *Present* health.

**SAVINGS**

Substantial savings over individual policy purchases because of group buying power of your Association.

**CONVENIENT**

Policy issued on an annual basis—however, you may apply any time during the policy term.

**AGE  
FEATURE**

Unlike many other plans, the accidental death and dismemberment coverage under this plan does not terminate at age 65 but can be continued until age 70 provided the insured is still a member of the American Political Science Association and the Master Policy has not been terminated.

**STATE  
TAX**

Third party ownership of policy may be executed for tax purposes.

**AIR TRAVEL**

Covers injuries received while traveling as a passenger in (a) any civil aircraft having an airworthiness certificate of other than a limited, restricted, or experimental classification; provided such aircraft is at the time making a flight which is for the sole purpose of transporting passengers or passengers and cargo, or (b) any U. S. Department of Defense aircraft, other than a single engine jet, which is at the time making a flight that is for the principal purpose of transporting passengers or passengers and cargo and not for or in connection with any other operational purpose or any tactical or test purpose.

**EXCLUSIONS  
IMPORTANT**

Suicide, war, or while in the armed services.

**THE POLICY DOES NOT PROVIDE A GRACE PERIOD FOR PAYMENT OF PREMIUM.**

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW when writing to advertisers

**(Please Print)**

6. If you desire insurance for your dependents, please furnish the information requested below:

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Signature of Member \_\_\_\_\_

1144

# **TRENDS OF THOUGHT AND TENDS OF CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLITICS**

## **DOCUMENTS ON EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT**

edited by **Steven Muller**, Cornell University

A one-volume collection of significant documents dealing with the governments of France (5th Republic), Germany, U.S.S.R., and Great Britain. The subject matter is arranged so that the constitutions, political party programs, crucial laws, and election procedures can be readily compared. Much of this important, hard-to-get material has never before been available in English. These readings can be used in beginning or advanced courses. 1962 280 pages \$2.25 paperbound

## **THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

Successor to *International Politics*)

by **Norman J. Padelford**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
**George A. Lincoln**, United States Military Academy

The dislocation of traditional power relationships and swift revolutionary changes in the world today multiply and intensify such problems as economic assistance, foreign trade, defense, and collective security. The authors emphasize the central fact that today's vital decisions must be made in an international context that is *constantly changing*. They offer no set formula for the solutions of these problems, but they do suggest some pragmatic guidelines. 1962 634 pages \$7.50

## **THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED**

by **John C. Livingston** and **Robert G. Thompson**,  
both of Sacramento State College

The authors analyze American democracy—its traditional liberal and conservative theories, and the newer theory of “broker” or “minorities” rule. The book presents opposing points of view fully and fairly—theories and alternatives; controversies, challenges, crises; politics and pressures at home; policies abroad. This basic text provides a critical approach to the study of American government. In preparation.

## **THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Conflicting Interpretations of the Great Issues**

by **Sidney Fine**, University of Michigan

Fourteen basic 20th-century issues are discussed by such eminent historians as Bernard DeVoto, John Morton Blum, Arthur S. Link, and many others. Students are shown both sides of significant questions, such as—who was responsible for the defeat of the League of Nations, Wilson or Lodge? The Yalta Agreements—surrender to Russia or wartime realism? An introduction to each topic supplies necessary background. 1962 470 pages \$3.25 paperbound

**MACMILLAN COMPANY**

60 Fifth Avenue

New York 11, N.Y.

Please mention *THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW* when writing to advertisers

## INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

American Academy of Political and Social Science .....	1138	Harvard University Press .....	1122
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. ....	1114, 1115	The Hauser Press .....	1122
Atherton Press .....	846	Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. ....	1122
The 1963 Atherton Press Political Science Prize .....	1099, 1100	Houghton-Mifflin Company .....	1122
Beacon Press .....	1127	University of Illinois Press .....	1122
Bruce Publishing Company .....	1127	Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ....	1122
Cambridge University Press .....	1119	Louisiana State University Press .....	1122
Chandler Publishing Company .....	1120, 1121	The Macmillan Company ...	1112, 1113
University of Chicago Press .....	1125	McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. ...	1112
Columbia University Press .....	1124	Thomas Nelson & Sons .....	1112
Cornell University Press .....	Cover III	Oxford University Press .....	1110, 1133
Council on Foreign Relations .....	1129	Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. ....	1106
CURRENT .....	1132	Prentice-Hall, Inc. ....	1112
Dorsey Press, Inc. ....	1105	Princeton University Press .....	1112
Doubleday & Company, Inc. ....	1117	Quadrangle Books, Inc. ....	1112
The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. ...	1130	Rand McNally & Company ....	Cover
General Motors Corporation .....	1103	Random House .....	1134, 1135
Ginn & Company .....	1139	Stanford University Press .....	1204
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. ....	1108, 1109	D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. ...	1106
Harper & Row, Publishers .....	Cover II	Yale University Press .....	1112

## ERRATUM

In the September, 1962 *Review*, the advertisement by Harper & Row, Publishers, on the page facing the inside front cover was printed with an error.

The advertisement erroneously stated that the fifth edition of *Public Personnel Administration*, by O. Glenn Stahl, would be "Coming in January" when it was actually due for publication in November, 1962. We now want to stress that the book has been published and is currently available.

The *Review* regrets this error.